University of Tennessee v. Elliott Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

    No.

In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1985

THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE, et al., Petitioners,

vs.
ROBERT B. ELLIOTT, Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Of Counsel
W. J. M ichael C ody 
Attorney General & 

Reporter
State of Tennessee 
450 James Robertson 

Parkway
Nashville, Tennessee 

37219-5025

B eauchamp E. B rogan*
A lan M. P arker*
Catherine S. M izell 
The University of Tennessee 
810 Andy Holt Tower 
Knoxville, Tennessee 37996-0184 
(615) 974-3245
G. R ay  B ratton
1620 First Tennessee Bank Building 
165 Madison Avenue 
Memphis, Tennessee 38103
N. R ichard G lassm an *
J ohn B arry B urgess*
26 N. Second Street 
Memphis, Tennessee 38103 

Attorneys for Petitioners 
* Counsel of Record

T o m m y  Coley 
532 Smith Lane 
Jackson, Tennessee 38301 

Pro Se Petitioner
October 1985

E. L. M endenhall, I n c ., 926 Cherry Street, Kansas City, M o. 64106, (816) 421-3030



QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether traditional principles of preclusion apply 
in an action under Title VII, section 1983, and other civil 
rights statutes to preclude issues fully and fairly litigated 
before a state administrative agency acting in a judicial 
capacity.



II

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ..........    I
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...... ......... ............... ............  m
OPINIONS BELOW ....    1
JURISDICTION .....................   2
STATEMENT OF THE C A SE...... ............. ......................  2
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ................... 4

1. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH
DECISIONS OF THIS COURT CONCERNING 
THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF ADMINIS­
TRATIVE ADJUDICATIONS AND THE AP­
PLICATION OF TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES 
OF PRECLUSION IN SUBSEQUENT SECTION 
1983 ACTIONS ....... .............. -........... - ........... -..... - 4

2. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH
DECISIONS OF OTHER COURTS OF AP­
PEALS CONCERNING THE PRECLUSIVE 
EFFECT OF STATE ADMINISTRATIVE AD­
JUDICATIONS IN SUBSEQUENT FEDERAL 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS ....... ................- ........  7

3. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE DECISION
BELOW AND THE DECISIONS OF THIS 
COURT AND OTHER COURTS OF APPEALS 
CONCERNS A MATTER OF NATIONAL IM­
PORTANCE    ..................................................  11

CONCLUSION ................................................................... 12



I l l

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) ........ ................. - 6
Bottini v. Sadore Management Corp., 764 F.2d 116 (2d

Cir. 1985) ....................... ....... ................ - ---- ----------------- 10
Buckhalter v. Pepsi-Cola General Bottlers, Inc., 768

F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1985) ................... ......... ........ ..... . 7, 8
Elliott v. University of Tennessee, 766 F.2d 982 (6th

Cir. 1985) ............ ............................................................  1
Fourakre v. Perry, 667 S.W.2d 483 (Tenn. App. 1983) 7
Heath v. John Morrell & Co., 768 F.2d 245 (8th Cir.

1985) ........ ............................... - - - ................................---  10
Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461

(1982) ................................... -............... ....... 5,6,7,8,9,10,11
Migra v. Warren City School District, ------ U.S..........,

104 S. Ct. 892 (1984) ...............................- ........ .......  6
Moore v. Bonner, 695 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1982) ........... 10
O’Hara v. Board of Education, 590 F. Supp. 696 (D.N.J.

1984), affd  mem., 760 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1985) .......  7,9
Polsky v. Atkins, 197 Tenn. 201, 270 S.W.2d 497 (1954) 7
Purcell Enterprises, Inc. v. State, 631 S.W.2d 401

(Tenn. App. 1981) ...........................................................  7
Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355

(4th Cir. 1985) ..................................................... .... -.....  10
Steffan v. Housewright, 665 F.2d 245 (8th Cir. 1981) .... 10
United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384

U.S. 394 (1966) ........ ........... .............-......................................-............ 4,5
Zanghi v. Incorporated Village of Old Brookville, 752 

F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1985) 10



IV

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1964) .............................................. 2
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1964) ..................................................9, 10

State Statutes:

Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-5-301 through -323 (Supp. 1984) 2
Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322 (Supp. 1984) ......................  3, 4

Miscellaneous:

18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 4403 (1981) ...................................... 11

1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 1:10 (1983) 11



No.
In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE, et al., Petitioners,
vs.

ROBERT B. ELLIOTT, Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Petitioners1 respectfully pray that a writ of certiorari 
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit entered 
in this proceeding on July 9, 1985.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported in 
766 F.2d 982 (6th Cir. 1985), and a copy of the slip opin­
ion appears in the Appendix hereto. The memorandum

1. Petitioners are the defendants below—The University of 
Tennessee, The University of Tennessee Institute of Agriculture, 
The University of Tennessee Agricultural Extension Service, 
University officials (M. Lloyd Downen, Willis W. Armistead, 
Edward J. Boling, Haywood W. Luck, and Curtis Shearon), mem­
bers of the Madison County Agricultural Extension Service 
Committee (Billy Donnell, Arthur Johnson, Jr., Mrs. Neil Smith, 
Jimmy Hopper, and Mrs. Robert Cathey), Murray Truck Lines, 
Inc., Tom Korwin, and Tommy Coley. Petitioner Coley is appear­
ing pro se.



2

decision of the United States District Court for the West­
ern District of Tennessee and the final agency order in 
the contested case hearing under the Tennessee Uniform 
Administrative Procedures Act also appear in the Ap­
pendix hereto.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit was entered on July 9, 1985, and this petition for 
certiorari was filed within ninety days of that date. This 
Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) 
(1964).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The University of Tennessee is an agency of the State 
of Tennessee, and respondent is a black employee of the 
University’s Agricultural Extension Service. The Uni­
versity proposed to terminate respondent’s employment 
for disciplinary reasons. Respondent elected to contest the 
proposed termination in a hearing under the Tennessee 
Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, Tenn. Code Ann. 
§§ 4-5-301 through -323 (Supp. 1984). Before the hear­
ing was held, however, respondent filed this action under 
Title VII and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988, 
seeking an injunction against any action with respect to 
his employment, one million dollars in damages, and certifi­
cation of a class action. The district court did not certify 
a class. After entry and dissolution of a temporary re­
straining order, the district court ruled that respondent 
had failed to meet the prerequisites for preliminary in­
junctive relief and removed any restraint regarding em­
ployment action against respondent. Respondent elected



3

to proceed with the administrative hearing and did not 
seek further action in federal court.

In compliance with the Administrative Procedures 
Act, respondent’s hearing was conducted with complete trial 
rights including discovery, subpoenas, representation by 
counsel, examination and cross-examination of witnesses, 
and filing of pleadings, briefs, and proposed findings of 
fact. The administrative record consists of 55 volumes with 
over 5,000 pages of testimony from over 100 witnesses and 
159 exhibits. Respondent insisted that evidence of alleged 
racial discrimination be admitted in the administrative 
hearing. The University objected that this evidence 
should be introduced instead in respondent’s Title VII 
action. Despite this objection, the Administrative Law 
Judge admitted voluminous evidence of alleged racial dis­
crimination against respondent. Nonetheless, the Admin­
istrative Law Judge found that the proposed termination 
was not racially motivated. Finding further, however, that 
the University’s proof was insufficient to warrant respon­
dent’s termination, the Administrative Law Judge or­
dered that respondent be transferred to another county 
under new supervisors. The findings of the Administrative 
Law Judge were affirmed on appeal to the Agency Head.

Tenn. Code. Ann. § 4-5-322 (Supp. 1984) provides for 
judicial review of a final agency order upon the filing 
of a petition within sixty days of the order. Respondent 
failed to file a petition for judicial review within sixty 
days. Instead, after his transfer had been accomplished 
and eighty-four days after the final agency order, respon­
dent filed a motion in the district court for a temporary 
restraining order, preliminary injunction, and stay of the 
final agency order. The University defendants opposed 
the motion and amended their earlier motion for summary 
judgment. In granting summary judgment for the de­



4

fendants, the district court held that it lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction under Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322 (Supp. 
1984) to review the merits of the final agency order and 
that it was otherwise precluded by res judicata principles 
from reviewing the issues fully litigated in the administra­
tive hearing. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that a 
final state administrative judgment is never entitled to 
preclusive effect in a subsequent federal court action under 
either Title VII or section 1983.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH 
DECISIONS OF THIS COURT CONCERNING 
THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF ADMINISTRA­
TIVE ADJUDICATIONS AND THE APPLICA­
TION OF TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF PRE­
CLUSION IN SUBSEQUENT SECTION 1983 
ACTIONS.

In United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 
384 U.S. 394 (1966), this Court held that traditional prin­
ciples of res judicata are applicable to administrative pro­
ceedings “ [wjhen an administrative agency is acting in 
a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact 
properly before it which the parties have had an adequate 
opportunity to litigate.. . .” Id. at 422. Applying this prin­
ciple to the facts in Utah, this Court concluded as follows:

[T]he Board was acting in a judicial capacity . . . 
the factual disputes were clearly relevant to issues 
properly before it, and both parties had a full and 
fair opportunity to argue their version of the facts 
and an opportunity to seek court review of any ad­



5

verse findings. There is, therefore, neither need nor 
justification for a second evidentiary hearing on these 
matters already resolved as between these two parties.

Id, By holding that traditional principles of res judicata 
are applicable to administrative proceedings, this Court 
recognized the modem model of administrative procedure 
which often closely approximates judicial procedure and 
thus merits the same finality.

In the decision below, the Sixth Circuit acknowledge^ 
the holding in Utah but refused to apply it to the question 
of whether a final state administrative judgment precludes 
relitigation of issues in a federal civil rights action. The 
court treated the holding as limited to the res judicata 
effect of federal administrative decisions in subsequent 
federal court proceedings. Appendix at A14-15, A18. 
There is nothing in this Court’s opinion in Utah, however, 
to suggest that the holding is so limited. This Court 
expressly invoked general principles of res judicata and 
described their application to “an administrative agency 
acting in a judicial capacity” without use of the delimiting 
term “ federal agency.” Id. at 421-422. Moreover, in 
Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461 
(1982), this Court cited the Utah holding approvingly in 
considering the adequacy of state proceedings to be given 
preclusive effect in a subsequent Title VII action:

Certainly, the administrative nature of the fact­
finding process is not dispositive. In United States 
v. Utah Construction & Mining Co. [citation omitted], 
we held that, so long as opposing parties had an ade­
quate opportunity to litigate disputed issues of fact, 
res judicata is properly applied to decisions of an ad­
ministrative agency acting in a “ judicial capacity” 
[citation omitted].



6

Id. at 484-485 n.26. The Sixth Circuit clearly erred, 
therefore, in failing to follow this Court’s opinion in Utah 
and to apply traditional principles of res judicata to the 
final administrative judgment in this case.

Furthermore, the failure of the Sixth Circuit to follow 
the Utah holding leads to a conflict between the decision 
below and the opinion of this Court in Allen v. McCurry, 
449 U.S. 90 (1980). In Allen, this Court held that nothing 
in the language or legislative history of section 1983 sug­
gests a congressional intention to contravene traditional 
doctrines of preclusion. Id. at 97-98. In so holding, this 
Court rejected the suggestion “that every person asserting 
a federal right is entitled to one unencumbered opportu­
nity to litigate that right in a federal district court, re­
gardless of the legal posture in which the federal claim 
arises.” Id. at 103. This Court reaffirmed Allen in Migra
v. Warren City School District, ....... U.S........, 104 S. Ct.
892 (1984), extending application of res judicata principles 
in section 1983 actions from the issue preclusion rule of 
Allen to preclusion of the claim itself. The Sixth Circuit’s 
refusal to give preclusive effect to the final administrative 
judgment in this case rests, however, on the assumption 
that “ Congress provided a civil rights claimant with a 
federal remedy in a federal court, with federal process, 
federal factfinding, and a life-tenured judge.” Appendix 
at A20. This assumption cannot be reconciled with this 
Court’s holding in Allen and Migra that section 1983 cre­
ates no exception to traditional rules of preclusion, which 
are applicable, according to the Utah holding, to admin­
istrative adjudications as well as judicial proceedings.2

2. The decision below also conflicts in principle with the 
holding in Allen and Migra that the preclusive effect of state 
court proceedings in subsequent section 1983 actions is governed

(Continued on following page)



7

2. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH 
DECISIONS OF OTHER COURTS OF APPEALS 
CONCERNING THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECT 
OF STATE ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICA­
TIONS IN SUBSEQUENT FEDERAL CIVIL 
RIGHTS ACTIONS.
In refusing to give preclusive effect to the final ad­

ministrative judgment of the state agency in this case, 
the Sixth Circuit conceded that its decision conflicts with 
that of other circuits. Appendix at A24-25. Although 
the court conceded conflict only with respect to the ap­
plication of preclusion principles in civil rights actions 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the decision also conflicts with 
decisions of the Third and Seventh Circuits in Title VII 
actions. See Buckhalter v. Pepsi-Cola General Bottlers, 
Inc., 768 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1985) (slip op. in Appendix 
at A185); O’Hara v. Board of Education, 590 F. Supp. 696 
(D.N.J. 1984), affd  mem., 760 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1985).

In refusing to apply principles of res judicata to pre­
clude respondent’s Title VII action, the Sixth Circuit held 
that the issue was controlled by the following general 
principle stated by this Court in footnote 7 of Kremer v. 
Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 470 (1982): 
“ [Ujnreviewed administrative determinations by state 
agencies . . . should not preclude . . . [de novo] review

Footnote continued—
by the state’s own law of res judicata. The Sixth Circuit failed 
even to consider whether the state administrative adjudication in 
this case would have been afforded preclusive effect in the 
courts of the State of Tennessee. If the Sixth Circuit had looked 
to the law of res judicata in Tennessee, it would have found 
that an administrative adjudication by a state agency acting in 
a judicial capacity is entitled to preclusive effect in Tennessee 
courts. See Polsky v. Atkins, 197 Tenn. 201, 270 S.W.2d 497 
(1954); Fourakre v. Perry, 667 S.W.2d 483 (Tenn. App. 1983); 
Purcell Enterprises, Inc. v. State, 631 S.W.2d 401 (Tenn. App. 
1981) .



8

[in federal court] even if such a decision were to be af­
forded preclusive effect in a State’s own courts.” The 
Sixth Circuit rejected petitioner’s argument that this 
general principle, considered in the light of this Court’s 
citation of the Utah holding with approval in footnote 26, 
must be construed to apply only with respect to admin­
istrative decisions rendered by agencies possessing in­
vestigatory rather than adjudicatory authority. Appen­
dix at A12-13. With respect to respondent’s action under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the other Reconstruction Civil Rights 
Statutes, the Sixth Circuit first concluded that the Utah 
holding does not apply in the state-to-federal context and 
then refused to create, as it put it, a rule of administrative 
preclusion in section 1983 actions. Appendix at A20.

Less than two weeks after the Sixth Circuit’s decision 
in this case, the Seventh Circuit decided Buckhalter v. 
Pepsi-Cola General Bottlers, Inc., 768 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 
1985) (slip op. in Appendix at A185). The decision below 
directly conflicts with the Seventh Circuit’s opinion on the 
question presented by this petition. Like the present case, 
Buckhalter involved both a Title VII action and an action 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Beginning with this Court’s ac­
knowledgement of “ administrative res judicata” in foot­
note 26 of the Kremer opinion, the Seventh Circuit con­
sidered the Utah criteria to determine whether principles 
of res judicata should be applied to plaintiff’s Title VII 
action. Finding that the state administrative agency had 
acted in a judicial capacity and that both parties had had 
a full and fair opportunity to litigate their case, the Seventh 
Circuit concluded that principles of res judicata should 
be applied to determine whether the plaintiff’s Title VII 
action was precluded by the prior administrative proceed­
ing. Appendix at A200-206. Unlike the Sixth Circuit in 
the decision below, the Seventh Circuit expressly rejected



9

a broad interpretation of footnote 7 of the Kremer opin­
ion, concluding that it applied only to judicially unre­
viewed administrative decisions by agencies exercising 
investigatory rather than adjudicatory authority. The 
court noted that a narrow interpretation of footnote 7 is 
supported by this Court’s approving citation of the Utah 
holding in footnote 26 of the same opinion. Appendix at 
A208-210. Finally, the Seventh Circuit held that the 
principles of “ administrative res judicata” are applicable 
to civil rights actions brought under section 1981 as well 
as Title YII and thus dismissed the plaintiff’s claims 
under both statutes. Appendix at A212. The decision 
below is thus squarely and irreconcilably in conflict with 
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Buckhalter.

With respect to respondent’s Title VII action, the de­
cision below is also squarely and irreconcilably in con­
flict with the Third Circuit’s decision in O’Hara v. Board 
of Education, 590 F. Supp. 696 (D.N.J. 1984), affd  mem., 
760 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1985). In determining whether a 
federal court may give collateral estoppel effect to a state 
administrative agency decision, the district court in O’Hara 
looked not only to the Utah criteria of whether the agency 
was acting in a judicial capacity and whether the parties 
had an adequate opportunity to litigate the issues but 
also to whether a state court would give preclusive effect 
to the administrative decision. Id. at 701. The O’Hara 
court thus relied in part on the full-faith-and-credit re­
quirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1964). In the decision be­
low, however, the Sixth Circuit summarily rejected any ap­
plication of traditional principles of full-faith-and-credit 
to adjudicatory proceedings before administrative agencies. 
Appendix at A ll, A16. Therefore, although the Third 
Circuit affirmed the district court decision in O’Hara 
without an opinion, its decision must be considered as di­
rectly in conflict with the decision below.



10

With respect to respondent’s action under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 and the other Reconstruction statutes, the decision 
below directly conflicts with decisions of the Second and 
Eighth Circuits. In Zanghi v. Incorporated Village of Old 
Brookville, 752 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1985), the Second Circuit 
held that a prior finding of probable cause to arrest by 
an administrative law judge precluded the plaintiff’s section 
1983 action for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malici­
ous prosecution. The Second Circuit based its holding on 
this Court’s opinion in Utah. Similarly, in Steffan v. 
Housewright, 665 F.2d 245 (8th Cir. 1981), the Eighth Cir­
cuit relied on the Utah holding to preclude the plaintiff’s 
due process claims under section 1983. The Sixth Circuit’s 
refusal to apply the Utah holding in a section 1983 action 
thus presents a clear conflict with decisions by the Second 
and Eighth Circuits.

On the other hand, the Second and Eighth Circuits 
have failed to give preclusive effect to state administrative 
proceedings in subsequent Title YII actions, relying on 
footnote 7 of this Court’s opinion in Kremer. See Heath 
v. John Morrell & Co., 768 F.2d 245 (8th Cir. 1985); Bottini 
v. Sadore Management Corp., 764 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1985). 
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has held in a Title VII action 
that “unreviewed administrative determinations by state 
agencies do not preclude a trial de novo in federal court.” 
Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 361 
n.6 (4th Cir. 1985). In an earlier decision, Moore v. Bonner, 
695 F,2d 799 (4th Cir. 1982), the Fourth Circuit had failed 
to give preclusive effect to a state administrative judg­
ment in a subsequent section 1983 action, holding that 
preclusion is not required by the full-faith-and-credit re­
quirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1964) and failing to address 
this Court’s decision in Utah.

These decisions from the Second, Third, Fourth, Sev­
enth and Eighth Circuits, together with the Sixth Circuit’s



11

decision below, demonstrate that a serious and continuing 
conflict exists among the courts of appeals on the question 
presented by this petition. Moreover, the conflict has 
become particularly intense since this Court’s 1982 de­
cision in Kremer, with much of the debate centering on 
inferences to be drawn from footnotes 7 and 26 of that 
opinion. This important question of federal law should 
be decided by this Court. The existing conflict will not 
abate in the absence of a decision by this Court.

3. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE DECISION
BELOW AND THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT
AND OTHER COURTS OF APPEALS CONCERNS
A M ATTER OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in this case seriously un­

dermines the finality of state administrative proceedings 
and encourages repetitious litigation. It thus contravenes 
both the public interest in judicial economy and the pri­
vate interest in repose underlying the doctrine of res 
judicata. See 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 4403 (1981). It produces the 
possibility of conflicting results on the same issue and 
burdens the federal courts with the necessity of hearing 
issues which have already been litigated fully and fairly 
between the parties.

Moreover, many states have enacted administrative 
procedures acts which are similar to the one in this case. 
See 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 1:10 (1983). 
The adjudicatory nature of contested case hearings under 
these acts may be virtually identical to that of federal 
and state courts, as was true in this case. Therefore, the 
significance of the Sixth Circuit’s refusal to enforce repose 
when respondent elected to pursue his claims under the 
formal adjudicative procedure established by state law—- 
and then failed to pursue judicial review provided by



12

state law—goes far beyond the particular facts and parties 
in this case. It calls into serious question the validity of 
the modern model of administrative procedure as a mech­
anism for resolution of disputes, especially disputes be­
tween employers and employees.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue 
to review the judgment and opinion of the Sixth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

Of Counsel
W. J. M ichael C ody 
Attorney General & 

Reporter
State of Tennessee 
450 James Robertson 

Parkway
Nashville, Tennessee 

37219-5025

B eaucham p  E. B rogan*
A lan  M. P arker*
Catherine S. M izell 
The University of Tennessee 
810 Andy Holt Tower 
Knoxville, Tennessee 37996-0184 
(615) 974-3245
G. R ay  B ratton

1620 First Tennessee Bank Building 
165 Madison Avenue 
Memphis, Tennessee 38103
N. R ichard G lassm an *
J ohn B arry B urgess*
26 N. Second Street 
Memphis, Tennessee 38103 

Attorneys for Petitioners 
* Counsel of Recor d

T o m m y  Coley 
532 Smith Lane 
Jackson, Tennessee 38301 

Pro Se Petitioner

October 1985