Central Alabama Fair Housing Center v. Lowder Reality Co., Inc. Brief of Appellants Cynthia Foster, Denise Frazier, Barbara Gill-Smith, Brenda Smith, and Ezell Smith

    No. 79-1236

In the

(tort 0I %  Inttei* Staten
October Teem, 1980

F rank L. Carson, L awrence H atcher, and Stuart E. M ines,
Petitioners,

y.

A merican Brands, I nc ., t/a  The A merican T obacco Com pany; 
L ocal 182, Tobacco W orkers I nternational Union,

____  Respondents.

ON A W RIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OP APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

H enry L. Marsh, III 
W illiam  H. Bass, III 
Randall G. Johnson

H ill , T ucker & Marsh 
214 East Clay Street 
P. 0 . Box 27363 
Richmond, Virginia 23261 
(804) 648-9073

John W. Scott, Jr.
615 Caroline Street 
Fredericksburg, Virginia 22401 
(703) 371-3700

Jack Greenberg 
James M. Nabrit, I I I  
Napoleon B. W illiams, Jr ,

Suite 2030 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019 
(212) 586-8397

Barry L. Goldstein 
Suite 940
806 15th Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006 
(202) 638-3278

Counsel for Petitioners
December, 1980



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES............................................  i i i

ARGUMENT....................................................................  1

I .  THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER
REFUSING ENTRY OF THE PROPOSED 
CONSENT DECREE GRANTING PETI­
TIONERS AN INJUNCTION IS APPEAL- 
ABLE UNDER 28 U.S.C.§ 1291(a)(1) AS 
AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER REFUSING AN 
INJUNCTION ............................................  1

A. The D is t r i c t  Court 's Order 
Determined the Merits o f  this
Action ............................................  3

1. The D is t r i c t  Court Would Not
Have Considered Dê  Novo The 
Grounds fo r  a Prel iminary 
Injunction ............................  3

2. The D is t r i c t  Court Would Not 
Have Reconsidered i t s
Order ............................................  11

3. The D i s t r i c t  Court Passed on 
the Su ff ic iency  of  P e t i t i o n ­
e rs '  Claim fo r  Prel iminary and 
Permanent In junct ive
R e l i e f  ..................................    15

B. The D is t r i c t  Court's Order Could
Not Be Reviewed Pr io r  to Final 
Judgment ..............................................  19

l



Page

C. The D is t r i c t  Court 's Order W i l l  
Cause Pe t i t ione rs  I rreparable  
Injury Unless An Immediate 
Appeal is Allowed ......................  25

I I .  THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER IS A COL­
LATERAL ORDER WHICH IS APPEALABLE AS 
AN EXCEPTION TO 28 U.S.C.§ 1291 . .  31

A. The D is t r i c t  Court 's Order Con­
c lu s iv e ly  Determined Important 
Interests  o f  The Part ies  Concern­
ing Settlement and the Use
o f  a Remedial, Race-Conscious 
A f f i rm at ive  Action Plan ..........  31

B. The Order o f  the D is t r i c t  Court 
Resolved Important Issues Com­
p le t e l y  Separate From the Merits
of  the Action .......................... . • 39

CONCLUSION........ ...................... ........................... . 44

- ii -



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
Cases

Albemarle Paper Co. v.  Moody, 422 U.S.
405 (1975) .................................................. 10

Baltimore Contractors v. Bodinger,
348 U.S. 176 (1955) ................................  26,28

Barrett v. Roberts, 551 F. 2d 662 (5th
Cir.  1977) ...................    10

Bel l  v. Hood, 327 U.S 678 (1946) ................  40

Blackwelder Furn. Co . , Etc. v.  S e i l i g  
Mfg. Co., In . ,  550 F .2d 189 (4th 
Cir.  1977) ..................................................  16

Carson v. American Brands, Inc . ,
446 F.Supp. 780 (E.D. Va. 1977) . .  31,33,40

Crowther v. Seaborg, 415 F. 2d 437
(10th Cir.  1969) ...................................... 16

Dopp v. Franklin Nat. Bank, 461 F.2d
873 (2d Cir .  1972) ..................................  10,28

Ettelson v. Metropolitan L i f e  Insurance
Co. , 317 U.S. 188 (1942) ...................... 4

Flinn v. F.M.C. Corporation, 528 F .2d
1169 (4th C ir .  1975), ce r t ,  denied,
424 U.S. 967 (1976) .......    28

■- i i i  -



Page

F u l l i l o v e  v. Klutznick,  U.S. 65 L.Ed.
2d 902 (1980) .................... ................... .. . 20

General E l e c t r i c  Co. v .  Marvel Rare Metals
Co. , 287 U.S. 430 (1932) ............ .........  4

Greenspahn v. Joseph Seagram's Sons, Inc . ,
186 F .2d 616 (2d Cir.  1951) ................  43

Internat ional  Brotherhood o f  Teamsters 
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 
(1977) ..........................................................  10

Leighton v.  New York S. & W.R.R., 306
F. Supp. 513 (S .D .N .Y . )  (1969) ..........  24

Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436
(1912) ..........................................................  6

Morgenstern Chemical Co.,  Inc. v .
Schering Corp. , 181 F.2d 160
(3rd C ir .  1950) ........................................  4

Morse Boulger Destructor Company v.
Fibre M i l l s ,  In c . ,  239 F.2d 382
(3rd Cir .  1956) ........   43

Robbins Co. v .  Laurence Mfg. Co.,  482
F .2d 426 (9th Cir .  1973) ......................  24

Rodgers v. U.S. Stee l Corp., 541 F.2d
365 (3d Cir .  1976) ..................................  22

Southern Ry. Co. v .  C l i f t ,  260 U.S. 316
(1972) . ..............     6

- iv -



Page

Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Westinghouse
E le c t r i c  Corp., 325 F. 2d 822 (2d Cir.
1963) ........................................................  4,35,37

United States v.  City o f  Alexandria, 614
F.2d 1358 (5th C ir .  1989) ...................  28

United Steelworkers of  America v. AFL-CIO- 
CLC v.  Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979) ............................................  28,32,33,37,38

39,41,42

Statutes and Rules:

28 U.S.C. § 1291 .....................................  28,31,41,42,
43

28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1 ) ...................  1,2,11,21,22,
24,25,26,28,
29,30,33,34,

42,43,

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) ............................. 22,24,25

T i t l e  V I I  o f  the C i v i l  Rights Act of
1964, as amended, 32 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq .....................................................  10,14,16,
-------- 32,35

Rule 23 (e ) ,  Fed. R. Civ. Proc ..........................  19,23

- v -



Page

Other A u th o r i t i e s :

Moore's Federal Pract ice  ...................... .. 6

Moore and Oglebay, The Supreme Court,
Stare Decisis and Law o f  the Case,
21 Tex L. Rev. 514 (1943) ....................  7

Vesta l ,  Law o f  the Case: Single  Suit
Preclusion, 1967 Utah L. Rev. 1 ........  7

Wright, The In ter locutory  Appeals Act o f
1958, 23 F.R.D. 199 (1969) ____. . . . .  . 25

Note, Federal Appellate  Jur isd ic t ion  -
A~Dis tr ic t  Court Order Disapproving 
A Proposed Settlment o f  A Class 
Act ion Is Not Appealable Under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292 (a ) (1 ) , 48 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 456 (1980) ..................................  24

Note, Mandamus As A Means o f  Federal
In ter locu to ry  Review, 38 Ohio S.L.J.
301 (1977) ..................................................  24

- vi -



IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

October Term, 1980 

No. 79-1236

FRANK L. CARSON, LAWRENCE HATCHER, 
and STUART E. MINES,

P e t i t i o n e r s ,

v.

AMERICAN BRANDS, INC., T/A THE 
AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY; LOCAL 182, 
TOBACCO WORKERS INTERNATIONAL,
TOBACCO WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION,

Respondents.

ON A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

ARGUMENT

I

THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER REFUSING ENTRY OF 
THE PROPOSED CONSENT DECREE GRANTING PETI­
TIONERS AN INJUNCTION IS APPEALABLE UNDER 
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)  AS AN INTERLOCUTORY
ORDER REFUSING AN INJUNCTION

Respondents contend in the ir  B r ie f  that the



2

orde r  o f  the d i s t r i c t  court  be low  r e fu s in g  to  

enter the p a r t i e s '  j o i n t l y  proposed consent decree 

enjo in ing defendants to r e f ra in  from d iscr im inat­

ing  a ga in s t  b lack  workers (J .  A. 26 ) ,  and to  

i n s t i t u t e  employment p r a c t i c e s  se t  f o r t h  in 

Part I I I  o f  the proposed consent decree (J. A. 

27a-28a), was not an in ter locutory  order refus ing 

an injunction with in the intendment of  28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(a ) (1 ) .  Four basic reasons were o f fe red  by 

respondents in support o f  the contention.

F i r s t ,  they  c la im  that  " ( h ) a d  p e t i t i o n e r s  

made a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  p r e l im in a r y  i n ju n c t i v e  

r e l i e f ,  the D is t r i c t  Court would necessar i ly  have 

undertaken de_ novo consideration o f  the grounds 

a l leged  in support" (Resp. Br. at 30).  Second, 

they assert that " ( t ) h e  D is t r i c t  Court's order did 

not impair p e t i t i o n e rs '  a b i l i t y  to prove facts  at 

t r i a l  which may have en t i t l ed  them to in junct ive  

r e l i e f "  (Resp. Br. at 34).  Third, respondents 

c la im  that  "w h i l e  the D i s t r i c t  Court may have 

expressed an opinion concerning the lawfulness of  

the tendered decree, i t  did not pass on the lega l



\

- 3 -

su f f i c iency  o f  p e t i t i o n e r s '  claims fo r  in junctive 

r e l i e f "  (Resp. Br. at 34-35). Fourth, respondents 

claim that the order o f  the D is t r i c t  Court can be 

e f f e c t i v e l y  reviewed a f t e r  f in a l  judgment (Resp. 

Br. at 28). These claims of  respondents have no 

basis in fac t  or law. As p e t i t ion e rs  w i l l  demon­

s trate ,  proof o f  th e i r  v a l i d i t y  depends e i ther  

upon assumptions whose truth cannot be established 

or upon assumptions which are demonstrably fa lse .

A. The D is t r i c t  Court 's Order Determined
The Merits Of This Action_______ _______

1. The D i s t r i c t  Cour t  Would Not Have 
Considered  De Novo The Grounds f o r  a 
P r e l im in a r y  In ju n c t i o n ___________________

The f i r s t  three claims o f  respondents have a 

common f a l l a c y .  Under ly ing  each c la im  i s  the 

fa l lac ious  assumption that i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  an 

order  as an i n t e r l o c u t o r y  order  r e fu s in g  an 

injunction is a matter which is independent of 

the judge 's  conclusions o f  law and the rat ionale  

upon which the order  is  based.  P e t i t i o n e r s  

submit, however, that the conclusions of  law and 

the r a t i o n a l e  o f  the d e c i s i o n  must be taken



- 4 -

i n t o  account in d e te rm in in g  whether an orde r  

c o n s t i t u t e s  an i n t e r l o c u t o r y  o rde r  r e fu s in g  

an in junction.  I t  cannot be emphasized too much 

that the status o f  an order as an inter locutory  

order re fus ing  an in junction is determined by the 

nature  and the e f f e c t  o f  the o rd e r .  See e . g .  

General  E l e c t r i c  Co. v .  Marvel  Rare Metals Co . , 

287 U.S. 430 (1932); Ette lson v. Metropol itan L i f e  

Insurance Co. , 317 U.S.  188, 192 (1 9 4 2 ) ( "T h e

statute looks to the substant ia l e f f e c t  of  the 

order made"). Also, see Morgenstern Chemical Co., 

Inc, v.  Schering Corp. , 181 F.2d 160, 162 (3rd

Cir.  1950); Stewart-Warner Corp. v.  Westinghouse 

E l e c t r i c  C orp . , 325 F. 2d 822, 829 (2d C i r .

1963)(F r i e n d ly , J . , d is sen t ing ) .

Apart from a consideration o f  the purposes o f  

the order and the sp ec i f i c  r e l i e f  granted by i t ,  

the only r e l i a b l e  gauge for  measuring the nature 

and e f f e c t  o f  an order is  to examine the ra t iona le  

given in support o f  the order and the conclusions 

o f  law and f indings o f  fac t  accompanying i t .  When 

the d i s t r i c t  cour t 's  order below is  considered in



-  5 -

th is  l i g h t ,  i t  becomes evident that respondents'  

o b j e c t i o n s  to  p e t i t i o n e r s '  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  

o f  the d i s t r i c t  court 's  order as an in ter locu tory  

order refusing an in junction,  are without sub­

stance and can be shown to be fa ls e .

For example, c o n s id e r  r espon den ts '  con­

t e n t i o n  that  the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ,  faced  w i th  a 

motion by p l a i n t i f f s  fo r  a prel iminary injunc­

t ion ,  would have considered de_ novo the grounds 

favor ing  the motion despite the ra t iona le  o f  i t s  

previous rul ing r e j e c t in g  the proposed consent 

decree.

Respondents, o f  course, c i t e  no authority  fo r  

th is  propos i t ion and pe t i t i on e rs  have found none. 

The v i c e  in the argument, apart from the fac t  that 

i t  strains c redu l i ty ,  is that i t  f a i l s  to take 

in t o  account both  the s t a r e  d e c i s i s  e f f e c t  o f  

the e a r l i e r  decis ion and the general p r inc ip le  

that d i s t r i c t  courts are obl igated to apply the i r  

e a r l i e r  rul ings as the law o f  the case.

For example, Professor  Moore, in his Trea-



-  6 -

t i s e  on Federal P ra c t i c e , sta tes  that

When, there fore  a federa l  court enunciates a 
rule of  law to  be applied in the case at bar 
i t  not on ly  e s t a b l i s h e s  a predecen t  f o r  
subsequent cases under the doctr ine o f  stare 
d ec is is ,  but, as a general propos it ion ,  i t  
e s t a b l i s h e s  the law, which o th e r  courts  
owing obed ience  to  i t  must, and which i t  
i t s e l f  w i l l ,  no rm a l ly  apply  to the same 
is sues  in subsequent p roceed ings  in that  
case.

Vol.  IB, 1 0.404(1 ),  pp. 402-403. While i t  is 

t ru e ,  as s t a t e d  by th i s  Court in Messenger v . 

Anderson , 225 U.S.  436, 444 (1912 ) ,  that  " th e  

phrase, ' law o f  the the case '  as applied to the 

e f f e c t  o f  previous orders on the la t e r  action of  

the court rendering them in the same case merely 

exp resses  the p r a c t i c e  o f  c ou r ts  g e n e r a l l y  to  

refuse to reopen what has been decided, not, a 

l im it  to  th e i r  power", s t i l l  i t  would be a foo l i sh  

l i t i g a n t  who, without reason to expect otherwise, 

proceeded upon the assumption tha t  a court  

would do in the fu tu re  what i t  has e x p r e s s l y  

s t a t e d  in  the past  that  i t  would not do. See 

a l s o ,  Southern Ry . Co. v .  C l i f t ,  260 U.S 316,

319 (1972). Generally , see Moore and Oglebay,



7

The Supreme Court ,  S tare  D e c i s i s  and Law o f  the 

Case, 21 Tex. L. Rev. 514 (1943); Vesta l ,  Law o f  

the Case: Single  Suit P rec lus ion , 1967 Utah L. 

Rev. 1. What determination would have been made 

by the d i s t r i c t  court below i f  confronted with a 

motion by p l a i n t i f f s  fo r  summary judgment, is  a 

matter which must be decided, in the f i r s t  in­

stance, in l i g h t  o f  what that court has prev iously  

decided and said.

At the t ime when the d i s t r i c t  court  made 

i t s  order below, i t  was accepted by a l l  sides, 

in c lu d in g  the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ,  that  p r i o r  to 

September 1963, regular  job c la s s i f i c a t i o n s  in the 

Richmond Leaf  Plant such as truck d r i v e r ,  watch­

man, maintenance s t o r a g e ,  and b o i l e r  ope ra ­

to r ,  were reserved fo r  white workers. See Carson 

v. American Brands, I n c . , 446 F. Supp. 780, 782 

(E.D. Va. 1977) . I t  was a l s o  accepted  by the 

d i s t r i c t  court that there were, in ea r ly  1976, 15 

white watchmen and only one black watchman.—-̂  Id.

1J  With respect to the other job ca tegor ies ,  the



-  8 -

The d i s t r i c t  cour t  fu r th e r  assumed, in 

denying approval o f  the pro ferred  consent decree, 

that only 20% o f  the supervisory pos it ions at the 

respondent American Brands' Richmond Leaf  Plant 

were s t a f f e d  w i th  b lack  employees as o f  A p r i l  

1976. 446 F. Supp. at 783. P r io r  to September 

1963, supervisory pos i t ions were r e s t r i c t ed  to 

white personnel.  See answer # 14a o f  Respondent 

American Brands 1 Answer to Pe t i t ione rs  1 Second Set 

o f  In te r roga to r i e s ,  P. 29. The seasonal workers 

have t rad i t i on a ly  been black employees. Id. at 

27-28. A l s o ,  see Carson v .  American Brands, 

In c . ,  446 F. Supp. at 782. Jobs held by seasonal 

employees are id en t ica l  or s im i lar  to those held

1_/ (continued)

r a c i a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n in February 1976 was
indicated on the chart below:

Pos i t ion Whites Blacks

Truck Drivers 5 4
Maintenance Storage 1 0
B o i le r  Operators 0 3

See Carson v . American Brands, Inc . ,
446 F. Supp. at 782.



by r e g u la r  employees .  See American Brands' 

Memorandum in  Support o f  Entry o f  Proposed 

Consent Decree. (J.A.  38a).  As stated by re ­

spondent American Brands, I n c . ,  " s e ason a l  em­

ployees become fam i l ia r  with permanent job c l a s s i ­

f i c a t ion s  by working in c lose proximity  to such 

jobs held  by regular  employees." Id. The d is ­

t r i c t  cour t  a l s o  assumed tha t  in 1976, there  

were 37 (39.4%) r e g u la r  wh i te  employees,  57 

(60.6%) regular  black employees, and 135 seasonal 

employees. 446 F. Supp. at 782. This implies,  o f  

course, that,  in  1976, only 6.25% o f  the watchmen 

were black and only 20% o f  the supervisors were 

black although 60.6% o f  the regular employees were

black.
On these  assumed f a c t s , t h e  d i s t r i c t  court  

he ld  tha t  i t  d id  not p e r c e i v e  any v e s t i g e s  o f  

d iscr imination.  446 F. Supp at 790. Moreover, 

the d i s t r i c t  cour t 's  holding was adopted in the 

face of  the p a r t i e s '  assurance that the proposed 

consent decree  was in tended  to  overcome the 

ves t iges  o f  r a c ia l  d iscr im ination.  Id.



\

- 10 -

This holding was a mixed conclusion o f  law 

and f ind ing  o f  f a c t .  I t  const i tuted ,  however, 

the law o f  the case .  As such, i t  bound the 

d i s t r i c t  court, in the absence o f  spec ia l circum­

stances, to  decide the merits o f  any request fo r  a 

p r e l im in a r y  i n ju n c t i o n  in accordance w i th  i t s  

h o ld in g  that  th e re  were no v e s t i g e s  o f  r a c i a l  

d iscr imination.  App l icat ion  o f  th is  ho lding as 

law o f  the case would, however, render i t  impossi­

b le  fo r  pe t i t ione rs  to  s a t i s f y  the i r  burden, as 

the movant f o r  a p r e l im in a r y  in ju n c t i o n ,  to  

es tab l ish  a substant ia l l ik e l ih ood  that they would 

p reva i l  on the merits , see e . g . ,  Popp v. Franklin 

N a t . Bank, 461 F . 2d 873, 878 (2d C i r .  1972);  

Barrett  v .Rober ts , 551 F.2d 662, 665 (5th Cir.  

1977), or even that they could meet th e i r  i n i t i a l  

burden o f  making out a prima fa c ie  case o f  employ­

ment discr im ination under T i t l e  V I I  o f  the C i v i l  

Rights Act of  1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 

e t . seq. See Internat ional  Brotherhood o f  Team­

sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977);

Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425

(1975).



11

2. The D i s t r i c t  Court Would Not Have 
R e c o n s i d e r e d  I t s  Order______

Apparently an t ic ipa t ing  p e t i t i o n e r s '  argu­

ment concern ing  th i s  r a th e r  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  

a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  the law o f  the case d o c t r in e ,  

respondents  sugges t  in t h e i r  b r i e f  tha t  th i s  

r e s u l t  can be avo ided  by the " D i s t r i c t  Court 

reconsideration o f  the proposed order" (Resp. Br. 

at 31). I t  is c lear ,  however, that the appeal- 

a b i l i t y  o f  an order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1) 

can not p o s s ib l y  turn upon whether or not the 

los ing party  moves f o r  reconsiderat ion.  This is 

e spec ia l ly  the case, where, as here, there is no 

basis for  assuming that the d i s t r i c t  court would 

have, in f a c t ,  reconsidered i t s  o r ig in a l  decis ion.

Besides the d i s t r i c t  cour t 's  conclusion con­

cerning the nonexistence o f  any ves t iges  o f  r a c ia l  

d iscr imination,  there are other aspects o f  the 

court 's  order which would also operate to bar the 

granting o f  a motion fo r  pre l iminary injunct ion. 

For example, prov is ions 1, 2, 3, and 4 o f  Part I I I  

o f  the proposed consent decree  make c e r t a in



-  12 -

bene f i t s  ava i lab le  to seasonal workers. (J.A.  

at 27a-28a). The d i s t r i c t  court objected, how­

e v e r ,  to  i n c lu s i o n  o f  the p r o v i s i o n s  in the 

proposed decree  on the ground that  " th e  poo l  

o f  employees b e n e f i t i n g  from t h i s  p r o v i s i o n ,  

that is  seasonal employees, has been t r a d i t i o n ­

a l l y  and are now a l l  b l a c k . . . ( a n d  t h e r e f o r e )  

tha t  b e n e f i t s  are be ing  bestowed on the bas is  

o f  race" .  446 F. Supp. at 788. The court ad­

hered to  th i s  c on c lu s ion  d e s p i t e  i t s  own r e ­

c o g n i t i o n  th a t  " l e g i t i m a t e  n o n r a c ia l  bus iness
2/

reasons may underlie  such a dec is ion " . -  Id.

2_/ Respondent American Brands, I n c . ,  in  i t s  
Memorandum in Support o f  Entry o f  Proposed Consent 
Decree, made the fo l low ing  statement about pro­
v is ions  1, 2, and 3 o f  Part I I I  o f  the proposed 
consent decree.

There i s  sound business  reason ing  
behind t h i s  p r a c t i c e .  Many o f  the jobs 
h e ld  by r e g u la r  employees are  s im i l a r  
or i d e n t i c a l  to  jobs h e ld  by seasona l  
employees. Also, seasonal employees become 
fam i l ia r  with permanent job c la s s i f i c a t i o n s  
by working in c lose proximity to such jobs 
held by regular employees. This being the 
c a s e ,  s e a s o n a l  e m p lo y e e s  p r o v i d e  the  
Company with a ready pool o f  experienced 
employees who are be t te r  qu a l i f i ed  to f i l l



\

- 13 -

. . . . J
In l i g h t  o f  th is  determination by the d is ­

t r i c t  court, a motion by p e t i t ion e rs  f o r  a pre-  

l iminary injunction enjo in ing respondents, .to 

grant the p l a i n t i f f  c lass o f  seasonal workers the 

aforementioned r e l i e f  would have been denied 

since the d i s t r i c t  court would have conceived

2/ (continued)

v a c a n c i e s  in  r e g u l a r  employment  than 
would be o u t s id e  h i r e .  F i n a l l y ,  i t  i s  
f a i r  and e q u i t a b l e  to a l l o w  q u a l i f i e d  
seasonal employees the i n i t i a l  op­
p o r t u n i t y  to  t r a n s f e r  to  r e g u l a r  j o b  
vacancies. (J .A.  at 38a).

S i m i l a r l y ,  w i th  r e s p e c t  to p r o v i s i o n  4 
of  Part I I I ,  respondent American Brands, Inc . ,  
stated:

Paragraph 4 i s  redundant o f  Para ­
graph 3 inasmuch as the job c l a s s i f i c a ­
t ion  of  Watchman is  considered an hourly 
p a i d  perm anent  p r o d u c t i o n  j o b .  The 
p ract ice  o f  defendant Company is  and has 
been however ,  t o  canvass on ly  the most 
s en io r  seasona l  employees f o r  i n t e r e s t  
in f i l l i n g  a permanent vacancy in  the 
job o f  Watchman when no regular employee 
s igns  a p o s t in g  f o r  such vacancy .  I f  
none o f  the employees canvassed is in t e r ­
ested,  i t  has been the pract ice  to f i l l  the 
vacancy with an outside h i r e .  This prac­
t i c e  o f  canvass ing  on ly  the most s en io r



14 -

the granting o f  any such r e l i e f  to be equivalent 

to g ra n t in g  a remedy on r a c i a l  grounds. The 

judgment o f  the d i s t r i c t  court that "p r e f e r en t ia l  

treatment on the basis o f  race . . . v i o l a t e s  the 

Consti tution and T i t l e  V I I "  would thus have been 

d ec is ive .  Moreover, the e a r l i e r  conclusion of  the 

court that there were no ves t iges  o f  p r io r  r a c ia l

2/ (continued)

s e a s o n a l  e m p lo y e e s  f o r  i n t e r e s t  in  a 
permanent vacancy in the job o f  Watchman is  
supported  by the r e a l  need to  f i l l  such 
vacancies with indiv iduals  who want to be 
watchmen. As o f  March 1, 1977, the inven­
tory o f  stored tobacco at defendant Company 
was 138, 583,770 pounds having a value o f  
$214, 113,265. The e x p e r i e n c e  has been 
that seasonal and regular  employees have 
been r e l u c t a n t  t o  t a k e  t h i s  j o b  on a 
permanent b a s i s  because o f  the n ig h t ,  
weekend and ho liday work which is  required.  
A l s o ,  th e  Company wants  t o  a v o i d  th e  
problem o f  very junior seasonsonal employ­
ees taking the job fo r  th is  l im ited  purpose 
o f  obtaining regular  employment from which 
he or she can bid on vacancies in permanent 
production job c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s ,  thus, in 
e f f e c t ,  b y -p a s s in g  a l l  the more s en io r  
seasonal employees. However, f o r  purposes 
o f  s e t t l i n g  th i s  l a w s u i t ,  the de fendant 
Company has agreed  to  d is co n t in u e  th i s  
pract ice .  (J.A.  at 38a-39a).



15

d i s c r im in a t i o n  would s e rv e  to r e i n f o r c e  the 

c o u r t ' s  o b j e c t i o n s  f o r  denying a reques t  f o r  

a p r e l im in a r y  in ju n c t i o n .  In e i t h e r  case ,  i t  

seems c lea r ,  as a p ra c t ica l  matter, that there 

would not be any " de novo c o n s id e r a t i o n "  by 

the d i s t r i c t  court  o f  e i t h e r  the b as is  f o r  

i t s  p re v iou s  r u l in g  or  o f  the grounds o f f e r e d  

in support o f  a mot ion f o r  a p r e l im in a r y  i n ­

junct ion.

3. The D i s t r i c t  Court Passed on the
S u f f i c i e n c y  o f  P e t i t i o n e r s '  C la ims  
f o r  P r e l im in a r y  and Permanent In ju n c -  
t i v e  R e l i e f . ___________________________________

These c o n s id e r a t i o n s  a l s o  show that  r e s ­

pondents e r r  when they a l l e g e  that  "w h i l e  the 

D i s t r i c t  Court may have expressed  an o p in ion  

concerning the lawfulness o f  the tendered decree, 

i t  d id  not pass on the l e g a l  s u f f i c i e n c y  o f

2/ (continued)

I t  should be noted here that there is  not, 
in these comments of  respondent American Brands, 
any su g ges t ion  that  seasona l  employees are 
not capable o f  performing the r e sp o n s ib i l i t i e s  
assigned to watchmen.



- 16

p e t i t i o n e r s '  claim fo r  in junct ive  r e l i e f "  (Resp. 

Br. at 34-35). Even the most cursory, and char i ­

tab le ,  review o f  the d i s t r i c t  court 's  order w i l l  

indicate  that the court 's  conclusions with respect 

to the absence o f  any ves t i g e s  o f  d iscr iminat ion 

and the impropriety o f  granting ju d ic ia l  r e l i e f  

which would bene f i t  the c lass o f  seasonal workers, 

are  judgments which tend to  show the i n s u f f i ­

ciency o f  a claim by p e t i t i on e rs  fo r  prel iminary 

in junct ive  r e l i e f .  Since both conclusions a f f e c t  

adversely the a b i l i t y  o f  p e t i t i on e rs  to estab l ish 

a pr ima fac  i e  c la im ,  they  tend to  p rove  the 

i n s u f f i c i e n c y  o f  both a c la im  f o r  p r e l im in a r y  

in junct ive  r e l i e f  as we l l  as p e t i t i o n e r s '  o v e ra l l  

T i t l e  V I l ' s  c la im s .  See Crowther v .  Seaborg , 

415 F.2d 437 (10th Cir.  1969); Blackwelder Furn. 

Co, Etc, v. S e i l i g  Mfg. Co., I n c . , 550 F .2d 189, 

197 (4th Cir .  1977).

Respondents are much too ingenuous in the ir  

argument. They seek to  draw a d is t in c t i o n  between 

the expression o f  an "opin ion concerning the law­

fu ln e s s "  o f  the p a r t i e s '  r eq u es ted  c la im  f o r



17

in junct ive  r e l i e f ,  as embodied in the proposed

consent decree, and the "pass ( ing )  on the lega l

su f f i c i en cy  o f  p e t i t i o n e r s '  claim fo r  in junct ive

r e l i e f " .  Whatever the d i f fe rences  are which might

general ly  be drawn between the two actions,  i t  is

p la in  here  that  those d i f f e r e n c e s  w i l l  be n i l

when, as here, the court 's  opinion is so expansive

that i t  analyzes and decides what would also be
. 3 /the merits o f  a claim fo r  in junct ive  r e l i e f . — 

Respondent 's  con fu s ion  on th i s  po in t  can

3/ This analys is  also shows, contrary to r e ­
spondents '  a s s e r t i o n ,  that  the o rde r  o f  the 
d i s t r i c t  court did " impair  p e t i t i o n e r s '  a b i l i t y  to 
prove fac ts  at t r i a l  which may have en t i t l ed  them 
to  i n j u n c t i v e  r e l i e f " .  (Resp.  B r . at 34 ) .  I t  
cannot be g a in s a id  that  the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  
b e l i e f  that ju d ic ia l  r e l i e f  on behal f  o f  seasonal 
workers is  tantamount to unlawful discrimination 
on the b as is  o f  r a c e ,  has an adverse  impact 
upon p e t i t i o n e r s '  e f f o r t s  to  ob ta in  j u d i c i a l  
r e l i e f  f o r  the c la s s  o f  seasonal  employees.  
Indeed,  r espon den ts '  a c t i o n s ,  f o l l o w i n g  the 
announcement o f  the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  op in ion ,  
seemed to const i tute  a recogn it ion  o f  the various 
hazards which pe t i t i on e rs  would face in seeking 
to estab l ish th e i r  claims in the d i s t r i c t  court. 
Indeed tha t  r e c o g n i t i o n  may w e l l  have been a 
c a u sa t i v e  f a c t o r  inducing them to  o b j e c t  to 
the appeal of  th is  act ion to the Fourth C ircu i t .  
See J.A. at 4-6. S im i lar ly  the d i s t r i c t  court 's  
f i n d in g  th a t  there  were no v e s t i g e s  o f  p r i o r



- 18 -

be t ra c ed  to  t h e i r  f a i l u r e  to  a p p re c ia t e  tha t  

what, in part,  made the d i s t r i c t  court 's  order an 

in ter locu tory  order passing on the su f f i c i en cy  o f  

p e t i t i o n e r s '  in junct ive  claim was the re fusal  by 

the d i s t r i c t  court , as indicated by the opinion, 

to l im it  i t s  dec is ion  to factors  which concerned 

the p ropr ie ty ,  or impropriety, o f  approving the 

proposed consent decre e .  Rather  the court  

used i t s  op in ion  to address issues  a f f e c t i n g  

ultimate reso lu t ion  o f  the merits o f  the action.

For instance, the d i s t r i c t  cour t 's  decis ion 

on whether r e l i e f  could be granted to seasonal 

employees or on whether the pre-1963 segregation 

o f  jobs by race  c o n s t i t u t e d  e v id en ce  o f  the 

existence o f  v es t iges  o f  p r io r  r a c ia l  d iscr im in­

at ion (when considered in conjunction with a work 

force  in which blacks comprised 20% o f  the pro­

duction supervisors and 6.25% o f  watchmen while

3j  (continued)

ra c ia l  d iscr im ination,  would also hamper p e t i ­
t i o n e rs '  a b i l i t y  to p r e va i l  at t r i a l .



19

c o n s t i t u t i n g  the va s t  m a jo r i t y  o f  new h i r e s  

since 1971, 446 F. Supp. at 783 (J .A.  at 36a-37a, 

47a) ) ,  has a bearing on the merits o f  the law­

suit.  I t  was the d i s t r i c t  cour t 's  excursion into 

these  and o th e r  areas which transformed the 

opinion and order o f  the court in to something more 

than a decis ion under Rule 23 (e ) ,  Fed. R. Civ. 

P r o c . ,  and p r o j e c t e d  i t  in s tead  in to  a d e t e r ­

m inat ion  on matters  a f f e c t i n g  the m er i t s  o f  

p e t i t i o n e r s '  c la ims f o r  p r e l im in a r y  and f i n a l  

in junct ive  r e l i e f .

3. The D i s t r i c t  Court 's Order Could Not Be 
Reviewed P r i o r  to  F in a l  Judgment______

Respondents also contend that "the par t ies

could  have p re sen ted  the same or a l t e r n a t i v e
„ 4 /p roposa ls  at any s tage  in  the p roceed ings  .—

47 This  c o n t e n t io n  f a i l s  to r e c o g n i z e  the 
f a r - r e a c h in g  nature  o f  the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  
conclusions. The decis ion was o f  such wide scope 
that i t  el iminated a broad range of  settlement 
proposals. For example, i t  el iminated the pos­
s i b i l i t y  that a remedial,  race-conscious, a f f i rm ­
a t i v e  a c t i o n  program cou ld  be embedded in to  a 
consent decree. See Carson v. American Brands, 
In c . ,  446 F. Supp. at 789-790.



\

- 20 -

(Resp.  Br. at  29 ) .  This  p o in t  was o f f e r e d  in 

support o f  t h e i r  more g en e ra l  t h e s i s  that  the 

d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  o rd e r  r e j e c t i n g  the proposed 

settlement was one which could be reviewed sub­

sequent to f i n a l  judgment. (Resp. Br. at 28-30).

4/ (continued)

S i m i l a r l y ,  the o rde r  p rec luded  the pos­
s i b i l i t y  that the consent decree could be fashion­
ed to improve the pos i t ion  of  seasonal workers as 
a c lass .  C lea r ly ,  the d i s t r i c t  court would have 
assumed that any r e l i e f  o f  th is  kind would con­
s t i tu t e ,  given the r a c ia l  composition o f  the class 
o f  seasonal workers, an unlawful r a c ia l  p r e f e r ­
ence. 446 F. Supp. at 788-789.

The e l im in a t i o n  o f  any form o f  r em ed ia l  
r e l i e f  f o r  seasonal workers o f  th is  descr ip t ion  or 
remedial r e l i e f  to  black workers went, o f  course, 
to the heart o f  any poss ib le  settlement o f  the 
action.

M oreover ,  the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  in s i s t e n c e  
that the r e l i e f  must not cause what i t  termed harm 
to " in nocen t  t h i r d  p a r t i e s "  a l s o  reduced the 
al lowable scope o f  acceptable compromises. 446 F. 
Supp. at 786, 790. A lso,  the d i s t r i c t  cour t 's
concern with the impact o f  the settlement decree 
upon "innocent pa r t i e s "  is  fa r  d i f f e r e n t  than the 
way in which th is  Court has considered the pro­
blem. Only recen t ly ,  th is  Court said, in F u l l -
i l o v e  v. K lu tzn ick , ____ U.S. , 65 L.Ed. 2d 902,
928 (1980), that



- 21

Quite obviously, i t  would be meaningless to 

present to the d i s t r i c t  court for  approval the 

same proposals which i t  so emphatically re jec ted .  

Moreover, nothing in the h is to ry  and meaning o f  28 

U.S.C. § 1292(a )(1 ) requires adoption of  such a 

meaningless gesture. P e t i t ion e rs  and respondents 

were e n t i t l e d  to assume that the opinion o f  the 

d i s t r i c t  judge stated his actual assessment o f  the 

l e g a l  i s sues  and fu r t h e r  to  assume that  the 

assessment,  would c o n s t i t u t e  the law o f  the 

case. Thus, i t  was quite u n rea l i s t i c  to assume 

that the court 's  order was not f in a l ,  and that i t  

would be reviewed again by the d i s t r i c t  judge.

As a fu r th e r  argument in  support o f  t h e i r  

c o n ten t io n  that  the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  order  

could be "reviewed both p r io r  to and a f t e r  f in a l

4/ (continued)

Moreover ,  a lthough we may assume 
that the complaining part ies  are innocent 
o f  any d i s c r im in a t o r y  conduct,  i t  was 
w i t h i n  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  power  t o  a c t  on 
the  a s su m pt io n  th a t  in  the  p a s t  some
n o n -m in o r i t y  bus inesses  may have reaped 
c o m p e t i t i v e  b e n e f i t  o v e r  the years from 
the v i r t u a l  e x c lu s i o n  o f  m i n o r i t y _f irms 
from th ese  c o n t r a c t in g  o p p o r t u n i t i e s .



22-

judgment" (Resp. Br. at 28),  respondents claim 

that  " t h e r e  remained o the r  means o f  o b t a in in g  

in junct ive  r e l i e f  short o f  t r i a l  and post-judgment 

rev iew" .  (Resp. Br. at 30).  Two of  the other 

means were i d e n t i f i e d  by respondents. They were 

(1 )  "a request f o r  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(b)" and "a w r i t  o f  mandamus". (Resp. Br. at 

30 ) .  P e t i t i o n e r s ,  however ,  submit that  the 

construct ion and appl icat ion o f  28 U.S.C. § 1292 

( a ) ( 1 )  are  n o t ,  in  g e n e r a l ,  t o  be determined 

by the a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  rev iew pursuant to a wr i t  

o f  mandamus. On the other hand, review by c e r t i f i ­

cat ion under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) is  dependent upon 

the u n a va i la b i l i t y  o f  review under § 1292 (a ) (1 ) .

Respondents c i t e  the decis ion o f  the Third 

C ircu it  in Rodgers v. U.S. Stee l  Corp. ,  541 F .2d 

365 (3d Cir .  1976) fo r  the propos i t ion  that the 

d i s t r i c t  cou r t 's  order could be reviewed by w r i t  

of  mandamus. This decis ion,  however, supports 

p e t i t i o n e r s '  argument, not that o f  respondents. 

In i t s  o p in io n ,  the Th ird  C i r c u i t  s t a t e s  con­

d i t ions  under which review by mandamus is pos-



23-

s ib l e .  I t  sayl that:

(R )eview by mandamus may be ava i lab le  in 
those ra r e  in s tances  where a d i s t r i c t  
court has acted outside the scope o f  i t s  
ju r i s d i c t i o n  or a r b i t r a r i l y  and in 
d i s r e g a r d  o f  a p p r o p r i a t e  p r o c e d u r a l  
safeguards. . .

541 F .3d at 372.

T h i s  s t a n d a r d  i s  n o t  s a t i s f i e d  in  the  

instant act ion.  P e t i t ion e rs  do not claim that the 

d i s t r i c t  cour t 's  actions are outside i t s  ju r i s ­

d i c t i o n .  Nor do p e t i t i o n e r s  c la im  that  the 

d i s t r i c t  cou r t 's  order v i o la t ed  procedural sa fe ­

guards. P e t i t ion e rs  have, at a l l  times, l im ited 

th e i r  claim to the a l l e ga t ion  that the d i s t r i c t  

court f a i l e d  to apply appl icab le  p r inc ip les  o f  law 

in determining whether the p a r t i e s '  proposed jo in t  

settlement decree should be approved pursuant to 

Rule 23(e) o f  the Fed. R. Civ. Proc. A d i s t r i c t  

court 's  f a i lu r e  to  apply correct  l e ga l  pr inc ip les  

to a case before  i t  does not make the result ing  

orders reviewable thereby pursuant to a wr i t  o f  

mandamus.

S im i la r ly ,  review by c e r t i f i c a t i o n  pursuant



- 24-

to § 1292(b) is  unavailable .  This route o f  review 

has, more over, been severe ly  r e s t r i c t e d  by the 

cases .  For example, i t  has been s ta t e d  tha t  

review by c e r t i f i c a t i o n  should be granted only 

in extraord inary  cases where necessary to avoid 

p r o t r a c t e d  and e x p en s iv e  l i t i g a t i o n ,  Robbins 

Co. v.  Laurence Mfg. Co. ,  482 F.2d 426, 429 (9th 

Cir .  1973), or where there ex is ts  unusual circum­

stances  w ar ran t in g  such r e v i e w .  L e igh ton  v . 

New York S. & W. R. R . , 306 F. Supp. 513, 515 

(S.D.N.Y. 1969). See g enera l ly ,  Note, Federal 

A p p e l l a t e  J u r i s d i c t i o n  -  A D i s t r i c t  Court Order 

D i s a p p r o v in g  A Proposed Se t t lem ent  o f  a Class 

A c t i o n  Is  Not Appealable Under 28 U.S.C.§ 1292(a) 

( 1 )  , 48 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 456 (1980 ) .  See 

genera l ly ,  Note, Mandamus As A Means o f  Federal 

In te r locu to ry  Review, 38 Ohio S.L.J.  301 (1977). 

No unusual circumstances ex is t  here. Nor is this 

an extraord inary  case or one where the l i t i g a t i o n  

is e spec ia l l y  protracted or expensive. F in a l l y ,  

i t  has been stated that § 1292(a ) (1 ) and 1292(b) 

are mutually exc lus ive .  See Wright, The In t e r -



25-

l o c u t o r y  Appeals  Act o f  1958, 23 F .R .D.  199,

202 (1969). Indeed, § 1292(b) sta tes  e x p l i c i t l y  

that i t  is appl icable  only when an order is "not 

otherwise appealable under th is  sect ion " .

C. The D i s t r i c t  Court 's Order W i l l  Cause
Pe t i t ion e rs  I r reparab le  Injury Unless 
An Immediate Appeal Is Allowed.________

Respondent's argument against allowance of 

an appeal  under § 1 2 9 2 ( a ) ( 1 )  o f  the d i s t r i c t  

court 's  order below, is  also based upon a claim 

that i r reparab le  in jury  w i l l  not resu lt  to p e t i ­

t ioners  i f  the appeal is  d isallowed.  The merits o f  

th is  argument can perhaps best be considered by 

examining the re la t ionsh ip  between orders encom­

passed by § 1 2 9 2 ( a ) ( 1 )  and the requirement o f  

i r reparab le  in jury .  I f  an order has been shown to 

be with in the scope of  § 1292 (a ) (1 ) ,  then i t  is  

not necessary to make a further showing o f  the 

existence o f  an ir reparab le  in jury .  The i r repara ­

ble in jury i s ,  in th is  instance, simply assum­

ed as a resu l t  o f  the o rder 's  inclusion within



26

§ 1292(a) ( 1 )

In short,  there is no need to make a ju d ic ia l  

assessment o f  the e x i s t e n c e  o f  an i r r e p a r a b l e  

i n ju r y  i f  the  o rde r  f a l l s  w i t h in  the scope o f  

§ 1292 (a ) (1 ) .  Such an assessment i s  only required 

where a doubt ex is t s  concerning the a p p l i c a b i l i t y  

o f  § 1292(a )(1 ) to a pa r t icu la r  order or c lass o f  

orders. When such an even tua l i ty  occurs, con­

s idera t ion  must then be given to whether orders o f  

tha t  c a t e g o r y  are g e n e r a l l y  l i k e l y  to  cause 

ir reparab le  in jury  in the absence o f  an immediate 

appeal.

Now, the o rde r  under c o n s id e r a t i o n  in  the 

present action is an in ter locu to ry  order re fus ing 

to approve a proposed consent decree enjo in ing 

respondents from further  v i o la t io n s  o f  T i t l e  V I I ' s

5J For example, in te r locu to ry  orders denying 
a request fo r  a pre l iminary in junction are with in  
the intendment o f  § 1292 (a ) (1 ) .  Baltimore Con­
tractors  v.  Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176j HT2 (1955). 
When an order denying a pre l im inary injunction is  
issued by a d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ,  i t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  
not n ecessa ry  to  make an independent j u d i c i a l  
assessment o f  whether  the o rde r  causes an i r ­
reparable in jury  in the pa r t icu la r  case.



27

ban against employment d iscr im inat ion based upon 

race. The d i s t r i c t  c ou r t 's  order, however, has 

the e f f e c t  of  permit t ing  respondents to continue 

with th e i r  a l l e ged  d iscr im inatory pract ices  un t i l  

f i n a l  judgment is  rendered .  The order  i s  i n ­

d i f f e r e n t  to the impact which the a l leged  d is ­

criminatory pract ices  have upon p e t i t ion e rs  since 

the d i s t r i c t  court does not b e l i e v e  that there are 

any v e s t i g e s  o f  r a c i a l  d i s c r im in a t i o n  at the 

Richmond Leaf  Plant.

The e f f e c t s  o f  the o rd e r ,  however ,  are 

s e v e r e .  For example, as a consequence o f  the 

o r d e r ,  seasona l  workers  are  den ied ,  u n t i l  the 

completion o f  t r i a l ,  the experience, knowledge, 

t r a i n i n g ,  l o n g e v i t y ,  s k i l l s ,  and r e c o g n i t i o n  

which they would have acquired, through approval 

and enforcement o f  the proposed consent decree, as 

regular employees, watchmen, b o i l e r  operators, 

track d r i v e r s ,  production supervisors, e tc .  Since 

the extent o f  the delay o f  the t r i a l  cannot be 

ca lcula ted,  there is  no way to  spec i fy  p rec ise ly  

the scope and magnitude o f  t h i s  i n ju r y .  The



28 -

harm meanwhile caused to the p l a i n t i f f  class o f

seasona l  workers ,  however ,  w i l l  be i r r e p a r a -
6/

b l e .— The r esu l t ing  loss o f  experience, s k i l l s ,  

knowledge,  and job  t enure ,  w i l l  p la c e  these  

workers at a compet it ive disadvantage with respect 

to other workers ins ide ,  and outside, the Richmond 

Leaf P lan t .—■

6 ]  In the context o f  an appeal taken pursuant 
to 28 U .S .C .S  1291 by means o f  the c o l l a t e r a l  
order exception, the ir reparab le  in ju ry ,  besides 
including the loss o f  compet it ive  advantage and 
the loss of  r igh ts  sanctioned by United S tee l ­
workers  o f  America v.  AFL-CIO-CLC- v.  Weber, 443 
U.S. 193 (1979), would a lso include the loss o f  
the r igh t  to s e t t l e  the lawsuit without t r i a l  as 
we l l  as the incurr ing o f  addit ional  expense and 
loss o f  time.

7/ In th i s  c o n t e x t ,  i t  should be remembered 
that § 1292(a ) (1 )  was designed to "permit l i t i ­
gants  to  e f f e c t i v e l y  c h a l l e n g e  i n t e r l o c u t o r y  
orders  o f  s e r i o u s ,  perhaps i r r e p a r a b l e  c on se ­
q u en ce . "  B a l t im ore  C o n t ra c to r s ,  I n c . ,  v .  Bo- 
d inger , 348 U.S. 176, 181, (1955).

N e i th e r  in  an appeal, o f  an orde r  deny ing  
a pre l iminary in junction nor in an appeal o f  the 
d i s t r i c t  cou r t 's  order below i s  there a necessity  
to make a f i n a l  determination of  the mer its .  In 
both cases a prel iminary assessment o f  the merits 
w i l l  s u f f i c e .  Compare, f o r  example, Popp v .



29

This i n ju r y  i s  p r e c i s e l y  ^he  type  o f  i n ­

jury which a prel iminary in junction is  designed to 

thwart. The same considerat ions which presume the 

existence o f  i r reparab le  in jury  when a prel iminary 

in junction is denied argue here fo r  the app l ica­

t ion o f  § 1292 (a ) (1 ) .  See e . g . ,  United States v. 

C i t y  o f  A l e x a n d r i a , 614 F . 2d 1358 (5 th  C i r .  

1980).

The d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  d e n ia l  o f  the motion 

f o r  approval o f  the proposed consent decree also 

caused i r reparab le  in jury  by denying the par t ies  

th e i r  only meaningful chance of  settlement.  I t  

damaged thereby the public and p r iva te  in te res t  in 

the use o f  voluntary settlements.  The court 's  

judgment operated, through the use o f  erroneous 

l e ga l  p r in c ip l e s , to  diminish substant ia l ly  the 

amount o f  maneuvering room needed fo r  agreement on 

mutually acceptable compromises. Moreover, i t  

threatens to unduly a f f e c t  the p e t i t i o n e r s '  p re-

7 j (continued)

F ran k l in  N a t io n a l  Bank, 461 F .2d 783 (2d C i r .  
1972) w i th  F l in n  v .  F.M.C. C o r p o r a t i o n , 528 
F.2d 1169 (4 th  C i r .  1975),  c e r t ,  den ied ,  424 
U.S. 967 (1976).



30

p a r a t i o n  f o r  t r i a l  and chances f o r  r e c o v e r y .  

Injury o f  th is  qu a l i t y  and magnitude is  c e r ta in ly  

ir reparab le  to  the p e t i t i on e rs .

F in a l l y ,  the order caused i r reparab le  in jury  

to the public in te res t  since disallowance o f  an 

immediate appeal w i l l  grant d i s t r i c t  courts an 

e s s e n t ia l l y  unreviewable power to coerce par t ies  

in t o  f a s h i o n in g  proposed s e t t l e m e n ts  decrees  

which r e f l e c t  the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  erroneous 

conceptions o f  applicable  lega l  p r in c ip le s .  This 

could e a s i l y  lead to widespread enforcement by the 

d i s t r i c t  courts o f  settlement decrees t o t a l l y  at 

variance with const i tu t iona l  and other federa l  

values. Respondents' arguments would support such 

a resu l t  and there fore  should be r e jec ted .  For 

the reasons s ta t e d  h e r e in ,  the  judgment be low 

should be r e v e r s ed  and p e t i t i o n e r s  should be 

granted th e i r  r igh t  to appeal the d i s t r i c t  cour t 's  

order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a ) (1 ) .



- S i ­

ll
THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER IS A COLLATERAL 
ORDER WHICH IS APPEALABLE AS AN EXCEPTION TO 
28 U.S.C. § 1291

Respondents contest p e t i t i o n e r s '  character­

i z a t i o n  o f  the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  order  as a 

c o l l a t e r a l  order appealable as an exception to 28 

U.S.C. § 1291 under the rule  announced in Cohen v . 

B en e f i c ia l  Indus. Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 

I t  is  respondents' p os i t ion  that the order did 

not  c o n c l u s i v e l y  de term ine  any c o l l a t e r a l  i n ­

te r es ts ,  that i t  did not reso lve  any issues which 

were completely separate from the mer its ,  and that 

i t  was e f f e c t i v e l y  rev iewable  upon the rendering 

o f  f i n a l  judgment here in .

A. The D i s t r i c t  Court 's Order Conclusively 
Determined Important In teres ts  o f  the 
Par t ies  Concerning Settlement and the 
Use o f  A R e m e d ia l ,  R a c e -C o n s c io u s  
A f f i r m a t i v e  A c t i o n  Plan.__________________

With respect to § 1291, the nature and e f f e c t  

of  the d i s t r i c t  cour t 's  decree was to determine 

three issues o f  c r i t i c a l  importance to the par­

t i e s .  F i r s t ,  the decree, as prev iously  mentioned, 

prejudged cer ta in  issues on the merits , such as



- 32 -

whether th e r e  were v e s t i g e s  o f  p r i o r  r a c i a l  

d iscr im inat ion or whether race-conscious remedial 

programs v io la t ed  the Consti tution and T i t l e  V I I  

o f  the C i v i l  Rights Act o f  1964, as amended, or 

whether j u d i c i a l  r e l i e f  awarded to  seasona l  

workers as a c lass  would per se const i tu te  d is ­

crimination against white employees. Second, the 

d i s t r i c t  c ou r t 's  decree deprived the par t ies  of  

the o p p o r tu n i t y  to s e t t l e  the  l i t i g a t i o n  and 

thereby avoid an unnecessary waste of  money, time, 

and resources.

Third, the d i s t r i c t  cou r t 's  order deprived 

the par t ies  o f  the r i gh t  which th is  Court recent ly  

a f f i r m e d ,  in  Un ited  S tee lw o rk e rs  o f  Am er ica , 

AFL-CIO-CLC v.  Weber, supra, to ex is t  f o r  unions, 

employees ,  and employees w i th  r e sp e c t  to  i n ­

dustr ies  in which there has ex is ted  a t r a d i t i o n a l  

pattern o f  segregat ion and d iscr im inat ion against 

m inor i t ie s ,  namely, a r i gh t  to adopt and implement 

vo lu n ta r i l y  a remedial,  race-conscious a f f i rm a t iv e  

action plan designed to "break down old patterns 

o f  r a c ia l  segregat ion and h ierarchy" ,  to  "open



33

employment opportunit ies  fo r  Negroes in occupa­

t i o n s  which have been t r a d i t i o n a l l y  c l o s e d  to  

them", and " t o  e l im inate a manifest r a c ia l  b a l ­

ance"  " and not " t o  m a in ta in  r a c i a l  b a l a n c e . "  

U n i t e d  S tee lw o rk e rs  o f  A m er ica ,AFL-CIO-CLC v . 

Weber, supra, 443 U.S. at 208.

The f i r s t  mentioned e f f e c t  concerns the 

m er i ts  o f  the a c t i o n  and thus i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  

appl icab le  to appeals under § 1292 (a ) (1 ) .  The

l a s t  two e f f e c t s ,  however ,  i n v o l v e  c o l l a t e r a l  

i s sues  th a t  are  s epa ra te  and apart  from the 

merits . They are re levant to the issue o f  appeal- 

a b i l i t y  under the c o l l a t e r a l  o rd e r  e x c e p t i o n

a r t i c u l a t e d  in Cohen v.  B en e f ic ia l  Indus. Loan 
9/Corp. ,  supra.

— Respondents' f a i lu r e  to recognize the three 
d is t in c t  e f f e c t s  o f  the d i s t r i c t  cou r t 's  order is 
a p p a ren t ly  r e s p o n s ib l e  f o r  t h e i r  i n a b i l i t y  to  
understand how the order below can simultaneously 
be appealable both as a c o l l a t e r a l  order and as an 
in ter locu tory  order denying in junct ive  r e l i e f .  
They seem to assume that r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  o f  these 
two pos i t ions  is "schizophrenic"  since in the i r  
mind "a s ing le  court order cannot simultaneously 
be ' c o l l a t e r a l  t o '  the claim, as required by the 
c o l l a t e r a l  order doctr ine,  while at the same time



34 -

I t  i s  these  l a s t  two e f f e c t s  o f  the d i s t r i c t  

cour t 's  order which respondents claim were not 

conclusive determinations.

I t  i s ,  o f  c ou rse ,  t r u e ,  as respondents  

contend, that the d i s t r i c t  c ou r t 's  order did not

9J  (continued)

' a f f e c t in g  the mer i ts '  o f  p e t i t i o n e r s '  claims and 
passing on the l e ga l  su f f i c i en cy  o f  any claims fo r  
in junct ive  r e l i e f ' ,  as required f o r  a p p ea lab i l i t y  
under § 1 2 92 (a ) (1 ) . "  (Resp. Br. at 32, n. 18).

But s u r e l y ,  th e r e  can be no d i f f i c u l t y  in  
comprehending how a s ing le  court order,  composed 
o f  severa l  d i f f e r e n t  components, can have severa l 
d is t in c t  e f f e c t s .  Nor is  i t  incomprehensible that 
each o f  these d is t in c t  e f f e c t s ,  or components, 
might a f f e c t  d i f f e r e n t  things d i f f e r e n t l y  or that 
one e f f e c t  might concern the merits o f  a claim 
while  another e f f e c t  might be t o t a l l y  extraneous 
to the merits . Such p o s s i b i l i t i e s  ex is t  whenever 
there is a s ing le  order which decides d is t in c t  
issues .

The c r i t i c a l  question is  not whether there is  
a s ing le  order but rather "What did the s ingle  
order decide and f o r  what were the issues decided 
re levan t? "  These questions are not answered, as 
respondents  su g ge s t ,  by l o o k in g  to  see i f  the 
order i s  in some sense unitary,  but rather they



35

op e ra te  to p re c lu de  e v e ry  im ag inab le  type  o f  

s e t t l e m e n t  but s u r e l y  such an extreme r e s u l t  

is  not required by the Cohen ru le .  The f i n a l i t y  

ach ieved  by the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  o rd e r  w i th  

respect  to the p a r t i e s '  in te res ts  in settlement o f  

the l i t i g a t i o n  was pr imar i ly  caused by the court 's  

invocation o f  an erroneous set o f  l e ga l  p r inc ip les  

to c lose  o f f  areas o f  settlement opportunit ies .  

As Judge Friendly  noted in his d issenting opinion 

in Stewart-Warner Corp. v,  Westinghouse E le c t r i c  

Corp. , 325 F. 2d 822,829 (2d C ir .  1963):

The d a n g e r  o f  s e r i o u s  harm f rom  th e  
c o u r t ' s  e rroneous b e l i e f  in the e x i s ­
tence  o f  a l e g a l  b a r r i e r  t o  i t s  e n t e r ­
t a in in g  a c la im  f o r  an in ju n c t i o n  has 
been th o u g h t  t o  o u tw e i g h  the  g e n e r a l  
u n des i rab i l i t y  o f  in ter locu tory  appeals.

Se t t l em en t  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  were f o r e c l o s e d  

by the d i s t r i c t  cou r t 's  order in severa l  ways. 

F i r s t ,  the court held ,  as a matter o f  law, that 

" ( p ) r e f e r e n t i a l  treatment on the basis o f  r a c e . . .  

v i o la t e s  the Consti tution and T i t l e  V I I " .  446

7 ] (continued)

are  answered by lo o k in g  at  the na ture  o f  the 
r e l i e f  provided by the order and the nature o f  the 
conlusions o f  law and f indings o f  fac ts ,  i f  any, 
upon which the order was based.



- 36 -

F. Supp. at 788. Second, the court found, as a 

mixed issue of  law and fa c t ,  that, despite  the 

h is to ry  o f  d iscr im inat ion ,  there were no ves t iges  

o f  r a c i a l  d i s c r im in a t i o n  at the Richmond L ea f  

Plant. Id. at 790.

T h i rd ,  the court  concluded that  r e l i e f  on 

b e h a l f  o f  the p l a i n t i f f  c l a s s  o f  seasona l  em­

p lo y e es  could  on ly  be g i v e n  i f  members o f  the 

c la s s  were shown to have been p r i o r  v i c t im s  

o f  r a c ia l  d iscr im inat ion at the Plant.  446 F. 

Supp. at 786. And fourth, the court found that 

s e t t l e m e n t  agreements  which e i t h e r  f a i l e d  to  

include f indings o f  p r io r  r a c ia l  d iscr im inat ion or 

which included general exculpatory clauses con­

cerning discrimanatory p ract ices ,  cannot serve as 

the basis f o r  a consent decree. 446 F. Supp. at 

788-789.

Each o f  the above h o ld in g  was made as a 

matter o f  law. Jud ic ia l  holdings as to what the 

law is  necessar i ly  must be taken as conclusive 

d e t e rm in a t io n s .  The e x i s t e n c e  o f  avenues f o r  

obtaining reconsiderat ion i s  i r r e le van t  to this  

issue. Indeed, i t  was the f i n a l i t y  o f  a c ou r t ’ s 

lega l  conclusions, compared to i t s  d iscre t ionary



37

f i n d in g s  tha t  made Judge F r i e n d l y  in  S t ew a r t -  

Warner  C orp .  v .  West inghouse E l e c t r i c  C o r p . , 

supra, emphasize how important i t  was to  recognize 

the

" d i s t i n c t i o n . . .between a ' r e fu s a l '  based 
on an a l l e g e d l y  e r r o n e o u s  c o n c l u s i o n  
tha t  the law does not  permit  the c la im  
f o r  an i n j u n c t i o n  to  be h e a r d  in  the  
a c t i o n . . . a n d  one based on a l l e g e d  abuse 
o f  a d i s c r e t i o n a r y  power ove r  the scope 
of the ac t ion " ,  325 F.2d at 829.

Moreover, as he pointed out "The very  fac t  t h a t . . .  

(an) order hinges on the t r i a l  court 's  d iscre t ion  

is i t s e l f  an ind icat ion  that such orders . . .  carry a 

l e s s e r  th r e a t  o f  harm". Id .  A p p ly in g  Judge 

F r i end ly 's  analys is  to the fac ts  here, i t  i s  p la in 

that the holding o f  the d i s t r i c t  court below is 

not based upon the exerc ise  o f  d iscre t ionary  power 

but rather is  based upon the court 's  ascerta in­

ment o f  what i t  p e r c e i v e s  to  be the gove rn ing  

p r inc ip les  o f  law.

The d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  o rd e r  was c l e a r l y  a 

conclusive determination o f  the p a r t i e s '  r igh t  to 

do, whether in or out of  court, what th is  Court 

sanc t ioned  in United Steelworkers o f  America,



-  38 -

AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, supra, i . e . ,  the r igh t  to

i n s t i t u t e  a r a c e - c o n s c io u s ,  r em ed ia l  a f f i r ­

mat ive  a c t i o n  program. The d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  

determination o f  the issue is  separate from i t s  

r e f u s a l  t o  e n t e r  a j u d i c i a l  decree  in c o r p o r ­

a t in g  the s e t t l e m e n t  terms a r r i v e d  at  by the 

par t ies .  In l i g h t  o f  the d i s t r i c t  cour t 's  opinion, 

there can be no question but that an out-o f -court  

agreement between the pa r t ie s ,  which incorporated 

the terms o f  the proposed consent decree, would be 

v u ln e r a b l e ,  u n l ik e  the one upheld in Un ited  

S tee lw o rk e rs  o f  America ,  AFL-CIO-CLC v .  Weber, 

supra, to a successful ju d i c i a l  challenge in the 

d i s t r i c t  court at the hands o f  d i s s a t i s f i e d  white 

regular  employees. This consequence of  the order 

demonstrates  the e x ten t  t o  which i t  not on ly  

c o n s t i t u t e d  a f i n a l  d e t e rm in a t io n  o f  c e r t a i n  

c o l l a t e r a l  issues but also shows the extent to 

which the order undercuts the r ights  o f  workers 

and employers to use agreements produced out o f  

court to remedy r a c ia l  imbalance in h i s t o r i c a l l y  

s e g r e ga t ed  in d u s t r i e s  by the e s tab l ishm en t  o f



39

co r r e c t i v e ,  voluntary,  race-conscious a f f i rm a t iv e  

action programs. See e . g . ,  United Steelworkers o f  

America, AFL-CIQ-CLC v. Weber, supra.

B. The Order of  the D i s t r i c t  Court Resolved 
Important Issues  C om ple te ly  Separate  
From the Merits o f  the A c t i o n ___________

In l i e u  o f  what has been said in the previous 

sect ion concerning the f i n a l i t y  o f  the d i s t r i c t  

court 's  order with respect to i t s  determination o f  

p u re ly  l e g a l  i s su es ,  i t  f o l l o w s  that  the c o l ­

l a t e r a l  issues determined by the order are sepa­

ra te  and apart from the merits o f  the lawsuit.  As 

in d i c a t e d  p r e v i o u s l y ,  th ese  c o l l a t e r a l  i s sues  

concern (1 ) the p a r t i e s '  in te res ts  in s e t t l in g  

th e i r  lawsuit without t a i l o r in g  the settlement to 

r e f l e c t  erroneous con cep t ions  by the d i s t r i c t  

court o f  the relevant lega l  p r inc ip les  and (2) 

th e i r  r igh t  to adopt, whether in  or out o f  court, 

an a f f i r m a t i v e  a c t i o n  program conforming  to  

g u id e l in e s  set  f o r t h  by t h i s  Court in United 

S tee lw o rk e rs  o f  America,  AFL-CIQ-CLC v .  Weber,

supra.



- 40

Respondents ob ject  to i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  these 

in teres ts  as c o l l a t e r a l  matters with in the scope 

o f  the Cohen ru le .  F i r s t ,  they claim that the 

" ' r i g h t '  t o  s e t t l e  pursuant to  the tendered  

d e c r e e . . . i s  an i ssue  encompassed w i th in  the 

'abuse o f  d i s c r e t i o n '  questions expressly  excluded 

from the grant of  c e r t i o r a r i  in th is  case" (Resp. 

Br. at  13 ) .  This  o b j e c t i o n  misses the p o in t .  

P e t i t i on e rs  are not asking the Court to confirm, 

or decide, that such r igh ts ,  or in t e r e s t s ,  e x is t  

but rather they assert only that the a l l e g a t i o n  of 

the exis tence of such in t e r e s ts ,  or r igh ts ,  is  

s u f f i c i e n t l y  substant ia l to  permit invocation of  

the c o l l a t e r a l  order doctr ine .  See e . g . ,  B e l l  v . 

Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946). Where-as here-appeal-  

a b i l i t y  is  based upon the c o l l a t e r a l  order excep­

t ion ,  a dec is ion  upholding appea lab i l i t y  does not 

necessar i ly  imply that the Court recognizes the 

existence o f  the a l leged  c o l l a t e r a l  r igh ts ,  or 

i n t e r e s t s .  A d e c i s i o n  f a v o r i n g  a p p e a l a b i l i t y  

means only that the Court agrees that the a l leged  

c o l l a t e r a l  in te res ts  are s u f f i c i e n t l y  substant ia l



- 41

to warrant inquiry for  the purpose o f  determining 

whether the claim, i f  made out, would const i tu te  a 

cause co m p le t e ly  s epa ra te  and apart from the 

merits o f  the action to invoke the exception to 

§ 1291 permitted under Cohen v. B en e f ic ia l  Loan

Corp. , supra.

Respondents a l s o  a l l e g e  tha t  t h i s  C o u r t ' s  

decis ion in Weber, supra, f a i l e d  to es tab l ish  the 

existence o f  a r igh t  to s e t t l e  a lawsuit (Resp, 

Br. 13-15).  While t e chn ica l ly ,  th is  is correct ,  

i t  n o n e th e le s s  remains t rue  that  the C o u r t ' s  

d e c i s i o n  in  tha t  case a c t u a l l y  p rec luded  a 

c o l l a t e r a l  a t t a c k ,  by a t h i r d  p a r t y ,  on the 

v a l i d i t y  o f  an o u t - o f - c o u r t  agreement.  Thus 

the Court 's  act ion in d i r e c t l y  const i tuted  ju d ic ia l  

support and sanction fo r  the out-o f -court  agree­

ment. The decis ion  in Weber, there fo re ,  recog­

n i z e d  the r i g h t  o f  un ions,  employers ,  and em­

p loy e es  to  f a sh io n ,  o u t - o f - c o u r t ,  r em ed ia l ,  

voluntary,  pr iva te  a f f i rm a t iv e  action agreements 

which can be p r o t e c t e d  a g a in s t  undue j u d i c i a l  

in ter fe rence .  In essence, Weber recognized theIn essence,



42

leg i t imacy  o f  the in teres ts  of  p r iva te  par t ies  in 

enter ing into p r iva te ,  race-conscious, voluntary 

a f f i rm a t iv e  act ion programs.

T h i s  i n t e r e s t  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  d i s t i n c t  

from the in teres ts  which pa r t ie s  have in s e t t l in g  

an on-going lawsuit.  Although the decis ion in 

Weber may not be d i r e c t l y  a p p l i c a b l e  to  th i s  

l a t t e r  issue, i t  is re levant to i t .  To the extent 

that a settlement o f  a pending case p a ra l l e l s  that 

o f  the agreement in Weber, supra, the v a l i d i t y  o f  

the settlement is governed by the p r inc ip les  set 

forth  in Weber, supra.

P e t i t i o n e rs ,  in th e i r  previous B r ie f ,  demon­

strated  that the c o l l a t e r a l  issues discussed here 

are separate from the merits o f  th is  act ion.  That 

discussion need not be repeated here. In th is  

Reply B r i e f ,  p e t i t ion e rs  have also demonstrated 

that the d i s t r i c t  cour t 's  order caused them to 

su f fe r  i r reparab le  in ju ry .  That argument, which 

was made with respect to § 1292(a )(1 )  is  equally  

appl icable  to  § 1291, and for  that reason also 

need not be repeated.



43

S im i la r ly ,  the arguments concerning rev iew- 

a b i l i t y  o f  the d i s t r i c t  cour t 's  order, were also 

made in p e t i t i o n e r s '  B r ie f  and are not repeated 

here. Moreover, the arguments, which were made in 

the in s ta n t  b r i e f ,  under § 1 2 9 2 ( a ) ( 1 ) ,  on the 

issue of r e v i e w a b i l i t y ,  are read i ly  t rans latab le  

to § 1291. These arguments, considered separately  

and c o l l e c t i v e l y ,  require  that judgment below be 

d issm issed  and that p e t i t i o n e r s  be a l l o w ed  to  

appeal the d i s t r i c t  cour t 's  judgment as an ex­

c e p t i o n  to the requ irem ents  o f  § 1291 in  a c -
. 10/

cordance with the Cohen ru le .—

10/ The respondent u n i o n s ' argument tha t  the 
act ion is moot because they have withdrawn the ir  
consent to the proposed decree i s  f r i v o lo u s .  See 
Morse Bou lger  Des tructor  Company v. Camden Fibre 
M i l l s ,  I n c . , 239 F. 2d 382, 383 (3rd C ir .  1956); 
Greenspahn v.  Joseph Seagram ' Sons, In c . , 186 F . 
2d 616, 619-621 (2nd Cir .  1951). ~No act ion has 
been taken by the d i s t r i c t  court on the respon­
dent unions ' motion to withdraw th e i r  consent to 
the proposed decree. Accordingly ,  th is  Court, 
being vested with ju r i s d i c t i o n  of  the case, has 
the power to  define the circumstances under which 
respondent unions' consent to the proposed consent 
decree can be withdrawn.



44

CONCLUSION

For the reasons indicated here in  the decis ion 
below should be vacated with instruct ions to al low
the appeal .

Respec t fu l ly  submitted,

HENRY L. MARSH, I I I  
WILLIAM H. BASS, I I I  
RANDALL G. JOHNSON 

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JACK GREENBERG
Counsel o f  Record 

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