Rice v Arnold Petition for Writ Certiorari

    TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD

S u p r e m e  C o u r t  o f  th e  U n ite d  S ta te s

OCTOBER TERM, 1950

No.

JOSEPH lilCE, PETITIONER,

H. H. ARNOLD, AS SUPERINTENDENT OF MIAMI 
SPRINGS COUNTRY CLUB

ON PE TITIO N  FOB W RIT OF CERTIORARI TO T H E  SUPREM E COURT 
OF T H E  STATE OF FLORIDA

FILED



SUPREME CO U RT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1950

No.

JOSEPH RICE, PETITIONER, 

vs.

H. H. ARNOLD, AS SUPERINTENDENT OP MIAMI 
SPRINGS COUNTRY CLUB

ON PE TITIO N  EOR W R IT  OE CERTIORARI TO TH E  SUPREM E COURT 
OP T H E  STATE OE FLORIDA

INDEX

Record from the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial
Circuit of Florida in and for Dade County.....................

Petition for alternative writ o f mandamus...................
Alternative writ of mandamus.......................................
Return and answer...........................................................
Note re filing of motion to quash...................................
Motion for peremptory writ of mandamus...................
Opinion and judgment.....................................................
Notice o f appeal...............................................................
Assignment of errors.......................................................
Directions for making up transcript of record..............
Respondent-Appellee’s directions for making up tran­

script of record ...........................................................
Clerk’s certificate................... (omitted in printing)..

Proceedings in Supreme Court of Florida.........................
Opinion, Chapman, J. ...........................................................
Clerk’s certificate............................. (omitted in printing). .

ginal Print

i l
i l
3 3
4 4
6 6
7 6
7 7

10 9
11 10
12 12

14 13
15
16 14
16 14
23

J udd  & D e t w e il e r  (Ino.), Printers, W a s h in g t o n , D. C., J u n e  21, 1950. 

—8799



1

[fol. 1]
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDI­

CIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA IN AND FOR DADE
COUNTY

No. 23127

Joseph Rioe, Realtor 
vs.

H. H. A rnold, as Superintendent of Miami Springs 
Country Club, Respondent

Petition for A lternative W rit of M andamus— Piled June
3, 1949

To: The Honorable Judges of the Above Styled Court:
Comes now Joseph Rice, by his undersigned attorneys, 

and respectfully represents unto your Honors as follows:

1
That the petiotioner, or relator, is a citizen and resident 

of Miami, Dade County, Florida. That both of the parties 
hereto are above the age of twenty one years and are 
sui juris. That the respondent, H. H. Arnold, is the duly 
appointed superintendent of the Miami Springs Country 
Club, a recreational center which is owned and operated 
by the City of Miami, Florida, a municipal corporation.

2
That for a long time prior to April 27, 1949 the City of 

Miami, Florida owned and operated, and on the date of the 
filing of this petition still owns and operates, the Miami 
Springs Country Club for the use and enjoyment of the 
residents of Miami and their guests. That the respondent 
as an employee of the City of Miami, Florida and as 
Superintendent of the Miami Springs Country Club has been 
delegated the authority by the City of Miami to prescribe 
and enforce the rules and regulations governing the use 
of the Miami Springs Country Club. Your relator further 
represents unto your Honors that the Miami Springs Coun­
try Club is the only recreation center which is operated by 
[fol. 2] the City of Miami which has a golf course.

1—8799



2

That the petitioner is a colored man or a man often 
referred to as a descendent from the African race. That 
on April 27, 1949, in strict compliance with all of the rules 
and regulations then in effect governing the use of the 
Miami Springs Country Club G-olf Course, and during the 
hours in which the golf course was open and in general 
use, the petitioner did request the ticket agent at the golf 
course to sell unto the petitioner a ticket which would admit 
him to golf on the said links on the aforementioned date. 
That the petitioner on said date was refused admission to 
the golf course by the ticket agent because the respondent 
in his official capacity directed the agent to refuse to sell 
the petitioner the requested ticket because he, the petitioner, 
was a colored man and for no other reason. That as a 
resident of Miami, Florida, your petitioner is entitled to 
use the municipally owned links free from his arbitrary, 
capricious, and unlawful exclusion by the respondent.

Wherefore the relator being without a remedy save in 
mandamus, relator respectfully prays that this Honorable 
Court do issue an alternative writ of mandamus, command­
ing the respondent, as Superintendent of Miami Springs 
Country Club within a short time to be set by this Court to 
either permit the relator to golf on the Miami Springs 
Country Club Golf Course, subject to such lawful rules and 
regulations made by the respondent, during all of the hours 
in which the course is usually open, or show cause before 
this Court for his refusal to do so.

(Signed) Joseph Rice, Petitioner.

(Signed) John D. Johnson, 171 N.W. 11th Street, 
Miami, Florida; G. E. Graves, Jr., 941 N.W. Sec­
ond Avenue, Miami, Florida, Attorneys for Re­
lator.

3



3

[fol. 3] In Circuit Court of Dade Countt

A lternative W rit of A lternative— June 10,1949

In the Name of the State of Florida:
T o : H. H. Arnold, as Superintendent of Miami Springs

Country Club, Greetings:
Whereas, it appears from the petition filed by Joseph 

Rice that he, the petitioner, is entitled to golf on the Miami 
Springs Country Club Golf Course during all of the hours 
in which the said course is open to the public; subject, how­
ever, to the rules and regulations governing the use thereof 
lawfully made and provided by the Superintendent of the 
Miami Springs Country Club; that the petitioner has asked 
your permission to golf on the Miami Springs Country Club 
Golf Course during all of the hours in which the said course 
is open to the public and that it is your duty as superin­
tendent of said club to permit the petitioner to golf on said 
links without discrimination and that you have failed and 
refused and persist in your refusal to permit the peti­
tioner to golf on the course owned and operated by the 
City of Miami, Florida under similar rules and regulations 
as are applied to others. (A  copy of the said petition is 
hereto attached and is hereby made a part of this writ 
just as if the contents thereof were fully set forth herein.)

Now Therefore, we being willing that full and speedy 
justice be done in the premises, do command you as Super­
intendent of the Miami Springs Country Club to forthwith 
grant the petitioner the privilege of golfing on the Miami 
Springs Country Club Golf Course during all of the hours 
in which the said course is open to the public, subject how­
ever to any lawful rules and regulations governing the use 
thereof, or in default thereof that you appear before this 
Court on the 27th day of June, 1949 in Chambers at Miami, 
Florida and then and there show cause why you refuse 
so to do.

Done and Ordered at the Court House in Miami, Florida 
this 10th day of June, 1949.

(Signed) Charles A. Carroll, Circuit Judge.

2—8799



4

[fol. 4] In Circuit Court of Dade County

R eturn and A nswer— June 24, 1949
The respondent, H. H. Arnold, as Superintendent of 

Miami Springs Country Club, by and through his under­
signed attorneys, makes this, his return to the alternative 
writ of mandamus, heretofore issued in this cause, and his 
answer to the allegations of the petition for such alterna­
tive writ, and thereupon alleges:

1. The respondent admits the material allegations of 
paragraph numbered one of the petition, with the exception, 
of that portion of such numbered paragraph which alleges 
that the relator is a citizen and resident of Miami, Dade 
County, Florida and that he is sui juris, and, as to such 
allegations, the respondent is without knowledge and there­
fore neither admits nor denies the said allegations and 
demands strict proof thereof.

2. The respondent admits the material allegations of 
paragraph numbered two of the petition.

3. In answer to paragraph numbered three of the peti­
tion, the respondent admits the material allegations of fact 
therein set forth and denies that the respondent’s action 
in denying the petitioner the privilege of using the golf 
course on April 27th, 1949, is arbitrary, capricious, 
and unlawful, for the reason that such date fell upon a 
Wednesday, a day of the week set aside for the exclusive 
use of the mentioned golf course by persons of the Cau­
casian race, as will more fully appear hereinafter.

4. For further answer to the petition herein, the respond­
ent alleges:

(a) There is, throughout the State of Florida and more 
particularly within the City of Miami, a general policy of 
segregation of races.

(b) Until April, 1949, the golf course at the Miami 
Springs Country Club has been used exclusively by golfers 
of the Caucasian race for the reason that no persons of the 
negro race had prior to such time, evidenced a desire to the 
[fol. 5] respondent to exercise the privilege of playing golf 
on the mentioned course.



5

(c) On April 11, 1949, five negroes demanded that they 
he permitted to play golf upon the course in question, and 
after complying with the rules of the Club, were granted 
the privilege which they had demanded. Thereafter, the 
following number of negro players used the golf course 
upon the days hereinafter mentioned:

April 12th, 1949, Tuesday—8 players;
April 13th, 1949, Wednesday—6 players;
April 14th, 1949, Thursday—12 players;
April 15, 1949, Friday—52 players;
April 16, 1949, Saturday—8 players;
April 17, 1949, Sunday—6 players;

(d) The golf course at Miami Springs Country Club is 
and has been for many years a wholly self-sustaining proj­
ect, maintained solely from fees paid by golfers for the 
use of the course. It receives no subsidy from taxes paid 
by citizens of the city. In order that the course may re­
main self-sustaining it is essential that an average of at 
least 200 golfers a day use the course, and pay the required 
fees.

(e) As a result of the general policy of segregation al­
leged above, the white patrons of the golf course announced 
their intention to withdraw their patronage from the club 
if they were to be required to share the facilities thereof 
with negroes during the times they were using the course, 
which action, in view of the small number of negroes using 
the course, would result in such loss of revenue as to require 
the abandonment by the city of the facilities offered by the 
club.

(f) In accordance with the general policy of segregation 
as above alleged and because of the threatened action by 
white patrons of the Club facilities, the respondent, as 
Superintendent of the Club, invoked and announced a 
policy by and under which both negro and white patrons 
might use and enjoy the privilege of the mentioned golf 
course bu allot-ing to each group or race the exclusive use 
of the course on separate, designated days, and, because 
the number of white players far exceeds the number of 
negro players, the respondent, by the rule laid down in con­
formity with this announced policy, allotted to the white 
patrons of the golf course exclusive use of such facilities



6

on six days of the week and to the negro patrons exclusive 
use of said facilities on one day, namely, Monday of each 
[fol. 6] week, the number of negro players being much less 
than one-seventh of the total number of players using the 
course.

(g) Since the invocation and announcement of the rule 
alleged in the preceding paragraph, negro and white play­
ers have enjoyed the use of the facilities of the golf course, 
and the number of negro players has not increased suffi­
ciently at the time of making of this answer to warrant any 
increase in the time allotted them for the exclusive use of 
the course.

(h) Wherefore, the respondent says that the relator is 
not being denied the use of the facilities of the mentioned 
golf course as is alleged in the petition, and moves that an 
appropriate order be entered herein, adjudging this cause 
in favor of the respondent and dismissing the alternative 
writ.

(Signed) J. W. Watson, Jr., John D. Marsh, Attor­
neys for Respondent.

Duly sworn to by John D. Marsh. Jurat omitted in print­
ing.

I n Circuit Court op Dade County

N otice re F iling op M otion to Quash

On June 24th, 1949, the respondent filed a motion to quash 
[fol. 7] the alternative writ of mandamus.

In Circuit Court op Dade County

M otion for Peremptory W rit of Mandamus—Filed July
18, 1949

Comes now the relator, by his undersigned attorneys, and 
moves the Court for a peremptory writ of mandamus and 
for reason therefor says that the return and answer of the



7

respondent fail to show an cause which is cognizable at law 
for his failure and refusal to permit the relator to golf 
on the Miami Springs Country Club Golf Course.

John D. Johnson and G. E. Graves, Jr., Attorneys for 
Relator, by (Signed) G. E. Graves, Jr., Of Counsel.

In  Circuit Court op Dade County

Opinion and Judgment—July 22, 1949
This cause is before this Court on relator’s motion for 

peremptory writ notwithstanding the answer or response.
Argument of counsel was heard thereon after notice.
The alternative writ of mandamus and petition on which 

it is based reveal that the City of Miami maintains one 
public golf course, of which the respondent Arnold is the 
superintendent, empowered to make and enforce rules as to 
its use; that on a certain date, complying with the use 
rules, the relator Joseph Rice, a Negro resident of the city, 
was denied the right and privilege of playing golf on the 
course; that the sole reason for the refusal was because rela­
tor was a member of the colored race; and that the refusal 
was an arbitrary, capricious and unlawful exclusion of the 
[fol. 8] relator by the respondent.

The command of the alternative writ was that the re­
spondent superintendent of the golf course “ forthwith grant 
petitioner (relator) the privilege of golfing on the Miami 
Springs Country Club Golf Course during all of the hours 
in which the said course is open to the public, subject to 
any lawful rules and regulations governing the use thereof. ’ ’

The response averred that there was a general policy of 
segregation of the races throughout this state and in the 
city; that shortly prior to the date involved, certain other 
Negroes had requested and been granted the privilege of 
play on the course, for six consecutive days, and while fifty- 
two played on one of those days the average on the other 
five days was eight or nine; that the course, which is self 
sustaining from fees paid by the golfers, operates on the 
basis and experience of a daily quota or average of two 
hundred players; that announced loss of patronage, from 
players who objected to such joint use by the races, was 
such as to indicate a loss of revenue which would endanger



8

future successful operation; that the respondent had then 
made a rule under which on one day of each week (Monday) 
use of the course was available to negroes exclusively, with 
white players having exclusive use the other six days of 
each week; that this rule or plan was made in accordance 
with the general policy of segregation, and with regard to 
the necessities indicated by the proportionate numbers 
of players of the two groups respectively.

The response averred that the day on which the relator 
had applied to play golf and had been refused the use of 
the course was a Wednesday, the refusal being in recognition 
and enforcement of the rule allocating Mondays to Negro 
players.

In a determination of this case it must be noted at the 
outset that the command of the alternative writ would re­
quire that the city’s public golf course superintendent per­
mit the relator to use the course at all hours when it is open 
to public play. In order for relator to he entitled to a 
peremptory writ of mandamus it must appear that there is 
a clear legal duty for the respondent to comply and perform.

Relator, in mandamus, faces the obstacle that, if granted, 
the command of the peremptory writ may not he for less 
[fol. 9] than that which is commanded by the alternative 
writ. Tampa Waterworks Co. v. State, 82 So. 230.

The question then becomes this: Is the relator entitled 
to an order permitting him to use the city’s sole public golf 
course at all hours and times when it is open for play?

The question must be answered in the negative.
A requirement that some use of the course should be pro­

vided for relator, is by no means the same thing as a right 
or privilege for its use at any and all times every day.

This case does not involve the feature of furnishing for 
relator as a member of the Negro race golfing facilities 
substantially equivalent (to those afforded White players) 
on some other and separate golf course. There is no other 
such golf course owned or operated by the City of Miami. 
Compare, Law v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimoer, 78 F. 
Supp. 346.

The response shows a sufficient answer and defense. The 
point it makes of a general policy of segregation is sup­
ported by decisions of our Supreme Court, and was con­
ceded by counsel for relator in the argument before this 
Court.



9

It appears that the City, through its golf course super­
intendent has made an administrative determination of 
allotment of separate times for play on its public golf 
course for white players and for colored players.

From the nature of this mandamus case, this Court is 
not concerned with, nor called upon to pass upon any ques­
tion as to the reasonableness or sufficiency of the one day 
each week allotted to the members of relator’s race to use 
the course. Any complaint on that score might he the 
basis and subject of some other suit or proceeding, but 
relief of that character was not sought here, nor was it 
included in the command of the alternative writ.

Accordingly, the motion for peremptory writ is denied, 
and it is Considered, Ordered and Adjudged that judgment 
is awarded to the respondent.

Done and Ordered at Miami, Florida, this 22nd day of 
July, 1949.

(S.) Charles A. Carroll, Circuit Judge.

[fol. 10] In Circuit Cotjrt of Dade. County

N otice of A ppeal— Filed September 19, 1949
Comes now the relator, Joseph Rice, and takes and enters 

his appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida to review the 
order denying relator’s motion for a peremptory writ of 
mandamus and judgment for the respondent of the Circuit 
Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida in and 
for Dade County bearing the date of July 22, 1949, entered 
in the above styled cause and recorded among the records 
of said Court in Minute Book 171 at Page 88 and all parties 
to said cause are called upon to take notice of the entry of 
this appeal.

(S.) J. D. Johnson, 171 N. W. 11th Street, Miami, 
Florida. Gf. E. Craves, Jr., 941 N. W. Second 
Avenue, Miami, Florida, Attorneys for Relator.

State of F lorida,
County of Dade:

Personally appeared before me, an officer duly author­
ized to administer oaths and take acknowledgments, Gf. E. 
Graves, Jr., who being by me first duly sworn upon his 
oath deposes and says that he is one of the attorneys of



10

record for the relator in the above styled cause; and that 
on the 19th day of September, 1949 he did mail to the Hon­
orable J. W. Watson and John D. Marsh, solicitors for 
the respondent herein, a true and complete copy of the 
above and foregoing notice of appeal enclosed in an envelope 
bearing the requisite amount of United States uncancelled 
postage stamps, addressed as follows:

Hon. J. W. Watson, City Attorney, Dade County Court 
House, Miami, Florida
and
[fol. 11] John D. Marsh, Esquire, Assistant City Attor­
ney, Dade County Court House, Miami, Florida
by depositing said envelopes, properly sealed, stamped and 
addressed as aforesaid, in the United States Mail; and 
that the addresses on the said envelopes are the usual post- 
office addresses of the solicitors of record for the respondent 
in the above styled cause.

(S.) G. E. Graves, Jr.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 19th day of 
September A. D. 1949. (S.) W. D. Maynard,
Notary Public State of Florida at Large. My 
Commission Expires February 20, 1952. (Seal.)

In Circuit Court or Dade County

A ssignment of E rrors—Filed September 27, 1949
Now comes the relator and makes the following assign­

ment of errors on the entire record intended to be relied 
upon in the Supreme Court of Florida:

1. The Court erred in overruling and denying the relator’s 
motion for a peremptory writ of mandamus and simul­
taneously entering judgment for the respondent.

(S.) J. D. Johnson, 171 N. W. 11th Street, Miami, 
Florida. G. E. Graves, Jr., 941 N. W. Second Ave­
nue, Miami, Florida, Attorneys for Relator.



11

State of F lorida,
County of Dade:

Personally appeared before me, an officer duly authorized 
to administer oaths and take acknowledgments, G. E. 
[fol. 12] Graves, Jr., who upon his oath deposes and says 
that he is one of the attorneys of record for the relator in 
the above styled cause; and that on the 27th day of Sep­
tember, 1949 he did mail to the Honorable J. W. Watson 
and John D. Marsh, solicitors for the respondent herein, 
a true and complete copy of the above and foregoing assign­
ment of errors enclosed in an envelope bearing the requisite 
amount of United States uncancelled postage stamps, ad­
dressed as follows:

Hon. J. W. Watson, City Attorney, Dade County Court 
House, Miami, Florida
and

John D. Marsh, Esquire, Assistant City Attorney, Dade 
County Court House, Miami, Florida
by depositing said envelopes, properly sealed, sta-ped and 
addressed as aforesaid, in the United States Mail; and that 
the addresses on the said envelopes are the usual post- 
office addresses of the solicitors of record for the respondent 
in the above styled cause.

(S.) G. E. Graves, Jr.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 27th day of 
September A. D. 1949. (S.) Frank E. Jones,
Notary Public State of Florida at Large. My Com­
mission Expires: March 19, 1951. (Seal.)



12

I n Circuit Court op Dade County

D irections for M aking I T p  Transcript of Record—Filed 
September 27, 1949

To the Clerk of the avove styled Court:
You will please begin making up the transcript of record 

in the above entitled cause on the 27th day of September, 
A. D. 1949 and insert in full therein the following described 
pleadings, to wit:
[fol. 13] 1. Relators petition for an alternative writ of
mandamus.

2. Alternative writ of mandamus.
3. Return and answer of the respondent to the alternative 

writ of mandamus.
4. Relators motion for peremptory writ of mandamus.
5. Opinion and judgment of the Court overruling and 

denying relator’s motion for peremptory writ of mandamus.
6. Relator’s notice of appeal.
7. Relator’s assignment of errors.
8. Relator’s directions to the Clerk of the Circuit Court 

of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida for making up 
the transcript of record.

(Signed) J. D. Johnson, 171 N. W. Eleventh Street, 
Miami, Florida; (Signed) G. E. Graves, Jr., 941 
N. W. Second Avenue, Miami, Florida, Attorneys 
for Relator.

State of F lorida,
County of Dade:

Personally appeared before me, an officer duly authorized 
to administer oaths and take acknowledgments, G. E. Graves, 
Jr., who being first duly sworn upon his oath deposes and 
says that he is one of the attorneys of record for the rela­
tor in the above styled cause; and that on the 27th day of 
September, 1949, he did mail to the Honorable J. W. Watson 
and John D. Marsh, solicitors for the respondent herein, a 
true and complete copy of the above and foregoing direc­
tions to the clerk of the Circuit Court for the preparation of 
the transcript of record in the above captioned cause and 
did enclose the same in an envelope bearing the requisite 
amount of United States uncancelled postage stamps, ad­



13

dressed as follows: Hon. J. W. Watson, City Attorney, Dade 
County Court House, Miami, Florida, and John D. Marsh, 
Esquire, Assistant City Attorney, Dade County Court 
[fol. 14] House, by depositing said envelope, properly 
sealed, stamped and addressed as aforesaid in the United 
States Mail; and that the addresses on the said envelopes 
are the usual postoffice addresses of the solicitors of record 
for the respondent in the above styled cause.

(Signed) G. E. Graves, Jr.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 27th day of 
September, A. D. 1949. (Signed) Frank E. Jones, 
Notary Public State of Florida at Large. My 
Commission expires: March 19, 1951. (Seal.)

I n Circuit Court of Dade County 

(Same Caption)

R espondent-A ppellee’s D irections for M aking up T ran­
script of R ecord— Filed October 3,1949

To the Clerk of the above styled court:
In making up the tra-script of record herein, in accordance 

with the directions of the relator-appellant, you are further 
directed to include in the transcript the following :

1. Recite the filing on June 24, 1949, of the respondent’s 
motion to quash the alternative writ of mandamus.

2. Omitting all formal parts therefrom, copy these direc­
tions of the respondent-appellee for making up transcript 
of record.

J. W. Watson, Jr., City Attorney, and John D. Marsh, 
Assistant City Attorney, Attorneys for Respond­
ent-Appellee. By: (Signed) John D. March, Of 
Counsel.

I hereby certify that a copy of the above and foregoing 
Respondent-Appellee’s Directions for making up transcript 
of record, was mailed to John D. Johnson, Esq., 171 N. W.



14

11th Street, Miami, Florida, and to Gt. E. Graves, Jr., 941 
[fol. 15] N. W. Second Avenue, Miami, Florida, attorneys 
for Relator-Appellant, this the 30 day of September, 1949.

(Signed) John D. Marsh.

Clerk’s Certificate to foregoing transcript omitted in 
printing.

[fol. 16] Briefs having been submitted by counsel for the 
Relator-Appellant and counsel for the Respondent-Appellee 
and this cause having’ come on for oral argument before the 
Supreme Court of Florida, the Supreme Court of Florida 
rendered its opinion in the following words and figures:

In the Supreme Court of F lorida, January T erm, A. D. 
1950, Special D ivision B

J oseph R ice, Relator-Appellant,

vs.

H. H. A rnold, as Superintendent of Miami Springs Country 
Club, Respondent-Appellee

Opinion— Filed March 24, 1950

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dade County, Charles 
A. Carroll, Judge

John D. Johnson and G. E. Graves, Jr., for Appellant.
J. W. Watson and John D. Marsh, for Appellee.

Chapman , J .:
This is an action in mandamus originating in the Circuit 

Court of Dade County, Florida, stemming from the follow­
ing factual situations: The City of Miami owns and operates 
golf links known as the Miami Springs Country Club for the 
use and enjoyment of its citizens and residents and their 
guests. The city delegated to the respondent, H. H. Arnold, 
the authority to supervise and manage the golf course, in­
clusive of the power to promulgate reasonable rules and 
regulations necessary for the use and enjoyment thereof in 
behalf of the public. The petitioner, a colored man, on 
April 27, 1949, requested of the respondent the right and



15

privilege to play on the municipally owned golf links, but the 
request, it is contended was arbitrarily and unlawfully 
[fol. 17] denied.

The respondent, superintendent of the Miami Springs 
Country Club, concedes that the petitioner is a colored 
man, a citizen and resident of the City of Miami; now and 
for many years past a general policy of segregation of 
races has existed in both the State of Florida and City 
of Miami. The Miami Springs Country Club Golf Course 
until recently has been used exclusively by golfers of the 
white or Caucasian race, as no demands to use the course 
were made by negroes until April 11, 1949, when several 
colored men, after complying with all the rules of the golf 
links were permitted to use the golf course, when the dates 
of playing and the number of negro golf players were 
accurately recorded. This record reflects the following:

“ April 12th, 1949, Tuesday—8 players;
April 13, 1949, Wednesday—6 players;
April 14, 1949, Thursday—12 players;
April 15, 1949, Friday—52 players;
April 16, 1949, Saturday—8 players;
April 17, 1949, Sunday—6 players.

The costs of maintenance and operation of the Miami 
Springs Country Club Golf Course are paid exclusively 
from green fees paid by golfers for the use of the course 
and in order that it remain a self sustaining project it is 
essential that an average of 200 golfers daily use the course 
and pay the prescribed fees. The white patrons of the 
course refused and have declined to patronize the golf 
course and share the facilities thereof at the same time 
with the negro golfers. The total revenues arising from 
the small number of negro players using the course and 
paying the green fees, when standing alone, are insufficient 
to pay the actual operating and maintenance costs of the 
links. The golf course facilities previously supplied the 
citizens and residents of Miami will be abandoned (a) if 
the use of the course is exclusively restricted to the negro 
[fol. 18] golfers, because it will not be financially self sus­
taining; (b) if negro golfers are permitted to share the 
facilities of the course with the white golfers the latter 
will not patronize it, thereby resulting in an operational 
loss.



16

Pursuant to the existing general policy of segregation 
and in order to make the facilities of the golf course avail­
able to the public and usable by the two races and to avoid 
an abandonment thereof, the respondent superintendent 
adopted a rule for the operation of the links applicable to 
both negro and white golfers. The negro golfers under 
the rule use the facilities of the course one day each week 
and the white golfers use it the remaining six days of the 
week. The rule or policy so adopted and now in force and 
effect designate the days of the week in which white golfers 
will be allotted the exclusive use of the facilities of the 
golf course; and the days of the week in which the exclu­
sive use of the facilities of the golf course will be allotted 
to negro golfers. Pursuant to an administrative policy 
and in behalf of the public interest the above rule was 
adopted by the Superintendent of the course which al­
lotted the facilities of the course at different times to the 
white and colored golfers. If the ratio of colored golfers 
requesting the use of the facilities of the course shall from 
time to time increase, then the rule supra promulgated 
may or can be altered to conform to the demands of an 
increased number of colored golfers, thereby accom-odat- 
ing all citizen and resident golfers, and their guests as to 
the facilities of the course without regard to race or color. 
Under the operation of this rule the two races now and 
for some time past have used and enjoyed the recreational 
facilities of the course.

The commands of the alternative writ as issued required 
the respondent to permit the relator the use of the facili­
ties of the Miami Springs Country Club Golf Course “ dur­
ing all of the hours in which the course is usually open or 
show cause before the Court for his refusal so to do” . 
In the order denying the relator below a peremptory writ 
of mandamus as prayed for the trial court, in part, said: 
[fol. 19] “ In a determination of this case it must be noted 
at the outset that the command of the alternative writ 
would require that the city’s public golf course superin­
tendent permit the relator to use the course at all hours 
when it is open to public play. In order for relator to be 
entitled to a peremptory writ of mandamus it must appear 
that there is a clear legal duty for the respondent to comply 
and perform” .

The controlling question presented by the record is viz: 
Are the constitutional rights of the relator-appellant vio­



17

lated by the rule adopted and now in effect regulating tbe 
use of tbe facilities of tbe Miami Springs Country Club 
Golf Course owned and operated by tbe city and maintained 
exclusively by tbe green fees paid for tbe facilities by tbe 
golfers? Tbe white and negro golfers functioning under 
the rule use tbe facilities of the course, but on different 
days of the week. It appears that if tbe negroes are per­
mitted tbe use of the course with tbe white golfers, then 
tbe white golfers will not patronize the course. Tbe green 
fees paid by tbe negro golfers are insufficient to support 
and maintain the course. Tbe rule allows tbe negro golfers 
to use tbe course one day of the week and tbe white golfers 
six days. It is argued that tbe adopted rule avoids a clash 
of tbe two races; funds are made available to tbe city with 
which to supply golfing facilities to tbe public; golfing facili­
ties can be supplied the public by tbe city only in the man­
ner provided for by the rule, otherwise tbe services will 
be abandoned.

Counsel for relator-appellant contend that tbe rule, 
supra, violates the 14th Amendment to tbe Federal Con­
stitution; Section 1 of the Declaration of Eights of tbe 
Florida Constitution; it is contrary to tbe holdings of tbe 
Supreme Court of the United States as enunciated in Mis­
souri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337, 59 S. Ct. 232, 
83 L. Ed. 208; McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe E. 
Co.; 235 U. S. 151, 35 S. Ct. 69, 59 L. Ed. 169; Strauder v. 
West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 25 L. Ed. 664 and similar 
[fol. 20] cases. It is not contended that tbe City of Miami 
must maintain a golf course for the use and benefit of tbe 
negroes but since tbe city elected to supply golfing facilities 
to tbe public, then equal facilities must be provided to the 
relator and other members of the Negro race; that the 
relator-appellant and white golfers have a constitutional 
right to play the course at all times when it is open to the 
public.

It is generally conceded that an equal protection of the 
law operates as a protection against any state action, or 
municipality as an arm of the state, by statute or other­
wise, which denies to any person equal protection on ac­
count of race or color. If substantially equal accommo­
dations, facilities or privileges, are provided for persons 
of different races, then there is no violation of the equal 
protection clause of the Federal Constitution. Thus it 
has been held that a state may constitutionally forbid the



18

co-education of different races in the same private school. 
Berea College v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 209, 94 S.W. 623 
(On appeal Berea College v. Kentuckey, 211 U.S. 45, 295 
S. Ct. 33, 53 L. Ed. 81). It may assign different portions 
of parks for the exclusive use of different races. Warley 
v. Board of Park Comm’rs., 233 Ky. 688, 26 S. W. (2d) 554. 
It may prohibit the sale of liquor to different races at the 
same saloon. State ex rel. Tax Collector v. Falkenheiner, 
123 La. 617, 49 So. 214.

In the case of State v. Board of Trustees, 126 Ohio 290, 
185 N. E. 196, Dorris Weaver, a colored girl, in a mandamus 
action sought admission to a “ Home Economics Course”  
of the University of Ohio. The Home was so managed 
that the white students bought groceries, cooked and dined 
together as a common enterprise. They lived together 
two in a room with roommates of their own selection and 
had a common bath and toilet facilities. The relator was 
by the University authorities granted living quarters 
equipped in a similar manner to other buildings on the 
campus and no one interfered with her rights and priv­
ileges in pursuing the educational courses offered and she 
had an opportunity to entertain her friends and associates 
[fol. 21] as granted to other students. She had been denied 
the privilege of residing and associating with white stu­
dents and partaking in their family or communal life. 
Mandamus was denied—the court pointed out that when 
the government secured to each of its citizens equal rights 
before the law, equal opportunity for improvement, it had 
accomplished the end for which it was organized. Courts 
are powerless to eradicate social instincts or to abolish 
distinctions based on physical differences and the attempt 
to do so only accentuates existing difficulties. It cannot 
be overlooked that persons of the same tastes and desires, 
whether white or black, usually associate together to enjoy 
themselves to the best advantages. People generally move 
in the circles in which they are likely to be suited or matched. 
The reason for the rule was to prevent friction between the 
white and negro golfers on the course.

The relator-appellant requests this Court to hold as a 
matter of law that he is entitled to use the city’s golf course 
at all hours and times it is open to play despite the findings 
of fact in the Court below that he now enjoys substantially 
equal accom-odations provided for persons of the dif­
ferent races. It does not appear by the record that the



19

one day allotment of the facilities of the course to the 
negroes discriminated against the negro race. The days 
of playing each week were apportioned to the number of 
white and colored golfers according to the record of the 
course kept by the respondent. If an increased demand on 
the part of the negro golfers is made to appear, then more 
than one day each week will be allotted.

Mandamus is a legal remedy which is not always awarded 
as a matter of right but in the exercise of sound judicial 
discretion, and then only when based on equitable principles. 
The relator must establish a clear legal right to its issuance 
and further show that no other adequate remedy exists. 
State v. City of Miami, 156 Fla. 784, 24 So. (2d) 363. Ke- 
versible error has not clearly been made to appear. 

Affirmed.

[fol. 22] Adams, C. J. and Hobson, J., and Taylor, Asso­
ciate Justice concur.

[fol. 23] Clerk’s Certificate to foregoing transcript omitted 
in printing.

(8799)



20

[fol. 20] Transcript of Record of Proceedings Subsequent 
to the Granting- of the First Writ of Certiorari by the Su­
preme Court of the United States.

Supreme Court op the U nited States, October Term, 1951

N o.—

J o s e p h  R ic e , Petitioner,

vs.

H. H. A rnold, as Superintendent of Miami Springs Country
Club, Respondent

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of
Florida *

[fol. 21] On June 17, 1950 the petitioner tiled his petition 
for a writ of certiorari to issue to the Supreme Court of 
the State of Florida to have reviewed the first opinion and 
judgment of said Court. The Supreme Court granted the 
writ of certiorari.

* This is a transcript of the proceedings had in the Su­
preme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of 
Florida had subsequent to the granting of a writ of cer­
tiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States. The 
writ was granted by the Supreme Court in the October 
Term of the United States Supreme Court under the same 
caption in cause No. 145.



21

In the Supreme Court of the U nited States 

No. 145

J oseph E ice, Petitioner,
vs.

H. H. A rnold, as Superintendent of Miami Springs Country
Club

Order— Entered October 16, 1950 

“ Per Curiam :

The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The 
judgment is vacated and the cause is remanded to the Su­
preme Court of Florida for reconsideration in the light of 
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma 
State Eegents, 339 U. S. 637.”

I n the Supreme Court of F lorida 

J oseph E ice, Eelator-Appellant,
vs.

H. H. A rnold, as Superintendent of Miami Springs Country 
Club, Eespondent-Appellee

M otion for L eave to F ile B rief and for Oral A rgument

The judgment in the above entitled cause having been 
vacated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the 
case of Eice v. Arnold, No. 145, and the cause having been 
remanded to this Honorable Court for reconsideration in 
the light of Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 and McLaurin 
v. Oklahoma State Eegents, 339 U. S. 637, and counsel for 
the appellee herein, H. H. Arnold, as Superintendent of 
Miami Springs Country Club, being of the opinion that the 
mentioned cases can be distinguished from the case at bar, 
the said counsel for appellee herein respectfully move the 
Court, in the event that this cause is reconsidered, that 
they be granted leave to tile a brief in support of the judg­



22'

ment heretofore rendered in this cause, cited in — Fla. —, 
[fol. 22] 4o So. 2d 195, and that they further be granted 
leave to present oral argument before this Honorable Court 
prior to the entry of any further judgment herein.

In the event that this motion is granted, it is requested 
that the Court will, by appropriate order, fix a time within 
which briefs shall be filed and set a time for oral argument.

Respectfully submitted, J. W. Watson, Jr., City At­
torney and John D. Marsh, Assistant City Attor­
ney, Attorneys for Appellee, by (Signed) John D. 
Marsh, of Counsel.

I Hereby Certify that a copy of the foregoing Motion for 
Leave to File Brief and For Oral Argument was mailed 
to each of the following attorneys for appellant:

Franklin H. Williams, Esq., 20 West 40 Street, New York 
18, New York;

G-. E. Graves, Jr., Esq., 941 N. W. Second Avenue, Miami, 
Florida;

John D. Johnson, Esq., 171 N. W. Eleventh Street, Miami, 
Florida; this the 23 day of October, 1950.

I n the Supreme Court oe F lorida, January T erm, A . D.
1951, M onday, May 28, 1951

(Same Caption)
Upon consideration of motion of counsel for Appellee for 

leave to file brief in this cause since the coming down of 
the mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States, it 
is ordered that said motion be and the same is hereby 
denied.

Test:
(Signed) Guyte P. McCord, Clerk, Supreme Court.

(Supreme Court Seal.)



23

In the Supreme Court of F lorida, J une T erm, A. D., 1951,
E n B anc.

(Same Caption)

Opinion

Opinion filed August 31,1951.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dade County, 

Charles A. Carroll, Judge.
[fol. 23] John D. Johnson and G. E. Graves, Jr., for Ap­
pellant.

J. W. Watson, Jr., and John D. Marsh for Appellee. 

Taylor, Associate Justice:
This is an action in mandamus originating in the Circuit 

Court of Dade County. We will, refer to the parties as re­
lator and respondent, the capacities which they occupied in 
the Circuit Court.

It appears that the City of Miami owns a golf course, the 
management of which is delegated to the respondent, II. H. 
Arnold; that respondent, acting for the City, made certain 
rules regulating the use of these public facilities; that 
among these rules was one which provided for the allocation 
of certain days for the use of the golf course exclusively 
by colored persons and the allocation of certain days for 
the use of the course exclusively by white persons.

Relator, Joseph Rice, a colored person, was denied the 
privilege of enjoying these facilities on one of the days on 
which the use of the course had been allocated to white 
persons.

Relator, Joseph Rice, a colored person, was denied the 
privilege of enjoying these facilities on one of the days 
on which the use of the course had been allocated to white 
persons.

Upon his application, the Circuit Court issued its alter­
native writ of mandamus requiring the respondent

“ To forthwith grant the petitioner the privilege of 
golfing on the Miami Springs Country Club golf course 
during all of the hours in which the said course is 
open to the public, subject, however, to any lawful 
rules and regulations governing the use thereof” ,



24

or show cause why the peremptory writ should not issue. 
The respondent filed his return to the alternative writ 
setting up the rule above referred to and setting up vari­
ous facts which he contended justified the allocation of time 
for the use of the course by the persons of different races. 
Relator moved for a peremptory writ notwithstanding the 
return. This motion was denied for reasons stated in the 
judgment of the Circuit Court. We affirmed with opinion. 
See 45 So. (2d) 195.

The relator appealed to the Supreme Court of the United 
States and that court issued its judgment and mandate, 
[fol. 24] the pertinent parts of which are as follows:

“ It is ordered and adjudged by this court that the 
judgment of the said Supreme Court (of Florida) 
in this cause be, and the same is hereby, vacated with­
out cost to either party.

“ It is further ordered that this cause be, and the 
same is hereby, remanded to the said Supreme Court 
for reconsideration in the light of subsequent decisions 
of this Court in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629, and 
McLaurin vs. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637. ’ ’

The first question to be considered by us is whether this 
judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States is 
such as to impel this Court to reverse its former judgment 
or whether this court is left free to use its independent 
judgment in determining the correctness of its original con­
clusion when viewed in the light of the development of the 
judicial construction of the Federal Constitution in the 
cited cases which were decided subsequent to our first con­
sideration of this case.

The language employed in the mandate would seem to 
clearly indicate that no final adjudication was intended. 
The use of the word “ vacated”  instead of the usual term 
“ reversed”  and the direction that we reconsider the case 
suggest that our original judgment should be regarded as 
reopened for further study of the question presented and 
that our views of the law should be reconsidered in the light 
of the cited opinions.

To hold otherwise would attribute to that court a vague­
ness of decision or delicacy in expressing its disagreement



25

with a state court which is not in harmony with its action 
in other cases. In reviewing the decisions to which our 
attention has been directed, we must yield to the Supreme 
Court of the United States its paramount authority as the 
final arbiter of all questions involving the construction of 
the Federal Constitution. In examining its opinions, we 
should not search for distinctions without differences be­
tween a case before us and established precedent. On the 
other hand, we should announce and adhere to our con­
sidered judgment as to the meaning of the Constitution and 
its application to a particular factual situation, so long 
as it is support- by earlier decisions and is not in conflict 
[fol. 25] with more recent holdings either directly or by 
necessary inference.

We would be guilty of closing our eyes to a fact not only 
apparent from the pages of recent decisions but generally 
known throughout the nation if we do not approach the 
problem in full recognition of the fact that the applicable 
parts of the Constitution are in process of redefinition; 
that they are being given a broader meaning than they were 
previously thought to have. It is our duty to follow the 
Supreme Court in this process and to conform our legal 
thinking to whatever that body declares the Constitution 
to mean; but until earlier precedents have been clearly modi­
fied by the court which established them, we should adhere 
to these decisions. The cases to which our attention is di­
rected both dealt with the right of colored persons to enjoy 
facilities of higher education offered by state institutions.

In the McLaurin case the question presented, as stated by 
the court, was:

“ Whether a state may, after admitting a student to 
graduate instructions in a state university, afford him 
different treatment from other students solely because 
of his race” .

The answer was in the negative but the basis of that an­
swer, as appears from the opinion of the court, was that 
the action of the university officials in adopting rules of 
racial segregation was such that:

“ The result is that appellant is handicapped in his 
pursuit of effective graduate instruction. Such re­



26

strict ions impair and inhibit his ability to study, to 
engage in discussions and exchange views with other 
students, and, in general, to learn his profession” .

And the court said:
“ We hold that under these circumstances the Four­

teenth Amendment precludes differences in treatment 
by the State based upon race” . (Emphasis supplied.)

It should be observed that the purpose of the public insti­
tutions there involved was the education of those enrolled as 
students. The court held that the treatment accorded Mc- 
Laurin, segregation, handicapped him and tended to “ im­
pair and inhibit”  his ability to acquire the education that 
[fob 26] it was the purpose and function of the institution 
to provide.

In the Sweatt case the appellant had been denied admis­
sion to the University of Texas Law School and offered a 
course of study in another law school provided by the state 
for members of petitioner’s race. After a discussion of 
various phases of the process of legal education and the 
benefits that flow from study in and graduation from the 
particular school in question, the court concluded that:

“ Whether the University of Texas Law School is 
compared with the original or the new law school for 
Negroes, we can not find substantial equality in the 
educational opportunities offered white and Negro law 
students by the State ’ ’.

“ With such a substantial and significant segment 
of society excluded, we cannot conclude that the educa­
tion offered petitioner is substantially equal to that 
which he would receive if admitted to the University 
of Texas Law School” . (Emphasis supplied.)

Here again the conclusion reached seems to be bottomed 
squarely upon the finding that the educational facilities 
offered were not equal and, therefore, the individual’s rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution were 
impaired. If the rationale of these opinions applies to the



27

factual situation before this court, it is our duty to apply 
them and decide this case accordingly. On the other hand, 
if the reasoning by which the court reached the conclusions 
announced in those cases, does not apply to the case before, 
us, the decisions are not in point and we should not expand 
them so as to construe them as covering situations not 
within the contemplation of the court when those decisions 
were written, particularly when to do so would conflict with 
previously accepted views as to the meaning of the Fed­
eral Constitution and the views of the law as expressed in 
this case by the relator, himself. In his brief filed before 
us, the relator says:

“ The appellant does not contend that there is not 
a general policy of segregation of the races in Florida 
ffol. 27] and more particularly in the City of Miami nor 
does he contend that racial segregation in the pro­
vision of public facilities is per se unlawful. This ele­
mentary rule of lawx has long since been settled in this 
state under the numerous decisions of our Supreme 
Court which hold that the state may within the exercise 
of its powers segregate the white and colored races. 
Patterson vs. Taylor, 51 Florida 275, 40 So. 493; Crooms 
vs. Schad, 51 Fla. 168, 40 So. 479; Sanders vs. City of 
Daytona Beach, 95 Fla. 279, 116 So. 23” .

Again he states:
“ For emphasis the appellant reiterates. The appel­

lant does not contend that there is not a general policy 
of segregation of the races: he does not challenge the 
now often confirmed power of a state or its subordinate 
parts to create and enforce a policy of segregation of 
races. His sole contention regarding the validity of 
racial segregation is that the rule made and provided by 
the respondent as the authorized agent of the City of 
Miami by providing only one day in each week for the 
exclusive use of the only municipally owned golf course 
and the reservation of the remainder of each week for 
white players is contrary to the Constitution of the 
United States and the Constitution of the State of 
Florida ’ ’.



28

Turning to the facts of the case before this court, we take 
judicial notice that the game of golf is of such a nature 
that it requires the maintenance of links which cover a con­
siderable area and that it can be played only by persons 
alone or in very small groups not exceeding, except in 
unusual cases, four persons, although several of such 
groups may play simultaneously on different parts of the 
course. There are of necessity some, but limited, contacts 
between the various groups so playing, particularly around 
the club house and starting tees. The purpose and function 
of the game is to obtain the pleasure and exercise incident 
to the playing and the rivalry and association between per­
sons who arrange in advance to play together. The exercise, 
the rivalry and the association are not enhanced by the 
[fol. 28] other persons who may, on the same day or during 
the same hours, elect to enjoy the facilities.

This is quite different from an educational institution 
where the purpose is to develop the capacities of an 
individual to practice a profession. The intangible benefits 
referred to by the Supreme Court of the United States as 
incident to the educational advantages offered by the Uni­
versity of Oklahoma and the University of Texas Law 
School are entirely absent. The decisions above referred 
to are not, therefore, controlling.

It is significant that in the Sweatt case the court was 
urged to hold that discrimination inevitably results 
wherever the “ separate but equal”  doctrine is applied 
with reference to public facilities furnished persons of 
different races; but the court said, “ broader issues have 
been urged for our consideration, but we adhere to the 
principle of deciding constitutional questions only in the 
context of the particular case before the court” , thereby de­
clining* to destroy the well established rule that has been 
applied ever since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment to the Constitution to the effect that where separate 
but equal facilities are provided persons of different races, 
no person of either race is thereby denied the full protection 
of his constitutional rights. Among the numerous deci­
sions enunciating this principle, we cite only Plessv v. 
Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 41 L. Ed. 256, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 
because of its clarity and because the Supreme Court in the



29

Sweatt case expressly declined to “ re-examine”  that hold­
ing, thus impliedly directing all courts subordinate to it 
in the field of constitutional construction, to continue to 
recognize that decision as binding authority. We are di­
rected to reconsider our conclusions in the case before us 
in the light of the decision in the Sweatt case. A part of 
that decision was the refusal of the Supreme Court to 
modify Plessy v. Ferguson.

In the case before us there is no question of the equality 
of the physical facilities offered petitioner with which he 
may enjoy his constitutional right to engage in the game 
of golf upon public property. The facilities offered "peti­
tioner are identical with the facilities offered persons of 
other races by the City of Miami.

Petitioner contends that in the application to him of a 
[fol. 29] rule allocating to him and others of his race certain 
times within which he may use the facilities and limiting his 
use to such times, there has been an unreasonable and un­
just discrimination which deprives him of his constitutional 
right.

In the former opinion of this court which has been 
vacated by the Supreme Court of the United States, we 
affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court of Dade County. 
In the opinion we expressed the view that it had not been 
made to appear that the rule allocating time for the use 
of the golf course between persons of different races, of 
which complaint is here made was unreasonable in the 
light of the circumstances presented by the record. In so 
stating, we went beyond the decision of the Circuit Court 
being reviewed and that opinion should be vacated and 
withdrawn and the case should be re-examined in its 
entirety.

If this case can properly be disposed of without going 
beyond the holding of the circuit court, we should restrict 
our present adjudication to the review of the action of that 
court and in order to do this, we must analyze the pleadings 
before that court and the holding of that court on those 
pleadings.

The circuit court granted relator an alternative writ of 
mandamus commanding the respondent “ to forthwith grant 
the petitioner the privilege of golfing on the Miami Springs



30

Country Golf Club Course during all of the hours in which 
said course is open to the public; subject, however, to any 
lawful rules and regulations governing the use thereof” . To 
this writ a return was filed setting up various matters which 
the respondent felt justified the rule which the respondent 
had adopted allocating the use of the golf course to white 
persons exclusively on certain days and to colored persons 
exclusively on certain days.

Thereupon, the relator moved for a peremptory writ on 
the ground that, “ The return and answer of the respondent 
failed to show any cause which is cognizable at law for 
the failure and refusal to permit the relator to golf on the. 
Miami Springs Country Club Golf Course” .

On these pleadings the Court entered an order in which 
it held:

“ In a determination of this case it must be noted at 
the outset that the command of the alternative writ 
[fol. 30] would require that the city’s public golf course 
superintendent permit the relator to use the course at 
all hours when it is open to public play. In order for 
relator to be entitled to a peremptory writ of manda­
mus, it must appear that there is a clear, legal duty 
for the respondent to comply and perform.

“ Belator in mandamus faces the obstacle that if 
granted the command of the peremptory writ may not 
be for less than that which is commanded by the alter­
native writ (citing authority). “ The question then 
becomes this: Is the relator entitled to an order per­
mitting him to use the city’s sole public golf course at 
all hours and times when it is open for play? “ That 
question must be answered in the negative. “ A require­
ment that some use of the course should be provided for 
relator is by no means the same thing as the right or 
privilege for its use at any and all times every day.

^

“ It appears that the city, through its golf course 
superintendent, has made an administrative determi­
nation of allotment of separate times for jjlay on its 
public golf course for white players and colored play­
ers. “ From the nature of this mandamus case, this



31

court is not concerned with, nor called upon to pass 
upon any question as to the reasonableness of suffi­
ciency of the one day each week allot-ed to the members 
of the relator’s race to use the course. Any complaint 
on that score might be the basis and subject of some 
other suit or proceedings, but relief of that character 
was not sought here nor was it included in the com­
mand of the alternative writ” .

If it be conceded that the rule adopted by the respondent 
is unreasonable, a question which should not be now de­
cided, the relator would not be entitled to a peremptory 
writ as broad as the alternative writ because such a writ 
would preclude the adoption of a rule making a reasonable 
allocation of time for the use of the golf course between 
persons of different races.

It might be urged, although it does not appear from the 
[fol. 31] pleadings that such a contention was presented to 
the circuit court, that the rule allot-ing time between the 
races is unreasonable, and therefore, invalid and as a con­
sequence there exists no lawful rule allot-ing time between 
the races and that for this reason the peremptory writ 
should issue. This process of reasoning, however, contains 
two fundamental fallacies. It is admitted, in fact, asserted, 
in the brief of the relator that there exists in the State of 
Florida and in the City of Miami an established public 
policy for the segregation of the races that would apply to 
a golf course. This public policy would require that there 
be a fair, just and reasonable allocation of time to the re­
lator and members of other races, but the granting of the 
peremptory writ in conformity with the alternative writ 
would forever preclude the respondent from promulgating 
such a rule. Secondly, it was, at the time this judgment 
was entered, the established practice in this State that the 
command of a peremptory writ must follow the command of 
the alternative writ, and unless the relator had made it 
appear from his petition, coupled with the allegations of 
the answer, that he has a clear, legal right to use the golf 
course at all times when it is open for play, he was not 
entitled to a peremptory writ upon his alternative writ in 
its present form.



32

Under the laws of this State the relator has adequate 
means by which to test the reasonableness of the rule pro­
mulgated by the respondent. He may do so by a bill for 
declaratory judgment in which the court could hear the 
contentions of all parties and determine what would be a 
reasonable allocation of time for the use of the course 
between persons of different races. He may take the posi­
tion that the present rule is void for unreasonableness and 
by mandamus seek to require the respondent to adopt a 
reasonable rule. Equity would also have jurisdiction to 
protect his rights.

The circuit court clearly indicated to relator that he 
should pursue another remedy. Relator has not seen fit to 
do so. Rights under the Federal Constitution as well as 
other rights must be enforced by orderly processes of the 
courts and in accordance with established rules of procedure.

The rights of Sweatt and McLaurin were properly en­
forced by mandamus because the Court held that, as regards 
the factual situation there presented, any segregation was 
[fol. 32] unlawful and the determination of the reasonable­
ness of the rules was not necessary. In the case before us the 
relator admits that the policy of segregation exists in Miami 
and admits that it is not per se unlawful, yet he seeks a 
writ which would, if issued, make it impossible for the city 
to adopt any rirle effectuating this admittedly lawful public 
policy. He is not entitled to that writ even if he is entitled 
to secure, in a proper proceeding, an allotment of a greater 
amount of time for the use of the golf course by persons 
of his race.

It is now the judgment of this court that the opinion and 
judgment of this court filed herein March 24, 1950, be, and 
the same is, hereby withdrawn, vacated and set aside; that 
in accordance with the mandate of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, we have reconsidered this cause in the light 
of recent decisions of that court and, upon such reconsider­
ation, for the reasons hereinbefore stated, the judgment of 
the Circuit Court of Dade County is hereby affirmed.

Chapman, Thomas and Adams, JJ., concur.
Terrell, Acting Chief Justice, and Hobson, J., dissent.
Roberts, J., not participating.



33

State oe F lorida,
County of Leon:

I, Guyte P. McCord, Clerk of the Supreme Court of 
Florida, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing is 
a true and correct transcript of all of the proceedings had 
in the case of Joseph Rice v. H. H. Arnold, as Superin­
tendent of Miami Springs Country Club, subsequent to the 
granting of the writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court of 
the United States in Case No. 145 according to the records 
of said Court in the October Term of 1950.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and 
affixed the seal of said Court this 8th day of November, 1951.

Guyte P. McCord, Clerk of the Supreme Court of 
Florida. (Seal.)

(8622)