Dandridge v. Jefferson Parish School Board Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

    IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM 1971

No.
LENA VERN DANDRIDGE, ET AL.,

Plaintiff s-Respondents, 

versus

JEFFERSON PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL.,
Defendants-Petitioners.

Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The United States 
Court Of Appeals For The Fifth Circuit

DENIS A. BARRY II
1212 National Bank of Commerce
Building
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112

GEORGE R. BLUE
833 Howard Avenue
New Orleans, Louisiana 70113

ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENORS



INDEX
Page

Jurisdiction .....................   2

Opinions ..........      2

Questions Presented.......................... ....................... . • 2

Statutes Involved .............................................    3
Statement of the Case ................................... ..............  3
Specification of Errors to be Urged ........................... 4

Argument . ......... .................. . ........... ....................... . • 5
Conclusion ....................................................   12
Proof of S ervice ......................       14
Appendix A (District Court Order) . .................... .. la
Appendix B (Court of Appeals Decision) .................  7a

CITATIONS

Swann versus Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
Education, 402 U.S. 1, 28 L. Ed. 2d 554
(1971) ............................................2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11

Brown versus Board of Education, 347 U.S, 483
(1954) .......................................................... 2, 6, 9, 12

STATUTES
42 U.S.C.A. Section 2000-C-6(a) ..........................  2, 3, 9

20 U.S.C.A. Section 1232 a ........................................ 3, 10



IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

October Term 1971

No.

LENA VERN DANDRIDGE, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

versus

JEFFERSON PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL.,
Defendants-Petitioners.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

TO THE HONORABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND 
THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:

Your petitioner, Albert B. Eason and others, Inter­
veners, respectfully pray that a Writ of Certiorari be 
issued out of and under the seal of this Court to review 
the decision of the United State Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit in No. 71-2542 rendered on February 
11, 1972, which affirmed an earlier Judgment by the 
District Court of the United States for the Eastern Dis­
trict of Louisiana, New Orleans Division, in civil ac­
tion number 14,801, granting Respondent further relief 
as originally prayed, for.



2

JURISDICTION

The Judgment of the Court of Appeals (Appendix 
B) was entered February 11, 1972.

Jurisdiction to review this case upon Writ of Cer­
tiorari is authorized and created by U.S.C.A. title 28, 
Section 1254 (1).

OPINIONS

The Order of the District Court is printed in Appendix 
'“A” ; the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit is printed in Appendix “B”.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether 20 U.S.C.A., Section 1232a and
42 U.S.C.A., Section 2000-C-6 are applicable in further­
ance of Brown 1 as cited in Swann versus Charlotte- 
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 28 L.Ed. 
2d 554 (1971).

2. The question of “de facto” segregation on a lim­
ited scale as a result of housing patterns as the sole 
basis for compulsory busing after a unitary system 
has been in operation with full cooperation of the local 
School Board.

3. The legality of compulsory busing where a uni­
tary school system has achieved approximately eighty 
percent full integration of students and total integra­
tion of faculty, transportation, and extra curricular 
activities.



3

4. Whether the District Court properly interpreted 
and applied the broad provisions of Swann (supra).

STATUTES INVOLVED
Pertinent provisions of title IV of the Civil Rights 

Act of 1964, Section 2000C-6(a) and 20 U.S.C.A., Sec­
tion 1232a.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiffs’ original petition filed in July, 1964, sought 
an end to the dual school system in Jefferson Parish, 
including the assignment of students and faculty. A 
freedom of choice plan was adopted and fully imple­
mented.

Plaintiffs sought further relief in 1968 and a unitary 
system was prepared and implemented by the School 
Board on non-racial geographical zones. The District 
Court adopted the School Board plan, complemented 
the School Board for its cooperation, and the unitary 
system was operationally successful.

Immediately following the Swann (supra) decision, 
plaintiffs sought further relief asking that every school 
in the Parish achieve a set 65-35 white black pupil ratio 
(the actual ratio was 80-20), and faculty assignments 
comparable to the system-wide faculty white black 
composition. Plaintiffs’ last petition is the subject of 
this appeal and obviously relies on the broad language 
in Swann.



4

The District Court ordered the School Board to sub­
mit a new plan in accord with the Swann decision. 
An intervention was filed by Albert B. Eason and ap­
proximately fourteen thousand (14,000) parents (black 
and white) opposing compulsory busing of students.

•in August, 1971, the District Court withdrew the free­
dom of choice concept and ordered a new plan which 
changed every School District, ordered compulsory 
busing beyond district lines for approximately three 
thousand (3,000) students, which further required 
transfers of approximately ten thousand (10,000) stu­
dents, because of the new districts.

The District Court denied a stay order on August 
13, 1971, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied a 
stay order on August 23, 1971, and Justice Thurgood 
Marshall denied a stay order on August 30, 1971.

The matter was considered by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit by briefs and 
the District Court order was affirmed on February 11, 
1972.

SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS TO BE URGED

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit erred and 
misdirected itself in affirming the District Court’s Or­
der, as follows:

1. Finding “de facto” segregation because 
nineteen (19) out of seventy five (75) schools 
remained uniracial under the Court approved 
unitary system adopted in 1969.



5

2. In granting plaintiffs relief with a new 
school plan to achieve “racial balance” which 
in turn would eliminate racial identification of 
any particular school.

3. In holding that the remaining one race 
schools which existed under the unitary sys­
tem previously approved by the District Court 
were discriminatory and not as a result of vol­
untary housing patterns in Jefferson Parish.

4. Invoking Judicial powers contrary to Con­
gressional legislation which clearly prohibits 
transportation of students to overcome racial 
imbalance and negating any Federal authority 
over direction, supervision, or control concern­
ing assignment or transportation of students 
in order to overcome racial imbalance.

ARGUMENT

1. Finding “de facto” segregation because 
nineteen (19) out of seventy five (75) schools 
remained uniracial under the Court approved
unitary system adopted in 1969.

The main thrust of the District Court’s Order was 
utilizing Swann (supra) to require compulsory busing 
beyond normal geographical zones because nineteen 
(19) schools out of the entire seventy five (75) school 
system, remained uniracial. In 1969 the Jefferson Par­
ish School Board prepared and adopted a unitary sys­
tem disregarding assignment of pupils by race. The 
system proved highly successful and transition oc-



6

cured without incident. Faculties were integrated, stu­
dent bus transportation was integrated, and extra cur­
ricular activities were integrated. The only reason that 
nineteen schools remained basically uniracial was be­
cause of housing patterns that existed long before 
Brown I. The patterns that developed were not within 
the control of the School Board at any time, but now 
formed the basis for the District Court to order a com­
plete revamping of every School District, taking three 
thousand (3,000) children from their home schools and 
force busing them to distant locations. As a further 
result of the District Court’s Order, aproximately ten 
thousand (10,000) students were displaced from their 
home schools and forced to attend new schools in new 
districts. All of this occured in spite of the good faith 
efforts of the School Board in achieving a unitary sys­
tem and in fully complying with every order and re­
quest of the District Court. There is no evidence in 
the record which indicates that segregation or willful 
discrimination caused the remaining nineteen (19) 
schools out of seventy five (75) schools to be uniracial.

As stated by Mr. Chief Justice Burger in Swann, 
pp 571, “The constitutional command to desegregate 
schools does not mean that every school in every com­
munity must always reflect the racial composition of 
the school system as a whole.” This is contrary to 
the District Court in its reasons for Judgment that 
“this new plan would achieve racial balance in every 
school”. The District Court also directed that the 
School Board be guided by the principles of “racial 
balance”. This, too, is contra to Swann.



7

2. In granting plaintiffs relief with a new
school plan to achieve “racial balance” which 
in turn would eliminate racial identification of 
any particular school.

The Chief Justice warned that District Courts should 
not be misguided in their interpretation of Swann. The 
decision clearly provided that forced busing was not 
to be used in order to achieve racial balance in all 
schools. Busing was merely one tool to implement de­
segregation plans after taking into consideration other 
factors clearly specified in the decision. The primary 
objective of the long list of desegregation cases was 
to eliminate State imposed segregation. Under Brown 
I to do otherwise was contrary to the Constitution. 
Remedies sought would be considered by equitable 
principles. Remedial powers such as compulsory bus­
ing ordered by the District Court should be utilized 
only when there is a finding of a constitutional viola­
tion. To do otherwise would allow District Judges to 
assume full authority over all public schools. The rec­
ord in this case clearly reflects total cooperation by 
the Jefferson Parish School Board, full compliance 
with every request and Order, and the operation of 
a smooth, unitary system during the past years.

Swann outlines other criteria for consideration, such 
as the racial composition of teachers and staff, the 
quality of school buildings and equipment, and extra 
curricular activities. The record herein is void of any 
racial identification in these categories.

The Constitution does not require “racial balance” 
in public schools. This Honorable Court has never ruled



8

that all black schools in all cities are unlawful. The 
Swann decision did not require that all School Boards 
bus children in furtherance of a unitary system.

3. In holding that the remaining one race 
schools which existed under the unitary sys­
tem previously approved by the District Court 
were discriminatory and not as a result of vol­
untary housing patterns in Jefferson Parish.

As pointed out above, the School Board has absolute­
ly no control over the development of subdivisions and 
the personal desires of parents to live in particular 
sections of Jefferson Parish. There is no evidence in 
the record that schools were intentionally built in par­
ticular neighborhoods in order to accommodate either 
white or black students. To the- contrary, the building 
program of the School Board has consistently been non- 
discriminatory and development of the home sites in 
the Parish were regulated by zoning ordinances and 
personal desires. Discrimination of any kind should 
not have been considered as the reason for the few 
remaining one race schools which existed under the 
unitary system adopted by the District Court in 1989. 
Neither the District Court nor the School Board con­
trolled the location of homes or living habits of the 
parents which have existed in this area for more than 
one hundred (100) years.

4. Invoking Judicial powers contrary to Con­
gressional legislation which clearly prohibits 
transportation of students to overcome racial 
imbalance and negating any Federal authority 
over direction, supervision, or control concern-



9

ing assignment or transportation of students in 
order to overcome racial imbalance.

The language of title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C.A., Section 2000c clearly defines and lim­
its the Federal government’s participation in further 
implementation of Brown I. The language is clear and 
unmistakable, stating: “Nothing herein shall empower 
any official or Court of the United States to issue any 
order seeking to achieve a racial balance in any school 
by requiring the transportation of pupils or students 
from one school to another or one school district to 
another in order to achieve such racial balance, or 
otherwise enlarge the existing power of the Court to 
insure compliance with the constitutional standards” .

The interpretation in Swann of this unambiguous lan­
guage was clearly erroneous. Section 2000c-6 not only 
restricts but prohibits the assignment of students to 
public schools in order to overcome racial imbalance. 
The prohibition is clear that “nothing herein shall em­
power any official or Court of the United States to issue 
any order seeking to achieve a racial balance in any 
school by requiring the transportation of pupils or stu­
dents from one school to another or one- school district 
to another in order to achieve such racial balance” . 
How could Swann conceivably interpret this language 
as anything but a clear limitation on unreasonable im­
plementation by District Courts in furtherance of 
Brown I. In fact, Mr. Chief Justice Burger stated “In 
short, there is nothing in the act (Civil Rights Act) 
which provides us material assistance in answering 
the question of remedy for state imposed segregation 
in violation of Brown I”. This being the case, the Court



10

ignored this legislation, created new “guidelines”, and 
created the new monstrosity called “forced busing” 
where it clearly had no authority to do so.

Interveners strongly urge that 20 U.S.C.A., Section 
1232 (a) requires re-examination of Swann and revers­
al of the Court of Appeals decision herein. This statute 
Prohibition against Federal Control of Education” 

provides:

“No provision of . . .  . the Elementary and Sec­
ondary Act of 1965 . . . .  shall be construed to 
authorize any department, agency, officer, or 
employee of the United States to exercise any 
direction, supervision, or control over the cur­
riculum, program of instruction, administra­
tion, or personnel of any educational institu­
tion, school or school system, or over the selec­
tion of library resources, text books, or other 
printed or published instructional materials by 
any educational institution or school system, 
or to require the assignment or transportation 
of students or teachers in order to overcome 
racial balance.”
(emphasis added)

How can such clear language and intent be ignored? 
Will District Courts select text books, or perhaps re­
quire certain courses in the school curriculum? How 
far can the Courts go in derrogation of federal pro­
hibitions?



11

Constant reference must be made to the Swann de­
cision since the District Court relied exclusively upon 
the broad language contained therein.

The factual situation in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
area in no way resembles the Jefferson Parish system. 
In Charlotte the District Court found the School Board 
to be discriminatory; in Jefferson Parish the District 
Court complemented the School Board for developing 
and implementing plans which created a unitary sys­
tem. The Charlotte School Board failed to comply with 
District Court Orders, and when it did so, its plans 
were unacceptable. The Jefferson Parish School 
Board, on very short notice, submitted the present plan 
in operation (under protest) and fully complied with 
every order. By contrast, the Charlotte School Board 
was cited for having “totally defaulted in its acknowl­
edged duty”, providing a “loaded game plan”, and its 
failure to cooperate which required the District Court 
to appoint a qualified expert for assistance.

The geographical distinction between Charlotte and 
Jefferson Parish should also be noted. The Charlotte 
area is basically metropolitan with concentrated minor­
ity groups in certain areas. Jefferson Parish is strict­
ly suburban and covers a much larger land area. For 
this reason a few geographical zones existed which 
allowed the continuance of nineteen uniracial schools. 
However, the record is clear that school assignments 
in these areas were genuinely nondiseriminatory and 
based upon the Court approved plan adopted in 1969.

The Swann decision noted that it is impossible to 
fix guidelines on a Court’s powers, but there are limits:



12

which must be recognized. The simple objective of all 
school litigation since Brown I is to dismantle the dual 
school system. This has been accomplished in Jeffer­
son Parish.

CONCLUSION

This petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by Albert 
B. Eason and others, Interveners, representing ap­
proximately fourteen thousand white and black par­
ents, results from a lack of complete understanding 
of the Swann versus Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
Education case. Many other cases have developed and 
will develop seeking clarification of guidelines and re­
strictions. It is respectfully submitted that a Writ of 
Certiorari should be granted to accomplish that end.

The Jefferson Parish School Board has never op­
posed or taken any action to retard the evolutionary 
process of Constitutional law requiring conversion to 
unitary, nonracial school systems. This is especially 
important today when public education has a crisis 
of adverse public opinion. Parents are deserting the 
public school system in favor of private schools. Pri­
vate schools are basically segregated which in turn 
retards the effort to create unitary school systems.

Thousands of parents have filed this intervention be­
cause they sincerely feel that the District Court. Order 
seriously endangers the public school system of Jef­
ferson Parish. Further, the Order is harmful to the 
rights, interests, and welfare of the children involved, 
and will hinder rather than help achieve a unitary non­
racial school system.



13

Future problems can be predicted from the District 
Court Order. Parents, their friends, associates and oth­
er people in the community who realize the injustice 
of compulsory busing will cause more students to aban­
don the public schools. This would be the basis for 
a new Court-Ordered forced busing program which 
would start a disasterous cycle with the end result even 
worse than pre-Brown I.

Intervenors use this illustration to argue that unrea­
sonable means such as forced busing to reach a desir­
able objective can defeat that same objective. The Dis­
trict Court Order endangers the public education sys­
tem in Jefferson Parish and is adverse to the interest 
of the parents and students. Therefore, intervenors 
pray that this Honorable Court will reevaluate the con­
stitutional and educational considerations enunciated 
in Swann. It is respectfully submitted that the decision 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, No. 71-2542, and the Judgment of the District 
Court of the United States, Eastern District of Louisi­
ana, New Orleans Division, Civil Action Number 14801, 
should be reversed and that the previous Court ap­
proved plan for a unitary school system in Jefferson 
Parish be reinstated.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this

£±a' - o  'V t o

DENIS A. BARRY II

day of May, 1972.

(JL U

1212 National Bank of
Commerce Building
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112



14

GEORGE R. BLUE
833 Howard Avenue
New Orleans, Louisiana 70113

ATTORNEYS FOR 
INTERVENORS

PROOF OF SERVICE

In furtherance of the Rules I have served 2 copies 
of the above and foregoing Petition for Writ of Cer­
tiorari upon all parties, by pre-paid mail, addressed 
to their Counsel, this day of May, 1972.

U .  \ 6 o a a ^  _ j j

7DENIS A. BARRY II



la

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 

NEW ORLEANS DIVISION

LENA VERN DANDRIDGE
SECTION “A” 

versus No. 14,801
CIVIL ACTION

JEFFERSON PARISH SCHOOL BOARD ET AL

ORDER

On May 10, 1971, plaintiffs in this action moved for 
further relief in their continuing effort to have a truly 
unitary school system established in Jefferson Parish, 
Louisiana. The basis of their position is that at pres­
ent there remain four all-black schools’ and fifteen 
all-white, or virtually all-white schools2 in the Jeffer-

iThe all-black public schools and their enrollments are:
Fourth Ward Elementary School (867), Granville T. Woods 
Elementary School (380), Percy Julian Elementary School 
(580), and Washington Elementary School (607).
Another all-black school, Avondale Gardens, has been dis­
continued as of the close of this past school year. 

sThe all-white or substantially all white schools and their en­
rollments are:
John Quincy Adams Junior High School (1060), T. H. Harris 
Junior High School (1737), Airline Park Elementary School 
(915), Alice Birney Elementary School (867), Alexander Ele­
mentary School (586), George A. Cox Elementary School (957),



2a

son Parish School System which comprises 75 schools. 
The relief sought is that this court direct the Jefferson 
Parish School Board to formulate a new desegregation 
plan which, through racial balance, would eliminate 
the racial identification of any particular school. In 
addition, plaintiffs ask that the faculty of each school 
be integrated in substantially the same ratio of white 
to black teachers as exists between white and black 
teachers throughout the school system and that the 
School Board henceforth hire new teachers on a non- 
racial basis.

In the seven years that this court has had jurisdic­
tion over this case, several desegregation orders have 
been issued to the Jefferson Parish School Board and 
the school system has made significant accomplish­
ments. During this period the Supreme Court has con­
tinued to rule on the meaning and implementation of 
the equal educational opportunity doctrine required by 
the Fourteenth Amendment and enunciated in Brown 
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

In Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968), 
the Supreme Court commanded school boards to form-

J. C. Ellis Elementary School (710), Harvey Elementary 
School (748), Phoebe Hearst Elementary School (923), Madi­
son Elementary School (1101), Metairie Grammar School (401), 
Terrytown Elementary School (892), Westgate Elementary 
School (693), Bissonet Plaza Elementary School (1038) and 
East End Elementary School (613).
The public school superintendent of Jefferson Parish stated 
that two other schools, John Clancy Elementary School (848) 
and Catherine Strehle Elementary School (956), are already 
scheduled to be substantially integrated in the 1971-1972 
school year.



3a

ulate desegregation plans that would realistically and 
effectively remove de jure school segregation. The im­
mediacy of this command was reiterated in Alexander 
v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U.S. 
19 (1969).

It was not until April 20, 1971, however, that the Su­
preme Court specifically answered the question of 
what means might be constitutionally utilized “to elim­
inate from the public schools all vestiges of state-im­
posed segregation.” Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Board of Education, 91 S. Ct. 1267, 1275 (1971). The 
evidence adduced since this case was reopened indi­
cates that the Jefferson Parish School System served 
almost 63,000 pupils in 75 schools during the 1970-1971 
school year. Approximately 80 percent of the pupils 
are white and 20 percent are black. Presently more 
than 25 percent of the Jefferson Parish public schools 
are scheduled to remain segregated or virtually segre­
gated in the 1971-1972 school year. These 19 one race 
schools (four all-black and 15 all-white or virtually all- 
white) will encompass approximately 13,000 pupils, 
roughly 21 percent of the total.

While the court feels that the Parish has increasingly 
realized its legal duty to provide an equal educational 
opportunity to pupils of all races and that a spirit of 
cooperation has generally prevailed, the present situa­
tion must now be examined in light of Swann. The 
School Board has asserted that a unitary system has 
been adopted and that further relief is unwarranted 
because of residential patterns that would necessitate 
the daily busing of young children over lengthy and 
unsafe routes in the Parish. In the hearing and con­



4a

ferences thus far held, however, plaintiffs have demon­
strated that massive busing is not the only solution 
available to overcoming the vestiges of the dual school 
system that previously existed in Jefferson Parish. 
Plaintiffs have suggested rezoning the present school 
districts and/or pairing schools in adjacent districts 
where possible.

The Swann decision endorsed various means for the 
institution of a genuinely unitary system, leaving the 
means selected within the district judge’s discretion 
so long as the means adopted is an effective remedy. 
Concerning situations where some integration has 
taken place but where segregated schools remain, Mr. 
Chief Justice Burger stated:

“ [I]t should be clear that the existence 
of some small number of one race, or virtually 
one race, schools within a district is not in and 
of itself the mark of a system which still prac­
tices segregation by law. The district judge or 
school authorities should make every effort to 
achieve the greatest possible degree of actual 
desegregation and will thus necessarily be con­
cerned with the e l i m i n a t i o n  of one-race 
schools. No per se rule can adequately em­
brace all the difficulties of reconciling the com­
peting interests involved; but in a system with 
a history of segregation the need for remedial 
criteria of sufficient specificity to assure a 
school authority’s compliance with its constitu­
tional duty warrants a presumption against 
schools that are substantially disproportionate 
in their racial composition. Where the school



5a

authority’s proposed plan for conversion from 
a dual to a unitary system contemplates the 
continued existence of some schools that are 
all or predominately of one race, they have 
the burden of showing that, such school assign­
ments are genuinely nondiseriminatory. The 
court should scrutinize such schools, and the 
burden upon the school authorities will be to 
satisfy the court that their racial composition 
is not the result of present or past discrimina­
tory action on their part.”

91 S. Ct. at 1281.
It is the view of this court that the School Board 

has not met its burden of justifying the continued exis­
tence of such a substantial number of one race schools. 
It is therefore necessary that the School Board officials 
of Jefferson Parish devise a remedial desegregation 
plan that will fully satisfy the constitutional require­
ments of a unitary system.

While it is the duty and responsibility of the School 
Board to formulate a constitutionally sound plan, the 
court suggests that the parties enter into cooperative 
consultation in order to resolve the current deficiencies 
as expeditiously as possible. The School Board is to 
be guided by the racial balance concept, but, in doing 
so, careful analysis should be given to the neighbor­
hoods of each school district and every effort should 
be made to preserve geographic zoning criteria where 
there is no conflict with constitutional requirements. 
While busing is a permissible tool for school desegrega­
tion, and undoubtedly will be1 necessary to some extent, 
all parties have stated that there are practical limita­



6a

tions on the extent of any additional busing which 
might be required. In other words this court feels that 
busing should be a last resort remedy.

The School Board should therefore consider the mod­
ification of existing boundaries of school zones, pair­
ing, and, if necessary, general rezoning. In the future, 
it might be added, new schools should be strategically 
located to enhance desegregation.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Jefferson 
Parish School Board, in cooperative consultation with 
counsel for plaintiffs, formulate a desegregation plan 
for the public schools of Jefferson Parish. This plan 
is to comport with the requirements of Swann v. Char- 
lotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 91 S.Ct. 1267 
(1971), and with the guidelines set forth hereinabove.

The new plan is to be submitted by the School Board 
to the court for approval not later than August 2, 1971, 
and it is to be implemented in the forthcoming (1971- 
1972) school year. While this may place a temporary 
burden on the School Board, the time for delay is past.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Jefferson Par­
ish School Board integrate the faculty of each school 
so that the ratio of white to black teachers in an in­
dividual school reflects the ratio of white to black 
teachers in the school system as a whole.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 9th day of July, 1971.

UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT JUDGE



7a

APPENDIX B

IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 71-2542

LENA VERN DANDRIDGE, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,

versus

JEFFERSON PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Louisiana

(February 11, 1972)

Before GEWIN, GOLDBERG and DYER,
Circuit Judges.

GEWIN, Circuit Judge: Upon a motion for further 
relief by Lena Dandridge and the other members of 
her plaintiff class, the district court ordered the im­
plementation of a new desegregation plan in Jefferson 
Parish, Louisiana. The Jefferson Parish School Board 
appeals from that order. We affirm.



In 1969 the district court approved a desegregation 
plan for Jefferson Parish. In 1971, following the deci­
sion in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Edu­
cation,1 plaintiffs filed a Motion for Further Relief. At 
that time there remained in Jefferson Parish 19 one 
race schools — 4 all black schools with 2.434 students 
or 19% of all black students, and 15 all white schools. 
At the beginning of the 1971-72 school year there1 were 
75 schools and approximately 63,000 students, 80% 
white and 20% black. In their Motion for Further Relief 
the plaintiffs asked that every school be required to 
achieve a white-black ratio more nearly proportionate 
to the ratio of the entire system and that assignment 
of faculty members be on a ratio comparable to the 
system wide faculty composition.

After a hearing on plaintiffs’ motion the district court 
ordered the Jefferson Parish School Board to submit 
a plan in accordance with Swann to be implemented 
in the 1971-72 school year. In compliance, the School 
Board submitted a plan to the court, but without rec­
ommending that it be adopted. On August 10, 1971, the 
district court approved the plan, submitted by the 
school board and ordered that it be implemented. The 
plaintiffs are fully satisfied with the court’s order. The 
order provides for the integration of all 19 formerly 
one race schools by altering boundaries for elementary 
and middle school attendance zones and by bussing 
some 3,000 students. Evidence presented at the hearing 
showed that the average daily roundtrip distance for 
the students to be bussed would be approximately 7 
miles. The longest round trip distance for any child

1402 U.S. 1, 28 L.Ed.2d 5S4 (1971).



9a

was shown to be 14 miles. The plan also provides for 
the assignment of faculty so that the racial composition 
of the faculty in each school will be comparable to 
the system wide ratio.

The School Board contends that the district court 
erred in requiring “forced bussing” to achieve racial 
balance and in concluding that the one race schools 
involved were “vestiges” of the previously operated 
dual school system rather than the product of volun­
tary housing patterns.

Swann made clear that bussing is an available tool 
for use by district courts in achieving school desegre­
gation. In Swann 23,000 students were to be bussed,2 
in Jefferson Parish only 3,000; and in Swann the aver­
age daily round trip was 15 miles,3 in Jefferson Parish 
only 7 miles. No serious argument was made or evi­
dence presented which would support a finding that 
the bussing required here would adversely affect the 
health of the children or significantly impinge on the 
educational process.4 We find no abuse of the district 
court’s equitable discretion with respect to bussing.

Swann placed the burden on school authorities to 
show that one race schools are “genuinely nondiscrim­

2Id. a t____ , 28 L.Ed.2d at 574 n .ll.
3 Id.
-*In memoranda submitted to this court in support of the School 

Board’s motion for a stay pending appeal the Board claimed 
that the logistical problems involved in obtaining the buses 
necessary to implement the new plan were insurmountable. 
We denied the stay. The briefs on appeal add nothing to those 
arguments.



inatory.”3 The district court found that the only evi­
dence presented by the School Board to justify the pres­
ence of 19 one race schools in this case “was an allu­
sion to housing patterns.” In view of the history of 
officially sanctioned school segregation in Jefferson 
Parish, the court concluded that such a bare allegation 
was without merit. The real thrust of the School 
Board’s argument is a plea for neighborhood schools. 
But Chief Justice Burger reminded the litigants 
in Swann that, “Desegregation plans cannot be limited 
to the walk-in school.”6 The district court did not com­
mit error in concluding that the School Board had not 
met its burden under Swann to show that the 19 schools 
were genuinely nondiscriminatory.

The district court permitted Abert B. Eason and oth­
ers of his class to intervene on behalf of the School 
Board. Their brief on appeal raises substantially the 
same issues as those raised by the School Board. They 
emphasize that the district judge who granted the mo­
tion for further relief was the same judge who in 1969, 
ordered a plan implemented which he held would es­
tablish a unitary school system. Thus, Eason contends 
that Jefferson Parish already has a unitary school sys­
tem and that no further relief is required. At the time 
of the 1969 order the Supreme Court had not made 
clear the extent of the remedial power available to 
district courts in dealing with the vestiges of a dual 
and unconstitutional school system. Swann has since 
provided additional guidance. Whether either the par­
ties or the district court thought the Jefferson Parish

5402 U.S. a t__________ , 28 L.Ed.2d at 572.
eId. a t_____, 28 L.Ed.2d at 575.



11a

system in 1989 was a unitary one is not controlling. 
Swan held that one race schools, as here, which have 
always been one race schools in a system with a history 
of segregation are suspect.7 Seeking to justify the re­
maining 19 one race schools the intervenors state in 
their brief:

The few remaining one-race schools exist sole­
ly because of housing patterns prevalent in Jef­
ferson Parish for many years before Brown I 
was rendered.

It is unquestioned that before Brown I there was state 
imposed segregation in Jefferson Parish. As the dis­
trict court noted we do not have here schools which 
have been desegregated and then resegregated by 
shifting population trends. The argument of the inter­
venors thus lends support to the district court’s finding 
that the 19 one race schools are in fact “vestiges” of 
former school segregation.

The intevenors also suggest that 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232 
a8 (Supp. 1971) supports their position. A similar ar­

7Id. a t_____, 28 L.Ed.2d at 572.
©Section 1232a provides:

No provision ot the Act of September 30, 1950, Pub­
lic law 874, Eighty-first Congress; the National De­
fense Education Act of 1958; the Act of September 23, 
1950, Public Law 815, Eighty-first Congress; the High­
er Education Facilities Act of 1963; the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act of 1965; the Higher 
Education Act of 1965; the International Education 
Act of 1966; or the Vocational Education Act of 1963 
shall be construed to authorize any department, a- 
gency, officer, or employee of the United States to



12a

gument was made under 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000-C-69 and 
rejected in Swann.10 The result we reach here is not 
based on § 1232(a) or on our construction of other 
federal statutes. As stated by the Supreme Court in 
Swann:

The basis of our decision must be the prohibi­
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment that no 
State shall “deny to any person with its juris­
diction the equal protection of the laws.” 11

The order of the district court is AFFIRMED.

exercise any direction, supervision, or control over 
the curriculum, program of instruction, administration, 
or personnel of any given educational institution, 
school, or school system, or over the selection of li­
brary resources, textbooks, or other printed or pub­
lished instructional materials by any educational insti­
tution or school system, or to require the assignment or 
transportation of students or teachers in order to 
overcome racial imbalance.

sSection 2000C-6 authorizes the Attorney General to initiate federal 
desegregation suits. The portion of the statute relied upon in 
Swann is found in § 2000C-6(a)(2):

nothing herein shall empower any official or court 
of the United States to issue any order seeking to 
achieve a racial balance in any school by requiring 
the transportation of pupils or students from one 
school to another or one school district to another 
in order to achieve such racial balance, or otherwise 
enlarge the existing power of the court to insure com­
pliance with constitutional standards.

’ 0402 U.S. at_____, 28 L,Ed.2d at 567.
ii Id.



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