Wheeler v. Montgomery Brief Amicus Curiae
Public Court Documents
September 30, 1969

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Wheeler v. Montgomery Brief Amicus Curiae, 1969. 8d107ce6-c89a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/5b43782a-c88b-4f81-9c11-4b25f9bd02b2/wheeler-v-montgomery-brief-amicus-curiae. Accessed July 06, 2025.
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I N D E X Pago Opinions below_____________________________________ 2 Jurisdiction_______________________________________ 2 Question presented________________________________ 2 St: tutes and regulations invo'ved__________________ 2 St: tement___________________ 3 1. Wheeler v. Montgomery________________ 4 2 . Goldberg v. Kelly______________________ 6 3. The federal requirements :q plicable to ter minating or reducing welfare payme its 7 a. The requirements prior to 190S__ 8 b. The present requirements____ _______ 11 St nmary of argument ______________ ______ __ 15 A ■ turner t_______________________________ IS Neither the due process clause nor the s< itu- tory requirement of “ fair hearing” requites a trial-type hearing before welfare assist mce pay nents are terminated or reduced___________ 18 A. The Secretary’s present practi e— under ’which the rec pient of pi blic assistance is given notice and op- jortunity for : conference prk r to termination ot reduction of a: sist- ance and can obtain a trial ype hearing before sucl terminate i or reduction bee ones final—-sat sfies the statutory and constitut onal requirejnents of a f ir hearing_____ 19 B. If the court were.t conclude that. the present practii is inadeq ate, it should not lequi ; a prelimi lary trial-type heai ng i every cas< be fore payments can >e initially ter minated or red iced__________ ____ 32 Conclusion______________________________________ 30 (i) II CITATIONS Cases: Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of PatP Equalization of Colorado, 239 IT.S. T! 1___ 35 Cafeteria Workers v. McElron, 307 U.S. 886 __ 20, 26, 30 C alley Electronics Coro. v. Federal Coi muni- cations Commission, 394 F. 2d 620__ ____ 35 F dcral Power Commission v. Texan >, 377 U.S. 33___________________________________ 35 Flemming v. Xestor, 3(>3 U.S. 603______ 22 Hannah v. Bar die, 368 U.S. 420 _____ 15, 20, 29 Morgan v. United Stal s, 298 U.S. 468 __ 34 Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 5S9 ______ 29 Shapiro v. Thompson, ■ 94 U.S. 618_ 20 Shcrbcrtv. Vernier, 374 U.S. 398 _____ __ __ 20 Sniadach v. Family Finance Carp., 3S5 U.S. 337____________ 28 United States v. Store • Broadcasting ( >., 351 U.S. 192__________________________________ 35 Constitution, and statutes: United States Constit ition: Fifth Amend men : Due Process Clause__ ____ — 5,19,22 Fourteenth Amen Iment: Due Process ( Clause_________ _. 4, 6, 19 Internal Revenue (Tide, 20 U.S.C. 0861- 6864______________ 29 Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq.__ ....... ........... — — 2. 4 42 U.S.C. 302(a) ___ ____ ___ _ _ 3 42 U.S.C. 302(a) ( 1) ______________ _____ 3,4 42 U.S.C. 302(a)(5)____________ 8,23 42 U.S.C. 302(a)(8)_______ ... __ 23 42 U.S.C. 403(h) 3)___________ 29 42 U.S.C. 601 et ■ r/.____________________ 6 42 U.S.C. 602(a) 1)___________ 3 Til C< institution and Statutes— Continued Social Security Act, as amended— Continued 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(5)_____________________ 42 U.S.C. 1202(a)(4)____________________ 42 U.S.C. 1202(a)(4)____________________ 42 U.S.C. 1252(a)(4)____________________ 42 U.S.C. i:582(a) (4)_______________ 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(3) (Supp. IV )._ Social Security Act, Public Law No. 27 , 49 Slat. 620 et sea.: Section 2(a)(4)_____________________ Section 402(a) (4) __ _____________ Section 1002(a)(4)_________________ Social Security Amendments of 1951 64 Stat. 477, Sec. 321________________________ 5 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 558(c)____________ 28 U.S.C. 2281 . ______ _____________________ 47 U.S.C. 312(c)____________________________ A! iscellaneous: 34 F.R, 13595_____ ___________________ Handbook of Public Assistance Adininisti ition of tin; Deparl metit ( f Health, Hduntion and Welfare, Part I V _______________ § 2200(b)(4)___________________________~ § 2200(d )________________ ______________ § 2300(d)(5)_______________________ § 5514, item 2a___ ________________ ____ § 5514, item 2b___________________ § 5514, item 2c____________________ _____ § 5514, item 2d____________________ § 6201 i__________________________________ § 6200(b).. ___________ ________ § 6200 ( j )_______________________________ § 6200(k) ______________________________ § 6300__________________________________ § 6400(a)_________________________ Page 8, 23 3 3 *)tj 3 3 8 P 8 8 29 5 29 3 10 11 12 11 11 13 13 9 34 13 14 9 p IV Miscellaneous— Continued Handbook of Public Assistance Administra tion o f the Department of Health, edu cation and Welfare, Part IV — Continued page § 6500(a)__________________________________ 14 § 6500(b)_________________________________ 14 Willcox, The Lawyer in the Administrate >i of Non regulatory Programs, Public Adm ns- tration Review, Vol. X III , No. 1, W iter 1953_________________________________________ 21 J i t i te S u p rem e dfmtrt oj the U n ite d S ta te s October T erm 1969 Xo. M M at. W heeler, et at. , aitellants r. -John Montgomkey, D irector oe rnii-: State I )epart- men r oe Social W es.take, a > d R onald Horn, (Jen- ERAI ]\ ANAiiLi; OE THE SAX FRANCISCO ClTY AND Cot .;tv Department oe Social Services No. 62 -J \C K v. (toLDRERO, COMMISSIONER OE SOCIAL S RVICEN of 'i .ie C ity oe N ew Y ork, et al., viteli ants v. -J ohn K elly, et al . OX API BAT/,Sf FROM THE E X IT ED STATE.S' D I S T R I C T COURTS FOR HE X O R T I IE R X DIS TR IC T Oh' CAT IFOR XIA . 17 ) THE SORT ERX D IS T R IC T OF X E W YORE BE 3F FOE ?HE UNITEI STATE AS AMICUS CUT :AE Thi brief is submitted in r< spouse to the < Court's order >f Apr I 2 1 . 1969. inviting H e Solicitor Con- 9 cal. to express the views of the United States with respect to these cases. OPINIONS BELOV/ The opinion of the three-judge district court in No. 14 (Wheeler App. (12') is reported at 299 F. Sup]). 138. The opinion of the three-judge district < ourt in No. 82 ( ( loldberg A]>p. 895a) is reported at : 94 F. Supp. 893. JURISDICTION In No. 14, the district <■ uirt's judgment was entered < u April 19. 1998, and the notice of appeal was filed n June 14, 11)98. In Xo. 92, the judgment was entered u December 13, 1998, and the notice of appeal was led on January 9, 1999. In both cases, this Court oted probable jurisdiction on April. 21, I960 (394 r.S. 970-971). Tile jurist ietion of this Court rests on 8 U.S.C. 1253. QUESTION PRESENTED Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth amendment to the Constitution requires he States to Ford recipients of welfare assistance a tidal-type earing before suspending, terminating or reducing heir benefit payments. STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED The relevant provision of t ie Social Security Act, ; s amen led, 42 U.S.C. 301 cl scq., are as follows: 1 1‘‘Wheeler App.” citations are t;> the appendix iiv Xo. 14. Goldber • App.” references a e to ihe appendix ia I to. 62. 3 § 302(a). A. State plan for old-age assistance, or for medical assistance for the aged, or for old-age assistance and medical assi dance for the aged must— (4) provide for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing before [lie State agency to any individual whose claim for assistance under the plan is denied or is not acted upon with reason able promptness * * *. §(>02(a ). A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must * * * (4 ) provide for granting an opportunity for a fair bearing before the State agency to any individ ual whose claim for aid to families with depend ent children is denied >r is not acted upon with reasonable promptness * * *.2 Id rtinent excerpts from Pa t 1 Y of the Handbook of Puli'i< Assistance Administration o f the United States Pep i nieni of 1b'altli Ifdlic; 1 ion, and Well are here- aide Ilaudboolv” ) ai e set o d in \|>P<■ndi' ; 1 f to the 1 >ri< for A ipeil ants in No. 1 . Tin rele\•ant prov isions of id • Calif. rnia Well' i re and 1 nsi tutions Code and of Cab ornia. s ale regulations a re s( out in J ppen dices 1 1 I ml IV to 11 it1 I ii i • f for . p]>( ants in > o. 1 k The appl cable .few York stale regu! itioi is set out in App •II ant’s 1 »ri ■f iu Nro. 62, pp. 2-5. ETATEMl NT 1? then tinm a tempi its ow i des •ripi ion o r the facts of t e pendi ng t ases, the gov •mm nt s: is f nth below - 1 to!lei pi ovisions :ij ) 1 y 1 < > he i tgrams of aid to the blind it id to ito 1 crnuini illy an< tor: y <Ii ' title* aid to rte iti ind, or distil led, an ' medic; 1 ass' ance. 12 r S.C. 1202 (a) ( ), 1352(a )(4) , 13S2( 0(4), aad 1 :6a (a) (8) Sup! r IV). 4 only a brief summary of the proceedings below. Like 1 he brief amicus curiae which the government tiled in No. 62 below, the Statement is principally devoted to an explanation in outline form, based on information sup plied by the Department of Health, Education, and Volf are, of certain Federal policies and procedures pplicable to the Federal-State pro,a rams involved here. 1. WHEELER V. jMOXTCiOMERV Jn No. 14, the appellant, Mae Ydheeler, brought an iction for individual ai d class declaratory and in- pmctive relief from C; lifornia welfare procedures m emitting the termination or suspension of assist ance— including assistance from Federal-State pro grams under the Social Security Act— before the giv ing of notice and an opportunity to he heard in a trial-type proceeding. The State assistance program specifically involved was Old Vge Security assistance, which is eligible for federal funding under dnle I of the Social Sec irity A % 42 U.S.C. 301 cf seq., sub ject, inter alia, to a requirement that the participating state agencies provide a “ la ir hearing, on request, to any claimant to whom assistance is denied. 42 U.S.C. 302(a) (4 . Because the complaint sought to enjoin the operation of California statutes and regu lations of general appli -ation on grounds of conflict with the Fourtei nth Amendment, a three-judge dis- 3 To avoid any c< illusion between the statutory requirement of n. “fail- hearing" and a. hearing Hint is fair in the constitu tional sense of moi ring tin reqnireine its ot the Hue Process Clause, quotation n arks an used where the statutory hearing is referred to. 5 ti-iet court was convened.4 28 U.S.O. 2281: Wheeler App. 29-31. California then amended its Public Social Services Manual to provide for the termination procedures, now in effect, which were ruled on by the district court, fhese procedures require that whenever a de cision is made to wit 1 hold welfai assistance from a presi nt recipient, a n< (ice of the imposed action and the M'asons for it must he given to him at least three mai delivery days before the withheld assistance ordi- nari / would he received. The recipient is then en title to an informal conference with his caseworker or a lotlier responsibh person in the county depart- men before the withdrawal t dees effect, to “ learn the natu e and extent of the information on which the with olding action is based,’ to “ provide any expla- nati< i or information” to the officials concerned, and to “ < iscuss the entire matter informally for the pur pose of clarification and, whore possil le, resolution.” 1 >rif for Appellants in No. 14, pp. 19a -20a. T 1 i district court concluded, that this pre-termina tion informal conference procedure, taken together with the trial-type “ fair hear ng” required by statute and egulations to he held soon after tennin ition, met the . mauds of due pr< cess. 4 Ti convening I In tliroi' udge court, the ruling district judge noted diat the pleat ings also raiset! by inference a further con- stitut 'li il challengt—that if the California termination pro- cedur s were not repugnant to the. Social Security Act, that Act as repugnant to tin Due Process Clause ot the Fifth Amoi ment. Wheeler App. 30. 1-515— 6fl------ 2 6 2. GOLDBERG V. KELLY The action in Xo. 62 was brought by a number of X"w York State wel fare recipients: some of‘ them were recipients of goner; 1 assistance mu.or slate aw awl the others wore recipients of Aid to Families with I ) 'pendent Children ( ‘-A F IK D . a federally-funded program under Title 1\ o! ihe Social Security -Act, 42 U.S.C. 601 et HCtf. Like Mrs. Wheeler, they sought, ii lividual and class declaratory and injunctive relief fi an the operation of Xew York statutes and regula- ti ns which permitted the termination or suspension o benefi s before tin; giving of notice and an oppor- ti nity to lie beard in a triad-type proceeding, on g ounds of conflict with the Due Process Clause of tb . Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge district court was convened. Coldburg App. 131a-139a. At the time the suit war brought. State regulations provided for neither notice nor bearing before termi nation of welfare assistance, but permitted recipients under st; te as well as Federal-State programs to obtain a trial-type bearing after termination. During the p eideney of the action, the state regulations were a aended— for both State a d Federal-Stale programs— p require local program administrators to choose one 0 two mow procedures: ( >) an informal pre-termina tion hearing procedure . imilar to tba adopted by California; and (2 ) a review-on-tlm-m-ord procedure' in which recipien s would be permitted to submit written statements sliowii g why tl eir benefits should 1 ' conti nu'd. Doth option re([uire sevi'ii days ad\ance written notice of t le reasons for a proposed termina tion, and both continue C e provision for a post.-termi- t nation “ fair hearing.” Now York City chose to apply the second of those procedures to all its aid programs. Colt berg App. “ (18a “71a. The district com! concl idod that this second pro- cedr re violated tlie Due Process Clause. Coldberg Api . 1180 38(>a. It held tint the first procedure— less immediately involved since all the plaintiff-appellants resided i . New York City and accordingly would be processed under the second— would bo permissible if eoi trued to require both eonfrontalion of persons whose ert dihility was in qu *stion regarding the factual basis for terminating benefits and that the reviewing officer be a superior of the person proposing the ad verse action. Coldberg App. 386a-389a. The court noted that nothing in its opinion was “ meant to affect the right to a post-te rmina tion hearing in accordance witl the procedures already in existence,’ ’ Coldberg App. 391a— i.c., the* “ fair bearing" procedures re quired In federal law for programs under the Social Security \rt and carried o' er by State law into State - funded general welfare programs. Tims, as in T17 I'clcr, the court appear'd te> reach its conclusions in the context of an ass nr; nee th it a nil >ost.-termi- natiein trial-type1 bearing would be bad. 3. TUB FKDKI’AIj EE.QU1RBMEXTS APP I TO A RLE TO TERVI iNATIM i OR REIUJC1 \TG WET FART ’AYMF.NT T D iring tlie past, few ye irs, eonsidei able attention lias been ‘ocused on ihe op ration of f lerally funded I rograms under the, Social Securi y A . Much of this attention has beam directed to th que tien s of eligi bility ane level of welfare assist; nee, and the proe-e- 8 dures for determining these issues. As a result, those procedures have b-*en in considerable flux. V. e set out iu'low, first, the procedures that have been generally required until recent times of States participating in federal programs: and second, the current require- aents, the product of changes of which most became effective duly 1 , 1 ! 08. A. TUF. REQUIREMENTS I ’RIOR TO 11ICR As originally enacted in 11135, the Social Seem it\ \(-t provided tha each State plan for public assist ance must provide for granting to any individual, vhose claim for aid or assistance is denied, an oppor- unity for ; ‘ ‘fail hearing” before the State agency. Sections 2 (a )(4 ). 402 (a)(4 ) and 1002(a)(4) of the Social Security A -t, Public Law No. 271, 40 Stat. 020 I set/. The Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, >4 Stat. 477. 549,; dded the requirement that such hear ings be afforded ii cases whore claims for benefits were not acted ui on wi h reasonable promptness; otherwise, the provisions have continued without substantial change to the present. On the basis of t hose “ fair hearing” requirements and the Secretary’s general authority to require that the states provide for such methods of administration as he finds necessary for proper and efficient operation, 42 TT.IS.O. 302 (a)(5 ), 002 (a)(5 ), the Secretary (like his predecessors, the Federal Security Administrator and the Social Security Hoard) has prescribed de tailed procedure requirements for ‘ ‘ fair hearings. Any claimant wl o is aggrieved by any agency action affecti lg his rcc< ipt of assistance, including tormina- 9 tion, must be afforded a bearing i f be requests one. T ie claimant must be informed of bis right to a bear ing, how to obtain it, and that be may be rep -esented by counsel; and any clear express.•• n o f a desire to present bis cast' to higher authority must be treated a an effective request, lea rings m to be conducted by impartial officers, in accordant with published procedures, at a time and place < nvcnient to the elaima d and after reasonable noth.' to him. A t the It aria s. the claimant must have ; opportunity to c amii o all documents and roc >rds tst'd at tin' hear- it g, re hte any testimony or evident present, bis own e idem o, witnesses, and testimony, dvance all perti- n nt arguments and secure conside tion o f any fac tual or legal issue important, to his r dm. The decision n ust be based exclusively on the e 'deuce and other muteri d introduced at tl e hearng. ] iandbook §§ (1200, ft 00; ilrie f for Appellants in \o. 14, pp. 3u-9a. In si ort, while “ |'t.]lie hearing is co iduc >d in an informal r: ther than formal court-type pro< lure in order to serve the best interests of Hit1 clai ant. [, it] * is to he subject to the requirement:- >f due process.” LI. at y 6400(a), p. 10a. A 1th >m b tliest' j roced ices an ■ foi >wed at the “ fair la arin ,” until recent! \ the inly requirement for a; enee pioeedures ]>rim to termini ion or reduction ol pay in its 1o individi als already receiving aid or assistance was that the paymei ts m ist be continued until 1 lere bad been a formal agei y determination that, t (' individual was no h.ngei eligible or was ebgibb only for lesser amounts. ’ hat is, agencies ci uld iot terminate or reduce issis nice jam ling in- 10 vcstigations or the evaluation of information it had received. Handbook, § 2200( b) ( l). I Jut 1 hoy were not required to inform recipients that an investigation or evaluation was under way or to permit them to par ticipate in the process leading to this initial decision. Once the agency decided to terminate or reduce assist ance, it could do so without advance notice or any ! wring procedures and then 1 otif'y the individual of his right to a “ fair hearing.” The rules governing Federal funding operated in a way which probably encoorag l the Slates to make tl ere determinations promptly, and did not encourage i volvement of the recipient at this slagt. As a matter ( overall policy, there is a st ng inter‘st in paying ; sistance to all individuals w ho are eligible, and in < nying assistance to ail indivi luah who are not eligi- 1 e. There is also a need, in a Fedoral-Siaie program, :f r a fa ir sharing between the federal and State gov- t muents o f the costs of those case.- in which, despite tl e best efforts of the administrators to determine ( igibility, payments are made to persons Inter found 1 have been ineligible. Accordingly, Federal mateh- i g funds are paid in cases where a Stale follows the < rrect procedures hut err meo isly determines that an i dividual is eligible. To inis extend, the Federal gov- ( nnlent shares in the payment of ineligible cases, in tl e interests of orch rly aclministr iti >n. As a condition of such p iym< nts l ndcr the previous i gulations, however, the 1 'edera! government insisted o speedy action, with r< ;pect to both the periodic r pilar reevalnation of all reci ienis and the special e ablations which tl e Stab s are - xp >cted to undertake 11 upon receipt of information suggesting the possible ineligibility of particular recipients. Thus, if rede- terminations of < iigibility were not made within pre scribed time periods and the recipient turned out to have become ineligible, Federal rinancial participation was not av; ifable for payments in periods beyond the dead'ine for Dial ing the re< eterminat: >n. Handbook § 22<H(di ; § of) 14 , item 2a. i imilarly, the State must investigate within 30 d; vs any report of possible in eligibility received during tin interim Ir ween regular reiuwstig.i; ions. Handbook § of, 14, i 'in 2b. The periods ■•wed did not ])m■mit i 01 lgtl : ]Vi .1 oeedures. i a r('SI iif, wi ere assistauee \vas tm iiinated or ro (I I ICC :! a., 11. i ;a “ fa'r hear: ]} oy was tlien osted, the usual st;: i o pract ice was to 11 .•» V”/ > 1 <1 > V the t mu illation or redu.i •t iOT\ h i effe<-t ] lending lie learin -if;.( cn;ues eouk' co: ■4 ;; .me th ■ paymcuts if thay wi died, but Fed- oral :inamcial as dstanv ■ was no■ pro idee1, and in ju'ac ice the Stati ■s did not oi■dinarily i: ■if'C such pay ment V,dthout .1'Vdora 1 m; i chi i:g. ! f the hearing decis.l on vvas in favor iif ti: ■ im!i vidu 1, tiho. States could •eins' ate t: ie pay item " P-'<iSTV'Ct i vely., or they could pay for t! ie bad ]>e •iod. I f ti ey i'•hose the latte COIll'se, flu y woi1 id n •eivi Fed. ral matching fund B. TUR PIlESRXT Ii ■’.Q Fill i HTCXTS Tit * revent changes, i lost of w hich 1>ok effect on •Inly I, 106S, considerably m< lifted the : xisting prac- tice by requiring advance n< ice that adverse action is pi ■ lined, and an opportuni y for an informal con- fere ee before that acti< n tal >s effect, ; ad providing an ilargei scope of fklera! funding participation 12 during the process of assistance reduction or termina- 1 ion. Thus, it is now required for participation in feder ally-funded programs that when a question arises concerning change in a recipient’s circumstances, the agency must give—- advance notice of ques ions it h is about an individual’s eligibility s that a rcc picnt has an opportunity to discus his situ lion before receiving formal writ! n notice' >f reduction in payment or terminati n of assist mce. [Hand book' § 2200(d ) (5 ) . ] This irocedure is designed tc serve so' ral purposes in the public' assistance prog 11ns. First it gives the individual a chance1 to bring lew or additional facts o the agency’s attention ; thus he may Ik able to show, arior te> anv more lormal a< ion, that ids situation ias not actually changed, or as cliany d to a lesser legre e than the agency belie es. I f In can tliereby avoid termination of assistai -e, it ben fits both the individual, who does not h; e his usi al payments inter upted and need ne>t sen a “ fair tearing,” and the agency, which will be t Hired the expense and staff time involved in an unn -essary I anal hearing. More >ver, because this advan ■ notice ; ocedure must be followed in all cases, ev n those' r cipients who would not contest terminatioi of assist ice are given some time to prepare for 10 effect vhich it will have on their financial sit itions, e! minating the el cm* nt of surprise. I t soon became obvious the states w 1 information of possible ineligibility could ot com pi with this new requ rement within the 30 ay peri* allowed for 13 making a determination of ineligibility du ing which Federal matching continued. Accordingly, the States are now permitted an additional 30-day period of federal matching during which to give the advance notice, provide time for the recipient to obtain and appear at a conference, eonsidei any new evidence or oilier re levant matters he may raise, and determine whether he is still eligible. Ham book § 5b 1, item 2c. Tl e fact that the new period i this brie however, sh \vs tl at the conference is con rived as a, i informal an exj(editions proceeding bef -e local aft", not a tri . 1-type “ fair hearing’ ' at the date agem y level. It is nerely a method of providing lotice am screening on thoi-e cases which can he vsolved h\ informal pi 'Cedures. iter the advance notice p ocedure, t le agency m; kes its determination on the basis of all the infor mal ion it then lias available. ssistance payments nn st 1h continued as before 1 > this point. I f the ag ncy < <-ternlines that assistant will be ter >limited or re< need, it nur t communicate tl decision In writing to he in lividual and advise him ' his right to request; a • fair iearing” before the Sta e agency. i f a “ fair lie; ring” is not requested, that the end < f the mat tei I f a hearing is requested, t State must hold it an tak ‘ final administrative a lion withi i (it) days of the eqnesty' Handbook § (12 0 ( j ) , but is not ro- s flic S'ate is allowed ail additional ( days of fe leral match ing to carry out the mechanics of disco I inning or r during pay- mo Is. Ifa ldboolc, §5514. item 2d..Tin a total of liree 30-dav pei ods— tor investigation of ineligibi y, for the idvance no- tic; and c inference, and for stopping • payment are allowed foi continuation of Federal matching u State pa\ lents to in ch; 'I>11‘ individuals and families. 302 09------ 3 14 quired to continue assistance pending tin> heaving and decisi >n. I f the State does continue as istance, how ever, [federal matching- funds now will hr paid, Hand- hook § 6500(b), whether the lie a ring decision is in .favor of the recipient or the agency. Two or three of the S ales continue assistance pending liraring. In all of tin other States, if the hea ring decisii 11 is in favor of th recipient, the agency i repaired lo make cor rect!' payments retroactive!;, to the date of the in- corre t action terminating r reducing payments, ITani look § 6200(k), and Fe< ral matcl ng funds are •aid ir these corrected paynu its, TTandl ml; § 6500(a). (a ). In sum, under the cun- utly a]i]>1 icahle IIE W equi ements, assistance pay: 'ids unde federal pro- ,'rani may not he terminated or redu -cd until the ecipi 'lit has been given a dvr ice notice and an oppor tunity for a conference, and lie agency lias made its ( eteri iination. I f the paymo ts are terminated, the iudivi Inal may obtain a “ f r hearing" which com- orts with the customary reqi irements o ‘ due process efor< such termination bee< mes final. I f the hearing < ecision is in favor of the recipient, corrective pay ment must he made retroact; ely. Tho ; ate at its op tion ay continue payments aiding th hearing and, if it oes so, there will he fi ral shariu ;■ in the pay- i icuts regardless of whethei he d<'<-isi . i is in favor >>f t Ik recipient or the agency.' “On August 20, 1 !)<>!), 11 ic Sec tary postp.. >d IVom O.to- 5m 1, lie.), to July 1. 1070, the c 'Ctivo date ■ a new regula- i on r paring that, in cases in Iving <pu-- i >ns of fact or j ulgm it relating to the partici, ir individual involved (as < isting lishetl from cases involvii the application of a gen- 15 SUMMARY OF A GUMENT No question lias been raised that the trial-type hear ing t hat is held at the reqi est of tlie recipient of welfare assistance before the erminatioi or reduction <>f his benefits becomes final, satisfies 1 fill the statu tory requirement of “ fair hearing” and the constitu tional requirement of procedural due process. The issue here is the narrower o: ‘ of the liming of such bearing: whether it must be eld bcfop there is any preliminary termination or p luction o benefits. We subnet that the present a< ninistrati e practice— under which the beneficiary p eives ad nee notice of a proposed termination or r< luction o his benefits lias tb(' opportunity for infoi nil confc mce with the taff of tin' State welfare ag icy befoi • such action is taken, and can obtain a “ f; r bearin', ’ before such termination or reduction lie* ines final -satisfies the statutory and constitutional requirenwilts o f fair hearing. A. Where questions of adm istrativc iroeeduve are -oncerned, “ the re<iui rements due pro ss frequently vary with the typo of proceei ng invol d ’ ’ {Ilannali • La d ie , 3(13 l .S. -130, -110 ). n the co ext of public velfare programs, these reqi •ements , > I so may vary •nil policy to individual cases, see ifra, pp. ,-85), assistance be continued until (here has been trial-type earing, 84 IMP 3595 (19(59). A press release of lie Departi cut of Health, education, and Welfare explained taf the Si \s are slid pip ing into effect the federal require nits whirl became effective uly 1, 19(>S, and are working t attendai problems, and hat some States have taken the j it ion that i lie effect of the iew regulation will he to keep re pients on , u> rolls hevond lie point of reasonahle question ah it their el hilily. 16 "'it'll tin; nature of the programs adopted. We discuss oidy what procedures are required for tlx particular program here involved. The determinatio i of the appropriate procedures here requires a balancing of competing social policy considerations invoicing, on the one hand, he govern ment’s interest in avoiding improper ex. uditure of v dfarc funds and unduly burd< nsome pro. (hires, and o i the other hand the interest of the -ipients of Public assistance in fair treatment and p >er receipt of the benefits Congi*ess intended them t( lave. Since " are interpreting the statut try re<[uii incut that th >re be a “ fair hearing,” snbst; ntial wei: t should be gi' en to the expert judgment of the Secretary that, on the basis of present experience with the opera te n of public assist nice progr; ms, the p icedures he ha-i adopted constiti te the most approp ate method f« ’ accomplishing th > congressional direct ve. The cur- r< it procedures bee; me effective' only on ' dy I. 19(JS ai 1 it is still too soon to make an adeouate assess- nn nt of their effectiveness. The changes they have m de have required substantia! modifiewi ms bv the St ites of their prior practice, and these i i ditications ha Te not been completely achiev d. I f the . -esent pro- cedures should prove inadequaie properl \ to accom plish the Congressional purpose retlected n the fed- ei'.d program here i lvolved, th< Secretary can make fu flier changes. It is important, ho\ve\< ■, that his thr ibility to do so should be preserved, and that fixed procedures should no be required. There is a strong public interest in av< iding con tinuation of payments to persom who arc i ot entitled 17 thereto, both to avoid improper disbursement ol' gov- ernment funds and to prevent prejuc ee to the inter ests of eligible persons who would suffer i f substan tial sums were paid to ineligible ones, i f benefits were required to be continued whenever a trial-type bear ing was requested, the inevitable res It would be the disburse merit, of significant amounts to person ulti mately found not entitled thereto. 15. I f contrary to our submission, the Court >re to conclud ■ that the present procedures - re inadeq ite, it should ot require a preliminary tri; type hea ng in every case before' payments can be in . ially term nated or rcdiK >d. Such a requirement, which he court below in No. 62 came close to adopting, would - mse sub antial and unnece'ssary delay in a large number of cases and would i npose needless expense upon the welfar pro grams. Moreover, the court below in Vo. 62 apn rent- ly woul 1 require a trial-type hearin even wh" e the only issue raised by the claimant is the validity of settled principles of general applicability— as, for exampli , a challenge to the general evel of In ictits. Rcquiri ig a trial-type hearing in ev ry such ca te be fore be; efits could be initially termii ited would mean that pe. sons who had no hope of ulti itely pre\ tiling becaust hey art'ineligible under the cl llenged) vctico neverth less could continue to receive enefits u il the hearing were held. A trial-type heat ng ordin; rily is not ret, tired before a general prim pie is ro inely applied o a particular individual. 18 ARGUMENT NEITHER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE NOR THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT 01*' “ FAIR HEARING” REQUIRES A TRIAL- TYPE HEARING BEFORE WELFARE ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS ARE TERMINATED OR REDUCED No question lias been raised in these eases that the trial-type hearing, ae< mled 01 request, to the recip ient of welfare assistance before the termination or reduction of his benefits becomes final, satisfies both the statutory requirement of “ lair bearing’7 and the constitutional standard of procedural due process. The issue, rather, involves the timing- of such hearing: whether, as the recipients coi fund, it must be held before there is any suspension, termination or reduc tion of benefits, or whether, as the Secretary believes, the constitutional and statutory requirements are sat isfied as long as the recipient can obtain such “ fair hearing” before there is a find determination as to whether bis benefits are to be ended or reduced. To state the issue another way, in the context of public assistance programs involving millions of re cipients and thousands of possible hearings every year, do the essential elements of ir procedure require anything more than the present practice? Ihider that practice, ( 1 ) the beneficiary receives advance notice that bis payments are to be terminated or reduced ; ( 2 ) he has the opportunity for a cm Perenco with the staff of the wel fare agency before su< h termination or reduc tion, at which the reasons I'm* the action will be explained to him and he can present any facts or ex planations showing why his assistance should be con tinued at ts existing level; (3 ) if the state then termi 19 nates or reduces assistance, he can obtain a “ fair hear ing” lx*fore llie state action becomes final; and (4 ) if lie prevails at such hearing, lie receives back payments for the interim period during which his benefits were terminated or reduced. Our submission is that the present procedures sat isfy both the statutory and conditutional equirements >f fair hearing, and that a t mil-type hearing is not required before public assistance is susp tided, termi nated or reduced. I t also follows, we bel we, that wel fare recipients arc* not entitled to a continuation of their previous benefits during the period between pre liminary termination or reduction and tlie final deci sion of the state agency that i rendered after a “ fair hearing” in those relatively fe cases wl ere such more formal proceeding is requestet A. THE SECRETARY^ PRESENT PRACTICE-— UNDER WHICH THE RECIP IENT OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE IS CI\ V NOTICE 1) OPPORTUNITY FOR A CONFERENCE PRIOR TO TERM \TION OR R! RUCTION OF AS SISTANCE AN1) CAN OBTAIN A TRIAl 1'YPE HEAR! ,G BEFORE SUCH TERMINATION OR REDUCTION IiKO IBS FIN AI -SATISFIES THE STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF A FAIR HEARING 1 . Neither any of Hie partie. nor tin* Dinted Stales disputes that the Due Proee. Clause of the Four- teentl Amendment and, for 11 District if Columbia, the F ifth Amendment to the tonstituth n, are appli- cabli* to public welfare progi mis. Alt! ugh there is no constitutional requiremei that sic li programs exist- so that access to benefi payment could be de scribed for some purpose's as a 'privileg ' rather than a “ right”—the fact of their < \istenee carries with it the guarantees against gove mental iprioiousness 20 and arbitrariness embodied in those clauses. /'>.//., Sherbcrt v. Vom er, 274 U.S. 208; Shapiro v. Thomp son, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n. 6. bidiis observation, however, serves only to frame the question of what procedures are to be followed in benefit termination cases, not to answer it. For where questions of administrative pro cedure are concerned, as dislinct from the issues of capriciousness and arbitrariness involved in the cited cases, “ the requirements of due process frequently vary with the type of proceeding involved.” Hannah v. Larchc, 363 U.S. 420, 440. A r the Court, expl ained in Cafeteria. Workers v. McElroi/, 367 U.S. 886, 895: [Consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set, of c ircum stances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function in volved as well as of tin private interest that has been affected by governmental act ion. * * * There would bo significant differences, for example, in the procedures necessary in a zoning case, a prosecu tion for a capital crime, a garnishment, a suspension of a government employee, or the termination or re duction of public assistance. 2 . Tn the context of pubi e welfare programs, we believe those requirements might also vary with the nature and aims of the prog vms adopted. 1 f a State wished to— and assuming it constitutionally could__ revert to programs for dispensing charitv to the “ worthy poor,” it, might be permitted far different procedures than would have h attend programs whose purposes include promotion < f equity among all re cipients and their freedom fi >m the private charity 21 giver’s traditional control. In view of these possible variations, we address ourselves only to the question what (hie process requires for the federal!) funded programs lore at issue. For their purpose is <• ear. When the Social Security Act was issed its : public assistance titles were designed to bring about, for the population groups to wi ieh they app ied, important changes in the i .oner of dis] ,nsing aid to the needy, flic pub!i almoner had been prone to assume he prero fives of the giver of private eliarih, to gran or with hold according to his judgment o f the deserts of 1 te applicant, and often to assunr a pater nalistic control over the live s o f those lie aided. Tin Social Security Act s night to itroduce int< this field a govern 1 lent of laws, a:; 1 to that end. among others, attached a series . f condi tions to it s proffer of fedei al grant n-aid to the states. One of the condh ions re' res that the state grant a fair lieari g to any pplicant who is denied assistance; otl rs look 1 uniform application of the plan throughout tk state, to equiiable treatment of pers< is in dil’i ing eco nomic situations, and to 1 e safegu ding of information about applicants, and r. -ipients; while tin' definition of assistance as “ n uey pay ments” calls for the givin ; o f casl with no strings attached. [W illcox, he Lav r in the Adiuinistritiou of Nonrec laiory 'ograms, Public Administration Rev w, Yob t i l , No. 1, W inter 1953,12, 15-1G.] In thus legislating to provide f >r the general wel fare, the Congress authorized the i e of Fed al funds to fi mis! part of the cost o f pa incuts m le under Stall pub c assistance plans. lIow< er one nr r charac- 0 9 / / / terize the interest of the benefieiaries of such pro grams, it certainly is less tangible than that o f the beneficiaries of the federal old-age, survivors’ and dis ability insurance program. For under 1 he latter pro gram the potential beneficiaries pay taxes therefor that are placed in a trust fund so lhat, unlike the public assistance benefits here involved, payments are not dependent upon yearly Congress! ■ ial appropria tions. Yet even under that program ihe “ right” to bene its is not protected under the Fifth Amendment in t ie manner of personal property ( Flcmminf/ v. Neat or, 36b U.S. 603), and benefits are terminated, redu jed or suspended without a prior t rial-type hear ing.7 The statutory mandate that there ' a “ fair hear ing” before public assistan-e payments are denied helps to define the kind of protect ion lhat Congress intended to give the be noth iaries of tch payments. The statute does not distin uish bel\ en the initial denial of applications for bei 'fits and "ir subsequent- deni;'. I by termination. Whe t a State agency decides initially that a new applica t for hem tits is not en titled! thereto, it does so wit sout first >lding a < rial- type hearing; such a liearim is held o y if tlic appli cant requests it; and when uch a he. ing is sought, 7 While (.here are differences be> the old ag.' survivors’ and disab grams, a requirement that the S sistance payments pending the <l sistent with ‘lie practice aufhori Act for the 0ASD1 program, \ by t! e Federal government and whicl irdiv! buds have a stated seen the pi ity insur.an ;tes must < u r hearing d under I aich is <I i • lvolvos ii ■ “ right." 'ic assistance and ■ fO A S D ! ) pro- itinuo public as- would be incon- Socia! Security 11 v .administered ranee benefits to . 11. hlfr:'-. 23 benefits are not ]>aicl in the interim.8 I t lias never been suggre ted that this procedure denies tlie applicant a "fa ir icaring.” As we develop below, cogent policy considerations support the Secretary’s judgment that the same prac tice should be followed where following the informal conference procedure, the Shite initia ly decides to lermirate or reduce benefits, fids pra dice not only records with the statutory re< uirement that there be ucha hearing before a claim f< rassistan -e is “ denied,” but is further supported by the statutory provisions autlioi izing the Secretary to adopt such methods of admin stration as he finds t< lie necessary for the grope • and efficient operation o public a> distance plans. -’2 U.S.C. 302 (a)(5 ), 602(a) ( f ) . °. d o determination of wha procedu es and timing are appropriate in an administrative proceeding of inis h pe requires a balancing of competing social ] obey considerations. On the one hand, there is the interest of the government in insuring that tiie pro- tedures do not become either so unnecessarily expen sive or so time-consuming and cumbers* me that their i ltimate effect is to hinder rather th; n aid in the ( ffectu ition of the public policies the program re- f ects. )n the other hand, there is the i derest of the } ersons affected—-here the recipients of public assist ance— in being fa irly treated and in pro] >rlv recefving t le benefits they rightfully cai expect the program to 8I f t ,0 applicant prevails at sue hearing. ! .'iiefits are paid ritroactively to the date of the in al (hut er oneous) denial. accomplish. These two interests are complementary lather than antithetical. For welfare recipients would suffer in the long run if' the government were required to follow inefficient and unnecessarily burdensome re quirements, while the public interest would suffer if the recipients were not treated fairly. Moreover, since we are dealing with the interpre tation o f the statutory command that there be a “ fa ir hearing,” it is appropriate to give considerable weight to the expert judgment of the Secretary that, on the basis of our present experience with the operation o f ] ublic assistance programs, the procedures he has < dopted constitute the most appropriate method for accomplishing the congressional directive. The current procedures have been in effect only since -July il, 1968, and ii is still too soon to make an adequate assessment of their effectiveness in properly accommodating the competing policy considerations. The introduction of the new informal conference pro cedure and the establishment of the 60-dav period for completing trial-type hearings wl eu requested came at a time when an increasing mi nber o f public as sistance recipients were challengir ? agency decisions, were represented by counsel and wore requesting “ fa ir hearings.” In order to handle this nereased workload, the .States had to hire and train more hearing exami ners and to appropriate funds for their employment. Although the States have made substantial progress in solving these problems, they have not been fully sur mounted. Moreover, in some States a large number of public assistance recipien s have r< quested “ fair hear- i lgs” to challenge basic aspects of the particular wel 24 I fare program involved—contending, for example,: that the level of 1) 'nefits is inadequate.” Challenges of this type inevitably lead to extensive delay in the hearing and decision of all pending cases. The nature of public assistance programs inevitably requires consi lerable room for experiment and change in determining, through trial and error, what are the most effective methods for carrying out the programs. It is therefor > important that flexibility in adjusting the procedures to changing circumstances remain available to tl e Secretary. Significant changes recently have been lira le in the procedures, and i f they should prove i lappi >priate in the light of experience in working witl them, the way always is open for the Secretary to nodify them still further. A t this stage of their devei >pment, however, the procedures should 9 For examplt during the r eek' of January 29, 1!>( >, there were approxim; ely 500 requests for hearings in the Miami, Florida, area < udlenging the amount of assistance and the method of its < imputation. In seven counties in Kentucky in July 1969 there vore 417 requests for hearings challengii g deter mination.- of ine gibility that had resulted from a change made by the State >f Ke tueky in its delinition of um mployment In De- cemher l! >8 and January I960 in Los Angeles County, California, there wer ■ 222 inquests for hearings on the contention hat the amount o' bene !i is was inadequate; in Hinds County, IMf hssippi, in July )67 th re were 184 requests for hearings on the same question. In October 1968 in Philadelphia, I’ennsylven a, there were 275 requests for hearings on a claim that each child should re eive $50.00 to have an American Christmas. In add ion, theme have recent! v been several instances in which a large nun her of requests have been made for a hearing on a single issue. Foi instance, in New York City in November 1968 l ! we were approxin ttely 1! >00 requests for hearings on whether the ■ upient needed a eleplx le. 2(1 not be frozen into the fixed molds in' ]lc 'ssistanee recipients would push ( 4 Testf,(1 by these standards, we Secretary's present procedures for fa i“ Payments meet the statutory a requirements of a. fa ir hearing. 1,1 view o f Congress' choice to requ m - ' for aggrieved claimants of he Hoc al Security Act and the implicath for the nature o f the benefit progra we lo not argue that it is -possibli [the receipt of benefits under the Act | loge subject to the Executive’s plen that “ notice and iiearing are not co: finir -d.” Cafeteria Workers, supra, : Xon 'fheless, the privilege aspect o f r, role s both the government unction interest involved in a way which be the 'prior hearing question. Av a matter of government funetioi in th '\ ri.-ht of the federal and state p!a.c< budgetary limitations on the tot• they will undertake for the e progr; mati- ally than a simple desire for <: rost, such limitations make ; i aceure binds to eligible ])ersons imp. •ative; i of ineligible persons are abb to enf. receive benefits for substantia! period ■“frect will be to reduce the amounts sharing by eligible recipient . ft see: hut f payments are eontim d pend:- ug” here will be more reqi -sts for 0 which the pub- 1 hem. mb:.lit that the 'rimnafing wel- I constitutional ' re a “ fa ir hear- 1 "'fits under the os of t hat choice u, supra, p. 22, to ‘Anraw: rize as a mere ju ivi- 1 ry power, ’ ’ so <itutionallv re- E.S. at 8.fib. eipt of benefits oid the private ors directly on . if. is reflected ovfunments to I expenditures ms. More dra- ieiency or low • a i Vocation of I urge nmnhcrs ree a right to of time, the available foi l s predictable g “ fair hoar- uch hearings, and mcm payments will be made to ineligible individual . rl'be full effect of continuation o f payme its pend ing hearing would be experienced only ovc a ])eriod of years. \t present, information is scanty. Missis sippi, however, in August 1968 put into effc: ‘ a policy ef continr.ing assistance pending “ fa ir lie ring” in eases of t< -urination o f assistance. For the ; ar ended dune 30, il )69, the increase over ti e previoi s year in the numb r of liearings requested was sul -tantially greater in -ases involving terminat on o f ]> • fits than for all we fare cases; the latter inn-eased r -uglily 40 pore; nt, fi an 773 to 1059, while th * former increased appr iximaiely 200 percent, from )7 to 28 . O f the 288 inquests for hearings in 19(38- 9(i9 inv< sing tor mina ion < ’ benefits, 46 wore witbd awn pro • to hear ing, one e! limant died before lieai ing, 26 <• ises were pend ng o- July 1 , 1969, and 215 < ecisions cere ren dered. 50 < ecisions were in favor o the clai lant, and 165 decisions uphold the agency’s d terminal on. Thus, on the basis of the “ fair hoari g ” deci-ions, the claimant was ineligible in 77 pe cent of die cases wher - assistance was continued, n the p ior year, when benefits were not continued ] aiding h siring, 57 hearings were held in termination ases; tin claimant prevailed n seven, and the State geney i 50. Moreover, the cognizable priva ■ intorei- in con tinued rec-’ ipt of welfare benefits ending 1 earing is i lore tentai ive than a direct interest i proper .• as such. The issue ;s not whether a present sset is t< be taken away fron its owner, but whether he reel] nt shall continue t- share in a limited reso ree altlu ugh (un- 28 like others) his eligibility is in serious doubt. There could be no legitimate interest in a prior hearing simply as a means by which ineligible persons could proh ng the time during which they continue to receive benefits at the expense of the general public and, pos sibly. of eligible recipients. Tbe in teres arises because some individuals in fact are or have a sound claim that they are, eligible despil a prelii linary determi- nati< n to the contrary, and herefore should not be mad* to suffer such hardslii is as ar< set out in the com] laints. Thus, as would lot be true of property detei urinations, assessment o the indi\ idual’s stake in a p ro r hearing depends on i nv often the individuals reqm sting such hearings pro ail. Th i present case is then lore unlike Sniadacli v. Fam ly Finance Carp., 395 1 .S. 337, \ here the Court inva dated, under the Thu Process Clause o f the Poui eentli Amendment, a t ate pro<- dure by which wag( s could be garnished ay bout pr >r notice to or opp< 'tunity for hearing for le wage arner. The key to t at decision was that “ [w ]e deal here with wage — a specialized type of iroperty presenting dis tinct problems in our econom - system' (p. 340). Potli the i lajority opinion and tl - concuri ing opinion of Mr. rustice Harlan made pi in that t ie State proce dure was invalid because gar islnnent involves the im- med be taking of a AArage e -ner’s “ property” ; and the < ourt stated ( p. 339) th: althoug i “ [s]uch sum- man procedure may well i -et the i -quirements of 29 due process in extraordinary sit tations,” 0 garnish ment 1>y a wage earner’s creditor vas not such a situ ation. In the present case, howe er— as in cases in volving government employment, licenses, and other benefits commonly dealt with thix ugh the ; dministra- tive proc >ss-—the recipients have 10 prope -ty (in the classic se ise) of which the gove unent is seeking to deprive them. In cases involvin the question what procedui 1 due process required in this • property h'ss com *xt, this Court has sev ral time indicated tliai the mswer permissibly vari s with tl e proceed ing and private interests concert d.11 E.g., Hannah v. 10 The cl iss of “extraordinary situat ns-’ is large enough to include sui unary actions to protect goc 'rrunent r< enues. Phil lips v. Commissioner, 28“ TT.S. 589, 591 597. Thus even should this Court conclude that this case does all within the teaching of hniadach, it does not follow that h< rings prio to termina tion or reduction are constitutionally required, ft would be nece ssary to assess whether in the we are conic" t any threat to gtvernn cut revenues posed by a requ cement cl >rior hearing is so great. s to justify summary procedu e. 11 Statute ty solutions to the problem 1 ive not bet > uniform. A licet se to use part, of the limited broa cast sped um may not usu; lly be suspended before notice am hearing, ' TJ.S.C. 312 (c) and see, 5 U.S.C. (Supp. IV ) 1 -8(c) : but there is ex- plic t statutory authority to suspend b< .efits unde the Federal Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Ins ranee Ben tits Program bef< re. hea •ing, 42 U.S.C. 403(h )(3 ), f it appeti 'S that there is a dangei of overpayments being mac , and fede al employees are regularly suspended from their en, >loyment i advance of the hearings to which they are entitled under the Civil Service Act. As in Phillipy supra, n. 10, the <1 ect involv ment of gov ern! Lent revenues in the latter cases 5 iay justify a procedure more summary than would be appropri te where ; benefit with out cost t< the government, such as a roadcast I -ense, is con cern id. Si lilarly, in case of “jeopard; federal axes may be assessed a d collected without any op] ntunity f< r prior hear ing. Inten il Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. >1-68(14. 30 Larc'ne, 363 U.S. 420, 440; Cafeteria \ I'Jlror. 307 U.S. 886, 894-895. Th>* present statistics show that sub- ineligible tlian eligible individuals reqi ings’ V 1' Moreover, it p la in tiff prevail, her a id proportion of ineligible indO mg f; ir hearings might increase. Such retiec either a substantial degree of usi iiig” requests as a means of proiongi; ments for individuals who clearly are hie, or, as the appellant in No. 62 suggv pp. 14-17, tl'.e efficient fuuct oning ot new | re-hearing notice-and-cu nferenee eithe. case, the argument for -fa ir lie; terrni nation or reduction of benefits less s rung than it is now. 12 While a substantial proportion of ‘‘ fan- lie past led to reversal or modi ieation <>j leterminations, only a small propo tion of U a reqi cst.s for such hearings. Tlui forms ■ i fornia to the National Center for Social St a nartmi nt of Health, Education an Welfare leriod July 1, 1908. to March .'ill, 1 09— durim ‘‘or Appellants in No. 14 states tl; -re were ■oncer; ing termination of assist an e, p. lU, i total of 163,035 terminations of r -sistance n •ity Act programs. O f these, 98,98- represent issistanca under the Aid for Famil -s with I )« irogram, and the remainder, the a rious adu Statistics collected in the annual -eports of Nationwide Quality Control Svstei on Publi V f o r t'w year April 1, 1907, > March ocal a pencies in the nation as a w iole incorr ermin i-ted benefits in 5.6 percent >f AFFK if adi t program cases, and under] lid benefit VFTX and 9 percent of adult p igram cas hand, .0 percent of A F D C cases i id 1.7 per- o r k e r s v. 31 c - tantially more est " fa ir hear- both the num- duals request- chaugo might of “ fair hear- g benefit pay- 0 longer eligi- is in bis brief, the relatively ieclmiques. fit ring” prior to could be even earing-s’’ have in adverse agency 1 niinal ions rc nit hm if ted by ( ali- istics of the De- how that in the which the- Uriel' "fair hearings” . 12— there wore >der Social Secn- d termination of icndent Ohihlren jirograms. i he Department's Assistance Case . 1908, show that -ct 1 v withheld or and 4.0 percent in II percent of ■s. On the other -nt of adult pro- 31 The ewrently applicable Federal strike the oalance fairly in the light of ently known. The individual lias adv; termination or reduction of: assistance nity for conference. Such con Terence p formal, expeditious procedure available ents with respect to whom the agency ing termination or reduction of paymei is thus inform; 1 of the proposed agency vance and can get an explanation; i f lie the content plat d action is incorrect, it < The emphasis is on notice, communicate ing out those cases where the agency < shown it is making a mistake, or the r< given informal ion so that he understa ineligible. The risk of incorrect St; thereby reduced. I f tire State agency tl that the term nation or reduction is claimant s afforded opportunity foi hearing, which is to be conducted exj the minority o f cast's where the agenc out to be incorrect, corrective payments- The proct-du,-e tlms provides an expo< for handling a large volume of cases gives all welfare recipients the opportui gram. c;ises involved incorrect determinations were eligibh, and 10.4 percent of AFDO and adult p.'ogr; m recipients were being overpaid These (ignn ■> are compiled by State quality the basis o! a controlled sampling of local and are en irelj7 independent of “ fair hear These latter figures, however, cover total tern do not know in bow many instances hearing requiren mts what is pres- ice noth of tnd opportu- ivides an in to all reoipi- contem >lat- ts. Ever one action i. ad- an show that n l)o ave fed. i, and screen- ii readil ' be i])ient c;i i be Is why i e is e action; is n dotern ines justified, the a trial- ype ditiously 111 action 1 urns are mad . tious m< hod i a way hat ty to exi lain that rocij ients 10.1 percc I of iring this ime. •ntrol uni ■; on ency case files g” prorr ires, at ions, ;e: we vere ra w ;ted. 32 to tlie State agency in advance why their payments should not be termin; ted or curtailed, with the assur ance o f a trial-type bearing I efore such State action becomes final. I t satisfies both the statutory and con stitutional command op fair hearing. ]’.. I P T H E COl'JtT WERE TO t ’ONOIAIDE I'll AT TH E 1’EENENT PRACTICE IS INADEQUATE, i t s n o t I) NOT r e q u ir e A P R E L IM IN A R Y T R IA L - T Y P E HEARING IN' EVERY \8E UEPOR PAYM EN TS (!A ' P,E IN IT IA L L Y TERM INATED OR REDUCE A principal inten t o f tin United States in this case is to avoid a pi -.liberation of hearings and pro- cedures which would substant ally burden the admin istration of the Soci il Security Act without confer ring material benefii on eligi >le recipients. The dis trict court in No. 62, owever, failed to adopt this per spective. I pon colic1 ding that due process requires more substantial pro< edings ] rior to termination, the court’s solution was o enlarge and expand the ad vance notice and info mal conference procedure which is required before tin agency edetermines eligibility. By adding the vaiio s procot ural elements which it concluded are requii 1 by du * process ai that early stage, the court mad two sig lificant changes in the overall procedure. First, the conferen ; is no h ngor a conference; it is something close to a ull-dres hearing at which wit nesses must appear, ; id the it apient lias the right to question them, etc. ideed, t ie court stated: “ W e realize that these req rement- will duplicate the ‘fair hearing’ post-termina ion ]iroc ‘dure to some extent.” Goldberg App. 385a. ! bus, the e may be two bearings in each case, the pre- erminat >n and the post-termi nation hearing. This seems unnecessary and potential ly expensive. Most likely, the 30-day time period now provided for the advance notice and conference pro cedure will be inadequate in many cases, so that addi tional time will be needed before the agency can determine whether the recipient has become im ligible. Moreover, the procedure may often rove inadequate to handle cases involving complex I dual sit ations. Finally, it might so burden the agen y staff a; to add further del; ys before these matters can be finally resolved—a result; as detrimental to welfare re ipients as to the agency. Such a procedure es not a] pear to be conducive to the proper and effi< *nt oper; tion o f the welfare program. The second, and closely related, difficult;, arises from the requirement that assistance be conti iued in all cases until the agency’s initia determ nation, which is made after the first confer nee hear ng and which, because of the new procedure required for all cases, necessarily will further dele; the adn nistra- tive process at a point where it is ; ready o\ 'rburd- ened and dilatory. The added expen e to the federal am; State agencies could be consider; le. The seriously adverse effect o f tin leeision ; clow in No. 62 is compounded by ils applic; on even o cases where ihe claimant challenges only le provisions of law or settled agency policy. A t leas; me of th appel lees in that case, Mrs. Altagraeia G man, ap tears to present only' such an issue in her con daint. M \s. Guz man's VFDG payments are alleged i be in it minent danger of t rmuiation because she 'fuses t< assign to New Yoi k welfare authorities In right o action 34 ! against her husband for non-support once with an established policy, threaten to terminate her benefits. She the tacts nor the policy’s applicabili simply asserts that the policy ‘ ‘has no and indeed is contrary to th • statutes State ” Goldberg App. 25a. ' lie court exclu !o her from the relief g anted.1:1 I f ‘very individual subject d as am to tin adverse impact of a ge oral adn icy could require that his bet ‘fits be - ing ; trial-type hearing on the law I' policy, this could almost par lyzc the of t l i1 Act and would add immeasural The ( Ifect of requiring trial-1 vpe heari eases would be that persons a ho could no vindication from the pr cedures 33 Its failure to do so may luo ■ been ina ]>oint in its opinion tlie court note ! that "W> with the issue whether procedural < ue process to ora argument on a matter of i\v. See. [' TT.S. 265, 276 * * *. ft. is true tin [ I forr/an ‘198 TT.S. T68, 481] contained the c ‘turn that lie oral or written,’ * * * but w< do not fa t hat in this case there is no const it itional rig deuce, as opposed to argument, in ] Tson." Go Hie t. ct that one of the plaintiffs i fact did duce arguments, not evidence, appe: ‘S not to b to in t ie proceedings below. 14 U der the existing H E W regi at ions, an i ipienf of assistance can obtain a fair heari grieves by * * * agency action affe ting bis r lion oi assistance, or by agency pol y as it alii Hand! aik, § 6200(b). We are info- led that i this regulation is to provide “f; • hearing which, like Mrs. Guzman's, raise o !y issues < uid, in accord- hey therefore denies neither y to her, but mpport at l;tw of New Y ork below did ,ot tier o f course nistrative poi- utiimed peud- iluess o f that '.dministratioii !y to its costs, igs in all such dope to obtain bus invoked 14 ivertent. At. one do not. deal hero ' •quires the right, v. W JR , .-‘17 . I ’nlt-rd States, | ajrgmnent may ke that to mean 1 to present, evi- i'eerg App. 98La. visli only to p-o- ve been adverted claimant or re- ig” if lie is “ag- eipt or termina ls his s'ituat io.i." .' practice under on complaints f general policy. 35 because they are ineligible under the policy el could continue to receive benefits until the was held. The cost of this delay would have to i by the community as a whole and, i f total tun able for benefit purposes were limited, by othe cuts under the program in the form of redue< levels. Indeed, i f prior “ fair hearings” were for each individual adversely affected by a P(fiicy change, they would be requh >d wher- ciency of funds required across-the )oard re in benefit levels. V trial-type hearing is not requii d befor< general rule is applied to a part -ular ind unless there are demonstrable sp< -ial reas different action in the individual ca e. Unite- v. Stover Broadcasting Co., 3f>l T S. 192; Power Commission v. Texaco, 377 LT.S. 33: Electronics Corp. v. Fcdt a! Conn, /(nicotic, mission, 39-! F. 2d (120, (!2(i (C.A. I( . “ When of conduct applies to more than a few pe-n impracticable that every one should 1 ve a di in its adoption. * * * There1 must 1 a limit vidual argument in such matters ' govern to go on,” Bi-Metallic Investment ( . v. Sfai of Equalization of Colorado, 239 U h 441, 4 Guzman does not allege any special -ireumst: her case; she challenges only the neral rn dlenged nearing ;e borne :s avaii- ' reel pi- benefit ■quired general insuffi- uctions such a i vidual, ns for States federal Conley ; Com ix rule !e it is t voice o indi- lent is Board 5. Mrs. nces in 36 CONCLUSION Tlie judgment of the district court in No. 14 should be affirmed. The judgment of the district court in No. 62 should be modified to eliminate the conditions im posed by the court as to the first procedure permitted by the New York statute and as thus modified, should be a firmed. R ' 'spectfully subu fitted. September 1969. E rwin N Gris wo in, Solii lor General. W illiam D. R uck eshaus, As sis mt Attn I iey General. R obert A Zener, Stephen l . F elso , A Homeys. U.S. OOVERNMEN NTINS OFHCF :