Alpha Portland Cement Company v. Reese Appendix
Public Court Documents
June 25, 1973 - June 25, 1973
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Alpha Portland Cement Company v. Reese Appendix, 1973. b73c90a4-b79a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/5f09fd3b-35e3-4502-bdb9-83a2993480bd/alpha-portland-cement-company-v-reese-appendix. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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APPENDIX
IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT
NO. 74-1290
ALPHA PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant,
vs.
WILLIE C. REESE,
Plaintiff-Appellee
Appeal From The United States District Court
For the Northern District of Alabama
William F. Gardner
Sydney F. Frazier, Jr.
Cabaniss, Johnston, Gardner, Dumas &
1900 First National-Southern Natural
Birmingham, Alabama 35203
O'Neal
Bldg.
Attorneys for Appellant Alpha Portland Cement Company
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INDEX
Original Document No. Appendix Page No_.
Docket
Complaint—
8Motion of defendant to dismiss- 3
Order of August 30, 1974 deny
ing notion to dismiss and
holding in abeyance motion
to dismiss class action
aspects---------- 4 11
Order of August 10, 1973
on motion for evidentiary
hearing-"------- 5 13
Answer------------------------- 6 14
Amendment to motion to dismiss- 7 17
Memorandum Opinion and Order
of November 13, 1973 8
9
19
34Amendment to answer-
Order of the Court of Appeals
granting leave to appeal 10 36
Notice of appeal----------“ 11 37
"SRyjf "•
SOUTHERN DIVISION A 7 3 ~ 0 I i / /( ^
CIVIL D O C K E T . ( /
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Jury demand date:
BASIS: Civil Rights - Employment Title VII - 42 USC 2000e .p. C. Form No. 10GA nor.
Trmn or casd
WILLIE C. REESE, individually and on behalf
of others similarly situated
VS.
ATTORNEYS
— For plaintiff: U. W. demon;
Adams, Baker and demon
1630 North 4th Avenue
Birmingham, AL 35203
ALPHA PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY, INC,
For defendant: Willi am F. Gardner -
Cabaniss, JohnsCon^Cardner A’-CiaYk, I
First Nation-Southern Natural Building
Birmingham, AL 35203
BTATJSTJCAL. RECORD COOTS 1 DATZ1
NAME OR | RECEIPT NO. ( REC. j DIss.
J.S. 5 mailed Clerk Jun.25 Cis« 'AtluIilS | D
Clenon
Ker &
Rec .£9487 15 oo ̂
flun.27 Cr. 100S69 1 15 oo
J.S. C mailed Marshal ■., V 1974
Feb. 8 Sk- Cnbaniss, John: ton #
Basis of Action: Docket fee ■tec.dl2540
lot.of A.ODeal 5 00 00• Witness fees Feb.13 Cr. 100369 5
Action arose at: Depositions
KOT10
rP.̂ -TR
TRIAL
JS C
• f S’ s * ■
AL
tAlLd
1 ■ 0
19f/”
"June A
P R O C E E D IN G S
, , n f { ^ M 4 S & n . ‘ ! B S » i s U ’ - V *J»ly 10 H SuSons ind complaint returned executed, W. E, Frtichand served 6/29/73, filed,
i n /Order dated August 10, 1973, on motion of defendant for an evidentiary hearing Aug. l3̂ 0ron 8tgnding or opacity of plaintiff to r-aintaln a class action, Chet this
motion io tiken under odviacoent until such ticie as an opinion is rendered by
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on its en banc hearing in the case of
__ Uuff v. N. P. Cass Co., filed end entered (Guin) - c m
•< 31 /border, dated August 30, 1973, denying defendant's notion to dismiss the complaint
and holding in abeyance defendant's notion to dioniss the class action greets,
of this cose pending on evidentiary hearing set on October 17, 1973, at 3:00 p n.,
in chanbers, filed and entered (Guin) - cm
/^Answer of defendant to the complaint filed - ca
D*trJudfT
Sep. 10 C 8
4 tL
never 0 1 -- r---- ,13 TZjnterrogatories of defendant propounded to plaintiff filed
9ft '*7 Amendment to notion to dismiss by defendant filed, cs
Nov 14 ""Memorandum Opinion with Order thereon, dated November 13, 1973, overruling
* 1 \Aj defendant's amended notion to dlsniss the class ; action aspects of
__ plaintiff's complaint, filed and entered (Guin) - cm , .
21 / ̂ /Amendment to anaver of defendant denying the allegations of paragraph II of t
4-a/ co<flp l a l n t separately and severally and denying the allegations o. su.-paragrapna
B, C, and D of paragraph VII of the complaint separately and severally, f-lcd
^Certified copy of order of the 0. S. Court of Appeals granting leave to appeal
£roal the interlocutory order of the U. S. District Court entered on Novenoer 1A.
7 /''//Notice’of appeal by defendant from interlocutory order of this Court enterca
November 14, 1974, filed - cm
8 ) / H i Appeal Bond (250.00) filed
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FcL^THE^NORTHERiV dISTRICT OF ALABAMA
f° SOUTHERN DIVISION
WILLIE C. REESE, individually
and on behalf of others simi
larly situated,
Plaintiff,
rVS.
ALPHA PORTLAND CEMENT
COMPANY, INC., Dofenaant.
CIVIL ACTION NUMBER
CA 73 “ '611
COMPLAINT
i
* FILED IN CLERK'S OfFlCEl
NORTHERN DISTRICT of ALASKA
JUN 2 5 ^
^ K ^ u.st^ t COo.t,
®Yi -
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to
28 U.S.C. Section 13*13. This i» a suit in e*Ul-*y aUth°ri=ed
and instituted pursuant to Title VII of the Act known as
„ . . nf -,qC4 " T)2 U.S.C. Sections 2000e et seq.,Civil Rights Act of 19bA,
anS ,2 U.S.C. Section 1983.- The Jurisdiction of this court
ls invoked to secure protection of and to redress deprivation
at vw (a ) T1 tie VII of the Act known as The of rights secured by (a) T^txe
icfili » 42 U S C. Sections 2000e et seq.,■ Civil Rights Act of 196U, *»2 U.S.C. s
. .. ... .. and other r e l i e f against racial dis
*, prOVJLUXilb uu"
crimination in employment and CM « • " * * -
l providing for the equal rights of oltlsens and all persons
f, ,i,hln the jurisdiction of the United States.
| ' ■ » '
I! Plaintiff brings this action on his o»n behalf and
j! on behalf of others similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 a
(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. There are common
L i o n s of lau and fast affecting the rights cf o t h e r R.groe
I! eeking equal em-loyme„t opportunity .Ithout dlsorlmlnaUon n
: the ground of race or color »ho are so numerous as to make
? impracticable to bring them all before this court. »
;j . • . t The interests of said class are adequatelj. relief is sought. m e
i! reoresented by plaintiff.
Ill
This is a proceeding for a preliminary and permanent
injunction restrain.-,, defendant from maintaining a policy,
practice, custom and usar.e of withholding, denying or attempt
ing to withhold or to deny, and depriving or attempting to
deprive, or otherwise Interfering, with the rights of the plain-
tiff and others similarly situated of equal employment oppor
tunities at the Alpha Portland Cement Company. __
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IV
Plaintiff, Ulllle C. Reese, Is a Negro Citizen
of the United States, residing In Fairfield, Alabama.
On information and belief, defendant, Alpha Portland
Cement Company, Inc., Is an Alabama Corporation doing business
in the State of Alabama, and the town of Phoenlxvllle, Alabama.
VI
Defendant Is'an employer engaged In an Industry
Which affects Interstate commerce and defendant employs more
than thirty-five employees.
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: A. Plaintiff, Willie C. Reese, was hired by defen-
\ dant as Yardman on May 21, 1969- On June 6, 1969, plaintiff
ji „as discharged by defendant to make room for a white person
!; who was then hired to fill the vacancy left by reason of
ii plaintiffs discharge.
B. Defendant limits the employment opportunity of
in thp assignment of blacks to lower paying its black employees in the assignment
Job classifications because of race.
C. Plaintiff and other Negroes have been denied
equal employment opportunity because of defendant
standing policy, practice, custom and usage of hiring blacks
only in certain designated Job classifications.
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• D. All of the above stated unlawful employment
practices existed prior to June 6, 1969, and have continued
by the defendant since that date.
_ VIII
Plaintiff is qualified to perform the Job from
which he was discharged.
IX
Neither the State of Alabama, nor the town of
Phoenixville, has a law prohibiting the unlawful practices
alleged herein. On June 10, 1969, plaintiff filed a complaint
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging
denial by defendant of his rights under Title VII of the
"Civil Rights Act of 1 9 6 V k2 U.S.C* Sections 2000e et seq.
On July 7, 1971, the Commission found reasonable cause to
believe that a violation of the Act had occurred by defendant,
Alpha Portland Cement Company. On March 26, 1973, the Com
mission notified plaintiff that defendant’s compliance with
Title VII had not been accomplished within the maximum period
allowed to the Commission, and that plaintiff is entitled to
maintain a civil action for relief in a United States District
Court.
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Plaintiff has no plain, adequate or complete remedy
at law to redress the wrongs alleged and this suit for a pre
liminary and permanent injunction is his only means of securing
adequate relief. Plaintiff and- the class he represents are
now suffering and will continue to suffer irreparable injury
from defendant's policy, practice, custom and usage as set
forth herein.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays this Court
advance this case on the docket, order a speedy hearing at
the earliest practicable date, cause this case to be in every
way expedited, and upon such hearing to:
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1. Grant plaintiff and the class he represents a
preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining the defendant,
Alpha Portland Cement Company, Inc., its agent3, successors,
employees, and those acting in concert with them and at
their direction, from continuing or maintaining the policy,
practice, custom and usage of denying, abridging, withholding,
conditioning, limiting or otherwise interfering with the right
of plaintiff to employment, and promotion on an equal basis
with white employees at defendant's operation in Phoenlxville,
Alabama.
2. Grant plaintiff and the class he represents a
preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining defendant,
Alpha Portland Cement Company, Inc., its agents, successors,
employees, and those acting in concert with them and at their
direction from continuing or maintaining the policy, practice,
custom and usage of denying, abridging, withholding, condition
ing, limiting or otherwise interfering with the rights of the
plaintiff and others similarly situated to enjoy equal employ
ment opportunities as secured by Title VII of the Act known as
-The Civil Rights Act of 196H," 42 U.S.C. Sections 2000e et
̂o-> *.u*.,*- - on on theseq., and u.b.o. otcuuu xyvx --- “
basis of race or color, including but not limited to admission
to employment on the equal basis with white employees without
consideration of race or color.
3. Grant plaintiff and the class the court finds
plaintiff to represent back pay from the time the plaintiff or
any of the class were denied equal employment opportunities
by the defendant because of their race in violation of Title
VII, 42 U.S.C. Sections 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. 1981 to
the present.
4, Allow plaintiffs their costs herein, including
reasonable attorneys' fees and other additional relief as may
appeal; to the Court to be equitable and Just.
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IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
NORTHERN DISTRICT Or ALA3AMA
JULO 1373
WILLIE C. REESE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ALPHA PORTLAND CEMENT
COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant.
) CIVIL ACTION
* 4) NO. 73-611
)
)
MOTION
Comes now Alpha Portland Cement Company, Inc.,
a corporation, defendant in the above-styled case, and moves the Court
as follows, separately and severally:
1. The defendant moves to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that it fails to state a claim on which relief
can be granted.
2. The defendant moves to dismiss the class action
allegations and aspects of the complaint on the ground that
the suit is not and cannot be a proper class action by repre
sentation by the plaintiff for the reason, as shown
by the allegations of the complaint, that the plaintiff was
employed by the defendant for a period of approximately two
weeks only and was terminated from employment with defendant
in 1969. The plaintiff therefore is not a proper class representative
with respect to terms and conditions of active employment
unless and until it should be established that he was unlawfully
discharged and is entitled to reinstatement.
<3
3. The defendant moves that the Court hold an
evidentiary hearing on the standing or capacity“of the plaintiff
to maintain a class action v;ith respect to terms and conditions of
employment affecting currently employed employees by determining
whether or not the plaintiff was unlawfully discharged and whether
or not the plaintiff is entitled to reinstatement.
iTTTl iam F. Gardner
.. . 1900 First 1-Jational-Southern Natural Bldg
Birmingham, Alabama 35203
Attorney for defendant Alpha
Portland Cement Company
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the above and foregoing
motion to dismiss has this day been served by United States
mail, postage prepaid, on Mr. U. W. Clemon, Adams, Baker S
demon, 1630 - 4th Avenue North, Birmingham, Alabama 35203.
This the day of July, 1973.
10
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
WILLIE C. REESE,
Plaintiff
) CIVIL ACTION NO. 73-G-611VS
ALPHA PORTLAND CEMENT
COMPANY, INC.,
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)
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FILED IN CLERK’S OFFICE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF AlASAV.A
-AUG 311973
Defendant. )
ORDER
This motion came on to be heard on a regularly scheduled
motion docket on August 10, 1973, on the motion of the defendant,
Alpha Portland Cement Company, Inc., to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that it fails to state a claim on which relief can be
granted, to dismiss the class action allegations and aspects of
the complaint on the ground that the suit cannot be a proper class
action by representation by the plaintiff; and the defendant moved
that the Court hold an evidentiary hearing on the standing or
capacity of the plaintiff to maintain a class action with respect
to terms and conditions of employment affecting currently employed
employees by determining whether or not the plaintiff was unlaw
fully discharged and whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
reinstatement. The Court has considered the motion and is of the
opinion that the motion to dismiss the complaint is due to be
denied. The Court is further of the opinion that the motion to
dismiss the class action aspects be held in abeyance pending an
evidentiary hearing on this matter.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the
defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint be and the same hereby
11
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is denied. Defendant's motion- to dismiss the class action
aspects of this case shall be held in abeyance pending an
evidentiary hearing hereby set on October 17, 1973, at 3:00 P.M
in my chambers.
Done this 30th day 'of August, 1973.
StatesT"d7st^ct Judge
y. Foy Guin, Jr,
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IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
WILLIE C. REESE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ALPHA PORTL7CJD CEMENT
COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant.
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O R D E R
FILED IN CLERK’S OFFICE
NORTHERN DISTRICT Of ALABAMA
AUG 1 1973
WILLIAM E. DAVIS
CLERK, II. S. DISTRICT COURT,B y , C 4 L 7*>..„-:A.. .■<-rr. *-■.CwmK
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 73-G-C11
This cause is before the Court on the motion of
defendant Alpha Portland Cement Company for an evidentiary hearing
on the standing or capacity of plaintiff to maintain a class
action with respect to terms and conditions of employment
affecting currently employed employees.
The Court notes that on banc hearing was held October
30, 1972 in the case of Huff v^ * L ^ _ C a sJL_£°^ The C°Urt iS °f
the opinion and the parties agree that it is appropriate to
withhold a ruling on the motion of defendant until such
time as an opinion is rendered as a result of the en banc hearing
by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that
the motion of defendant be and the same is hereby taken under
advisement until such time as an opinion is rendered by the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals on its en banc hearing in the case of
Huff v^ N. T>. Cass Co._
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Done this
United7'Stands Distric^'hludge'
IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WILLIE C. REESE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA '
SOUTHERN DIVISION
FOR THE
) O'
Plaintiff )) CIVIL ACTION
VS . No. 73-G-611
ALPHA PORTLAND CEMENT
COMPANY, INC., )
Defendant > -
A N S W E R
The defendant Alpha Portland Cement Company answers
the complaint as follows:
1. There is no dispute with the fact that the plaintiff
has invoked the statutes referred to in Paragraph I of the
complaint. The defendant agrees that the Court has jurisdiction
over the action. -- •
2. The allegations of Paragraph II of the complaint are
deemed to call for no response from the defendant in view of
the Court's Order of August 30, 1973 holding the motion to
dismiss the class action aspects of the complaint in abeyance.
3. The action is a proceeding seeking an injunction.
With this exception, the allegations of Paragraph III of the
complaint are separately and severally denied.
4. It is true that the plaintiff, Willie C. Reese, is
a black citizen of the United States. The defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief with respect
to the plaintiff's residence.
5. , The allegations of Paragraph V of the complaint are
true.
1 4
G: The allegations of Paragraph VI of the complaint
are true.
7.(a) It is true that the plaintiff, VJillic C. Reese,
was hired by the defendant on May 21, 1969. It is not tiue,
and defendant denies, that he was discharged "to make room for
a white person who was then hired to fill the vacancy left by
reason of plaintiff’s discharge." The facts are that the.
plaintiff was terminated during the probationary trial period
because of unsatisfactory work. .
(b)-(d) The allegations set forth in sub-paragraphs B,
C, and D of Paragraph VII of the complaint are deemed to call
for no response from the defendant in view of the Court’s Order
of August 30, 1973, holding the motion to dismiss the class
action aspects of the complaint in abeyance.
8. The allegation of Paragraph VIII of the complaint
is denied.
9. It is true that the State of Alabama and the Town of
Phoenixville (if there is any such town extant) do not have
laws covering the subject matter of the complaint. The defenda.
is without knowledge or information sufficient to form u belief
as to the truth of the remaining allegations of Paragraph IX of
the complaint.
10. The allegations of Paragraph X and the prayer for
relief are separately and severally denied.
Willi&m F. Gardner1900- First National-Southern Natura
Birmingham, Alabama 35203
Bldg.
Attorney for Defendant Alpha Portland
Cement Company
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE-
I hereby certify that a copy of the above and foregoing
Answer has this day been served by United States mail, postage
prepaid, on Mr. U. W. Clemon, Adams, Baker 6 Clemon, 1630 - 4th
Avenue North, Birmingham, Alabama 35203, attorney for the
plaintiff.
This the \q ^ day of September, 1973. ' 3
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IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OR ALABAMA |f(
SOUTHERN DIVISION NORTHERN DISTRICT Or ALABAMA
WILLIE C. REESE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ALPHA PORTLAND CEMENT
COMPANY, INC. ,
Defendant.
)
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Sr.P2 :: 12?:
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 73-G-611
W IL L IA M tT. D '- V iS
CLEHK/t. S. 0!5'r.7i?».- COURT.
■v tyt't*?'. /■'..■V____OtPUTVtCLf
AMENDMENT TO MOTION
Comes now the defendant and amends its previously
filed motion as follows, separately and severally:
1 . The defendant moves the Court to dismiss the
allegations and claims of the complaint other than those regarding
the plaintiff’s discharge on the ground that such claims
were not raised in the charge filed by the plaintiff with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and are not
like or related to the claim raised by the plaintirr D e i o r e
the Commission.
2. The defendant moves to dismiss the class action
allegations and aspects of the complaint on the ground that the
plaintiff is not a proper class representative because he is
not a member of the class, having been employed by the defendant
only as a probationary employee and not as a regular employee.
William F . Gardner•1900 First. National-Southern Natural Bldg.
Birmingham, Alabama 35203
Attorney for Defendant Alpha Portland
Cement Company
NOTICE OF HEARING
Please take notice that this motion will be brought
on for hearing before the Court on October 17, 1973 at 3:00 p.m.
before Honorable J. Foy Guin, Jr., United States District Judge
of the Northern District of Alabama.
_______
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the above and foregoing
Amendment to Motion was served by United States mail, postage
prepaid, on Mr. U. W. Clemon, 1630 - 4th Avenue North, Birmingham
Alabama 35203, attorney for plaintiff.
This the 7-9^ day of < 1973.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
WILLIE C. REESE,
Plaintiff,
v s .
ALPHA PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY,
INC.,
Defendant.
)
)
)
) CIVIL ACTION NO. 73-611
)
) FILED IN CLERK’S OFFICE
) NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This cause came on to be heard by
NOV 1 4 1973
WILLIAM E. DAVIS'
CLERK, U. S. DISTRICT COURT,
the Court on October 17,
4
1973, on the amended motion of the defendant, Alpha Portland Cement
Company,. Inc. , (hereinafter the "Company"), to dismiss the class
action aspects of the complaint. Counsel of record for the respec
tive parties agreed to stipulate the facts relevant to this pending
issue as folluws:
r
(1) The plaintiff, Willie C. Reese, was hired by the
Company on May 21, 1969. As is generally true of industrial
plants,-new employees are on a probationary trial period for a
specified length of time so the Company can evaluate them and
decide whether or not to retain them as regular employees. The
probationary period at the Company was 260 hours. The plaintiff
was allegedly judged lacking in effort and initiative and was
therefore terminated during his probationary period on June 6, 1969;
(2) He thereafter filed a charge with the Equal Employ
ment Opportunity Commission. The sole claim raised by the plaintiff’s
charge was "Discharge because of race." (See Appendix EEOC Decision
in Case No. YBIO-119);
(3) After the case had remained with the Commission for
more than four years, this suit was filed in June of 1973 un
LU
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §200Ccet scq.)%
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. §1981). The complaint
asserts not only the claim relating to the plaintiff's termi
nation in 1969 but also seeks to litigate class action claims
relating to job classifications and job assignments.
At the time the complaint in this action was filed, >_he
standing of a discharged employee to maintain a class action was
governed by Huff v. N.D. Cass Co.., 468 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1972),
which held that a plaintiff who is found to have been lawfully
discharged may not be a class representative of present employees.
Defendant's original motion to dismiss the class action aspects
of this case was based on this point. Since then, the Fifth
Circuit has decided the Huff case on rehearing and held en banc
that the failure of a plaintiff to establish his own cause of
■action regarding his discharge does not preclude the suit from
being a class action, with 'the apparent rationale of this decision
the proposition of class- action law that the determination
w »
of whether there is a class action does not depend on whether the ̂
plaintiff has a cause of action. Huff N. D. Cass Co ,̂
F .2d ____, Civil No. 71-2842 (5th Cir., Sept. 4, 1973).
The defendant concedes that the rehearing in the Huff
case is dispositive of its position that the plaintiff could not
be a class representative because he was lawfully discharged.
However, by amended motion, the defendant Company urges that the
class action aspects of the complaint should be dismissed on the
following grounds:
(1) The charges of racially discriminatory job assign
ments and classifications were not raised before the EEOC and they
are not "like or related" charges within the meaning of Sanchc^ v^
. ct-nnH.rd Brands. Inc.., 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970); and _
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(2) The plaintiff is not a member of the class on
vhose behalf he sues, since his only employment nexus with the
defendant Company was that of a probationary employee.
I.
Yhe first issue raised by the defendant concerns the
application of the "like or related" principle established by
the Fifth Circuit in Sanchez v . Standard Brands, Inc., supra.
The defendant contends that the only charge which the plaintiff
filed with the Commission raised only the claim that he had been
unlawfully discharged because of race. The defendant concedes
that the plaintiff can litigate this claim, but asserts that he
cannot litigate the claims regarding job classifications and
assignments because these claims were neither raised in the charge
filed with the Commission nor are they like or related to the
claim raised before the Cornnission*
_ . „ . ^ . • . • O ___ V __ ___ V _ n c ̂ A *-V, /-» -? r c u n K o f n r o•me tutu V/UCUJ.L au o — ,
it as being "what standard is to be utilized in measuring the
•proper scope of the complaint." 431 F.2d at 466. The Court then
stated that "the scope of the judicial complaint is limited to the
•scope' of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected
to grow out of the charge of discrimination." 431 F.2d at 466.
The Court rationalized its holding as follows:
"The logic of this rule is inherent in the statutory
scheme of Title VII. A charge of discrimination is not ;
filed as a preliminary to a lawsuit. On the contrary, the
purpose of a charge of discrimination' is to trxgger the
investigatory and conciliatory procedures of the EEOC.
Once a charge has been filed, the Commission carries out
its investigatory function and attempts to obtain voluntary
compliance with the law. Only if the EEOC fails to achieve
. voluntary compliance will the matter ever become the sub
ject of court action. Thus it is obvious that the civil _
action is much more intimately related to the EaOC inv«_stx
gation than the words of the charge which originally
triggered the investigation." (431 F.2d at 466)
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f h-md the EEOC findings dated July 7,In the case at hand, t
M71 indicate that the -cope of the ^ e e t l Setion in this case
dld ;ot extend to gucstions o« * *
. (See Appendix EEOC Decision in Case No.
»«<> classifications. (See
nio.119.) This case is analogous to S i M S
6 FEP cases 194 . (D.D.C., 1973), * i c h v,as £ H
-- ,F.Supp.---1 , alleging racial
discrimination. In that case, the charge m - .
. . „ alleged that the plaintiff had been refnsed e»p
CO” of race and unlihe this case, raised claims regarding
" . 7 , and hiring. The civil action in that case
recruitment, testing,
t • regarding "compensation, terms, v.*- tn litigate claims regaramg
ditions and privileges of employment" and "limiting, segregating,
employment opportunities. clas5 action
, <-he liVe or related principle, thes • that under the like related
, - „..,,cfi they were not u k ccVim,1 d be dismissed because / .
.... . . ln so holding, tne
a Vim fore the C o m m is s io n . i n to the claims raised before tn
c d to the Fifth Circuit's decision in the S a - h ^
r - . - - — - - toû
analysis: thc instant case, this
"Applying thc Sanc^ga rn Kinsey in has
Court finds that f e mat ers all-.^ ^ condltrons
- - 7 bs \ r -S 2 5 ̂ h ^ a T S ^ o ^ t heeanse of has
"This Court is mindful of the^fact £ a*h“ °aWCand that
are generally filed by J ^ eesti£ lished liberal standard^^
consequentially court ions in charges °l disc.
for construing factual co. poses of the Civil Rio
' S o n in order to accomplish t h e ^ c r o u s construction of
Act 'Nevertheless, even .1 -EOC concerning Legg, ‘*asthe" facts and issues hefore the aEOC^co^ ^ ^ an
' . 15
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clear that the EEOC was not requested to investigate
these practices and that litigation 6£ thexr^time
in i Title VII enforcement suit at tne pres • ,
would be unjustified. If parties were grven complete
, , t 1-i fixate claims of discrimination neverfreedom to ittigame ciaxiM . . _, _r;ipresented to the EEOC for investigation and concil
tion, it would result in the frustration of the
S t o r y scheme and policies favoring
persuasion and voluntary compliance. (6 FEP^Cas
at 198)
The courts have consistently held that a claim must be
submitted to the Commission in order to provide the Commission
uith at least the opportunity to resolve it administratively
before the plaintiff files a Title VII suit in federal district
court.
In Beverly Vy_ T.onc Star Lead Construction CorjL,.,
437 F .2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1971), the Court emphasized the important
'role of the Commission in the legislative scheme by stating:
takc " { S I ’S '
£ do“n ot°thS t h^parUerSouid1! aliened to bypass
this requirement." («7 F.2d at llo9>
plaintiff asserts in this case that it is unnecessary
for this Court to pass on the Catcher question, inasmuch as this
. action is alternatively premised on « U.S.C.A. <1981. This same
argument Vas recently raised and soundly rejected by the District
Court for the District of Columbia in Kinsey ym heeq, Mason.d_COa,
supra, bike this ease, that was a suit brought under Title VII
and the Civil Fights Act of 1666. After applying the like or
related principle as established by the 5th Circuit in the Sanches
ease and holding that the class action claims not related to the
claims raised in the charge could not he litigated, the Court then
turned to analysis of the plaintiffs argument that these class
action claims- could be litigated under the 1866 law. The Court
rejected the contention and stated as follows in so holding,
(C
/
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"[T]liis Court holds that Section 1981 is not a
_ carte blanche authorization to circumvent and under
mine the preferred policy of exhausting administrative
remedies and utilizing the conciliatory procedures of
the EEOC. Accordingly, plaintiff will not be allowed
to assert claims under Section 1981 which go beyond
his claims of discrimination in hiring, recruitment
and testing that were originally raised during the
EEOC proceeding." (6 FEP Cases at 199)
This precise question was raised before the 5th Circuit
in Hill v. American Airlines, Inc., 479 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1973),
where the plaintiff brought suit in the district court under both
Title VII and Section 1981. The court in Hill stated that:
aw " . . . even if we assume that none of the charges
was even remotely related to those pressed before the
EEOC, Hill still is entitled to pursue his completely
independent remedy under,Section 1981 without first
negotiating the EEOC administrative channels."
(Citations omitted.) (479 F.2d at 1050) (Emphasis added.)
The defendant does not contend that Congress intended
to repeal §1981, by implication or otherwise, in enacting Title VII.
This point was raised in Sanders v. Dob'-s House,' Inc., 431 F.2d
1097 (5th Cir. 1970), and the Court held that:
"Since there is no language in Title VII that can
remotely be construed as directly repealing §1981, the
only means of repeal would be by implication. Repeals by
implication, however, are not favored and the intention
of the legislature must be clear and manifest . . .
Fos-adas v . National Citv Sank, 296 U.S. 497, 503, 56 S.Ct.
349, 352, 80 L.Ed. 351 (1936)." (431 F.2d at 1100)
The Court in Sanders cited with approval Waters v ■
Wisconsin Steel Works of International Harvester Company, 427 F.2d
476 (7th Cir. 1970) where this same argvment was raised and rejected
by that court by stating that "we are convinced that the two acts
can, in large measure, be reconciled and effect given to the
Congressional intent in both enactments." 427 F.2d at 485. The Waters
Court went on to hold that:
"[B]ccouse of the strong emphasis which Congress
placed upon conciliation, we do not think that aggrieved
persons should be allowed intentionally to bypass the
Commission without.good reason. We hold, therefore, that
o nr
7
an aggrieved person may sue directly under §1981 if
he pleads a reasonaole excuse for his failure to
exhaust EEOC remedies." (427 F.2d at 487)
The preference of Congress for resolution of disputes
by conciliation out of court is shown in the legislative history
of Title VII. The Court in Waters lists several reasons why
conciliation was favored as follows:
"By establishing the EEOC Congress provided an
inexpensive and uncomplicated remedy for aggrieved
parties, most of whom were poor and unsophisticated.
Conciliation also was designed to allcw a respondent
to rectify or explain his action without the public
condemnation resulting from a more formal proceeding.
Furthermore, the absence of direct government coercion
was thought to lessen the antagonism between parties
and to encourage reasonable settlement. The need for
voluntary compliance was stressed since more coercive
remedies were likely to enflame respondents or
encourage them to employ subtle forms of discrimina
tion." (427 F.2d at 486-487)
While this Court favors the 7th Circuit's reasoning in
the Waters case, this Court feels bound by the 5th Circuit's
opinion in Hill v, American Airlines, I'. c., surra. The Court
in Hill seems to hold that where an actron is alternatively
premised under §1981 that it is unnecessary to pass on the "like
or related" principle. The Court states that:
"Because the district court has jurisdiction
under §1981, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether
the charges were reasonably related to those urged
before the EEOC, see Sanches v. Standard Brands. Inc.,
5 Cir. 1970, 431 F.2d 455, or whether the fact that the
acts complained of accrued after the EEOC complaint was
filed has any significance, see Danner v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 5 Cir. 1971,.447 F.2d 159, 162, and
Edwards v. North American Rockwell Corn., C.D.D. Cal. 1968,
291 F.Supp. 199." (479 F.2d at 1060 N.5)
The Hill case is irreconcilable with the Beverly v .
Lone Star Lead Constructlon Corp., 437 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1971)
wherein the Court discusses the Waters case in footnote 22. The
Court states that:
"Although it is readily apparent that Congress did
not have §1981 in mind when Title VII was enacted, the
two statutes are not in irreconcilable conflict; repeal
or;/C,0
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by implication, therefore, is not appropriate.
Doubtless the two acts are not in entire agreement.
We think, nevertheless, that the differences which
• " arise may appropriately be resolved on a case by
case basis. Waters, supra. One such conflict has
already been resolved satisfactorily in Waters.
Because of the strong emnhasis on conciliation,
comp 1 ainants rr.av not be allowed to by-pass— the
■ Commission vithov.t toad reason. Thus a $1931 __
nl a in tiff must first exhaust his Title VII rcaeoxes
nr nlead a'Tcasonabla excuse for failure to oo so, . ..
(437 F .2d at 1141 N.22)
While this Court feels that this is a logical and
correct reconciliation of Title VII and §1981, the Court feels
bound by the "completely independent remedy" theory of Hill,
since this is the more recent word on this matter, and until
further light is shed on this question by the Fifth Circuit.
The mere allegation of alternative grounds of juris
diction under §1981 allows the plaintiff to completely by-pass
the conciliatory procedures under Title VII and allows the
plaintiff to frustrate the statutory scheme under Title VII
favoring informal persuasion and voluntary compliance. The
"completely independent remedy" theory of Hill compels this
Court to allow an across-the-board attack on charges of racially
discriminatory job assignments and classification where the
EEOC has not been requested to investigate these charges nor
any like ox* related charge*
The Court is of the opinion that this determination
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from this order, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A.
51262(b), may materially advance the ultimate termination of
this litigation.
I •
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9
___
The defendant Company's second contention is that the
plaintiff is not a member of the class on whose behalf he sues,
since his only employment nexus with the Company ■was that of a
probationary employee. In the recent en banc decision in
Huff v. N. D. Cass Co. of Alabama, ___ F.2d ___, (5th Cir.
Civil No. 71-2842, Sept. 4, 1973), Judge Godbold, speaking'for
a unanimous court, stated that:
"This Court is committed to the principle that
the standard for determining whether a plaintiff may’
maintain a class action is not whether he will ultimately
prevail on his claim. Miller v. Mackey Int11 - Ir.c . ,
452 F.2d 424 (C.A. 5, 1971); Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc., 417 F.2d'1122 (C.A. 5, 1969)."
(___ F.2d at ___, Civil No. 71-2842 at 4)
In the case at hand, the defendant admits that the
plaintiff worked for the Company. -The plaintiff alleges that he
has been personally subjected to the abuses of which he complains
and for which he seeks relief. The complaint in this case alleges
that blacks are hired by the Company only in designated job
classifications and that they are assigned only to lower-paying
job classifications because of their race. It is of no moment
that plaintiff was a probationary employee, since probationary
employees are given initial assignments which the plaintiff con
tends are racially discriminatory. - ■
This Court recognizes that racial discrimination is
in and of itself "class discrimination." Georgia Powder Co. v.
EEOC, 412 F .2d 462, 468 (5th Cir. 1969). The Court in Huff
states that "we have applied a broad approach to standing,
stressing the individual’s role as a private attorney general
taking on the mantle of the sovereign." ___ F.2d ___, Civil
No. 71-2842 at 8. This Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff
meets the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
/
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Procedure, and that this action is properly maintainable as a
class action.
Accordingly, it is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and
DECREED that the defendant's amended motion to dismiss the
class action aspects of the plaintiff's complaint be, and the
same hereby is, overruled.
Done this of November 1973.
A TRUE COPY
WILLIAM E. BA7IS. WOTC
- UNHID SJ..2E3
tORTICYUl iJiaiRJCI CP ILASAE*
BY: Q-’' ̂ s'/
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E Q U A L E M P L O Y M E N T O P P O R T U N IT Y C O M M IS S IO N
W A S H IN G T O N . D .C . 20503
Willie C. Reese
Charging Party
v.
Case No. YBI0-119
Alpha Portland Cement Company • *
Phoeniy.vi.lie, Alabama * . ’
Respondent
June 6, 1969
June 10, 1969
August 12, 1969
-----7 2 " 0 0 4 £ T
DECISION ______1______
Date of alleged violation:
Date of filing of charge:
Date of service of charge:
SUMMARY OF CHARGE
Charging Party alleges that Respondent has. engaged in an unlaw
ful employment practice in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 by discharging him because of his race
(Negro).
JURISDICTION ,
Respondent manufactures cement and cement products for sale
and distribution in interstate commerce. It employs approxi
mately 125 persons. The charge was filed within the time
prescribed by Section 706(d) of Title VII.
SUMMARY OF INTOSTICATION
Charging Party was hired by Respondent on May 21, 1969 , and
discharged on June 6, 1969. Charging Party alleges that he
was discharged because of his race.
Charging Party, a probationary Yardman, contends, and five
witnesses corroborate his testimony, that he was discharged
without warning. Respondent's Production Superintendent
admits that it is Company policy to make periodic oral
corrections to the performance of probationary employees.
Charging Party's foreman acinitted that he failed to do so in
30
y
ff
'1
Alpha Portland Cement Company Page 2
Case Mo. YBIO-119
Charging Party's case. live employees testify that Charging
Party was a good worker, that, "If his work was unsatisfactory,
all of our work was," and that, "He was faster than I was."
One affiant testifies that the foreman (all supervisors are
Caucasian) did not care for Charging Party and-negroes
generally. He contends that, ". . .' if he could dismiss others,
he would. Most of us have too much seniority and are protected
by the union for him to bother us."
It is Respondent's position that Charging Party was discharged
because lie required "excessive supervision" and "failed to
demonstrate initiative." The former assertion is cast m r o
considerable doubt since Company policy was not followed. -
Thus, Charging Party's discharge is unexplained by any circum-
_ stance save the opinion testimony of his fellow employees. We
credit their testimony. - - '
Although Respondent continues to hire Hegro employees, we
find it reasonable to infer that, but for his race, Charging
Party would have been afforded, treatment consistent with
Respondent's avowed policy, thereby giving him an opportunity
to improve his performance if, in fact, it was below Respondent's
required standards.
DHC1SI0M
There is reasonable cause to believe that Respondent^has
engaged in an unlawful employment practice in violation of ■
Title VII of tlie Civil Rights Act of 1964, as alleged.
Tor the Commission:
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PPJISMi
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT nLED |N CLERK'S OFFICE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 2 i 1373
SOUTHERN DIVISION W IL L I A M E . D A V I S
WILLIE C. REESE )
)
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J
Plaintiff CIVIL ACTION
vs. NO. 73-G-611
ALPHA PORTLAND CEMENT
COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant
AMENDMENT TO ANSWER
Comes now defendant Alpha Portland Cement Company
and in view of the Court's opinion and order entered on November
14, 1973 files this amendment to its ansv/er previously filed in
this case, as follows:
1. The allegations of paragraph II of the complaint are
separately and severally denied.
2. The allegations of sub-paragraphs B, C, and D
of paragraph VII of the complaint are separately and severally
denied.-
William F. Gardner
1900 First National-Southern Natural Bldg
Birmingham, Alabama 35203
Attorney for Defendant
Alpha Portland Cement Company
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2.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the above and foregoing
Amendment to Answer has this day been served by United States mail,
postage prepaid, on Mr. U. W. Clemon, Adams, Baker & Clemon, 1630 -
4th Avenue North, Birmingham, Alabama 35203, attorney for plaintiff.
• This the \̂V 'day of November, 1973.-- a
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOH THE FIFTH CIUCUIT
U. S. COURT CF Af r-EALS
f i l e d
FEB 1 1 9 7 4
• EOKAKJD. \Y4 iSlcVDSWORXH
CEHitK'
„ • No. 73-8364
ALPHA PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY,
Petitioner,
versus
WILLIE E. REESE,
Respondent.
On Application for Leave to Appeal from an
Interlocutory Order
Before GE'iVIN, GODBOLD and CLARK, _ Circuit Judges.
BY THE COURT: ' .
IT IS ORDERED that leave to appeal from the interlocutory
order of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama entered on November 14, 1973,in the
.above styled and numbered cause, is hereby GRANTED.
A t ru o copy
Test:
C le r k , U. S,
By.
H er O r le a n s ,
EDWARD W.•WADSWORTH
Court, of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
Deputy
Louisiana FEB 1 1374
FILED IN CLERK’S OFFICE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
/-1974
• -WILLIAM E. DAWSjm . U.S. DISTRICT CD|
r 'iy cnit
COURT
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUHTuED IN C<
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABfiKftKRN oistV ic t o f a u ^ SOUTHERN DIVISION ' ALABnf"A
WILLIE C. REESE, )
)Plaintiff, )
)
v- )
)ALPHA PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY,)
INC., )
)__________Defendant. _____ )
FEB? 1974
wlliam e. DAVIS u. s. C:STRICT COURT XA
'IP'jy CLERK
CIVIL ACTION NO. 73-G-611
NOTICE OF APPEAL TO lilE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
_____ FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Notice is hereby given that the defendant. Alpha
P°rtland Cement Company, Inc., pursuant to the granting of
its petition for leave to appeal from an interlocutory order,
hereby appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit from the following order of the District Court
of the United States for the Northern District of Alabama
entered in this action:
•rnc order entered by the District Court on November
14, 1973, overruling the motion of Alpha Portland Cement Company
to dismiss the class action aspects of the complaint.
Portland Cement Company, inc.
Of Counsel:
Cabaniss, Johnston, Gardner, Dumas
s O'Neal
1900 First National-Southern Natural
Building
Birmingham, Alabama 35203
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing notice
was served on Mr. U. W. demon, Adams, Baker & demon, 16 30 -
4th Avenue, North, Birmingham, Alabama 35203, bv deoositing a
copy of same in the United States mail, Droperlv addressed and
first class .postage prepaid, this 7 daY of February, 1974.