Response to Respondents' Motion to Dismiss
Public Court Documents
August 9, 1983
Cite this item
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Case Files, Bozeman & Wilder Working Files. Response to Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, 1983. 3c7e4702-f192-ee11-be37-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/5ae0c40c-46ba-495a-823a-19cbeb25a7e9/response-to-respondents-motion-to-dismiss. Accessed November 03, 2025.
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IN THE T'NITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF AI"ABAII,TA
NORTHERN DIVISION
MAGGIE
EALON
S . BOZEIIAN,
Peti tioner,
vs.
M. LAMBERT, €t dl.,
Respondents.
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 83-H-579-N
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS' IIOTION TO DISI4ISS
Petitioner, through her attorneys, hereby asks the Court
to deny respondents'motion, filed on July 18, 1983, to dis-
miss petitioner's habeas corpus petition (hereinafter, Petition).
Respondents, in their motion, claim to raise three
grounds on which the Petition should be dismissed. Each ground,
however, is hinged upon 28 U.S.c. S 2254(b) , (c), wherein the
requirement that state remedies be exhausted prior to commenc-
ing federal habeas proceedings is codified.
The first step in resolving the issue of exhaustion of
state remedies must be to determine whether "there is an
absence of available State corrective process," 28 U.S.C. S 2254
(b). OnIy if it is determined that at the time the Petition
was filed there was a State process available in Alabama for
the consideration of petitioner's claims, does it become aPpo-
site under 28 U.S.c. S 2254(b), (c) to determine whether those
claims were presented previously to the Alabama courts. See,
€9.r Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284, 286-287 (5th Cir. 1971)
It is notable that respondents, in alleging that certain of
petitioner's claims were not fairly presented to the State
courts, avoid mentioning how those claims could be presented
in the Alabama courts at the present time. In fact, it is
clear that petitioner is utterly foreclosed as a matter of
Alabama law from presenting any of the claims in her Petition
through either of Alabama's two post-conviction relief proces-
L/ses.-' The Courts of the United States, through the federal
writ of habeas corpus, are the only remaining forum in which
petitioner may challenge the unconstitutional restraint to
which she is now subject.
Not a single one of petitioner's claims fits within the
narro$, class of claims that may be heard under the alabama wrlt
of error coram nobis. Convictions may be challenged under
coram nobis only on the basis of "an error of fact, unknown to
the court or the affected party at the time of trial, which
had it been known, would have prevented the judgment chal-
lenged," Ex parte Vaughn, 395 So.2d 95, 96 (Ala. 1979). None
of petitioner's claims fits that description.
Each of petitioner's claims is based on asserted viola-
tions of the United States Constitution rather than newly
L/ Because there is no state remedy presently available to
Eer, it is not necessary for petitioner to respond to the other
claims raised by respondents. Petitioner, however, does not
admit any of the allegations in respondents' Motion to Dismiss.
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discovered evidence. Constitutional challenges have been
allowed under coram nobis only in the limited area of claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel, Summers v. State, 366
So.2d 336 (AIa. Crim. App. 1978). It is well established that
coram nobis "does not lie to enable the defendant to question
the merits of the case.' Butler v. State, 184 So.2d 823, 824
(AIa. f965). this is no less the case when the defendant
raises constitutional objections to her conviction. See,
e.9., Ihomas v. State, 150 So.2d 387 (AIa. 1953); Ex parte Banks,
178 So.2d 98 (Ala. App. 1955); Ex parte Ellis, 159 So.2d 862
(AIa. App. 1954). As a result, federal courtsr orl petitions
of habeas corpus, have found Alabama remedies exhausted on the
basis of the unavailability of coram nobis for the presentation
of constitutional claims. See, e.9., Piazzola v. Watkins,
supra; Rice v. Simpson, 271 F. Supp. 267 (M.D. AIa. L9671,
aff'd, 396 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1958), aff'd on other grounds sub
nom., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 71I (1969).
The Alabama writ of habeas corpus, AIa. Code SS 15-2I-I
et seq. (1975), is foreclosed to petitioner because she has
been released from prison as a parolee. In Williams v. State,
I55 So.2d 322 (AIa. App. ), cert. denied, I55 So.2d 323 (AIa.
1953), it was held that Alabama habeas corpus is not available
to parolees.
Petitioner, were she to attempt to proceed under Alabama
habeas corpus, would thus have to do so under the bleak hope
that williams would be overruled for her case. Petitioner need
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not attempt to maintain a State habeas proceeding where the
prospects for success are so speculative; State habeas is,
therefore, exhausted on grounds of unavailability. See
Wilwordinq v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 250 (1971).
Even if petitioner's status as a parolee did not bar her
from proceeding under Alabama habeas corpus, with one minor
exception, none of her claims are of the sort which wiII be
heard under Alabama habeas. Habeas corpus may be used under
Alabama law only to challenge a conviction which is void on its
face because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to pronounce
judgment. See, e.g-,-, Piazzola v. Watkins, supra; Edwards v.
State, I50 So.2d 709 (Ala. 1953), cqrt. denied,375 U.S.882
(1e53).
Within the Petition only the claims in paragraphs L9-2L
-- because they attack the indictment for defects associated
with an essential element of the offense -- allege what may be
denominated as a void judgment under Alabama law. See, €.9.r
Barbee v. State, 4L7 So.2d 511 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982). Those
claims have been "fairly presentedr" Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S.
270, 275 (1971), to the Alabama courts in satisfaction of the
exhaustion requirements of 28 U.S.C. S 2254(b'l , (c) .
Contrary to respondentsr unsuPPorted assertions, the
indictment filed against petitioner was exhaustively challenged
at trial and at every stage of petitioner's direct appeal.
In petitioner's plea, the indictment was attacked on numer-
ous grounds, including, in plea number 2, that nthe indictment
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fails to state an offense under the laws of the State of
Alabamar" and, in plea number 3, that the indictment "fails to
reasonably apprise the defendant of what it is she is called
upon to defendr " in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Tr. 11 (Pickens County Circuit Court,
Nov. L-2, LgTg).?/
Before the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, the objec-
tions made in the plea were reiterated and elaborated upon.
See Respondents' Exhibit ttBrr at 18-21. As in claims L9-2L,
petitioner's objections were focused on the failure of the
indictment to "identify the accusations or charge," id. at 18,
as weII as the "particular act or acts" of petitioner's which
were alleged to have been criminal, id. at 19.
Petitioner, in her brief requesting a rehearing before
the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, Respondents' Exhibit uE'
at 2, and in her brief in support of her Petition for Writ of
Certiorari in the Alabama Supreme Court, Respondents' Exhibit
rrFr at L9-2L, restated the argument against the indictment made
in her initial brief to the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Through these repeated and futile prayers to the Alabama
courts, p€titioner has provided those courts with a fair and
Petitioner is unable to recite all objections to the
tment interposed at trial since respondents have failed
ovide her attorneys with a complete transcript of the pro-
ngs. See Motion to Order Respondents to Furnish Complete
cripts of TriaI Proceedings.
?/indic
to pr
ceedi
Trans
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adequate opportunity to pass upon the "substantial equivaleDtr'
Lambert v. Wainwriqht, 513 f.2d 277, 282 (5th Cir. 1975), of
claims 19-21.
CONCLUSION
Respondentsr nption to dismiss the cause should be denied.
Petitioner has exhausted all state remedies presently available
to her
Respectful ly submitted,
JACK GREENBERG
IANI GUINIER
SIEGFRIED KNOPF
Suite 2030
10 Columbus Cirle
New York, New York 10019
VANZEETA PENN DURAITT
639 l.{artha Street
Ir{ontgomery, Alabama 36108
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER
Of Counsel:
ANTEONY G. AIISTERDAIIi
New York Universitlr School of Law
Room 327, 40 Washington Square South
New York, New York 10012
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing docunent has been
served upon Jean l{illiams Brown, Esg., Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, by mailing the same to her by first class United States
uail, postage prepaid, on this 9th day of August, 1983, addressed
as follows:
Jean WiIliams Brown, Esg.
Assistant Attorney General
250 Administrative Building
64 North Union Street
Montgomery, Alabarna 36130
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER