Motion for Leave to File and Brief of Amici Curiae Texans for Judicial Election Reform

    % * 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN 
AMERICAN CITIZENS, et al., 

Plaintiffs / Appellees, 

VS. 
No. 90-8014 

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF THE STATE OF TEXAS, et al, 

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Defendants/Appellants. 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMICUS BRIEF   

  

Texans for Judicial Election Reform, together with former Chiéf 

Justices of the Texas Supreme Court Robert W. Calvert, Joe R. Greenhill and 

John L. Hill file this Motion for Leave to file an amicus brief in the above- 

styled and captioned appeal. 

1. Texans for Judicial Election Reform is a non-profit organization 

formed to promote judicial reform measures in the Texas legislature. The 

individually-named amicus parties are retired chief administrative officers 

of the Texas judicial system. Each of these parties has a long-standing 

interest in preserving the independence and accountability of Texas state 

court judges. 

 



  

Respectfully submitted, 

By: pay Ww. Jil 
Russell W. Miller 

State Bar No. 14112300 
LIDDELL, SAPP, ZIVLEY, HILL 

& LABOON, L.L.P. 
3300 Texas Commerce Tower 
Houston, Texas 77002 
Telephone: (713) 226-1200 
Telecopy: (713) 223-3717 

  

ATTORNEY IN CHARGE FOR 
PLAINTIFF, FIRST GIBRALTAR BANK, 
FSB 

Robert W. Calvert 
Texas Bar No. 03671000 
919 Congress Avenue 
Austin, Texas 78701 

(512) 478-2773 

Joe R. Greenhill, Jr. 

Texas Bar No. 00000023 
98 San Jacinto 

Austin, Texas 78701 

(512) 322-2500 

John L. Hill, Jr. 
Texas Bar No. 00000027 
3300 Texas Commerce Tower 
Houston, Texas 77002 
(713) 226-1200 

 



  

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

  

I certify that this 14th day of October, 1991, I sent a copy of the foregoing document by certified mail, return receipt requested, to each of the following: William L. Garrett, Garrett, Thompson & Chang, 8300 Douglas, Suite 800, Dallas, Texas 75226, Rolando Rios, Southwest Voter Registration & Education Project, 201 N. St. Mary's , Suite 521, San Antonio, Texas 78205; Sherrilyn A. Ifill, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 
99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor, New York, New York 10013; Gabrielle K. McDonald, 301 Congress Avenue, Suite 2050, Austin, Texas 78701; Edward B. Cloutman, III, Mullinax, 
Wells, Baab & Cloutman, P.C., 3301 Elm Street, Dallas, Texas 75226-1637; Robert H. Mow, Jr., Hughes & Luce, 2800 Momentum Place, 1717 Main Street, Dallas, Texas 75201; Walter 
L. Irvin, 5787 South Hampton Road, Suite 210, Lock box 122, Dallas, Texas 75232-2255; 
Susan Finkelstein, Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., 201 N. St. Mary's, Suite 600, San Antonio, Texas 78205; Renea Hicks, Special Assistant Attorney General, P. O. Box 12584, Capitol Station, Austin, Texas 78711-2548; Seagal V. Wheatley, Oppenheimer, Rosenberg, Kelleher 
& Wheatley, Inc, 711 Navarro, Sixth Floor, San Antonio, Texas 78205; and J. Eugene Clements, Porter & Clements, 3500 NCNB Center, 700 Louisiana Street, Houston, Texas 
77002-2730. 

VA ’ 4 N————_ 

Russell W. Miller 
  

H/186490 

“14. 

 



No. 90-8014 

  

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

  

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN 

CITIZENS (LULAC), et al. 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v. 

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF TEXAS, et al. 

Defendants-Appellants 

  

On Remand 
from the United States Supreme Court 

  

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE 
TEXANS FOR JUDICIAL ELECTION REFORM 

AND 
ROBERT W. CALVERT, JOE R. GREENHILL AND JOHN L. HILL 

  

Robert W. Calvert 

919 Congress Avenue 
Austin, Texas 78701 

Russell W. Miller (512) 478-2773 
LIDDELL, SAPP, ZIVLEY, HILL 

& LABOON, L.L.P. Joe R. Greenhill, Jr. 
3300 Texas Commerce Tower 98 San Jacinto Blvd. 
Houston, Texas 77002 Austin, Texas 78701 
(713) 226-1199 (512) 322-2500 

ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE, John L. Hill, Jr. 
TEXANS FOR JUDICIAL ELECTION 3300 Texas Commerce Tower 
REFORM Houston, Texas 77002 

(713) 226-1230  



No. 90-8014 

  

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

  

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN 

CITIZENS (LULAC), et al. 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

Vv, 

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF TEXAS, et al. 

Defendants-Appellants 

  

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE 
  

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS: 

Texans for Judicial Election Reform, together with former Texas Supreme Court 

~ Chief Justices Joe R. Greenhill, Robert Calvert and John Hill, Amici Curiae, file this brief 

in accordance with Fed. R. App. Proc. 29 and Local Rule 29 of the Fifth Circuit. 

INTRODUCTION 
  

Texans for Judicial Election Reform is a non-profit organization formed to promote 

judicial reform measures in the Texas legislature, particularly in the areas of campaign 

finances and the candidate selection process. The individually named Amici Curiae are  



  

former chief administrative judicial officers of Texas with a long-standing interest in 

preserving the independence and accountability of Texas' judges. 

In this Court's previous decision, the majority held that elected state district judges 

are not "representatives" within the meaning of the Voting Rights Act. League of United 

Latin American Citizens, Counsel No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620, 631 (5th Cir. 1990,   

en banc) (hereafter cited as "LULAC"). The concurring judges considered that state district 

judges are "representatives" within the meaning of the statute but that, as holders of single- 

member offices, they are exempt from vote dilution challenges under Section 2 of the Voting 

Rights Act. LULAC, 914 F.2d at 651. The Supreme Court rejected both views, but it 

obviously was sensitive to the state's "compelling interest" in "linking jurisdiction and elective 

base for judges acting alone": 

"We deliberately avoid any evaluation of the merits of the concerns expressed in Judge Higginbotham's concurring opinion because we believe they are 
matters that are relevant either to an analysis of the totality of the 
circumstances that must be considered in an application of the results test embodied in § 2, as amended, or to a consideration of possible remedies in the event a violation is proved, but not to the threshold question of the Act's 
coverage." 

  

Houston Lawyers’ Assoc, v. Attorney General of Texas, 59 U.S.L.W. 4706, 111 S. Ct. 2374, 

2380, 115 L.Ed.2d 379 (1991)(hereafter cited as "HLA"). In fact, the Supreme Court 

implicitly acknowledged that the distinction between district court judges and other elected 

officials may preclude a finding of vote dilution in this case as a matter of law, stating: 

. . . the concerns expressed by Judge Higginbotham in distinguishing elections 
of Texas district judges from elections of supreme court justices relate to the 
question of whether a vote dilution violation may be found or remedied rather 
than whether such a claim may be brought . . .. 

HLA, 111 S. Ct. at 2381 (Emphasis added.). 

 



  

The individual appellants have made strong arguments that there are many errors in 

the methodology used by the court below in deciding that Plaintiffs have proven a claim of 

vote dilution; however this brief is filed to address only the more fundamental point 

suggested by the Supreme Court's decision. Because the State of Texas has a compelling 

interest in "linking jurisdiction and elective base" for district judges who singularly exercise 

their power to rule, as a matter of law a vote dilution violation under § 2 of the Voting 

Rights Act may not be found in this case. 

The undersigned Amici Curiae are all of the view that Texas' system for partisan 

election of judges, fueled by large campaign contributions and expenditures, is seriously 

flawed and that significant reforms are needed: however, a decree in this case requiring that | 

district judges in populous counties be elected from county subdistricts is not the solid 

to those problems. Such a decree would disenfranchise most of the people over whom the 

judges exercise primary jurisdiction, without their consent or the consent of their elected 

representatives. Additionally, it would not only make an already flawed system infinitely 

worse by increasing the role of special interest politics in the state's courts, it would likely 

set the result in concrete and render meaningful reform impossible. 

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
  

The legitimate and compelling state interests in preserving a linkage between 

jurisdiction and elective base for Texas' district courts preclude a finding of vote dilution in 

this case under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 

 



  

ARGUMENT 

Amici Curiae submit that Texas' overriding interests in preserving the county-wide 

election of district judges in populous counties, whether that election be partisan, non- 

partisan or retention, stems from the fundamental democratic principle that the power to 

govern is legitimately derived only from the consent of the governed. If an official may 

singularly exercise the power to govern over an entire county, then all of the citizens of the 

county must have a voice in the selection of that official unless they consent to another 

political arrangement. 

Texas historically has used the county as the jurisdictional unit for the selection of 

many of its officers, including most district judges. Article 5, § 7a(i) of the Texas 

Constitution (Vernon Supp. 1991) expressly forbids any change in this arrangement in any 

county without the direct consent of that county's citizens: 

The legislature, the Judicial Districts Board, or the Legislative Redistricting 
Board may not redistrict the judicial districts to provide for any judicial 
district smaller in size than an entire county except as provided by this section. 
Judicial districts smaller in size than the entire county may be created 
subsequent to a general election where a majority of the persons voting on the 
proposition adopt the proposition "to allow the division of County 
into judicial districts composed of parts of County." No 
redistricting plan may be proposed or adopted by the legislature, the Judicial 
Districts Board, or the Legislative Redistricting Board in anticipation of a 
future action by the voters of any county. 

  

In no county involved in this case have the citizens consented to submit to the jurisdiction 

of courts chosen by less than all of the voters in that county. 

It is a proper exercise of this Court's power to insure that all of the county's citizens 

participate equally in the selection of the decision-making authority that rules over them: 

however, it would offend the most basic of democratic principles to forcibly subject the 

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citizens of Texas' urban counties to the rule of any decision-making authority for whom they 

have no voice in the selection process. Section 1 of the F ifteenth Amendment provides that: 

The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 

Thus, the constitution does not allow the federal courts to violate the right of any of Texas’ 

citizens to vote for the judges who individually may wield power over them, even if the 

courts do 50 to increase the number of minority judges who are elected. 

Because it is not practical for every Texas citizen to vote for every Texas judge, the 

people of this State have consented to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of some judges 

for whom they have relinquished their right to vote." This consent is expressed through a 

system of complex venue and jurisdictional statutes enacted by the citizens elected 

representatives. But the people have not consented to relinquish their right to vote for the 

district judges who exercise primary jurisdiction over the counties in which they reside. 

Because no outside power should strip away that right, even the federal courts should not 

  

' The degree of direct control voluntarily relinquished by the people has varied with the importance they have attached to the various judicial offices. All citizens of the State may 
vote for its Supreme Court justices. The State is divided into fourteen districts for the 
election of judges sitting upon the Court of Appeals. District Court judges and county court 
judges are elected on a county-wide basis, and justices of the peace are elected from county 
sub-districts. Because the jurisdiction granted to Justices of the peace generally is limited 
to misdemeanor offenses involving fines only and civil disputes where the amount in 
controversy is less than $200, see Tex. Const. Art. 5, § 19 (Vernon Supp. 1991), and because 
decisions of justices of the peace are not reported and have no precedential effect, it is not 
as critical that those officers be selected from a broad cross-section of the community. 
However, the interest in linking jurisdiction to electoral base is so fundamental that it is 
applied even to justices of the peace. See, Tex. Const. Art. 5, § 18 (Vernon Supp. 1991). 

-S- 

 



be able to force a county's citizens to accept as legitimate the decisions of a judge who is 

elected exclusively by another subgroup within the county. 

Since the extent to which the people have relinquished their franchise is solely a 

matter of choice, Amici Curiae do not believe it is necessary for this Court to analyze their 

interest in doing so. Nevertheless, Amici Curiae submit that the election of district court 

judges on a county-wide basis serves a compelling public interest in providing broad-based 

accountability for those officials. It is important to protect elected judges from the undue 

pressure of any particular constituency or political group and, as compared to elective 

subdistricts, judges elected on a county-wide basis are materially buffered from such 

pressure. While not fool-proof, this arrangement reduces the likelihood that any one 

individual or special interest group within the county will control enough votes or calles 

dollars to elect a judge with a specific political agenda. Votes from neighborhoods in the 

county that generally are sympathetic to labor interests are balanced by votes from 

neighborhoods that generally are less sympathetic to labor. Votes in conservative 

neighborhoods are balanced by the votes in less conservative neighborhoods. The votes of 

professional fishermen are balanced by the votes of city-dwellers concerned with recreational 

  

2 Amici Curiae believe that the concept of dividing Texas' urban counties into dozens of smaller judicial districts, each with its area of primary jurisdiction limited to its elective base, is so inherently unworkable that it scarcely deserves mention. Aside from the fact that absurd venue problems would be caused, such an arrangement still would not overcome the fact that Texas' citizens have reserved the right to vote for all judges elected in their county. Even if there were subdistricts of limited geographic jurisdiction, it is inevitable that citizens in other areas of the county would have to appear in the court of that subdistrict. Having reserved the right to vote for the judge on that court, the Constitution prohibits this Court from abridging that right to vote on the basis of race. U.S. Constitution, Amendment XV, Section 1.  



interests. - It is not in the interest of the administration of Justice for silk-stocking districts 

to exclusively elect some judges and for less economically advantaged districts to exclusively 

elect others. 

The smaller the district from which a judge is elected, the greater the likelihood that 

partisan political pressures will affect the election. This is particularly true when the judicial 

subdistrict's boundaries are made co-extensive with the boundaries of legislative districts. 

It is common knowledge that when the legislature is redistricted, legislative districts are 

often fixed to accommodate the interests of incumbent officeholders, particularly those who 

are members of the party in power. To require that judges run for election from districts 

with the same boundaries practically guarantees that judges will be the product of the same 

political forces that elect the legislator. ; 

The same is true of campaign contribution abuse. While the special interest groups 

interested in a judicial election may have impact on the election of a judge elected on a 

county-wide basis, they would be much more able to control the election of a substantial 

number of judges elected from politically sensitive subdistricts. 

Similarly, Amici Curiae believe the same factors produce a significantly greater 

danger of corruption. The problem was stated bluntly recently by a Houston Chronicle 

political columnist as follows: 

But the dangers inherent in small districts seem too pronounced 
for one not to be presumptuous. So many points have to be 
considered. For example, right now we primarily have lawyers 
pulling the strings in judicial races. As alarming as that may be, 
friends and neighbors, it's better than what could happen. Sure, 
it sounds goofy, but think what influence a well-heeled drug 
dealer could have in a couple of small district elections.  



  

Jane Ely, "Wait before changing judicial selection." Houston Chronicle, July 7, 1991. 

  

The relatively broad electoral base provided by county-wide judicial elections also 

acts to impose a degree of moderated accountability on district judges. Because district 

judges sit as single-member officeholders, their rules and decrees are less subject to the 

tempering effect of compromise or dilution that is common in a collegial body. Accordingly, 

if judges are elected, it is important that their elective base be broad enough to include all 

of the citizens within their primary jurisdiction. It is impossible to obtain this accountability 

if some judges are elected exclusively from silk-stocking neighborhoods and some from 

economically disadvantaged neighborhoods. 

The importance of this moderating influence upon the legitimacy of the courts is 

readily apparent. For example, if district judges are elected from subdistricts but drerelss 

county-wide jurisdiction, they will inevitably preside in cases in which one of the litigants is 

a resident of the judge's subdistrict and the other is a resident of the county, but of a 

different subdistrict. If the party residing in the judge's district prevails, particularly if he 

is an influential citizen, the losing party will inevitably question the fairness of the 

proceeding, and the justice system will have been damaged. This effect can only be 

aggravated as judicial districts become smaller and more politically diverse. The individual 

litigant's vote, and those of his or her friends, will be statistically more significant to the 

judge and the perception is likely to follow that justice depends upon whether a litigant is 

able to get into "his own" court or whether he is dragged into "his opponent's" court. 

 



  

The county-based judicial district in Texas also serves the citizens' interest in 

providing juries that represent an adequate cross section of the community. The Sixth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that: 

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein 
the crime shall have been committed . . . . 

This provision requires that juries represent a fair cross section of the "community" in which 

the crime occurred. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). 

Both federal and state courts have held that the judicial district is the proper definition of 

the "community" for purposes of jury selection. United States v. Dickie, 775 F.2d 607 (Sth 

  

  

Cir. 1985); Williams v. Superior Court, 781 P.2d 537, 263 Cal. Rptr. 503, 49 C.3d 736 (1989). 

If this Court requires the restructuring of Texas' judicial system, so that the courts will Pf 

representative of smaller communities within the county, then a fundamental question is 

raised as to whether a criminal defendant must also be tried before a jury that is 

representative of that community. If a child from a poor subdistrict is accused of 

committing a crime in a silk-stocking district, would it be fair to try that child before a judge 

and jury selected exclusively from that district? 

The court below summarily dismissed this issue by finding that "jury selection could 

continue to be done on a county-wide basis." League of United Latin American Citizens, 
  

Council 4434 v. Mattox, Mem. Op. at 77 (W.D. Tex. Now. 8, 1989) (hereafter cited as "Mem.   

Op. at __"). The court cited no authority for its dicta. In dismissing this issue so casually, 

it appears that the court treated it as a mere "administrative" matter. It is clear from the 

 



  

record that the court either misunderstood the issue, or that it simply chose not to consider 

it. 

The court below also chose not to give any consideration to Texas interest in 

facilitating the prompt and orderly administration of justice by providing for specialized 

courts in its most populous counties. The existence of parallel criminal and civil courts in 

those counties with the most crowded dockets allows civil cases to proceed to trial without 

being displaced on the docket by criminal trials, which the Constitution requires to be 

speedy. U.S. Const. Amend. VI. The existence of family law courts allows the judges of 

those courts the increased time necessary to adequately monitor guardianships, divorces, 

and parent-child relationships on an on-going basis. Because all of these fields have highly 

technical differences, and because the specialized courts generally are-established in counties | 

where the dockets are the heaviest, providing for judges of particular expertise serves the 

interests of justice by reducing the amount of time a judge must take to familiarize himself 

with the law pertaining to whatever case is before him, allowing the court to render 

decisions more quickly and reducing the possibility of error in the decision-making process. 

The court below erroneously refused to consider these interests among the totality of 

circumstances. Substituting its own policy preferences for the state's interests, the court 

below dismissed these interests as being "wrong." Mem. Op. at 78. 

This Court already has observed that: 

The judiciary occupies a unique position in our system of separation of powers, and that is why the job of a judge differs in a fundamental way from 
that of a legislator or executive. The purpose of the judiciary is not to reflect 
public opinion in its deliberations or to satisfy public opinion with its 
decisions. Rather, it is to ensure that the ordinary laws do not run contrary 
to the more fundamental law of the Constitution, to resolve disputes and 

-10- 

 



  

controversies surrounding the law, and to resolve disputes among contesting 
parties over the meaning of the law and the Constitution. If a member of 
congress serves to make the law and a president to enforce it, the judge serves to understand it and interpret it. In this process, it is quite possible for a judge to render a decision which is directly at odds with the majority 
sentiment of the citizens at any particular time. A judge might find, for 
example, a very popular law to be unconstitutional. Indeed, it can be argued 
that the quality most needed in a judge is the ability to withstand the 
pressures of public opinion in order to ensure the primacy of the rule of law 
over the fluctuating politics of the hour. 

LULAC, 914 F.2d at 626. Since the purpose of the judiciary is not to reflect the views of 

any particular constituency or to satisfy any particular constituency in its deliberations, this 

Court should not accept a premise that minorities have a legitimate interest in electing 

judges solely to serve their own particular concerns. Judges have no constituency to serve. 

Moreover, it certainly does not advance the minority individual's interest to drastically - 

reduce, if not eliminate, his or her participation in the selection of the judge who probably 

will rule upon his or her controversy. 

In the instant case, there is no significant discussion of these issues in the opinion and 

decision of the court below. It is clear from the record that the court did not consider these 

circumstances and interests in weighing the "totality of circumstances." It's decision, 

therefore, is clearly erroneous. Furthermore, as long as Texas district court judges singly 

exercise power to rule in the disputes before them, and as long as they exercise primary 

jurisdiction over an entire county, the State's interest in extending the franchise to all 

subjects residing within the Court's area of primary jurisdiction outweighs the interest of any 

particular group of subjects, including racial minorities, in electing their own candidates. 

As a matter of law, the federal courts may not by decree disenfranchise one group of 

citizens from the political unit that wields power over them, even if they do so to remedy 

11 

 



  

past injustices. We need more minorities on the bench in Texas, but we can meet that need 

without striking at the very foundation of our traditional court system. 

Amici Curiae respectfully urge the Court to hold that the state's compelling interests 

in maintaining its county-wide selection process for the judicial seats at issue prevents a 

finding of liability under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act in this particular case as a matter of 

law, and to render judgment in favor of the State of Texas. 

12. 

Respectfully submitted, 

LIDDELL, SAPP, ZIVLEY, HILL 
& LABOON, L.L.P. 

By: dt dip 
Russell W. Miller 
Texas Bar No. 14112300 
3300 Texas Commerce Tower 
Houston, Texas 77002 
(713) 226-1199 
(713) 223-3717 Telecopier 

  

ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE, 
TEXANS FOR JUDICIAL ELECTION 
REFORM 

Putost id fod, oit~ 
Robert W. Calvert 
Texas Bar No. 03671000 
919 Congress Avenue 
Austin, Texas 78701 
(713) 478-2773 

  

 



PNB } / 

RT DAE CLD 
  

Joe R. Greenhill, Jr. 
Texas Bar No. 00000023 
1600 San Jacinto Center 
98 San Jacinto Blvd. 
Austin, Texas 77001 
(512) 322-2500 

  

A ew jl 
John L. Hill, Jr. 
Texas Bar No. 00000027 
3300 Texas Commerce Tower 
Houston, Texas 77002 
(713) 226-1230 

 



  

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I certify that this 14th day of October, 1991, I sent a copy of the foregoing document by certified mail, return receipt requested, to each of the following: William L. Garrett, Garrett, Thompson & Chang, 8300 Douglas, Suite 800, Dallas, Texas 75226, Rolando Rios, Southwest Voter Registration & Education Project, 201 N. St. Mary's , Suite 521, San Antonio, Texas 78205; Sherrilyn A. Ifill, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational F und, Inc., 99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor, New York, New York 10013; Gabrielle K. McDonald, 301 Congress Avenue, Suite 2050, Austin, Texas 78701; Edward B. Cloutman, III, Mullinax, Wells, Baab & Cloutman, P.C., 3301 Elm Street, Dallas, Texas 75226-1637; Robert H. Mow, Jr., Hughes & Luce, 2800 Momentum Place, 1717 Main Street, Dallas, Texas 75201; Walter L. Irvin, 5787 South Hampton Road, Suite 210, Lock box 122, Dallas, Texas 75232-2255; Susan Finkelstein, Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., 201 N. St. Mary's, Suite 600, San Antonio, Texas 78205; Renea Hicks, Special Assistant Attorney General, P. O. Box 12584, Capitol Station, Austin, Texas 78711-2548; Seagal V. Wheatley, Oppenheimer, Rosenberg, Kelleher & Wheatley, Inc., 711 Navarro, Sixth Floor, San Antonio, Texas 78205; and J. Eugene Clements, Porter & Clements, 3500 NCNB Center, 700 Louisiana Street, Houston, Texas 

  

77002-2730. 

pant radtl wi LL 
Russell W. Miller 

«14