Rice v Arnold Petition for Writ Certiorari
Public Court Documents
October 1, 1950

36 pages
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Rice v Arnold Petition for Writ Certiorari, 1950. fea67125-c29a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/612ce0c3-a0a2-429e-85ff-0c716b5cf044/rice-v-arnold-petition-for-writ-certiorari. Accessed July 30, 2025.
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TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD S u p r e m e C o u r t o f th e U n ite d S ta te s OCTOBER TERM, 1950 No. JOSEPH lilCE, PETITIONER, H. H. ARNOLD, AS SUPERINTENDENT OF MIAMI SPRINGS COUNTRY CLUB ON PE TITIO N FOB W RIT OF CERTIORARI TO T H E SUPREM E COURT OF T H E STATE OF FLORIDA FILED SUPREME CO U RT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM, 1950 No. JOSEPH RICE, PETITIONER, vs. H. H. ARNOLD, AS SUPERINTENDENT OP MIAMI SPRINGS COUNTRY CLUB ON PE TITIO N EOR W R IT OE CERTIORARI TO TH E SUPREM E COURT OP T H E STATE OE FLORIDA INDEX Record from the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida in and for Dade County..................... Petition for alternative writ o f mandamus................... Alternative writ of mandamus....................................... Return and answer........................................................... Note re filing of motion to quash................................... Motion for peremptory writ of mandamus................... Opinion and judgment..................................................... Notice o f appeal............................................................... Assignment of errors....................................................... Directions for making up transcript of record.............. Respondent-Appellee’s directions for making up tran script of record ........................................................... Clerk’s certificate................... (omitted in printing).. Proceedings in Supreme Court of Florida......................... Opinion, Chapman, J. ........................................................... Clerk’s certificate............................. (omitted in printing). . ginal Print i l i l 3 3 4 4 6 6 7 6 7 7 10 9 11 10 12 12 14 13 15 16 14 16 14 23 J udd & D e t w e il e r (Ino.), Printers, W a s h in g t o n , D. C., J u n e 21, 1950. —8799 1 [fol. 1] IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDI CIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA IN AND FOR DADE COUNTY No. 23127 Joseph Rioe, Realtor vs. H. H. A rnold, as Superintendent of Miami Springs Country Club, Respondent Petition for A lternative W rit of M andamus— Piled June 3, 1949 To: The Honorable Judges of the Above Styled Court: Comes now Joseph Rice, by his undersigned attorneys, and respectfully represents unto your Honors as follows: 1 That the petiotioner, or relator, is a citizen and resident of Miami, Dade County, Florida. That both of the parties hereto are above the age of twenty one years and are sui juris. That the respondent, H. H. Arnold, is the duly appointed superintendent of the Miami Springs Country Club, a recreational center which is owned and operated by the City of Miami, Florida, a municipal corporation. 2 That for a long time prior to April 27, 1949 the City of Miami, Florida owned and operated, and on the date of the filing of this petition still owns and operates, the Miami Springs Country Club for the use and enjoyment of the residents of Miami and their guests. That the respondent as an employee of the City of Miami, Florida and as Superintendent of the Miami Springs Country Club has been delegated the authority by the City of Miami to prescribe and enforce the rules and regulations governing the use of the Miami Springs Country Club. Your relator further represents unto your Honors that the Miami Springs Coun try Club is the only recreation center which is operated by [fol. 2] the City of Miami which has a golf course. 1—8799 2 That the petitioner is a colored man or a man often referred to as a descendent from the African race. That on April 27, 1949, in strict compliance with all of the rules and regulations then in effect governing the use of the Miami Springs Country Club G-olf Course, and during the hours in which the golf course was open and in general use, the petitioner did request the ticket agent at the golf course to sell unto the petitioner a ticket which would admit him to golf on the said links on the aforementioned date. That the petitioner on said date was refused admission to the golf course by the ticket agent because the respondent in his official capacity directed the agent to refuse to sell the petitioner the requested ticket because he, the petitioner, was a colored man and for no other reason. That as a resident of Miami, Florida, your petitioner is entitled to use the municipally owned links free from his arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful exclusion by the respondent. Wherefore the relator being without a remedy save in mandamus, relator respectfully prays that this Honorable Court do issue an alternative writ of mandamus, command ing the respondent, as Superintendent of Miami Springs Country Club within a short time to be set by this Court to either permit the relator to golf on the Miami Springs Country Club Golf Course, subject to such lawful rules and regulations made by the respondent, during all of the hours in which the course is usually open, or show cause before this Court for his refusal to do so. (Signed) Joseph Rice, Petitioner. (Signed) John D. Johnson, 171 N.W. 11th Street, Miami, Florida; G. E. Graves, Jr., 941 N.W. Sec ond Avenue, Miami, Florida, Attorneys for Re lator. 3 3 [fol. 3] In Circuit Court of Dade Countt A lternative W rit of A lternative— June 10,1949 In the Name of the State of Florida: T o : H. H. Arnold, as Superintendent of Miami Springs Country Club, Greetings: Whereas, it appears from the petition filed by Joseph Rice that he, the petitioner, is entitled to golf on the Miami Springs Country Club Golf Course during all of the hours in which the said course is open to the public; subject, how ever, to the rules and regulations governing the use thereof lawfully made and provided by the Superintendent of the Miami Springs Country Club; that the petitioner has asked your permission to golf on the Miami Springs Country Club Golf Course during all of the hours in which the said course is open to the public and that it is your duty as superin tendent of said club to permit the petitioner to golf on said links without discrimination and that you have failed and refused and persist in your refusal to permit the peti tioner to golf on the course owned and operated by the City of Miami, Florida under similar rules and regulations as are applied to others. (A copy of the said petition is hereto attached and is hereby made a part of this writ just as if the contents thereof were fully set forth herein.) Now Therefore, we being willing that full and speedy justice be done in the premises, do command you as Super intendent of the Miami Springs Country Club to forthwith grant the petitioner the privilege of golfing on the Miami Springs Country Club Golf Course during all of the hours in which the said course is open to the public, subject how ever to any lawful rules and regulations governing the use thereof, or in default thereof that you appear before this Court on the 27th day of June, 1949 in Chambers at Miami, Florida and then and there show cause why you refuse so to do. Done and Ordered at the Court House in Miami, Florida this 10th day of June, 1949. (Signed) Charles A. Carroll, Circuit Judge. 2—8799 4 [fol. 4] In Circuit Court of Dade County R eturn and A nswer— June 24, 1949 The respondent, H. H. Arnold, as Superintendent of Miami Springs Country Club, by and through his under signed attorneys, makes this, his return to the alternative writ of mandamus, heretofore issued in this cause, and his answer to the allegations of the petition for such alterna tive writ, and thereupon alleges: 1. The respondent admits the material allegations of paragraph numbered one of the petition, with the exception, of that portion of such numbered paragraph which alleges that the relator is a citizen and resident of Miami, Dade County, Florida and that he is sui juris, and, as to such allegations, the respondent is without knowledge and there fore neither admits nor denies the said allegations and demands strict proof thereof. 2. The respondent admits the material allegations of paragraph numbered two of the petition. 3. In answer to paragraph numbered three of the peti tion, the respondent admits the material allegations of fact therein set forth and denies that the respondent’s action in denying the petitioner the privilege of using the golf course on April 27th, 1949, is arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful, for the reason that such date fell upon a Wednesday, a day of the week set aside for the exclusive use of the mentioned golf course by persons of the Cau casian race, as will more fully appear hereinafter. 4. For further answer to the petition herein, the respond ent alleges: (a) There is, throughout the State of Florida and more particularly within the City of Miami, a general policy of segregation of races. (b) Until April, 1949, the golf course at the Miami Springs Country Club has been used exclusively by golfers of the Caucasian race for the reason that no persons of the negro race had prior to such time, evidenced a desire to the [fol. 5] respondent to exercise the privilege of playing golf on the mentioned course. 5 (c) On April 11, 1949, five negroes demanded that they he permitted to play golf upon the course in question, and after complying with the rules of the Club, were granted the privilege which they had demanded. Thereafter, the following number of negro players used the golf course upon the days hereinafter mentioned: April 12th, 1949, Tuesday—8 players; April 13th, 1949, Wednesday—6 players; April 14th, 1949, Thursday—12 players; April 15, 1949, Friday—52 players; April 16, 1949, Saturday—8 players; April 17, 1949, Sunday—6 players; (d) The golf course at Miami Springs Country Club is and has been for many years a wholly self-sustaining proj ect, maintained solely from fees paid by golfers for the use of the course. It receives no subsidy from taxes paid by citizens of the city. In order that the course may re main self-sustaining it is essential that an average of at least 200 golfers a day use the course, and pay the required fees. (e) As a result of the general policy of segregation al leged above, the white patrons of the golf course announced their intention to withdraw their patronage from the club if they were to be required to share the facilities thereof with negroes during the times they were using the course, which action, in view of the small number of negroes using the course, would result in such loss of revenue as to require the abandonment by the city of the facilities offered by the club. (f) In accordance with the general policy of segregation as above alleged and because of the threatened action by white patrons of the Club facilities, the respondent, as Superintendent of the Club, invoked and announced a policy by and under which both negro and white patrons might use and enjoy the privilege of the mentioned golf course bu allot-ing to each group or race the exclusive use of the course on separate, designated days, and, because the number of white players far exceeds the number of negro players, the respondent, by the rule laid down in con formity with this announced policy, allotted to the white patrons of the golf course exclusive use of such facilities 6 on six days of the week and to the negro patrons exclusive use of said facilities on one day, namely, Monday of each [fol. 6] week, the number of negro players being much less than one-seventh of the total number of players using the course. (g) Since the invocation and announcement of the rule alleged in the preceding paragraph, negro and white play ers have enjoyed the use of the facilities of the golf course, and the number of negro players has not increased suffi ciently at the time of making of this answer to warrant any increase in the time allotted them for the exclusive use of the course. (h) Wherefore, the respondent says that the relator is not being denied the use of the facilities of the mentioned golf course as is alleged in the petition, and moves that an appropriate order be entered herein, adjudging this cause in favor of the respondent and dismissing the alternative writ. (Signed) J. W. Watson, Jr., John D. Marsh, Attor neys for Respondent. Duly sworn to by John D. Marsh. Jurat omitted in print ing. I n Circuit Court op Dade County N otice re F iling op M otion to Quash On June 24th, 1949, the respondent filed a motion to quash [fol. 7] the alternative writ of mandamus. In Circuit Court op Dade County M otion for Peremptory W rit of Mandamus—Filed July 18, 1949 Comes now the relator, by his undersigned attorneys, and moves the Court for a peremptory writ of mandamus and for reason therefor says that the return and answer of the 7 respondent fail to show an cause which is cognizable at law for his failure and refusal to permit the relator to golf on the Miami Springs Country Club Golf Course. John D. Johnson and G. E. Graves, Jr., Attorneys for Relator, by (Signed) G. E. Graves, Jr., Of Counsel. In Circuit Court op Dade County Opinion and Judgment—July 22, 1949 This cause is before this Court on relator’s motion for peremptory writ notwithstanding the answer or response. Argument of counsel was heard thereon after notice. The alternative writ of mandamus and petition on which it is based reveal that the City of Miami maintains one public golf course, of which the respondent Arnold is the superintendent, empowered to make and enforce rules as to its use; that on a certain date, complying with the use rules, the relator Joseph Rice, a Negro resident of the city, was denied the right and privilege of playing golf on the course; that the sole reason for the refusal was because rela tor was a member of the colored race; and that the refusal was an arbitrary, capricious and unlawful exclusion of the [fol. 8] relator by the respondent. The command of the alternative writ was that the re spondent superintendent of the golf course “ forthwith grant petitioner (relator) the privilege of golfing on the Miami Springs Country Club Golf Course during all of the hours in which the said course is open to the public, subject to any lawful rules and regulations governing the use thereof. ’ ’ The response averred that there was a general policy of segregation of the races throughout this state and in the city; that shortly prior to the date involved, certain other Negroes had requested and been granted the privilege of play on the course, for six consecutive days, and while fifty- two played on one of those days the average on the other five days was eight or nine; that the course, which is self sustaining from fees paid by the golfers, operates on the basis and experience of a daily quota or average of two hundred players; that announced loss of patronage, from players who objected to such joint use by the races, was such as to indicate a loss of revenue which would endanger 8 future successful operation; that the respondent had then made a rule under which on one day of each week (Monday) use of the course was available to negroes exclusively, with white players having exclusive use the other six days of each week; that this rule or plan was made in accordance with the general policy of segregation, and with regard to the necessities indicated by the proportionate numbers of players of the two groups respectively. The response averred that the day on which the relator had applied to play golf and had been refused the use of the course was a Wednesday, the refusal being in recognition and enforcement of the rule allocating Mondays to Negro players. In a determination of this case it must be noted at the outset that the command of the alternative writ would re quire that the city’s public golf course superintendent per mit the relator to use the course at all hours when it is open to public play. In order for relator to he entitled to a peremptory writ of mandamus it must appear that there is a clear legal duty for the respondent to comply and perform. Relator, in mandamus, faces the obstacle that, if granted, the command of the peremptory writ may not he for less [fol. 9] than that which is commanded by the alternative writ. Tampa Waterworks Co. v. State, 82 So. 230. The question then becomes this: Is the relator entitled to an order permitting him to use the city’s sole public golf course at all hours and times when it is open for play? The question must be answered in the negative. A requirement that some use of the course should be pro vided for relator, is by no means the same thing as a right or privilege for its use at any and all times every day. This case does not involve the feature of furnishing for relator as a member of the Negro race golfing facilities substantially equivalent (to those afforded White players) on some other and separate golf course. There is no other such golf course owned or operated by the City of Miami. Compare, Law v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimoer, 78 F. Supp. 346. The response shows a sufficient answer and defense. The point it makes of a general policy of segregation is sup ported by decisions of our Supreme Court, and was con ceded by counsel for relator in the argument before this Court. 9 It appears that the City, through its golf course super intendent has made an administrative determination of allotment of separate times for play on its public golf course for white players and for colored players. From the nature of this mandamus case, this Court is not concerned with, nor called upon to pass upon any ques tion as to the reasonableness or sufficiency of the one day each week allotted to the members of relator’s race to use the course. Any complaint on that score might he the basis and subject of some other suit or proceeding, but relief of that character was not sought here, nor was it included in the command of the alternative writ. Accordingly, the motion for peremptory writ is denied, and it is Considered, Ordered and Adjudged that judgment is awarded to the respondent. Done and Ordered at Miami, Florida, this 22nd day of July, 1949. (S.) Charles A. Carroll, Circuit Judge. [fol. 10] In Circuit Cotjrt of Dade. County N otice of A ppeal— Filed September 19, 1949 Comes now the relator, Joseph Rice, and takes and enters his appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida to review the order denying relator’s motion for a peremptory writ of mandamus and judgment for the respondent of the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida in and for Dade County bearing the date of July 22, 1949, entered in the above styled cause and recorded among the records of said Court in Minute Book 171 at Page 88 and all parties to said cause are called upon to take notice of the entry of this appeal. (S.) J. D. Johnson, 171 N. W. 11th Street, Miami, Florida. Gf. E. Craves, Jr., 941 N. W. Second Avenue, Miami, Florida, Attorneys for Relator. State of F lorida, County of Dade: Personally appeared before me, an officer duly author ized to administer oaths and take acknowledgments, Gf. E. Graves, Jr., who being by me first duly sworn upon his oath deposes and says that he is one of the attorneys of 10 record for the relator in the above styled cause; and that on the 19th day of September, 1949 he did mail to the Hon orable J. W. Watson and John D. Marsh, solicitors for the respondent herein, a true and complete copy of the above and foregoing notice of appeal enclosed in an envelope bearing the requisite amount of United States uncancelled postage stamps, addressed as follows: Hon. J. W. Watson, City Attorney, Dade County Court House, Miami, Florida and [fol. 11] John D. Marsh, Esquire, Assistant City Attor ney, Dade County Court House, Miami, Florida by depositing said envelopes, properly sealed, stamped and addressed as aforesaid, in the United States Mail; and that the addresses on the said envelopes are the usual post- office addresses of the solicitors of record for the respondent in the above styled cause. (S.) G. E. Graves, Jr. Sworn to and subscribed before me this 19th day of September A. D. 1949. (S.) W. D. Maynard, Notary Public State of Florida at Large. My Commission Expires February 20, 1952. (Seal.) In Circuit Court or Dade County A ssignment of E rrors—Filed September 27, 1949 Now comes the relator and makes the following assign ment of errors on the entire record intended to be relied upon in the Supreme Court of Florida: 1. The Court erred in overruling and denying the relator’s motion for a peremptory writ of mandamus and simul taneously entering judgment for the respondent. (S.) J. D. Johnson, 171 N. W. 11th Street, Miami, Florida. G. E. Graves, Jr., 941 N. W. Second Ave nue, Miami, Florida, Attorneys for Relator. 11 State of F lorida, County of Dade: Personally appeared before me, an officer duly authorized to administer oaths and take acknowledgments, G. E. [fol. 12] Graves, Jr., who upon his oath deposes and says that he is one of the attorneys of record for the relator in the above styled cause; and that on the 27th day of Sep tember, 1949 he did mail to the Honorable J. W. Watson and John D. Marsh, solicitors for the respondent herein, a true and complete copy of the above and foregoing assign ment of errors enclosed in an envelope bearing the requisite amount of United States uncancelled postage stamps, ad dressed as follows: Hon. J. W. Watson, City Attorney, Dade County Court House, Miami, Florida and John D. Marsh, Esquire, Assistant City Attorney, Dade County Court House, Miami, Florida by depositing said envelopes, properly sealed, sta-ped and addressed as aforesaid, in the United States Mail; and that the addresses on the said envelopes are the usual post- office addresses of the solicitors of record for the respondent in the above styled cause. (S.) G. E. Graves, Jr. Sworn to and subscribed before me this 27th day of September A. D. 1949. (S.) Frank E. Jones, Notary Public State of Florida at Large. My Com mission Expires: March 19, 1951. (Seal.) 12 I n Circuit Court op Dade County D irections for M aking I T p Transcript of Record—Filed September 27, 1949 To the Clerk of the avove styled Court: You will please begin making up the transcript of record in the above entitled cause on the 27th day of September, A. D. 1949 and insert in full therein the following described pleadings, to wit: [fol. 13] 1. Relators petition for an alternative writ of mandamus. 2. Alternative writ of mandamus. 3. Return and answer of the respondent to the alternative writ of mandamus. 4. Relators motion for peremptory writ of mandamus. 5. Opinion and judgment of the Court overruling and denying relator’s motion for peremptory writ of mandamus. 6. Relator’s notice of appeal. 7. Relator’s assignment of errors. 8. Relator’s directions to the Clerk of the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida for making up the transcript of record. (Signed) J. D. Johnson, 171 N. W. Eleventh Street, Miami, Florida; (Signed) G. E. Graves, Jr., 941 N. W. Second Avenue, Miami, Florida, Attorneys for Relator. State of F lorida, County of Dade: Personally appeared before me, an officer duly authorized to administer oaths and take acknowledgments, G. E. Graves, Jr., who being first duly sworn upon his oath deposes and says that he is one of the attorneys of record for the rela tor in the above styled cause; and that on the 27th day of September, 1949, he did mail to the Honorable J. W. Watson and John D. Marsh, solicitors for the respondent herein, a true and complete copy of the above and foregoing direc tions to the clerk of the Circuit Court for the preparation of the transcript of record in the above captioned cause and did enclose the same in an envelope bearing the requisite amount of United States uncancelled postage stamps, ad 13 dressed as follows: Hon. J. W. Watson, City Attorney, Dade County Court House, Miami, Florida, and John D. Marsh, Esquire, Assistant City Attorney, Dade County Court [fol. 14] House, by depositing said envelope, properly sealed, stamped and addressed as aforesaid in the United States Mail; and that the addresses on the said envelopes are the usual postoffice addresses of the solicitors of record for the respondent in the above styled cause. (Signed) G. E. Graves, Jr. Sworn to and subscribed before me this 27th day of September, A. D. 1949. (Signed) Frank E. Jones, Notary Public State of Florida at Large. My Commission expires: March 19, 1951. (Seal.) I n Circuit Court of Dade County (Same Caption) R espondent-A ppellee’s D irections for M aking up T ran script of R ecord— Filed October 3,1949 To the Clerk of the above styled court: In making up the tra-script of record herein, in accordance with the directions of the relator-appellant, you are further directed to include in the transcript the following : 1. Recite the filing on June 24, 1949, of the respondent’s motion to quash the alternative writ of mandamus. 2. Omitting all formal parts therefrom, copy these direc tions of the respondent-appellee for making up transcript of record. J. W. Watson, Jr., City Attorney, and John D. Marsh, Assistant City Attorney, Attorneys for Respond ent-Appellee. By: (Signed) John D. March, Of Counsel. I hereby certify that a copy of the above and foregoing Respondent-Appellee’s Directions for making up transcript of record, was mailed to John D. Johnson, Esq., 171 N. W. 14 11th Street, Miami, Florida, and to Gt. E. Graves, Jr., 941 [fol. 15] N. W. Second Avenue, Miami, Florida, attorneys for Relator-Appellant, this the 30 day of September, 1949. (Signed) John D. Marsh. Clerk’s Certificate to foregoing transcript omitted in printing. [fol. 16] Briefs having been submitted by counsel for the Relator-Appellant and counsel for the Respondent-Appellee and this cause having’ come on for oral argument before the Supreme Court of Florida, the Supreme Court of Florida rendered its opinion in the following words and figures: In the Supreme Court of F lorida, January T erm, A. D. 1950, Special D ivision B J oseph R ice, Relator-Appellant, vs. H. H. A rnold, as Superintendent of Miami Springs Country Club, Respondent-Appellee Opinion— Filed March 24, 1950 An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dade County, Charles A. Carroll, Judge John D. Johnson and G. E. Graves, Jr., for Appellant. J. W. Watson and John D. Marsh, for Appellee. Chapman , J .: This is an action in mandamus originating in the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, stemming from the follow ing factual situations: The City of Miami owns and operates golf links known as the Miami Springs Country Club for the use and enjoyment of its citizens and residents and their guests. The city delegated to the respondent, H. H. Arnold, the authority to supervise and manage the golf course, in clusive of the power to promulgate reasonable rules and regulations necessary for the use and enjoyment thereof in behalf of the public. The petitioner, a colored man, on April 27, 1949, requested of the respondent the right and 15 privilege to play on the municipally owned golf links, but the request, it is contended was arbitrarily and unlawfully [fol. 17] denied. The respondent, superintendent of the Miami Springs Country Club, concedes that the petitioner is a colored man, a citizen and resident of the City of Miami; now and for many years past a general policy of segregation of races has existed in both the State of Florida and City of Miami. The Miami Springs Country Club Golf Course until recently has been used exclusively by golfers of the white or Caucasian race, as no demands to use the course were made by negroes until April 11, 1949, when several colored men, after complying with all the rules of the golf links were permitted to use the golf course, when the dates of playing and the number of negro golf players were accurately recorded. This record reflects the following: “ April 12th, 1949, Tuesday—8 players; April 13, 1949, Wednesday—6 players; April 14, 1949, Thursday—12 players; April 15, 1949, Friday—52 players; April 16, 1949, Saturday—8 players; April 17, 1949, Sunday—6 players. The costs of maintenance and operation of the Miami Springs Country Club Golf Course are paid exclusively from green fees paid by golfers for the use of the course and in order that it remain a self sustaining project it is essential that an average of 200 golfers daily use the course and pay the prescribed fees. The white patrons of the course refused and have declined to patronize the golf course and share the facilities thereof at the same time with the negro golfers. The total revenues arising from the small number of negro players using the course and paying the green fees, when standing alone, are insufficient to pay the actual operating and maintenance costs of the links. The golf course facilities previously supplied the citizens and residents of Miami will be abandoned (a) if the use of the course is exclusively restricted to the negro [fol. 18] golfers, because it will not be financially self sus taining; (b) if negro golfers are permitted to share the facilities of the course with the white golfers the latter will not patronize it, thereby resulting in an operational loss. 16 Pursuant to the existing general policy of segregation and in order to make the facilities of the golf course avail able to the public and usable by the two races and to avoid an abandonment thereof, the respondent superintendent adopted a rule for the operation of the links applicable to both negro and white golfers. The negro golfers under the rule use the facilities of the course one day each week and the white golfers use it the remaining six days of the week. The rule or policy so adopted and now in force and effect designate the days of the week in which white golfers will be allotted the exclusive use of the facilities of the golf course; and the days of the week in which the exclu sive use of the facilities of the golf course will be allotted to negro golfers. Pursuant to an administrative policy and in behalf of the public interest the above rule was adopted by the Superintendent of the course which al lotted the facilities of the course at different times to the white and colored golfers. If the ratio of colored golfers requesting the use of the facilities of the course shall from time to time increase, then the rule supra promulgated may or can be altered to conform to the demands of an increased number of colored golfers, thereby accom-odat- ing all citizen and resident golfers, and their guests as to the facilities of the course without regard to race or color. Under the operation of this rule the two races now and for some time past have used and enjoyed the recreational facilities of the course. The commands of the alternative writ as issued required the respondent to permit the relator the use of the facili ties of the Miami Springs Country Club Golf Course “ dur ing all of the hours in which the course is usually open or show cause before the Court for his refusal so to do” . In the order denying the relator below a peremptory writ of mandamus as prayed for the trial court, in part, said: [fol. 19] “ In a determination of this case it must be noted at the outset that the command of the alternative writ would require that the city’s public golf course superin tendent permit the relator to use the course at all hours when it is open to public play. In order for relator to be entitled to a peremptory writ of mandamus it must appear that there is a clear legal duty for the respondent to comply and perform” . The controlling question presented by the record is viz: Are the constitutional rights of the relator-appellant vio 17 lated by the rule adopted and now in effect regulating tbe use of tbe facilities of tbe Miami Springs Country Club Golf Course owned and operated by tbe city and maintained exclusively by tbe green fees paid for tbe facilities by tbe golfers? Tbe white and negro golfers functioning under the rule use tbe facilities of the course, but on different days of the week. It appears that if tbe negroes are per mitted tbe use of the course with tbe white golfers, then tbe white golfers will not patronize the course. Tbe green fees paid by tbe negro golfers are insufficient to support and maintain the course. Tbe rule allows tbe negro golfers to use tbe course one day of the week and tbe white golfers six days. It is argued that tbe adopted rule avoids a clash of tbe two races; funds are made available to tbe city with which to supply golfing facilities to tbe public; golfing facili ties can be supplied the public by tbe city only in the man ner provided for by the rule, otherwise tbe services will be abandoned. Counsel for relator-appellant contend that tbe rule, supra, violates the 14th Amendment to tbe Federal Con stitution; Section 1 of the Declaration of Eights of tbe Florida Constitution; it is contrary to tbe holdings of tbe Supreme Court of the United States as enunciated in Mis souri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337, 59 S. Ct. 232, 83 L. Ed. 208; McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe E. Co.; 235 U. S. 151, 35 S. Ct. 69, 59 L. Ed. 169; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 25 L. Ed. 664 and similar [fol. 20] cases. It is not contended that tbe City of Miami must maintain a golf course for the use and benefit of tbe negroes but since tbe city elected to supply golfing facilities to tbe public, then equal facilities must be provided to the relator and other members of the Negro race; that the relator-appellant and white golfers have a constitutional right to play the course at all times when it is open to the public. It is generally conceded that an equal protection of the law operates as a protection against any state action, or municipality as an arm of the state, by statute or other wise, which denies to any person equal protection on ac count of race or color. If substantially equal accommo dations, facilities or privileges, are provided for persons of different races, then there is no violation of the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution. Thus it has been held that a state may constitutionally forbid the 18 co-education of different races in the same private school. Berea College v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 209, 94 S.W. 623 (On appeal Berea College v. Kentuckey, 211 U.S. 45, 295 S. Ct. 33, 53 L. Ed. 81). It may assign different portions of parks for the exclusive use of different races. Warley v. Board of Park Comm’rs., 233 Ky. 688, 26 S. W. (2d) 554. It may prohibit the sale of liquor to different races at the same saloon. State ex rel. Tax Collector v. Falkenheiner, 123 La. 617, 49 So. 214. In the case of State v. Board of Trustees, 126 Ohio 290, 185 N. E. 196, Dorris Weaver, a colored girl, in a mandamus action sought admission to a “ Home Economics Course” of the University of Ohio. The Home was so managed that the white students bought groceries, cooked and dined together as a common enterprise. They lived together two in a room with roommates of their own selection and had a common bath and toilet facilities. The relator was by the University authorities granted living quarters equipped in a similar manner to other buildings on the campus and no one interfered with her rights and priv ileges in pursuing the educational courses offered and she had an opportunity to entertain her friends and associates [fol. 21] as granted to other students. She had been denied the privilege of residing and associating with white stu dents and partaking in their family or communal life. Mandamus was denied—the court pointed out that when the government secured to each of its citizens equal rights before the law, equal opportunity for improvement, it had accomplished the end for which it was organized. Courts are powerless to eradicate social instincts or to abolish distinctions based on physical differences and the attempt to do so only accentuates existing difficulties. It cannot be overlooked that persons of the same tastes and desires, whether white or black, usually associate together to enjoy themselves to the best advantages. People generally move in the circles in which they are likely to be suited or matched. The reason for the rule was to prevent friction between the white and negro golfers on the course. The relator-appellant requests this Court to hold as a matter of law that he is entitled to use the city’s golf course at all hours and times it is open to play despite the findings of fact in the Court below that he now enjoys substantially equal accom-odations provided for persons of the dif ferent races. It does not appear by the record that the 19 one day allotment of the facilities of the course to the negroes discriminated against the negro race. The days of playing each week were apportioned to the number of white and colored golfers according to the record of the course kept by the respondent. If an increased demand on the part of the negro golfers is made to appear, then more than one day each week will be allotted. Mandamus is a legal remedy which is not always awarded as a matter of right but in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, and then only when based on equitable principles. The relator must establish a clear legal right to its issuance and further show that no other adequate remedy exists. State v. City of Miami, 156 Fla. 784, 24 So. (2d) 363. Ke- versible error has not clearly been made to appear. Affirmed. [fol. 22] Adams, C. J. and Hobson, J., and Taylor, Asso ciate Justice concur. [fol. 23] Clerk’s Certificate to foregoing transcript omitted in printing. (8799) 20 [fol. 20] Transcript of Record of Proceedings Subsequent to the Granting- of the First Writ of Certiorari by the Su preme Court of the United States. Supreme Court op the U nited States, October Term, 1951 N o.— J o s e p h R ic e , Petitioner, vs. H. H. A rnold, as Superintendent of Miami Springs Country Club, Respondent On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida * [fol. 21] On June 17, 1950 the petitioner tiled his petition for a writ of certiorari to issue to the Supreme Court of the State of Florida to have reviewed the first opinion and judgment of said Court. The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari. * This is a transcript of the proceedings had in the Su preme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Florida had subsequent to the granting of a writ of cer tiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States. The writ was granted by the Supreme Court in the October Term of the United States Supreme Court under the same caption in cause No. 145. 21 In the Supreme Court of the U nited States No. 145 J oseph E ice, Petitioner, vs. H. H. A rnold, as Superintendent of Miami Springs Country Club Order— Entered October 16, 1950 “ Per Curiam : The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated and the cause is remanded to the Su preme Court of Florida for reconsideration in the light of Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Eegents, 339 U. S. 637.” I n the Supreme Court of F lorida J oseph E ice, Eelator-Appellant, vs. H. H. A rnold, as Superintendent of Miami Springs Country Club, Eespondent-Appellee M otion for L eave to F ile B rief and for Oral A rgument The judgment in the above entitled cause having been vacated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Eice v. Arnold, No. 145, and the cause having been remanded to this Honorable Court for reconsideration in the light of Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Eegents, 339 U. S. 637, and counsel for the appellee herein, H. H. Arnold, as Superintendent of Miami Springs Country Club, being of the opinion that the mentioned cases can be distinguished from the case at bar, the said counsel for appellee herein respectfully move the Court, in the event that this cause is reconsidered, that they be granted leave to tile a brief in support of the judg 22' ment heretofore rendered in this cause, cited in — Fla. —, [fol. 22] 4o So. 2d 195, and that they further be granted leave to present oral argument before this Honorable Court prior to the entry of any further judgment herein. In the event that this motion is granted, it is requested that the Court will, by appropriate order, fix a time within which briefs shall be filed and set a time for oral argument. Respectfully submitted, J. W. Watson, Jr., City At torney and John D. Marsh, Assistant City Attor ney, Attorneys for Appellee, by (Signed) John D. Marsh, of Counsel. I Hereby Certify that a copy of the foregoing Motion for Leave to File Brief and For Oral Argument was mailed to each of the following attorneys for appellant: Franklin H. Williams, Esq., 20 West 40 Street, New York 18, New York; G-. E. Graves, Jr., Esq., 941 N. W. Second Avenue, Miami, Florida; John D. Johnson, Esq., 171 N. W. Eleventh Street, Miami, Florida; this the 23 day of October, 1950. I n the Supreme Court oe F lorida, January T erm, A . D. 1951, M onday, May 28, 1951 (Same Caption) Upon consideration of motion of counsel for Appellee for leave to file brief in this cause since the coming down of the mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States, it is ordered that said motion be and the same is hereby denied. Test: (Signed) Guyte P. McCord, Clerk, Supreme Court. (Supreme Court Seal.) 23 In the Supreme Court of F lorida, J une T erm, A. D., 1951, E n B anc. (Same Caption) Opinion Opinion filed August 31,1951. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dade County, Charles A. Carroll, Judge. [fol. 23] John D. Johnson and G. E. Graves, Jr., for Ap pellant. J. W. Watson, Jr., and John D. Marsh for Appellee. Taylor, Associate Justice: This is an action in mandamus originating in the Circuit Court of Dade County. We will, refer to the parties as re lator and respondent, the capacities which they occupied in the Circuit Court. It appears that the City of Miami owns a golf course, the management of which is delegated to the respondent, II. H. Arnold; that respondent, acting for the City, made certain rules regulating the use of these public facilities; that among these rules was one which provided for the allocation of certain days for the use of the golf course exclusively by colored persons and the allocation of certain days for the use of the course exclusively by white persons. Relator, Joseph Rice, a colored person, was denied the privilege of enjoying these facilities on one of the days on which the use of the course had been allocated to white persons. Relator, Joseph Rice, a colored person, was denied the privilege of enjoying these facilities on one of the days on which the use of the course had been allocated to white persons. Upon his application, the Circuit Court issued its alter native writ of mandamus requiring the respondent “ To forthwith grant the petitioner the privilege of golfing on the Miami Springs Country Club golf course during all of the hours in which the said course is open to the public, subject, however, to any lawful rules and regulations governing the use thereof” , 24 or show cause why the peremptory writ should not issue. The respondent filed his return to the alternative writ setting up the rule above referred to and setting up vari ous facts which he contended justified the allocation of time for the use of the course by the persons of different races. Relator moved for a peremptory writ notwithstanding the return. This motion was denied for reasons stated in the judgment of the Circuit Court. We affirmed with opinion. See 45 So. (2d) 195. The relator appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States and that court issued its judgment and mandate, [fol. 24] the pertinent parts of which are as follows: “ It is ordered and adjudged by this court that the judgment of the said Supreme Court (of Florida) in this cause be, and the same is hereby, vacated with out cost to either party. “ It is further ordered that this cause be, and the same is hereby, remanded to the said Supreme Court for reconsideration in the light of subsequent decisions of this Court in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629, and McLaurin vs. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637. ’ ’ The first question to be considered by us is whether this judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States is such as to impel this Court to reverse its former judgment or whether this court is left free to use its independent judgment in determining the correctness of its original con clusion when viewed in the light of the development of the judicial construction of the Federal Constitution in the cited cases which were decided subsequent to our first con sideration of this case. The language employed in the mandate would seem to clearly indicate that no final adjudication was intended. The use of the word “ vacated” instead of the usual term “ reversed” and the direction that we reconsider the case suggest that our original judgment should be regarded as reopened for further study of the question presented and that our views of the law should be reconsidered in the light of the cited opinions. To hold otherwise would attribute to that court a vague ness of decision or delicacy in expressing its disagreement 25 with a state court which is not in harmony with its action in other cases. In reviewing the decisions to which our attention has been directed, we must yield to the Supreme Court of the United States its paramount authority as the final arbiter of all questions involving the construction of the Federal Constitution. In examining its opinions, we should not search for distinctions without differences be tween a case before us and established precedent. On the other hand, we should announce and adhere to our con sidered judgment as to the meaning of the Constitution and its application to a particular factual situation, so long as it is support- by earlier decisions and is not in conflict [fol. 25] with more recent holdings either directly or by necessary inference. We would be guilty of closing our eyes to a fact not only apparent from the pages of recent decisions but generally known throughout the nation if we do not approach the problem in full recognition of the fact that the applicable parts of the Constitution are in process of redefinition; that they are being given a broader meaning than they were previously thought to have. It is our duty to follow the Supreme Court in this process and to conform our legal thinking to whatever that body declares the Constitution to mean; but until earlier precedents have been clearly modi fied by the court which established them, we should adhere to these decisions. The cases to which our attention is di rected both dealt with the right of colored persons to enjoy facilities of higher education offered by state institutions. In the McLaurin case the question presented, as stated by the court, was: “ Whether a state may, after admitting a student to graduate instructions in a state university, afford him different treatment from other students solely because of his race” . The answer was in the negative but the basis of that an swer, as appears from the opinion of the court, was that the action of the university officials in adopting rules of racial segregation was such that: “ The result is that appellant is handicapped in his pursuit of effective graduate instruction. Such re 26 strict ions impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession” . And the court said: “ We hold that under these circumstances the Four teenth Amendment precludes differences in treatment by the State based upon race” . (Emphasis supplied.) It should be observed that the purpose of the public insti tutions there involved was the education of those enrolled as students. The court held that the treatment accorded Mc- Laurin, segregation, handicapped him and tended to “ im pair and inhibit” his ability to acquire the education that [fob 26] it was the purpose and function of the institution to provide. In the Sweatt case the appellant had been denied admis sion to the University of Texas Law School and offered a course of study in another law school provided by the state for members of petitioner’s race. After a discussion of various phases of the process of legal education and the benefits that flow from study in and graduation from the particular school in question, the court concluded that: “ Whether the University of Texas Law School is compared with the original or the new law school for Negroes, we can not find substantial equality in the educational opportunities offered white and Negro law students by the State ’ ’. “ With such a substantial and significant segment of society excluded, we cannot conclude that the educa tion offered petitioner is substantially equal to that which he would receive if admitted to the University of Texas Law School” . (Emphasis supplied.) Here again the conclusion reached seems to be bottomed squarely upon the finding that the educational facilities offered were not equal and, therefore, the individual’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution were impaired. If the rationale of these opinions applies to the 27 factual situation before this court, it is our duty to apply them and decide this case accordingly. On the other hand, if the reasoning by which the court reached the conclusions announced in those cases, does not apply to the case before, us, the decisions are not in point and we should not expand them so as to construe them as covering situations not within the contemplation of the court when those decisions were written, particularly when to do so would conflict with previously accepted views as to the meaning of the Fed eral Constitution and the views of the law as expressed in this case by the relator, himself. In his brief filed before us, the relator says: “ The appellant does not contend that there is not a general policy of segregation of the races in Florida ffol. 27] and more particularly in the City of Miami nor does he contend that racial segregation in the pro vision of public facilities is per se unlawful. This ele mentary rule of lawx has long since been settled in this state under the numerous decisions of our Supreme Court which hold that the state may within the exercise of its powers segregate the white and colored races. Patterson vs. Taylor, 51 Florida 275, 40 So. 493; Crooms vs. Schad, 51 Fla. 168, 40 So. 479; Sanders vs. City of Daytona Beach, 95 Fla. 279, 116 So. 23” . Again he states: “ For emphasis the appellant reiterates. The appel lant does not contend that there is not a general policy of segregation of the races: he does not challenge the now often confirmed power of a state or its subordinate parts to create and enforce a policy of segregation of races. His sole contention regarding the validity of racial segregation is that the rule made and provided by the respondent as the authorized agent of the City of Miami by providing only one day in each week for the exclusive use of the only municipally owned golf course and the reservation of the remainder of each week for white players is contrary to the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Florida ’ ’. 28 Turning to the facts of the case before this court, we take judicial notice that the game of golf is of such a nature that it requires the maintenance of links which cover a con siderable area and that it can be played only by persons alone or in very small groups not exceeding, except in unusual cases, four persons, although several of such groups may play simultaneously on different parts of the course. There are of necessity some, but limited, contacts between the various groups so playing, particularly around the club house and starting tees. The purpose and function of the game is to obtain the pleasure and exercise incident to the playing and the rivalry and association between per sons who arrange in advance to play together. The exercise, the rivalry and the association are not enhanced by the [fol. 28] other persons who may, on the same day or during the same hours, elect to enjoy the facilities. This is quite different from an educational institution where the purpose is to develop the capacities of an individual to practice a profession. The intangible benefits referred to by the Supreme Court of the United States as incident to the educational advantages offered by the Uni versity of Oklahoma and the University of Texas Law School are entirely absent. The decisions above referred to are not, therefore, controlling. It is significant that in the Sweatt case the court was urged to hold that discrimination inevitably results wherever the “ separate but equal” doctrine is applied with reference to public facilities furnished persons of different races; but the court said, “ broader issues have been urged for our consideration, but we adhere to the principle of deciding constitutional questions only in the context of the particular case before the court” , thereby de clining* to destroy the well established rule that has been applied ever since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend ment to the Constitution to the effect that where separate but equal facilities are provided persons of different races, no person of either race is thereby denied the full protection of his constitutional rights. Among the numerous deci sions enunciating this principle, we cite only Plessv v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 41 L. Ed. 256, 16 S. Ct. 1138, because of its clarity and because the Supreme Court in the 29 Sweatt case expressly declined to “ re-examine” that hold ing, thus impliedly directing all courts subordinate to it in the field of constitutional construction, to continue to recognize that decision as binding authority. We are di rected to reconsider our conclusions in the case before us in the light of the decision in the Sweatt case. A part of that decision was the refusal of the Supreme Court to modify Plessy v. Ferguson. In the case before us there is no question of the equality of the physical facilities offered petitioner with which he may enjoy his constitutional right to engage in the game of golf upon public property. The facilities offered "peti tioner are identical with the facilities offered persons of other races by the City of Miami. Petitioner contends that in the application to him of a [fol. 29] rule allocating to him and others of his race certain times within which he may use the facilities and limiting his use to such times, there has been an unreasonable and un just discrimination which deprives him of his constitutional right. In the former opinion of this court which has been vacated by the Supreme Court of the United States, we affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court of Dade County. In the opinion we expressed the view that it had not been made to appear that the rule allocating time for the use of the golf course between persons of different races, of which complaint is here made was unreasonable in the light of the circumstances presented by the record. In so stating, we went beyond the decision of the Circuit Court being reviewed and that opinion should be vacated and withdrawn and the case should be re-examined in its entirety. If this case can properly be disposed of without going beyond the holding of the circuit court, we should restrict our present adjudication to the review of the action of that court and in order to do this, we must analyze the pleadings before that court and the holding of that court on those pleadings. The circuit court granted relator an alternative writ of mandamus commanding the respondent “ to forthwith grant the petitioner the privilege of golfing on the Miami Springs 30 Country Golf Club Course during all of the hours in which said course is open to the public; subject, however, to any lawful rules and regulations governing the use thereof” . To this writ a return was filed setting up various matters which the respondent felt justified the rule which the respondent had adopted allocating the use of the golf course to white persons exclusively on certain days and to colored persons exclusively on certain days. Thereupon, the relator moved for a peremptory writ on the ground that, “ The return and answer of the respondent failed to show any cause which is cognizable at law for the failure and refusal to permit the relator to golf on the. Miami Springs Country Club Golf Course” . On these pleadings the Court entered an order in which it held: “ In a determination of this case it must be noted at the outset that the command of the alternative writ [fol. 30] would require that the city’s public golf course superintendent permit the relator to use the course at all hours when it is open to public play. In order for relator to be entitled to a peremptory writ of manda mus, it must appear that there is a clear, legal duty for the respondent to comply and perform. “ Belator in mandamus faces the obstacle that if granted the command of the peremptory writ may not be for less than that which is commanded by the alter native writ (citing authority). “ The question then becomes this: Is the relator entitled to an order per mitting him to use the city’s sole public golf course at all hours and times when it is open for play? “ That question must be answered in the negative. “ A require ment that some use of the course should be provided for relator is by no means the same thing as the right or privilege for its use at any and all times every day. ^ “ It appears that the city, through its golf course superintendent, has made an administrative determi nation of allotment of separate times for jjlay on its public golf course for white players and colored play ers. “ From the nature of this mandamus case, this 31 court is not concerned with, nor called upon to pass upon any question as to the reasonableness of suffi ciency of the one day each week allot-ed to the members of the relator’s race to use the course. Any complaint on that score might be the basis and subject of some other suit or proceedings, but relief of that character was not sought here nor was it included in the com mand of the alternative writ” . If it be conceded that the rule adopted by the respondent is unreasonable, a question which should not be now de cided, the relator would not be entitled to a peremptory writ as broad as the alternative writ because such a writ would preclude the adoption of a rule making a reasonable allocation of time for the use of the golf course between persons of different races. It might be urged, although it does not appear from the [fol. 31] pleadings that such a contention was presented to the circuit court, that the rule allot-ing time between the races is unreasonable, and therefore, invalid and as a con sequence there exists no lawful rule allot-ing time between the races and that for this reason the peremptory writ should issue. This process of reasoning, however, contains two fundamental fallacies. It is admitted, in fact, asserted, in the brief of the relator that there exists in the State of Florida and in the City of Miami an established public policy for the segregation of the races that would apply to a golf course. This public policy would require that there be a fair, just and reasonable allocation of time to the re lator and members of other races, but the granting of the peremptory writ in conformity with the alternative writ would forever preclude the respondent from promulgating such a rule. Secondly, it was, at the time this judgment was entered, the established practice in this State that the command of a peremptory writ must follow the command of the alternative writ, and unless the relator had made it appear from his petition, coupled with the allegations of the answer, that he has a clear, legal right to use the golf course at all times when it is open for play, he was not entitled to a peremptory writ upon his alternative writ in its present form. 32 Under the laws of this State the relator has adequate means by which to test the reasonableness of the rule pro mulgated by the respondent. He may do so by a bill for declaratory judgment in which the court could hear the contentions of all parties and determine what would be a reasonable allocation of time for the use of the course between persons of different races. He may take the posi tion that the present rule is void for unreasonableness and by mandamus seek to require the respondent to adopt a reasonable rule. Equity would also have jurisdiction to protect his rights. The circuit court clearly indicated to relator that he should pursue another remedy. Relator has not seen fit to do so. Rights under the Federal Constitution as well as other rights must be enforced by orderly processes of the courts and in accordance with established rules of procedure. The rights of Sweatt and McLaurin were properly en forced by mandamus because the Court held that, as regards the factual situation there presented, any segregation was [fol. 32] unlawful and the determination of the reasonable ness of the rules was not necessary. In the case before us the relator admits that the policy of segregation exists in Miami and admits that it is not per se unlawful, yet he seeks a writ which would, if issued, make it impossible for the city to adopt any rirle effectuating this admittedly lawful public policy. He is not entitled to that writ even if he is entitled to secure, in a proper proceeding, an allotment of a greater amount of time for the use of the golf course by persons of his race. It is now the judgment of this court that the opinion and judgment of this court filed herein March 24, 1950, be, and the same is, hereby withdrawn, vacated and set aside; that in accordance with the mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States, we have reconsidered this cause in the light of recent decisions of that court and, upon such reconsider ation, for the reasons hereinbefore stated, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Dade County is hereby affirmed. Chapman, Thomas and Adams, JJ., concur. Terrell, Acting Chief Justice, and Hobson, J., dissent. Roberts, J., not participating. 33 State oe F lorida, County of Leon: I, Guyte P. McCord, Clerk of the Supreme Court of Florida, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing is a true and correct transcript of all of the proceedings had in the case of Joseph Rice v. H. H. Arnold, as Superin tendent of Miami Springs Country Club, subsequent to the granting of the writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States in Case No. 145 according to the records of said Court in the October Term of 1950. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court this 8th day of November, 1951. Guyte P. McCord, Clerk of the Supreme Court of Florida. (Seal.) (8622)