Wheeler v. Montgomery Brief Amicus Curiae
Public Court Documents
September 30, 1969
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Wheeler v. Montgomery Brief Amicus Curiae, 1969. 8d107ce6-c89a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/5b43782a-c88b-4f81-9c11-4b25f9bd02b2/wheeler-v-montgomery-brief-amicus-curiae. Accessed December 04, 2025.
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I N D E X
Pago
Opinions below_____________________________________ 2
Jurisdiction_______________________________________ 2
Question presented________________________________ 2
St: tutes and regulations invo'ved__________________ 2
St: tement___________________ 3
1. Wheeler v. Montgomery________________ 4
2 . Goldberg v. Kelly______________________ 6
3. The federal requirements :q plicable to ter
minating or reducing welfare payme its 7
a. The requirements prior to 190S__ 8
b. The present requirements____ _______ 11
St nmary of argument ______________ ______ __ 15
A ■ turner t_______________________________ IS
Neither the due process clause nor the s< itu-
tory requirement of “ fair hearing” requites a
trial-type hearing before welfare assist mce
pay nents are terminated or reduced___________ 18
A. The Secretary’s present practi e—
under ’which the rec pient of pi blic
assistance is given notice and op-
jortunity for : conference prk r to
termination ot reduction of a: sist-
ance and can obtain a trial ype
hearing before sucl terminate i or
reduction bee ones final—-sat sfies
the statutory and constitut onal
requirejnents of a f ir hearing_____ 19
B. If the court were.t conclude that.
the present practii is inadeq ate,
it should not lequi ; a prelimi lary
trial-type heai ng i every cas< be
fore payments can >e initially ter
minated or red iced__________ ____ 32
Conclusion______________________________________ 30
(i)
II
CITATIONS
Cases:
Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of PatP
Equalization of Colorado, 239 IT.S. T! 1___ 35
Cafeteria Workers v. McElron, 307 U.S. 886 __ 20,
26, 30
C alley Electronics Coro. v. Federal Coi muni-
cations Commission, 394 F. 2d 620__ ____ 35
F dcral Power Commission v. Texan >, 377
U.S. 33___________________________________ 35
Flemming v. Xestor, 3(>3 U.S. 603______ 22
Hannah v. Bar die, 368 U.S. 420 _____ 15, 20, 29
Morgan v. United Stal s, 298 U.S. 468 __ 34
Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 5S9 ______ 29
Shapiro v. Thompson, ■ 94 U.S. 618_ 20
Shcrbcrtv. Vernier, 374 U.S. 398 _____ __ __ 20
Sniadach v. Family Finance Carp., 3S5 U.S.
337____________ 28
United States v. Store • Broadcasting ( >., 351
U.S. 192__________________________________ 35
Constitution, and statutes:
United States Constit ition:
Fifth Amend men :
Due Process Clause__ ____ — 5,19,22
Fourteenth Amen Iment:
Due Process ( Clause_________ _. 4, 6, 19
Internal Revenue (Tide, 20 U.S.C. 0861-
6864______________ 29
Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
301 et seq.__ ....... ........... — — 2. 4
42 U.S.C. 302(a) ___ ____ ___ _ _ 3
42 U.S.C. 302(a) ( 1) ______________ _____ 3,4
42 U.S.C. 302(a)(5)____________ 8,23
42 U.S.C. 302(a)(8)_______ ... __ 23
42 U.S.C. 403(h) 3)___________ 29
42 U.S.C. 601 et ■ r/.____________________ 6
42 U.S.C. 602(a) 1)___________ 3
Til
C< institution and Statutes— Continued
Social Security Act, as amended— Continued
42 U.S.C. 602(a)(5)_____________________
42 U.S.C. 1202(a)(4)____________________
42 U.S.C. 1202(a)(4)____________________
42 U.S.C. 1252(a)(4)____________________
42 U.S.C. i:582(a) (4)_______________
42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(3) (Supp. IV )._
Social Security Act, Public Law No. 27 , 49
Slat. 620 et sea.:
Section 2(a)(4)_____________________
Section 402(a) (4) __ _____________
Section 1002(a)(4)_________________
Social Security Amendments of 1951 64
Stat. 477, Sec. 321________________________
5 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 558(c)____________
28 U.S.C. 2281 . ______ _____________________
47 U.S.C. 312(c)____________________________
A! iscellaneous:
34 F.R, 13595_____ ___________________
Handbook of Public Assistance Adininisti ition
of tin; Deparl metit ( f Health, Hduntion
and Welfare, Part I V _______________
§ 2200(b)(4)___________________________~
§ 2200(d )________________ ______________
§ 2300(d)(5)_______________________
§ 5514, item 2a___ ________________ ____
§ 5514, item 2b___________________
§ 5514, item 2c____________________ _____
§ 5514, item 2d____________________
§ 6201 i__________________________________
§ 6200(b).. ___________ ________
§ 6200 ( j )_______________________________
§ 6200(k) ______________________________
§ 6300__________________________________
§ 6400(a)_________________________
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IV
Miscellaneous— Continued
Handbook of Public Assistance Administra
tion o f the Department of Health, edu
cation and Welfare, Part IV — Continued page
§ 6500(a)__________________________________ 14
§ 6500(b)_________________________________ 14
Willcox, The Lawyer in the Administrate >i of
Non regulatory Programs, Public Adm ns-
tration Review, Vol. X III , No. 1, W iter
1953_________________________________________ 21
J i t i te S u p rem e dfmtrt oj the U n ite d S ta te s
October T erm 1969
Xo. M
M at. W heeler, et at. , aitellants
r.
-John Montgomkey, D irector oe rnii-: State I )epart-
men r oe Social W es.take, a > d R onald Horn, (Jen-
ERAI ]\ ANAiiLi; OE THE SAX FRANCISCO ClTY AND
Cot .;tv Department oe Social Services
No. 62
-J \C K v. (toLDRERO, COMMISSIONER OE SOCIAL S RVICEN
of 'i .ie C ity oe N ew Y ork, et al., viteli ants
v.
-J ohn K elly, et al .
OX API BAT/,Sf FROM THE E X IT ED STATE.S' D I S T R I C T COURTS
FOR HE X O R T I IE R X DIS TR IC T Oh' CAT IFOR XIA . 17 ) THE
SORT ERX D IS T R IC T OF X E W YORE
BE 3F FOE ?HE UNITEI STATE AS AMICUS CUT :AE
Thi brief is submitted in r< spouse to the < Court's
order >f Apr I 2 1 . 1969. inviting H e Solicitor Con-
9
cal. to express the views of the United States with
respect to these cases.
OPINIONS BELOV/
The opinion of the three-judge district court in
No. 14 (Wheeler App. (12') is reported at 299 F.
Sup]). 138. The opinion of the three-judge district
< ourt in No. 82 ( ( loldberg A]>p. 895a) is reported at
: 94 F. Supp. 893.
JURISDICTION
In No. 14, the district <■ uirt's judgment was entered
< u April 19. 1998, and the notice of appeal was filed
n June 14, 11)98. In Xo. 92, the judgment was entered
u December 13, 1998, and the notice of appeal was
led on January 9, 1999. In both cases, this Court
oted probable jurisdiction on April. 21, I960 (394
r.S. 970-971). Tile jurist ietion of this Court rests on
8 U.S.C. 1253.
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution requires he States to
Ford recipients of welfare assistance a tidal-type
earing before suspending, terminating or reducing
heir benefit payments.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED
The relevant provision of t ie Social Security Act,
; s amen led, 42 U.S.C. 301 cl scq., are as follows: 1
1‘‘Wheeler App.” citations are t;> the appendix iiv Xo. 14.
Goldber • App.” references a e to ihe appendix ia I to. 62.
3
§ 302(a). A. State plan for old-age assistance,
or for medical assistance for the aged, or for
old-age assistance and medical assi dance for
the aged must—
(4) provide for granting an opportunity for
a fair hearing before [lie State agency to any
individual whose claim for assistance under the
plan is denied or is not acted upon with reason
able promptness * * *.
§(>02(a ). A State plan for aid and services
to needy families with children must * * * (4 )
provide for granting an opportunity for a fair
bearing before the State agency to any individ
ual whose claim for aid to families with depend
ent children is denied >r is not acted upon with
reasonable promptness * * *.2
Id rtinent excerpts from Pa t 1 Y of the Handbook of
Puli'i< Assistance Administration o f the United States
Pep i nieni of 1b'altli Ifdlic; 1 ion, and Well are here-
aide Ilaudboolv” ) ai e set o d in \|>P<■ndi' ; 1 f to the
1 >ri< for A ipeil ants in No. 1 . Tin rele\•ant prov isions
of id • Calif. rnia Well' i re and 1 nsi tutions Code and of
Cab ornia. s ale regulations a re s( out in J ppen dices
1 1 I ml IV to 11 it1 I ii i • f for . p]>( ants in > o. 1 k The
appl cable .few York stale regu! itioi is set out in
App •II ant’s 1 »ri ■f iu Nro. 62, pp. 2-5.
ETATEMl NT
1? then tinm a tempi its ow i des •ripi ion o r the facts
of t e pendi ng t ases, the gov •mm nt s: is f nth below
- 1 to!lei pi ovisions :ij ) 1 y 1 < > he i tgrams of aid to the
blind it id to ito 1 crnuini illy an< tor: y <Ii ' title* aid to rte
iti ind, or distil led, an ' medic; 1 ass' ance. 12 r S.C. 1202
(a) ( ), 1352(a )(4) , 13S2( 0(4), aad 1 :6a (a) (8) Sup! r IV).
4
only a brief summary of the proceedings below. Like
1 he brief amicus curiae which the government tiled in
No. 62 below, the Statement is principally devoted to an
explanation in outline form, based on information sup
plied by the Department of Health, Education, and
Volf are, of certain Federal policies and procedures
pplicable to the Federal-State pro,a rams involved here.
1. WHEELER V. jMOXTCiOMERV
Jn No. 14, the appellant, Mae Ydheeler, brought an
iction for individual ai d class declaratory and in-
pmctive relief from C; lifornia welfare procedures
m emitting the termination or suspension of assist
ance— including assistance from Federal-State pro
grams under the Social Security Act— before the giv
ing of notice and an opportunity to he heard in a
trial-type proceeding. The State assistance program
specifically involved was Old Vge Security assistance,
which is eligible for federal funding under dnle I
of the Social Sec irity A % 42 U.S.C. 301 cf seq., sub
ject, inter alia, to a requirement that the participating
state agencies provide a “ la ir hearing, on request,
to any claimant to whom assistance is denied. 42
U.S.C. 302(a) (4 . Because the complaint sought to
enjoin the operation of California statutes and regu
lations of general appli -ation on grounds of conflict
with the Fourtei nth Amendment, a three-judge dis-
3 To avoid any c< illusion between the statutory requirement
of n. “fail- hearing" and a. hearing Hint is fair in the constitu
tional sense of moi ring tin reqnireine its ot the Hue Process
Clause, quotation n arks an used where the statutory hearing
is referred to.
5
ti-iet court was convened.4 28 U.S.O. 2281: Wheeler
App. 29-31.
California then amended its Public Social Services
Manual to provide for the termination procedures,
now in effect, which were ruled on by the district
court, fhese procedures require that whenever a de
cision is made to wit 1 hold welfai assistance from a
presi nt recipient, a n< (ice of the imposed action and
the M'asons for it must he given to him at least three
mai delivery days before the withheld assistance ordi-
nari / would he received. The recipient is then en
title to an informal conference with his caseworker
or a lotlier responsibh person in the county depart-
men before the withdrawal t dees effect, to “ learn the
natu e and extent of the information on which the
with olding action is based,’ to “ provide any expla-
nati< i or information” to the officials concerned, and
to “ < iscuss the entire matter informally for the pur
pose of clarification and, whore possil le, resolution.”
1 >rif for Appellants in No. 14, pp. 19a -20a.
T 1 i district court concluded, that this pre-termina
tion informal conference procedure, taken together
with the trial-type “ fair hear ng” required by statute
and egulations to he held soon after tennin ition, met
the . mauds of due pr< cess.
4 Ti convening I In tliroi' udge court, the ruling district judge
noted diat the pleat ings also raiset! by inference a further con-
stitut 'li il challengt—that if the California termination pro-
cedur s were not repugnant to the. Social Security Act, that
Act as repugnant to tin Due Process Clause ot the Fifth
Amoi ment. Wheeler App. 30.
1-515— 6fl------ 2
6
2. GOLDBERG V. KELLY
The action in Xo. 62 was brought by a number of
X"w York State wel fare recipients: some of‘ them were
recipients of goner; 1 assistance mu.or slate aw awl
the others wore recipients of Aid to Families with
I ) 'pendent Children ( ‘-A F IK D . a federally-funded
program under Title 1\ o! ihe Social Security -Act,
42 U.S.C. 601 et HCtf. Like Mrs. Wheeler, they sought,
ii lividual and class declaratory and injunctive relief
fi an the operation of Xew York statutes and regula-
ti ns which permitted the termination or suspension
o benefi s before tin; giving of notice and an oppor-
ti nity to lie beard in a triad-type proceeding, on
g ounds of conflict with the Due Process Clause of
tb . Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge district
court was convened. Coldburg App. 131a-139a.
At the time the suit war brought. State regulations
provided for neither notice nor bearing before termi
nation of welfare assistance, but permitted recipients
under st; te as well as Federal-State programs to obtain
a trial-type bearing after termination. During the
p eideney of the action, the state regulations were
a aended— for both State a d Federal-Stale programs—
p require local program administrators to choose one
0 two mow procedures: ( >) an informal pre-termina
tion hearing procedure . imilar to tba adopted by
California; and (2 ) a review-on-tlm-m-ord procedure'
in which recipien s would be permitted to submit
written statements sliowii g why tl eir benefits should
1 ' conti nu'd. Doth option re([uire sevi'ii days ad\ance
written notice of t le reasons for a proposed termina
tion, and both continue C e provision for a post.-termi-
t
nation “ fair hearing.” Now York City chose to apply
the second of those procedures to all its aid programs.
Colt berg App. “ (18a “71a.
The district com! concl idod that this second pro-
cedr re violated tlie Due Process Clause. Coldberg
Api . 1180 38(>a. It held tint the first procedure— less
immediately involved since all the plaintiff-appellants
resided i . New York City and accordingly would be
processed under the second— would bo permissible if
eoi trued to require both eonfrontalion of persons
whose ert dihility was in qu *stion regarding the factual
basis for terminating benefits and that the reviewing
officer be a superior of the person proposing the ad
verse action. Coldberg App. 386a-389a. The court
noted that nothing in its opinion was “ meant to affect
the right to a post-te rmina tion hearing in accordance
witl the procedures already in existence,’ ’ Coldberg
App. 391a— i.c., the* “ fair bearing" procedures re
quired In federal law for programs under the Social
Security \rt and carried o' er by State law into State -
funded general welfare programs. Tims, as in
T17 I'clcr, the court appear'd te> reach its conclusions
in the context of an ass nr; nee th it a nil >ost.-termi-
natiein trial-type1 bearing would be bad.
3. TUB FKDKI’AIj EE.QU1RBMEXTS APP I TO A RLE TO
TERVI iNATIM i OR REIUJC1 \TG WET FART ’AYMF.NT T
D iring tlie past, few ye irs, eonsidei able attention
lias been ‘ocused on ihe op ration of f lerally funded
I rograms under the, Social Securi y A . Much of this
attention has beam directed to th que tien s of eligi
bility ane level of welfare assist; nee, and the proe-e-
8
dures for determining these issues. As a result, those
procedures have b-*en in considerable flux. V. e set out
iu'low, first, the procedures that have been generally
required until recent times of States participating in
federal programs: and second, the current require-
aents, the product of changes of which most became
effective duly 1 , 1 ! 08.
A. TUF. REQUIREMENTS I ’RIOR TO 11ICR
As originally enacted in 11135, the Social Seem it\
\(-t provided tha each State plan for public assist
ance must provide for granting to any individual,
vhose claim for aid or assistance is denied, an oppor-
unity for ; ‘ ‘fail hearing” before the State agency.
Sections 2 (a )(4 ). 402 (a)(4 ) and 1002(a)(4) of the
Social Security A -t, Public Law No. 271, 40 Stat. 020
I set/. The Social Security Act Amendments of 1950,
>4 Stat. 477. 549,; dded the requirement that such hear
ings be afforded ii cases whore claims for benefits were
not acted ui on wi h reasonable promptness; otherwise,
the provisions have continued without substantial
change to the present.
On the basis of t hose “ fair hearing” requirements and
the Secretary’s general authority to require that the
states provide for such methods of administration as
he finds necessary for proper and efficient operation,
42 TT.IS.O. 302 (a)(5 ), 002 (a)(5 ), the Secretary (like
his predecessors, the Federal Security Administrator
and the Social Security Hoard) has prescribed de
tailed procedure requirements for ‘ ‘ fair hearings.
Any claimant wl o is aggrieved by any agency action
affecti lg his rcc< ipt of assistance, including tormina-
9
tion, must be afforded a bearing i f be requests one.
T ie claimant must be informed of bis right to a bear
ing, how to obtain it, and that be may be rep -esented
by counsel; and any clear express.•• n o f a desire to
present bis cast' to higher authority must be treated
a an effective request, lea rings m to be conducted
by impartial officers, in accordant with published
procedures, at a time and place < nvcnient to the
elaima d and after reasonable noth.' to him. A t the
It aria s. the claimant must have ; opportunity to
c amii o all documents and roc >rds tst'd at tin' hear-
it g, re hte any testimony or evident present, bis own
e idem o, witnesses, and testimony, dvance all perti-
n nt arguments and secure conside tion o f any fac
tual or legal issue important, to his r dm. The decision
n ust be based exclusively on the e 'deuce and other
muteri d introduced at tl e hearng. ] iandbook §§ (1200,
ft 00; ilrie f for Appellants in \o. 14, pp. 3u-9a. In
si ort, while “ |'t.]lie hearing is co iduc >d in an informal
r: ther than formal court-type pro< lure in order to
serve the best interests of Hit1 clai ant. [, it] *
is to he subject to the requirement:- >f due process.”
LI. at y 6400(a), p. 10a.
A 1th >m b tliest' j roced ices an ■ foi >wed at the “ fair
la arin ,” until recent! \ the inly requirement for
a; enee pioeedures ]>rim to termini ion or reduction
ol pay in its 1o individi als already receiving aid or
assistance was that the paymei ts m ist be continued
until 1 lere bad been a formal agei y determination
that, t (' individual was no h.ngei eligible or was
ebgibb only for lesser amounts. ’ hat is, agencies
ci uld iot terminate or reduce issis nice jam ling in-
10
vcstigations or the evaluation of information it had
received. Handbook, § 2200( b) ( l). I Jut 1 hoy were not
required to inform recipients that an investigation or
evaluation was under way or to permit them to par
ticipate in the process leading to this initial decision.
Once the agency decided to terminate or reduce assist
ance, it could do so without advance notice or any
! wring procedures and then 1 otif'y the individual of
his right to a “ fair hearing.”
The rules governing Federal funding operated in a
way which probably encoorag l the Slates to make
tl ere determinations promptly, and did not encourage
i volvement of the recipient at this slagt. As a matter
( overall policy, there is a st ng inter‘st in paying
; sistance to all individuals w ho are eligible, and in
< nying assistance to ail indivi luah who are not eligi-
1 e. There is also a need, in a Fedoral-Siaie program,
:f r a fa ir sharing between the federal and State gov-
t muents o f the costs of those case.- in which, despite
tl e best efforts of the administrators to determine
( igibility, payments are made to persons Inter found
1 have been ineligible. Accordingly, Federal mateh-
i g funds are paid in cases where a Stale follows the
< rrect procedures hut err meo isly determines that an
i dividual is eligible. To inis extend, the Federal gov-
( nnlent shares in the payment of ineligible cases, in
tl e interests of orch rly aclministr iti >n.
As a condition of such p iym< nts l ndcr the previous
i gulations, however, the 1 'edera! government insisted
o speedy action, with r< ;pect to both the periodic
r pilar reevalnation of all reci ienis and the special
e ablations which tl e Stab s are - xp >cted to undertake
11
upon receipt of information suggesting the possible
ineligibility of particular recipients. Thus, if rede-
terminations of < iigibility were not made within pre
scribed time periods and the recipient turned out to
have become ineligible, Federal rinancial participation
was not av; ifable for payments in periods beyond the
dead'ine for Dial ing the re< eterminat: >n. Handbook
§ 22<H(di ; § of) 14 , item 2a. i imilarly, the State must
investigate within 30 d; vs any report of possible in
eligibility received during tin interim Ir ween regular
reiuwstig.i; ions. Handbook § of, 14, i 'in 2b. The
periods ■•wed did not ])m■mit i 01 lgtl : ]Vi .1 oeedures.
i a r('SI iif, wi ere assistauee \vas tm iiinated or ro
(I I ICC :! a., 11. i ;a “ fa'r hear: ]} oy was tlien osted, the
usual st;: i o pract ice was to 11 .•» V”/ > 1 <1 > V the t mu illation or
redu.i •t iOT\ h i effe<-t ] lending lie learin -if;.( cn;ues
eouk' co: ■4 ;; .me th ■ paymcuts if thay wi died, but Fed-
oral :inamcial as dstanv ■ was no■ pro idee1, and in
ju'ac ice the Stati ■s did not oi■dinarily i: ■if'C such pay
ment V,dthout .1'Vdora 1 m; i chi i:g. ! f the hearing
decis.l on vvas in favor iif ti: ■ im!i vidu 1, tiho. States
could •eins' ate t: ie pay item " P-'<iSTV'Ct i vely., or they
could pay for t! ie bad ]>e •iod. I f ti ey i'•hose the
latte COIll'se, flu y woi1 id n •eivi Fed. ral matching
fund
B. TUR PIlESRXT Ii ■’.Q Fill i HTCXTS
Tit * revent changes, i lost of w hich 1>ok effect on
•Inly I, 106S, considerably m< lifted the : xisting prac-
tice by requiring advance n< ice that adverse action
is pi ■ lined, and an opportuni y for an informal con-
fere ee before that acti< n tal >s effect, ; ad providing
an ilargei scope of fklera! funding participation
12
during the process of assistance reduction or termina-
1 ion.
Thus, it is now required for participation in feder
ally-funded programs that when a question arises
concerning change in a recipient’s circumstances, the
agency must give—-
advance notice of ques ions it h is about an
individual’s eligibility s that a rcc picnt has an
opportunity to discus his situ lion before
receiving formal writ! n notice' >f reduction
in payment or terminati n of assist mce. [Hand
book' § 2200(d ) (5 ) . ]
This irocedure is designed tc serve so' ral purposes
in the public' assistance prog 11ns. First it gives the
individual a chance1 to bring lew or additional facts
o the agency’s attention ; thus he may Ik able to show,
arior te> anv more lormal a< ion, that ids situation
ias not actually changed, or as cliany d to a lesser
legre e than the agency belie es. I f In can tliereby
avoid termination of assistai -e, it ben fits both the
individual, who does not h; e his usi al payments
inter upted and need ne>t sen a “ fair tearing,” and
the agency, which will be t Hired the expense and
staff time involved in an unn -essary I anal hearing.
More >ver, because this advan ■ notice ; ocedure must
be followed in all cases, ev n those' r cipients who
would not contest terminatioi of assist ice are given
some time to prepare for 10 effect vhich it will
have on their financial sit itions, e! minating the
el cm* nt of surprise.
I t soon became obvious the states w 1 information
of possible ineligibility could ot com pi with this new
requ rement within the 30 ay peri* allowed for
13
making a determination of ineligibility du ing which
Federal matching continued. Accordingly, the States
are now permitted an additional 30-day period of
federal matching during which to give the advance
notice, provide time for the recipient to obtain and
appear at a conference, eonsidei any new evidence or
oilier re levant matters he may raise, and determine
whether he is still eligible. Ham book § 5b 1, item 2c.
Tl e fact that the new period i this brie however,
sh \vs tl at the conference is con rived as a, i informal
an exj(editions proceeding bef -e local aft", not a
tri . 1-type “ fair hearing’ ' at the date agem y level. It
is nerely a method of providing lotice am screening
on thoi-e cases which can he vsolved h\ informal
pi 'Cedures.
iter the advance notice p ocedure, t le agency
m; kes its determination on the basis of all the infor
mal ion it then lias available. ssistance payments
nn st 1h continued as before 1 > this point. I f the
ag ncy < <-ternlines that assistant will be ter >limited or
re< need, it nur t communicate tl decision In writing
to he in lividual and advise him ' his right to request;
a • fair iearing” before the Sta e agency. i f a “ fair
lie; ring” is not requested, that the end < f the mat
tei I f a hearing is requested, t State must hold it
an tak ‘ final administrative a lion withi i (it) days
of the eqnesty' Handbook § (12 0 ( j ) , but is not ro-
s flic S'ate is allowed ail additional ( days of fe leral match
ing to carry out the mechanics of disco I inning or r during pay-
mo Is. Ifa ldboolc, §5514. item 2d..Tin a total of liree 30-dav
pei ods— tor investigation of ineligibi y, for the idvance no-
tic; and c inference, and for stopping • payment are allowed
foi continuation of Federal matching u State pa\ lents to in
ch; 'I>11‘ individuals and families.
302 09------ 3
14
quired to continue assistance pending tin> heaving and
decisi >n. I f the State does continue as istance, how
ever, [federal matching- funds now will hr paid, Hand-
hook § 6500(b), whether the lie a ring decision is in
.favor of the recipient or the agency. Two or three of
the S ales continue assistance pending liraring. In all
of tin other States, if the hea ring decisii 11 is in favor
of th recipient, the agency i repaired lo make cor
rect!' payments retroactive!;, to the date of the in-
corre t action terminating r reducing payments,
ITani look § 6200(k), and Fe< ral matcl ng funds are
•aid ir these corrected paynu its, TTandl ml; § 6500(a).
(a ).
In sum, under the cun- utly a]i]>1 icahle IIE W
equi ements, assistance pay: 'ids unde federal pro-
,'rani may not he terminated or redu -cd until the
ecipi 'lit has been given a dvr ice notice and an oppor
tunity for a conference, and lie agency lias made its
( eteri iination. I f the paymo ts are terminated, the
iudivi Inal may obtain a “ f r hearing" which com-
orts with the customary reqi irements o ‘ due process
efor< such termination bee< mes final. I f the hearing
< ecision is in favor of the recipient, corrective pay
ment must he made retroact; ely. Tho ; ate at its op
tion ay continue payments aiding th hearing and,
if it oes so, there will he fi ral shariu ;■ in the pay-
i icuts regardless of whethei he d<'<-isi . i is in favor
>>f t Ik recipient or the agency.'
“On August 20, 1 !)<>!), 11 ic Sec tary postp.. >d IVom O.to-
5m 1, lie.), to July 1. 1070, the c 'Ctivo date ■ a new regula-
i on r paring that, in cases in Iving <pu-- i >ns of fact or
j ulgm it relating to the partici, ir individual involved (as
< isting lishetl from cases involvii the application of a gen-
15
SUMMARY OF A GUMENT
No question lias been raised that the trial-type hear
ing t hat is held at the reqi est of tlie recipient of
welfare assistance before the erminatioi or reduction
<>f his benefits becomes final, satisfies 1 fill the statu
tory requirement of “ fair hearing” and the constitu
tional requirement of procedural due process. The
issue here is the narrower o: ‘ of the liming of such
bearing: whether it must be eld bcfop there is any
preliminary termination or p luction o benefits. We
subnet that the present a< ninistrati e practice—
under which the beneficiary p eives ad nee notice of
a proposed termination or r< luction o his benefits
lias tb(' opportunity for infoi nil confc mce with the
taff of tin' State welfare ag icy befoi • such action
is taken, and can obtain a “ f; r bearin', ’ before such
termination or reduction lie* ines final -satisfies the
statutory and constitutional requirenwilts o f fair
hearing.
A. Where questions of adm istrativc iroeeduve are
-oncerned, “ the re<iui rements due pro ss frequently
vary with the typo of proceei ng invol d ’ ’ {Ilannali
• La d ie , 3(13 l .S. -130, -110 ). n the co ext of public
velfare programs, these reqi •ements , > I so may vary
•nil policy to individual cases, see ifra, pp. ,-85), assistance
be continued until (here has been trial-type earing, 84 IMP
3595 (19(59). A press release of lie Departi cut of Health,
education, and Welfare explained taf the Si \s are slid pip
ing into effect the federal require nits whirl became effective
uly 1, 19(>S, and are working t attendai problems, and
hat some States have taken the j it ion that i lie effect of the
iew regulation will he to keep re pients on , u> rolls hevond
lie point of reasonahle question ah it their el hilily.
16
"'it'll tin; nature of the programs adopted. We discuss
oidy what procedures are required for tlx particular
program here involved.
The determinatio i of the appropriate procedures
here requires a balancing of competing social policy
considerations invoicing, on the one hand, he govern
ment’s interest in avoiding improper ex. uditure of
v dfarc funds and unduly burd< nsome pro. (hires, and
o i the other hand the interest of the -ipients of
Public assistance in fair treatment and p >er receipt
of the benefits Congi*ess intended them t( lave. Since
" are interpreting the statut try re<[uii incut that
th >re be a “ fair hearing,” snbst; ntial wei: t should be
gi' en to the expert judgment of the Secretary that,
on the basis of present experience with the opera
te n of public assist nice progr; ms, the p icedures he
ha-i adopted constiti te the most approp ate method
f« ’ accomplishing th > congressional direct ve. The cur-
r< it procedures bee; me effective' only on ' dy I. 19(JS
ai 1 it is still too soon to make an adeouate assess-
nn nt of their effectiveness. The changes they have
m de have required substantia! modifiewi ms bv the
St ites of their prior practice, and these i i ditications
ha Te not been completely achiev d. I f the . -esent pro-
cedures should prove inadequaie properl \ to accom
plish the Congressional purpose retlected n the fed-
ei'.d program here i lvolved, th< Secretary can make
fu flier changes. It is important, ho\ve\< ■, that his
thr ibility to do so should be preserved, and that fixed
procedures should no be required.
There is a strong public interest in av< iding con
tinuation of payments to persom who arc i ot entitled
17
thereto, both to avoid improper disbursement ol' gov-
ernment funds and to prevent prejuc ee to the inter
ests of eligible persons who would suffer i f substan
tial sums were paid to ineligible ones, i f benefits were
required to be continued whenever a trial-type bear
ing was requested, the inevitable res It would be the
disburse merit, of significant amounts to person ulti
mately found not entitled thereto.
15. I f contrary to our submission, the Court >re to
conclud ■ that the present procedures - re inadeq ite, it
should ot require a preliminary tri; type hea ng in
every case before' payments can be in . ially term nated
or rcdiK >d. Such a requirement, which he court below in
No. 62 came close to adopting, would - mse sub antial
and unnece'ssary delay in a large number of cases and
would i npose needless expense upon the welfar pro
grams. Moreover, the court below in Vo. 62 apn rent-
ly woul 1 require a trial-type hearin even wh" e the
only issue raised by the claimant is the validity of
settled principles of general applicability— as, for
exampli , a challenge to the general evel of In ictits.
Rcquiri ig a trial-type hearing in ev ry such ca te be
fore be; efits could be initially termii ited would mean
that pe. sons who had no hope of ulti itely pre\ tiling
becaust hey art'ineligible under the cl llenged) vctico
neverth less could continue to receive enefits u il the
hearing were held. A trial-type heat ng ordin; rily is
not ret, tired before a general prim pie is ro inely
applied o a particular individual.
18
ARGUMENT
NEITHER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE NOR THE STATUTORY
REQUIREMENT 01*' “ FAIR HEARING” REQUIRES A TRIAL-
TYPE HEARING BEFORE WELFARE ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS
ARE TERMINATED OR REDUCED
No question lias been raised in these eases that the
trial-type hearing, ae< mled 01 request, to the recip
ient of welfare assistance before the termination or
reduction of his benefits becomes final, satisfies both
the statutory requirement of “ lair bearing’7 and the
constitutional standard of procedural due process. The
issue, rather, involves the timing- of such hearing:
whether, as the recipients coi fund, it must be held
before there is any suspension, termination or reduc
tion of benefits, or whether, as the Secretary believes,
the constitutional and statutory requirements are sat
isfied as long as the recipient can obtain such “ fair
hearing” before there is a find determination as to
whether bis benefits are to be ended or reduced.
To state the issue another way, in the context of
public assistance programs involving millions of re
cipients and thousands of possible hearings every year,
do the essential elements of ir procedure require
anything more than the present practice? Ihider that
practice, ( 1 ) the beneficiary receives advance notice
that bis payments are to be terminated or reduced ; ( 2 )
he has the opportunity for a cm Perenco with the staff
of the wel fare agency before su< h termination or reduc
tion, at which the reasons I'm* the action will be
explained to him and he can present any facts or ex
planations showing why his assistance should be con
tinued at ts existing level; (3 ) if the state then termi
19
nates or reduces assistance, he can obtain a “ fair hear
ing” lx*fore llie state action becomes final; and (4 ) if
lie prevails at such hearing, lie receives back payments
for the interim period during which his benefits were
terminated or reduced.
Our submission is that the present procedures sat
isfy both the statutory and conditutional equirements
>f fair hearing, and that a t mil-type hearing is not
required before public assistance is susp tided, termi
nated or reduced. I t also follows, we bel we, that wel
fare recipients arc* not entitled to a continuation of
their previous benefits during the period between pre
liminary termination or reduction and tlie final deci
sion of the state agency that i rendered after a “ fair
hearing” in those relatively fe cases wl ere such more
formal proceeding is requestet
A. THE SECRETARY^ PRESENT PRACTICE-— UNDER WHICH THE RECIP
IENT OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE IS CI\ V NOTICE 1) OPPORTUNITY
FOR A CONFERENCE PRIOR TO TERM \TION OR R! RUCTION OF AS
SISTANCE AN1) CAN OBTAIN A TRIAl 1'YPE HEAR! ,G BEFORE SUCH
TERMINATION OR REDUCTION IiKO IBS FIN AI -SATISFIES THE
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF A FAIR
HEARING
1 . Neither any of Hie partie. nor tin* Dinted Stales
disputes that the Due Proee. Clause of the Four-
teentl Amendment and, for 11 District if Columbia,
the F ifth Amendment to the tonstituth n, are appli-
cabli* to public welfare progi mis. Alt! ugh there is
no constitutional requiremei that sic li programs
exist- so that access to benefi payment could be de
scribed for some purpose's as a 'privileg ' rather than
a “ right”—the fact of their < \istenee carries with it
the guarantees against gove mental iprioiousness
20
and arbitrariness embodied in those clauses. /'>.//.,
Sherbcrt v. Vom er, 274 U.S. 208; Shapiro v. Thomp
son, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n. 6. bidiis observation, however,
serves only to frame the question of what procedures
are to be followed in benefit termination cases, not to
answer it. For where questions of administrative pro
cedure are concerned, as dislinct from the issues of
capriciousness and arbitrariness involved in the cited
cases, “ the requirements of due process frequently
vary with the type of proceeding involved.” Hannah v.
Larchc, 363 U.S. 420, 440. A r the Court, expl ained in
Cafeteria. Workers v. McElroi/, 367 U.S. 886, 895:
[Consideration of what procedures due process
may require under any given set, of c ircum
stances must begin with a determination of the
precise nature of the government function in
volved as well as of tin private interest that has
been affected by governmental act ion. * * *
There would bo significant differences, for example, in
the procedures necessary in a zoning case, a prosecu
tion for a capital crime, a garnishment, a suspension
of a government employee, or the termination or re
duction of public assistance.
2 . Tn the context of pubi e welfare programs, we
believe those requirements might also vary with the
nature and aims of the prog vms adopted. 1 f a State
wished to— and assuming it constitutionally could__
revert to programs for dispensing charitv to the
“ worthy poor,” it, might be permitted far different
procedures than would have h attend programs whose
purposes include promotion < f equity among all re
cipients and their freedom fi >m the private charity
21
giver’s traditional control. In view of these possible
variations, we address ourselves only to the question
what (hie process requires for the federal!) funded
programs lore at issue. For their purpose is <• ear.
When the Social Security Act was issed its
: public assistance titles were designed to bring
about, for the population groups to wi ieh they
app ied, important changes in the i .oner of
dis] ,nsing aid to the needy, flic pub!i almoner
had been prone to assume he prero fives of
the giver of private eliarih, to gran or with
hold according to his judgment o f the deserts
of 1 te applicant, and often to assunr a pater
nalistic control over the live s o f those lie aided.
Tin Social Security Act s night to itroduce
int< this field a govern 1 lent of laws, a:; 1 to that
end. among others, attached a series . f condi
tions to it s proffer of fedei al grant n-aid to
the states. One of the condh ions re' res that
the state grant a fair lieari g to any pplicant
who is denied assistance; otl rs look 1 uniform
application of the plan throughout tk state, to
equiiable treatment of pers< is in dil’i ing eco
nomic situations, and to 1 e safegu ding of
information about applicants, and r. -ipients;
while tin' definition of assistance as “ n uey pay
ments” calls for the givin ; o f casl with no
strings attached. [W illcox, he Lav r in the
Adiuinistritiou of Nonrec laiory 'ograms,
Public Administration Rev w, Yob t i l , No.
1, W inter 1953,12, 15-1G.]
In thus legislating to provide f >r the general wel
fare, the Congress authorized the i e of Fed al funds
to fi mis! part of the cost o f pa incuts m le under
Stall pub c assistance plans. lIow< er one nr r charac-
0 9
/
/
/
terize the interest of the benefieiaries of such pro
grams, it certainly is less tangible than that o f the
beneficiaries of the federal old-age, survivors’ and dis
ability insurance program. For under 1 he latter pro
gram the potential beneficiaries pay taxes therefor
that are placed in a trust fund so lhat, unlike the
public assistance benefits here involved, payments are
not dependent upon yearly Congress! ■ ial appropria
tions. Yet even under that program ihe “ right” to
bene its is not protected under the Fifth Amendment
in t ie manner of personal property ( Flcmminf/ v.
Neat or, 36b U.S. 603), and benefits are terminated,
redu jed or suspended without a prior t rial-type hear
ing.7
The statutory mandate that there ' a “ fair hear
ing” before public assistan-e payments are denied
helps to define the kind of protect ion lhat Congress
intended to give the be noth iaries of tch payments.
The statute does not distin uish bel\ en the initial
denial of applications for bei 'fits and "ir subsequent-
deni;'. I by termination. Whe t a State agency decides
initially that a new applica t for hem tits is not en
titled! thereto, it does so wit sout first >lding a < rial-
type hearing; such a liearim is held o y if tlic appli
cant requests it; and when uch a he. ing is sought,
7 While (.here are differences be>
the old ag.' survivors’ and disab
grams, a requirement that the S
sistance payments pending the <l
sistent with ‘lie practice aufhori
Act for the 0ASD1 program, \
by t! e Federal government and
whicl irdiv! buds have a stated
seen the pi
ity insur.an
;tes must <
u r hearing
d under I
aich is <I i •
lvolvos ii
■ “ right."
'ic assistance and
■ fO A S D ! ) pro-
itinuo public as-
would be incon-
Socia! Security
11 v .administered
ranee benefits to
. 11. hlfr:'-.
23
benefits are not ]>aicl in the interim.8 I t lias never been
suggre ted that this procedure denies tlie applicant a
"fa ir icaring.”
As we develop below, cogent policy considerations
support the Secretary’s judgment that the same prac
tice should be followed where following the informal
conference procedure, the Shite initia ly decides to
lermirate or reduce benefits, fids pra dice not only
records with the statutory re< uirement that there be
ucha hearing before a claim f< rassistan -e is “ denied,”
but is further supported by the statutory provisions
autlioi izing the Secretary to adopt such methods of
admin stration as he finds t< lie necessary for the
grope • and efficient operation o public a> distance plans.
-’2 U.S.C. 302 (a)(5 ), 602(a) ( f ) .
°. d o determination of wha procedu es and timing
are appropriate in an administrative proceeding of
inis h pe requires a balancing of competing social
] obey considerations. On the one hand, there is the
interest of the government in insuring that tiie pro-
tedures do not become either so unnecessarily expen
sive or so time-consuming and cumbers* me that their
i ltimate effect is to hinder rather th; n aid in the
( ffectu ition of the public policies the program re-
f ects. )n the other hand, there is the i derest of the
} ersons affected—-here the recipients of public assist
ance— in being fa irly treated and in pro] >rlv recefving
t le benefits they rightfully cai expect the program to
8I f t ,0 applicant prevails at sue hearing. ! .'iiefits are paid
ritroactively to the date of the in al (hut er oneous) denial.
accomplish. These two interests are complementary
lather than antithetical. For welfare recipients would
suffer in the long run if' the government were required
to follow inefficient and unnecessarily burdensome re
quirements, while the public interest would suffer if
the recipients were not treated fairly.
Moreover, since we are dealing with the interpre
tation o f the statutory command that there be a “ fa ir
hearing,” it is appropriate to give considerable weight
to the expert judgment of the Secretary that, on the
basis of our present experience with the operation o f
] ublic assistance programs, the procedures he has
< dopted constitute the most appropriate method for
accomplishing the congressional directive.
The current procedures have been in effect only
since -July il, 1968, and ii is still too soon to make an
adequate assessment of their effectiveness in properly
accommodating the competing policy considerations.
The introduction of the new informal conference pro
cedure and the establishment of the 60-dav period for
completing trial-type hearings wl eu requested came
at a time when an increasing mi nber o f public as
sistance recipients were challengir ? agency decisions,
were represented by counsel and wore requesting “ fa ir
hearings.” In order to handle this nereased workload,
the .States had to hire and train more hearing exami
ners and to appropriate funds for their employment.
Although the States have made substantial progress in
solving these problems, they have not been fully sur
mounted. Moreover, in some States a large number of
public assistance recipien s have r< quested “ fair hear-
i lgs” to challenge basic aspects of the particular wel
24
I
fare program involved—contending, for example,: that
the level of 1) 'nefits is inadequate.” Challenges of this
type inevitably lead to extensive delay in the hearing
and decision of all pending cases.
The nature of public assistance programs inevitably
requires consi lerable room for experiment and change
in determining, through trial and error, what are the
most effective methods for carrying out the programs.
It is therefor > important that flexibility in adjusting
the procedures to changing circumstances remain
available to tl e Secretary. Significant changes recently
have been lira le in the procedures, and i f they should
prove i lappi >priate in the light of experience in
working witl them, the way always is open for the
Secretary to nodify them still further. A t this stage
of their devei >pment, however, the procedures should
9 For examplt during the r eek' of January 29, 1!>( >, there
were approxim; ely 500 requests for hearings in the Miami,
Florida, area < udlenging the amount of assistance and the
method of its < imputation. In seven counties in Kentucky in
July 1969 there vore 417 requests for hearings challengii g deter
mination.- of ine gibility that had resulted from a change made by
the State >f Ke tueky in its delinition of um mployment In De-
cemher l! >8 and January I960 in Los Angeles County, California,
there wer ■ 222 inquests for hearings on the contention hat the
amount o' bene !i is was inadequate; in Hinds County, IMf hssippi,
in July )67 th re were 184 requests for hearings on the same
question. In October 1968 in Philadelphia, I’ennsylven a, there
were 275 requests for hearings on a claim that each child
should re eive $50.00 to have an American Christmas.
In add ion, theme have recent! v been several instances in which a
large nun her of requests have been made for a hearing on a single
issue. Foi instance, in New York City in November 1968 l ! we were
approxin ttely 1! >00 requests for hearings on whether the ■ upient
needed a eleplx le.
2(1
not be frozen into the fixed molds in'
]lc 'ssistanee recipients would push
( 4 Testf,(1 by these standards, we
Secretary's present procedures for
fa i“ Payments meet the statutory a
requirements of a. fa ir hearing.
1,1 view o f Congress' choice to requ
m - ' for aggrieved claimants of he
Hoc al Security Act and the implicath
for the nature o f the benefit progra
we lo not argue that it is -possibli
[the receipt of benefits under the Act |
loge subject to the Executive’s plen
that “ notice and iiearing are not co:
finir -d.” Cafeteria Workers, supra, :
Xon 'fheless, the privilege aspect o f r,
role s both the government unction
interest involved in a way which be
the 'prior hearing question.
Av a matter of government funetioi
in th '\ ri.-ht of the federal and state
p!a.c< budgetary limitations on the tot•
they will undertake for the e progr;
mati- ally than a simple desire for <:
rost, such limitations make ; i aceure
binds to eligible ])ersons imp. •ative; i
of ineligible persons are abb to enf.
receive benefits for substantia! period
■“frect will be to reduce the amounts
sharing by eligible recipient . ft see:
hut f payments are eontim d pend:-
ug” here will be more reqi -sts for
0 which the pub-
1 hem.
mb:.lit that the
'rimnafing wel-
I constitutional
' re a “ fa ir hear-
1 "'fits under the
os of t hat choice
u, supra, p. 22,
to ‘Anraw: rize
as a mere ju ivi-
1 ry power, ’ ’ so
<itutionallv re-
E.S. at 8.fib.
eipt of benefits
oid the private
ors directly on
. if. is reflected
ovfunments to
I expenditures
ms. More dra-
ieiency or low
• a i Vocation of
I urge nmnhcrs
ree a right to
of time, the
available foi
l s predictable
g “ fair hoar-
uch hearings,
and mcm payments will be made to ineligible
individual .
rl'be full effect of continuation o f payme its pend
ing hearing would be experienced only ovc a ])eriod
of years. \t present, information is scanty. Missis
sippi, however, in August 1968 put into effc: ‘ a policy
ef continr.ing assistance pending “ fa ir lie ring” in
eases of t< -urination o f assistance. For the ; ar ended
dune 30, il )69, the increase over ti e previoi s year in
the numb r of liearings requested was sul -tantially
greater in -ases involving terminat on o f ]> • fits than
for all we fare cases; the latter inn-eased r -uglily 40
pore; nt, fi an 773 to 1059, while th * former increased
appr iximaiely 200 percent, from )7 to 28 . O f the
288 inquests for hearings in 19(38- 9(i9 inv< sing tor
mina ion < ’ benefits, 46 wore witbd awn pro • to hear
ing, one e! limant died before lieai ing, 26 <• ises were
pend ng o- July 1 , 1969, and 215 < ecisions cere ren
dered. 50 < ecisions were in favor o the clai lant, and
165 decisions uphold the agency’s d terminal on. Thus,
on the basis of the “ fair hoari g ” deci-ions, the
claimant was ineligible in 77 pe cent of die cases
wher - assistance was continued, n the p ior year,
when benefits were not continued ] aiding h siring, 57
hearings were held in termination ases; tin claimant
prevailed n seven, and the State geney i 50.
Moreover, the cognizable priva ■ intorei- in con
tinued rec-’ ipt of welfare benefits ending 1 earing is
i lore tentai ive than a direct interest i proper .• as such.
The issue ;s not whether a present sset is t< be taken
away fron its owner, but whether he reel] nt shall
continue t- share in a limited reso ree altlu ugh (un-
28
like others) his eligibility is in serious doubt. There
could be no legitimate interest in a prior hearing
simply as a means by which ineligible persons could
proh ng the time during which they continue to receive
benefits at the expense of the general public and, pos
sibly. of eligible recipients. Tbe in teres arises because
some individuals in fact are or have a sound claim
that they are, eligible despil a prelii linary determi-
nati< n to the contrary, and herefore should not be
mad* to suffer such hardslii is as ar< set out in the
com] laints. Thus, as would lot be true of property
detei urinations, assessment o the indi\ idual’s stake in
a p ro r hearing depends on i nv often the individuals
reqm sting such hearings pro ail.
Th i present case is then lore unlike Sniadacli v.
Fam ly Finance Carp., 395 1 .S. 337, \ here the Court
inva dated, under the Thu Process Clause o f the
Poui eentli Amendment, a t ate pro<- dure by which
wag( s could be garnished ay bout pr >r notice to or
opp< 'tunity for hearing for le wage arner. The key
to t at decision was that “ [w ]e deal here with
wage — a specialized type of iroperty presenting dis
tinct problems in our econom - system' (p. 340). Potli
the i lajority opinion and tl - concuri ing opinion of
Mr. rustice Harlan made pi in that t ie State proce
dure was invalid because gar islnnent involves the im-
med be taking of a AArage e -ner’s “ property” ; and
the < ourt stated ( p. 339) th: althoug i “ [s]uch sum-
man procedure may well i -et the i -quirements of
29
due process in extraordinary sit tations,” 0 garnish
ment 1>y a wage earner’s creditor vas not such a situ
ation. In the present case, howe er— as in cases in
volving government employment, licenses, and other
benefits commonly dealt with thix ugh the ; dministra-
tive proc >ss-—the recipients have 10 prope -ty (in the
classic se ise) of which the gove unent is seeking to
deprive them. In cases involvin the question what
procedui 1 due process required in this • property
h'ss com *xt, this Court has sev ral time indicated
tliai the mswer permissibly vari s with tl e proceed
ing and private interests concert d.11 E.g., Hannah v.
10 The cl iss of “extraordinary situat ns-’ is large enough to
include sui unary actions to protect goc 'rrunent r< enues. Phil
lips v. Commissioner, 28“ TT.S. 589, 591 597. Thus even should
this Court conclude that this case does all within the teaching
of hniadach, it does not follow that h< rings prio to termina
tion or reduction are constitutionally required, ft would be
nece ssary to assess whether in the we are conic" t any threat
to gtvernn cut revenues posed by a requ cement cl >rior hearing
is so great. s to justify summary procedu e.
11 Statute ty solutions to the problem 1 ive not bet > uniform. A
licet se to use part, of the limited broa cast sped um may not
usu; lly be suspended before notice am hearing, ' TJ.S.C. 312
(c) and see, 5 U.S.C. (Supp. IV ) 1 -8(c) : but there is ex-
plic t statutory authority to suspend b< .efits unde the Federal
Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Ins ranee Ben tits Program
bef< re. hea •ing, 42 U.S.C. 403(h )(3 ), f it appeti 'S that there
is a dangei of overpayments being mac , and fede al employees
are regularly suspended from their en, >loyment i advance of
the hearings to which they are entitled under the Civil Service
Act. As in Phillipy supra, n. 10, the <1 ect involv ment of gov
ern! Lent revenues in the latter cases 5 iay justify a procedure
more summary than would be appropri te where ; benefit with
out cost t< the government, such as a roadcast I -ense, is con
cern id. Si lilarly, in case of “jeopard; federal axes may be
assessed a d collected without any op] ntunity f< r prior hear
ing. Inten il Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. >1-68(14.
30
Larc'ne, 363 U.S. 420, 440; Cafeteria \
I'Jlror. 307 U.S. 886, 894-895.
Th>* present statistics show that sub-
ineligible tlian eligible individuals reqi
ings’ V 1' Moreover, it p la in tiff prevail,
her a id proportion of ineligible indO
mg f; ir hearings might increase. Such
retiec either a substantial degree of usi
iiig” requests as a means of proiongi;
ments for individuals who clearly are
hie, or, as the appellant in No. 62 suggv
pp. 14-17, tl'.e efficient fuuct oning ot
new | re-hearing notice-and-cu nferenee
eithe. case, the argument for -fa ir lie;
terrni nation or reduction of benefits
less s rung than it is now.
12 While a substantial proportion of ‘‘ fan-
lie past led to reversal or modi ieation <>j
leterminations, only a small propo tion of U
a reqi cst.s for such hearings. Tlui forms ■ i
fornia to the National Center for Social St a
nartmi nt of Health, Education an Welfare
leriod July 1, 1908. to March .'ill, 1 09— durim
‘‘or Appellants in No. 14 states tl; -re were
■oncer; ing termination of assist an e, p. lU,
i total of 163,035 terminations of r -sistance n
•ity Act programs. O f these, 98,98- represent
issistanca under the Aid for Famil -s with I )«
irogram, and the remainder, the a rious adu
Statistics collected in the annual -eports of
Nationwide Quality Control Svstei on Publi
V f o r t'w year April 1, 1907, > March
ocal a pencies in the nation as a w iole incorr
ermin i-ted benefits in 5.6 percent >f AFFK
if adi t program cases, and under] lid benefit
VFTX and 9 percent of adult p igram cas
hand, .0 percent of A F D C cases i id 1.7 per-
o r k e r s v. 31 c -
tantially more
est " fa ir hear-
both the num-
duals request-
chaugo might
of “ fair hear-
g benefit pay-
0 longer eligi-
is in bis brief,
the relatively
ieclmiques. fit
ring” prior to
could be even
earing-s’’ have in
adverse agency
1 niinal ions rc nit
hm if ted by ( ali-
istics of the De-
how that in the
which the- Uriel'
"fair hearings”
. 12— there wore
>der Social Secn-
d termination of
icndent Ohihlren
jirograms.
i he Department's
Assistance Case
. 1908, show that
-ct 1 v withheld or
and 4.0 percent
in II percent of
■s. On the other
-nt of adult pro-
31
The ewrently applicable Federal
strike the oalance fairly in the light of
ently known. The individual lias adv;
termination or reduction of: assistance
nity for conference. Such con Terence p
formal, expeditious procedure available
ents with respect to whom the agency
ing termination or reduction of paymei
is thus inform; 1 of the proposed agency
vance and can get an explanation; i f lie
the content plat d action is incorrect, it <
The emphasis is on notice, communicate
ing out those cases where the agency <
shown it is making a mistake, or the r<
given informal ion so that he understa
ineligible. The risk of incorrect St;
thereby reduced. I f tire State agency tl
that the term nation or reduction is
claimant s afforded opportunity foi
hearing, which is to be conducted exj
the minority o f cast's where the agenc
out to be incorrect, corrective payments-
The proct-du,-e tlms provides an expo<
for handling a large volume of cases
gives all welfare recipients the opportui
gram. c;ises involved incorrect determinations
were eligibh, and 10.4 percent of AFDO and
adult p.'ogr; m recipients were being overpaid
These (ignn ■> are compiled by State quality
the basis o! a controlled sampling of local
and are en irelj7 independent of “ fair hear
These latter figures, however, cover total tern
do not know in bow many instances hearing
requiren mts
what is pres-
ice noth of
tnd opportu-
ivides an in
to all reoipi-
contem >lat-
ts. Ever one
action i. ad-
an show that
n l)o ave fed.
i, and screen-
ii readil ' be
i])ient c;i i be
Is why i e is
e action; is
n dotern ines
justified, the
a trial- ype
ditiously 111
action 1 urns
are mad .
tious m< hod
i a way hat
ty to exi lain
that rocij ients
10.1 percc I of
iring this ime.
•ntrol uni ■; on
ency case files
g” prorr ires,
at ions, ;e: we
vere ra w ;ted.
32
to tlie State agency in advance why their payments
should not be termin; ted or curtailed, with the assur
ance o f a trial-type bearing I efore such State action
becomes final. I t satisfies both the statutory and con
stitutional command op fair hearing.
]’.. I P T H E COl'JtT WERE TO t ’ONOIAIDE I'll AT TH E 1’EENENT PRACTICE
IS INADEQUATE, i t s n o t I) NOT r e q u ir e A P R E L IM IN A R Y T R IA L -
T Y P E HEARING IN' EVERY \8E UEPOR PAYM EN TS (!A ' P,E IN IT IA L L Y
TERM INATED OR REDUCE
A principal inten t o f tin United States in this
case is to avoid a pi -.liberation of hearings and pro-
cedures which would substant ally burden the admin
istration of the Soci il Security Act without confer
ring material benefii on eligi >le recipients. The dis
trict court in No. 62, owever, failed to adopt this per
spective. I pon colic1 ding that due process requires
more substantial pro< edings ] rior to termination, the
court’s solution was o enlarge and expand the ad
vance notice and info mal conference procedure which
is required before tin agency edetermines eligibility.
By adding the vaiio s procot ural elements which it
concluded are requii 1 by du * process ai that early
stage, the court mad two sig lificant changes in the
overall procedure.
First, the conferen ; is no h ngor a conference; it is
something close to a ull-dres hearing at which wit
nesses must appear, ; id the it apient lias the right to
question them, etc. ideed, t ie court stated: “ W e
realize that these req rement- will duplicate the ‘fair
hearing’ post-termina ion ]iroc ‘dure to some extent.”
Goldberg App. 385a. ! bus, the e may be two bearings
in each case, the pre- erminat >n and the post-termi
nation hearing. This seems unnecessary and potential
ly expensive. Most likely, the 30-day time period now
provided for the advance notice and conference pro
cedure will be inadequate in many cases, so that addi
tional time will be needed before the agency can
determine whether the recipient has become im ligible.
Moreover, the procedure may often rove inadequate
to handle cases involving complex I dual sit ations.
Finally, it might so burden the agen y staff a; to add
further del; ys before these matters can be finally
resolved—a result; as detrimental to welfare re ipients
as to the agency. Such a procedure es not a] pear to
be conducive to the proper and effi< *nt oper; tion o f
the welfare program.
The second, and closely related, difficult;, arises
from the requirement that assistance be conti iued in
all cases until the agency’s initia determ nation,
which is made after the first confer nee hear ng and
which, because of the new procedure required for all
cases, necessarily will further dele; the adn nistra-
tive process at a point where it is ; ready o\ 'rburd-
ened and dilatory. The added expen e to the federal
am; State agencies could be consider; le.
The seriously adverse effect o f tin leeision ; clow in
No. 62 is compounded by ils applic; on even o cases
where ihe claimant challenges only le provisions of
law or settled agency policy. A t leas; me of th appel
lees in that case, Mrs. Altagraeia G man, ap tears to
present only' such an issue in her con daint. M \s. Guz
man's VFDG payments are alleged i be in it minent
danger of t rmuiation because she 'fuses t< assign
to New Yoi k welfare authorities In right o action
34
!
against her husband for non-support
once with an established policy,
threaten to terminate her benefits. She
the tacts nor the policy’s applicabili
simply asserts that the policy ‘ ‘has no
and indeed is contrary to th • statutes
State ” Goldberg App. 25a. ' lie court
exclu !o her from the relief g anted.1:1
I f ‘very individual subject d as am
to tin adverse impact of a ge oral adn
icy could require that his bet ‘fits be -
ing ; trial-type hearing on the law I'
policy, this could almost par lyzc the
of t l i1 Act and would add immeasural
The ( Ifect of requiring trial-1 vpe heari
eases would be that persons a ho could
no vindication from the pr cedures
33 Its failure to do so may luo ■ been ina
]>oint in its opinion tlie court note ! that "W>
with the issue whether procedural < ue process
to ora argument on a matter of i\v. See. ['
TT.S. 265, 276 * * *. ft. is true tin [ I forr/an
‘198 TT.S. T68, 481] contained the c ‘turn that
lie oral or written,’ * * * but w< do not fa
t hat in this case there is no const it itional rig
deuce, as opposed to argument, in ] Tson." Go
Hie t. ct that one of the plaintiffs i fact did
duce arguments, not evidence, appe: ‘S not to b
to in t ie proceedings below.
14 U der the existing H E W regi at ions, an
i ipienf of assistance can obtain a fair heari
grieves by * * * agency action affe ting bis r
lion oi assistance, or by agency pol y as it alii
Hand! aik, § 6200(b). We are info- led that i
this regulation is to provide “f; • hearing
which, like Mrs. Guzman's, raise o !y issues <
uid, in accord-
hey therefore
denies neither
y to her, but
mpport at l;tw
of New Y ork
below did ,ot
tier o f course
nistrative poi-
utiimed peud-
iluess o f that
'.dministratioii
!y to its costs,
igs in all such
dope to obtain
bus invoked 14
ivertent. At. one
do not. deal hero
' •quires the right,
v. W JR , .-‘17
. I ’nlt-rd States,
| ajrgmnent may
ke that to mean
1 to present, evi-
i'eerg App. 98La.
visli only to p-o-
ve been adverted
claimant or re-
ig” if lie is “ag-
eipt or termina
ls his s'ituat io.i."
.' practice under
on complaints
f general policy.
35
because they are ineligible under the policy el
could continue to receive benefits until the
was held. The cost of this delay would have to i
by the community as a whole and, i f total tun
able for benefit purposes were limited, by othe
cuts under the program in the form of redue<
levels. Indeed, i f prior “ fair hearings” were
for each individual adversely affected by a
P(fiicy change, they would be requh >d wher-
ciency of funds required across-the )oard re
in benefit levels.
V trial-type hearing is not requii d befor<
general rule is applied to a part -ular ind
unless there are demonstrable sp< -ial reas
different action in the individual ca e. Unite-
v. Stover Broadcasting Co., 3f>l T S. 192;
Power Commission v. Texaco, 377 LT.S. 33:
Electronics Corp. v. Fcdt a! Conn, /(nicotic,
mission, 39-! F. 2d (120, (!2(i (C.A. I( . “ When
of conduct applies to more than a few pe-n
impracticable that every one should 1 ve a di
in its adoption. * * * There1 must 1 a limit
vidual argument in such matters ' govern
to go on,” Bi-Metallic Investment ( . v. Sfai
of Equalization of Colorado, 239 U h 441, 4
Guzman does not allege any special -ireumst:
her case; she challenges only the neral rn
dlenged
nearing
;e borne
:s avaii-
' reel pi-
benefit
■quired
general
insuffi-
uctions
such a
i vidual,
ns for
States
federal
Conley
; Com
ix rule
!e it is
t voice
o indi-
lent is
Board
5. Mrs.
nces in
36
CONCLUSION
Tlie judgment of the district court in No. 14 should
be affirmed. The judgment of the district court in No.
62 should be modified to eliminate the conditions im
posed by the court as to the first procedure permitted
by the New York statute and as thus modified, should
be a firmed.
R ' 'spectfully subu fitted.
September 1969.
E rwin N Gris wo in,
Solii lor General.
W illiam D. R uck eshaus,
As sis mt Attn I iey General.
R obert A Zener,
Stephen l . F elso ,
A Homeys.
U.S. OOVERNMEN NTINS OFHCF :