Concurrence and Dissent

    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 

EASTERN DIVISION 

  

Civil Action No. 4-96-CV-104-BO(3) 

MARTIN CROMARTIE, THOMAS ) 

CHANDLER MUSE, and GLENNES ) 

DODGE WEEKS, ) 

) 
Plaintiffs, ) 

) 
Vv. ) 

) 
JAMES B. HUNT, JR.. in his official ) 

capacity as Governor of the State of North ) 

Carolina, et al.. ) 

) 
Defendants. ) 

MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVITS FILED IN SUPPORT OF 

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

AND 

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 

NOW COME the defendants, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

and move the Court to strike the affidavits of R.O. Everett. J.H. Froelich, Jr., Neil C. Williams, John 

Weatherly. and Lee Mortimer. which were filed by plaintiffs in support of their motion for summary 

judgment.’ The legal and factual grounds for this motion are set out below. 

  

Plaintiffs also rely on these same affidavits to support their motion for preliminary 

injunction. For the same reasons they must be struck from consideration for summary judgment, 

these affidavits should carry no weight in deciding plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. 

 



INTRODUCTION 

On or about February 3. 1998, plaintiffs filed a motion and brief seeking summary judgment 

on their claim that the State’s 1997 Congressional redistricting plan is an unconstitutional racial 

gerrymander. Plaintiffs contend that Districts 1 and 12 were drawn with a predominately racial 

motive and are tainted by the prior districts from the 1992 Congressional plan. In support of their 

claim, plaintiffs filed the affidavits of two plaintiffs who reside in District 12, R.O. Everett and J.H. 

Froelich, Jr., along with affidavits from three other citizens who do not live in the challenged 

districts, Neil C. Williams, John Weatherly and Lee Mortimer. The affidavits of these plaintiffs and 

interested citizens are rife with hearsay, speculation. personal opinions, and unsupported conclusions 

and beliefs which are not based on personal knowledge. For this reason the affidavits are not 

competent evidence to support plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and must be struck. 

ARGUMENT 

An affidavit filed as evidence in a summary judgment proceeding “must present evidence 

in substantially the same form as if the affiant were testifying in court.” Evans v. Technologies 

Applications & Service Co., 80 F.3d 954. 962 (4th Cir. 1996). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) 

specifically requires that affidavits supporting or opposing a motion for summary judgment “shall 

be made on personal knowledge. shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and 

shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.” See 

Scosche Industries, Inc. v. Visor Gear, Inc., 121 F.3d 675, 681 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In evaluating 

evidence concerning a summary judgment motion. “a court may not consider affidavits that do not 

satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).” El Deeb v. University of Minn., 60 F.3d 423, 429 

(8th Cir. 1995).  



  

AFFIDAVITS OF EVERETT, FROELICH AND WILLIAMS 

The affidavits of Everett. Froelich and Williams are inadmissible conclusory expressions of 

personal beliefs and lay opinions and are not competent evidence for purposes of deciding a 

summary judgment motion. Everett offers testimony that he “perceive[s]” that the shape of District 

12 in the 1992 plan was predominantly motivated by race and also his lay opinion that the shape of 

District 12 in the 1997 plan is still a racial gerrymander motivated predominately by race. Everett, 

a local businessman from Rowan County who had no involvement in the legislature’s redistricting 

process, also speculates that the boundaries would have been quite different if race-neutral principles 

such as compactness, contiguity, and political subdivisions had been followed. Similarly, Froelich, 

a businessman from Guilford County who had no involvement in the legislature’s redistricting 

process, offers his personal belief that apart from a racial motive, no one could justify putting 

Mecklenburg and Guilford Counties in the same district. He further speculates that based on race- 

neutral redistricting principles all of Mecklenburg County would be in one district, while all of 

Guilford County would be in another district. The Williams affidavit offers similar incompetent 

testimony. Williams, a lawyer and local politician from Mecklenburg County who lost the 

Republican primary in 1994 in District 9, also had no involvement in the legislature’s redistricting 

process. However, he offers his personal belief that it “is apparent” that racial motives predominated 

in creating District 12 and speculates that using traditional redistricting principles of compactness. 

contiguity and respect for political subdivisions and actual communities of interest, all of 

Mecklenburg County would be in a single district. Finally, he offers his legal conviction that 

District 12 is the “fruit of the poisonous tree.” 

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As a matter of law, such conclusory and speculative statements of belief are insufficient to 

support summary judgment on the issue of whether race was the predominate factor motivating the 

legislature 'sredistricting decision. “[O]nly statements ‘made on personal knowledge” will support 

a motion for summary judgment; statements of mere belief must be disregarded.” Tavery v. United 

States, 32 F.3d 1423, 1435 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine 

Research, 339 U.S. 827, 831, 70 S. Ct. 894, 896, 94 L. Ed. 1312 (1950)). See also Jameson v. 

Jameson, 176 F.2d 58, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (“Belief, no matter how sincere, is not equivalent to 

knowledge.”); Carey v. Beans, 500 F. Supp. 580, 583 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (on summary judgment, 

statements prefaced by the phrases “I believe” or those made upon an “understanding” are properly 

subject to a motion to strike). Because personal knowledge is the necessary foundation for lay 

testimony, “affidavits composed of hearsay and opinion evidence do not satisfy Rule 56(¢) and must 

be disregarded.” Scosche Industries, 121 F.3d at 681 (citing State Mut. Life Assurance Co. of Am. 

v. Deer Creek Park. 612 F.2d 259. 264-65 (6th Cir. 1979) and Rossi v. Trans World Airlines. Inc., 

507 F.2d 404, 406 (9th Cir. 1974)). Similarly. “[s]peculation does not meet a party's burden” in a 

summary judgment proceeding and “[f]acts, not [a plaintiff's] perceptions and feelings, are 

required.” Uhl v. Zalk Josephs Fabricators, Inc., 121 F.3d 1133, 1137 (7th Cir. 1997). 

The lay witness testimony offered by plaintiffs is not probative or competent evidence. The 

“gauzy generalities” of the affidavits offered by plaintiffs, which are “apparently based on something 

less than personal knowledge,” prove nothing and “are not entitled to weight in the summary 

judgment balance.” Cadle Co. v. Haves, 116 F.3d 957. 961 (Ist Cir. 1997). See also Baker v. 

Latham Sparrowbush Assocs., 72 F.3d 246, 255 (2nd Cir. 1995) (allegation made solely upon 

information and belief without any supporting evidentiary facts could not be considered on motion 

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for summary judgment); U.S. for Use and Ben. of Conveyor Rental & Sales Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 

Co.. 981 F.2d 448. 454, (9th Cir. 1992) (affidavit was inadmissible as evidence on summary 

judgment motion absent requisite personal knowledge of affiant). Evidence submitted in summary 

judgment affidavits must be based on personal knowledge and cannot be conclusory. Evans, 80 F.3d 

at 962. Because “self-serving opinions without objective corroboration [are] not significantly 

probative, the decision to strike and disregard as irrelevant” is proper. /d. In the instant case, the 

affidavits of Everett, Froelich and Williams consist of conclusory statements predicated on personal 

beliefs unsupported by objective facts. For these reasons. the affidavits must be struck by this Court 

pursuant to Rule 56(e). 

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN WEATHERLY 

Representative John Weatherly is the current representative from House District 48 and 

previously served in the North Carolina House of Representatives in the 1989, 1993 and 1995 

sessions. Although he served on an Election Laws Reform Committee in 1996, and unsuccessfully 

introduced a bill in 1997 to establish a redistricting commission, he did not serve in the General 

Assembly when the 1992 Congressional plan was enacted and was not a member of the House 

Committee on Congressional Redistricting during the 1997 session when the current redistricting 

plan was enacted. See Bartlett Aff.. Vol. IV at 97C-28F-3B, p. 3. Representative Weatherly 's only 

link to the redistricting process was an appearance at the Public Hearing held by the General 

Assembly's Congressional Redistricting Committees on February 26, 1997, to speak in support of 

his bill to create a redistricting commission. (Weatherly’s Commission bill was never enacted by 

the General Assembly.) Weatherly took this opportunity to criticize the proposed Senate and House 

redistricting plans presented at the public hearing on the grounds that they were designed for the 

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primary purpose of protecting the interests of incumbents and political parties. See Bartlett Aff., 

Vol. IV at 97C-28F-3B. pp. 38-40. There was no suggestion in his public comments that Districts 

1 and 12 were racial gerrymanders or that race was the predominant motive in the creation of these 

two districts. 

Although he had no participation in the redistricting process other than appearing at the 

public hearing and casting a vote against the plan (Bartlett Aff., Vol. V at 97C-28F-4H at House Roll 

Call Vote #196). Representative Weatherly concludes in his affidavit that race predominated in 

determining the boundaries of Districts 1 and 12. and with no supporting evidence expresses his 

opinion that the General Assembly acted under a premise that two Congressional districts should be 

created to assure the election of African-Americans, specifically the incumbent African-Americans. 

He also expresses his conviction that the only conceivable motive for linking Mecklenburg with 

Guildford and Forsyth Counties in a Congressional district was the racial motive of guaranteeing the 

election of an African-American. He further expresses his belief that the same racial motivation 

applied to the creation of District 1. Representative Weatherly candidly admits in his affidavit that 

his opinions and conclusions are not based on personal knowledge, but are based on hearsay-- 

“statements made on or off the floor of the General Assembly or in Committee, on the final results 

of the redistricting process, and on [his] experience as a legislator.” Weatherly Aff. at 4. 

Representative Weatherly 's beliefs and conclusions on the motivations behind the drawing 

of current Districts 1 and 12 are not competent admissible evidence. See discussionabove at pp. 4-5, 

regarding the inadmissibility of conclusory statements of personal belief. In addition, “hearsay 

evidence, which is inadmissible at trial, cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment.” 

Maryland Highway Contractors’ Ass 'n., Inc. v. State of Maryland, 933 F.2d 1246, 1251-52 (4th Cir. 

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1991). See also Miller v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1020. 1026 (8th Cir. 1984) (affidavits containing hearsay 

statements failed to comply with Rule 56(e) requirements); Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 

632 F.2d 539, 556 (5th Cir. 1980) (hearsay evidence in Rule 56 affidavits is entitled to no weight); 

Blair Foods, Inc. v. Ranchers Cotton Oil, 610 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 1980) (hearsay evidence is 

inadmissible and may not be considered by this court on review of a summary judgment). 

Representative Weatherly ’s inadmissible affidavit “is very nearly entirely conclusory and devoid of 

specific facts to support his opinion.” Rohrboughv. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 916 F.2d 970, 975 (4th Cir. 

1990). In addition, given the conflict between his conclusory affidavit alleging a predominant racial 

motive and his public statement criticizing the primary motive of protecting incumbents and political 

parties, the Court may disregard the affidavit. Jd 

Finally, Representative Weatherly’s affidavit is inadmissible to prove the legislature's 

motivation in enacting the 1997 Congressional plan and must be struck. It is a long standing rule 

of law in North Carolina that the affidavit or testimony of a member of the legislature may not be 

relied upon to prove legislative intent. D & W, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 268 N.C. 577, 581-82, 151 

S.E.2d 241, 244 (1966). A statute “is an act of the legislature as an organized body” and it 

“expresses the collective will of that body™ so that the understanding of a single member may not 

be accepted by the Court to ascertain the legislative intent. Id. See also Milk Comm'n v. National 

Food Stores, 270 N.C. 323, 332-33, 154 S.E.2d 548, 555 (1967) (testimony or affidavits of members 

of the legislature are not competent evidence of legislative intent and must be disregarded). Because 

North Carolina law provides that the affidavit of an individual member of the General Assembly is 

inadmissible and cannot be relied upon to prove legislative intent, the affidavit of Representative 

Weatherly attempting to establish the legislature’s motive in drawing Districts 1 and 12 must be 

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struck. Empire Distribs. of N.C. v. Schieffelin & Co., 679 F. Supp. 541 (W.D.N.C. 1987). For all 

the foregoing reasons. this Court must disregard the affidavit of Representative Weatherly. 

AFFIDAVIT OF LEE MORTIMER 

Lee Mortimer, a self-professed expert on proportional representation, is a technical writer 

in the Research Triangle Park who has previous experience as a journalist. His educational 

background consists of an undergraduate degree from Western Carolina University in history with 

a minor in political science. As an active proponent of proportional representation, a 

representational theory irrelevant to Congressional elections, Mortimer purports to be qualified to 

provide expert testimony on the Congressional redistricting process in North Carolina. He had no 

involvement in and has no personal knowledge of the legislature’s Congressional redistricting 

process. Mortimer’s views on the motivation of the General Assembly and its leadership in drawing 

the 1997 Congressional plan are not based on any personal knowledge and his affidavit does not 

show affirmatively that he is competent based, on education, experience, or other training, to testify 

as an expert to the matters stated therein. 

Despite an absence of qualifications to testify as an expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 

702. Mortimer offers testimony consisting of a string of lay opinions: 

“in my opinion” the severe misshapenness indicates race predominated in 

determining District 1's boundaries. 

“So. in my opinion’ it is clear from the resemblance to the previous districts 

that Districts 1 and 12 are the “fruit of the poisonous tree.” 

“I believe” the new Districts 1 and 12 would never have been drawn with 

their present boundaries “except for race.” 

“I can see no legitimate basis” for the way the minority communities were 

grouped together.  



  

. “In my opinion” District 12 is a make over of the old unconstitutional district. 

. “I believe it is the process used to reach a result that “indicates” a racial 

intent. 

. “In my opinion” the only explanation for disregarding the objective to 

maintain intact counties and municipalities is that such an objective 

undermined and conflicted with the predominate objective of maximizing the 

district’s black population. 

. “In my opinion” the inclusion of some minimum number of intact counties 

is an important test of whether the district is raced-based. 

. “It appears to me” District 12 has no intact counties because race was the 

predominant consideration. 

. “I believe” the common characteristics test is a common sense criteria 

applied in redistricting cases to determine whether race predominated in 

drawing a district. 

. “It is clear to me” that the option of drawing separate districts using 

Mecklenburg and Guildford Counties was not considered because it would 

not produce a district that had more than a 29 percent minority population. 

See generally Mortimer Aff. at 3-9. 

To be admissible, expert testimony must consist of scientific, technical. or other specialized 

knowledge that will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. 

See, Rule 702, Federal Rules of Evidence. 

[T]he plain language of the Rules maintains some limitations on expressions of 

opinion. Lay opinions must be “rationally based on the perception of the witness,” 

Fed. R. Evid. 701. and. only experts qualified by “knowledge. skill, experience, 

training or education” may submit an opinion. Fed. R. Evid. 702. 

Thomas J. Kline, Inc. v. Lorillard. Inc., 878 F.2d 791. 799 (4th Cir. 1989). Although the Federal 

Rules of Evidence have generally relaxed traditional barriers to expert opinion testimony, the 

Supreme Court has emphasized that Rule 702 “clearly contemplates some degree of regulation of 

 



the subjects and theories about which an expert may testify.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow 

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579. 589. 113 S. Ct. 2786. 2795, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469, 480, (1993). 

In particular, the Court observed that Rule 702 permits an expert to testify only when “scientific, 

technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact,” and that “the word 

‘knowledge’ connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.” Id. at 589-90, 113 

S. Ct. at 2795, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 480-81. 

Expert opinion is admissible as evidence in a summary judgment proceeding “only where 

it appears that the affiant is competent to give an expert opinion.” Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 

F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990). A witness who lacks an appropriate educational background and lacks 

any training or other experience in the area of testimony is not qualified under Rule 702 as an expert 

witness. See Thomas J. Kline, 878 F.2d at 799-800 (witness who was not an economist, whose 

highest level of education was a masters degree in business administration, who had published only 

one article on an unrelated topic, and who had no relevant work experience, was not qualified to 

testify as expert on credit decisions); Doddy v. Oxy USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 448, 459 (5th Cir. 1996) 

(witness qualified to testify as an expert on procedures for treating oil and gas wells for corrosion 

not qualified to testify on issues related to chemical content and toxicity which were matters not 

within his field of expertise). To allow a witness to testify to matters beyond his expertise or of 

which he has no personal knowledge “would tend to mislead the jury by having an ‘expert’ testify 

to matters that are not within his field.” Doddy, 101 F.3d at 459. 

In the instant case, Mortimer has laid no foundation supporting his self-serving description 

of himself as an expert on redistricting. The affidavit on its face shows he lacks the relevant 

educational background, experience or other training to qualify as such an expert, and his various 

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impression of exactness in an area where a [fact finder’s] common sense is less available than usual 

to protect it.” 7 Eastern Auto Distributors, Inc. v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 795 F.2d 329, 338 

(4th Cir. 1986) (quoting Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp. 297 F.2d 906, 912 (2d 

Cir. 1962)). The affiant Mortimer has not, and cannot, establish his qualification to offer expert 

testimony on a political science electoral theory; nor can he offer any expertise or knowledge to 

validate the electoral theory and projections of other persons on whom he relies as required by Rule 

702. Under these circumstances, the testimony on election projections is inadmissible and 

Mortimer’s affidavit cannot be relied on by the Court. 

Finally, Mortimer also improperly cites to hearsay within hearsay from various newspaper 

articles. in addition to an article from the American Political Science review, to support his 

testimony. See Mortimer Aff. at 3 n.1, 6 n.2, 10 n.4, 11 (Exhibit B), and 13 (Exhibits C& D). 

Newspaper accounts of events are inadmissible hearsay, and their accounts of people’s statements 

are hearsay within hearsay. Horta v. Sullivan, 4 F.3rd 2, 8 (1st Cir. 1993). See also Mayor v. 

Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605,618 n. 19,94 S. Ct. 1323,1332n.19,39 L. Ed. 2d 630, 

643 n.19 (1974); New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 888 F.2d 646, 650-51 (10th Cir. 

1989). Such hearsay evidence is inadmissible at trial and “cannot be considered on a motion for 

summary judgment.” Maryland Highway Contractors’ Ass'n, Inc., 933 F.2d at 1251-52. 

CONCLUSION 

Plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment and defendants have cross-moved for summary 

judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate unless plaintiffs produce evidence that is sufficient to 

establish a reasonable probability of the existence of the essential elements of their claims. Autry 

v. N.C. Dept. of Human Resources, 820 F.2d 1384, 1386 (4th Cir. 1987); Lovelace v. Sherwin- 

13 

 



personal opinions and beliefs are inadmissible lay testimony which should not be considered by the 

Court. See discussionabove at pp. 4-5, regarding the inadmissibility of conclusory and unsupported 

lay witness personal opinions and beliefs. 

In addition to offering his various personal opinions and beliefs, Mortimer also attempts to 

offer expert testimony on the minimum percentage of black voting-age population needed in a 

Congressional district in North Carolina to achieve what he deems an equal electoral opportunity as 

a matter of law. See Mortimer Aff. at 9-17. Not only is Mortimer unqualified to offer this particular 

analysis and legal conclusion, but he attempts to support his lay opinion by attaching to his affidavit 

a theoretical article on black representation by two political scientists. The inappropriateness of 

Mortimer’s testimony on a theory of equal electoral opportunity for minorities arises not only from 

his lack of competence to present the theory, but also from the unvalidated nature of the theory itself. 

In order for expert testimony to be properly admitted, it must meet a two part test: (1) the expert 

testimony must consist of knowledge that is supported by appropriate validation; and (2) “the 

evidence or testimony must ‘assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact 

in issue.’” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590-91, 113 S. Ct. at 2795, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 481. To determine 

whether certain expert evidence properly satisfies the first prong of the test, trial courts must 

consider whether the theory used by the expert can be, and has been, tested; whether the theory has 

been subject to peer review and publication; the known or potential rate of error of the method used; 

and the degree of the method’s or conclusion’s acceptance within the relevant scientific community. 

Id at 593-94, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-97. 125 L. Ed. at 483. Even if testimony meets the first prong of 

the test, the Supreme Court has warned that in determining whether evidence meets the second prong 

of the test, judges must be mindful of other evidentiary rules which permit the exclusion of evidence 

11  



  

when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 

the issues or misleading the jury: 

Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty 

in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge in weighing possible prejudice 

against probative force under Rule 403 of the present rules exercises more control 

over experts than over lay witnesses. 

Id at 595,113 S. Ct. at 2798, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 484 (citations omitted). See U.S. v. Dorsey, 45 F.3d 

809 (4th Cir. 1995) (no error to exclude testimony where the evidence offered did not meet either 

prong of the Daubert test). 

In the case of Mortimer 's affidavit, the affiant lacks knowledge or expertise regarding the 

methodology employed by the political scientists in devising a formula to calculate the minimum 

percentage of minorities theoretically necessary to assure an equal electoral opportunity. Although 

Federal Rule of Evidence 703 permits experts to rely on hearsay, this exception to the usual hearsay 

rules is allowed “because the expert's ‘validation, expertly performed and subject to cross- 

examination, ought to suffice for judicial purposes.” ” Tk-7 Corp. v. Estate of Barbouti, 993 F.2d 

722, 732 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Rule 703, Advisory Committee Notes). However, that rationale 

is not satisfied where the so-called “expert” fails to demonstrate any basis for concluding that 

another individual's opinion on a subject is reliable. and where the so-called “expert” lacks 

familiarity with the methods and reasons underlying the other individuals projections, thereby 

precluding any assessment of the validity of the projections through cross-examination. /d. Itis the 

Court's duty to “make sure that the expert isn’t being used as a vehicle for circumventing the rules 

of evidence.” In re James Wilson Assocs., 965 F.2d 160, 173 (7th Cir. 1992). “Scrutiny of expert 

testimony is especially proper where it consists of ‘an array of figures conveying a delusive 

 



Williams, 681 F.2d 230, 242 (4th Cir. 1982). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) also demands 

that affidavits supporting or opposing a motion for summary judgment be made on personal 

knowledge, set forth facts admissible in evidence and show affirmatively that the affiant is 

competent to testify to the matters contained in the affidavit. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires 

that only experts qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education are competent to 

give expert opinions. Thomas J. Kline, Inc., 878 F.2d at 799. The five affidavits offered by 

plaintiffs fail to meet these basic requirements, and they must be struck and disregarded by the Court 

in determining the parties’ summary judgment motions. 

This the 2nd day of March, 1998. 

MICHAEL F. EASLEY 

A or h EY GENERAL 

Edwin M. Speas, Jr. 

Senior Deputy Attorney General 

  

N.C. State Bar No. 2 Fin 

rare B. a 

Special Deputy Attorney General 

N. C. State Bar No. 7119 

  

fren ct Sd 
Norma S. Harrell 

Special Deputy Attorney , io 

N.C. State Bar No. 6654 

  

N.C. Department of Justice 

P.O. Box 629 

Raleigh, N.C. 27602 

(919) 716-6900  



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

  

This is to certify that I have this day served a copy of the foregoing Motion to Strike 

Affidavits Filed in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum 

in Support of Motion in the above captioned case upon all parties as noted: 

Robinson O. Everett HAND DELIVERY 

Suite 300 First Union Natl. Bank Bldg. 

301 W. Main Street / 

P.O. Box 586 3/ 3/9% 
Durham, NC 27702 

Martin B. McGee EXPRESS MAIL 

Williams, Boger, Grady, Davis 

& Tittle, P.A. 

147 Union Street, South 

Concord, NC 28025 

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS 

Anita S. Hodgkiss UNITED STATES MAIL 

Ferguson, Stein, Wallas, Adkins, (1st class, postage prepaid) 

Gresham & Sumter, P.A. 

741 Kenilworth Avenue * 

Charlotte, NC 28204 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPLICANTS FOR INTERVENTION 

io B Ide 
fare B. Smiley 

Special Deputy Attorney General 

This the 2nd day of March, 1998. 

  

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