Lawson v. Vera Jurisdictional Statement

    No. 94-

I n  T h e

Supreme Court of tf)e Hmteb States'

O c t o b er  T e r m , 1994

R e v . W il l ia m  L a w son  e t  a l ., A ppe l l a n t s , 

and

R o b e r t  R e y e s , e t  a l ., A ppe ll a n t s

V.

A l V e r a , e t  a l .

ON APPEAL. FROM THE UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT

OF TEXAS

JU R ISD ICTIO N A L STATEM ENT

Charles Drayden 
Drayden, Wyche & Woods, 

L.L.P.
1360 Post Oak Blvd.
Suite 1650
Houston, Texas 77056 
(713) 965-0120

Anthony E. Chavez 
Mexican American Legal 
Defense & Educational Fund 
634 South Spring Street 
Los Angeles, California 90014 
(213) 629-2512

Elaine R. Jones 
Director-Counsel

Theodore M. Shaw 
Associate Director-Counsel

Penda D. Hair 
Counsel o f Record 
NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund, Inc. 
1275 X. St. N.W.
Suite 301
Washington, D.C. 20005 
(202) 682-1300

Additional Counsel Listed on Inside Cover



Lawrence Boze 
2208 Blodgett 
Houston, Texas 77004 
(713) 520-0260

Kevin Wiggins 
White, Hill, Sims & Wiggins 
2001 Ross Avenue 
Dallas, Texas 75201 
(214) 954-1700

Carmen Rumbault 
Mexican American Legal Defense 

and Educational Fund 
140 E. Houston, Suite 300 
San Antonio. Texas 78205 
(210) 224-5476



1

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. Where a State knows that it is possible to construct 
a reasonably compact minority opportunity district, 
within the meaning of Thornburg v. Gingles, and 
recognizes its obligation to avoid vote dilution, does 
Shaw v. Reno require the State to abandon all other 
districting goals and maximize regularity of shape of 
the voting rights district?

II. Where a State’s majority-white congressional districts 
are highly irregular in shape, does Shaw v. Reno 
require the State to maximize regularity of shape 
only for its minority opportunity districts?

III. Are small, functional, rational, single-urban-area 
minority opportunity districts, that unite persons with 
a commonality of interest, unconstitutional under 
Shaw v. Reno?

IV. Did plaintiffs prove the elements of an Equal 
Protection claim with respect to Texas 
congressional District 18, 29 or 30?

V. Does Shaw v. Reno confer automatic standing on any 
State resident who idealizes colorblind districting?



IX

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Plaintiffs are A1 Vera, Edward Blum, Edward Chen, 
Pauline Orcutt, Barbara L. Thomas and Kenneth Powers.

Defendants are Texas State officials, Ann Richards, 
Governor, Bob Bullock, Lieutenant Governor, Pete Laney, 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Dan Morales, 
Attorney General, and Ron Kirk, Secretary of State.

The Lawson Defendant-Intervenors are Rev. William 
Lawson, Zollie Scales, Jr., Rev. Jew Don Boney, Deloyd T. 
Parker, Dewan Perry, Rev. Caesar Clark, David Jones, Fred 
Hofheinz and Judy Zimmerman.

The LULAC Defendant-Intervenors are Robert 
Reyes, Angie Garcia, Robert Anguiano, Sr., Dalia Robles, 
Nicolas Dominguez, Oscar T. Garcia, Ramiro Gamboa and 
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) of 
Texas.

The United States intervened as a defendant.



Ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented .....................   i

Parties To The Proceeding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ii

Table Of C o n te n ts .......................     iii

Table Of Authorities .............................. .. v

Opinion B elow ............ 2

Jurisdiction .....................     2

Constitutional And Statutory
Provisions Involved ............................................................ . 2

Statement ..................................... ............. ....................... 3

Proceedings Below . ..............     3

Incumbency Protection .................................   3

Voting Rights Act Considerations . . . . . . . . . .  5

Construction of the Invalidated Districts . . . . . .  7

Description of the Invalidated Districts . . . . .  10

Opinion Below ....................................     14

The Questions Presented Are Substantial . . . . . . . . .  16

I. The Court Below Erred In Holding That 
Minority Opportunity Districts Must 
Maximize "Regularity" Of Shape, Ignoring All 
Other State Districting Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17



IV

II. The Court Below Erred In Ignoring The
Highly Irregular Shapes Of Texas’ Majority- 
White Districts .........................................  22

III. The Court Below Erred In Ignoring The Size, 
Functionality And Rationality Of Districts 18,
29 and 30 ..........................        24

IV. The Court Below Erred In Holding That
Plaintiffs Proved An Equal Protection 
Violation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25

V. The Court Below Erred In Holding That The
Plaintiffs Have Standing ..............    26

Conclusion ....................................    28

Appendix A . .....................   la

Appendix B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4a



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737 (1984) .................................................... .. 26

Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . .  20

Davis v. Bandemer,
478 U.S. 109 (1986) .................................. . . . . . .  20, 21

De Witt v. Wilson, 1994 WL 325415 (E.D.
Calif. June 27, 1994) ................................................ 24

Gaffney v. Cummings,
412 U.S. 735 (1973) ............................... ............. .. 14

Growe v. Emison, 113 S.Ct. 1075 (1993) . . . . . . . . .  5, 20

Hays v. Louisiana, No. 92-1522 (W.D. La.
July 29, 1994) ................................................ 18

Johnson v. De Grandy,
129 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5

Johnson v. Miller, No. 194-008
(S.D. Ga. Sept. 12, 1994) . . . . . . . . .  15, 18, 19, 23, 25

Lujan v. Defenders o f Wildlife,
119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ........................................ .. 26

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 583 (1964) . . . . . . . . . . . .  20

Shaw v. Hunt, No. 92-202 - Civ-5-Br
(ED. N.C. Aug. 1, 1994) . ................. .. 20, 23, 25

Shaw v. Reno, 125 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1993) ............ passim



VI

Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30 (1986) .......... .............................. .. . . . 5, 17, 18

Voinovich v. Quilter,
113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993) . . . . . . . . ___ . . . . . . . . . . 5, 20

Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,
458 U.S. 457 (1982) . . . . . . ....... ..................... ............  22

White v. Weiser,
412 U.S. 783 (1973) ............ .. . . 4, 14, 20

Williams v. City o f Dallas,
734 F. Supp. 1317 (N.D. Tex. 1990) ___ _ . . .............6 ,7

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV (Equal Protection 
Clause) ........................................... .. . . . passim

28 U.S.C. § 1253 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2

Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1973, 1 9 7 3 c ............

S. Rep. No. 97-417 (1982)....... ............. .. ............  6



No. 94-

In  T h e

Supreme Court of tije States?

O c t o b er  Te r m , 1994

R e v . W il l ia m  La w so n  e t  a l ., A ppella n ts , 

and

R o b e r t  R e y e s , e t  a l ., A ppella nts

A l  V e r a , e t  a l .

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT

OF TEXAS

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Appellants, Rev. William Lawson, Zollie Scales, Jr., 
Rev. Jew Don Boney, Deloyd T. Parker, Dewan Perry, Rev. 
Caesar Clark, David Jones, Fred Hofheinz and Judy 
Zimmerman (Lawson Intervenors) and appellants Robert 
Reyes, Angie Garcia, Robert Anguiano, Sr., Dalia Robles, 
Nicolas Dominguez, Oscar T. Garcia, Ramiro Gamboa and 
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) of 
Texas (LULAC Intervenors), appeal from the injunction of



2

Texas’ congressional districting plan entered by the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

OPINION BELOW

The unreported opinion of the three-judge district 
court finding three districts unconstitutional, entered on 
August 17, 1994, is set out in the Appendix to the 
Jurisdictional Statement of the State Appellants (State App.) 
at 5a-84a.

JURISDICTION

On September 2, 1994, the district court entered an 
order requiring the State Legislature to develop a remedy 
plan by March 15, 1995. State App. la. On September 14, 
1994, the court amended its September 2 order nunc pro 
tunc, to enjoin use of Texas’ congressional districting plan 
for 1996 elections. Id  at 30. The Lawson Intervenors and 
the LULAC Intervenors filed Notices of Appeal on October 
3 and September 30, respectively. App. la, 4a. The Court 
has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1253.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment provides that "[N]o State . . . shall deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws." Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973c, are set out in State App. 87a-88a.



3

STATEMENT

Proceedings Below

Plaintiffs filed suit on Januaiy 26, 1994, challenging 
under the Fourteenth Amendment at least 24 of Texas’ 30 
congressional districts. See State App. 9a & n.3. Plaintiffs 
claimed that Texas illegally used race in constructing 
congressional districts and failed to follow certain allegedly 
"traditional" districting principles. State App. 10a. The 
court granted motions of Rev. William Lawson, et al., nine 
black and white voters in Districts 18 and 30 (Lawson 
Intervenors), the League of United Latin American Citizens 
(LULAC) of Texas and seven Hispanic voters (LULAC 
Intervenors) and the United States, to intervene as 
defendants. Id. at 11a.

The court below invalidated three districts, including 
Texas’ only two African American opportunity districts (18 
and 30) and one district (29) intended to provide Hispanic 
political opportunity. The court upheld the constitutionality 
of the other 21 challenged districts, of which 18 are majority 
white and 3 are majority Hispanic.

Incumbency Protection

More than a year prior to redistricting, the Texas 
congressional delegation began work with the "overriding 
objective" of "incumbency protection." State App. 23a. The 
court below noted: "The incumbents ‘have practically drawn 
their own districts. Not practically, they have.’" Id. at 24a 
(quoting Senator Johnson, Chair, Subcommittee on 
Congressional Districts). The district court found: "[Njever 
before have districts been drawn on a block-by-block or 
neighborhood- or town-splitting level to corral voters 
perceived as sympathetic to incumbents or to exclude 
opponents of incumbents." Id. at 55a. The court graphically 
described the result:



4

[M]any incumbent protection boundaries sabotaged 
traditional redistricting principles as they routinely 
divided counties, cities, neighborhoods, and regions.
. . . Congressmen or would-be Congressmen shed 
hostile groups and potential opponents by fencing 
them out of their districts. ... The Legislature 
obligingly carved out districts of apparent supporters 
of incumbents, as suggested by the incumbents, and 
then added appendages to connect their residences to 
those districts.

Id. at 55a-56a (footnotes and citations omitted).1

As found by the district court, many Texas 
congressional districts were "disfigured less to favor or 
disadvantage one race or ethnic group than to promote the 
reelection of incumbents." State App. 9a (footnote omitted). 
Pictured on the following page are two examples of 
irregularly shaped, majority-white districts. District 6 
rambles over 5 counties, PX 34P, includes urban, suburban 
and rural territory, and makes a jagged incursion into Ellis 
County to pick up the residence of incumbent Joe Barton. 
Its longest axis is 82 miles, almost twice that of Districts 18, 
29 and 30. U.S. Ex. 1067. District 6 interweaves with

draw ing districts to promote election of incumbents and aspiring 
State Legislators is a strong Texas tradition. See, e.g., White v. Weiser, 
412 U.S, 783, 792 (1973) (describing incumbency protection in 
1970’s). Regular shapes and respect for political subdivisions have a 
weak history, at best, as districting goals. See State App. 15a, n.9. 
Although the court below thought that prior plans were more 
compact than the 1991 plan, there is no evidence of a previous 
legislative goal of compact districts, as opposed to lack of the 
technological capacity available in 1991. Many legislators stated 
without contradiction that compactness has never been a strong State 
interest in congressional districting. E.g. Lawson Ex. 14 11 17 (State 
Senator Ted Lyon); State Ex. 23 (Justice (former State Senator) 
Oscar Mauzy).



47 Percent African American 
Democrat Eddie Bernice Johnsoi

89 Percent White 
Republican Joe Barton

District 30

District 6 Barton Residence

87 Percent White 
Democrat Pete Geren

COMPARISON OF SELECTED TEXAS CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS 
(NOT DRAWN TO SCALE) PLAN ID: PUBLC657

DAN MORALES 

ATTORNEY GENERAL



5

District 12, at one point using a narrow corridor to pass into 
territory almost totally surrounded by District 12. District 12 
includes parts of three counties, PX 34P, and is 84 miles 
long, U.S. Ex. 1067. For comparison, the invalidated 
District 30 is also set out.2

Voting Rights Act Considerations

The Legislature was aware as it redistricted that the 
African American population in both Harris County 
(Houston), where District 18 had been represented by an 
African American since Barbara Jordan, and in Dallas 
County, was "sufficiently large and geographically compact"3 
to constitute an effective majority in a single-member 
district.4 In Harris County, the Hispanic population had 
experienced phenomenal growth and numbered enough to 
constitute the majority in two congressional districts. A 
highly-publicized plan creating a new majority-Hispanic 
district in Harris County, while preserving District 18 as an 
African American opportunity district, was proposed by 
State Representative Roman Martinez on March 23, 1991.5

2The pictures are not to scale, thus obscuring the larger size of 
Districts 6 and 12.

3Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986). See also Johnson v. 
De Grandy, 129 L.Ed.2d. 775, 788-790 (1994); Voinovich v. Quitter, 
113 S.Ct. 1149 (1993); Growe v. Emison, 113 S.Ct. 1075 (1993).

4Plaintiffs’ only expert witness testified that "reasonably compact," 
effective African American opportunity districts could be drawn in 
the Dallas and Houston areas. TR 111:113-115. See also State App. 
70a-71a; State Exs. 12A, 12B, 12C.

3LULAC E x. 6; Martinez Dep. 1:27, 52. Virtually all of the 
witness statements and documentary evidence introduced by the State 
and the Intervenors was uncontested by plaintiffs and accepted as 
accurate by the court below. But see State App. 47a, n.36.



6

The Legislature was well aware of numerous court 
decisions finding high levels of racially polarized voting 
across the State.6 The Legislature also knew that section 5 
of the Voting Rights Act prohibited retrogression of District 
18.

In the Dallas area, the Legislature knew that the 
large, geographically compact and politically cohesive 
African American community had been fragmented between 
the districts of two white incumbents in the districting plan 
used in the 1980’s.7 Also before the Legislature was the 
federal District Court’s decision in Williams v. City o f Dallas, 
734 F. Supp. 1317, 1393 (N.D. Tex. 1990), issued on March 
28, 1990, just as the redistricting process began. Williams 
concluded: "[I]t is clear that there is white bloc voting in 
Dallas which usually defeats the preferred choice of African- 
Americans."8 Williams also found extensive evidence of 
virtually all of the other factors listed in the Senate Report 
as relevant to the "totality of the circumstances" analysis 
under Section 2,9 including common use of racial appeals in

6E.g., U.S. Ex. 1065; State Ex. 17 at 7-24; State Ex. 15, at 6, 7. 
The Legislature’s knowledge that voting is highly racially polarized 
was scientifically confirmed by experts at trial. State App. 22a-23a.

7E.g. Lawson Ex. 15 11 10.

8For example, in 1983, African American community leaders 
chose a highly qualified candidate who still could not raise money 
from whites. Id. at 1361. The African American candidate was 
soundly defeated by the white candidate in a runoff, obtaining almost 
all of the black vote but only 11 percent of the white vote. Id. at 
1324.

9S. Rep. No. 97-417 (1982), at 28-29. The egregious history of 
racial discrimination in Dallas politics is set out in the Senate Report. 
Id. at 21-22.



7

campaigns,10 lack of success of minority candidates, a 
history of discrimination, socioeconomic disadvantages 
affecting political participation11 and an atmosphere of 
racial polarization.12 In 1988, just three years before the 
new congressional districts were drawn, the "city split across 
racial lines," id. at 1364.

Construction of the Invalidated Districts

Fortunately for Voting Rights Act compliance, Texas 
in 1991 received three new districts in which there was no 
incumbent. Based on extensive factual evidence, merely 
summarized above, the Legislature decided to maintain 
District 18 as an African American opportunity district, to 
place a new Hispanic opportunity district in Harris County 
(29), and to place another new district (30) in the Dallas 
metroplex as an African American opportunity district.

Protecting incumbents while inserting new voting 
rights districts into the incumbents’ territory was not easy. 
In Dallas, Senator Johnson proposed a much more compact 
African American opportunity district, which "drew much

I0"[I]n the 1986 general election, John Vance — the successful 
candidate for Dallas County District Attorney — ran a newspaper ad 
with his picture next to the picture of his black opponent." 734 F. 
Supp. at 1363. See also id. at 1348 (Mayor ran on anti-busing 
platform, using racially derogatory campaign materials), 1360 
(newspaper identified white candidate as "civil leader" and opponent 
as "black activist").

n734 F. Supp. at 1382, 1403.

12For example, statements were made in 1981-1982 City Council 
meetings that Oak Cliff "had to have a white representative on the 
Council because ‘Anglos felt extremely uncomfortable being 
represented by blacks’" and if Oak Cliff "did not have an Anglo 
member on the City Council, there would be ‘white flight’ and ‘Oak 
Cliff would be black within two years.”' 734 F. Supp. at 1323.



8

opposition from incumbents and was quickly abandoned." 
State App. 31a. See also id. at 49a. Two powerful, white, 
Democrat incumbents in Dallas (Martin Frost in District 24 
and John Bryant in District 5) had established ties to 
territory and voters, including African Americans who in the 
198Q’s had been fragmented between their districts. A 
carefully-crafted compromise was forged in which Frost’s 
and Bryant’s districts were each pulled back and the new 
district was squeezed in between them.13

Because Frost and Bryant retained territory that 
would have been in the most regularly shaped version of 
District 30, the District was not configured to maximize 
regularity of shape. To replace population taken by 
incumbents, then-State Senator Eddie Bernice Johnson, who 
intended to seek election from District 30, wanted to include 
voters o f all races from her political base, the City of Grand 
Prairie. Congressman Frost, who also had a base in Grand 
Prairie, engaged in a vicious battle with Johnson over that 
City, which they ultimately split in a compromise. State 
App. 32a. Significantly, this battle was over white, and not 
African American, voters. The portion of Grand Prairie 
included in District 30 is only 14% African American. PX 
34T.

One of the most irregular parts of District 30, to the 
northwest, does not pick up population, but goes out to 
DFW Airport, State App. 27a, which was included in the 
District for non-racial reasons. U.S. Exs. 1070, at 4-5, 1074, 
1075. The main northern portion of District 30 would not 
exist if incumbents Frost and Bryant had not taken 
population out of District 30 on the other sides. In pushing

13State App. 32a, n.23 ("Frost and Bryant split Dallas County and 
we were forcing another district right down in-between the two of 
them and pushing them outward.")(quoting staff member of Senate 
Subcommittee on Legislative Redistricting).



9

north, District 30 ran into Park Cities, a highly Republican 
community, whose Republican incumbent had strongly 
requested to keep this area.14 Complying with this 
incumbent desire caused a huge incursion by District 3 into 
the middle of District 30. Another major goal was to 
comply with the request of Jewish voters to be in District 30. 
Lawson Ex. 22. Significant industry, located on the Central 
Expressway corridor in the north, was important to give 
political clout to the district. A final goal was to include two 
small African American communities, one in Hamilton Park 
and the other in Plano, each of which desired to be in 
District 30. E.B. Johnson Dep. 133-138.

Many factors influenced the boundaries of the 
districts in the Houston/Harris County area. As found by 
the district court, Congressman Mike Andrews’ District 25 
"was to be kept intact and Democratic." State App. at 38a. 
"[A] suggestion by Congressman Craig Washington that 
District 18 be reconfigured based on the shape of African- 
American majority Senate District 13 was unacceptable 
’because it would have taken a large chunk out of District 
25.’" Id. at 38a.

State Representative Roman Martinez proposed a 
plan in which the new Hispanic district would overlap 
substantially with his House District.15 State App. 36a-37a, 
Significantly, Rep. Martinez’ plan did not split any precincts, 
State App. 39a, and has never been characterized as non­

14E. B. Johnson Dep. 130.

i5AU agreed that African American and Hispanic voters are not 
cohesive and therefore that each minority group had to be treated 
separately for purposes of Voting Rights Act compliance. See State 
App. 21a-22a.



10

compact or unduly irregular.16 The more regularly shaped 
version of District 29 proposed by Rep. Martinez was 
rejected because then-State Senator Gene Green, who is 
white, wanted District 29 to overlap as much as possible with 
his Senate District. The court below found that "the borders 
of district 29 became increasingly distended as [Rep. 
Martinez] and Senator Green fought to place their state 
constituents within the new district." State App. 66a. See 
also id. at 38a-39a.

Description of the Invalidated Districts

Districts 18, 29 and 30 are racially integrated. The 
only plaintiff from the Dallas area, Pauline Orcutt, testified 
forcefully about District 30: "It is integrated. O f course it is, 
and you know it." Orcutt Dep. 110-111 (emphasis added).17 
Dallas businessman Albert Black stated: "I grew up in a 
segregated neighborhood . . . .  I do not understand how 
anyone could think a district that brings together an African- 
American businessman from South Dallas (like me) and an 
Anglo businessman from North Dallas (like Jerry Johnson) 
to further economic development in the entire Dallas area 
could be considered segregative." Lawson Ex. 1 at 16.18

l6Rep. Martinez’ plan also preserved the Democratic nature of 
District 25, thus protecting white incumbent Mike Andrews. State 
App. 38a.

I7Districts 18 and 29 also are integrated, according to plaintiffs. 
TR 1:25 (Ed Blum); Thomas Dep. 71-72.

l8See also Lawson Ex. 5 UH 2-3 (Councilwoman Sandra Crenshaw) 
("I think it is ridiculous to say that this District segregates voters. . . . 
[District lines are invisible things in the world. . . . Dallas is 
extremely segregated. My neighborhood is 100 percent African 
American. . . . The segregation of people . . .  in Dallas was present 
before the current congressional district lines . . . were drawn. 
Redlining, lack of fair housing, lack of economic development,

(continued...)



11

Houston. District 18 was constructed in 197118 19 with 
the expectation, realized shortly thereafter, that then-State 
Senator Barbara Jordan would become its congressional 
representative. U.S. Ex. 1071, at 10.20 "[Fjundamentally, 
the 18th district has not changed much over the last 20 
years." Lawson Ex. 16 11 7. In voting age population (VAP), 
it is 49% African American. District 29, 55% Hispanic 
VAP, is the poorest district in the State, in which "there is 
definitely a community of interest." Martinez Dep. 1:73. 
Districts 18 and 29 are located entirely within a single 
county. No point in District 18 is further than 39 miles from 
any other point, while District 29’s longest axis is only 43 
miles. U.S. Ex. 1067. Both districts provide for ease of 
transportation and communication among their residents. 
Id.21

Dr. Paul Geisel, an expert demographer, analyzed 
Districts 18 and 29 as follows:

18(...continued)
exclusion from the political process, and other forms of discrimination 
cause segregation -- not lines on a map.").

19District 18’s traditions extend not just to African Americans, but 
to the long-included, majority-Anglo areas that are an integral part 
of the District, such as the Montrose neighborhood in downtown 
Houston. E.g. Lawson Ex. 15 11 19. Voters of all races in District 18 
are satisfied with its composition. E.g., Lawson Ex. 10 H 10 (white 
resident).

“ Race was considered in the creation of District 18 in 1971, yet 
the district was never challenged and plaintiff Chen believed it was 
constitutional then. TR 1:33.

21The perimeters of Districts 18 and 29 are only 540 and 539 miles 
respectively, roughly in the middle of Texas congressional districts. 
U.S. Ex. 1067. Eleven Texas congressional districts have boundaries 
of more than 900 miles, with District 23 measuring 2035 miles in total 
perimeter. Id. The State average is 750 miles. Id.



12

Both of these districts are essentially in the city of 
Houston and represent historic political wards of the 
city. . . .  In total physical size districts 18 and 29 are 
small as congressional districts. It is possible to visit 
all parts of either district in any direction in less than 
1 hour. The media and other communication 
accesses to these districts is similar.

State Ex. 18, Pt. 3 at 8. Dr. Richard Murray, a well- 
respected,22 local political scientist, reported about Districts 
18 and 29: "Stable neighborhoods and communities of
interest were generally respected. . . . Stable innercity 
neighborhoods — River Oaks, south Montrose, the East End, 
Third Ward, Acres Home — were not divided." Lawson Ex. 
26, at 17.23 Controlling for race within Districts 18 and 29, 
Dr. Murray found: "The congressional district plan adopted 
by the Texas Legislature created districts in Harris County 
[that] bring together people, including minorities not well 
represented in the legislative chambers even in the 1990’s, 
who share a number of demographic and political behavioral 
characteristics." Id. at 25. Dr. Murray concluded that "the 
arguments for maximizing compactness" are "weak" in Harris 
County. Id. at 26.

Dallas. District 30 also is located in a single 
metropolitan area, with no point more than 42 miles from 
any other point, U.S. Ex. 1067.24 The residents of District

22Plamtiffs’ only expert witness, testified: ”1 know Professor
Murray very well, and I respect him." TR V:75.

™See also Lawson Ex. 15 HIT 11-12; Lawson Ex. 18 11 8.

24District 30’s perimeter is 433 miles. U.S. Ex. 1067.



13

30 all live and work25 within a short distance of each other, 
and the district rationally ties together persons with a 
community of interest. Demographer Paul Geisel described 
District 30 as follows: "Urban congressional districts,
because of the population densities, can physically appear 
rather odd. . . . The truth . . .  is that District 30 is quite 
compact. It represents a constituency that has a genuine 
focus not only for black citizens but for the region as a 
whole." State Ex. 18, Pt. 2 at 7-8.26 See also TR IV:136- 
161.

The residents of District 30 share a common public 
transportation system (DART). The Senate Redistricting 
Committee used voting patterns on DART referenda in 
constructing District 30, including persons of all races who 
had voted in supported of DART and thus demonstrated a 
community of interest with each other. State App. 34a; 
E. B. Johnson Dep. 85-86. DART’s system map bears an 
undeniable correspondence to the map of District 30.27 * * 30

“ Even members of District 30 who live the farthest from the 
District’s core travel to the downtown area to work, to go to church 
and to socialize. Johnson Dep. 134.

26The court below found that Dr. Geisel’s Report, as well as that 
of Dr. Waddell, "accurately describejs] the district." State App. 35a.

27See Lawson Ex. 17. The DART light rail system does not go
into the affluent Park Cities area excluded from District 30. DART
board member and former House member, Jesse Oliver, stated: 
"[T]he Dart light rail system appears to be the skeleton of District 
30." Lawson Ex. 17 U 10. "Without a doubt, the drawing of District
30 brought together, into one district, the voters most affected by 
DARTs light rail project." Id. at 5 13. "The light rail starter system 
was designed to serve transit-dependent people; and those people are 
usually low to moderate income workers, who most often are 
minorities. District 30 includes this same community of people." Id. 
at H 11.



14

Opinion Below

The court below invalidated districts 18, 29 and 30, 
while specifically upholding the constitutionality of 18 
majority-white and 3 majority-Hispanic districts. The court 
subjected districts 18, 29 and 30 to strict scrutiny because of 
two factors: 1) the State admittedly took race into account 
in an effort to comply with the Voting Rights Act; and 2) 
the districts did not comply with the court’s definition of 
"traditional" districting criteria. State App. 69a. Exalting the 
benefits of "geography and effective representative 
government," the judges opined that their definition of 
tradition (regular shapes and respect for political 
subdivisions) would promote the "bedrock principle of self- 
government," State App. 56a, 57a n.43. The judges sharply 
criticized the State for adopting a different vision of 
democratic self-government -  one which protected 
incumbents of both parties because of the benefits their 
seniority and experience conferred on the whole State. 
"[Ijncumbent gerrymandering" offended the court’s civic 
"ideals," and moved it to accuse the Legislature of a 
"pernicious tendency" toward "underminfingj" "the 
interdependency of representatives and their constituents." 
Id. at 56a-57a & n.43.

Concluding that "[t]his form of incumbent protection 
is much different in degree from the generalized, and 
legitimate, goal of incumbent and seniority protection 
previously recognized by the Supreme Court," id. at 551,28 
the district court rejected incumbency protection as an 
explanation for the shapes of Districts 18, 29 and 30. The 
court reasoned that "Shaw nowhere refers to incumbent 
protection as a traditional districting criterion," State App. 28

28See State App. 55a (distinguishing White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 
791 (1973), and Gaffney v. Cummings 412 U.S. 735, 753 n.18 (1973)).



15

at 56a,29 and found that "racial gerrymandering was an 
essential part of incumbency protection," State App. 65a, 
because minorities were intentionally placed in the districts 
of white Democrats. The court did not find the white 
Democrats’ districts unconstitutional, however. The result 
of the ruling below is that the race-conscious construction of 
an irregularly shaped district is permissible to help white 
incumbents, but if that construction of the majority-white 
district causes a neighboring minority opportunity district to 
have an irregular shape, the minority district is 
unconstitutional.

Applying strict scrutiny, the court did not deny that 
the State had a compelling justification for creating minority 
opportunity districts in the areas of the State where Districts 
18, 29 and 30 lie.30 Rather, the court’s problem was with 
the particular configuration chosen by the Legislature for 
these districts. The court ruled that narrow tailoring 
requires "the least possible amount of irregularity in shape." 
Id. at 72a. Since the State had gone to great effort to prove 
that it rejected regularly shaped versions of these districts in 
order to achieve other State goals, the court easily concluded 
that the districts did not meet its definition of narrowly 
tailored. Id. at 73a.31

29In contrast, Johnson v. Miller, No. 194-008 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 12, 
1994), holds that a "nonexclusive list" of "traditional districting 
principles" includes "protecting incumbents." Slip op. at 30.

3<>The court found it unnecessary to explore the compelling 
interest issue, finding narrow tailoring dispositive.

31There is no suggestion that these districts did not meet the other 
elements of narrow tailoring. They are not packed with minority 
voters and Texas did not create more voting rights districts than 
necessary. See Johnson v. Miller, slip op. at 67.



16

THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE SUBSTANTIAL

The Court should note probable jurisdiction to 
resolve several important questions concerning the meaning 
of Shaw v. Reno, 125 L.Ed. 2d 511 (1993). Full briefing and 
argument on this case is important because it involves facts 
and issues not presented in other pending appeals.

An important element of the claim under Shaw v. 
Reno is a district "so bizarre on its face that it is 
‘unexplainable on grounds other than race.’" 125 L.Ed.2d at 
527. This case presents the question whether minority 
opportunity districts shaped consistently with many majority- 
white districts in the same State plan are actionable at all 
under Shaw. Because the minority opportunity districts 
invalidated by the court below are not "bizarre" or "unusually 
shaped" in comparison to other Texas districts, the court 
below should not have reached strict scrutiny. And, 
imposing higher shape requirements only on minority 
opportunity districts discriminates against minority voters 
and minority incumbents.

This case also raises the unique question whether, 
where the ability to draw reasonably compact minority 
opportunity districts is conceded, Shaw v. Reno overrides 
federalism and deprives the State of the ability to pursue its 
own districting goals simultaneously with Voting Rights Act 
compliance. Unlike all other post -Shaw v. Reno appeals, this 
case does not concern whether there will be three minority 
opportunity districts in the areas of the State now served by 
Districts 18, 29 and 30; all parties agree that such districts 
are necessary and the lower court did not indicate otherwise. 
The issue presented here concerns the surrounding, 
majority-white districts. If the minority opportunity districts 
are required to be pretty, the majority-white, neighboring 
districts will either sacrifice incumbents or become more ugly 
than they already are, to pull together enough like-minded 
voters to save the incumbents. The court below required the



17

State’s minority opportunity districts to conform to 
districting principles not constitutionally required for 
majority-white districts and not valued by Texas. The Court 
has generally rejected, as infringing on the States’ political 
function, arguments for constitutionalizing certain federally- 
idealized districting principles, and there is no immediately 
apparent logic for applying a different rule only to minority 
opportunity districts.

This case is particularly appropriate for review by this 
Court. In this case, small, functional, rational, single-urban- 
area districts have been invalidated. The court below 
extended Shaw to prohibit joining in one district persons 
who live in the same city. The lower courts are divided on 
whether shape or functionality governs the analysis of voting 
districts.

This case also presents a clear, undisputed record of 
plaintiffs’ failure to prove any of the substantive elements of 
a Shaw claim. Finally, the case raises the unresolved 
question whether plaintiffs whose only harm is to their 
idealized vision of a "colorblind" districting process have 
standing to challenge a state’s districting plan.

I. THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN HOLDING 
THAT MINORITY OPPORTUNITY DISTRICTS 
MUST MAXIMIZE "REGULARITY" OF SHAPE, 
IGNORING ALL OTHER STATE DISTRICTING 
GOALS

Had the State not drawn districts to give recognition 
to the voting strength of the large and geographically 
compact African American and Hispanic populations in 
Houston and Dallas, plaintiffs suing under section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act would have been able to present 
conclusive proof of hypothetical liability districts that meet 
the Gingles compactness threshold. Thus, this case squarely



18

presents the unique32 question whether a State which 
knows compactness exists and recognizes its obligation not 
to dilute minority voting strength must abandon all other 
districting goals in order to maximize regularity of shape of 
the voting rights districts.

The court below mandated that all minority 
opportunity districts "have the least possible amount of 
irregularity in shape, making allowances for traditional 
districting criteria."33 State App. 72a. Thus, race must be 
the exclusive determinant of the district. This holding 
conflicts directly with Johnson v. Miller, which ruled that 
where race is only one of several influences, the district is 
not subject to strict scrutiny. Slip op. at 37, 40-41. The 
decision below converts Shaw v. Reno from a claim 
concerning districts shaped by race, to a constitutional 
prohibition on non-racial influences on the shape of minority 
opportunity districts.34

32This question is not presented in any pending appeal. In 
addressing Louisiana District 4 and Georgia District 11, federal courts 
ruled that the African American population was so dispersed that it 
was impossible to draw a district with an effective African American 
majority that would meet the Gingles compactness threshold. Hays 
v. Louisiana, No. 92-1522 (W.D. La. July 29, 1994), slip op. at 5 n.4; 
Johnson v. Miller, slip op. at 85. Whatever the merits of those courts’ 
definitions of compactness, which are being challenged on appeal, 
neither case presents the question whether the state is free to reject 
the most compact version of a remedial district in favor of an 
irregularly shaped version that better serves other state goals.

33The court defined "traditional" criteria narrowly as a matter of 
law, without regard for the State’s actual traditions. State App. 56a.

34The lower court rejected incumbency protection as a non-racial 
explanation for the shapes of minority opportunity districts because 
Shaw does not explicitly mention incumbency protection and because 
protecting white incumbents was found to involve the use of race.

(continued...)



19

Under Shaw v. Reno, a necessary threshold for strict 
scrutiny is a district shape "on its face . . . ‘unexplainable on 
grounds other than race.’" 125 L.Ed 2d at 527 (citation 
omitted). Where regularly shaped, compact versions of 
minority districts are possible, the State’s choice to recognize 
minority voting strength in a less regularly shaped manner 
cannot be attributed to a racial motive or to a desire to 
segregate on the basis of race. Both the regular and the 
irregular district equally meet the State’s goal of complying 
with the Voting Rights Act; the irregular version meets 
several other State goals, concerning, for example, 
incumbents, constituent desires, businesses and airports. 
Where a regularly shaped version of a voting rights district 
is rejected for reasons such as these, the analysis should 
never reach strict scrutiny.

The district court’s interpretation of narrow tailoring 
conflicts with the decisions of the Southern District of 
Georgia and the Eastern District of North Carolina. 
Johnson v. Miller reasoned that incorporating notions of 
compactness, contiguity or respect for political subdivisions 
into the definition of narrow tailoring would

elevate to constitutional status that which was 
intended only as a barometer for determining 
whether a district adequately serves its constituents. 
Observance of those traditional principles is also 
difficult to judge at the exacting level required for a 
narrow tailoring determination, and such judging 
would force the judiciary to meddle with legislative 
prerogatives to an undesirable degree. 34

34(...continued)
State App. 65 a. Thus, the minority districts were held
unconstitutional because of the influence on their shapes of a 
constitutional use of race in the white districts. This result does not 
appear to have been contemplated by the Court in Shaw v. Reno.



20

Slip op. at 19 n.40. See also Shaw v. Hunt, No. 92-202-CIV- 
5-BR (E.D. N.C. Aug. 1, 1994), slip op. at 95. The court 
below commented: "Regarding this aspect of narrow
tailoring, we ... register disagreement with the two-judge 
majority that decided Shaw on remand." State App. 72a 
n.55.

The extension of Shaw v. Reno to require that all 
minority opportunity districts maximize regularity of shape 
has troubling implications. It gives district shape exclusive 
influence, exalting judges’ aesthetic and civic ideals over the 
careful balancing of the State’s interests, performed by 
elected representatives. This seriously undermines the 
principle of federalism. Redistricting is "fundamentally a 
political affair," Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 (1986) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring), on which the federal judiciary 
should "follow the policies and preferences of the State, as 
expressed . . .  by the State legislature," White v. Weiser, 412 
U.S. 788, 795 (1973).35

The lower court’s conclusion also means that a State 
has less flexibility when it acts voluntarily than when it waits 
to be sued under section 2. After finding a violation, the 
federal court must give the State an opportunity to devise a 
remedy according to the legislature’s definition of "important 
state interests," which may include protecting incumbents, 
White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. at 796. See Growe, 113 S.Ct. at 
1081 (voluntary compliance encouraged); Chapman v. Meier, 
420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975).

35The Court recently emphasized that "[rjeapportionment is 
primarily the duty and responsibility of the State through its 
legislature or other body, rather than of a federal court." Growe v. 
Emison, 113 S.Ct. at 1081 (internal quotations omitted). See also 
Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S.Ct. at 1157; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 583, 
586 (1964).



21

Even more troubling is that by imposing a special 
regular-shape maximization requirement only on minority 
opportunity districts, the court below mandates that the 
State discriminate against racial minorities, compared to 
other groups seeking recognition of their voting strength. 
Redistricting involves "competing claims of political, 
religious, ethnic, racial, occupational, and socioeconomic 
groups." Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 147 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (emphasis added). Under the rule established 
by the court below, a state may, without federal court 
interference, construct irregular districts to recognize the 
voting strength of any group that is not a historically 
disadvantaged racial minority — even on the basis of 
normally suspect classifications, such as partisan affiliation36 
or religion. Yet, racial minorities must convince the State to 
forsake all other districting goals and to maximize the 
regular shape of minority opportunity districts.37 This

i6See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 143 (plurality opinion) (partisan vote 
dilution occurs only when electoral system consistently degrades 
voters’ influence on system as a whole).

37The ruling below also requires the State to discriminate against 
minority incumbents and would-be incumbents. Craig Washington, 
an African American incumbent in 1991, was treated like all other, 
mostly white incumbents, when the Legislature created a district from 
which he could be re-elected. Because racially polarized voting is a 
fact of life in Texas, race had to be taken into account in constructing 
District 18, just as Republican districts had to be majority white. To 
achieve other important state interests, Washington’s district became 
irregular, just as the districts of white incumbents in Harris County. 
By singling out one incumbent on the basis of race and forcing the 
State to treat him less favorably than all other incumbents, the district 
court requires unconstitutional racial discrimination against the 
State’s only African American incumbent.

Similarly, although Districts 29 and 30 had no incumbent, two 
State Senators, one white and one African American, were treated as

(continued...)



22

heaps an additional, overwhelming disadvantage on racial 
minority groups which already suffer tremendous obstacles 
in the political process — obstacles which the Equal 
Protection Clause and the Voting Rights Act were intended 
to ameliorate, not intensify.37 38

II. THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN IGNORING 
THE HIGHLY IRREGULAR SHAPES OF 
TEXAS’ MAJORITY-WHITE DISTRICTS

This case raises the important, unresolved question 
whether the highly irregular shape of virtually all of a state’s 
congressional districts should be considered in evaluating 
minority opportunity districts. The court below found three 
minority opportunity districts unconstitutional, while 
specifically upholding the constitutionality of 18 irregularly 
shaped, majority-white districts. As found by the lower 
court, many Texas majority-white districts are "disfigured" 
and "equally ‘untraditional.’" State App. 9a, 65a. Yet, the 
court subjected only minority opportunity districts to strict 
scrutiny.

Under Shaw v. Reno, "bizarreness," and whether it is 
explainable on non-racial grounds, has become a doctrinal 
standard of profound constitutional significance, implicating 
whether strict scrutiny is applied to a congressional district. 
Yet, the term "bizarre" has no generally-accepted definition

37(...continued)
functional incumbents in the Texas tradition. The court below erred 
in ruling that Shaw v. Reno requires the State to treat these aspirants 
differently than other incumbents, based on their race, or that of their 
constituents.

38"Singling out the political processes affecting racial issues for 
uniquely disadvantageous treatment" violates Equal Protection. 
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 486 n.30 
(1982).



23

in practice or political science literature.39 In rating the 
"bizarreness" of districts, one of the plaintiffs in this case 
explained: "There is no right or wrong on that. That’s
personal judgment." TR 1:41. The court below used the 
"eyeball"40 test to find Districts 18, 29 and 30 "bizarre," 
looking at these districts in isolation from the rest of the 
State’s plan. Clarification of the substantive content of the 
"bizarreness" doctrine is essential to provide for uniformity 
of application and to avoid the imposition of widely- 
divergent, subjective "personal judgment[s]" and "eyeball" 
tests by plaintiffs and federal courts.

In failing to consider the shapes of other Texas 
congressional districts, the court below diverged substantially 
from Shaw v. Reno. Shaw indicates that the "bizarreness" of 
a challenged district must be apparent "on its face." 125 
L.Ed.2d at 525, 526, 527, 528, 530, 532, 536. The purpose of 
the bizarreness doctrine is not to impose a fixed, federally- 
mandated artistic ideal for district shape, but rather to ferret 
out "unusually-shaped"41 districts. Where all of the State’s 
districts are irregularly shaped, there is nothing "unusual" or 
"dramatic" about such a shape in a minority opportunity 
district. Moreover, a facial, non-racial explanation for the 
irregular shape of the minority districts is obvious — they are 
shaped just like the rest of the State’s districts.

39Similarly, as recently explained by the court in Johnson v. Miller. 
"there is no litmus test for compactness; it has been described as 
‘such a hazy and ill-defined concept that it seems impossible to apply 
it in any rigorous sense in matters of law.’" Slip op. at 80. See also 
Shaw v. Hunt, slip op. at 90-92 (no judicially manageable standard of 
compactness).

mE.g. State App. 46a.

41Shaw, 125 L.Ed.2d at 521. See also id. at 529 ("dramatically 
irregular shapes").



24

If the court below had correctly applied the 
bizarreness doctrine, districts 18, 29 and 30 would not have 
been subjected to strict scrutiny. The irregular shape of 
many majority-white congressional districts is beyond 
dispute. The plaintiffs identified 23 of Texas’ current 
congressional districts as equally or more bizarre than 
districts 18, 29 or 30.* 4 42 Only four of Texas’ 30 districts did 
not appear on a plaintiffs list as at least equally bizarre to 
district 18, 29 or 30. On these facts, it is illogical to 
conclude that the shape of a minority opportunity district 
"on its face" establishes a racial basis, while the equally 
irregular shapes of other districts do not.

III. THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN IGNORING
T H E  S I Z E ,  F U N C T I O N A L I T Y  A N D
RATIONALITY OF DISTRICTS 18, 29 AND 30

This case also presents the important question left 
unresolved in Shaw v. Reno concerning whether small, 
urban, functional congressional districts are "bizarre" and 
unexplainable on grounds other than race. In Shaw v. Reno, 
the Court emphasized that one of the districts before it 
spanned 160 miles, ten counties and several urban areas. 
Unlike the districts at issue in Shaw, Districts 18, 29 and 30 
are each in a single media market and served by a single 
transportation system. District 30 rationally joins together 
persons who have a common interest in the DART 
transportation system. The Court should note probable 
jurisdiction to decide whether the functionality43 and

42Thomas Dep. 49-52; Vera Dep. 36-44; Blum Dep. 65-73; Chen 
Dep. 65-77; Powers Dep. 55-58.

4iSee De Witt v. Wilson, 1994 WL 325415, pp. 5-6 (E.D. Calif. June 
27, 1994) ("[cjompactness does not refer to geometric shapes but to 
the ability of citizens to relate to each other and their representatives 
and to the ability of representatives to relate effectively to their

(continued...)



25

rationality of urban districts should be considered in 
assessing their constitutionality.

IV. THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS PROVED
AN EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATION

Although Shaw v. Reno has primarily been viewed as 
a ruling about the shape of congressional districts, the 
decision also sets out the substantive elements of this type 
of claim. Under Shaw, the substantive elements a plaintiff 
must prove are:

1. the district includes individuals who belong to 
the same race, but who are otherwise widely 
separated;

2. the district is segregated;

3. the district reinforces stereotypes that
members of a racial group will prefer the 
same candidates at the polls;

4. the district exacerbates racially polarized
voting; and

5. the district results in elected officials who do 
not represent their constituency as a whole.

125 L. Ed. 2d at 525, 529-530. In the instant case, plaintiffs 
proved none of these substantive elements of a "racial 
gerrymander." Although it was not their burden, defendants 
and intervenors disproved each of these elements. The 43

43(...continued)
constituency"); Johnson v. Miller, slip op. 83, n.43 (prefers "functional" 
approach to compactness); Shaw v. Hunt, slip op. 132-138.



26

Court should note probable jurisdiction to clarify that an 
Equal Protection claim under Shaw v. Reno is not simply 
about artistic ideals of shape, but includes important 
substantive elements on which plaintiffs have the burden of 
proof.

V. THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING

Standing to assert a constitutional claim normally 
requires proof of a "concrete and particularized" injury. 
Lujan v. Defenders o f Wildlife, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351, 364 (1992) 
(citations omitted). The Court below interpreted Shaw v. 
Reno as discarding normal standing doctrine and as 
conferring automatic standing on any voter in the state who 
desires to challenge any or all of a state’s voting districts. 
State App. 50a, n.38. The Court should note probable 
jurisdiction to clarify that the same standing requirements 
apply to white plaintiffs challenging racial discrimination as 
to minority plaintiffs.44

Shaw v. Reno identified two types of injury that 
could, if proved, establish standing: 1) a voting rights
district causes the representative to "represent a particular 
racial group rather than their constituency as a whole"; or 
2) a district "reinforces racial stereotypes." 125 L. Ed. 2d at 
530. Plaintiffs proved neither of these injuries, but instead 
showed the following:

District 18: Plaintiff Thomas has been "very favorably
impressed" with congressional nominee Sheila

uSee Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (stigmatic injury when 
government discriminates against racial minority group is insufficient 
harm to confer standing).



2 7

Jackson Lee45 and expects that she will be a 
good congressional representative. Thomas 
Dep. 74. Sheila Jackson Lee does not ignore 
white voters and Thomas expects as a 
Congresswoman, Sheila Jackson Lee will 
reach out to white voters and try to build 
racial bridges. Id. at 78.

District 29: Plaintiff Thomas felt that Congressman Green
did not represent her only because he is a 
Democrat and she is a Republican. Thomas 
Dep. at 47.

District 30: Plaintiff Orcutt stated that Congresswoman
Johnson does not represent her because 
Orcutt has a conservative philosophy, but the 
complaints are unrelated to race. Orcutt Dep. 
at 20-24, 26.

Strong, uncontradicted evidence shows that the 
congressional representatives of Districts 18, 29, and 30 
effectively represent their constituents, regardless of race or 
ethnicity.46 The only evidence on racial stereotypes shows 
that minority opportunity districts help break down, rather 
than reinforce these notions, by giving highly-qualified

45This past March, Councilwoman Sheila Jackson Lee defeated 
incumbent Congressman Craig Washington in the Democratic 
primary for nomination as the representative of District 18.

^See, e.g., Lawson Ex. 7 11 11; Lawson Ex. 9 H 11; Lawson Ex. 10 
ITU 4, 9 (white voter in CD18); Lawson Ex. 12 1111 5, 7; Lawson Ex. 13 
H 3; Lawson Ex. 21 ITU 9, 11, 16 (white voter in Dallas County); 
Lawson Ex. 22 HIT 4, 6-7, 9 (white voter in CD30); Lawson Ex. 23, 
HIT 10-14; Lawson Ex. 25 HIT 7, 8, 9, 12 (white voter in CD30).



28

minority representatives, such as Barbara Jordan, exposure 
in the white community.47

Plaintiffs’ claimed injury is the belief in "colorblind" 
districting. TR 1:23 (Blum); id. at 29 (Chen); Thomas Dep. 
69-70; Powers Dep. 48. Their disagreement with the 1991 
redistricting plan falls far short of a "concrete and 
particularized" injury in fact.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Court should note 
probable jurisdiction.

Charles Dray den 
Drayden, Wyche & Woods 
1360 Post Oak Blvd.
Suite 1650
Houston, Texas 77056 
(713) 965-0120

Lawrence Boze 
2208 Blodgett 
Houston, TX 77004 
(713) 520-0260

Respectfully submitted,

Elaine R. Jones 
D irector-Counsel

Theodore M. Shaw 
AssociateD irector-Counsel

Penda D. Hair 
Counsel o f Record 
NAACP Legal Defense & 
Educational Fund, Inc. 
1275 K Street, N.W.
Suite 301
Washington, D.C. 20005 
(202) 682-1300

47Lawson Ex. 7 5 6 ("Barbara Jordan’s . . . strong example made 
it easier for other African-American elected officials to gain some 
level of acceptance in the white community.").



2 9

Kevin Wiggins 
White, Hill, Sims & Wiggins 
2500 Trammel Crow Center 
2001 Ross Avenue 
Dallas, Texas 75201 
(214) 954-1700

Anthony E. Chavez 
Mexican American Legal 
Defense and Educational 
Fund
634 South Spring Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90014 
(213) 629-2512

Carmen Rumbault 
Mexican American Legal 
Defense and Educational 
Fund
140 E. Houston, Suite 300 
San Antonio, Texas 78205 
(210) 224-5476



APPENDIX



la

APPENDIX A
[FILED Oct. 3, 1994]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

HOUSTON DIVISION

Civil Action No. H-94-0277

AL VERA, et al., 

Plaintiffs,

v.

ANN RICHARDS, et al, 

Defendants, 

v.

REV. WILLIAM LAWSON, et a l, 

D efen dant-Int erven ors,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant-Intervenor,

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN 
CITIZENS (LULAC) OF TEXAS, 

et al.,

Defendant-Intervenors.

NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES

Pursuant to Rule 18.1 of the Rules of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, notice is hereby given that the



2a

Lawson Defendant-Intervenors -  William Lawson, Zollie 
Scales, Jr., Jew Don Boney, Deloyd T. Parker, Dewan Perry 
and Caesar Clark, David Jones, Fred Hofheinz, Judy 
Zimmerman -- appeal to The Supreme Court of the United 
States from the Order of September 2, 1994, as amended 
nunc pro tunc by Order of September 19, 1994, entered by 
the three-judge United States District Court for the 
Southern Distirct of Texas.

This appeal is taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253.

Respectfully submitted,

Charles Drayden 
USDC ID No. 10156 
Texas State Bar No. 06113600 
Drayden, Wyche & Woods, L.L.P. 
1360 Post Oak Blvd.
Suite 1650
Houston, Texas 77056 
(713) 965-0120

Lawrence Boze 
USDC ID No. 61776 
Texas State Bar No. 02801600 
2208 Blodgett 
Houston, TX 77004 
(713) 520-0260

Kevin Wiggins
Texas State Bar No. 21441600 
White, Hill, Sims & Wiggins 
2500 Trammel Crow Center 
2001 Ross Avenue 
Dallas, Texas 75201 
(214) 954-1700

Elaine R. Jones 
D irector-Counsel

Is/
Penda D. Hair 
NAACP Legal Defense & 
& Educational Fund, Inc. 
1275 K Street, N.W.
Suite 301
Washington, D.C. 20005 
(202) 682-1300 
ATTORNEY IN CHARGE

Theodore M. Shaw 
Clyde Murphy 
Alice L. Brown 
NAACP Legal Defense & 
Educational Fund, Inc.
99 Hudson St.
Suite 1600
New York, NY 10013 
(212) 219-1900



3a

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal 
to the Supreme Court of the United States was served on the 
28th day of September, 1994, by first class U.S. mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed as follows:

Renea Hicks, Esq.
State Solicitor
P.O Box 12548, Capitol Station 
Austin, TX 78711

Paul Loy Hurd, Esq.
P.O. Box 2190 
Monroe, Louisiana 71207

Gaye L. Hume, Esq.
Voting Section 
Civil Rights Division 
Department of Justice 
P.O. Box 66128 
Washington, D.C. 20035-6128

Luis Wilmot, Esq.
MALDEF
140 E Houston, Suite 300 
San Antonio, Texas 78205

J§L
Penda D. Hair



4a

APPENDIX B
[FILED Sept. 30, 1994]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

HOUSTON DIVISION

Civil Action No. H-94-0277

AL VERA, et a l, 

Plaintiffs,

v.

ANN RICHARDS, et a l, 

Defendants,

v.

REV. WILLIAM LAWSON, et a l,

Defendant-Intervenors,

v.

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS 
(LULAC) OF TEXAS, ROBERT REYES, ANGIE 

GARCIA, ROBERT ANGUIANO, SR., DALIA 
ROBLES, NICOLAS DOMINGUEZ, OSCAR T. 

GARCIA, and RAMIRO GAMBOA, et a l,

Defendant-Intervenor Applicants.

NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES



5a

Pursuant to Rule 18.1 of the Rules of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, notice is hereby given that 
Defendant-Intervenors, Robert Reyes, Angie Garcia, Robert 
Anguiano, Sr., Dalia Robles, Nicolas Dominguez, Oscar T. 
Garcia, and Ramiro Gamboa, appeal to the Supreme Court 
of the United States from fill 2, 3 & 5 (plus the injunctive 
provision added by the Court’s nunc pro tunc amended order 
of September 19, 1994) of the three-judge Court’s Order of 
September 2, 1994 (subsuming within it the Court’s 
declaration of the unconstitutionality of Texas Congressional 
Districts 18, 29 and 30 on page 93 of its Opinion of 
August 17, 1994).

This appeal is taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253.

DATED: September 29, 1994

Respectfully submitted,

IsL_______________________________
CARMEN RUMBAUT 
LUIS WILMOT 
ALBERT H. KAUFFMAN 
Mexican American Legal Defense 

and Educational Fund 
140 E. Houston Street, Suite 300 
San Antonio, TX 78205 
State Bar No.: 17389480 
(210) 224-5476 
(210) 224-5382 (FAX)
ATTORNEY IN CHARGE



6 a

JOSE GARZA 
2306 W. Magnolia 
San Antonio, TX 78201 
State Bar No.: 07731950 
(210) 731-9951

LOCAL COUNSEL:

FRUMENCIO REYES 
Reyes & Reyes-Castillo, P.C.
3715 North Main 
Houston, TX 77009 
(713) 864-4700
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT- 
INTER VENOR APPLICANTS



7a

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of the 
United States has been mailed by certified mail, return 
receipt requested on this 29th day of September, 1994 to:

Renea Hicks, Esq.
State Solicitor
209 W. 14th Street, 8th Floor 
Austin, TX 78701

Elaine Jones, Esq.
Penda D. Hair, Esq.
NAACP Legal Defense and 

Educational Fund,Inc.
1275 K Street, N.W., Suite 301 
Washington, D.C. 20005

Paul Loy Hurd, Esq.
P.O. Box 2190 
1101 Royal Avenue 
Monroe, Louisiana 71207

Gaye L. Hume, Esq.
Voting Section 
Civil Rights Division 
Department of Justice 
P.O. Box 66128 
Washington, D.C. 20035-6128

Solicitor General 
Department of Justice 
Washington, D.C. 20530

IsL____________________
CARMEN RUMBAUT