Response to Respondents' Motion to Dismiss
Public Court Documents
August 9, 1983

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Case Files, Bozeman & Wilder Working Files. Response to Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, 1983. 3c7e4702-f192-ee11-be37-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/5ae0c40c-46ba-495a-823a-19cbeb25a7e9/response-to-respondents-motion-to-dismiss. Accessed April 06, 2025.
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IN THE T'NITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF AI"ABAII,TA NORTHERN DIVISION MAGGIE EALON S . BOZEIIAN, Peti tioner, vs. M. LAMBERT, €t dl., Respondents. CIVIL ACTION NO. 83-H-579-N RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS' IIOTION TO DISI4ISS Petitioner, through her attorneys, hereby asks the Court to deny respondents'motion, filed on July 18, 1983, to dis- miss petitioner's habeas corpus petition (hereinafter, Petition). Respondents, in their motion, claim to raise three grounds on which the Petition should be dismissed. Each ground, however, is hinged upon 28 U.S.c. S 2254(b) , (c), wherein the requirement that state remedies be exhausted prior to commenc- ing federal habeas proceedings is codified. The first step in resolving the issue of exhaustion of state remedies must be to determine whether "there is an absence of available State corrective process," 28 U.S.C. S 2254 (b). OnIy if it is determined that at the time the Petition was filed there was a State process available in Alabama for the consideration of petitioner's claims, does it become aPpo- site under 28 U.S.c. S 2254(b), (c) to determine whether those claims were presented previously to the Alabama courts. See, €9.r Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284, 286-287 (5th Cir. 1971) It is notable that respondents, in alleging that certain of petitioner's claims were not fairly presented to the State courts, avoid mentioning how those claims could be presented in the Alabama courts at the present time. In fact, it is clear that petitioner is utterly foreclosed as a matter of Alabama law from presenting any of the claims in her Petition through either of Alabama's two post-conviction relief proces- L/ses.-' The Courts of the United States, through the federal writ of habeas corpus, are the only remaining forum in which petitioner may challenge the unconstitutional restraint to which she is now subject. Not a single one of petitioner's claims fits within the narro$, class of claims that may be heard under the alabama wrlt of error coram nobis. Convictions may be challenged under coram nobis only on the basis of "an error of fact, unknown to the court or the affected party at the time of trial, which had it been known, would have prevented the judgment chal- lenged," Ex parte Vaughn, 395 So.2d 95, 96 (Ala. 1979). None of petitioner's claims fits that description. Each of petitioner's claims is based on asserted viola- tions of the United States Constitution rather than newly L/ Because there is no state remedy presently available to Eer, it is not necessary for petitioner to respond to the other claims raised by respondents. Petitioner, however, does not admit any of the allegations in respondents' Motion to Dismiss. 2- discovered evidence. Constitutional challenges have been allowed under coram nobis only in the limited area of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Summers v. State, 366 So.2d 336 (AIa. Crim. App. 1978). It is well established that coram nobis "does not lie to enable the defendant to question the merits of the case.' Butler v. State, 184 So.2d 823, 824 (AIa. f965). this is no less the case when the defendant raises constitutional objections to her conviction. See, e.9., Ihomas v. State, 150 So.2d 387 (AIa. 1953); Ex parte Banks, 178 So.2d 98 (Ala. App. 1955); Ex parte Ellis, 159 So.2d 862 (AIa. App. 1954). As a result, federal courtsr orl petitions of habeas corpus, have found Alabama remedies exhausted on the basis of the unavailability of coram nobis for the presentation of constitutional claims. See, e.9., Piazzola v. Watkins, supra; Rice v. Simpson, 271 F. Supp. 267 (M.D. AIa. L9671, aff'd, 396 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1958), aff'd on other grounds sub nom., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 71I (1969). The Alabama writ of habeas corpus, AIa. Code SS 15-2I-I et seq. (1975), is foreclosed to petitioner because she has been released from prison as a parolee. In Williams v. State, I55 So.2d 322 (AIa. App. ), cert. denied, I55 So.2d 323 (AIa. 1953), it was held that Alabama habeas corpus is not available to parolees. Petitioner, were she to attempt to proceed under Alabama habeas corpus, would thus have to do so under the bleak hope that williams would be overruled for her case. Petitioner need 3- not attempt to maintain a State habeas proceeding where the prospects for success are so speculative; State habeas is, therefore, exhausted on grounds of unavailability. See Wilwordinq v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 250 (1971). Even if petitioner's status as a parolee did not bar her from proceeding under Alabama habeas corpus, with one minor exception, none of her claims are of the sort which wiII be heard under Alabama habeas. Habeas corpus may be used under Alabama law only to challenge a conviction which is void on its face because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to pronounce judgment. See, e.g-,-, Piazzola v. Watkins, supra; Edwards v. State, I50 So.2d 709 (Ala. 1953), cqrt. denied,375 U.S.882 (1e53). Within the Petition only the claims in paragraphs L9-2L -- because they attack the indictment for defects associated with an essential element of the offense -- allege what may be denominated as a void judgment under Alabama law. See, €.9.r Barbee v. State, 4L7 So.2d 511 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982). Those claims have been "fairly presentedr" Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971), to the Alabama courts in satisfaction of the exhaustion requirements of 28 U.S.C. S 2254(b'l , (c) . Contrary to respondentsr unsuPPorted assertions, the indictment filed against petitioner was exhaustively challenged at trial and at every stage of petitioner's direct appeal. In petitioner's plea, the indictment was attacked on numer- ous grounds, including, in plea number 2, that nthe indictment 4- fails to state an offense under the laws of the State of Alabamar" and, in plea number 3, that the indictment "fails to reasonably apprise the defendant of what it is she is called upon to defendr " in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Tr. 11 (Pickens County Circuit Court, Nov. L-2, LgTg).?/ Before the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, the objec- tions made in the plea were reiterated and elaborated upon. See Respondents' Exhibit ttBrr at 18-21. As in claims L9-2L, petitioner's objections were focused on the failure of the indictment to "identify the accusations or charge," id. at 18, as weII as the "particular act or acts" of petitioner's which were alleged to have been criminal, id. at 19. Petitioner, in her brief requesting a rehearing before the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, Respondents' Exhibit uE' at 2, and in her brief in support of her Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the Alabama Supreme Court, Respondents' Exhibit rrFr at L9-2L, restated the argument against the indictment made in her initial brief to the Court of Criminal Appeals. Through these repeated and futile prayers to the Alabama courts, p€titioner has provided those courts with a fair and Petitioner is unable to recite all objections to the tment interposed at trial since respondents have failed ovide her attorneys with a complete transcript of the pro- ngs. See Motion to Order Respondents to Furnish Complete cripts of TriaI Proceedings. ?/indic to pr ceedi Trans 5- adequate opportunity to pass upon the "substantial equivaleDtr' Lambert v. Wainwriqht, 513 f.2d 277, 282 (5th Cir. 1975), of claims 19-21. CONCLUSION Respondentsr nption to dismiss the cause should be denied. Petitioner has exhausted all state remedies presently available to her Respectful ly submitted, JACK GREENBERG IANI GUINIER SIEGFRIED KNOPF Suite 2030 10 Columbus Cirle New York, New York 10019 VANZEETA PENN DURAITT 639 l.{artha Street Ir{ontgomery, Alabama 36108 ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER Of Counsel: ANTEONY G. AIISTERDAIIi New York Universitlr School of Law Room 327, 40 Washington Square South New York, New York 10012 6 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing docunent has been served upon Jean l{illiams Brown, Esg., Assistant Attorney Gen- eral, by mailing the same to her by first class United States uail, postage prepaid, on this 9th day of August, 1983, addressed as follows: Jean WiIliams Brown, Esg. Assistant Attorney General 250 Administrative Building 64 North Union Street Montgomery, Alabarna 36130 ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER