Jones v. The New York City Human Resources Administration Petition for Rehearing

    Cfcwrt ni %  §>tatrs
O ctober  T e r m , 1975 

No. 75-1694

I n  t h e

J a m es  0 .  J o n es , 
D o rothy  W il l ia m s , e t  a l.,

vs.
Petitioners,

T h e  N ew  Y ork C it y  H u m an  R esources 
A dm inistration , et al.

o n  p e t i t i o n  f o r  a  w r i t  o f  c e r t i o r a r i  t o  t h e  

U N IT E D  STA TES C O U R T  O F  A P P E A L S  FO R  T H E  SEC O N D  C IR C U IT

PETITION FOR REHEARING

J ack  G reen berg  
J am es  M. N abrit , III 
S ta n ley  E n g e l st e in  
D eborah  M. G reenberg  

Suite 2030 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

C o v ington , H oward, H agood 
& H olland

15 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

Attorneys for Petitioners



In th e

^ttprnn? dnurt n! tlj? HHxnteb #>M?b
O ctober  T eem, 1975 

No. 75-1694

J a m es  C. J o n es , 
D orothy  W il l ia m s , e t  a l.,

v s .
Petitioners,

T h e  N e w  Y ork  C it y  H u m a n  R esources 
A d m in ist r a t io n , e l  al.

O N  P E T IT IO N  FO R  A W R IT  OF CER TIO R A R I TO T H E  

U N IT E D  STA TES CO U RT OF A PPEA LS FO R  T H E  SECO N D  C IR C U IT

PETITION FOR REHEARING

The petitioners herein respectfully move this Court for 
an order (1) vacating its denial of the petition for writ of 
certiorari, entered on October 4, 1976, and (2) granting the 
petition. As grounds for this motion, petitioners state the 
following:

On October 4, 1976, this Court denied certiorari to review 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the denial 
of award of counsel fees in this employment discrimination 
case, brought under 42 TJ.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, on the 
ground that there was no express statutory authorization 
for such award. On October 19, 1976, the President signed 
into law The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of



2

1976, P.L. 94-559, which authorizes the award of attorneys’ 
fees ito a prevailing party in suits brought to enforce, 
inter alia, Sections 1981 and 1983 of Title 42 of the United 
States Code.1 The legislative history of the Act makes clear 
that it is intended to apply to pending cases, such as the 
instant one.2

This case is still pending in the district court, so peti­
tioners could move there for an award of attorneys’ fees 
pursuant to P.L. 94-559. However, given the likelihood 
of protracted litigation over the effect of the denial of cer­
tiorari, petitioners respectfully submit that in the interests

1 The text of P.L. 94-559 is as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives 

of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That 
this Act may be cited as “The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees 
Awards Act of 1976”.

Sec. 2. That the Revised Statutes section 722 (42 U.S.C. 
1988) is amended by adding the following:

“In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 
1977, 1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981 of the Revised Statutes, title 
IX of Public Law 92-318, or in any civil action or proceeding 
by or on behalf of the United States of America, to enforce, 
or charging a violation of, a provision of the United States 
Internal Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, the court in its discretion, may allow the prevailing 
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s 
fee as part of the costs”.

2 During the Senate debate, Senator Abourezk, who managed 
the bill on the floor of the Senate, stated:

The Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees Awards Act authorizes 
Federal courts to award attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party 
in suits presently pending in the Federal courts. The applica­
tion of this Act to pending cases is in conformity with the 
unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in Bradley v. School 
Board of City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974).

This application is necessary to fill the gap created by the 
Alyeska decision and thus avoid the inequitable situation of 
an award of attorneys’ fees turning on the date the litigation 
was commenced.

122 Cong. Rec. S 17052 (Daily Ed., Sept. 29, 1976).



3

of justice and judicial economy it would be appropriate for 
this Court to grant rehearing of the order of denial, grant 
the petition, vacate that portion of the judgment of the 
court below affirming the district court’s denial of counsel 
fees, and remand the case to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit for reconsideration in light 
of P.L. 94-559. Wallace v. House, No. 75-914, 44 TJ.S.L.W. 
3607 (April 25, 1976).3

Respectfully submitted,

J ack  G reen berg  
J a m es  M. N a brit , III 
S ta n ley  E n g e l st e in  
D eborah  M. Green berg  

Suite 2030 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

C ovin g to n , H oward, H agood 
& H olland

15 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

3 In Wallace v. Hoxise, No. 75-914, 44 U.S.L.W. 3607 (April 25, 
1976), a voting rights ca'se, this Court vacated a judgment denying 
counsel fees on the ground of lack of statutory authorization and 
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in 
light of P.L. 94-73, a law authorizing counsel fees in voting rights 
cases which was passed after the Court of Appeals’ decision. On 
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals held that the law should be 
applied retroactively to allow the award of attorneys’ fees in that 
case. No. 74-2654 (5th Cir. Sept. 17, 1976).



4

Certificate of Counsel

As counsel for petitioners, I hereby certify that this 
petition for rehearing is presented in good faith and not 
for delay and is restricted to the grounds specified in 
Buie 58(2).

D eborah  M . G reeh berg  
Counsel for Petitioners



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