Guinn v. Kelly Brief in Opposition to Certiorari

    1st th e

Bxtpxmx (Umtrt nl %  Wmtxb States
O ctober T erm , 1972 

No. 72-341

K e n n y  C. Gu in n , Superintendent of Schools, 
Clark County School District, et al.,

vs.
Petitioners,

H erbert E. K elly , Sr., et al. and L eague of W om en  V oters 
of L as V egas V alley , a Non-Profit Organization.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI

J ack G reenberg

J ames M. N abrit, III
N orman J .  Ch a c h k in  

10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

C harles L. K ellar

1042 West Owens Avenue 
Las Vegas, Nevada 89106

P rank  A. S chreck

717 South Third Street 
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Attorneys for Respondents



TABLE OF CONTENTS

PA G E

Opinions Below......................................... .....................  1

Jurisdiction ................................................... - ..........-....  1

Questions Presented ...................-............ -...................  2

Statement ........................................... -.........................—- 2

Statement of Facts ................. ......................... - ---------  3

R easons. W h y  t h e  W rit  S hould B e D enied  ...... -........—  6

Conclusion ......... ...................-................... -.................... U

Appendix A .............................................-......................  la

T able of A u tho rities

Cases:
Brewer v. Scliool Bd. of Norfolk, 397 F.2d 37 (4th Cir.

1968) ..........................-....................-..................-....... - 10
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ...........- 8

Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Ind. School Disk, 5th Cir.
No. 71-2397 (August 2, 1972) ------- ------ ------ -------  10

Clark v. Board of Educ. of Little Rock, 426 F.2d 1035 
(8th Cir. 1970) .............      - 10

Davis v. Board of School Comm’rs of Mobile County,
430 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1970), rev’d in part, 402
U.S. 33 (1971) _______- ..........................................-  9

Davis v. School Dist. of Pontiac, 309 F. Supp. 734 
(E.D. Mich. 1970), aff’d 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), 
cert, denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971) ...... —-................ 10



11

PAGE

Deal v. Cincinnati Bel. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 
1966), cert, denied, 389 TJ.S. 846 (1967), 419 F.2d 1387 
(6th Cir. 1969), cert, denied, 402 U.S. 962 (1971) .... 9

Ellis y. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County,
465 F.2d 878 (5th Cir. 1972) ................ .......................  10

Henry v. Clarksdale Municipal Separate School Dist.,
409 F.2d 682 (5th Cir.), cert, denied.-, 396 U.S. 940 
(1969) ..................................................... ....................  10

Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) .... 4

Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, No. 71-507 (argued 
October 11, 1972) ..................... ..................................  8

Mannings v. Board of Public Instruction of Hillsbor­
ough County, Civ. No. 3554-T (M.D. Fla., May 11, 
1971) ........................................................... ................  10

Sloan v. Tenth School Dist. of Wilson County, 433 F.2d 
587 (6th Cir. 1970) ...................................................... 10

Spencer v. Kugler, 326 F. Supp. 1235 (D.N.J. 1971), 
aff’d 404 U.S. 1027 (1972) .............................. ......... 9

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S.
1 (1971) - ....— .....— .............................................passim

United States v. Board of Educ., 429 F.2d 1253 (10th 
Cir. 1970) .................... ............................................ . 10

United States v. School Dist. No. 151, 286 F. Supp. 786 
(N.D. 111. 1966), aff’d 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968),
301 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. 111. 1969), aff’d 432 F.2d 1147 
(7th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 402 U.S. 943 (1971) ..... 10



1st t h e

j ^ u j i r m ?  C o u r t  o f  %  I m t r f o  S t a t e s

October T erm, 1972

No. 72-341

K enny C. Guin n , Superintendent of Schools, 
Clark County School District, et al.,

vs.
Petitioners,

H erbert E. K elly, Sr., et al. and L eague oe W omen V oters 
oe L as Vegas Valley, a Non-Profit Organization.

PETITION EOB A WRIT OP CERTIORARI TO THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OP APPEALS EOB THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI

Opinions Below

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit which affirmed the district court’s deseg­
regation order is now reported at 456 F.2d 100. The dis­
trict court opinions and orders herein are unreported and 
are reprinted in the Appendix to the Petition.

Jurisdiction

The jurisdiction of the Court is invoked pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §1254(1). The judgment of the Court of Appeals 
denying rehearing was entered on April 3, 1972. On June 
3, 1972, Mr. Justice Douglas extended the time for filing 
the Petition to and including August 31, 1972.



2

Questions Presented

1. When school authorities by conscious choice make 
decisions affecting the location, grade structure and ca­
pacity of school buildings, the size and perimeters of 
attendance zones by which students are assigned to these 
schools, and the assignment of faculties and staffs to those 
schools, all of which result in the maintenance and in­
crease of racially identifiable and segregated schools, does 
the absence of an explicit state-wide mandate compelling 
such segregation render the school authorities’ actions 
lawful ?

2. May a federal district court devising a remedy for 
Fourteenth Amendment violations in accord with the prin­
ciples of Swann v. Gharlotte-Mecklenhurg Bd. of Educ., 
402 U.S. 1 (1971), require—where there are no practical 
difficulties of the sort envisaged in Swann—that the plan 
be designed so as to avoid assignment of more than 50% 
black students to any school in a system wherein black 
students make up only a small proportion of the total 
student population?

Statement

This school desegregation action was commenced against 
the Clark County School District, Nevada, in 1968. Fol­
lowing a hearing and finding of illegal segregation, the 
district court retained jurisdiction and permitted the school 
board to attempt to comply with its responsibility to elim­
inate that segregation by implementing an open enroll­
ment or free choice plan. In 1970 the court reviewed 
progress under the plan at an evidentiary hearing and 
ordered adoption of new measures incorporating manda­
tory assignment of pupils to the end that no Clark County



3

district school should be more than 50% black. (With re­
spect to faculty, the court held that injunctive relief was 
not required because the board had adopted policies which 
promised effectively to redress the previous disproportion­
ate assignment of black teachers to black schools in the 
district).

Following' this Court’s decision in Swann, supra, the dis­
trict court reconsidered its decision in light thereof pur­
suant to a remand from the Court of Appeals for that 
purpose, and reaffirmed its holding that the Clark County 
School District was constitutionally obligated to desegre­
gate its schools. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding 
that the guidelines in Swann had been properly applied.

Statement of Facts

At the time this lawsuit was filed, some 4,978 black stu­
dents attended six westside Las Vegas elementary schools, 
each of which was over 95% black in student enrollment 
(10/68 Tr. 199, 388, 412; DX 17)1 and each of which had 
a faculty disproportionately black in comparison to other 
schools in the system DX 16). The students attending 
these schools vTere, on the average, a year behind the 
students attending predominantly white Las Vegas schools 
in achievement test scores (10/68 Tr. 413; 5/69 Tr. 48).

At the secondary level there was no school in which 
similar numbers of black students were concentrated. A 
predominantly black westside junior high school had been 
closed in 1956 (10/68 Tr. 200) and its students dispersed 
to other schools in the system (10/68 Tr. 150-51). At that 
time as well, some of the now-black westside elementary

1 Citations are to the original record before the Court of Appeals, 
which respondents have requested be transmitted to this Court. 
Transcript citations are identified by page and date of hearing.



4

schools had significantly larger white enrollments (e.g., 
10/68 Tr. 200). However, although the white and black 
school population of the district subsequently grew about 
the same rate, black students at the elementary level were 
increasingly isolated in heavily black westside elementary 
schools.

There were, of course, a variety of factors which brought 
about this result. Housing in the Las Vegas area was 
tightly segregated and Negroes were generally confined to 
the west side,2 a fact known to the school authorities (10/68 
Tr. 73, 220, 258, 451; 8/70 Tr. 83). Yet the district closed 
schools on the fringe areas of the westside Negro com­
munity (6/71 Tr. 100-01) and replaced them with new ele­
mentary schools built in the heart of black areas (10/68 
Tr. 201; 5/69 Tr. 302). At the same time, federally as­
sisted low-income housing projects on the west side swelled 
the impaction of black residents {e.g., 10/68 Tr. 251, 314- 
15; 8/70 Tr. 1601; cf. 8/70 Tr. 50); it has been only very 
recently that such projects have begun to be located out­
side the traditionally black westside area (6/71 Tr. 70-71).

The school district claims to have been following a 
“neighborhood school policy” in these matters, merely re­
sponding to the demands of local growth in determining 
both its site locations and its school attendance policies. 
However, it is significant that at the time of the hearings 
there were only six “neighborhood” schools in the Las 
Vegas area to which no students were bused; five of these 
were black, westside elementary schools (6/71 Tr. 237, 239). 
Under the district’s attendance plan, considerable numbers 
of white students were transported to school buildings

2 Nevada passed an open housing statute in 1970 (6/71 Tr. 48), 
two years after the federal Fair Housing Act of 1968 went into 
effect. See also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
But the effects of racially discriminatory housing practices are 
longstanding. See 10/68 Tr. 221.



5

other than those closest to them (5/69 Tr. 121; 8/70 Tr. 
221; 6/71 Tr. 237), including white students being trans­
ported to white schools and by-passing one of the black 
west side schools (5/69 Tr. 96, 122-23; 6/71 Tr. 301; see 
10/68 Tr. 428-29).

The school district says it did not take the racial effect 
of its school construction policies into account until 1966 
when it determined to build no more black schools on the 
west side3 (10/68 Tr. 330, 354); however, its new facilities 
have generally not been filled to capacity when they open 
(10/68 Tr. 163; 8/70 Tr. 394) and school construction 
generates increased settlement in the immediate area (10/68 
Tr. 372, 379; 5/69 Tr. 258). In the context of residential 
segregation in Las Vegas, therefore, the district’s con­
struction policies made the situation worse. As recently 
as 1969, the district was building a new school in a white 
suburb to relieve overcrowding at nearby white schools 
(5/69 Tr. 107-08) although black schools were underutilized 
(10/68 Tr. 143, 168-69).

The school district also helped to create and maintain 
the pattern of racially identifiable schools by restricting 
the transfer right of black students at the westside schools 
(10/68 Tr. 80, 254) and by failing to utilize yearly attend­
ance zone changes to increase desegregation (compare 
10/68 Tr. 163, 8/70 Tr. 367 with 6/71 Tr. 301). Tradition­
ally it has assigned its few black elementary teachers to 
the westside schools (e.g., R. 115); the district had never 
assigned a black teacher to a white school before 1969 
(after this action was filed) (10/68 Tr. 438). The school 
district recently has undertaken an extensive renovation 
program at the westside schools in order to “make them

8 Jo Mackey Elementary opened in 1965 and C.V.T. Gilbert in 
1966 (10/68 Tr. 142, 151).



6

equal to other schools in the District . . . ” (10/68 Tr. 354; 
8/70 Tr. 229).

Reasons Why the Writ Should Be Denied

The School Board’s primary contentions in support of 
its request for review of this matter seem to he that the 
courts below wrongly decided factual issues concerning the 
responsibility of school authorities for segregation in Clark 
County and that the decision is in conflict with rulings of 
other Courts of Appeals.

In its Statement of the Case and in general throughout 
the Petition, the District attempts to characterize its opera­
tions as merely following a neutral, neighborhood school 
doctrine. The courts below explicitly held that this was not 
the case in Las Vegas:

This is a clear finding that the school board furthered 
racial segregation by official conduct beyond the mere 
adoption and administration of a neutral, neighborhood 
school policy, [footnote omitted] This finding is sup­
ported by the record, and establishes a constitutional 
violation.

456 F.2d at 106 (Appendix to Petition at p. 10). The Court 
of Appeals reviewed the findings of the district court which 
justified the conclusion that Clark County school authori­
ties knowingly took actions which resulted in the establish­
ment, maintenance, or aggravation of segregated schools 
on the westside of Las Vegas. See 456 F.2d at 106-08 
(Appendix to Petition at pp. 10-13). Additional evidence 
relied upon by the plaintiffs was not directly used by the 
Court of Appeals to buttress its conclusion because the 
district court had not made findings thereon, but examina­
tion of the record will make apparent the solid basis upon



7

which the district court made its finding of constitutional 
violation. See 456 F.2d at 105, n.4 (Appendix to Petition 
at p. 7).4

There is some language in the opinions of the district 
court which is ambiguous because it employs the “de facto” 
school segregation terminology. The Court of Appeals 
properly viewed the lower court’s order as being grounded 
upon a correct interpretation of the law as enunciated by 
this Court in Swann, supra, irrespective of the terminology 
employed. See 456 F.2d at 106, n.6 (Appendix to Petition 
at p. 9).

The arguments in the Petition can be reduced to the 
simple assertion—which the District in fact made below— 
that the Constitution applies only to States which com­
pelled segregation by statute. But such statutes merely 
make the proof of state-created segregation relatively sim­
ple; they do not delimit the reach of the equal protection 
clause. “De jure” segregation can still be proved—as in 
this case—by showing official action resulting in segrega­

4 Attached to this Brief as Appendix A we have reproduced a 
Supplemental Brief filed following oral argument below, which 
describes some of the evidence demonstrating how this school dis­
trict

since Brown, closed schools which appeared likely to become 
racially mixed through changes in neighborhood residential 
patterns . . . [and built] new schools in the areas of white 
suburban expansion farthest from Negro population centers 
in order to maintain the separation of the races with a mini­
mum departure from the formal principles of “neighborhood 
zoning.”

Swann, supra, 402 U.S. at 21. The Supplemental Brief also dis­
cussed the construction of new black schools in areas of black con­
centration and the drawing of attendance boundaries so that the 
new schools continued to serve only that part of the school district 
formerly served by the older black schools, and the school system’s 
failure, while it “continually adjust [ed] attendance boundaries of 
schools” (Petition, p. 11) to ameliorate racial segregation in Las 
Vegas schools.



8

tion or discrimination in the absence of statute, as such 
discrimination can be proved in, for example, jury dis­
crimination cases. Thus, Swann cannot be read in the 
narrow way that the District suggests. This Court was, of 
course, dealing with segregation originally imposed pur­
suant to statute. But the lengthy discussion of issues such 
as school placement, attendance zones, and faculty ratios 
makes it clear that constitutional violations arise by school 
board actions that create or perpetuate segregation even in 
the absence of a statute.

This case involves a school district in which segregation 
has been brought about and maintained by regular, sys­
tematic and deliberate choice of the school authorities. 
While the district court may have labelled the school 
system’s stubborn adherence to a “neighborhood school 
policy” in the black westside schools (R. 513), or its delib­
erate construction of new “neighborhood” (and conse­
quently black) schools in that area (R. 514), “de facto” 
segregation (10/68 Tr. 501) because neither had Nevada 
law ever required segregation nor had the school district 
ever openly advocated it as formal policy, the lower court’s 
order was specifically grounded upon the official action of 
the school district in maintaining and aggravating segre­
gation long after Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954) (R. 514; Appendix to Petition at p. 26).

Not only are Petitioners seeking to controvert factual 
findings clearly supported by the record, but they have 
conjured up non-existent conflicts with the decisions of 
other Courts of Appeals in an effort to create issues merit­
ing the review of this Court. For example, in Keyes v. 
School District, No. 1, Denver, No. 71-501 (argued October 
11, 1972), the Denver school system made the same argu­
ment advanced by the Petitioners below respecting segre­
gation of its Park Hill area schools: that it followed a



9

neighborhood school policy which required it to construct 
new schools in this region of increasing black population 
despite the availability of classroom space elsewhere in the 
system. The Denver district court held that the reasonably 
foreseeable result of the policies knowingly adopted by the 
school board—segregation—imposed upon the Board the 
constitutional obligation to eliminate that segregation. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed on this issue and this Court has 
not acted upon the school board’s cross petition for cer­
tiorari as to this matter, No. 71-572. The standard applied 
by the district court and the Tenth Circuit in Denver is 
precisely the standard applied by the courts below in mea­
suring the constitutionality of the Clark County School 
District’s policies and practices resulting in segregation.

As we noted above, the courts below specifically found 
that the Clark County School District authorities were not 
innocently pursuing a neutral, neighborhood school policy 
which resulted in racial imbalance in existing schools solely 
because of population changes. That distinguishes this 
case from Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th 
Cir. 1966), cert, denied, 389 U.S. 846 (1967), 419 F.2d 1387 
(6th Cir. 1969), cert, denied, 402 U.S. 962 (1971) and Spen­
cer v. Kugler, 326 F. Supp. 1235 (D.N.J. 1971), aff’d 404 
U.S. 1027 (1972), in each of which there was no finding that 
segregation resulted from the actions of school authorities.

The Fifth Circuit cases cited at pages 21 and 22 of the 
Petition, as purportedly giving rise to a conflict among the 
Circuits, were all decided prior to this Court’s ruling in 
Swann, supra, and their limited remedies are insufficient 
under the principles of Swann. Indeed, these decisions 
were relied upon in Davis v. Board of School Comm’rs of 
Mobile County, 430 F.2d 883, 889 (5th Cir. 1970), rev’d in 
part, 402 U.S. 33 (1971), and the limited desegregation 
plans they approved have been altered since Swann, Com,-



10

pare Ellis v. Board, of Public. Instruction of Orange County, 
465 F.2d 878 (5tli Cir. 1972); Mannings v. Board of Public 
Instruction of Hillsborough County, Civ. No. 3554-T (M.D. 
Fla., May 11, 1971).

The Courts of Appeals are in agreement that actions 
such as those of the Clark County School District which 
perpetuate or result in school segregation violate the Four­
teenth Amendment to the Constitution. Davis v. School 
Dist. of Pontiac, 309 F. Supp. 734 (E.D.Mich. 1970), aff’d 
443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971); 
Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Ind. School Dist., 5th Cir., No. 
71-2397 (August 2, 1972); United States v. School Dist. No. 
151, 286 F. Supp. 786 (N.D. 111. 1966), aff’d 404 F.2d 1125 
(7th Cir. 1968), 301 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. 111. 1969), aff’d 432 
F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 402 U.S. 943 (1971); 
cf. Brewer v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 397 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 
1968); Henry v. Clarksdale Municipal Separate School 
Dist., 409 F.2d 682 (5th Cir.), cert, denied 396 U.S. 940 
(1969); Sloan v. Tenth School Dist. of Wilson County, 433 
F.2d 587, 589 (6th Cir. 1970); Clark v. Board of Educ. of 
Little Rock, 426 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1970), 449 F.2d 493 
(8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Board of Educ., 429 F.2d 
1253 (10th Cir. 1970).

There is no singular issue in this case which merits the 
attention of this Court.



11

CONCLUSION

W h erefo re , for the foregoing reasons, Respondents pray 
that the Writ be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

J ack Greenberg

J ames M. N a b r ii, III
N orman J .  C h a c h k in  

10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

C harles L. K ellar

1042 West Owens Avenue 
Las Yegas, Nevada 89106

P rank  A. S ohreck

717 South Third Street 
Las Yegas, Nevada 89101

Attorneys for Respondents



APPENDIX



l a

APPENDIX A

I n  the

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
F ob the N inth  Cibcuit

No. 71-2332
HERBERT E. KELLY, SR., et al.,

v.
Plaintiffs-Appellees,

KENNETH GUINN, Supt. of Schools,
Clark County School District, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 71-2340
HERBERT E. KELLY, SR., et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v.

KENNETH GUINN, Supt. of Schools,
Clark County School District, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 71-2422
HERBERT E. KELLY, SR., et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v.

KENNETH GUINN, Supt. of Schools,
Clark County School District, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants. 
[Cross-Appeals]

APPEAL FEOM TH E UNITED STATES DISTBICT COUET 
POE TH E DISTBICT OP NEVADA



2a

S u pplem en ta l  B rief  for P la in tiffs

Pursuant to leave granted by the panel at the oral argu­
ment in this matter on November 11, 1971, plaintiffs file 
this Supplemental Brief explaining in detail the use made 
of the various maps in the record by plaintiffs’ counsel at 
the oral argument. We are also taking’ the opportunity in 
this format to provide the Court with the citations to the 
two cases mentioned by counsel for plaintiffs at oral argu­
ment which were not contained in the brief.

I
With respect to a possible theory that black faculty mem­

bers were assigned to black schools because the district 
felt black students should be provided with role models 
whom they could emulate, counsel for plaintiffs mentioned 
Dove v. Parham, 282 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1960).

Counsel for plaintiffs also mentioned this Court’s deci­
sion holding segregation imposed by administrative action 
without the sanction of state law unconstitutional in West­
minster School District of Orange County v. Mendez, 161 
F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947).

II
The following comments about the maps in the record 

relate to subjects discussed at the oral argument and are 
elaborated in detail for the convenience of the Court.

One of the subjects at issue in this case is the construc­
tion by the school district in 1965 and 1966 of the black 
Gilbert and Mackey Elementary Schools. It is instructive 
in considering this matter to examine the 1964-65 zoning 
map for the Highland Elementary School found at page 
61 of the record, the 1965-66 zoning maps for the Highland 
and Mackey Elementary Schools found at page 113 of the 
record, and the 1966-67 map of the zones for Highland,



3a

Gilbert and Mackey found at page 116 of the record. 
Enrollment statistics by race for each school are avail­
able only for the 1964-65 (record at p. 50) and 1966-67 
(record at p. 114) school years. Although the comparison 
is made more difficult because the 1964-65 zoning maps are 
photocopies of street maps with individual zones deline­
ated by cross-hatching, while the 1965-66 and 1966-67 maps 
are schematic, it is apparent from a comparison of the 
three maps mentioned above that the area presently served 
by Highland (subsequently renamed Booker), Gilbert and 
Mackey is essentially the same area served by Highland 
Elementary alone in 1964-65. During’ that year the record 
shows that Highland had an enrollment of 1,014 black 
students at 46 “other” (white) students. The map at page 
61 of the record very clearly shows the northern boundary 
of the Highland zone to have run along Cheyenne xivenue 
from the railroad tracks on the east to Simmons Street on 
the west (the Xerox copy of the map in the record does 
not show the entire street name, but an arrow pointing 
to the western boundary of Highland running south from 
its intersection with Cheyenne can be seen and part of 
the words Simmons Street are visible). The zone runs 
south to Smoke Ranch Road (again the entire street name 
is not visible, but the last e of Smoke and the word Ranch 
can be made out) over to Tuning and south to Lake Mead 
Boulevard. The zone then takes in the entire area north 
of Lake Mead Boulevard and east to the railroad tracks 
except for a small area at the eastern edge which is 
marked “Valley View Estates.” Examination of the rec­
ord at page 73, showing the zone for Matt Kelly Elemen­
tary shows the disposition of that small area north of 
Lake Mead Boulevard and south of Miller Avenue, west 
of the railroad tracks and east of Revere.

Comparing the original Highland zone with the maps at 
pages 113 and 116 of the record, the first striking fact



4a

revealed is that the northern boundary line for Highland, 
Gilbert or Mackey has consistently been drawn along Chey­
enne Avenue. At the same time, Gilbert, Mackey and High­
land have remained black schools while Lois Craig, the ele­
mentary school serving the area north of Cheyenne, has 
been predominantly white. In 1964-65 when Lois Craig 
served a large area north of Cheyenne as well as a small 
area between Simmons and the Thunderbird Air Field, 
south to Cartier (record at p. 71), it enrolled 725 white 
students and 32 black students (record at p. 50). In 1965- 
66, it served essentially the same area. In 1966-67, it served 
virtually the same area but lost to C.Y.T. Gilbert the small 
space between Simmons and the Air Field; it actually lost 
a few black students in the process, enrolling 389 white 
students and 44 black students. Thus, the comment in the 
Reply Brief of the school board that Mackey was so located 
as to provide for future growth north of Cheyenne Avenue 
(page 6 of Reply Brief) is belied by the school district’s 
practice of drawing a rigid boundary between the black 
area south of Cheyenne and the predominantly white area 
north of Cheyenne.

In 1966-67 Lois Craig was considerably below its capac­
ity, enrolling 433 students compared to its 1964-65 enroll­
ment of 757. Yet no black students residing south of Chey­
enne Avenue between the railroad tracks and the air field 
were assigned to Lois Craig nor were white students north 
of Cheyenne assigned to either Gilbert or Mackey. Instead, 
whites living north of Cheyenne near the air field, who are 
obviously much closer to Gilbert or Mackey, travelled all 
the way east to Lois Craig. In 1966-67 Gilbert enrolled 516 
blacks and only 5 whites, Mackey 761 blacks and no whites, 
and Lois Craig 389 whites and 44 blacks.

Except for the addition of the area between Simmons and 
the air field to Gilbert, all of the zone changes necessitated 
by the construction of Gilbert and Mackey took place within



5a

the original Highland zone which was overwhelmingly 
black. Not surprisingly, three schools which now served 
that area, instead of one, became racially identifiable as 
black schools. There was no extension of the Lois Craig 
zone south or vice versa. There was no adjustment in the 
zones for other black schools, Kelly, Carson, Madison and 
Westside, despite the construction of Gilbert and Mackey 
to relieve the pressure on Highland.

The effect of closing Washington and Jefferson Elemen­
tary Schools was also discussed at the oral argument. We 
refer the Court in this connection to the 1964-65 zoning 
maps for Washington (record at p. 92), Jefferson (record 
at p. 62), Kit Carson (record at p. 68), and McCall (rec­
ord at p. 88) Schools as well as to the 1966-67 zoning maps 
(record at p. 116).

In 1964-65, the Kit Carson zone extended from Lake 
Mead Boulevard to West Owens between the railroad 
tracks and Holmes Street (record at p. 68) just as it did 
in 1966-67 (record at p. 116). In 1964-65 Carson enrolled 
719 blacks and 14 whites. The McCall School in 1964-65 
served an area south of Evans and Cartier between the 
railroad tracks on the west and the Las  egas Boulevard 
on the east but extending only south to Lake Mead Boule­
vard (record at p. 80). At that time it enrolled 514 whites 
and no black students. The area between the railroad tracks 
and Las Vegas Boulevard south of Lake Mead Boulevard 
was served in 1964-65 by the AVashington School (record at 
p. 92). It enrolled 185 whites and 9 blacks (record at p. 50). 
The Jefferson Elementary School had a zone just east of 
AVashington and east of Las Vegas Boulevard (record at 
p. 62) enrolling 196 whites and no blacks (record at p. 50).

After Washington and Jefferson were closed at the same 
time as new capacity was made available west of the rail­
road tracks by the construction of the Gilbert and Mackey



6a,

Schools, the zone for Kit Carson or Westside, black schools, 
was not extended to the east across the railroad tracks to 
integrate either facility. Instead the McCall zone was ex­
tended southward below Lake Mead Boulevard (record at 
p. 116). In 1966-67 McCall enrolled 512 whites and 42 
blacks. Had Washington or Jefferson been retained, the 
Superintendent testified that in 1968 they would have been 
about 50% black (October, 1968 transcript, p. 201). It is 
further clear that opportunities for desegregation at Car- 
son and Westside presented by the closing of Washington 
and Jefferson were not taken.

The maps also assisted in visualizing one of the examples 
mentioned in oral argument of the way in which white 
students have been assigned to white schools even if closer 
to black schools. The 1964-65 map for Highland Elemen­
tary (record at p. 61) shows an area south of Smoke Ranch 
Road, north of Lake Mead Boulevard and west of Turning 
which is much closer to the Highland School than most of 
the northeast portion of the zone. However, it is excluded 
from the zone. The zoning map for the McWilliams Ele­
mentary School for the same year (record at p. 67) shows 
that the area referred to next to the Highland School has 
been obviously gerrymandered into McWilliams; in 1964- 
65, McWilliams enrolled 989 white students and no blacks 
while Highland enrolled 1,014 blacks and 46 whites (record 
at p. 50). The 1966-67 map (record at p. 116) shows the 
same area cut out of the Gilbert zone and the map on page 
119 of the record shows that that area is zoned to McWil­
liams, a school located so far west that it cannot be shown 
on the map. Obviously students from that area are bused at 
the school district’s expense to McWilliams, which in 1966- 
67 enrolled 843 whites and 19 blacks while Gilbert enrolled 
516 whites and 5 blacks (record at p. 114). Hr. Lawrence 
confirmed that this white area has historically been zoned 
away from the closest black school, either Highland or



7a

Gilbert, and transported to McWilliams or Ronzone (June, 
1971 transcript, p. 301-02).

Plaintiffs greatly appreciate the opportunity to elucidate 
for the Court what the inspection of the maps in the record 
showTs. We regret that because of the short time available 
to work with the maps we were unable to include these 
detailed verbal descriptions in our main brief.



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