Houston Lawyers' Association v. Attorney General of Texas Joint Appendix

    N os. 90-813, 90-974

In  T h e

Supreme Court of ttjc ®mteb States
Oc t o b e r  T e r m , 1990

Houston Law yers’ A ssociation, et al.,
Petitioners,

v.

A ttorney General of Texa s , et al,
Respondents.

League of U nited Latin American Citizens, et al.,
Petitioners,

v.

A ttorney General of Texas, et al.,
Respondents.

On Writs of Certiorari to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

JOINT APPENDIX

Julius LeVonne Chambers 
‘ Charles Stephen Ralston 
Sherrilyn A. Ifill 

99 Hudson Street 
Sixteenth Floor 
New York, N.Y. 10013 
(212) 219-1900

*Counsel of Record for
Petitioners Houston Lawyers’ 
Association, et al.

Gabrielle K. McDonald 
301 Congress Avenue 
Suite 2050 
Austin, Texas 78701 
(512) 320-5055

Of Counsel:

Matthew & Branscomb 
A Professional Corporation

Attorneys for Houston 
Lawyers’ Association, et al.

[Additional Counsel Listed on Inside Front Cover]

PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI FILED 
NOVEMBER 11, 1990 IN NO. 90-813, DECEMBER 14, 1990 
IN NO. 90-974 CERTIORARI GRANTED JANUARY 18, 1991



* William L. Garrett
Brenda Hull Thompson 

8300 Douglas, Suite 800 
Dallas, TX 75225 
(214) 369-1952

*Counsel o f Record for  
Petitioners LULAC, et al.

Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc.
David Hall 

259 S. Texas 
Weslaco, TX 78596 
(512) 968-6574

Rolando L. Rios 
201 N. St. Mary’s, #521 
San Antonio, TX 78205 
(512) 222-2102

Attorneys for LULAC, et al.

Susan Finkelstein 
201 N. St. Mary’s, #624 
San Antonio, TX 78205 
(512) 222-2478

Attorneys fo r Petitioner Christina Moreno

*Edward B. Cloutman III E. Brice Cunningham 
3301 Elm St. 777 S.R.L. Thornton
Dallas, TX 75226 Dallas, TX 75203
(214) 939-9222 (214) 428-3793

*Counsel of Record fo r  Attorneys fo r Jesse Oliver, et al.
Petitioners Jesse Oliver, et al.

Dan Morales 
Mary F. Keller 
Renea Hicks 

(Counsel o f Record)
Javier Guajaro 

Office of the Attorney 
General

Supreme Court Building 
1401 Colorado Street 
Austin, TX 78701-2548 
(512) 463-2085

Attorneys for Respondent 
Attorney General of Texas

Seagal V. Wheatley 
(Counsel o f Record) 

Donald R. Philbin, Jr. 
Oppenheimer, Rosenberg 

Kelleher & Wheatley, 
Inc.

711 Navarro, Sixth Floor 
San Antonio, TX 78205 
(512) 224-2000

Attorneys for Bexar County 
Respondents

J. Eugene Clements 
(Counsel o f Record) 

Evelyn V. Keys 
Porter & Clements 

700 Louisiana Street 
Suite 3500
Houston, TX 77002-2730 
(713) 226-0600

Attorneys for Respondent 
Judge Sharolyn Wood

Robert H. Mow, Jr.
(Counsel of Record) 

Hughes & Luce 
2800 Momentum Place 
1717 Main Street 
Dallas, TX 75201 
(214) 939-5500

Attorneys for Dallas County 
Respondents



T able o f  C ontents
Item: Page:
1. Docket Entries............................................................ 2a

2. Complaint in Intervention of Houston Lawyers’ Assoc.,
et al..........................................................................   8a

3. Complaint in Intervention of Jesse Oliver, et al. . .24a

4. Answer of Judge Sharolyn Wood to Complaint in 
Intervention of Houston Lawyers’ Assoc., et al. . .35a

5. Answer of Judge Sharolyn Wood to Amended Complaint
ofLULAC, e ta l.................................................... 63a

6. Second Amended Complaint of LULAC, et al. . . 88a

7. Answer of Jim Mattox, et al., to Second Amended
Complaint of LULAC, et al..............................  102a'

8. First Amended Answer of Judge F. Harold Entz to 
Second Amended Complaint of LULAC, et al. . .1.12a

9. Answer of Judge F. Harold Entz to Complaint in
Intervention of Jesse Oliver, et al.............. 119a

10. Answer of Jim Mattox, et al., to Complaint in 
Intervention of Houston Lawyers’ Assoc., et al. . 126a

11. Trial Exhibit No. 1 of Judge Sharolyn Wood . . . 132a

12. Trial Exhibit No. 2 of Judge Sharolyn Wood . . . 139a

13. Motion to Intervene of Judge Tom Rickhoff, et a ll 4 6a

14. Response of Jim Mattox, et al., to Motion to Intervene
of Tom Rickhoff, et al.................................  157a

15. Order of January 2, 1990..............................  158a

16. Order of January 11, 1990 ..............................  180a



2a

Date

7/11/88

8/15/88

9/27/88

11/30/88

1/11/89

1/12/89

R elevant  D o c k et  E ntries

No. Description

1 Complaint filed and 15 summonses 
issued (sm)

2 Amended complaint by LULAC- 
Council 4434, LULAC-Council 
#4451, Christina Moreno, Aquilla 
Watson, LULAC (Statewide) James 
Fuller, Matthew W. Plummer Sr, 
amending complaint [1-1] [Entry date 
8/17/88]

7 Answer by William P. Clements, Jim
Mattox, Jack M. Rains, Thomas R. 
Phillips, John F. Onion Jr., Joe E. 
Kelly, Joe B. Evins, Sam B. Paxson, 
Weldon Kirk, Charles J. Murray, Ray 
D. Anderson, Joe Spurlock II (sm)

17 Motion by Midland County to
intervene (sm) [Entry date 12/1/88]

20 Motion by LULAC-Council 4434, 
LULAC-Council #4451. Christina 
Moreno, Aquilla Watson, LULAC 
(Statewide), James Fuller, Matthew 
W. Plummer Sr. to dismiss as to 
defendant William Clements only (sm)

23 Order granting motion to dismiss as to 
defendant William Clements only [20- 
1] (sm)



3a

1/23/89 24 Motion by Houston Lawyers Asso to 
intervene (sm)

1/23/89 Received Complaint in intervention of 
Houston Lawyers Association (sm)

1/30/89 28 Motion by Dist Jdgs of Travis with 
memorandum in support to intervene 
(sm) [Entry date 1/31/89]

1/30/89 Received answer of District Judges of 
Travis County (sm) [Entry date 
1/31/89]

1/31/89 29 Motion by Fred Tinsley, Joan Winn 
White, Jesse Oliver to intervene (sm)

2/1/89 30 Response by Jim Mattox, Jack M.
Rains, Thomas R. Phillips, John F. 
Onion Jr., Ron Chapman, thomas J. 
Stovall Jr., James F. Clawson Jr., Joe 
E. Kelly, Joe B. Evins, Sam B. 
Paxson, Weldon Kirk, Charles J. 
Murray, Ray D. Anderson, Joe 
Spurlock II to motion to intervene [24- 
1] (sm) [Entry date 2/2/89]

2/3/89 31 Response by LULAC-Council 4434,
LULAC-Council #4451, Cristina 
Moreno, Aquilla Watson, LULAC 
(Statewide), James Fuller, Matthew 
W. Plummer Sr. to motion to 
intervene [24-1] (sm)

2/9/89 32 Response by Jim Mattox, Jac, M.
Rains, Thomas R. Phillips, John F. 
Onion Jr., Ron Chapman, Thomas J. 
Stovall Jr., James F. Clawson Jr., Joe 
E. Kelly, Joe B. Evins, Sam B.



4a

2/13/89

2/21/89

2/27/89

3/6/89

3/21/89

3/21/89

2/13/89

Paxson, Weldon Kirk, Charles J. 
Murray, Ray D. Anderson, Joe 
Spurlock II to motion to intervene [29- 
1], motion to intervene [28-1] (sm)

34 Response by LULAC-Council 4434, 
LULAC Council #4451, Cristina 
Moreno, Aquilla Watson, LULAC 
(Statewide), James Fuller, Matthew 
W. Plummer Sr. to motion to 
intervene [28-1] (sm)

35 Response by LULAC-Council 4434, 
LULAC-Council #4451, Cristina 
Moreno, Aquilla Watson, LULAC 
(Statewide), James Fuller, Matthew 
W. Plummer Sr. to motion to 
intervene [29-1] (sm)

40 Motion by Sharolyn Wood to
intervene (sm)

45 Motion by F. Harold Entz to intervene
(sm)

50 Order granting motion to intervene
[45-1], granting motion to intervene 
[29-1], granting motion to intervene 
[28-1], granting motion to intervene, 
[24-1], granting motion to intervene, 
[17-1] (sm) [Entry date 3/7/89]

55 Answer by Sharolyn Wood to Houston 
Lawyers Assoc, (sm)

56 Answer to complaint by Sharolyn 
Wood against Legislative Black 
Caucus, LULAC-Council 4434, 
LULAC-Council #4451, Cristina



5a

4/6/89

4/13/89

5/12/89

4/6/89

5/24/89

Moreno, Aquilla Watson, LULAC 
(Statewide), James Fuller, Matthew 
W. Plummer Sr. (sm)

61 Motion by Legislative Black Caucus to 
intervene as plaintiffs (sm)

Received complaint in intervention of 
Legislative Black Caucus of Texas

69 Order granting motion to intervene as 
plaintiffs [61-1] (sm)

85 Second Amended Complaint by
LULAC-Council 4434, LULAC- 
Council #4451, Cristina Moreno, 
Aquilla Watson, LULAC (Statewide) 
Joan Ervin, Matthew W. Plummer, 
Sr., Jim Conley, Volma Overton, 
Willard Pen Conat, Gene Collins, A1 
Price, Theodore M. Hogrobrooks, 
Ernest M. Deckard, Mary Ellen 
Hicks, Rev. James Thomas (sm)

100 Answer of Jim Mattox, Jack M.
Rains, Thomas R. Phillips, John F. 
Onion Jr., Ron Chapman, Thomas J. 
Stovall Jr., James F. Clawson Jr., Joe 
E. Kelly, Joe B. Evins, Sam B. 
Paxson, Weldon Kirk, Charles J. 
Murray, Ray D. Anderson, Joe 
Spurlock II to Second Amended 
Complaint of LULAC-Council 4434, 
LULAC-Council #4451, Cristina 
Moreno, Aquilla Watson, LULAC 
(Statewide) Joan Ervin, Matthew W. 
Plummer, Sr., Jim Conley, Volma 
Overton, Willard Pen Conat, Gene 
Collins, A1 Price, Theodore M.



6a

5/24/89

11/8/89

11/27/89

12/22/89

12/26/89

1/2/90

5/24/89

Hogrobrooks, Ernest M. Deckard, 
Mary Ellen Hicks, Rev. James 
Thomas (sm)

101 First Amended Answer of F. Harold 
Entz to Second Amended Complaint 
of LULAC-Council 4434, LULAC- 
Council #4451, Cristina Moreno, 
Aquilla Watson, LULAC (Statewide) 
Joan Ervin, Matthew W. Plummer, 
Sr., Jim Conley, Volma Overton, 
Willard Pen Conat, Gene Collins, A1 
Price, Theodore M. Hogrobrooks, 
Ernest M. Deckard, Mary Ellen 
Hicks, Rev. James Thomas (sm)

102 Answer of F. Harold Entz to 
complaint of Fred Tinsley, Joann 
Winn White, and Jesse Oliver

282 Memorandum Opinion and Order

286 Order granting in part and denying in 
part motion to alter or amend Order 
of November 8, 1989

293 Motion to Intervene of Tom Rickhoff, 
Susan D. Reed, John J. Specia, Jr., 
Sid L. Harle, Sharon Macrae, Michael 
P. Peden

302 Order granting Motion to Correct
Clerical Mistake in Order of 
November 27, 1989

309 Order granting in part, denying in part 
Joint Motion for Entry of a Proposed 
Interim Plan, granting in part Motion



7a

to Certify the Opinion and Order of 
November 8, 1989 for Interlocutory 
Appeal, denying a stay in the 
proceedings, denying motion to 
intervene (sm)

1/11/90 331 Order amending order of January 2,
1990 (sm)



8a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
MIDLAND-ODESSA DIVISION

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS 
(LULAC), et al.,

PLAINTIFFS

Houston Lawyers’ Association 
Alice Bonner, Weldon Berry, Francis Williams, 
Rev. William Lawson, Deloyd T. Parker, 
Bennie McGinty

PLAINTIFF-INTERVENORS

vs.
No. 88-CA-154

WILLIAM CLEMENTS, Governor of the State of 
Texas, JIM MATTOX, Attorney General of the State 
of Texas; JACK RAINS, Secretary of the State of 
Texas, All in their official capacities;
THOMAS R. PHILLIPS; JOHN F. ONION, JR.;
RON CHAPMAN; THOMAS J. STOVALL, JR.; JAMES 
F. CLAWSON, JR.; JOE E. KELLY; JOE B. EVINS; 
SAM B. PAXSON; WELDON KIRK; CHARLES J. 
MURRAY; RAY D. ANDERSON; JOE SPURLOCK II, All 
in their official capacities as members of 
the Judicial Districts Board of the State of Texas,

DEFENDANTS.

X



9a

COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION 

Introduction

1. This action is brought by five Black registered voters 

and a membership organization of Black attorneys and 

registered voters in Harris County, Texas, who seek to 

intervene in MO 88 CA-154, LULAC v. Clements, for the 

purpose of protecting their interests as Black voters in being 

able to participate equally in the political process and elect 

candidates of their choice in Harris County district judge 

elections. They allege that the at large judicial electoral 

districts scheme as currently constituted, denies Black 

citizens an equal opportunity to elect the candidates of their 

choice, in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 

1965 as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, and the Fourteenth and 

Fifteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. 

They also allege that Art. 5, §7(a)i of the Constitution of the 

State of Texas was adopted with the intention, and/or has 

been maintained for the purpose of minimizing the voting 

strength of Black voters, in violation of the Fourteenth and 

Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 42



10a

U.S.C. §1983 and section II of the Voting Rights Act of 

1965 as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973. Plaintiff-intervenors 

seek declaratory and injunctive relief enjoining the continued 

use of the current judicial electoral districts scheme.

Jurisdiction

2. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331 

and 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(f). This is an action 

arising under the statutes and Constitution of the United 

States and an action to enforce statutes and constitutional 

provisions that protect civil rights, including the right to 

vote.

3. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and other appropriate relief 

pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 

2201 and 2202.

Parties

4. Plaintiff-intervenor Houston Lawyers’ Association is a 

member organization of seventy Black attorneys who reside 

in the Harris County area, each of whom is a registered 

voter, qualified to vote for district judges in Harris County. 

As part of its organizational mission, the Houston Lawyers’



11a

Association has worked to promote the fair representation of 

Blacks in the judiciary in Harris County.

5. Plaintiff-intervenor Weldon Berry is an adult Black 

citizen of the United States who resides in Harris County, 

Texas. He is registered to vote, and is qualified to vote for 

district judges in Harris County. He was an appointed 

district judge who lost in an at large election in Harris 

County, Texas.

6. Plaintiff-intervenor Francis Williams is an adult Black 

citizen of the United States who resides in Harris County, 

Texas. He is registered to vote and is qualified to vote for 

district judges in Harris County. He was an appointed 

district judge who lost in an at large election in Harris 

County, Texas.

7. Plaintiff-intervenor Alice A. Bonner is an adult Black 

citizen of the United States who resides in Harris County, 

Texas. She is registered to vote, and is qualified to vote for 

district judges in Harris County. She was an appointed 

district judge who lost in an at large election in Harris 

County, Texas.



12a

8. Plaintiff-intervenor William Lawson is an adult Black 

citizen of the United States who resides in Harris County, 

Texas. He is registered to vote, and qualified to vote for 

district judges in Harris County.

9. Plaintiff-intervenor Deloyd T. Parker, Jr. is an adult 

Black citizen of the United States who resides in Harris 

County, Texas. He is registered to vote, and qualified to 

vote for district judges in Harris County.

10. Plaintiff-intervenor Bennie McGinty is an adult Black 

citizen of the United States who resides in Harris County, 

Texas. She is registered to vote, and qualified to vote for 

district judges in Harris County.

11. Defendant William Clements is a white adult resident of 

the State of Texas. He is sued in his official capacity as 

Governor of the State of Texas. In his capacity as 

Governor, defendant Clements is the chief executive officer 

of the state and as such is charged with the responsibility to 

see that the laws of the State are faithfully executed.

12. Defendant Jack Rains is a white adult resident of the 

State of Texas. He is sued in his official capacity as



13a

Secretary of State of the State of Texas. In his capacity as 

Secretary of State, he is the chief elections officer of the 

state and as such is charged with the responsibility to 

administer the election laws of the state. The Secretary of 

State is further empowered under the Texas Election Code, 

Section 31.005, to take appropriate action to protect the 

voting rights of the citizens of Texas from abuse.

13. Defendant Jim Mattox is a white adult resident of the 

State of Texas. He is sued in his official capacity as 

Attorney General of the State of Texas. In his capacity as 

Attorney General he is the chief law enforcement officer of 

the state, and as such is charged with the responsibility to 

enforce the laws of the state.

14. Defendants Thomas R. Phillips, John F. Onion, Ron 

Chapman, Thomas J. Stovall, James F. Clawson, Jr., Joe E. 

Kelly, Joe B. Evins, Sam M. Paxson, Weldon Kirk, Charles 

J. Murray, Ray D. Anderson, and Joe Spurlock, II, are 

members of the Texas Judicial Districts Board, which was 

created by Art. 5, Sec. 7a of the Texas Constitution in 1985. 

The Judicial Districts Board is required to enact statewide



14a

reapportionment if the legislature fails to do so, after each 

federal decennial census. In addition to statewide 

reapportionment, the Judicial Districts Board may 

reapportion the judicial districts of the state as the necessity 

arises in its judgment. The Judicial Districts Board is 

comprised of twelve ex officio members, and one lawyer 

member appointed by the Governor of the State of Texas. 

No member of the Texas Judicial Districts Board has ever 

been Black.

Factual Allegations

15. Texas has a history of official discrimination that 

touched the right of Black citizens to register, to vote, and 

otherwise to participate in the democratic process.

16. Primary elections were restricted to whites in Texas 

until a Black resident of Houston successfully challenged this 

discriminatory practice before the Supreme Court of the 

United States in 1944.

17. The Texas Legislature created a state poll tax in 1902 

which helped to disenfranchise Black voters until the use of 

poll taxes was outlawed by the Supreme Court of the United



15a

States in 1966.

18. It has been estimated that the poll tax and white primary 

reduced the number of Blacks participating in Texas 

elections from approximately 100,000 in the 1890’s to 5,000 

by 1906.

19. The State of Texas, and its political subdivisions are 

covered by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as 

amended, the special administrative preclearance provision 

for monitoring all State and local voting changes.

20. Elections in Texas in general, and Harris County in 

particular, are characterized by significant racial bloc voting. 

In such elections, white voters generally vote for white 

candidates and Black voters generally vote for Black 

candidates. The existence of racial bloc voting dilutes the 

voting strength of Black voters where they are a minority of 

the electorate.

21. Texas has traditionally used, and continues to use 

unusually large election districts, particularly in large 

metropolitan areas such as Harris County, which have large 

concentrations of minority voters.



16a

22. The political processes leading to nomination or election 

in Texas in general, and Harris County in particular, are not 

equally open to participation by Blacks, in that Blacks have 

less opportunity than other members of the electorate to 

participate in the political process and to elect representatives 

of their choice. For example, Black citizens continue to 

bear the effects of pervasive official and private 

discrimination in such areas of education, employment and 

health, which hinders their ability to participate in the 

political process.

23. According to the 1980 Census, Texas had a total 

population of 14,228,383. Blacks comprise approximately 

12 percent of the State’s population.

24. No Black attorney has ever served on the Texas 

Supreme Court or on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.

25. District judges in Texas are elected in an exclusionary 

at large numbered place system.

26. Only 2% of district judges in Texas are Black. One (1) 

percent of the State’s appellate justices are Black.

27. Harris County is made up of 27 cities in southeastern



17a

Texas, of which Houston is the largest. Houston is the 

largest city in Texas. The population of Houston is 

approximately 1,728,910. The Black population of Houston 

is 440,346.

28. Harris County covers 1,723 square miles. According to 

the Texas Data Center, in 1987 the population of Harris 

County was 2,782,414. Blacks comprise approximately 

19.5% of the Harris County population.

29. The voting age population of Harris County is 

1,685,081. Eighteen (18) percent of the voting age 

population in Harris County is Black.

30. Harris County is served by fifty-nine (59) district 

judges. This is the largest number of district judges of any 

judicial district in Texas. Harris County is also the largest 

judicial district by population.

31. In recent years Black candidates have run for district 

judge in almost every general election in Harris County, yet 

only 4 judges out of 59 (6.7% of the district judges), are 

Black.

32. In the November 1988 General Election for example,



18a

six Black candidates ran for twenty-five (25) contested 

district judge positions. All six Black candidates lost, 

despite overwhelming Black voter support. Similarly, in the 

November 1986 General Election, of ten Black candidates 

who ran in twenty (20) contested races, eight lost, despite 

overwhelming support from Black voters.

33. Justices of the Peace are elected from single member 

precincts within Harris County. There are 2 Black Justices 

of the Peace in Harris County, elected from a precinct with 

a majority Black voting age population.

34. There is a substantial degree of residential segregation 

by race in Harris County.

35. Blacks in Harris County are a politically cohesive, 

geographically insular minority and the judicial candidates 

they support are usually defeated by a bloc voting white 

majority.

36. Plaintiff-intervenor reallege the contents of paragraphs 

of 11-29 of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, as they 

relate to Harris County, Texas.

37. In 1985, Art. 5 §7 of the Texas Constitution of 1876



19a

was amended to include §7(a), which created the Judicial

Districts Board and provided in relevant part that:

The legislature, the Judicial Districts Boards, or 
the Legislative Redistricting Board may not 
redistrict the judicial districts to provide for any 
judicial district smaller in size than an entire 
county except as provided by this Section. 
Vernon’s Ann. Tex. Const. Art. 5, §7(a)i.

38. Prior to the 1985 amendment, the Texas Constitution 

provided that "The State shall be divided into as many 

judicial districts as may now or hereafter be provided by 

law, which may be increased or diminished by law." Art. 

5, §7, Texas Constitution of 1876.

39. Although all counties in Texas have more than one 

district judge, no county in Texas holds elections for single 

member judicial districts. All districts judges in Texas run 

in exclusionary at large, winner take all, numbered place 

elections.

40. This electoral practice dilutes the voting power of 

politically cohesive, geographically insular communities of 

Black voters which could constitute effective voting 

majorities in single member districts.



20a

41. Using 1980 census figures, it would be possible to draw 

at least eleven single member geographically compact 

districts of equal population in which the majority of the 

voting age population is Black.

42. In the alternative, the failure to use a non-exclusionary 

at large election system for district judges, dilutes the voting 

strength of Black voters. The use of a non-exclusionary at 

large voting system could afford Blacks an opportunity to 

elect judicial candidates of their choice. For example, under 

an at large system utilizing limited or cumulative voting, 

Black voters would have a more equal opportunity to elect 

district judges.

Allegations Regarding Intervention

43. On July 11, 1988 plaintiffs filed an action on behalf of 

Mexican-American and Black plaintiffs challenging the 

district judges schemes in forty-four (44) counties throughout 

Texas, including Harris County.

44. Plaintiff-intervenors seek to intervene in this action, 

pursuant to Rule 24 (a) of the Fed. Rule Civ. Procedure, in 

order to protect the interests of Black plaintiffs in the Harris



21a

County area, who will be affected by a decision in this case. 

They are entitled to intervene as a matter of right because 

their application is timely, disposition of the action may 

impair or impede the ability of Black voters to protect their 

interest in ensuring that the method of electing district judges 

in Harris County is equally open to Black citizens, and the 

proposed-intervenors are not adequately represented by 

existing parties.

First Claim for Relief

45. Plaintiffs reallege the contents of paragraphs 1-42.

46. The present districting scheme for Texas district judges 

was adopted with the intention and/or has been maintained 

for the purpose of minimizing the political strength of Black 

voters in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution, section 2 of 

the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as amended, 42 U.S.C. 

§1973, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Second Claim for Relief

47. Plaintiffs reallege the contents of paragraphs 1-42.

48. The present districting scheme for Texas district judges



22a

has the result of making the political processes leading to 

nomination and election less open to participation by Black 

voters in that they have less opportunity than other citizens 

to elect the candidates of their choice, and thereby violates 

section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as amended, 42 

U.S.C. §1973.

Relief

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs ask this Court to enter a 

judgment:

1. Granting plaintiffs request to intervene in this action;

2. Declaring that the present districting scheme for electing 

Texas district judges violates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 

Amendments to the Constitution, section 2 of the Voting 

Rights Act of 1965 as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, and 42 

U.S.C. § 1983;

3. Ordering defendants to develop and establish a scheme 

for electing district judges that fully remedies the dilution of 

plaintiff-intervenors voting strength and provides Black 

voters with an equal opportunity to elect the candidates of 

their choice;



23a

4. Granting plaintiff-intervenors their taxable costs in this 

action, necessary expenses of the litigation, and reasonable 

attorney’s fees; and

5. Providing such other relief as the Court finds just.

Respectfully submitted,
January 19, 1988



24a

[Caption]

COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION

I. Introduction

1. Intervenors/plaintiffs Jesse Oliver, Fred Tinsley 

and Joan Winn White ("Intervenors") are former state 

district judges of Dallas County, and are Black citizens of 

the State of Texas. They bring this action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. Section 1971, 1973, 1983 and 1988 to redress a 

denial, under color of state law, of rights, privileges or 

immunities secured to plaintiffs by the said laws and by the 

Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of 

the United States.

2. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that the 

existing at large scheme of electing district judges in Dallas 

County of the State of Texas violates plaintiffs’ civil rights 

in that such method illegally and/or unconstitutionally dilutes 

the voting strength of Mexican-American and Black electors; 

plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction prohibiting the calling, 

holding, supervising or certifying any future elections for



25a

district judges under the present at large scheme in Dallas 

County; plaintiffs seek the formation of a judicial districting 

scheme by which district judges in the target counties are 

elected from districts are single member districts; plaintiffs 

seek costs and attorneys’ fees.

II. Jurisdiction

3. Jurisdiction is based upon 28 U.S.C. 1343(3) and 

(4), upon causes of action arising from 42 U.S.C. Section 

1971, 1973, 1983, and 1988, and under the Fourteenth and 

Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 

Declaratory relief is authorized by 28 U.S.C. Section 2201 

and 2202 and by Rule 57, F.R.C.P.

III. Plaintiffs/Intervenors

4. Plaintiffs Jesse Oliver, Fred Tinsley and Joan 

Winn White are Black citizens and registered voters of 

Dallas County, Texas. They are qualified to vote for district 

judges of Dallas County. Plaintiffs were appointed district 

judges who lost an at large election to a white opponent in 

Dallas County, Texas.



26a

IV. Defendants

5. Defendant William Clements is the Governor of 

the State of Texas, and is the chief executive officer of the 

state and as such is charged with the responsibility to execute 

the laws of the state. Defendant Jim Mattox is the Attorney- 

General of the State of Texas, and is the chief law 

enforcement officer of the state and as such is charged with 

the responsibility to enforce the laws of the state. Defendant 

Jack Rains is the Secretary of State of the State of Texas, 

and is the chief elections officer of the state and as such is 

charged with the responsibility to administer the election 

laws of the state. Defendants Thomas R. Phillips, John F. 

Onion, Ron Chapman, Thomas J. Stovall, James F. 

Clawson, Jr., Joe E. Kelly, Joe B. Evins, Sam M. Paxson, 

Weldon Kirk, Charles J. Murray, Ray D. Anderson, and Joe 

Spurlock, II are members of the Judicial Districts Board 

created by Article V, Section 7a of the Texas Constitution, 

and pursuant to Article 24.94Iff, Texas Revised Civil 

Statutes, have the duty to reapportion judicial districts within 

the State of Texas.



27a

V. Factual Allegations

6. District judges are elected either from judicial 

districts which are coterminous with and wholly contained 

within a county, or from judicial districts which may be 

composed of several entire counties.

7. In those counties which contain more than one 

judicial district, the present election system is an at large 

scheme with the equivalent of numbered places, the majority 

rule requirement, and staggered terms.

8. The following counties upon information and 

belief, contain multiple judicial districts and a sufficiently 

compact minority population for the drawing of at least one 

majority combined minority single member district.

Harris Lubbock
Dallas Fort Bend
Ector Smith
McClennan Brazos
Tarrant Brazoria
Midland Taylor
Travis Wichita
Jefferson Angelina
Galveston Gregg
Bell

9. The above counties contain some 190 judicial



28a

districts, and a combined minority population of almost 30%; 

however, only 10 or 5.3% of the 190 district judges are 

minority.

10. The following counties contain multiple judicial

districts and sufficient Black population for the drawing of

at least one majority-Black single member district:

Harris Galveston
Dallas Smith
Tarrant Bell
Jefferson McClennan 
Travis Gregg
Brazos Fort Bend

11. The above counties contain some 164 judicial 

districts, and a Black population of 16.4%; however, only 7 

or 4.3% of the 164 district judges are Black.

12. The following counties contain multiple judicial

districts and sufficient Hispanic population for the drawing

of at least one majority-hispanic single member district:

Harris Ector
Tarrant Lubbock
Galveston Fort Bend
Dallas 
Travis

13. The above counties contain some 148 judicial



29a

districts, and a Hispanic population of 15.4%; however, only 

4 or 2.7% of the 148 district judges are Hispanic.

14. The following judicial districts contain multiple 

counties and sufficient minority population for the drawing 

of at least one majority-minority single member districts:

Judicial District County

81st, 218th Atascosa, Frio, Karnes, 
LaSalle & Wilson

36th 156th, 343rd Aransas, Bee, Live Oak, 
McMullen & San Patricio

22nd, 207th Caldwell, Comal & Hays

24th, 135th, 267th Calhoun, DeWitt, Goliad, 
Jackson, Refugio & 
Victoria

64th, 242nd Castro, Hale & Swisher

34th, 205th, 210th Culberson, El Paso & 
Hudspeth

15. The above counties contain some 15 judicial

districts, and a combined minority population of 44.32%; 

however, only 1 or 6.7% of the 15 district judges is Black 

or Hispanic.

16. The following judicial districts contain multiple



30a

counties and sufficient hispanic population for the drawing 

of at least one majority-hispanic single member district: 

Judicial District County

81st, 218th Atascosa, Frio, Karnes, 
LaSalle & Wilson

36th, 156th, 343rd Aransas, Bee, Live Oak, 
McMullen & San Patricio

24th, 135th, 267th Calhoun, DeWitt, Goliad, 
Jackson, Refugio & 
Victoria

64th, 242nd Castro, Hale & Swisher

34th, 205th, 210th Culberson, El Paso & 
Hudspeth

17. The above counties contain some 13 judicial

districts, and a hispanic population of 42.77%; however, 

only 1 or 7.7% of the 13 district judges is hispanic.

18. Upon information and belief, if single members 

districts were drawn in the above named areas, the minority 

group is sufficiently large and compact so that districts could 

be drawn in which minorities would constitute a majority.

19. Upon information and believe, in the above

named areas minorities are politically cohesive.



31a

20. Upon information and belief in the above cited 

areas, the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to 

enable it -- in the absence of special circumstances, such as 

the minority candidate running unopposed -- usually to defeat 

the minority’s preferred candidate.

21. Upon information and belief, in the above 

challenged areas, the at large election scheme interacts with 

social and historical conditions to cause an in-equality in the 

opportunity of hispanic or black voters to elect 

representatives of their choice as compared to white voters.

22. Depending upon the evidence developed in 

discovery, some of the above named areas may be deleted 

and some unnamed areas may be added.

VI. Causes of Action

23. The present at large scheme of electing district 

judges, intentionally created and/or maintained with a 

discriminatory purpose, violates the civil rights of plaintiffs 

by diluting their votes.

24. The present at large scheme of electing district 

judges results in a denial or abridgement of the right to vote



32a

of the plaintiffs on account of their race or color in that the 

political processes leading to nomination or election of 

district judges are not equally open to participation by 

plaintiffs in that they have less opportunity than other 

members of the electorate to elect candidates of their choice.

VII. Immunities

25. Qualified and absolute immunity do not protect 

the defendants because plaintiffs seek only injunctive and 

declaratory relief and attorneys’ fees. Furthermore, absolute 

immunity does not protect defendants because they do not act 

in any of the capacities which receive immunity at common 

law. The defendants are not entitled to Eleventh 

Amendment immunity because plaintiffs seek only injunctive 

and declaratory relief and attorneys’ fees.

VIII. Equities

26. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law other 

than the judicial relief sought herein, and unless the 

defendants are enjoined from continuing the present at large 

scheme, plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed by the 

continuing violation of their statutory and constitutional



33a

rights. The illegal and unconstitutional conditions 

complained of preclude the adoption of remedial provisions 

by the electorate. The present electoral scheme is without 

any legitimate or compelling governmental interest and is 

arbitrarily and capriciously cancels, dilutes and minimizes 

the force and effect of the plaintiffs’ voting strength.

IX. Attorneys’ Fees

27. In accordance with 42 U.S.C. Section 1973-1(e) 

and 1988, plaintiffs are entitled to recover reasonable 

attorneys’ fees as part of their costs.

X. Prayer

28. WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiffs 

pray that defendants be cited to appear and answer herein; 

that a declaratory judgment be issued finding that the 

existing method of electing district judges is unconstitutional 

and/or illegal, null and void; that the defendants be 

permanently enjoined from calling, holding, supervising or 

certifying any further elections for district judges under the 

present at large scheme; that the Court order that district 

judges in the targeted counties be elected in a system which



34a

contains single member districts; adjudge all costs against 

defendants, including reasonable attorneys’ fees; retain 

jurisdiction to render any and all further orders that this 

Court may from time to time deem appropriate; and grant 

any and all further relief both at law and in equity to which 

these plaintiffs may show themselves to be entitled.

Respectfully submitted,



35a

[Caption]

DEFENDANT HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT JUDGE 
SHAROLYN WOOD’S ORIGINAL ANSWER TO 

HOUSTON LAWYERS’ ASSOCIATION

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW Defendants Sharolyn Wood, Judge of the

127th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas

("Wood") and, subject to her Motion to Dismiss and Motion

for More Definite Statement, files this her Original Answer

in response to the Complaint in Intervention of the Houston

Lawyers’ Association, Alice Bonner ("Bonner"), Weldon

Berry ("Berry"), Francis Williams ("Williams"), Rev.

William Lawson ("Lawson"), Deloyd T. Parker ("Parker"),

and Bennie McGinty ("McGinty") (hereinafter collectively

referred to as the "Houston Lawyers’ Association Plaintiffs")

in the above referenced cause of action as follows:

I.

BACKGROUND

1.1. This is a suit originally brought by the League of 

Latin American Citizens ("LULAC") and certain individual 

Mexican-American and black citizens of Texas seeking to



36a

declare illegal and/or unconstitutional and null and void in 

certain targeted counties the State of Texas’ constitutionally 

and legislatively mandated system of electing state district 

judges at large.

1.2. The Texas Constitution Article V, § 7 provides 

in relevant part that the state shall be divded into judicial 

districts with each district having one or more judges as 

provided by law or by the Texas Constitution. The section 

also provides that each district judge shall be elected by the 

qualified voters at a general election and shall be a citizen of 

the state and shall have been a practicing lawyer in the state 

or a judge of a state court for four years and shall have been 

a resident of the district for two years and shall agree to 

reside in the district during his term of office.

1.3. In 1985, the Texas Constitution was amended by 

the addition of a new section, article V, § 7a, which 

provides for the reapportionment of Texas judicial election 

districts. That section provides that no judicial district may 

be established smaller than an entire county except by 

majority vote of the voters at a general election. Tex.



37a

Const, of 1876, art. V, § 7a(i).

1.4. Pursuant to article V, the Texas legislature has 

enacted a comprehensive body of statutes governing the 

formation and function of judicial districts. The policy 

underlying the establishment of judicial districts is expressly 

stated in those statutes, to wit:

It is the policy of the state that the administration 
of justice shall be prompt and efficient and that, for this 
purpose, the judicial districts of the state shall be 
reapportioned as provided by this subchapter so that the 
district courts of various judicial districts have judicial 
burdens that are as nearly equal as possible.

Tex. Gov’t Code § 24.945.

1.5. To promote the ends of fairness and efficiency, 

all the district courts in a county with more than one judicial 

district are accorded concurrent jurisdiction and courts in 

those districts are permitted to equalize their dockets. Tex. 

Gov’t Code §§ 24.950, 24.951.

1.6. In addition, the Texas Government Code sets out 

rules and conditions for the reapportionment of judicial



38a

districts.1

1

Those statutes expressly require that the

The Tex. Gov’t Code provides,

(a) The reapportionment of the judicial 
districts of the state by the board is subject to the 
rules and conditions provided by Subsections (b)- 
(d).

(b) Reapportionment of the judicial 
districts shall be made on a determination of fact 
by the board that the reapportionment will best 
promote the efficiency and promptness of the 
administration of justice in the state by equalizing 
as nearly as possible the judicial burdens of the 
district courts of the various judicial districts. In 
determining the reapportionment that best 
promotes the efficiency and promptness of the 
administration of justice, the board shall 
consider:

(1) the numbers and types of 
cases filed in the district courts of the 
counties to be affected by the 
reapportionment;

(2) the numbers of types of
cases disposed of by dismissal or 
judgment in the district courts of those 
counties;

(3) the numbers and types of
cases pending in the district courts of
those counties;

(4) the number of district
courts in those counties;

(5) the population of the
counties;

(6) the area to be covered by



39a

a judicial district; and

(7) the actual growth or decline 
of population and district court case load 
in the counties to be affected.

(c) Each judicial district affected by a 
reapportionemnt must contain one or more 
complete counties except as provided by this 
section. More than one judicial district may 
contain the same county or counties. If more 
than one county is contained in a judicial district, 
the territory of the judicial district must be 
contiguous.

(d) Subject to the other rules and 
conditions in this section, a judicial district in a 
reapportionment under this subchapter may:

(1) be enlarged in territory by 
including an additional county or counties 
in the district, but a county having a 
population as large or larger than the 
population of the judicial district being 
reapportioned may not be added to the 
judicial district;

(2) be decreased in territory by 
removing a county or counties from the 
district;

(3) have both a county or 
counties added to the district and a county 
or counties removed from it; or

(4) be removed to another 
location in the state so that the district 
contains an entirely different county or 
counties.

(e) The legislature, the Judicial Districts



40a

reapportionment of state judicial election districts be made on 

that basis which "will best promote the efficiency and 

promptness of the administration of justice in the state by 

equalizing as nearly as possible the judicial burdens of the 

district courts of the various judicial districts." The Code 

further sets out the factors to be considered in determining 

which reapportionment best promotes the efficiency and 

promptness of the administration of justice.

1.7. Not only are both race and racial discrimination 

entirely alien to Texas’ judicial district reapportionment 

policy and the factors enumerated under it, but both the 

statement of policy itself and the enumerated factors to be 

considered make it absolutely clear that the fundamental state

Board, or the Legislative Redistricting Board may not 
redistrict the judicial districts to provide for any judicial 
district smaller in size than an entire county except as 
provided by this subsection. Judicial districts smaller in 
size than the entire county may be created subsequent to 
a general election in which a majority of the persons 
voting on the proposition adopt the proposition "to allow
the division o f ________ County into judicial districts
composed of parts of ________  County." A
redistricting plan may not be proposed or adopted by the 
legislature, the Judicial Districts Board, or the 
Legislative Redistricting Board in anticipation of a 
future action by the voters of any county.



41a

policy that determines the apportionment of judicial districts 

is the vitally important policy of promoting efficiency, 

promptness, and fundamental fairness in the administration 

of justice in Texas. Plaintiffs, however, would simply 

disregard this compelling state policy in the interests of 

increasing the numbers of protected minority class members 

in the state judiciary. Indeed, Plaintiffs expressly state that 

"the present electoral scheme is without any legitimate or 

compelling governmental interest and it arbitrarily and 

capriciously cancels, dilutes, and minimizes the force and 

effect of the Plaintiffs’ voting strength." Plaintiffs’ First 

Amended Complaint at f  31.

1.8. Despite their claim that the present judicial 

election scheme is without any legitimate foundation, 

Plaintiffs state no claim against Texas’ judicial election 

scheme in general. Rather, they complain that Texas’ state 

judicial districts were established and/or are maintained in 

certain target counties with the intent to discriminate against 

minorities protected by § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and 

that the district judge election scheme in those counties



42a

dilutes the votes of blacks and Hispanics and thereby violates 

the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.A. §§ 1971 and 1973, the 

Civil Rights Act, U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, and the 

fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the United States 

Constitution. Plaintiffs’ Complaint is essentially that when 

the target counties, which are widely scattered over the State 

of Texas, are considered as an aggregate, the proportional 

representation of black and/or Hispanic judges in those 

counties is less than the proportion of minorities in the gross 

population of those aggregated counties.

1.9. This suit initially challenged the judicial election 

system in 47 Texas counties.2 By agreement between 

Plaintiffs and the State of Texas, approved by the Court on 

oral motion of the parties at a hearing on various motions to 

intervene on February 27, 1989, the number of targeted

The counties targeted initially were Harris, 
Dallas, Ector, McLennan, Tarrant, Midland, Travis, 
Jefferson, Galveston, Bell, Lubbock, Fort Bend, Brazos, 
Brazoria, Taylor, Wichita, Angelina, Gregg, Smith, 
Atascosa, Frio, Karnes, LaSalle, Wilson, Aransas, Bee, Live 
Oak, McMullen, San Patricio, Caldwell, Comal, Hays, 
Calhoun, DeWitt, Goliad, Jackson, Refugio, Victoria, 
Castro, Hale, Swisher, Culberson, El Paso, and Hudspeth.



43a

counties was reduced to 15. These counties are Harris, 

Dallas, Ector, McLennan, Tarrant, Midland, Travis, 

Jefferson, Galveston, Lubbock, Fort Bend, Smith, 

Culberson, El Paso, and Hudspeth.

II.

DEFENSES

2.1. Defendant Wood is without knowledge as to 

whether the individual Houston Lawyers’ Association 

Plaintiffs are black registered voters as alleged in paragraph 

1 of the Houston Lawyers’ Association Plaintiffs’ Complaint 

in Intervention (the "Houston Lawyers’ Association 

Plaintiffs’ Complaint") and, therefore, denies the same.

2.2. Defendant Wood specifically denies all other 

allegations in paragraph 1 of the Houston Lawyers’ 

Association Plaintiffs’ Complaint. In particular, she denies 

that the at large judicial electoral districts scheme as 

currently constituted denies black citizens an equal 

opportunity to elect the candidates of their choice in Harris 

County. She also specifically denies that Art. 5, § 7a(i) of 

the Texas Constitution was adopted with the intention, or has



44a

been maintained for the purpose of, minimizing the voting 

strength of black voters.

2.3. Defendant Wood admits that this Court has 

jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 

1343. However, she denies that the Court has jurisdiction 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(f), since that section provides 

jurisdiction only over causes of action brought under § 1973j 

to impose civil and criminal penalties on persons who violate 

various voting rights statutes, and Plaintiffs have not brought 

any action under § 1973j nor does § 1973j provide for any 

private cause of action.

2.4. Defendant Wood is without information sufficient 

to form a belief as to the characterization of the Houston 

Lawyers’ Association in paragraph 4 of Houston Lawyers’ 

Association Plaintiff’s Complaint and the race and status of 

the individual Houston Lawyers’ Association Plaintiffs as 

alleged in paragraph 5 through 10 and therefore denies them.

2.5. Defendant Clements has been dropped from this 

suit by Court order.

2.6. Defendant Wood is without knowledge or



45a

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

averments in paragraphs 11 through 14 of Houston Lawyers’ 

Association Plaintiffs’ Complaint, except to the extent that 

those averments are admitted by the State Defendants. 

Defendant Wood denies, however, that the Judicial Districts 

Board may reapportion the judicial districts of Texas "as the 

necessity arises in its judgment" without regard to any other 

factors.

2.7. Defendant Wood makes no averments except 

with respect to Harris County. Insofar as Harris County is 

concerned, Defendant Wood is without knowledge or 

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

averments in paragraphs 15 through 35 of the Complaint to 

which a responsive pleading may be required and therefore 

denies them.

2.8. In addition, in response to paragraph 20 of the 

Complaint, Defendant Wood specifically denies that elections 

in Harris County in particular are characterized by 

significant racial bloc voting.

2.9. Defendant Wood also specifically denies that the



46a

State of Texas has used or continues to use unusually large 

election districts in Harris County; and she denies the 

implication in paragraph 21 of the Houston Lawyers’

Association Plaintiffs’ Complaint that the size of the judicial 

election districts in Harris County is in any way determined 

or influenced by the number of minority voters in the area.

2.10. Defendant Wood also specifically denies the

allegations in paragraph 22 of the Houston Lawyers’

Association Plaintiffs’ Complaint that the judicial election

process is not equally open to blacks, insofar as those 

allegations refer to Harris County.

2.11. Defendant Wood further specifically denies the

allegations in paragraph 35 of the Houston Lawyers’

Association Plaintiffs’ Complaint that black judicial 

candidates in Harris County are usually defeated by a bloc 

voting white majority.

2.12. Defendant Wood denies the allegations 

incorporated by reference in paragraph 36 of the Houston 

Lawyers’ Association Plaintiffs’ Complaint insofar as a 

responsive pleading is required; and she refers the Houston



47a

Lawyers’ Association Plaintiffs to her First Amended 

Answer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint.

2.13. Defendant Wood admits the allegations in 

paragraph 37 of the Houston Lawyers’ Association Plaintiffs’ 

Complaint that Art. 5, § 7 of the Texas Constitution of 1876 

was amended in 1985 to include § 7(a), but she denies that 

the snippet quoted is meaningful by itself.

2.14. Defendant Wood admits the averments in 

paragraph 38 insofar as any responsive pleading is required.

2.15. Defendant Wood is without information to permit 

her to respond to the allegations in paragraphs 39 and 41 and 

therfore denies them.

2.16. In response to paragraphs 40 and 42 of the 

Complaint, and with respect to Harris County alone, 

Defendant Wood specifically denies that the present at large 

scheme of electing district judges violates the civil rights of 

the Plaintiffs by diluting their votes. She further denies that 

the present at large election scheme results in a denial or 

abridgement of the right of the Plaintiffs to vote on account 

of their race or color in that they have less opportunity than



48a

other members of the electorate to elect candidates of their 

choice as alleged in paragraphs 22 and 48 of Houston 

Lawyers’ Association Plaintiffs’ Complaint. Intervenor

Wood asserts that such condition or effect does not exist in 

Harris County with respect to the election of district judges. 

She also asserts that no violation of the Voting Rights Act or 

of the United States Constitution has occurred within Harris 

County with respect to the current method or scheme of 

electing district judges and that, therefore, no remedy is 

required or justified in order to alleviate a problem which 

does not exist within this county.

2.17. No responsive pleading is required to the

Houston Lawyers’ Association Plaintiffs’ allegations

regarding intervention in paragraphs 43 and 44 of their 

Complaint.

2.18. Defendant Wood denies the allegations in 

paragraphs 45 through 48 of the Houston Lawyers’ 

Association Plaintiffs’ Complaint. She specifically denies in 

addition, and with respect to Harris County alone, that the 

present districting scheme was adopted or has been



49a

maintained with the intention of minimizing the political 

strength of black voters, as alleged in paragraph 46; and she 

specifically denies that the present scheme has the result of 

making the political process in Harris County less open to 

black voters.

II.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

A. Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Bring Their Claims (a) in 
Twelve of the Fifteen Target Counties and (b) in Each 
Already Identified Future Minority District in Which No 
Plaintiff Resides.

3.1. Defendant Wood hereby incorporates by 

reference the allegations heretofore made in paragraphs 1.1 

through 2.18 as though fully restated.

3.2. Defendant Wood still urging and relying on the 

matters herein alleged, further alleges by way of affirmative 

defense that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their claims of 

vote dilution in twelve of the fifteen counties which are 

targets of this suit in that no individual Plaintiff in this suit 

is a resident of any county except Harris, Midland, and 

Dallas. Thus, no decision of the Court regarding the



50a

application of Texas’ judicial district election scheme in any 

other county will affect any Plaintiff in this case. When no 

Plaintiffs will be affected by a decision regarding a claim, 

the Court lacks jurisdiction over that claim. Hence all 

claims as to the twelve unrepresented counties should be 

dismissed and the remaining case severed by county and 

transferred to the Federal District Court in such county.

3.3. In the alternative, the Court should join as 

indispensable parties individual voters in each target county 

as well as the district judges of those counties.

3.4. In addition, with respect to each of the eleven 

proposed judicial districts Plaintiffs have already identified 

in which no named Plaintiff is a resident, Plaintiffs lack 

standing to assert any claims.

B. State Judicial Elections Are Beyond the Scope o f the
Voting Rights Act.

4.1. Defendant Wood hereby incorporates by 

reference the allegations heretofore made in paragraphs 1.1 

through 3.4 as though fully restated.

4.2. Defendant Wood, still urging and relying on the



51a

matters herein alleged, further alleges by way of affirmative 

defense that state judicial elections are beyond the scope of 

the Voting Rights Act in that the plain language of § 2 of the 

Voting Rights Act, as amended in 1982 and codified at 42 

U.S.C. § 1973(b), limits the scope of the Act to elections of 

"representatives," not judges; and she alleges that the Voting 

Rights Act cannot be properly understood to require that 

judges, who serve the people rather than represent them, 

must be elected from single member districts drawn on racial 

lines, as Plaintiffs would require, in order to correct for the 

dilution of the votes of protected minority class members in 

multi-member judicial districts.

C. The Voting Rights Act, as Amended, is Unconstitutional
as Applied to Judicial Elections.

5.1. Defendant Wood hereby incorporates by 

reference the allegations heretofore made in paragraphs 1.1 

through 4.2 as though fully restated.

5.2. Defendant Wood, still urging and relying on the 

matters herein alleged, would further alleges by way of 

affirmative defense that the Voting Rights Act, as amended



52a

in 1982, is unconstitutional as applied to judicial elections.

5.3. Intentional discrimination is an essential element 

of a violation of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to 

the United States Constitution. The Voting Rights Act 

derives its constitutional validity from those two amendments 

and, in particular, from § 5 of the fourteenth amendment and 

§ 2 of the fifteenth amendment, which grant to Congress the 

power to enforce the provisions of those amendments. 

Following a holding by the Supreme Court that the Voting 

Rights Act was violated only by purposeful discrimination, 

Congress amended § 2 of the Voting Rights Act to make it 

clear that a violation could be proved by showing 

discriminatory effect alone without showing a discriminatory 

purpose on the part of the state in adopting or maintaining a 

contested electoral mechanism.

5.4. The 1982 amendments to § 2 of the Voting 

Rights Act transgress the constitutional limitations within 

which Congress has the authority to interfere with state 

regulation of the local electoral process. Although Congress 

has the power under the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments



53a

to pass statutes prohibiting conduct which does not rise to 

the level of a constitutional violation, it may not infringe any 

provision of the Constitution in doing so. Yet the Voting 

Rights Act, at least as applied to judicial elections, violates 

the principle of separation of powers underlying the United 

States and the Texas Constitution and the Equal Protection 

Clause of the fourteenth amendment in order to extend 

protections to protected minorities which are not themselves 

required by the Constitution.

5.5. The Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth 

amendment to the United States Constitution provides that 

"[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its 

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The Voting 

Rights Act, as amended in 1982, is, however, expressly 

designed to force states to adopt measures as remedies for 

alleged vote dilution that favor protected classes over other 

classes ad thus deprive members of nonprotected classes of 

the equal protection of the laws. Since Defendant Wood is 

not a member of a class protected by the Act, that Act, used 

to force the restructuring of state judicial election districts in



54a

Harris County, Texas, would unconstitutionally deprive 

Defendant Wood of the equal protection of the laws.

5.6. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as 

originally promulgated and enforced prior to 1982, did not 

expressly favor protected classes. The Act simply forbade 

any state or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right 

of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race 

or color. In 1975, the Act was amended to extend its 

protections to members of language minority groups.3 In 

1982 it was amended once again; and this time its 

protections were expressly limited to "members of a 

protected class."4

As amended in 1975, the § 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act provided:

No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, 
or standard, practice, or procedure shall be 
imposed or applied by any State or political 
subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any 
citizen of the United States to vote on account of 
race or color, or in contravention of the 
guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this 
title [i.e., guarantees protecting language 
minority groups].

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended 
in 1982, provides:



55a

5.7. Since the protections of § 2 of the Voting Rights 

Act as amended in 1982 are expressly extended to protected 

classes and not to others, the Voting Rights Act as amended 

is a race-based Act designed to further remedial goals. 

Therefore, its provisions are highly suspect and are to be 

treated by the courts with strict scrutiny so that they may

(a) No voting qualification or 
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or 
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any 
State or political subdivision in a manner which 
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of 
any citizen of the United States to vote on 
account of race or color, or in contravention of 
the guarantees set forth in section 1973b (f)(2) of 
this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this 
section.

(b) A violation of subsection (a) of 
this section is established if, based on the totality 
of circumstances, it is shown that the political 
processes leading to nomination or election in the 
State or political subdivision are not equally open 
to participation by members of a class of citizens 
protected by subsection (a) of this section in that 
its members have less opportunity than other 
members of the electorate to participate in the 
political process and to elect representatives of 
their choice. The extent to which members of a 
protected class have been elected to office in the 
State or political subdivision is one circumstance 
which may be considered: Provided, That
nothing in this section establishes a right to have 
members of protected class elected in numbers 
equal to their proportion in the population.



56a

determine whether its classifications are in fact motivated by 

racial politics, rather than by a more benign purpose, and 

whether those classifications carry the danger of leading to 

a politics of racial hostility.

5.8. Strict scrutiny reveals that the protections of § 2 

of the Voting Rights Act, as amended can be invoked in a 

vote dilution case, such as the present case, only by a 

protected minority which is geographically insular and 

politically cohesive and votes as a racial block against a 

white majority, which also votes as a racial block and 

usually manages to defeat candidates preferred by the 

protected minority. In that situation — and in that situation 

only — the Voting Rights Act comes alive to ensure that the 

protected class will be allowed to elect the representatives of 

its choice, even if that protected class is in the minority in 

the challenged election district, and even if the challenge 

district’s boundaries have been drawn for compelling state 

reasons having nothing to do with race. However, the 

Voting Rights Act does not protect the rights of any class of 

people other than those designated by the Act as protected



57a

classes -  even if the unprotected class finds itself in the 

precise circumstances which would invoke the Act if the 

class were protected, namely, in a situation where the 

unprotected class constitutes a minority of voters within a 

given election district -  a situation which, on information 

and belief, prevails in much of Southern Texas.

5.9. Defendant Wood makes no allegations concerning 

the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act in regard to 

matters other than judicial elections. However, in regard to 

judicial elections, Section 2 as amended is a preferential Act 

which, in the name of preventing discrimination, (a) is 

actually a device for encouraging and rewarding racial 

politics and implicitly the notion of race-conscious justice by 

forcing states to adopt measures to remedy "vote dilution" 

and (b) by ignoring the principal of "one man-one vote," to 

guarantee a disproportionally large number of minority 

judges committed to race-conscious justice. Both concepts 

would deprive nonprotected classes of the equal protection of 

the law. That Act therefore fails to meet the test of strict 

scrutiny and flagrantly violates the equal protection clause of



58a

the Constitution.

5.10. Second, the Voting Rights Act, when extended 

to judicial elections, obliterates the distinction between 

legislators -- who represent the people and are properly 

representatives of the voters’ personal interests (such as the 

voters’ desire to have the interests of their racial or language 

group put foremost) — and judges — who serve the interests 

of all the people impartially and in the proper exercise of 

whose function the desires of the voters to promote racial 

identification have no proper role at all. When the Voting 

Rights Act is applied to judges, the proper distinction 

between the legislative and judicial function is sacrificed to 

the promotion of racial interests and any state in which it is 

so used is denied the opportunity to maintain the separation 

of the legislative and judicial function which is fundamental 

to the United States Constitution itself and to all state 

constitutions, including the Texas Constitution.

WHEREFORE, Harris County District Judge Sharolyn 

Wood respectfully requests that the Houston Lawyers’ 

Association Plaintiffs’ cause of action be dismissed with



59a

respect to the system for electing district judges within 

Harris County and that judgment be entered in her favor and 

that she recover all other relief, both general and special, in 

law and in equity, to which she may show herself justly 

entitled.

III.

DEFENDANT WOOD’S COUNTERCLAIM

Harris County District Judge Sharolyn Wood, Defendant 

in the above-captioned action, now acting as and designated 

Counter-Plaintiff, complains of the Houston Lawyers’ 

Association Plaintiffs, now designated Counter-Defendants, 

and for cause of action would show by way of counterclaim 

the following:

6.1. Counter-Plaintiff incorporates by reference the 

allegations in paragraphs 1.1 through 5.10 as though fully 

restated.

6.2. In connection with the controversy which is the 

subject of this cause of action, Counter-Defendants rely 

integrally on the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 

1965 as amended in 1982 and codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §



60a

1973 (West Supp. 1988). Title 28 §§ 2201 and 2202 permit 

any interested party to seek a declaration of his rights and 

other legal relations in a case of actual controversy within its 

jurisdiction and to seek further necessary or proper relief 

based on a declaratory judgment. Therefore Counter- 

Plaintiff seeks a declaration of her rights vis-a-vis the 

amended Voting Rights Act under the United States 

Constitution.

6.3. For the reasons set forth above in paragraphs 4.1 

through 4.2 and hereby incorporated by reference, Counter- 

Plaintiff alleges that state judicial elections are beyond the 

scope of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

6.4. Alternatively, and still urging and relying upon 

the claim set forth herein, Counter-Plaintiff further alleges 

that, for the reasons set forth in paragraphs 5.1 through 5.10 

and hereby incorporated by reference, the Voting Rights Act 

as amended in 1982 is uncosntitutional as applied to judicial 

elections. It deprives non-protected classes of the equal 

protection of the law, in violation of the fourteenth 

amendment; and in addition, it deprives citizens of those



61a

states in which it is invoked to force the redistricting of state 

judicial election districts of their right to a form of 

government in which the function of the judiciary as servants 

of the people is kept separate from the function of the 

legislature as representatives of the people. More 

specifically, its application in the ways sought by Plaintiffs 

would deprive Defendant Wood of her constitutional rights.

6.5. In that she seeks a declaration of her

constitutional rights, Defendant Wood alleges that she is 

entitled to court costs and attorney’s fees.

WHEREFORE, Counter-Plaintiff Wood respectfully 

prays that the Court will grant her relief as follows:

1. Declare that the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as 

amended in 1982, does not apply to judicial elections; or, 

alternatively,

2. Declare that the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as 

amended in 1982, is unconstitutional as applied to judicial 

elections; and

3. Dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ claims; and

4. Award Counter-Plaintiff her just costs and



62a

attorney’s fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2202 and 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1988; and

5. Award Counter-Plaintiff such other and further 

relief in law and in equity to which she may show herself to

be justly entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

PORTER & CLEMENTS

By: A/ J. Eugene Clements 
[Caption]



63a

HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT JUDGE SHAROLYN 
WOOD’S FIRST AMENDED ORIGINAL ANSWER 

AND COUNTERCLAIM TO PLAINTIFFS 
LULAC, ETAL.

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW Sharolyn Wood, Judge of the 127th 

Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas ("Wood") 

and, subject to her Motion to Dismiss and Motion for More 

Definite Statement, files this her First Amended Original 

Answer in response to the Plaintiffs’ First Amended 

Complaint in the above-referenced cause of action as 

follows:

I.

BACKGROUND

1.1. This is a suit originally brought by the League 

of Latin American Citizens ("LULAC") and certain 

individual Mexican-American and black citizens of Texas 

seeking to declare illegal and/or unconstitutional and null and 

void in certain targeted counties the State of Texas’ 

constitutionally and legislatively mandated system of electing 

state district judges at large.



64a

1.2. The Texas Constitution Article V, § 7 provides 

in relevant part that the state shall be divided into judicial 

districts with each district having one or more judges as 

provided by law or by the Texas Constitution. The section 

also provides that each district judge shall be elected by the 

qualified voters at a general election and shall be a citizen of 

the state and shall have been a practicing lawyer in the state 

or a judge of a state court for four years and shall have been 

a resident of the district for two years and shall agree to 

reside in the district during his term of office.

1.3. In 1985, the Texas Constitution was amended by 

the addition of a new section, article V, § 7a, which 

provides for the reapportionment of Texas judicial election 

districts. That section provides that no judicial district may 

be established smaller than an entire county except by 

majority vote of the voters at a general election. Tex. 

Const, of 1876, art. V, § 7a(i).

1.4. Pursuant to article V, the Texas legislature has 

enacted a comprehensive body of statutes governing the 

formation and function of judicial districts. The policy



underlying the establishment of judicial districts is expressly

stated in those statutes, to wit:

It is the policy of the state that the administration 
of justice shall be prompt and efficient and that, for this 
purpose, the judicial districts of the state shall be 
reapportioned as provided by this subchapter so that the 
district courts of various judicial districts have judicial 
burdens that are as nearly equal as possible.

Tex. Gov’t Code § 24.945.

1.5. To promote the ends of fairness and efficiency, 

all the district courts in a county with more than one judicial 

district are accorded concurrent jurisdiction and courts in 

those districts are permitted to equalize their dockets. Tex. 

Gov’t Code §§ 24.950, 24.951.

1.6. In addition, the Texas Government Code sets out 

rules and conditions for the reapportionment of judicial 

districts.1 Those statutes expressly require that the

The Tex. Gov’t Code provides,

(a) The reapportionment of the judicial 
districts of the state by the board is subject to the 
rules and conditions provided by Subsection (b)- 
(d).

(b) Reapportionment of the judicial 
districts shall be made on a determination of fact 
by the board that the reapportionment will best



66a

promote the efficiency and promptness of the 
administration of justice in the state by equalizing 
as nearly as possible the judicial burdens of the 
district courts of the various judicial districts. In 
determining the repportionment that best 
promotes the efficiency and promptness of the 
administration of justice, the board shall 
consider:

(1) the numbers and types of 
cases filed in the district courts of the 
counties to be affected by the 
reapportionment;

(2) the numbers and types of 
cases disposed of by dismissal or 
judgment in the district courts of those 
counties;

(3) the numbers and types of
cases pending in the district courts of 
those counties;

(4) the number of district
courts in those counties;

(5) the population of the
counties;

(6) the area to be covered by
a judicial district; and

(7) the actual growth or decline
or population and district court case load 
in the counties to be affected.

(c) Each judicial district affected by 
a reapportionment must contain one or more 
complete counties except as provided by this 
section. More than one judicial district may 
contain the same county or counties. If more



67a

than one county is contained in a judicial district, 
the territory of the judicial district must be 
contiguous.

(d) Subject to the other rules and 
conditions in this section, a judicial district in a 
reapportionment under this subchapter may:

(1) be enlarged in territory by 
including an additional county or counties 
in the district, but a county having a 
population as large or larger than the 
population of the judicial district being 
reapportioned may not be added to the 
judicial district;

(2) be decreased in territory by 
removing a county or counties from the 
district;

(3) have both a county or 
counties added to the district and a county 
or counties removed from it; or

(4) be removed to another 
location in the state so that the district 
contains an entirely different county or 
counties.

(e) The legislature, the Judicial 
Districts Board, or the Legislative Redistricting 
Board may not redistrict the judicial districts to 
provide for any judicial district smaller in size 
than an entire county except as provided by this 
subsection. Judicial districts smaller in size than 
the entire county may be created subsequent to 
a general election in which a majority of the 
persons voting on the proposition adopt the
proposition "to allow the division of _______
County into judicial districts composed of parts 
o f _________  County." A redistricting plan



68a

reapportionment of state judicial election districts be made on 

that basis which "will best promote the efficiency and 

promptness of the administrtation of justice in the state by 

equalizing as nearly as possible the judicial burdens of the 

district courts of the various judicial districts." The Code 

further sets out the factors to be considered in determining 

which reapportionment best promotes the efficiency and 

promptness of the administration of justice.

1.7. Not only are both race and racial discrimination 

entirely alien to Texas’ judicial district reapportionment 

policy and the factors enumerated under it, but both the 

statement of policy itself and the enumerated factors to be 

considered make it absolutely clear that the fundamental state 

policy that determines the apportionment of judicial districts 

is the vitally important policy of promoting efficiency, 

promptness, and fundamental fairness in the administration 

of justice in Texas. Plaintiffs, however, would simply

may not be proposed or adopted by the 
legislature, the Judicial Districts Board, or the 
Legislative Redistricting Board in anticipation of 
a future action by the voters of any county.



69a

disregard this compelling state policy in the interests of 

increasing the numbers of protected minority class members 

in the state judiciary. Indeed, Plaintiffs expressly state that 

"the present electoral scheme is without any legitimate or 

compelling governmental interest and it arbitrarily and 

capriciously cancels, dilutes, and minimizes the force and 

effect of the Plaintiffs’ voting strength." Plaintiffs’ First 

Amended Complaint at  ̂ 31.

1.8. Despite their claim that the present judicial 

election scheme is without any legitimate foundation, 

Plaintiffs state no claim against Texas’ judicial election 

scheme in general. Rather, they complain that Texas’ state 

judicial districts were established and/or are maintained in 

certain target counties with the intent to discriminate against 

minorities protected by § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and 

that the district judge election scheme in those counties 

dilutes the votes of blacks and Hispanics and thereby violates 

the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.A. §§ 1971 and 1973, the 

Civil Rights Act, U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, and the 

fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the United States



70a

Constitution. Plaintiffs’ Complaint is essentially that when 

the target counties, which are widely scattered over the State 

of Texas, are considered as an aggregate, the proportional 

representation of black and/or Hispanic judges in those 

counties is less than the proportion of minorities in the gross 

population of those aggregated counties.

1.9. This suit initially challenged the judicial election 

system in 47 Texas counties.2 By agreement between 

Plaintiffs and the State of Texas, approved by the Court on 

oral motion of the parties at a hearing on various motions to 

intervene on February 27, 1989, the number of targeted 

counties was reduced to 15. These counties are Harris, 

Dallas, Ector, McLennan, Tarrant, Midland, Travis, 

Jefferson, Galveston, Lubbock, Fort Bend, Smith, 

Culberson, El Paso, and Hudspeth.

2 The counties targeted initially were Harris, 
Dallas, Ector, McLennan, Tarrant, Midland, Travis, 
Jefferson, Galveston, Bell, Lubbock, Fort Bend, Brazos, 
Brazoria, Taylor, Wichita, Angelina, Gregg, Smith, 
Atascosa, Frio, Karnes, LaSalle, Wilson, Aransas, Bee, Live 
Oak, McMullen, San Patricio, Caldwell, Comal, Hays, 
Calhoun, DeWitt, Goliad, Jackson, Refugio, Victoria, 
Castro, Hale, Swisher, Culberson, El Paso, and Hudspeth.



71a

II.

DEFENSES

2.1. Defendant Wood acknowledges that the League 

of United Latin American Citizens ("LULAC") consists of 

statewide and local organizations composed primarily of 

United States citizens of Mexican descent as alleged in 

paragraphs 1, 4 and 5 of Plaintiffs’ First Amended 

Complaint (the "Complaint"). However, she is without 

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the 

truth of the averments in the first paragraph of the Complaint 

about the citizenship and race of Plaintiffs Christina Moreno, 

Aquilla Watson, James Fuller, and Judge Matthew W. 

Plummer, Sr.

2.2. Paragraph 2 of the Complaint contains only 

averments to which no responsive pleading is required; 

however, to the extent that it is construed to contain 

averments requiring a responsive pleading, Defendant denies 

them.

2.3 To the extent that paragraph 3 of the Complaint 

is construed to contain averments to which responsive



72a

pleadings are required, Defendant Wood admits the averment 

in paragraph 3 that the Court has jurisdiction over this 

action. She is without knowledge or information sufficient 

to form a belief as to whether each of the cited statutory 

provisions provides sufficient jurisdiction.

2.4. Defendant Wood is without knowledge or

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

averments in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the 

Complaint. She is without knowledge or information. 

sufficient to form a belief as to the averments in paragraph 

10, except to the extent that those averments are admitted by 

the State Defendants.

2.5. Defendant Wood admits the averments in

paragraph 11 and 12 of the Complaint.

2.6. Defendant Wood is without knowledge or

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

averments in the remaining paragraphs, 13-32, of the

Complaint to which a responsive pleading may be required 

and therefore denies them.

2.7. In addition, in response to paragraph 26 of the



73a

Complaint, Defendant Wood specifically denies that the at 

large judicial election system causes an inequality in the 

opportunity of black or Hispanic voters to elect 

representatives of their choice, since state district judges are 

not representatives of the electorate.

2.8. Defendant Wood makes no contention or 

assertions regarding any other county of the state except 

Harris County. However, in response to paragraphs 28 and 

29 of the Complaint, and with respect to Harris County 

alone, Defendant Wood specifically denies that the present 

at large scheme of electing district judges violates the civil 

rights of the Plaintiffs by diluting their votes. She further 

denies that the present at large election scheme results in a 

denial or abridgement of the right of the Plaintiffs to vote on 

account of their race or color in that they have less 

opportunity than other members of the electorate to elect 

candidates of their choice. Defendant Wood asserts that 

such condition or effect does not exist in Harris County with 

the respect to the election of district judges. She also asserts 

that no violation of the Voting Rights Act or of the United



74a

States Constitution has occurred within Harris County with 

respect to the current method or scheme of electing district 

judges and that, therefore, no remedy is required or justified 

in order to alleviate a problem which does not exist within 

this county.

2.9. Defendant Wood also denies, with respect to 

paragraph 31 of the Complaint, that Plaintiffs will be 

irreparably harmed by the continuing violation of their rights 

in Harris County since she denies that there are any such 

violations in Harris County. She further denies that the 

present electoral scheme in Harris County is without any 

legitimate or compelling government interest.

III.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

A. Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Bring Their Claims in Twelve
o f the Fifteen Target Counties.

3.1. Defendant Wood hereby incorporates by 

reference the allegations heretofore made in paragraphs 1.1 

through 2.18 as though fully restated.

3.2. Defendant Wood still urging and relying on the



75a

matters herein alleged, further alleges by way of affirmative 

defense that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their claims of 

vote dilution in twelve of the fifteen counties which are 

targets of this suit in that no individual Plaintiff in this suit 

is a resident of any county except Harris, Midland, and 

Dallas. Thus, no decision of the Court regarding the 

application of Texas’ judicial district election scheme in any 

other county will affect any Plaintiff in this case. When no 

Plaintiffs will be affected by a decision regarding a claim the 

Court lacks jurisdiction over that claim. Hence all claims as 

to the twelve unrepresented counties should be dismissed and 

the case as to the remaining counties other than Midland 

should be severed and transferred to such counties.

3.3. In the altnemative, the Court should join as 

indispensable parties individual voters in each target county 

as well as the district judges of those counties.

B. State Judicial Elections Are Beyond the Scope of the
Voting Rights Act.

4.1. Defendant Wood hereby incorporates by 

reference the allegations heretofore made in paragraphs 1.1



76a

through 3.3 as though fully restated.

4.2. Defendant Wood, still urging and relying on the 

matters herein alleged, further alleges by way of affirmative 

defense that state judicial elections are beyond the scope of 

the Voting Rights Act in that the plain language of § 2 of the 

Voting Rights Act, as amended in 1982 and codified at 42 

U.S.C. § 1973(b), limits the scope of the Act to elections of 

"representatives," not judges; and she alleges that the Voting 

Rights Act cannot be properly understood to require that 

judges, who serve the people rather than represent them, 

must be elected from single member districts drawn on racial 

lines, as Plaintiffs would require, in order to correct for the 

dilution of the votes of protected minority class members in 

multi-member judicial districts.

C. The Voting Rights Act, as Amended, is Unconstitutional 
as Applied to Judicial Elections.

5.1. Defendant Wood hereby incorporates by 

reference the allegations heretofore made in paragraphs 1.1 

through 4.2 as though fully restated.

5.2. Defendant Wood, still urging and relying on the



77a

matters herein alleged, would further alleges by way of 

affirmative defense that the Voting Rights Act, as amended 

in 1982, is unconstitutional as applied to judicial elections.

5.3. Intentional discrimination is an essential element 

of a violation of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to 

the United States Constitution. The Voting Rights Act 

derives its constitutional validity from those two amendments 

and, in particular, from § 5 of the fourteenth amendment and 

§ 2 of the fifteenth amendment, which grant to Congress the 

power to enforce the provisions of those amendments. 

Following a holding by the Supreme Court that the Voting 

Rights Act was violated only by purposeful discrimination, 

Congress amended § 2 of the Voting Rights Act to make it 

clear that a violation could be proved by showing 

discriminatory effect alone without showing a discriminatory 

purpose on the part of the state in adopting or maintaining a 

contested electoral mechanism.

5.4. The 1982 amendments to § 2 of the Voting 

Rights Act transgress the constitutional limitations within 

which Congress has the authority to interfere with state



78a

regulation of the local electoral process. Although Congress 

has the power under the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments 

to pass statutes prohibiting conduct which does not rise to 

the level of a constitutional violation, it may not infringe any 

provision of the Constitution in doing so. Yet the Voting 

Rights Act, at least as applied to judicial elections, violates 

the principle of separation of powers underlying the United 

States and the Texas Constitution and the Equal Protection 

Clause of the fourteenth amendment in order to extend 

protections to protected minorities which are not themselves 

required by the Constitution.

5.5. The Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth 

amendment to the United States Constitution provides that 

"[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its 

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The Voting 

Rights Act, as amended in 1982, is, however, expressly 

designed to force states to adopt measures as remedies for 

alleged vote dilution that favor protected classes over other 

classes and thus deprive members of nonprotected classes of 

the equal protection of the laws. Since Defendant Wood is



79a

not a member of a class protected by the Act, that Act, used 

to force the restructuring of state judicial election districts in 

Harris County, Texas, would unconstitutionally deprive 

Defendant Wood of the equal protection of the laws.

5.6. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as 

originally promulgated and enforced prior to 1982, did not 

expressly favor protected classes. The Act simply forbade 

any state or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right 

of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race 

or color. In 1975, the Act was amended to extend its 

protections to members of language minority groups.3 In 

1982 it was amended once again; and this time its 

protections were expressly limited to "members of a

As amended in 1975, the § 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act provided:

No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or 
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or 
applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or 
abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to 
vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of 
the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this 
title [i.e., guarantees protecting language minority 
groups].



80a

protected class."4

5.7. Since the protections of § 2 of the Voting Rights 

Act as amended in 1982 are expressly extended to protected 

classes and not to others, the Voting Rights Act as amended 

is a race-based Act designed to further remedial goals. 

Therefore, its provisions are highly suspect and are to be

4 Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended 
in 1982, provides:

(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to 
voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be 
imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision 
in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of 
the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on 
account of race or color, or in contravention of the 
guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, 
as provided in subsection (b) of this section.

(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this 
section is established if, based on the totality of 
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes 
leading to nomination or election in the State or political 
subdivision are not equally open to participation by 
members of a class of citizens protected by subsection 
(a) of this section in that its members have less 
opportunity than other members of the electorate to 
participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice. The extent to which 
members of a protected class have been elected to office 
in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance 
which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in 
this section establishes a right to have members of 
protected class elected in numbers equal to their 
proportion in the population.



81a

treated by the courts with strict scrutiny so that they may 

determine whether its classifications are in fact motivated by 

racial politics, rather than by a more benign purpose, and 

whether those classifications carry the danger of leading to 

a politics of racial hostility.

5.8. Strict scrutiny reveals that the protections of § 2 

of the Voting Rights Act, as amended, can be invoked in a 

vote dilution case, such as the present case, only by a 

protected minority which is geographically insular and 

politically cohesive and votes as a racial block against a 

white majority, which also votes as a racial block and 

usually manages to defeat candidates preferred by the 

protected minority. In that situation -- and in that situation 

only — the Voting Rights Act comes alive to ensure that the 

protected class will be allowed to elect the representatives of 

its choice, even if that protected class is in the minority in 

the challenged election district, and even if the challenged 

district’s boundaries have been drawn for compelling state 

reasons having nothing to do with race. However, the 

Voting Rights Act does not protect the rights of any class of



82a

people other than those designated by the Act as protected 

classes — even if the unprotected class finds itself in the 

precise circumstances which would invoke the Act if the 

class were protected,, namely, in a situation where the 

unprotected class constitutes a minority of voters within a 

given election district -  a situation which, on information 

and belief, prevails in much of Southern Texas.

5.9. Defendant Wood makes no allegations concerning 

the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act in regard to 

matters other than judicial elections. However, in regard to 

judicial elections, Section 2 as amended is a preferential Act 

which, in the name of preventing discrimination, is (a) 

actually a device for encouraging and rewarding racial 

politics and implicitly the notion of race-conscious justice by 

forcing states to adopt measures to remedy "vote dilution" 

(b) by ignoring the principle of "one-man, one-vote" to 

guarantee a disproportionately large number of minority 

judges committed to such race-conscious justice. Both 

concepts would deprive nonprotected classes of the equal 

protection of the law. That Act therefore fails to meet the



83a

test of strict scrutiny and flagrantly violates the equal 

protection clause of the Constitution.

5.10. Second, the Voting Rights Act, when extended 

to judicial elections, obliterates the distinction between 

legislators -  who represent the people and are properly 

representatives of the voters’ personal interests (such as the 

voters’ desire to have the interests of their racial or language 

group put foremost) — and judges — who serve the interests 

of all the people impartially and in the proper exercise of 

whose function the desires of the voters to promote racial 

identification have no proper role at all. When the Voting 

Rights Act is applied to judges, the proper distinction 

between the legislative and judicial function is sacrificed to 

the promotion of racial interests and any state in which it is 

so used is denied the opportunity to maintain the separation 

of the legislative and judicial function which is fundamental 

to the United States Constitution itself and to all state 

constitutions, including the Texas Constitution.

WHEREFORE, Harris County District Judge Sharolyn 

Wood respectfully requests that the Houston Lawyers’



84a

Association Plaintiffs’ cause of action be dismissed with 

respect to the system for electing district judges within 

Harris County and that judgment be entered in her favor and 

that she recover all other relief, both general and special, in 

law and in equity, to which she may show herself justly 

entitled.

III.

DEFENDANT WOOD’S COUNTERCLAIM

Harris County District Judge Sharolyn Wood, Defendant 

in the above-captioned action, now acting as and designated 

Counter-Plaintiff, complains of the Plaintiffs, now designated 

Counter-Defendants, and for cause of action would show by 

way of counter-claim the following:

6.1. Counter-Plaintiff incorporates by reference the 

allegations in paragraphs 1.1 through 5.10 as though fully 

restated.

6.2. In connection with the controversy which is the 

subject of this cause of action, Counter-Defendants rely 

integrally on the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 

1965 as amended in 1982 and codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §



85a

1973 (West Supp. 1988). Title 28 §§ 2201 and 2202 permit 

any interested party to seek a declaration of his rights and 

other legal relations in a case of actual controversy within its 

jurisdiction and to seek further necessary or proper relief 

based on a declaratory judgment. Therefore Counter- 

Plaintiff seeks a declaration of her rights vis-a-vis the 

amended Voting Rights Act under the United States 

Constitution.

6.3. For the reasons set forth above in paragraphs 4.1 

through 4.2 and hereby incorporated by reference, Counter- 

Plaintiff alleges that state judicial elections are beyond the 

scope of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

6.4. Alternatively, and still urging and relying upon 

the claim set forth herein, Counter-Plaintiff further alleges 

that, for the reasons set forth in paragraphs 5.1 through 5.10 

and hereby incorporated by reference, the Voting Rights Act 

as amended in 1982 is unconstitutional as applied to judical 

elections. It deprives non-protected classes of the equal 

protection of the law, in violation of the fourteenth 

amendment; and in addition, it deprives citizens of those



86a

states in which it is invoked to force the redistricting of state 

judicial election districts of their right to a form of 

government in which the function of the judiciary as servants 

of the people is kept separate from the function of the 

legislature as representatives of the people. More 

specifically, its application in the way by Plaintiffs would 

deprive Defendant Wood of her constitutional rights.

6.5. In that she seeks a declaration of her 

constitutional rights, Defendant Wood is entitled to court 

costs and attorney’s fees.

WHEREFORE, Counter-Plaintiff Wood respectfully 

prays that the Court will grant her relief as follows:

1. Declare that the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as 

amended in 1982, does not apply to judicial elections; or, 

alternatively,

2. Declare that the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as 

amended in 1982, is unconstitutional as applied to judicial 

elections; and

3. Dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ claims; and

4. Award Counter-Plaintiff her just costs and



87a

attorney’s fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2202 and 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1988; and

5. Award Counter-Plaintiff such other and further 

relief in law and in equity to which she may show herself to 

be justly entitled.

Respectfully submitted, 

PORTER & CLEMENTS



88a

[Caption]

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The members of Plaintiffs LULAC, LULAC 

COUNCIL #4434 and LULAC COUNCIL #4451 and the 

named individual Plaintiffs are Mexican-American and Black 

citizens of the State of Texas. They bring this action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1971, 1973, 1983, 1988 to redress a 

denial, under color of state law, of rights, privileges or 

immunities secured to Plaintiffs by the said laws and by the 

Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of 

the United States.

2. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that the 

existing at large scheme of electing district judges in the 

target areas of the State of Texas violates Plaintiffs’ civil 

rights in that such method illegally and/or unconstitutionally 

dilutes the voting strength of Mexican-American and Black 

electors; Plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction prohibiting 

the calling, holding, supervising or certifying of any future 

elections for district judges under the present at large scheme



89a

in the target areas; Plaintiffs seek the formation of a judicial 

districting scheme by which district judges in the target areas 

are elected from districts which include single member 

districts; Plaintiffs seek costs and attorneys’ fees.

II. JURISDICTION

3. Jurisdiction is based upon 28 U.S.C. 1343 (3) & 

(4), upon causes of action arising from 42 U.S.C. 1971, 

1973, 1983, & 1988, and under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 

Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Declaratory relief is 

authorized by 28 U.S.C. 2201 & 2202 and by Rule 57, 

F.R.C.P.

III. PLAINTIFFS

4. Plaintiff LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN 

AMERICAN CITIZENS (LULAC) is a statewide 

organization whose members are United States Citizens of 

Mexican American and black descent, and are resident 

taxpayers of the State of Texas, and are qualified to vote for 

district judges in the various counties.

5. LULAC Council No. 4434 is a local organization 

whose membership is composed of United States Citizens



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most of whom are of Mexican-American and Black descent, 

and are resident taxpayers of the State of Texas, and are 

qualified to vote for district judges in Midland County. 

LULAC Council No. 4451 is a local organization whose 

membership is composed of United States Citizens most of 

whom are of Mexican-American or Black descent, and are 

resident taxpayers of the State of Texas, and are qualified to 

vote for district judges in Ector County.

6. Plaintiff CHRISTINA MORENO is a United 

States Citizen of Mexican-American descent and is a resident 

taxpayer of the' State of Texas, and is qualified to vote for 

district judges in Midland County.

7. Plaintiff AQUILLA WATSON is a Black United 

States Citizen and is a resident taxpayer of the State of 

Texas, and is qualified to vote for district judges in Midland 

County.

8. Plaintiff MATTHEW W. PLUMMER, Sr. is a 

Black United States Citizen and is a resident taxpayer of the 

State of Texas; he is qualified to vote for district judges in 

Harris County.



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9. Plaintiff JIM CONLEY is a Black United States 

Citizen and is a resident taxpayer of the State of Texas; he 

is qualified to vote for district judges in Bexar County.

10. Plaintiff VOLMA OVERTON is a Black United 

States Citizen and is a resident taxpayer of the State of 

Texas; he is qualified to vote for district judges in Travis 

County.

11. Plaintiff WILLARD PEN CONAT is a Black 

United States Citizen and is a resident taxpayer of the State 

of Texas; he is qualified to vote for district judges in Fort 

Bend County.

12. Plaintiff GENE COLINS is a Black United States 

Citizen and is a resident taxpayer of the State of Texas; he 

is qualified to vote for district judges in Ector County.

13. Plaintiff AL PRICE is a Black United States 

Citizen and is a resident taxpayer of the State of Texas; he 

is qualified to vote for district judges in Jefferson County.

14. Plaintiff THEODORE HOGROBROOKS is a 

Black United States Citizen and is a resident taxpayer of the 

State of Texas; he is qualified to vote for district judges in



92a

Smith County.

15. Plaintiff ERNEST M. DECKARD is a Black 

United States Citizen and is a resident taxpayer of the State 

of Texas; he is qualified to vote for district judges in Smith 

County.

16. Plaintiff MARY ELLEN HICKS is a Black 

United States Citizen and is a resident taxpayer of the State 

of Texas; she is qualified to vote for district judges in 

Tarrant County.

16a. Plaintiff REV. JAMES THOMAS is a Black 

United States Citizen and is a resident taxpayer of the State 

of Texas; he is qualified to vote for district judges in 

Galveston County.

IV. PLAINTIFF INTER'VENORS

17. Members of the HOUSTON LAWYERS’ 

ASSOCIATION, ALICE BONNER, WELDON BERRY, 

FRANCIS WILLIAMS, REV. WILLIAM LAWSON, 

DELOYD T. PARKER, BENNIE McGINTY, JESSE 

OLIVER, FRED TINSLEY, JOAN WINN WHITE, and 

Members of THE BLACK LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS are



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Black United States Citizens and are resident taxpayers of 

the State of Texas; they are qualified to vote for district 

judges in Texas.

V. DEFENDANTS

18. Defendant JIM MATTOX is the Attorney-

General of the State of Texas, and is the chief law 

enforcement officer of the state and as such, is charged with 

the responsibility to enforce the laws of the state. Defendant 

JACK RAINS is the Secretary of State of the State of Texas, 

and is the chief elections officer of the state and as such, is 

charged with the responsibility of administering the election 

laws of the state. Defendants THOMAS R. PHILLIPS, 

JOHN F. ONION, RON CHAPMAN, THOMAS J. 

STOVALL, JAMES F. CLAWSON, JR., JOE E KELLY, 

JOE B. EVINS, SAM M. PAXSON, WELDON KIRK, 

CHARLES J. MURRAY, RAY D. ANDERSON, 

LEONARD DAVIS and JOE SPURLOCK, II are members 

of the JUDICIAL DISTRICTS BOARD created by Art. V. 

Sec. 7a of the Texas Constitution, and pursuant to Art. 

24.941 et. seq. Texas Government Code. They have the



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duty to reapportion judicial districts within the State of 

Texas.

VI. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

19. District judges are elected either from judicial 

districts which are coterminous with and wholly contained 

within a county, or from judicial districts which are 

composed of several entire counties.

20. In those counties which contain more than one 

judicial district, the present election system is an at large 

scheme with the equivalent of numbered places, the majority 

rule requirement, and staggered terms.

21. The following counties, which are being 

challenged in this lawsuit, elect the following number of 

district judges and, according to the 1980 U.S. Census, 

contain the following population:

# OF JUDGES TOTAL S.S. BLK
COUNTY ELECTED POP. POP. (%) POP. (%) CM. %*

Harris 59 2,409,544 369,075(15.3) 473,698(19.7) 35.0

Dallas 36 1,556,549 154,560( 9.9) 287,613(18.5) 28.4

Bexar 19 988,800 460,911(46.6) 69,201(7.0) 53.6



95a

Tarrant 23 860,880 67,632( 7.9) 101,183(11.8) 19.7

Travis 13 419,335 72,271(17.2) 44,988(10.7) 27.9

Jefferson 8 250,938 10,279( 4.1) 70,810(28.2) 32.3

Lubbock 5 211,651 41,428(19.6) 15,780 (7.5) 27.0

Galveston 5 195,940 23,557(12.0) 36,328(18.5) 30.6

McLennan 4 170,755 14,988(8.8) 27,254(16.0) 24.7

Fort Bend 3 130,846 26,656(20.4) 20,420(15.6) 36.0

Smith 4 128,366 4,037(3.1) 28,215(22.0) 25.1

Ector 4 115,374 24,831(21.5) 5,154 (4.5) 26.0

Midland 3 82,636 12,323(14.9) 7,119(8.6) 23.5

El Paso,
Hudspeth,
and
Culberson* ** 11 485,942 282,691(58.2) 18,162 (3.7) 61.9

* Combined Minority
** Eight district judges are elected at large within El Paso County; the 
other three are elected at large within the three county area of El Paso, 
Hudspeth, and Culberson Counties.

22. The following counties comprise a judicial area 

that elects three (3) judges at large: EL PASO,

CULBERSON, and HUDSPETH. This area contains enough 

minorities that are sufficiently geographically concentrated 

that if single member districts were created, at least one of



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those districts would be able to elect a minority.

23. The above areas elect 197 district judges. Each 

area contains enough minorities that are sufficiently 

geographically concentrated so that if single member districts 

were created, at least one of those districts in each area 

would be able to elect a minority.

24. Upon information and belief, in the above named 

areas minorities are politically cohesive.

25. Upon information and believe in the above cited 

areas, the white majority votes sufficiently as a block to 

enable it—in the absence of special circumstances, such as 

the minority candidate running unopposed—usually to defeat 

the minority’s preferred candidate.

26. Upon information and belief, in the above 

challenged areas, the at large election scheme interacts with 

social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the 

opportunity of hispanic and/or black voters to elect 

representatives of their choice as compared to white voters.

27. Upon information and belief, the following are 

the names of the presently sitting judges’ elected from the



97a

above counties:

VOTING RACE/
COURT JUDGE COUNTY PRECINCT ETHNIC
11th Mark Davidson Harris 224
55th Reagan Cartwright Harris 178
61st Sheam Smith Harris **
80th William R. "Bill

Powel Harris 040
113th Geraldine B.

Tennant Harris 227
125th Don E. Wittig Harris 118
127th Sharolyn P. Wood Harris 282
129th Hugo A. Touchy Harris 385
133rd Lamar McCorkle Harris **
151st Alice Oliver

Trevathan Harris 441
152nd Jack O’Neill Harris 493
157th Felix Salazar, Jr. Harris 134
164 th Pete Soli to Harris 217
165th Ken Harrison Harris 413
174th George H. Godwin Harris 015
176th James Brian Rains Harris 116
177th Miron A. Love Harris 034
178th William T. "Bill"

Harmon Harris 129
179th J. Mike Wilkinson Harris 456
180th Patricia R. Lykos Harris 626
182th Donald K. Shipley Harris 261
183 th Jay W. Burnett Harris 567
184 th Robert N. Burdette Harris 356
185 th Carl Walker, Jr. Harris 138
189th Richard W. Millard Harris 056
190th Wyatt H. Heard Harris 227
208th Thomas H. Routt Harris 136
209th Michael T.

McSpadden Harris 148
215th Eugene Chambers Harris 663
228th Ted Poe Harris 658



98a

230th Joe Kegans Harris 222
232rd A.D. Azios Harris 178
234th Ruby K. Sondock Harris 434
245th Henry G. Schuble Harris 305
246th John W. Peavy, Jr. Harris 228
247th Charles Dean

Huckabee Harris 628
248th Woody R. Densen Harris 034
257th Norman R. Lee Harris 628
262nd Doug Shaver Harris 200
263rd Charles J. Hearn Harris 351
269th W. David West Harris 219
270th Ann Tyrrell

Cochran Harris 217
280th Melinda Furche 

Harmon Harris 129
281st Louis M. Moore Harris 297
295th Dan Downey Harris 441
308th Bob W. Robertson Harris 430
309th John D. Montgomery Harris 518
310th Allen J. Daggett Harris 577
311th Bill Elliott Harris 221
312th Robert S.

Webb, III Harris 200
313th Robert L. Lowery Harris 371
314th Robert R. Baum Harris 296
315th Eric G. Andell Harris 183
333rd Davie L. Wilson Harris 466
334th Russel T. Lloyd Harris 316
337th Jim Barr Harris 432
338th Mary Bacon Harris 344
339th Norman E. Lanford Harris 050
351st Lupe Salinas Harris 115
14th John M. Marshall Dallas 1174
44th Candace Tyson Dallas 1203
68th Gary B. Hall Dallas 1123
95th Joe B. Brown Dallas 4418
101st Joseph B. Morris Dallas 1227
116th Frank Andrews Dallas 1129



99a

134th Anne A. Packer Dallas 1176
160th Mark Whittington Dallas 4418
162nd Catherine J. Crier Dallas 2277
191st David Brooks Dallas 2242
192nd Merrill L. Hartman Dallas 2266
193rd Michael J. O’Neill Dallas 2260
194th Harold Entz, Jr. Dallas 1185
195th Joe Kendall Dallas 1171
203rd Thomas B. Thorpe Dallas 1103
204th Richard D. Mays Dallas 1148
254th Dee Miller Dallas 1176
255th Don D. Koons Dallas 1227
256th Carolyn Wright Dallas 3302
265th Keith T. Dean Dallas 1122
282nd Tom Price Dallas 1202
283rd Jack Hampton Dallas 2271
291st Gerry Meier Dallas 1209
292nd Michael E. Keasler Dallas 4406
298th Adolph Canales Dallas 1216
301st Robert O’Donnell Dallas 2203
302nd Frances A. Harris Dallas 2222
303rd N. Sue Lykes Dallas 4437
304th Harold C.

Gaither, Jr. Dallas 4516
305th Catherine J.

Stayman Dallas 2253
330th Theo Bedard Dallas 1185
Crim Dist. 1 Ron Chapman Dallas 2241
Crim
Dist.2 Larry W. Baraka Dallas 4453
Crim 
Dist. 3 Mark Tolle Dallas 1187
Crim
Dist.4 Frances J. Maloney Dallas 1145
Crim
Dist.5 Pat McDowell Dallas 1162
70th Gene Ater Ector **
161st Tryon D. Lewis Ector **
244th Joseph Connally Ector **



100a

358th Bill McCoy Ector ** W
19th Bill Logue McLennan ** W
54th George H. Allen McLennan ** W
74th Derwood Johnson McLennan ** W
170th Joe Johnson McLennan ** W
17th Fred W. Davis Tarrant 2052 W
48th William L.

Hughes, Jr. Tarrant 2143 w
67th George Allen 

Crowley Tarrant 4095 w
96th Jeff Walker Tarrant 3101 w
141st Dixon W. Holman Tarrant 2266 w
153rd Sidney C.

Farrar, Jr. Tarrant 4130 w
213rd George S. Kredell Tarrant 2352 w
231st Maryellen W. Hicks Tarrant 1104 B
233rd William H. Brigham Tarrant 3151 W
236th Albert L. White,Jr. Tarrant 1004 W
297th Everett Young, Jr. Tarrant 1004 W
322nd Frank W.

Sullivan, III Tarrant 3151 w
323rd Scott D. Moore Tarrant 4343 w
324th Brian A. Carper Tarrant 2012 w
325th Robert L. Wright Tarrant 1081 w
342nd Joe Bruce

Cunningham Tarrant 1081 w
348th Michael D.

Schattman Tarrant 3151 w
352nd Bruce Auld Tarrant 3286 w
360th V. Sue Koenig

Stephenson Tarrant 3289 w
Crim
Dist.l Louis E. Stums Tarrant 4203 B
Crim
Dist.2 Lee Ann Dauphinot Tarrant 1189 W
Crim
Dist.3 Don Leonard Tarrant 1004 w
Crim
Dist.4 Joe Drago, III. Tarrant 1022 w



101a

142nd Pat M, Baskin Midland 205
238th Van Culp Midland 307
318th Dean Rucker Midland 212
53rd Mary Pearl

Williams Travis 237
98th Jeanne Mourer Travis 207
126th Joe Hart Travis 320
147th Mace B.

Thurman, Jr. Travis 256
167th Bob Jones Travis 328
200th Paul R. Davis Jr. Travis 320
201st Jerry Dellana Travis 324
250th Harley Clark Travis 145



102a

[Caption]

STATE DEFENDANTS’ ORIGINAL ANSWER TO 
PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

The State Defendants — that is, the Attorney General of 

Texas, the Secretary of State of Texas and the thirteen 

members of the Judicial Districts Board of Texas, all in their 

official capacities — answer as follows to the Plaintiffs’ 

Second Amended Complaint ("the complaint"):

First Defense

The complaint fails to state a claim against State 

Defendants upon which relief can be granted because:

A. Each of the judicial districts challenged by the 

plaintiffs already is a single member district. State district 

judges are elected to a specific judicial district and serve as 

the judge for that district without sitting as part of a collegial 

decisionmaking body. Vote dilution claims cannot be made 

against a single member electoral system;

B. Alternatively, as to the challenge to the 72nd 

Judicial District and the 114th Judicial District, only one 

state district judge is elected from each of the geographical



103a

units comprising them. The 72nd Judicial District is 

comprised of the counties of Crosby and Lubbock. The 

114th Judicial District is comprised of the counties of Smith 

and Wood. Therefore, each of these two districts is a single 

member district. Vote dilution claims cannot be made 

against a single member electoral system;

C. Alternatively, as to the challenge to the following 

judicial districts, each already is a single member district 

because it is the only judicial district in the county for which 

an election is scheduled in the year indicated in brackets 

adjacent to the district: (i) 238th Judicial District in Midland 

County [1990]; (ii) 268th Judicial District in Fort Bend 

County [1992]; (iii) 34th Judicial District in Culberson, El 

Paso, and Hudspeth Counties (combined) [1992]; (iv) 7th 

Judicial District in Smith County [1992]; and (v) 161st 

Judicial District in Ector County [1992], Vote dilution 

claims cannot be made against a single member electoral 

system;

D. Alternatively, as to the challenge to the following 

judicial districts, each already is a single member district



104a

because it is the only judicial district in the county devoted 

to the general civil/non-specialized, criminal, or family 

docket, as indicated in brackets adjacent to the district: (i) 

289th Judicial District in Bexar County [family]; (ii) 147th 

Judicial District in Travis County [criminal]; (iii) 327th 

Judicial District in El Paso County [family]; (iv) 306th 

Judicial District in Galveston County [family]; (v) 321st 

Judicial District in Smith County [family]; (vi) 205th Judicial 

District in county unit of Culberson, El Paso, and Hudspeth 

[criminal]; (vii) 328 Judicial District in Fort Bend County 

[family]; and (viii) 318th Judicial District in Midland County 

[family]. (It subsequently may be determined that other of 

the challenged districts also are the only courts of a 

specialized type within a geographical unit and that, 

therefore, they too must be added to the immediately 

foregoing list.) Vote dilution claims cannot be made against 

a single member electoral system;

E. Alternatively, as to the challenge to the following 

judicial districts, each already is a single member district 

because it is the only judicial district in the county devoted



105a

to the general civil/non-specialized, criminal, or family 

docket, as indicated in brackets adjacent to the district, for 

which an election is scheduled in the year indicated in braces 

adjacent to the court specialization designation: (i) 303rd

Judicial District in Dallas County [family] {1992}; (ii) 360th 

Judicial District in Tarrant County [family] {1992}; (iii) 

289th Judicial District in Bexar County [family] {1990}; (iv) 

147th Judicial District in Travis County [criminal] {1990}; 

(v) 327th Judicial District in El Paso County [family] 

{1990}; (vi) 306th Judicial District in Galveston County 

[family] {1990}; (vii) 321st Judicial District [family] {1990}; 

(viii) 241st Judicial District in Smith County [general 

civil/non-specialized] {1990}; (ix) 7th Judicial District in 

Smith County [general civil/non-specialized] {1992}; (x) 

205th Judicial District in county unit of Culberson, El Paso, 

and Hudspeth [criminal] {1990}; (xi) 210th Judicial District 

in county unit of Culberson, El Paso, and Hudspeth [general 

civil/non-specialized] {1990}; (xii) 34th Judicial District in 

county unit of Culberson, El Paso, and Hudspeth [general 

civil/non-specialized] {1992}; (xiii) 328th Judicial District in



106a

Fort Bend County [family] {1990}; (xiv) 240th Judicial 

District in Fort Bend County [general civil/non-specialized] 

{1990}; (xv) 268th Judicial District in Fort Bend County 

[general civil/non-specialized] {1992}; (xvi) 318th Judicial 

District in Midland County [family] {1992}; (xvii) 238th 

Judicial District in Midland County [general civil/non- 

specialized] {1990}; and (xviii) 142nd Judicial District in 

Midland County [general civil/non-specialized] {1992}. (It 

subsequently may be determined that other of the challenged 

districts also are the only courts of a specialized type within 

a geographical unit up for election in a given year and that, 

therefore, they too must be added to the foregoing list.) 

Vote dilution claims cannot be made against a single member 

electoral system.

Second Defense

1. The State Defendants are without knowledge or 

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

averments in the first sentence of 11 of the complaint. The 

remainder of 11 of the complaint contains only averments to 

which no responsive pleading is required; however, to the



107a

extent it is construed to contain averments requiring a

responsive pleading, the State Defendants deny them.

2. 12 of the complaint contains only averments to

which no responsive pleading is required; however, to the

extent it is construed to contain averments requiring a

responsive pleading, the State Defendants deny them.

3. To the extent that 13 of the complaint is

construed to contain averments to which a responsive 

pleading is required, the State Defendants admit 13’s

averment that the Court has jurisdiction over this action, but 

deny that each of the cited provisions provides such 

jurisdiction.

4. The State Defendants are without knowledge or 

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

averments in 114-17 of the complaint.

5. The State Defendants admit that the averments in 

the first two sentences of 118 accurately identify who hold 

the two official positions to which reference is made and are 

generally accurate in their description of the state law-based 

responsibilities concerning the administration and



108a

enforcement of the laws of the state of Texas, including 

those concerning the electoral process. Because of 

uncertainty about the intended reach of some of the 

descriptions of the officials’ duties in the first two sentences 

of 118, however, the State Defendants are without 

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the 

truth of those averments beyond what is stated in the 

preceding portion of this paragraph. The State Defendants 

admit the averments in the third sentence of 118, except they 

deny that John F. Onion and Charles J. Murray are members 

of the Judicial Districts Board of Texas. They have been 

replaced by Michael J. McCormick and Roger J. Walker, 

respectively. The State Defendants deny the averments in 

the fourth sentence of 118 because the reapportionment 

duties are not exclusive and are dependent on other 

circumstances.

6. The State Defendants admit the averments in 119 

of the complaint.

7. The State Defendants deny the averments in 120

of the complaint.



109a

8. The State Defendants deny the averments in f21 

of the complaint insofar as they state or imply that: counties 

are being challenged; they have listed all the counties within 

whose geographical boundaries lie challenged judicial 

districts; and the listing of the number of state district judges 

elected within a specific county’s geographical boundaries 

indicates the number of at-large positions held by state 

district judges within that county’s boundaries. At this point, 

the State Defendants are without knowledge or information 

sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining 

averments in the paragraph, including averments concerning 

population data indicated by the 1980 United States Census. 

The 1980 United States Census data speaks for itself.

9. The State Defendants deny the averments in \\22  

and 23 of the complaint.

10. The State Defendants are without knowledge or 

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

averments in ^24-26 of the complaint.

11. The State Defendants admit, except for certain 

spelling or typographical errors, the averments in \21 of the



110a

complaint concerning the listing of the challenged district 

courts and the names of the individuals currently holding 

those positions. The State Defendants admit the paragraph’s 

averments about the geographical unit in which voters may 

cast their votes for those judicial district positions, except for 

the averments about the 72nd and 114th Judicial Districts. 

The State Defendants are without knowledge or information 

sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the averments in 

of the complaint about the voting precinct and the race 

or ethnicity of the individuals currently holding the district 

judgeships. However, attached as Exhibit A to this answer 

is a chart which assumes the accuracy of the plaintiffs’ 

racial/ethnic classification of individuals currently holding 

office in the challenged judicial districts. Exhibit A uses this 

assumption, plus the specialization designations for the 

judicial districts in the Texas Government Code, plus the 

schedule of when those positions are up again for election as 

indicated in the 1988 Fiscal Year Report on the Texas 

Judicial System as prepared by the Texas Judicial 

Council/Office of Court Administration.



111a

12. The State Defendants deny the averments in 1128 

and 29 of the complaint.

13. 130 of the complaint contains only legal

averments to which no responsive pleading is required.

14. The State Defendants deny the averments in 1131 

and 32 of the complaint.

15. 133 of the complaint contains only legal

averments to which no responsive pleading is required.

Respectfully submitted,

JIM MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas



112a

[Caption]

DALLAS COUNTY DISTRICT JUDGE F. HAROLD 
ENTZ’S FIRST AMENDED ANSWER TO LULAC’S 

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE BUNTON:

The Honorable F. Harold Entz ("Judge Entz") files his

First Amended Answer to LULAC’s Second Amended

Complaint as follows:

RESPONSE TO NUMBERED PARAGRAPHS 

. 1, Judge Entz lacks knowledge and information 

sufficient to form a belief regarding the specific membership 

of LULAC, the various LULAC councils, and the named 

individual plaintiffs, but has no reason to doubt that they are 

Mexican-American and African-American citizens of the 

State of Texas. Judge Entz need not respond to the legal 

statement with respect to the purported statutory bases for 

the instant action, but specifically denies that any of the 

Dallas County Plaintiffs have been denied any of their rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the laws of the United 

States of America.

2. Judge Entz denies that the Dallas County



113a

Plaintiffs are entitled to any of the relief sought.

3. Judge Entz does not contest jurisdiction at this 

time, but denies that any cause of action exists with respect 

to Dallas County.

4. -17. Judge Entz lacks knowledge or information 

sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of these allegations.

18. Judge Entz admits that the persons named hold 

the identified offices. The balance of the paragraph alleges 

a legal conclusion that Judge Entz neither admits nor denies.

19. Admitted as to Dallas County.

20. Denied because of the ambiguous terms used. 

Dallas County Judicial Districts are coterminous with county 

lines and Judges are elected by majority vote in differing 

years.

21. -22. Judge Entz lacks knowledge or information 

sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of these allegations.

23. Judge Entz denies that Mexican-Americans are 

sufficiently geographically compact in Dallas County to 

constitute a safe majority in any single member district if a 

single member districting plan was employed in Dallas



114a

County. Judge Entz lacks knowledge or information 

sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the balance of 

the allegations in the paragraph.

24.-26. Denied with respect to Dallas County.

27. Admitted with respect to Dallas County.

28. -29. Denied with respect to Dallas County.

30. This paragraph alleges a legal conclusion that 

Judge Entz neither admits nor denies.

31. -32. Denied with respect to Dallas County.

33. Judge Entz denies that Plaintiffs are entitled to 

the relief sought with respect to Dallas County.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

34. For purposes of preserving appellate review. 

Judge Entz affirmatively claims that neither the Voting 

Rights Act nor the 14th and 15th amendments of the United 

States Constitution apply to judicial selection.

35. The lack of electoral success, if any, of minority 

candidates for judicial office was not caused by the electoral 

practices that Plaintiffs challenge. Neither the Voting Rights 

Act nor the 14th and 15th amendments of the United States



115a

Constitution apply to electoral practices that do not cause the 

lack of electoral success, if any, of minority candidates.

36. Electoral success of judicial candidates in Dallas 

County depends on the partisan affiliation of the candidate, 

rather than the race of the candidate. Neither the Voting 

Rights Act nor the 14th and 15th amendments of the United 

States Constitution ensure the right of minority voters to 

elect judicial candidates from the political party of their 

choice.

37. Neither the Voting Rights Act nor the 14th and 

15th amendments of the United States Constitution permit 

aggregating distinct minority groups to prove dilution.

38. Application of either the Voting Rights Act or

the 14th and 15th amendments of the United States

Constitution to judicial elections is unconstitutional because 

it violates the separation of powers doctrine, the 10th

amendment of the United States Constitution, and

fundamental principles of federalism.

39. Application of either the Voting Rights Act or

the 14th and 15th amendments of the United States



116a

Constitution to alter electoral practices that did not cause the 

lack of electoral success, if any, of minority judicial 

candidates or the underrepresentation, if any, of minorities 

among successful judicial candidates would be 

unconstitutional under the equal protection and due process 

clauses of the United States Constitution.

40. Application of the Voting Rights Act or the 14th 

and 15th amendments of the United States Constitution to 

require single member districts for judicial elections in 

Dallas County without adjusting Texas state law venue and 

jury selection provisions to provide coterminous districts for 

venue and jury selection purposes would violate the due 

process and equal protection clauses and the 6th and 7th 

amendments of the United States Constitution.

41. Application of the Voting Rights Act or the 14th 

and 15th amendments of the United States Constitution to 

adjust Texas state law venue and jury selection provisions 

would violate the Guaranty Clause and 10th amendment of 

the United States Constitution, as well as fundamental 

principles of federalism.



117a

42. Application of the Voting Rights Act or the 14th 

and 15th amendments of the United States Constitution to 

Dallas County to require single member judicial districts, 

based on a showing that minorities are unable to elect non­

minority candidates of the political party of the minorities 

preference, would unconstitutionally interfere in the political 

process by favoring the political party currently enjoying the 

support of the minority population, as opposed to removing 

any alleged remaining obstacles to the elections of minority 

candidates.

43. Minorities are overrepresented on the Dallas 

County State District Courts in proportion to the number of 

minorities in Dallas County eligible for such judicial offices.

44. Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed for failure 

to join all district judges within the "target counties" and all 

appellate judges as defendants in that these judges are 

necessary or indispensable parties under Rule 19.

WHEREFORE, Dallas County District Judge F. Harold 

Entz respectfully requests that the Plaintiffs’ claims be 

dismissed with respect to the system for electing district



118a

judges within Dallas County and that judgment be entered in 

his favor and that he recover all other relief to which he may 

show himself justly entitled.

Respectfully submitted,



119a

[Caption]

DALLAS COUNTY DISTRICT JUDGE F. HAROLD
ENTZ’S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF INTERVENORS 

OLIVER, WHITE, AND TINSLEY

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE BUNTON:

The Honorable F. Harold Entz ("Judge Entz"), to the 

extent that Plaintiff Interveners Oliver, White, and Tinsley 

have not abandoned their Complaint in Intervention by 

joining in LULAC’s Second Amended Complaint, responds 

as follows:

RESPONSE TO NUMBERED PARAGRAPHS

1. Judge Entz admits that Jesse Oliver, Fred 

Tinsley, and Joan Winn White ("Intervenors") are former 

state district judges of Dallas County. He need not respond 

to the legal statement with respect to the purported statutory 

bases for the instant action, but specifically denies that 

Intervenors or any of the Dallas County Plaintiffs have been 

denied any of their rights, privileges, or immunities secured 

by the laws of the United States of America.

2. Judge Entz denies that Intervenors or any of the 

Dallas County Plaintiffs are entitled to any of the relief



120a

sought with respect to Dallas County.

3. Judge Entz does not contest jurisdiction at this 

time, but denies that any cause of action exists with respect 

to Dallas County.

4. Judge Entz lacks knowledge or information 

sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of these allegations.

5. Judge Entz admits that the persons named hold 

the identified offices. The balance of the paragraph alleges 

a legal conclusion that Judge Entz neither admits nor denies.

6. Admitted as to Dallas County.

7. Denied because of the ambiguous terms used. 

Dallas County Judicial Districts are coterminous with county 

lines and Judges are elected by majority vote in differing 

years.

8. -17. Judge Entz lacks knowledge or information 

sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of these allegations, 

except that Judge Entz admits that Dallas County contains 

multiple judicial districts and denies that the Hispanic 

population in Dallas County is sufficiently compact to form 

a majority in any single member district that could be drawn.



121a

18. Judge Entz denies that Mexican-Americans are 

sufficiently geographically compact in Dallas County to 

constitute a safe majority in any single member district if a 

single member districting plan was employed in Dallas 

County. Judge Entz lacks knowledge or information 

sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the balance of 

the allegations in the paragraph.

19. -21. Denied with respect to Dallas County.

22. This paragraph calls for no responsive pleading.

23. -24. Denied with respect to Dallas County.

25. This paragraph alleges a legal conclusion that 

Judge Entz neither admits nor denies.

26. -27. Denied with respect to Dallas County.

28. Judge Entz denies that Intervenors or any of the 

Dallas County Plaintiffs are entitled to the relief sought with 

respect to Dallas County.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

29. For purposes of preserving appellate review, 

Judge Entz affirmatively claims that neither the Voting 

Rights Act nor the 14th and 15th amendments of the United



122a

States Constitution apply to judicial selection.

30. The lack of electoral success, if any, of minority 

candidates for judicial office was not caused by the electoral 

practices that Plaintiffs challenge. Neither the Voting Rights 

Act nor the 14th and 15th amendments of the United States 

Constitution apply to electoral practices that do not cause the 

lack of electoral success, if any, of minority candidates.

31. Electoral success of judicial candidates in Dallas 

County depends on the partisan affiliation of the candidate, 

rather than the race of the candidate. Neither the Voting 

Rights Act nor the 14th and 15th amendments of the United 

States Constitution ensure the right of minority voters to 

elect judicial candidates from the political party of their 

choice.

32. Neither the Voting Rights Act nor the 14th and 

15th amendments of the United States Constitution permit 

aggregating distinct minority groups to prove dilution.

33. Application of either the Voting Rights Act or 

the 14th and 15th amendments of the United States 

Constitution to judicial elections is unconstitutional because



123a

it violates the separation of powers doctrine, the 10th 

amendment of the United States Constitution, and 

fundamental principles of federalism.

34. Application of either the Voting Rights Act or 

the 14th and 15th amendments of the United States 

Constitution to alter electoral practices that did not cause the 

lack of electoral success, if any, of minority judicial 

candidates or the underrepresentation, if any, of minorities 

among successful judicial candidates would be 

unconstitutional under the equal protection and due process 

.clauses of the United States Constitution.

35. Application of the Voting Rights Act or the 14th 

and 15th amendments of the United States Constitution to 

require single member districts for judicial elections in 

Dallas County without adjusting Texas state law venue and 

jury selection provisions to provide coterminous districts for 

venue and jury selection purposes would violate the due 

process and equal protection clauses and the 6th and 7th 

amendments of the United States Constitution.

36. Application of the Voting Rights Act or the 14th



124a

and 15th amendments of the United States Constitution to 

adjust Texas state law venue and jury selection provisions 

would violate the Guaranty Clause and 10th amendment of 

the United States Constitution, as well as fundamental 

principles of federalism.

37. Application of the Voting Rights Act or the 14th 

and 15th amendments of the United States Constitution to 

Dallas County to require single member judicial districts, 

based on a showing that minorities are unable to elect non­

minority candidates of the political party of the minorities 

preference, would unconstitutionally interfere in the political 

process by favoring the political party currently enjoying the 

support of the minority poplulation, as opposed to removing 

any alleged remaining obstacles to the elections of minority 

candidates.

38. Minorities are overrepresented on the Dallas 

County State District Courts in proportion to the number of 

minorities in Dallas County eligible for such judicial offices.

39. Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed for failure 

to join all district judges within the "target counties" and all



125a

appellate judges as defendants in that these judges are 

necessary or indispensable parties under Rule 19.

WHEREFORE, Dallas County District Judge F. Harold 

Entz respectfully requests that Intervenors and the Dallas 

County Plaintiffs’ claims be dismissed with respect to the 

system for electing district judges within Dallas County and 

that judgment be entered in his favor and that he recover all 

other relief to which he may show himself justly entitled.

Respectfully submitted,



126a

[Caption]

STATE DEFENDANTS’ ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
IN INTERVENTION BY HOUSTON 
LAWYERS’ ASSOCIATION, ET AL.

The State Defendants — that is, the Attorney General of 

Texas, the Secretary of State of Texas, and the thirteen 

members of the Judicial Districts Board of Texas, all in their 

official capacities — answer as follows to the Complaint in 

Intervention ("complaint") of the Houston Lawyers’ 

Association, Alice Bonner, Weldon, Berry, Francis 

Williams, Rev. William Lawson, Deloyd T. Parker, and 

Bennie McGinty.

First Defense

The complaint fails to state a claim against State 

Defendants upon which relief can be granted because each of 

the judicial districts challenged in Harris County already is 

a single member district. Sate district judges are elected to 

a specific judicial district and serve as the judge for that 

district without sitting as part of a collegial decisionmaking 

body. Vote dilution claims cannot be made against a single 

member electoral system.



127a

Second Defense

1. The State Defendants are without knowledge or 

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

averments in the first sentence of 11 of the complaint. The 

remainder of 11 of the complaint contains only averments to 

which no responsive pleading is required; however, to the 

extent it is construed to contain averments requiring a 

responsive pleading, the State Defendants deny them.

2. 112 and 3 of the complaint contain only 

averments to which no responsive pleading is required; 

however, to the extent they are construed to contain 

averments requiring a responsive pleading, the State 

Defendants deny them.

3. The State Defendants are without knowledge or 

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of 

averments in 51 4-10 of the complaint.

4. The State Defendants admit that the averments 

in 1111—13 of the complaint accurately identify the holders 

of the official positions to which reference is made and are 

generally accurate in their descriptions of the state law-based



128a

responsibilities concerning the administration and 

enforcement of the laws of the state of Texas, including 

those concerning the electoral process. Because of 

uncertainty about the intended reach of some of the 

descriptions of the officials’ duties in f 111-13, however, the 

State Defendants are without knowledge or information 

sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of those averments 

beyond what is stated in the preceding portion of this 

paragraph.

5. The State Defendants deny the averments in the 

first three sentences of ^14 of the complaint and admit the 

averments in the fourth sentence of that paragraph. The 

State Defendants are without knowledge or information 

sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the averments in 

the last sentence of ^14 of the complaint.

6. The State Defendants deny the averments in  ̂15 

of the complaint, among other things, because of uncertainty 

as to the full meaning of "history."

7. The State Defendants are without knowledge or 

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the



129a

averments in 116-18 of the complaint.

8. The State Defendants admit the averments in 119 

of the complaint.

9. The State Defendants deny the averments in 

1120-22 of the complaint.

10. The State Defendants are without knowledge or 

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

averments in 1123-24 of the complaint.

11. The State Defendants deny the averments in 125 

of the complaint.

12. Except for the averments in the second sentence 

of 127, which they admit, the State Defendants are without 

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the 

truth of the averments in 1126-29 of the complaint.

13. The State Defendants admit the averments in the 

first sentence of 130 of the complaint and deny the 

averments in the remainder of that paragraph.

14. The State Defendants deny the averments in 

1131-32 of the complaint, in part because of uncertainty as 

to the intended reach of some of the allegations.



130a

15. The State Defendants are without knowledge or 

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

averments in 133 of the complaint.

16. The State Defendants deny the averments in 

f 134-35 of the complaint.

17. The State Defendants incorporate by reference 

their Answer to the paragraphs 11-29 of Plaintiffs’ First 

Amended Complaint as their response to 136 of the 

complaint.

18. The State Defendants admit the averments in 137 

of the complaint.

19. The State Defendants admit that the averments in 

138 of the complaint are generally correct, but note that the 

first sentence of the current version of the referenced 

constitutional provision states that the "State shall be divided 

into judicial districts, with each district having one or more 

Judges as may be provided by law or by this Constitution."

20. The State Defendants deny the averments in 

1139-40 of the complaint.

21. The State Defendants are without knowledge or



131a

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

averments in 141 of the complaint.

22. The State Defendants deny the averments in 142 

of the complaint.

23. The State Defendants admit the averments in 143 

of the complaint.

24. The State Defendants are without knowledge or 

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

averments in 144 of the complaint.

25. The State Defendants deny the averments in 

1145-48 of the complaint.

26. The remainder of the complaint contains only 

legal averments to which no responsive pleading is required.



132a

T ria l  E x h ibit  N o . 1 o f  J ud ge  Sha rolyn  W ood



HARRIS COUNTY MINORITY CANDIDATE 
CONTESTED JUDICIAL RACES:

GENERAL ELECTIONS

Court Candidates Vote GOP %
- 1980 -------------------

Court of Civil Appeals (W) (R)* Conway 298,274 50.9
(B) (D) Doyle 288,197

80th District Court (W) (R) McAfee 306,767 51.4
(B) (D)* Bonner 290,458

309th District Court (W) (R) Zimmerman 309,810 51.6
(H) (D)* Hinojosa 290,870

County Criminal Court (W) (R) Musselwhite 307,931 53.3
(B) (D)* Muldrow 269,420

* = Incumbent 
Winner is underlined

42 Races

26 White Winners 
11 Hispanic Winners 
5 Black Winners

133a



Court Candidates Vote GOP %
- - - - - - - - - - -  -  -  -  - - 1 9 8 2 - ------------ - - - - - - - -  -  -  -

157th District Court (W) (R) Powell 185,030 46.0
(H) (D)* Salazar 217,234

208th District Court (W) (R) Arnold 191,659 48.7
(B) (D)* Routt 201,838

262nd District Court (W) (R) Shaver 199,671 51.1
(B) (D)* James 190,716

281st District Court (H) (R) Moore 201,623 51.9
(B) (D)* Ward 187,093

308th District Court (H) (R) Leal 190,985 48.7
(D) Robertston 201,465

County Criminal Court 6 (W) (R) Musselwhite 198,221 50.9
(B) (D)* Muldrow 191,136

County Criminal Court 9 (W) (R) Kolenda 172,467 44.8
(H) (D)* Leal 212,091

134a



Court Candidates Vote GOP %

Court of Appeals No. 1, Place 2 (W)
-  1980- .--------
(D) O’Connor 365,280

-  -  -  ■

(B) (R)* Hoyt 414,462 53.2
80th District Court (B) (D)* Berry 347,336

(W) (R) Powell 416,438 54.5
178th District Corut (B) (D)* Jackson 324,025

(W) (R) Harmon 429,858 57.0
215th District Court (B) (D)* Lee 363,686

(W) (R) Chambers 401,026 52.4
339th District Court (H) (D)* Salinas 359,482

(W) (R) Lanford 
- 1986- -  -  -  
(D)* Gonzales

400,734 52.7

Texas Supreme Court, Place 4 (H) 241,196
(W) (R) Bates 208,211 46.3

157th Civil District Court (H) (D)* Salazar 243,146
(W) (R) Wittig 200,169 45.2

135a



Court Candidates Vote GOP %

180th Criminal District Court (H) (D)* Guerrero 211,905
(W) (R) Lykos 230,825 52.1

185th Criminal District Court (B) (D)* Walker 218,637
(W) (R) Godwin 209,663 49.0

209th Criminal District Court (H) (D)* Sanchez 192,359
(W) (R) McSpadden 250,808 56.6

232nd Criminal District Court (H) (D)* Azios 234,271
(W) (R) Youngblood 203,799 46.5

245th Civil District Court (W) (D) Schuble 241,414
(B) (R)* Proctor 191,477 44.2

281st Civil District Court (B) (D)* Berry 202,886
(H) (R) Moore 229,288 53.1

308th Family District Court (W) (D) Robertson 236,044
(H) (R)* Dodier 183,755 43.8

County Civil Court 3 (B) (D)* Hobson 217,363
(W) (R) Hughes 211,650 49.3

County Criminal Court 3 (W) (D) Duncan 238,376
(B) (R)* Irvin 199,867 45.6

136a



Court Candidates Vote GOP %

County Criminal Court 9 (H) ( W Leal 226,455
(W) (R) Powell 199,667 46.9

County Criminal Court 11 (H) CD)- Mendoza 221,631
(W) (R) Pickren 206,094 48.2

County Criminal Court 13 (B) (D)* Fitch 211,713
(W) (R) Atkinson 213,268 50.2

County Criminal Court 14 (B) (D)* Fisher 201,922
(W) (R) Barclay 216,467 51.7

County Probate Court 4 (B) (D)* Lee 212,710
(W) (R) McCullough

-  1988- - - - - - - -
(D)* Gonzales

223,894 51.3

Supreme Court, Place 3 (H) 407,451 55.9
(W) (R) Howell 309,486 43.38
(W) (L) Scholz 13,262 1.81

1st Court of Appeals (H) (D)* Mirabal 385,692 54.09
District, Place 6 (W) (R) Stephanow 327,365 45.91

137a



Court
80th District Court (B)

(W)
133rd District Court (B)

(W)
152nd District Court (B)

(W)
179th District Court (H)

(W)
215th District Court (B)

(W)
295th District Court (B)

(W)
333rd District Court (B)

(W)
351st District Court (H)

(W)

Candidates Vote GOP %
(D)* Berry 307,612 43.32
(R) Powell 402,426 56.68
(D)* Plummer 313,880 44.67
(R) McCorkle 388,804 55.33

(D) Fitch 329,325 46.53
(R)* O’Neill 378,353 53.47

(D) Guerrero 347,287 49.36
(R) Wilkinson 356,335 50.64

(D) Jackson 307,147 44.04
(R) Chambers 390,290 55.96

(D) Lee 344,835 48.5
(R)* Downey 366,130 51.5
(D) Spencer 335,960 47.73
(R) Wilson 367,927 52.27
(D) Salinas 363,444 51.76
(R) Pruett 338,769 48.25

138a



139a

T ria l  E x h ibit  N o . 2 o f  J udge  Sh a rolyn  W ood



HARRIS COUNTY MINORITY CANDIDATE 
JUDICIAL RACES:

DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY ELECTIONS

Position Name Vote %

157th Judicial District (H) Salazar 40,821 100

208th Judicial District (B) Routt 40,854 100

246th Judicial District (B) Peavy 42,881 100

County Criminal Court #2 (W) Hendrix 27,426 52.97
(H) Barrera 24,346 47.03

County Criminal Court #6 (B) Muldrow 36,976 100

Winner is underlined

20 Black Winners 
13 Hispanic Winners 
6 White Winners

140a



Position Name Vote %

Court of Appeals, District 1
- -  -  -  1984- -  -  -  --  -  -  - -  -  -  -  - -  -  -  -

Place 2 (B) Mims 18,373 18.92
(W) Briscoe 36,363 37.73
(W) Price 19,513 20.10
(W) O’Conner 22,573 23.25

80th Judicial District (B) Berry 71,624 100
178th Judicial District (W) Dietz 5,236 5.91

(H) Castillo 28,018 31.62
(W) O’Brien 17,374 19.61
(W) Parrott 10,326 11.65
(W) Stripling 4,222 4.77
(B) Jackson 23,448 26.46

215th Judicial District (W) Brannon 15,282 15.93
(B) Lee 57,278 59.68

(W) Price 23,413 24.39
333rd Judicial District (W) Gilbert 21,293 24.92

(W) Levi 14,462 16.93
(W) Walters 26,938 31.53
(H) Sanchez 22,749 26.62

141a



Position Name Vote %
339th Judicial District (B) White 30,673 34.82

(H) Salinas 43,251 48.96
(B) James 14,414 16.32

351st Judicial District (W) Burnett 51,143 64.83
(B) Muldrow 27,748 35.17

County Civil Court
29.02at Law No. 3 (Unexpired) (H) Chow 25,377

(B) Hobson 32,868 37.58
(W) Drake 21,946 25.10

Amaimo 7,261 8.30

Supreme Court, Place 4
(Unexpired) (II) Gonzalez 29,334 57.27

(W) Humphreys 8,196 16.00
(W) Gibson 9,791 19.11
(W) Ivy 3,902 7.62

157th Judicial District (H) Salazar 40,568 100

142a



Position Name Vote %
180th Judicial District (H) Guerrero 20,765 43.79

(W) Kobobel 8,725 18.40
(W) Lanier 17,927 37.81

185th Judicial District (B) Walker 29,011 49.61
(H) Salinas 23,412 40.04
(W) Peterson 6,052 10.35

208th Judicial District (B) Routt 39,116 100
209th Judicial District (H) Sanchez 38,209 100
232nd Judicial District (H) Azios 39,995 100
246th Judicial District (B) Peavy 42,097 100
281st Judicial District (B) Berry 39,416 100
295th Judicial District (B) Jackson 24,650 48.15

(W) White 26,539 51.85
County Court at Law No. 3 (B) Hobson 36,246 100
County Criminal Court No. 4 (B) Williams 39,730 100
County Criminal Court No. 9 (H) Leal 37,508 100

143a



Position Name Vote %

County Criminal Court No. 11 (W) Craggs 9,073 18.97
(H) Mendoza 17,062 35.67
(W) Bynum 5,342 11.17
(W) Reynolds 9,109 19.05
(W) Bostick 7,241 15.14

County Criminal Court No. 13 (B) Fitch 37,300 100

County Criminal Court No. 14 (B) Fisher 25,125 50.86
(H) Fraga 24,280 49.14

County Probate Court No. 4 (W) Smith 19,478 34.68
(B) Lee 36,689 65.32

Supreme Court, Place 3 (H) Vega 55,100 45.93
(H) Gonzalez 64,855 54.07

1st Court of Appeals District,
Place 5 (W) Levy 60,505 52.47

(H) Mirabal 54,805 47.53

80th Judicial District (B) Berry 90,418 100

144a



Position Name Vote %

133rd Judicial District (B) Plummer 91,505 100
152nd Judicial District (B) Fitch 88,890 100
179th Judicial District (H) Guerrero 55,616 48.09

(W) Robertson 45,825 39.62
(W) Tise 14,212 12.29

215th Judicial District (B) Jackson 61,586 62.60
(W) Smith 36,803 37.41

333rd Judicial District (B) Spencer 63,676 59.55
(W) Wooten 43,248 40.45

351st Judicial District (H) Salinas 87,874 100

145a



146a

[Caption]

MOTION OF JUDGES TOM RICKHOFF, SUSAN D. REED, 
JOHN J. SPECIA, JR., SID L. HARLE, SHARON 

MACRAE, AND MICHAEL P. PEDEN TO INTERVENE 
AS DEFENDANTS

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

Judges Tom Rickhoff, Susan D. Reed, John J. Specia, 

Jr., Sid L. Harle, Sharon MacRae, and Michael P. Peden 

move for permission to intervene in this action as party 

defendants pursuant to Rule 24(a) and (b) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure and attach as Exhibit A to this 

Motion their original Intervention (as Defendants) for the 

following reasons:

INTERVENTION OF RIGHT PURSUANT TO RULE 24(a) 
OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

1. Rule 24(a)(2) allows intervention as of right by

intervenors who: (1) are timely; (2) have an interest relating

to the subject of the action; (3) are so situated that the

disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair

or impede their ability to protect that interest; and (4) are

inadequately represented by existing parties. Rule 24(b)

grants the court discretion to allow intervention by



147a

intervenors whose claims or defenses have a question of law 

of fact in common with the main action and whose 

intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the 

adjudication of the rights of the original parties.

2. Judges Tom Rickhoff, Susan D. Reed, John J. 

Specia, Jr., Sid L. Harle, Sharon MacRae, and Michael P. 

Peden (the "Bexar County District Judge Intervenors") are 

presently State Court District Judges (in the 289th, 144th, 

225th, 226th, 290th, and 285th District Courts) in Bexar 

County, Texas. Bexar County is one of the counties in 

Texas made the subject of the claims by Plaintiff and 

Plaintiff-Intervenors in this action. All of the Bexar County 

Judge Intervenors are incumbents, and all have filed for re- 

election or announced their intent to file for re-election in the 

upcoming judicial elections.

3. The Bexar County District Judge Intervenors 

have interests relating to the transaction which is the subject 

of this action, the Court’s Memorandum and Order of 

November 8, 1989, as they affect Bexar County and in the 

joint proposed interim plan between the Attorney General of



148a

the State of Texas and the Plaintiffs. Other judges from 

Dallas and Harris County, Texas, already have intervened in 

this action as Defendants, and the Court already has 

recognized the propriety of such intervention of those judges.

4. The Bexar County District Judge Intervenors are 

situated so that the Court’s disposition of this action will 

impair and impede substantially their ability to protect their 

interests, and the interests of the Bexar County District Judge 

Intervenors certainly are not represented adequately by any 

existing party in this action. In fact, the Attorney General 

of Texas, counsel for the State Defendants, has joined with 

Plaintiffs in submitting to the Court a joint Proposed Interim 

Plan that is contrary to these Intervenor’s interests.

5. These Intervenor’s are also similarly situated 

with and form part of the nexus between the remainder of 

the Bexar County District Judges, and the other district 

judges of the Fourth Judicial Administrative District, who 

will be impacted by the scope of any proposed interim plan 

or judgment so that the entire group of judges affected by 

any proposed interim plan and judgment will be similarly



149a

and simultaneously affected.

6. These Intervenor’s, as well as the other judges 

mentioned in paragraph 4 above, are uniquely situated as a 

group to decide proper court administration and determine 

the rights of litigants.

7. The joint proposed plan is entirely inconsistent 

with and prejudicial to the interests of the Bexar County 

Judge Intervenors, are contrary to the express wishes and 

specific instructions of the Attorney General’s clients and 

contrary to the Texas Constitution. The Attorney General’s 

unauthorized impermissible actions have been widely 

criticized by his clients, including the Governor of the State 

of Texas, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas, 

and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas, and 

numerous State District judges who are directly affected. An 

obvious conflict of interest exists and the court should not 

approve the proposed interim plan of the Attorney General 

under such circumstances.

8. This case has great and serious implications for 

all Texans and the entire judicial system in Texas, will



150a

require submission to the voters of amendments to the Texas 

Constitution, will require the Texas Legislature to act, and 

should not proceed in any manner until Defendants can 

secure counsel who will in fact represent Defendants fully 

and properly.

9. This Honorable Court on November 8, 1989, 

after extensive consideration, entered its Memorandum 

Opinion and Order (the "Order") in which the Court made 

certain explicit comments that are pertinent here. The Court 

expressed the following comments:

a. Legislation should be done by legislators 

(Order, p. 4);

b. The Texas Constitution will need to be 

amended (Order, p. 4); and

c. Single member districts may or may not 

be the answer if we are to continue to 

have partisan elections (Order, p. 6).

Should the Legislature fail to adopt a satisfactory

remedy in the Special Session . . . this Court will consider 

the granting of an expedited appeal to the Fifth Circuit to



151a

determine whether or not the Declaratory Judgment of this 

Court [the "Order"] was properly made. (Order, p. 94).

10. In this proceeding, the Interveners have been 

represented by the Attorney General of the State of Texas, 

who, following the Court’s Order of November 8, 1989, has 

decided, without proper authority, to submit an interim plan 

to this Court to govern judicial elections of Intervenors, and 

others similarly situated, for the 1990 election.

11. In so proposing, the Attorney General’s proposed 

plan violates the Texas Constitution, Article 5, § 7 (Vernon 

Supp. 1989) which allows Intervenors to serve a term of four 

(4) years because the proposed plan allows Intervenors to 

serve only two (2) years if elected in 1990. This Court did 

not find Article 5, § 7 to be unconstitutional in any manner, 

nor does the Attorney General have the authority to require 

a two (2) year term.

12. Furthermore, the Judicial Districts Board is 

created by the Texas Constitution, Article V, Section 7-A, 

which among other powers, is empowered to internally 

administer judicial assignments within the affected districts.



152a

The Court’s opinion did not hold the Board’s authority to 

administer internal affairs to be unconstitutional.

13. Without regard to these constitutional limitations, 

the Attorney General’s proposed interim plan constitutes a 

settlement which:

a. Clearly does not take into account all necessary 

factors of the class of judges affected.

b. Is a clear effort to preclude an appeal of right by 

affected class members, and

c. Would create turmoil and confusion as to the 

internal administration of trial dockets which 

could substantially impair the rights of litigants 

in civil cases, the rights of defendants in criminal 

cases, and the ability to fairly assign judges for 

the trial of cases.

14. It is unwarranted to deny these Intervenors a 

right to intervene because they will be left without 

representation as to the proposed plans before the Court and 

will be denied the right to appeal clearly warranted by the

Court’s Order.



153a

15. Because of the lack of adequate representation, 

any action by this court would not be binding upon 

Intervenors and no action should be taken by the Court until 

this issue is fully resolved. It is settled law that where there 

is not adequate representation, parties are not bound by any 

judgment. A case of this nature, extent, importance, and 

complexity, with its broad effects, should not proceed 

without the Defendants having proper representation. 

Intervenors’ interests as well as the interest of other judges 

and the people of Texas cannot be validly and determined 

with finality under the present circumstances.

16. Because of the crucial importance of this matter, 

the great expense which will be involved in any relief 

(interim or otherwise) that this Court determines, the cloud 

cast on this case and the conduct of the Attorney General 

should not be permitted to continue as to these Intervenors 

who are directly affected as are other District Judges, have 

no adequate representation, and thus any judgment entered 

will not be binding on them or others similarly situated.

17. The Bexar County District Judge Intervenors,



154a

therefore, are entitled to intervene in this action as a matter 

of right under Rule 24(a), and request that the Court permit 

their intervention in this action only for the purposes being 

afforded an opportunity to be heard and a right to participate 

in the claims made regarding Bexar County and any 

proposed relief, either interim or permanent, affecting 

election of judges in Bexar County.

PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION PURSUANT TO RULE 24(b) 
OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

18. The Bexar County District Judge Intervenors 

request as an alternative to their claim to intervention as a 

matter of right under Rule 24(a) that the Court grant them 

permissive intervention under Rule 24(b).

19. The Bexar County District Judge Intervenors are 

substantially prejudiced by the claims of Plaintiffs, and have 

defenses with issues of law and fact which are both common 

to those of the State Defendants and have additional defense.

20. As in their claim to intervention as a matter of 

right, the Bexar County District Judge Intervenors request 

that the Court allow them to intervene under Rule 24(b) only



155a

for the purposes of being afforded an opportunity to be heard 

and a right to participate in the claims asserted in this action 

about Bexar County and any relief, either interim or 

permanent, affecting the election of State Court Judges in 

Bexar County.

21. Intervention in this action by the Bexar County 

District Judge Interveners will not unduly delay or prejudice 

the rights of the original parties. Their Motion is timely 

filed because no final judgment has been entered by the 

Court and its filing is contemporaneous with our 

understanding of the Court’s deadline for consideration of 

plans.

REQUESTS FOR RELIEF

21. Accordingly, the Bexar County District Judge 

Intervenors request that the Court grant their Motion to 

Intervene under Rule 24(a) for the limited purposes of 

defending their interests against Plaintiffs’ claims for relief 

in Bexar County, Texas, and any relief affecting the election 

of judges in Bexar County.

22. The Bexar County District Judge Intervenors



156a

request alternatively that the Court grant their Motion to 

Intervene under Rule 24(b) for the limited purposes of 

defending their interests against Plaintiffs’ claims for relief 

in Bexar County, Texas, and any relief affecting the election 

of judges in Bexar County.

23. The Bexar County District Judge Intervenors 

request that if the Court grants this Motion under either Rule 

24(a) or 24(b) the Court consider as filed for all purposes in 

this action the signed, original Intervention of Judges Tom 

Rickhoff, Susan D. Reed, John J. Specia, Jr., Sid L. Harle, 

Sharon MacRae, and Michael P. Peden as Defendants 

attached to this Motion as Exhibit A.

Respecfully submitted,



157a

[Caption]

STATE DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO MOTION 
TO INTERVENE BY JUDGES RICKHOFF, REED, 

SPECIA, HARLE, MACRAE, AND PEDEN

The State Defendants reply as follows to the motion to

intervene filed by six state district judges sitting in Bexar

County ("Bexar County judge-intervenors"):

Without conceding the validity of the assertions made in

the intervention motion and supporting documents, the State

Defendants do not oppose the motion insofar as the Bexar

County judge-intervenors seek to intervene in their

individual, or personal, capacities. In its rulings concerning

the attempted intervention of thirteen Travis County judges,

this Court has held that personal capacity intervention by

sitting judges may be appropriate whereas official capacity

intervention is not. In an appeal arising out of this case, the

Fifth Circuit has agreed, by holding that sitting district

judges have no legally cognizable interest in this case in their

official capacity. See LULAC v. Clements, 884 F.2d 185,

188 (5th Cir. 1989).

Respectfully submitted,



158a

FILED JAN 2, 1990 

O R D E R

BEFORE THIS COURT are the parties with their 

respective Proposed Interim Plans, Motions to Certify this 

Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order, of November 8, 

1989, for Interlocutory Appeal, and Motion of Bexar County 

District Judges to Intervene in the above captioned cause.

This case is reminiscent of several lines of a recent 

song, I’m for Love, by Hank Williams, Jr. The lyric goes,

"The City is against the county,
The county is against the state,
The state is against the government, and 
the highway still ain’t paved."

In this case the Governor has been against the Attorney 

General, the Attorney General against the Legislature, the 

Judges against this Court, and the system is still flawed. 

This is a regrettable situation, but it can’t be helped. The 

Hank Williams song goes on to say "But I’m for love, and 

I’m for happiness."

This case was filed on July 11, 1988 and originally set 

for trial on February 13, 1989. The Court was persuaded,



159a

at least on one occasion, to continue the trial to give the 

Texas Legislature a chance to address the issue during its 

Regular Session. This Court continued the above captioned 

cause to April 17, 1989 to await the United States Supreme 

Court’s disposition of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari in 

the case of Roemer v. Chisom. The Court again continued 

the case to July 11, 1989, based on oral Motions to Continue 

made on the record during a hearing on Motions to Intervene 

held by this Court on February 27, 1989. The Court 

continued the trial to September 18, 1989, because of a 

conflict of settings with one of the attorneys. At the 

conclusion of the trial in September, the Court was requested 

to hand down its opinion prior to the convening of the Texas 

Legislature in Special Session so that a violation (if one was 

indeed found) could be looked at and perhaps remedied 

during the Special Session.

This Court specifically reserved ruling upon Plaintiffs’ 

Motion for an Order enjoining further use of the at-large 

election scheme in the affected counties until the State 

Legislature had an opportunity to offer a remedial plan. The



160a

Legislature went into Special Session on November 13, 

1989, some five days after entry of this Court’s November 

8, 1989 Order. Governor Clements deemed it advisable not 

to submit the question of judicial redistricting to the Special 

Session. The governor did, however, request that he and 

this Court meet and discuss the matter. The meeting was 

held, and attorneys for both Plaintiffs and Defendants were 

present. The Governor advised the Court that no remedy 

would be forthcoming until some time after the March 13, 

1990 Primary Elections. The Governor requested that the 

matter be delayed until the Regular Session of the Legislature 

in January, 1991. He further advised the Court that, if this 

was not satisfactory, he would call a Special Session some 

time in April or May of 1990 and request the Legislature to 

study and take whatever action might be necessary to remedy 

the situation.

The timing is perhaps unfortunate. There will be a 

census taken in 1990, which may reflect some changes in 

population in the nine counties involved. Our Legislature 

meets in Regular Session only in odd years and inevitably



161a

somewhere down the line the method of selection or election 

of State District Judges will have to be submitted to the 

voters of Texas. The Court is of the opinion that a delay 

until after the Primary Elections are held in 1990 and a delay 

until after a Special Session of the Legislature is held in late 

spring of 1990 and a further delay of implementation of any 

solution by the Legislature would not be in the interest of 

justice, would further dilute the rights of minority voters in 

the target counties in question, and would be inequitable and 

work an even greater hardship on the judges and courts 

involved.

Because the Legislature took no action on the matter in 

Special Session in November and December, 1989, and the 

refusal of the Supreme Court to grant a writ in Chisom v. 

Roemer, 853 F.2d 1186, 1192 (5th Cir. 1988), and the 

statements of the Governor of the State of Texas, and the 

imminence of the Primary Elections in 1990, the Court is 

not inclined to defer action. See Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 

U.S. 535 (1978). Under these circumstances, this Court is 

of the opinion that it may fashion an interim plan that the



162a

law, equity and justice require. Chisom, supra, at 1192. 

On December 12, 1989, or shortly thereafter, all parties 

were advised to file any Proposed Plans and Objections with 

the Court by December 22, 1989. An Agreed Settlement 

was entered into by and between the Plaintiffs and 

Defendants in this matter, but was not approved by some of 

the Intervenors.

The Court should point out that the State Legislature 

will have still a third opportunity to propose a permanent 

remedy consistent with this Court’s November 8, 1989 Order 

should it convene, and should it pass legislation in April or 

May of 1990.

The plan which follows is strictly an interim plan for 

the 1990 elections affecting 115 State District Court judicial 

seats in the nine counties in action. Upon consideration of 

the Motions, Responses, Objections, letters, exhibits, 

attachments and arguments of the parties, the Court is of the 

opinion that the following Orders are appropriate. 

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Joint Motion of Plaintiffs,



163a

Plaintiff-Intervenors and the Attorney General of Texas for 

Entry of a Proposed Interim Plan is hereby GRANTED IN 

PART and DENIED IN PART in the following respects:

1. All Defendants and those acting in concert are 

hereby enjoined from calling, holding, supervising and 

certifying elections for State District Court Judges in Harris, 

Dallas, Tarrant, Bexar, Travis, Jefferson, Lubbock, Ector 

and Midland Counties under the current at-large scheme.

2. For the 1990 elections, according to the 

Secretary of State of Texas, one hundred fifteen (115) 

District Court elections are scheduled in the counties affected 

by this Court’s Order. The following number of District 

Courts are up for election by respective county: Harris (36); 

Dallas (32); Tarrant (14); Bexar (13); Travis (6); Jefferson 

(6); Lubbock (3); Ector (3); and Midland (2).

Under this Interim Plan, District Court Elections in 

Harris, Dallas, Tarrant and Bexar Counties shall be selected 

from existing State Legislative House District lines as 

indicated in Attachment A. District Court Elections in 

Travis County shall be from existing Justice of the Peace



164a

Precinct Lines. See Attachment A. District Court Elections 

in Jefferson, Lubbock, Ector and Midland Counties shall be 

according to existing County Commissioner Precinct Lines. 

Id. Each county shall be designated by a District Number, 

and each election unit by subdistrict number.

3. Each candidate shall run within a designated 

subdistrict and be elected by the voters in the subdistrict. 

Consistent with the Texas Constitution, each candidate must 

be a resident of his or her designated judicial district (which 

is county wide), but need not be a resident of the election 

subdistrict.

4. Elections shall be non-partisan. Each candidate 

shall select the election subdistrict in which he or she will 

run by designated place. Candidates in Dallas, Tarrant, 

Bexar, Ector and Midland Counties shall file an application 

for a place on the election ballot with the County Elections 

Administrator. Tex. Elec. Code Ann. §31.031 et seq. 

(Vernon 1986). Candidates in Harris, Travis, Jefferson and 

Lubbock Counties shall file such an application with the 

County Clerk of those counties or the County Tax Assessor-



165a

Collector, depending on the practice of that particular 

county. Tex. Elec. Code Ann. §§31.1031 et seq., 31.091 

(Vernon 1986).

5.. All terms of office under this Interim Plan shall 

be for four (4) years. Tex. Const. Art. V, § (1976, 

amended 1985). This Court is of the opinion that a two- 

year term is unfair to both those beginning and those ending 

their judicial careers.

6. Elections shall take place the first Saturday of 

May, 1990, with Run-off Elections to take place the first 

Saturday of June, 1990. Tex. Elec. Code Ann. 

§41.001(b)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1989).

7. An application for a place on the non-partisan 

election ballot must be filed not later than 6:00 p.m. on 

March 26, 1990. Except as modified herein, all provisions 

of the Texas Election Code shall be applicable to the non­

partisan elections herein ordered.

8. In 1991, the Administrative Judge of the 

county wide district shall designate:

(1) Any courts of specialization in terms of



166a

docket preference; and

(2) The District Court numbers in use prior 

to the Interim Plan’s adoption. Successful incumbents 

shall have preference in such designation.

9. Current jurisdiction and venue of the District 

Courts remain unaffected, subject to modification by rule of 

the Supreme Court of Texas.

10. There shall be no right of recusal of judges 

elected under this plan. This Court is of the view that such 

a measure would be extremely disruptive to District Court 

dockets, administratively costly and could be the source of 

abuse by attorneys attempting to gain continuances of their 

cases.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the above Interim 

Plan applies only to the 1990 State District Court Judicial 

Elections in the nine target counties at issue in this case. If 

the Texas Legislature fails to fashion a permanent remedy by 

way of a Special Called Session in the spring of 1990, then 

this Court will put into effect a Permanent Plan for the 

election of State District Court Judges in the nine target



167a

counties in question.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motions of 

Defendant-Intervenor JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD, 

Defendant-Intervenor JUDGE HAROLD ENTZ and the State 

Defendants to Certify this Court’s Memorandum Opinion and 

Order of November 8, 1989 as modified for clerical 

corrections on November 27, 1989 and December 26, 1989 

for Interlocutory Appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) is 

hereby GRANTED IN PART.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that to the extent that such 

Motions request a stay of further proceedings in the above 

captioned cause such Motions are hereby DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion of Bexar 

County Judges TOM RICKOFF, SUSAN D. REED, JOHN 

J. SPECIA, JR., SID L. HARLE, SHARON MACRAE and 

MICHAEL P. PEDEN to Intervene as Defendants in the 

above captioned cause is hereby DENIED.

This Court, of course, has granted the right for an 

Interlocutory Appeal. The request to stay proceedings 

pending the appeal is DENIED, because the Court does not



168a

feel that District Judges should be continued in office for an 

indefinite period of time. The right of the electorate to 

select judges in the year 1990 should not be denied unless, 

of course, interim action is taken by the Texas Legislature 

which changes the method of the selection and election of 

judges. The pressing need for the administration of justice 

in our state courts is recognized. It is the opinion of this 

Court that the plan set forth herein is the least disruptive that 

can be effected at this juncture. To allow Primary Elections 

in 1990 to be held in the same manner as they were in 1988 

would be contra to the dictates of Fifth Circuit law and the 

Congressional Mandate of the Voting Rights Acts. 

Recognition that the November 8, 1989 Judgment has far- 

reaching effects is the reason for the allowance of an 

expedited appeal, and again the Court would encourage the 

Governor to call a Special Session to address the matter and, 

further, would request that the State Legislature remedy the 

current situation, as the Court is firmly of the opinion that 

any remedy other than this interim remedy should be done 

by duly elected legislators.



169a

SIGNED and ENTERED this 2nd day of January, 1990.

LUCIUS D. BUNTON 
Chief Judge



170a

Attachment A

HARRIS COUNTY
(District 401)

PLACE
DISTRICT
NUMBER

1 401
2 401
3 401
4 401
5 401
6 401
7 401
8 401
9 401
10 401
11 401
12 401
13 401
14 401
15 401
16 401
17 401
18 401
19 401
20 401
21 401
22 401
23 401
24 401
25 401
26 401
27 401
28 401
29 401
30 401
31 401

COUNTY
SUBDIST.
NUMBER

Harris *HD-125
Harris HD-126
Harris HD-127
Harris HD-128
Harris HD-129
Harris HD-130
Harris HD-131
Harris HD-132
Harris HD-133
Harris HD-134
Harris HD-135
Harris HD-136
Harris HD-137
Harris HD-138
Harris HD-139
Harris HD-140
Harris HD-141
Harris HD-142
Harris HD-143
Harris HD-144
Harris HD-145
Harris HD-146
Harris HD-147
Harris HD-148
Harris HD-149
Harris HD-150
Harris HD-132
Harris HD-139
Harris HD-147
Harris HD-148
Harris HD-131



171a

32 401 Harris HD-146
33 401 Harris HD-143
34 401 Harris HD-142
35 401 Harris HD-141
36 401 Harris HD-138

* "HD" indicates Texas House of Representatives 
Districts.



1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

172a

DALLAS COUNTY
(District 402)

DISTRICT SUBDIST.
NUMBER COUNTY NUMBER

402 Dallas HD-98
402 Dallas HD-99
402 Dallas HD-100
402 Dallas HD-101
402 Dallas HD-102
402 Dallas HD-103
402 Dallas HD-104
402 Dallas HD-105
402 Dallas HD-106
402 Dallas HD-107
402 Dallas HD-108
402 Dallas HD-109
402 Dallas HD-110
402 Dallas HD-111
402 Dallas HD-112
402 Dallas HD-113
402 Dallas HD-114
402 Dallas HD-100
402 Dallas HD-114
402 Dallas HD-111
402 Dallas HD-110
402 Dallas HD-102
402 Dallas HD-108
402 Dallas HD-107
402 Dallas HD-106
402 Dallas HD-105
402 Dallas HD-104
402 Dallas HD-103
402 Dallas HD-98
402 Dallas HD-99
402 Dallas HD-101
402 Dallas HD-109



173a

TARRANT COUNTY
(District 403)

PLACE
DISTRICT
NUMBER

1 403
2 403
3 403
4 403
5 403
6 403
7 403
8 403
9 403
10 403
11 403
12 403
13 403
14 403

COUNTY
SUBDIST.
NUMBER

Tarrant HD-89
Tarrant HD-90
Tarrant HD-91
Tarrant HD-92
Tarrant HD-93
Tarrant HD-94
Tarrant HD-95
Tarrant HD-96
Tarrant HD-97
Tarrant HD-90
Tarrant HD-95
Tarrant HD-94
Tarrant HD-93
Tarrant HD-92



174a

BEXAR COUNTY
(District 404)

PLACE
DISTRICT
NUMBER

1 404
2 404
3 404
4 404
5 404
6 404
7 404
8 404
9 404
10 404
11 404
12 404
13 404

COUNTY
SUBDIST.
NUMBER

Bexar HD-115
Bexar HD-120
Bexar HD-116
Bexar HD-124
Bexar HD-123
Bexar HD-122
Bexar HD-121
Bexar HD-118
Bexar HD-124
Bexar HD-117
Bexar HD-119
Bexar HD-118
Bexar HD-115



a
\ 

U
i 

4^
 U

> 
K>

175a

TRAVIS COUNTY
(District 405)

DISTRICT 
PLACE NUMBER

1 405
405 
405 
405 
405 
405

COUNTY
SUBDIST.
NUMBER

Travis **JP-1
Travis JP-2
Travis JP-3
Travis JP-4
Travis JP-5
Travis JP-4

** "JP" indicates Justice of the Peace Precincts.



<N cn n- 
u

~)

176a

JEFFERSO N  COUNTY
(District 406)

PLACE

1

DISTRICT SUBDIST.
NUMBER COUNTY NUMBER

406 Jefferson ***CC-1
406 Jefferson CC-2
406 Jefferson CC-3
406 Jefferson CC-4
406 Jefferson CC-4
406 Jefferson CC-3

*** "CC" indicates County Commissioner Precincts.



177a

LUBBOCK COUNTY
(District 407)

PLACE
DISTRICT
NUMBER COUNTY

SUBDIST.
NUMBER

1 407 Lubbock CC-3
2 407 Lubbock CC-4
3 407 Lubbock CC-2



178a

ECTOR COUNTY
(District 408)

PLACE
DISTRICT
NUMBER COUNTY

SUBDIST.
NUMBER

1 408 Ector CC-2
2 408 Ector CC-3
3 408 Ector CC-4



MIDLAND COUNTY
(District 409)

DISTRICT
PLACE NUMBER COUNTY

1 409 Midland
2 409 Midland

SUBDIST.
NUMBER

CC-3
CC-4



180a

FILED JAN 11, 1990 

ORDER

BEFORE THIS COURT is the Motion of Attorney 

General Jim Mattox on behalf of the State of Texas to Alter 

this Court’s Order of January 2, 1990; the Response thereto 

of Harris County District Judge Sharolyn Wood; and the 

Response thereto of Plaintiffs LULAC et al., Plaintiff- 

Intervenors Jesse Oliver, et al., and Plaintiff-Intervenors 

Houston Lawyers Association et al. Having considered said 

Motion and Responses, the Court is of the opinion that said 

Motion should be denied.

The Court is further of the opinion that other changes 

to certain terms of the injunction contained in that January 

2, 1990 Order are proper. Specifically, the Court herein 

modifies the Order for the limited purpose of delaying the 

elections ordered pursuant to its Order, and removing the 

expedited rights of appeal previously granted in this matter.

The Court believes that delaying judicial elections 

pursuant to its Order of January 2, 1990 is desirable for 

several reasons. First, the Court notes that Governor Bill



181a

Clements recently called a special session of February 27, 

1990, to deal specifically with Texas’ system of selecting 

judges. In the interests of comity and Federalism, 

legislatively directed remedial measures are preferable to 

measures ordered by this Court. Delaying the judicial 

elections ordered by this Court will serve these interests by 

giving the Legislature additional time. Second, judicial 

elections will still take place in 1990 under the modified 

Order, thus minimizing disruption of the Texas judiciary. 

Third, delaying court-ordered judicial elections will provide 

additional time for the United States Department of Justice 

to consider any remedy adopted by the Legislature before 

such elections occur. Fourth, delaying these elections will 

remove the need for expedited appeal to the Fifth Circuit by 

providing additional time for that Court to consider and rule 

upon this Court’s Order before court-ordered judicial 

elections occur.

The Court urges the Legislature to consider in its 

deliberations a quotation from President Harry S. Truman, 

who said, ”[w]e must build a better world, a far better



182a

world—one in which the eternal dignity of man is respected." 

I. The Attorney General’s Motion is Properly Asserted 

Pursuant to Rule 59(e), Fed. R. Civ. P., and This Court 

Retains Jurisdiction to Modify Its Order o f January 2, 1990.

The Defendant-Intervenor Judge Wood of Harris County 

appears to question the effect of the Attorney General’s 

Motion on the notices of appeal filed in this case by herself 

and Judge Entz, and the powers of this Court to modify the 

terms of the injunction contained in its Order of January 2, 

1990. There is no serious dispute before the Court that the 

parties to this case have the right under 28 U.S.C. Section 

1292(a)(1) to appeal this Court’s Order of January 2, 1990. 

If that Order were a judgment as to which the Attorney 

General’s Motion is properly asserted under Rule 59(e), then 

the Parties’ notices of appeal are ineffective, the Court 

retains jurisdiction to modify the judgment, and the deadlines 

for appeal are extended according to Fed. R. App. P. 

4(b)(4). The Court believes that Order is such a judgment, 

and that this is the correct analysis.



183a

A "judgment" for purposes of Rule 59(e), which 

provides for the amendment of a judgment and the 

postponement of the time for filing an appeal, is defined in 

Rule 54(a). See Wright, Miller & Kane, FEDERAL 

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Section 2651 and cases 

cited therein. Rule 54(a) defines judgment as an "appealable 

order." 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b) undisputedly makes this 

Court’s Order of January 2, 1990 appealable of right. 

Therefore a motion to alter or amend the judgment is 

properly asserted under Rule 59(e).

The Attorney General’s Motion would properly be 

brought under Rule 62(c), if jurisdiction of the case were 

already lodged in the court of appeals, for example where a 

Rule 59(e) motion was not timely made and appeal was 

taken, or a Rule 59(e) motion was made and ruled upon, and 

appeal subsequently taken.

The Court assumes for the purposes of this Motion that 

there exist other circumstances that would make a Rule 59(e) 

Motion improper here, although the Court takes pains to note 

that the parties have not cited the Court to such



184a

circumstances, and the Court in examining its jurisdiction 

has so far found none. In that event, Judge Wood contends, 

the Attorney General’s Motion is one properly asserted under 

Rule 62(c), under which Rule this Court’s modification 

powers are curtailed.

The Court also assumes that its sua sponte alteration of 

a judgment, that is independent of and goes beyond the 

alteration requested by a party under Rule 59(e), might be 

reviewed under the standard of Rule 62(c). The problem is 

that the timely filing of a Rule 59(e) motion, which the 

Court believes has been done here, suspends the appeal 

process and renders Rule 62(c) technically inapplicable 

because the case is not on appeal. Absent appeal, a district 

court has complete power over its interlocutory orders. 

Ideal Toy Corp. v. Sayco Doll Corp., 302 F.2d 623 (2nd 

Cir. 1962).

It is important to note that this Court has consistently 

voiced its preference for the Texas authorities devising a 

plan for judicial elections consistent with the Voting Rights 

Act, with reasonable dispatch, and therefore has considered



185a

and styled its January 2, 1990 injunction as an interim plan. 

The Order is, of course, binding and effective if, and to the 

extent, the Legislature fails to act. If the Legislature devises 

an acceptable plan under the Voting Rights Act this lawsuit, 

and the Court’s injunction along with it, would likely become 

moot. Of course, an argument could be made that this 

Court’s interim plan of redistricting, because conditional in 

this sense, is not a judgment at all until the contingency has 

been removed, and therefore is not even appealable. In any 

event, this Court’s overall plan of encouraging legislative 

redistricting is, the Court believes, relevant to considering, 

under the law of Rule 62(c), what constitutes a modification 

of an injunction "in aid of appeal."

In sum, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not 

seem to provide a neat category for classifying motions on 

equitable remedies such as the one at issue. This Court is 

of the opinion that the Attorney General’s Motion is one 

properly brought under Rule 59(e) because this Court s 

Order of January 2, 1990 is a "judgment" within the 

meaning of Rule 54(a). However, in the event this



186a

characterization is error, as Judge Wood seems to contend it 

is, the Court believes it proper to apply the more restrictive 

analysis under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 62(b) as set out in cases 

cited by the parties.

II. Alternatively, This Court Possesses Jurisdiction to Make 

Modifications to Its January 2, 1990 Order as Ordered 

Herein Pursuant to Rule 62(b), Fed. R. Civ. P.

Judge Wood challenges this Court’s jurisdiction to 

entertain a motion to modify its January 2, 1990 Order, and 

presumably as well the Court’s jurisdiction to modify said 

Order sua sponte. However, despite Judge Wood’s artful 

choice of quotations from pertinent case law, the Court is not 

persuaded that it lacks jurisdiction to make certain changes 

in its Order even if the injunction contained therein is 

properly on appeal.

Once appeal is taken from an interlocutory judgment (as 

the Court assumes for discussion purposes that it has been 

here), Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c) provides that "the court in its 

discretion may suspend, modify, restore or grant an 

injunction during the pendency of the appeal...." The scope



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of this Court’s power under Rule 62(c) has most recently 

been the subject of analysis by the Fifth Circuit in Coastal 

Corp. v. Texas Eastern Corp., 869 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1989). 

Under the holding in Coastal, this Court is. definitely 

constrained insofar it lacks authority to dissolve the 

injunction on appeal. Id. at 821. But regarding less radical 

modifications, the Court is directed to limit the exercise of 

its power to "maintaining the status quo." Id. at 820.

Judge Wood would have the Court interpret 

"maintaining the status quo" to mean that this court may do 

nothing except "in aid of the appeal." Willie v. Continental 

Oil Co., 746 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1984). The Fifth Circuit 

applied this directive in Willie to divest the District Court of 

jurisdiction to modify a judgment under Rule 60(b) because 

of inadvertence or excusable neglect, where substantive 

rights of the parties were at stake. Id. at 1045. In Willie, 

the parties sought to have the District Court correct its 

judgment to incorporate a mistakenly-omitted stipulation 

regarding the percentage of liability to be bome by one of 

the defendants. The District Court was empowered to deny



188a

such a motion because denial would be "in furtherance of the 

appeal". But had the District Court wished to grant the Rule 

60(b) motion, leave of the Court of Appeals would have 

been required. Id. at 1046.

In the Coastal case, however, the Fifth Circuit seemed 

to impose a different standard of "maintaining the status 

quo," and defining that standard to mean that a district court 

may not take action, such as vacating an injunction, that 

would presumably divest the court of appeals from 

jurisdiction while the issue is on appeal. Coastal, supra, at 

820. Cases cited in the Coastal opinion consistently deal 

with granting or staying injunctions during the pendency of 

appeal. Id. Consistent with the analysis expressed in the 

Attorney General’s brief, this Court interprets Coastal to say 

that it may not vacate the injunction now in issue while it is 

on appeal. No such action is contemplated.

Even if the "in aid of appeal" standard set out in Willie 

should guide the Court, it would seem that the modifications 

now ordered, which primarily give the Legislature additional 

time to consider redistricting, does not violate that standard.



189a

Accordingly, this Court’s Order of January 2, 1990 will 

be amended.

IT IS ORDERED that this Court’s Order of January 2, 

1990 be, and is hereby amended pursuant to the following 

directives only.

Item numbered "6" at pages 6 and 7 is amended to read 

as follows:

6. Elections shall take place on November 6, 

1990 with runoff elections, if and where necessary, on 

December 4, 1990.

Item numbered "7" at page 7 is amended to read as 

follows:

7. An application for a place on the non­

partisan election ballot must be filed not later than 6:00 

p.m. on September 19, 1990. Except as modified 

herein, all provisions of the Texas Election Code shall 

be applicable to the non-partisan elections herein 

ordered.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any rights of 

expedited appeal granted in this matter be, and are hereby



190a

RESCINDED.

SIGNED AND ENTERED this 11th _ day of January, 

1990.

s/________________
LUCIUS D. BUNTON 
CHIEF JUDGE