Faubus v. Aaron Motion to Affirm
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1959
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Faubus v. Aaron Motion to Affirm, 1959. e4ef2c7e-b19a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/61ad74aa-6b1d-46e1-ae5f-f1ee36584222/faubus-v-aaron-motion-to-affirm. Accessed November 03, 2025.
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Supreme ©mitt at % United States
October Term, 1959
No. 458
Orval E. F aubus, Governor of the State of Arkansas,
Appellant,
J ohn A aron, et al.,
Appellees.
No. 471
A rkansas State B oard of E ducation, and A rch W. F ord,
Commissioner of Education,
Appellants,
J ohn A aron, et al.,
Appellees.
appeals from the united states district court for the
EASTERN DISTRICT OF A R K A N SA S, W ESTE R N DIVISION
MOTION TO AFFIRM
W iley A. B ranton
T hurgood Marshall
Attorneys for Appellees
E lwood H. Chisolm
Of Counsel
£uprruu' (Enurt nf % United States
October Term, 1959
No. 458
Obval E. Faubus, Governor of the State of Arkansas,
Appellant,
J ohn A aron, et al.,
Appellees.
No. 471
A rkansas State B oard of E ducation, and A rch W. F ord,
Commissioner of Education,
Appellants,
J ohn A aron, et al.,
Appellees.
MOTION TO AFFIRM
Appellees in the above-entitled cases move to affirm on
the ground that the questions presented are so unsubstantial
as not to need further argument.
Questions Presented
Appellees, for the purposes of this motion, adopt the
“ Questions” as presented by appellant in No. 458 at pages
4-5 of his Jurisdictional Statement and by appellants in
No. 471 at page 3 of their Statement as to Jurisdiction.
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Statement of the Case
The appeals in this case involve the constitutionality of
the two Arkansas school closing laws which were adopted
at a special session of the legislature following the decision
of the Court of Appeals in Aaron v. Cooper, 243 F. 2d 361,
signed into law by the Governor of Arkansas on the day
this Court decided Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, and, there
after, on that same day, set in operation by the Governor’s
promulgation of a Proclamation closing all of the senior
high schools in Little Eock.
The complete history of this litigation from its inception
plus a statement of the proceedings giving rise to these
appeals, as well as the undisputed facts there adduced, are
set out in the per curiam opinion below. 173 F. Supp. 944.
Reasons for Granting the Motion
1. The questions presented on the instant appeals in the
Little Rock litigation put in issue another attempt of state
officials to “war against the Constitution.” Earlier efforts
to do so by means of gubernatorial, judicial and adminis
trative action could not be squared with the mandate of
the Federal Constitution. Faubus v. United States, 254
F. 2d 797, cert, denied 358 IT. S. 829; Thomason v. Cooper,
254 F. 2d 808; Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1. The case at
bar merely concerns an attempt to achieve the forbidden
end by legislative action. Thus, the case has nothing else
to distinguish it and the decision by the court below is cor
rect. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, 16-19; Aaron v.
Cooper, 261 F. 2d 97, 99-102, 108; James v. Almond, 170
F. Supp. 331 (E. D. Va. 1959); Harrison v. Day, 200 Va.
439, 106 S. E. 2d 636 (1959). Cf. James v. Duckworth, 170
F. Supp. 342, 346-347 (E. D. Va. 1959), affirmed Duckworth
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v. James, 267 F. 2d 224 (4th Cir. 1959), cert, denied 28
U. S. L. Week 3110 (October 13, 1959) (No. 286).
2. Moreover, the issue raised by appellants is “ too
moribund” for full hearing. Over a century before this
Court in Cooper v. Aaron admonished state officials not
to essay nullification by legislation—either “ openly and
directly” or “ indirectly . . . through evasive schemes”—
Justice Clifford, speaking for the Court in Biggs v. John
son County, 6 Wall. 166, said at page 195:
Repeated decisions of this court have also deter
mined that state laws, whether general or enacted for
the particular case, cannot in any manner limit or
affect the operation of process or proceedings in the
Federal Courts. U. 8 . v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 136.
The Constitution itself becomes a mockery, say the
court in that case, if the state legislature may at will
annul the judgments of the Federal courts, and the
nation is deprived of the means of enforcing its own
laws by the instrumentality of its own tribunals. Slo
cum v. Mayberry, 2 Wheat. 9; Beers v. Haughton, 9
Pet. 359.
3. Finally, there is no substantial merit to appellants’
positions with respect to judgment below with respect to
Act 5, as amended by Act 151. In No. 458 appellant asserts
that the decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas in
Fitzhugh v. Ford, 323 S. W. 2d 559, is involved (Appel
lant’s Brief, p. 4) and, subsequently, argues that it should
control the disposition of this appeal {ibid., pp. 18-20).
However, the state Supreme Court “ did not consider
whether [Act No. 5] violated any part of the Constitution
of the United States.” 173 F. Supp. 944, 951. See Appel
lants’ Brief, page 4. Furthermore, although appellant
made no suggestion of this, the construction given Act 5
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in Fitshugh v. Ford was one which neither precluded nor
avoided decision on the constitutionality of Act 5 by the
court below.
In No. 471 appellants ask this Court to consider the
effect of Act 466, an amendment to Act 5 “ in effect shortly
before the decision of the lower court,” which was “ ap
parently not considered” (Appellants’ Brief, p. 2). In
addition, they indicate that “ in [their] brief, a reference
to Act 5, as amended, refers to the Act, as amended by
Acts 151 and 466, Ark. Acts of 1959” (id.). Thereafter, the
case they make for full hearing rests—principally, if not
exclusively— on the application of Act 466 (see Appellants’
Brief, pp. 4-7). But elsewhere appellants explain that “ Act
5, as amended, merely authorizes the State Board of Edu
cation to withhold funds from schools which have been
closed by the Governor under Act 4,” and admit that “After
Act 466 became effective, the funds could be withheld as
before but could not be paid to another district except
where a school had been closed by the order of the Gov
ernor . . . ” (ibid., p. 4).
Thus, here as in Texas Co. v. Brown, 258 U. S. 466, a
case cited by appellants to support this Court’s considera
tion of Act 466, no case is shown for the application of this
Act. Bather, as the Court concluded in that case at page
483: “ It is conceded that this does not repeal or affect
the [instant] laws, and no argument is rested upon it
except in support of contentions already disposed of.”
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the questions presented
by appellants are clearly unsubstantial and this motion
to affirm should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
W iley A. Branton
119 East Barraque Street
Pine Bluff, Arkansas
T hurgood Marshall
10 Columbus Circle
New York 19, New York
Attorneys for Appellees
Elwood H. Chisolm
Of Counsel