Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Prohibition

Public Court Documents
June 26, 1972

Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Prohibition preview

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  • Case Files, Milliken Hardbacks. Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Prohibition, 1972. 04899531-53e9-ef11-a730-7c1e5247dfc0. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/5ed0dedb-3c24-4064-a8cb-0be9b201c693/petition-for-writ-of-mandamus-andor-prohibition. Accessed April 29, 2025.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BLOOMFIELD HILLS SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Petitioner

vs. No.
STEPHEN J. ROTH, UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT JUDGE,

Respondent.
_____________________________ /

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
_____ AND/OR PROHIBITION____

DICKINSON, WRIGHT, McKEAN & 
1700 North Woodward Avenue 
P. 0. Box 509
Bloomfield Hills, Michigan 
(313) 646-4300

CUDLIP

48013



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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BLOOMFIELD HILLS SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Petitioner

vs. No.
STEPHEN J. ROTH, UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT JUDGE,

Respondent.
_____  /

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
_____ AND/OR PROHIBITION_____

NOW COMES Bloomfield Hills School District, a Michigan 
body corporate, Petitioner, and petitions this Court, pursuant 
to the All Writs Statute (28 U.S.C. § 1651), to issue a writ 
of mandamus and/or prohibition directing Respondent Stephen J. 
Roth, Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan, to:

(i) Delete the geographical area encompassed by 
Petitioner's boundaries from the "desegregation area" 
described in Paragraph II A of Respondent's June 14,
1972 Ruling on Desegregation Area and Order For Develop-

jyment of Plan of Desegregation ("June 14, 1972 Ruling and 
Order") in Bradley, et al. v. Milliken, et al., Civil 
Action No. 35257, United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division: and

(ii) Refrain from enforcing each provision of 
Respondent's June 14, 1972 Ruling and Order which re­
strains Petitioner from exercising the powers conferred

See copy attached as Exhibit A.1/



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and discharging the duties imposed upon it by the 1963 
Constitution and statutes of the State of Michigan.

FACTS SUPPORTING THIS PETITION

1. Petitioner is a Michigan school district classified 
by the Michigan School Code of 1955 (MCLA §§ 340.1, et seq.) as a 
fourth class district. Based upon data collected for the 1971-72 
school year, Petitioner has a pupil enrollment of 9,353 students. 
Approximately 45.25% of these students are enrolled in K-6 ele­
mentary schools. In 1970-71, Petitioner ranked 45th in pupil 
enrollment among the 527 K-12 local school districts in Michigan. 
Approximately 86% of the taxable property in the school district 
is residential and 80.5% of Petitioner's school operating budget 
is derived from local sources of revenue. Petitioner's staff 
consists of: (i) 42 instructional and non-instructional admin­
istrative personnel; (ii) 474 teachers and teacher aides who are 
represented by Bloomfield Hills Education Association and are 
employed under a contract covering wages, hours and conditions 
of employment which will expire on August 28, 1973; (iii) 236 
support service employees who are represented by American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (Locals 
1384A and 1883A) and are employed under contracts covering wages, 
hours and conditions of employment which will expire on August 31, 
1973 and December 31, 1973. Petitioner owns 16 classroom school 
buildings located within the district and has a bonded indebted­
ness at the date hereof of $22,930,000, having maturities from 
July, 1972 through 1996.



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2. Bradley v. Milliken was commenced on August 18, 
1970, by the filing of a complaint which alleged the unconsti­
tutionality of a Michigan statute which was applicable only to 
the City of Detroit school district and further claimed that 
plaintiffs' constitutional rights were violated because of the 
segregated pattern of pupil assignments and racial identifiability 
of schools within the City of Detroit school system. The com­
plaint has never been amended and at no time have the pleadings 
alleged that any school system other than the Detroit system 
has failed to maintain a unitary system of schools. A trial 
on the question of de jure segregation in the Detroit schools 
was held in Respondent's court and concluded on July 22, 1971.
On September 27, 1971, Respondent entered his Ruling on Issue 
of Segregation which was limited to the finding that illegal 
segregation exists in the public schools of the City of Detroit. 
Plans of desegregation involving only the Detroit schools as 
well as plans involving the metropolitan area school districts 
were subsequently filed with Respondent. Respondent received evi­
dence from the original parties and intervenors relating to such 
plans. New intervenors (certain school districts, not including 
Petitioner) participated in the proceedings on the restricted 
basis outlined in Respondent's March 15, 1972 Order. On 
March 24, 1972, Respondent ruled that he could properly order 
a metropolitan plan to accomplish desegregation of the Detroit 
schools. On June 14, 1972, Respondent entered his Ruling and 
Order. That Order includes Petitioner within the geographic 
area that Respondent deemed necessary to achieve the racial

3



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mix required to correct the segregated conditions he found to 
exist in the Detroit schools.

3. Petitioner is not and never has been a party
to the proceedings in which the holding of de jure segregation 
relating to Detroit was made or which considered the appro­
priateness of a tri-county remedy, nor has any claim ever 
been made that Petitioner has committed any act of de jure 
segregation.

4. A motion to join Petitioner, together with 
other school districts in the tri-county area, as a party 
defendant, was filed by intervening defendants Denise 
Magdowski, et al., on July 12, 1971, but Respondent has 
refused to act upon their motion.

5. The first paragraph of Respondent's June 14, 
1972 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav/ in Support of 
Ruling on Desegregation Area and Development of Plan spe­
cifically states that Respondent "has taken no proofs with 
respect to...the issue of whether, with the exclusion of 
the city of Detroit school district, such school districts 
[all 86 school districts, including Petitioner, located 
within Wayne, Oakland and Macomb Counties] have committed 
acts of de jure segregation."

6. Among the powers conferred and duties imposed 
upon Petitioner by the Michigan School Code of 1955 are the

4



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II

following: (i) To sue and be sued in its name, (ii) to pur­
chase personal and real property for educational purposes,
(iii) to employ a superintendent, administrative personnel 
and teachers for the education of its pupils, (iv) to estab­
lish courses of studies and select text books to be utilized 
therein, and (v) otherwise to establish policies for the

_2/education of the pupils residing within its corporate limits.

7. Respondent's June 14, 1972 Ruling and Order 
restrains Petitioner in the enforcement, operation or execution 
of the powers conferred and the duties imposed upon it by the 
1963 Constitution and statutes of the State of Michigan in the 
following respects:

(a) The allocation of Petitioner's staff 
or other services and the expenditures therefor.
(11 I C)

(b) The enrollment in and attendance at 
Petitioner's schools only of children who are 
residents. (1f II B, C, D, E)

(c) The employment of qualified teachers 
to educate resident pupils upon terms satis­
factory to Petitioner. (II II F, G)

(d) The use of Petitioner's school facil­
ities. (11 II H)

(e) The construction or expansion of 
school facilities. (11 II I)

(f) The curriculum, activities and stan­
dards of conduct; the dignity and safety of

~27 See MCLA §§ 340.353; 340.77; 340.66; 340.569; 340.583; 340.882; 
340.575; 340.578; 340.613; 340.614 as illustrative of the powers 
and duties set forth.

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Petitioner's students, faculty, staff and 
parents. (1f II K)

Like restraints are imposed upon the other 53 school districts 
included within Respondent's June 14, 1972 Ruling and Order.

8. Respondent's June 14, 1972 Ruling and Order 
restrains the Michigan State Board of Education and the Super­
intendent of Public Instruction in the enforcement, operation 
or execution of the powers conferred and the duties imposed 
upon each of them by the 1963 Constitution and statutes of 
the State of Michigan in the following respects:

(a) The construction of new school 
facilities and the expansion of existing 
facilities. (1[ II I)

(b) The training and use of faculty 
and staff and the conduct of extra-curricular 
activities. (1| II L)

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ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Did Respondent deprive Petitioner of due process 
of law and thereby usurp the jurisdiction vested in him as a 
United States District Judge by subjecting Petitioner to his 
June 14, 1972 Ruling and Order in disregard of the facts that 
Petitioner was not a party to the action and was not found to 
have committed any act of de jure segregation?

2. Did Respondent usurp the jurisdiction exclusively 
vested by Title 28, USC § 2281 in a United States District Court 
of three judges by entering the June 14, 1972 Ruling and Order 
which restrains the enforcement, operation and execution of 
various Michigan statutes?

REASONS WHY WRIT SHOULD ISSUE

I. As a non-party Petitioner cannot appeal Respondent's 
June 14, 1972 Ruling and Order. That order has immense impact 
upon the 9,300 children being educated by Petitioner and upon 
the 770,000 other children being educated within the 54 districts 
the order affects. The totally unknown effects which massive tri­
county busing may have upon the education and safety of these 
children as well as the undeterminable cost in time and dollars 
of the order's implementation make this a matter of "public 
importance" and a "case appropriate for the extraordinary writs." 
Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728 (C.A. D.C. 1969) at 
736, 737.

7



II. Petitioner seeks the writ traditionally used to con­
fine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed 
jurisdiction. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Association, 319 U.S. 21 
(1943) at 26. Petitioner is not and never has been a party to 
Bradley v. Milliken. Only parties who have been properly sub­
jected to a federal court's in personam jurisdiction, and those 
who have been shown to have acted in concert with such parties, 
can be legally subjected to the provisions of its injunctive 
orders. FRCP, Rule 65(d), specifically states: i!Every order
granting an injunction... is binding only upon the parties to 
the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and 
attorneys, and upon those persons that act in concert or par­
ticipation with them...."

The evils prohibited by this provision of Rule 
65 were articulated by Judge Learned Hand in Alemite Manufacturing 
Corporation v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 833 (2d Cir. 1930), as 
follows:

"...no court can make a decree which will 
bind anyone but a party; a court of equity 
is as much so limited as a court of law; 
it cannot lawfully enjoin the world at 
large, no matter how broadly it words its 
decree. If it assumes to do so, the decree 
is pro tanto brutum fulmen, and the persons 
enjoined are free to ignore it. It is not 
vested with sovereign powers to declare con­
duct unlawful; its jurisdiction is limited 
to those over whom it gets personal service, 
and who therefore can have their day in 
court.

*  *  *

"This is far from being a formal distinc­tion; it goes deep into powers of a court 
of equity....It is by ignoring such proce­
dural limitations that the injunction of a 
court of equity may by slow steps be made 
to realize the worst fears of those who 
are jealous of its prerogative."

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In addition, Respondent has acknowledged that he has
taken no proofs as to whether Petitioner or the other affected 
school districts (with the exception of the Detroit school 
district) have committed acts of de jure segregation. Absent 
such a finding, Respondent's remedial powers cannot extend to 
Petitioner. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 1 (1971); Spencer v. Kugler, 326 F. Supp. 1235 (1971), 
aff'd. 92 Sup. Ct. 707 (1972).

III. The aim of Congress in creating United States 
district courts of three judges was to erect "procedural pro­
tection against an improvident state-wide doom by a federal 
court of a state's legislative policy." Phillips v. United 
States, 312 U.S. 246, 251 (1940). The legislative history of 
Title 28 USC § 2281 indicates that the section was "enacted 
to prevent a single federal judge from being able to paralyze 
totally the operation of an entire [state] regulatory scheme 
by issuance of a broad injunctive order." Kennedy v. Mendoza- 
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 154 (1962). Other decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court represent "unmistakable recog­
nition of the congressional policy to provide for a three- 
judge court whenever a state statute is sought to be enjoined 
on grounds of federal unconstitutionality...." Florida Lime 
Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 81 (1959).

Where such circumstances are present, the case 
is one "that is 'required by...Act of Congress to be determined 
by a district court of three judges.' 28 USC § 1253. (Emphasis
added.)" Florida Lime Growers, supra, at 85.

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It is manifest that Respondent's June 14, 1972 
Ruling and Order enjoins Petitioner (and 53 other tri-county 
school districts) from exercising and discharging a veritable 
host of powers and duties conferred upon each of them by the 
Michigan School Code of 1955. See paragraphs 7 and 8 of 
Facts, supra. Beyond all this, Respondent baldly orders the 
State Superintendent of Public Instruction to ignore state 
law in his recommendations to Respondent, if such law 'conflicts 
with what is necessary to achieve the objectives of" Respondent's 
June 14, 1972 Ruling and Order. If ever an order of an 
individual United States District Judge 'paralyzes" or 
"dooms" a state's legislative policy, the order in question 
is it. One can scarcely imagine a clearer case for appli­
cation of the principle enunciated in Phillips, supra. The 
780,000 school children residing in the affected geographic 
area, together with their parents, teachers and school admin­
istrators, are without doubt entitled to the procedural 
protection afforded, in Congress' wisdom and through its 
mandate, by a court of three judges. The convictions, and 
indeed prejudices, of an individual judge, no matter how 
learned, must be tempered when an injunction having the dis­
ruptive and dismantling effects of Respondent's June 14,
1972 Ruling and Order is at issue.

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IF

INTERIM RELIEF REQUESTED

To implement the Writ of Mandamus and/or Prohibition 
sought herein by Petitioner, Petitioner prays this Court to 
stay or suspend forthwith the proceedings, at least to the 
extent they affect Petitioner, contemplated by Respondent's 
June 14, 1972 Order and Ruling until such time as the ruling 
relative to this Petition has occurred.

ULTIMATE RELIEF REQUESTED 

Issuance of the writ herein requested.

DICKINSON, WRIGHT, McKEAN & CUDLIP

By: _______________________________
Fred W. Freeman

Charles F. Clippert

Robert V. Peterson 
Attorneys for Petitioner

Bloomfield Hills School District 
1700 North Woodward Avenue 
P. 0. Box 509
Bloomfield Hills, Michigan 48013 
(313) 646-4300

Dated: June 26, 1972

11



EXHIBIT A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RONALD BRADLEY, et al.,

V. Plaintiffs

WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al.,

and Defendants

DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
LOCAL 231, AMERICAN FEDERATION 
OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO,

Defendant-
Intervenorand

DENISE MAGDOWSKI, et al.,

Defendants-
Intervenoret al.

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A T R U E  C O P Y

CIVIL ACTION NO: 
35257

KUIjXNG on desegregation area
AND

ORDER FOR DEVELOPMENT no PLAN OF nFSEGREGATTnv

On September 27. 1971 the court made its Ruling on 
issue of Segregation, holding that illegal segregation exists 
in the public schools of the city of Detroit as a result of a
course of conduct on the part of the state of Michigan and th,
Detroit Board of Education ,^n. Having found a constitutional
violation as established ^  -u „ .oxisned, on October 4, 1971 the court
directed the school board defendants, city and state, to
develop and submit plans of desegregation, designed to
achieve the greatest •, _Possible degree of actual desegregation,
taking into account the  ̂.one practicalities of the situation. The
directive called for the ,. submission of both a "Detroit-only"
and a "Metropolitan" plan.

Clerk



Plans for the desegregation of the Detroit schools 
were submitted by the Detroit Board of Education and by the 
plaintiffs. Following five days of hearings the court found 
that whale plaintiffs' plan would accomplish more desegregation 
than now obtains in the -system, or which would be achieved under 
either Plan A or C of the Detroit Board of Education submissions, 
none of the plans would result in the desegregation of the 
public schools of the Detroit school district. The court, 
in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, concluded that . 
"relief of segregation in the Detroit public schools cannot 
be accomplished within the corporate geographical limits of . 
the city," and that it had the authority and the duty to 
look beyond such limits for a solution to the illegal segre­
gation in the Detroit public schools. Accordingly, the court 
ruled,it had to consider a metropolitan remedy for segregation.

The parties submitted a number of plans for metropolitan 
desegregation. The State Board of Education submitted six — 
without recommendation, and without indicating any preference.
With the exception of one of these, none could be considered as 
designed to accomplish desegregation. On the other hand 
the proposals of intervening defendant Magdowski, et al., 
the Detroit Board of Education and' the plaintiffs were all 
good faith efforts to accomplish desegregation in the Detroit 
metropolitan area. The three plans submitted by these parties 
have many similarities, and all of them propose to incorporate, 
geographically,.most— and in one instance, all— of the three- 
county area of Wayne, Oakland and Macomb.

The hearing on the proposals have set the framework, 
and have articulated the criteria and considerations, for 

developing and evaluating an effective plan of metropolitan 
desegregation. None of the submissions represent a complete



plan for the ^Eeetive and equitable desegregation of the
metropolitan area, capable of implementation in its present
form. The court will therefore draw upon the resources of
the parties to devise, pursuant to its direction, a
constitutional plan of desegregation of the Detroit public 

• #schools.
Based on the entire record herein, the previous oral 

and written rulings and orders of this court, and the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed herewith,
IT IS ORDERED: ’

I.
■ A. As a panel charged with the responsibility of

preparing and submitting an effective desegregation plan in 
accordance with the provisions of this order, the court 
appoints the following:

1. A designee of the State Superintendent of 
Public Instruction;

2. Harold Wagner, Supervisor of the Transportation 
Unit in the Safety and Traffic Education 
Program of the State Department of Education;

3. Merle Henrickson, Detroit Board of Education;
4. Aubrey McCutcheon, Detroit Board of Education;
5. Freeman Flynn, Detroit Board of Education;
6. Gordon Foster, expert for plaintiffs;
7. Richard Morshead, representing defendant 

Magdowski, et al.;

,8. A designee of the newly intervening defendants;
9. Rita Scott, of the Michigan Civil Rights .

Commission.

*
The designees of the State Superintendent of Public 

Instruction and newly intervening defendants shall be communicated 
to the court within seven days of the entry of this order. In 
the event the newly intervening defendants cannot agree upon a 
designee, they may each submit a nominee within seven days from 
the entry of this order, and the court shall select one of the 
nominees as representative of said defendants.



Should any designated member of this panel be unable 

to serve, the other members of the panel shall elect any 
necessary replacements, upon notice to the court and the 
parties. In the absence of objections within five days of 
the notice, and pending a final ruling, such designated 
replacement shall act as a member of the panel.

B. As soon as possible, but in no event later than 
45 days after the issuance of this order, the panel is to 
develop a plan for 'the assignment of pupils as set forth below 
in order to provide the maximum actual desegregation, and 
shall develop as well a plan for the transportation of pupils, 
for implementation for all grades, schools and clusters in 
the desegregation area. Insofar as required by the 
circumstances, which are to be detailed in- particular, the 
panel may recommend immediate implementation of an interim 
desegregation plan for grades K-6, K-8 or K-S in all or in 
as many clusters as practicable, with complete and final 
desegregation to proceed in no event later than the fall 
1973 term. in its transportation plan the panel shall, 
to meet the needs of the proposed pupil assignment plan, 
make recommendations, including the shortest possible time­
table, for acquiring sufficient additional transportation 
facilities for any interim or final plan of desegregation.
Such recommendations shall be filed forthwith and in no 
event later than 45 days after the entry of this order.
Should it develop that some additional transportation 
equipment is needed for an interim plan, the panel shall 
make recommendations for such acquisition within 20 days
of this order.



C. The parties, their agents, employees, successors/ 
and all others having actual notice of this order shall 
cooperate fully with the panel in their assigned mission, •
including, but not limited to, the provision of data and 
reasonable full and part-time staff assistance as requested 
by the panel. The State defendants shall provide support, 
accreditation, funds, and otherwise take all actions necessary 
to insure that local officials and employees cooperate fully 
with the panel. All reasonable costs incurred by the panel 
shall be borne by the State defendants; provided, however, 
that staff assistance or other services provided by any 
school district, its employees or agents, shall be without 
charge, and the cost thereof shall be borne by such school 
district.

II.
A. Pupil reassignment to accomplish desegregation

of the Detroit public schools is required within the geographical
area which may be des
school districts (see
referred to as the "d

Lakeshore 
Lakeview 
Roseville 
South Lake 
East Detroit 
Grosse Pointe 
Centerline 
Fitzgerald 
Van Dyke 
Fraser ,
Harper Woods 

, Warren 
Warren Woods 
Clawson 
Hamtramck 
Lamphere

• Madison Heights 
Troy.

cribed as encompassing
Exhibit P.M. 12), and

esegregation area":
Birmingham 
Hazel P.ark 
Highland Park 
Royal Oak 
Berkley 
Ferndale 
Southfield 
Bloomfield Hills 
Oak Park 
Redford Union 
West Bloomfield 
Clarenceville 
Farmington 

. Livonia
South Redford 
Crestwood 
Dearborn 
Dearborn Heights

the following 
hereinafter

Fairlane
Garden City
North Dearborn Height
Cherry Hill
Inkster
Wayne
Westwood
Ecorse
Romulus
Taylor
River Rouge
Riverview
Wyandotte
Allen Park
Lincoln park
Melvindale
Southgate
Detroit



Provided, ho^^ver, that if in the actua^^assignment of 
pupils it appears necessary and feasible to achieve effective 
and complete racial desegregation to reassign pupils of 
another district or other districts, the desegregation panel 
may, -upon notice to the parties, apply to the Court for 
an appropriate modification of this order.

B. Within the limitations of reasonable travel 
time and distance factors, pupil reassignments shall be 
effected within the'clusters described in Exhibit P.M. 12
so as to achieve the greatest degree of actual desegregation to 
the end that, upon implementation, no school, grade or class­
room be substantially disproportionate to the overall pupil 
racial composition. The panel may, upon notice to the 
parties, recommend reorganization of clusters within the 
desegregation area in order to minimize administrative 
inconvenience, or time and/or numbers of pupils requiring 

transportation.

C. Appropriate and safe transportation arrangements » .
shall be made available without cost to all pupils assigned to 
schools deemed by the panel to be other than "walk-in" 

schools. '

D. Consistent with the requirements of maximum 
actual desegregation, every effort should be made to minimize 
the numbers of pupils to be reassigned and requiring trans-

• t
portation, the time pupils spend in transit, and the number 
and cost of new transportation facilities to be acquired by 
utilizing such techniques as clustering, the "skip"- technique, 
island zoning, reasonable staggering of school hours, and 
maximization of use of existing transportation facilities,

-6-



including buses owned or leased by school districts and 
buses operated by public transit authorities and private 
charter companies. The panel shall develop appropriate 
recommendations for limiting transfers which affect the 
desegregation of particular schools.

E. Transportation and pupil assignment shall, 
to the extent consistent with maximum feasible desegregation, 
be a two-way process with both black and white pupils sharing 
the responsibility for transportation requirements at all. J*
grade levels. In the determination of the utilization of 
existing, and the construction of new, facilities, care 
■ohall be taken to randomize the location of particular 
grade levels.

F . Faculty and staff shall be reassigned, in 
keeping with pupil desegregation, so as to prevent the

or continuation of the identification of schools by 
reference to past racial composition, or the continuation of 
substantially disproportionate racial composition of the 
faculty and staffs, of the schools in the desegregation area. 
The faculty and staffs assigned to the schools within the 
desegregation area shall be substantially desegregated, 
bearing in mind, however, that the desideratum is the balance 
of faculty and staff by qualifications for subject and grade 
level, and then by race, experience and sex. In the context 
of the evidence in this case, it is appropriate to require 
assignment of no less than 10% black faculty and staff at 
each school, and where there is more than one building 
administrator, every effort should be made to assign a 
bi-racial administrative team.



G. In the hiring, assignment, promotion, demotion, 
and dismissal of faculty and staff, racially non-discriminatory 
criteria must be developed and used; provided, however,
there shall be no reduction in efforts to increase minority 
group representation among faculty and staff in the 
desegregation area. Affirmative action shall be taken to 
increase minority employment in all levels of teaching and 
administration.

H. The restructuring of school facility utilization 
necessitated by pupil reassignments should produce schools
of substantially like quality, facilities, extra-curricular 
activities and staffs; and the utilization of existing 
school capacity through the desegregation area shall be 
made on the basis of uniform criteria.

I. The State Board of Education and the State 
Superintendent of Education shall with respect to all school 
construction and expansion, "consider the factor of racial 
balance along with other educational considerations in 
making decisions about new school sites, expansion of
present facilities * * ; and shall, within the desegregation
area disapprove all proposals for new construction or expansion 
of existing facilities when "housing patterns in an area would 
result in a school largely segregated on racial * * * lines,"
all in accordance with the 1966 directive issued by the State 
Board of Education to local school boards and the State 
Board's “School Plant Planning Handbook" (see Ruling on Issue 
of segregation, p'. 13.). •

J. Pending further orders of the court, existing 
school district and regional boundaries and school governance



arrangements will be maintained and continued, except to 

the extent necessary to effect pupil and faculty desegregation 
as set forth herein; provided, however, that existing administra­
tive, financial, contractual, property and governance arrange­
ments shall be examined, and recommendations for their 
temporary and permanent retention or modification shall be 
made, in light of the need to operate an effectively desegregated 
system of schools.

. K. At each school within the desegregated area 
provision shall be made to insure that the curriculum, 
activities, and conduct .standards respect the diversity of 
students from differing ethnic backgrounds and the dignity and 
safety of <?ach individual, students, faculty, staff and parents.

L'. The defendants shall, to insure the effective 
desegregation of the schools in the desegregation area, take 
immediate action including, but not limited to, the 
establishment or expansion of in-service training of faculty 
and staff, create bi-racial committees, employ black counselors, 
and require bi-racial and non-discriminatory extra-curricular 
activities.

II i:
The State Superintendent of Public Instruction, with 

the assistance of the other state defendants, shall examine, 
and make recommendations, consistent with the principles

* t.

established above, for appropriate interim and final arrange­
ments for the (1) financial, (2) administrative and school 
governance, and (3) contractual arrangements for the operation 
of the schools within the desegregation area, including steps 
for unifying, or otherwise making uniform the personnel

-9-



Jpo2.xci.6S/ procebur e s/ contracts, and property arrangements 
of the various school districts.

Within 15 days of the entry of this order, the 
Superintendent shall advise the court and the parties of his 
progress in preparing such recommendations by filing a 
written report with the court and serving it on the parties.
In not later than 45 days after the entry of this order,

the Superintendent shall file with the court his recommendations
for appropriate interim and final relief in these respects.

In his examination and recommendations, the 
Superintendent, consistent with the rulings and orders of this 
court, may be guided, but not limited, by existing state law; 
where state law provides a convenient and adequate framework 
for interim or ultimate relief, it should be followed, where 
state law either is silent or conflicts with what is necessary 
to achieve the objectives of this order, the Superintendent 
shall independently recommend what he deems necessary. In 
particular, the Superintendent shall examine and choose one
appropriate interim arrangement to oversee the immediate 
implementation of a plan of desegregation.

IV.

Ea°h party may file appropriate plans or proposals 
for inclusion in any final order which may issue in this 
cause. The intent of this order is to permit all the parties . 
to proceed apace with the task before us.- fashioning an 
effective plan for the desegregation of the Detroit public 
schools. •

Fifteen days after the filing of the reports 
required herein, hearings will begin on any proposal to modify 
any interim plan prepared by the panel and all n-t-w ^  —



which may be incident to the adoption and implementation of 
any interim plan of desegregation submitted. The parties 
are placed on notice that they are to be prepared at that 
time to present their objections, alternatives and modifications. 
At such hearing the court will not consider objections to 

•desegregation or proposals offered "instead" of desegregation.
Hearings on a final plan of desegregation will be 

set as circumstances require.

DATE: JUNE 14 , 1972.

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