Bratcher v. Akron Area Board of Realtors Brief for the Defendants-Appellees First National Bank of Akron and Herberich-Hall-Harner, Inc.

    I n the

States (Emtrt of Kppmls
F or the F ourth Circuit 

No. 8708

Gloria Brooks, et al., 

— v.—
Appellants,

County School B oard of A rlington 
County, V irginia, et al.,

Appellees.

appeal from the united states district court for the
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

APPENDIX TO APPELLANTS’ BRIEF

J ack Greenberg
James M. Nabrit, III 

10 Columbus Circle 
New York 19, New York

Otto L. T ucker
901 Princess Street 
Alexandria, Virginia

S. W. T ucker
214 East Clay Street 
Richmond, Va.

F rank D. R eeves
1343 H Street, N.W. 
Washington 5, D. C.

Attorneys for Appellants



INDEX TO APPENDIX

PAGE

Memorandum by the Court, July 31, 1956 ................  10a

Order Granting Injunction, July 31, 1956 ................  11a

Memorandum on Motion to Amend Decree, July 27,
1956 .................. ..................... -...................................  15a

Excerpts from Transcript of Testimony—Septem­
ber 11, 1957 .......     17a

Testimony of T. Edward Rutter—
Direct ..................................... 17a
Cross ....................................... 31a

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Septem­
ber 14, 1957 ...............................................................  35a

Supplemental Decree of Injunction, September 14,
1957 ............................................................................  43a

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Septem­
ber 17, 1958 ...............................................................  45a

Supplementary Order of Injunction, September 22,
1958 ............................................................................  60a

Memorandum on Formulation of Decree on Man­
date, June 3, 1959 .......................... -........................ 61a

Decree on Mandate, June 5, 1959 ...............................  65a

Relevant Docket Entries ............................................  la



11

PAGE
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, July 25,

1959.............................................................................. 68a

Order, September 10, 1959 ....................................   73a

Order on Motion for Further Relief, September 15,
1959 ............................................................................  75a

Order on Report Filed September 8, 1959 .............. . 77a

Order on Unopposed Admission of Two Pupils, 
September 7, 1960 .................................................... 79a

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Septem­
ber 16, 1960 ...............................................................  80a

Motion to Dissolve Injunction ...................................  85a

Report of the County School Board of Arlington
County Dated November 9, 1961 ...........................  87a

Motion for Further R elie f..........................................  101a

Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings—Febru­
ary 8, 1962 ................................................................. 109a

Testimony of Elizabeth B. Campbell—
Direct ..................................... 138a
Cross ......................................  142a
Redirect .................................  148a

Memorandum Opinion, March 1, 1962 ........................ 154a

Order, March 1, 1962 .........................................   168a

Notice of Appeal ......      169a



Relevant Docket Entries

5- 17-56
6- 22-56
7- 30-56 
7-31-56
7- 31-56
8- 24-56

Date

3-29-57
3-29-57
7-18-57

7-27-57

7-27-57
7-29-57

9- 9-57

9-11-57

Filings—P roce edings 

Complaint filed.
Motion to Dismiss filed.
TRIAL PROCEEDINGS: * * *
Memorandum by the Court filed.
ORDER granting injunction entered and filed.
Notice of Appeal, together with Appeal Bond in 
the amount of $250.00 filed.
Mandate of the Circuit Court of Appeals filed. 
Opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals filed.
Motion to Modify Injunction Decree, Points and 
Authorities in Support of Motion, and Notice of 
Motion filed.
TRIAL PROCEEDINGS: This cause came on 
this day to be heard on Motion to Modify In­
junction Decree of July, 1956. Motion of Defen­
dant to stay the effective date of the Injunction 
Decree of this court. * * #
Memorandum on Motion to Amend Decree.
ORDER on Motion to Amend Original Injunction 
Decree, entered and filed.
ORDER for Hearing on Motion for Further
Relief—entered and filed.
TRIAL PROCEEDINGS: This cause came on 
this day to be heard on Order for Hearing on 
Motion for further relief and Order on Motion 
to Intervene. Motions presented by Mr. Sim- 
monds as follows: Motion to continue hearing on 
plaintiffs’ motion for further relief; Motion to 
dismiss the motion for further relief; Motion to 
dissolve Injunction; and Motion to vacate order



2a

Date

9-12-57

9-14-57

9-14-57

9-16-57

9-17-57

9-18-57

Relevant Docket Entries

Filings—Proceedings

on motion to intervene. Said motions filed in 
open court. Arguments heard. Motion to vacate 
order of intervention denied. Motion to continue 
hearing denied. Motion to dissolve injunction 
denied. Court deferred ruling on Motion to Dis­
miss Motion for Further Relief. Opening state­
ment of Edwin Brown heard. Evidence of plain­
tiff fully heard. Defendant offers no evidence. 
Court continued case until tomorrow morning 
for arguments.

TRIAL PROCEEDINGS: This cause came on 
this day as continued from September 11, 1957 
for final argument. Arguments of counsel heard. 
Court takes this matter under consideration.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered 
and filed.

Supplemental Decree of Injunction entered and 
filed.

Notice of Appeal filed. Copies mailed to Edwin 
C. Brown, Spottswood W. Robinson, III, and 
Oliver W. Hill.

Motion for Suspending Injunction Pending Ap­
peal filed.

TRIAL PROCEEDINGS: This cause came on 
this day to be heard on motion for a stay of 
Injunction pending appeal. Arguments of coun­
sel fully heard. Court suspends the execution of 
the order of injunction heretofore entered pend­
ing the appeal. Order to be presented. Order 
entered and filed in open court.



3a

8-26-58
8-26-58

8- 26-58

9- 2-58

Date

10- 2-57

9- 3-58

9- 4-58

Filings—Proceedings

ORDER (Robert A. Eldridge, III) entered and 
filed.
Motion for Further Relief filed by plaintiffs.
Notice of Hearing on Report and Request for 
Guidance filed.
Report and Request for Guidance filed.

TRIAL PROCEEDINGS: This cause came on 
this day to be heard on (1) Motion to substitute 
Ray E. Reid as party defendant. Motion granted. 
(2) Motion to intervene as party plaintiffs. Mo­
tion granted. (3) Motion on Report and Request 
for Guidance by the Arlington County School 
Board. * * * Evidence partially heard. Court 
adjourned until tomorrow morning.
TRIAL PROCEEDINGS: This cause came on 
this day for further hearing as continued from 
September 2, 1958. Parties appeared as hereto­
fore. Evidence heard. Case continued to tomor­
row morning.
TRIAL PROCEEDINGS: This cause came on 
this day for further hearing as continued from 
Sept. 3, 1958. Parties appeared as heretofore. 
Counsel stipulated as to remaining evidence. By 
Mr. Scott: Motion made at start of these pro­
ceedings by the Arlington School Board renewed, 
accepted and taken under consideration by the 
Court. By Mr. Tucker: Motion to strike evidence 
set forth in summary reports and substitute 
therefor Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 10—Opinion of 
Dr. Mill. Court will reserve ruling on this mo­
tion. Pinal arguments heard. * * *

Relevant Dochet Entries



4a

9-22-58

10-16-58

10-21-58

1-26-59

1-28-59

Date

9-17-58

2- 2-59 

2- 2-59 

2- 2-59 

4-21-59 

6- 5-59

Filings—Proceedings

Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law en­
tered and filed.

ORDER: Supplementary Order of Injunc­
tion * * *

Notice of Appeal filed by plaintiff (Appeal Bond 
filed.)

Notice of Cross-Appeal filed by School Board 
(Appeal Bond filed).

Mandate and Opinion of the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals filed.

TRIAL PROCEEDINGS: This cause came on 
to be heard on a motion to stay or modify injunc­
tion granted in this cause on Sept. 22, 1958. No­
tice of motion, motion for modification of injunc­
tion, together with affidavit of Ray E. Reid filed 
in open court. Preliminary arguments heard. 
Testimony heard. Final arguments heard. Mo­
tion denied. Statement by the Court heard.

Motion for Recall and Stay of Mandate filed in 
Fourth Circuit January 30, 1959—received.

Memorandum from Fourth Circuit Court of Ap­
peals filed January 30, 1959—received.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law en­
tered and filed.

Mandate and copy of the Opinion of the Fourth 
Circuit—filed.

Memorandum on Formulation of Decree on Man­
date-filed.

Relevant Docket Entries



5a

Date 
6- 5-59 
6-22-59
6- 29-59

7- 7-59

7- 3-59

7-25-59 

7- 8-59

9- 8-59 
9-10-59 

9-11-59 
9-11-59

9-14-59

Filings—Proceedings

Decree on Mandate entered and filed.

Report to Court filed.
Motion for Further Relief filed.

TRIAL PROCEEDINGS: This cause came on 
this day to be heard on Motion of plaintiff for 
further relief. Plaintiff’s evidence heard. Defen­
dant rested without presenting evidence. Court 
adjourned until tomorrow morning.

TRIAL PROCEEDINGS: This cause came on 
this day as continued from July 7th, 1959. De­
fendant presented evidence as to certain docu­
ments. Arguments of counsel heard. Court takes 
this matter under consideration.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law—en­
tered and filed.
TRIAL PROCEEDINGS: This cause came on 
this day to be heard on Motion to Intervene and 
request for temporary relief. Statement of coun­
sel to the court. Order to be presented directing 
the School Board to file a report.

Motion for Further Relief—filed by plaintiffs.
ORDER for Settlement of Decree—filed.

Report to the Court received and filed.
ORDER allowing intervention of Alice A. Brown, 
et al—entered & filed 9-10-59.

TRIAL PROCEEDINGS: This cause came on 
this day to be heard on the settlement of Decree

Relevant Docket Entries



6a

9-15-59

9-16-59 

7- 5-60

7- 8-60

7-19-60

7-19-60
7-21-60

Date Filings—Proceedings

Answer to Complaint in Intervention filed on or 
about September 2, 1959, FILED in open court. 
Response to Motion for further relief filed on or 
about September 7, 1959, filed in open court. 
Arguments of counsel heard. Court takes this 
matter under consideration.

Order on Motion for Further Relief entered and 
filed.

ORDER on Report entered and filed 9-8-59.
PRE-TRIAL ORDER: IT IS FURTHER OR­
DERED that this cause be and it hereby is set 
down for further hearing at 10:00 A.M. on July 
21, 1960, upon plaintiffs’ objections, if any, to the 
report to be filed by defendants as hereinabove 
ordered-—entered and filed.
Report to Court dated July 8, 1960—filed. 
(County School Board of Arlington County)
Objections to Defendants’ Report and Related 
Action not Reported—filed.
Motion to Intervene filed.

TRIAL PROCEEDINGS: This cause came on 
this day to be heard on further application for 
admissions to schools. Answer to Complaint in 
Intervention of Janice Blaunt, et al filed in open 
court. Evidence fully heard. Motion to Inter­
vene 3 additional plaintiffs. Motion granted. 
Clerk to send notice to Counsel. Hearing on argu­
ment set for September 6, 1960.

Relevant Docket Entries



7a

9-16-60

9-23-60

Date

9- 7-60

3-10-61

11-13-61

11- 13-61

12- 28-61 
2- 8-62

Filings—Proceedings

ORDER On Unopposed Admission of Two Pupils 
—entered and filed.

FINDINS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW entered and filed.

ORDER entered directing admission of Janice 
Blount, Wade Bowles, Jr., Samuel Curtis Gra­
ham, Doloris Wright, Carolyn Jones, Claude 
June, David Ruffner, Vivian P. Ruffner, Lillian 
Thompson and Diane Spriggs to Stratford Junior 
High School, and Henry Coleman in the Thomas 
Jefferson Junior High School; and further OR­
DERING that further relief be denied Gloria 
Brooks, Marcia Brown, Alice Brown, Elliott A. 
Brown, Mabra Brown, Deidra Hallion, George 
Moore, Gloria Rowe, and Thomas J. Spriggs; 
and ORDERING that the Court retain jurisdic­
tion of this cause.

Motion for Further Interlocutory and Permanent 
Injunctive Relief received and filed.

Report of the County School Board of Arlington 
County, dated November 9, 1961, with exhibits 
attached thereto—filed.

Motion to Dissolve Injunction, together with 
Points and Authorities—filed.
Motion for further relief filed.
COURT PROCEEDINGS: This cause came on 
this day to be heard on motion for intervention. 
Motion by plaintiff to withdraw motion to inter­
vene. Motion granted. This cause came on fur-

Relevant Docket Entries



8a

Date Filings—Proceedings

ther to be heard on motion for further relief. 
Motion by the plaintiff to withdraw motion for 
further relief and to treat the motion as affirma­
tive answer to the defendant’s motion to dissolve 
the injunction. Motion granted. And it came on 
to be heard on motion to dissolve the injunction. 
Exhibits A, B and C attached to defendant’s mo­
tion to dissolve the injunction admitted as evi­
dence in support of this motion. Exhibits Nos. 
1, 2, 3 and 4 offered by the plaintiff. Defendant 
had no objection. School District Maps, 1. Ele­
mentary, 2. Kindergarden, 3. Senior High, 4. 
Junior High. Arguments fully heard as to the 
motion to dissolve the injunction. Motion of 
plaintiff to amend this action by using Para­
graphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12, with 
the exception of last two lines—including 13 and 
eliminating paragraph 14, and to use certain parts 

Strike
only; include (15, 16, 17, IS, 19) 20 and 21. Alter 
certain portions of the prayer for relief. Prayer 
A eliminated; Prayer B altered; Prayer C al­
tered, include D and E and F. Strike paragraph 
G and leave paragraph H. Exhibit A (Member­
ship by Grades, 1961) made a part of the record 
and to be considered as evidence. Defendant di­
rected by the Court to submit report of the capac­
ity of the schools and the attendance in accord­
ance with the last survey. Motion to amend by 
the aforesaid is hereby granted at the Bar. The 
Court will take new amendments under advise­
ment and notify decision as soon as possible.

Relevant Docket Entries



9a

Date 

3- 1-62 
3- 1-62

3-30-62

5- 4-62

Relevant Docket Entries

Filings—Proceedings 

Memorandum opinion filed.

ORDER dismissing and striking case from cur­
rent docket entered and filed.

Notice of Appeal received and filed. (Appeal 
Bond filed—See Appeal Bond File).
ORDER Enlarging Time for Docketing Appeal 
entered and filed. (Notice sent to counsel.)



10a

I n the
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

F or the E astern D istrict of V irginia 

At Alexandria

Civil 1341

Clarissa S. T hompson et al.,

County School B oard of A rlington County et al.

Memorandum by the Court

It must be remembered that the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States in Brown v. Board of Education, 
1954 and 1955, 347 U.S. 483 and 349 U.S. 294, do not compel 
the mixing of the different races in the public schools. No 
general reshuffling of the pupils in any school system has 
been commanded. The order of that Court is simply that 
no child shall be denied admission to a school on the basis 
of race or color. Indeed, just so a child is not through any 
form of compulsion or pressure required to stay in a cer­
tain school, or denied transfer to another school, because 
of his race or color, the school heads may allow the pupil, 
whether white or Negro, to go to the same school as he 
would have attended in the absence of the ruling of the 
Supreme Court. Consequently, compliance with that ruling 
may well not necessitate such extensive changes in the 
school system as some anticipate.

July 31, 1956.

A lbert V. Bryan 
United States District Judge



11a

In the

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
F or the E astern D istrict of V irginia 

At Alexandria

Order Granting Injunction

[ same title]

This cause came on to be heard on the 30th day of July, 
1956 upon the complaint, upon the motion of the defen­
dants to dismiss the complaint and the affidavits in support 
thereof, upon the motions of the plaintiffs to drop certain 
persons and others as parties plaintiff, upon the stipula­
tion of the parties that the action not be heard before July 
23, 1956, and upon the documents offered in evidence at 
said hearing by agreement, and was argued by counsel.

Upon consideration whereof, after granting the said mo­
tions for the dropping and adding of parties, the court 
finds, concludes, and orders as follows:

1. The court treats said motion to dismiss as a motion 
for summary judgment and is of the opinion thereon as 
follows:

(a) That the defendant, County School Board of Arling­
ton County, is suable in this court, because if acting as 
charged in the complaint, it is not acting as an agency of 
the State of Virginia ;

(b) That the defendant, T. Edward Rutter, Division 
Superintendent of Schools of the County of Arlington, is



12a

suable in this action for the same reason as the said board 
is suable;

(c) That the complaint states a claim against each of 
said defendants upon which, if proved, relief can be 
granted;

(d) That, as appears from the said documentary evi­
dence, the plaintiffs before instituting this suit had ex­
hausted all administrative remedies then and now available 
to them, including the administrative steps set forth in 
section 26-57 Code of Virginia 1950, in that, they have since 
July 28, 1955, in effect maintained a continuing request 
upon the defendants, the County School Board and the Divi­
sion Superintendent of Schools, for admission of Negro 
children to the public schools of Arlington County on a 
non-racial basis, and said request has been denied, or no 
action taken thereon, the equivalent of a denial thereof;

(e) That this suit is not otherwise premature; and

(f) That the granting of the relief prayed in the com­
plaint would not constitute the regulation and supervision 
by this court of the public schools of Arlington County:

Therefore, it is A djudged, ordered, and decreed that said 
motion to dismiss the complaint, including summary judg­
ment for the defendants, be, and it is hereby, denied.

2. The court proceeding to inquire if final judgment 
may now be entered in the action, it appears to the court 
from an examination of the pleadings, the said affidavits, 
and the said documentary evidence, as well as from the 
interrogation of counsel, that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact in this case, and that on the admissions

Order Granting Injunction



13a

of record and the uncontrovertible allegations of the com­
plaint, summary judgment should be granted the plaintiffs;

Therefore, it is further A djudged, ordered, and decreed 
that effective at the times and subject to the conditions 
hereinafter stated, the defendants, their successors in office, 
agents, representatives, servants, and employees be, and 
each of them is hereby, restrained and enjoined from re­
fusing on account of race or color to admit to, or enroll or 
educate in, any school under their operation, control, direc­
tion, or supervision any child otherwise qualified for ad­
mission to, and enrollment and education in, such school.

3. Considering the total number of children attending 
the public schools of Arlington County, Virginia, and the 
number of whites and Negroes, respectively, in the elemen­
tary schools, junior high schools, and senior high schools, 
the relatively small territorial size of the County, its com­
pactness and urban character, and the requisite notice to 
the school officials, as well as the period most convenient 
to the children and school officials, of and for making the 
transition from a racial to a non-racial school basis, and 
weighing the public considerations, including the time 
needed by the defendants to conform to any procedure for 
such transition as may be prescribed by the General As­
sembly of Virginia at its extra session called by the Gov­
ernor for August 27, 1956, and weighing also the personal 
interests of the plaintiffs, the court is of the opinion that 
the said injunction hereinbefore granted should be, and it 
is hereby made, effective in respect to elementary schools 
at the beginning of the second semester of the 1956-1957 
session, to-wit, January 31, 1957, and in respect to junior 
and senior high schools at the commencement of the regu­
lar session for 1957-58 in September 1957.

Order Granting Injunction



14a

4. The foregoing injunction shall not be construed as 
nullifying any State or local rules, now in force or hereafter 
promulgated, for the assignment of children to classes, 
courses or study, or schools, so long as such rules or assign­
ments are not based upon race or color,* nor, in the event 
of a complaint hereafter made by a child as to any such 
rule or assignment, shall said injunction be construed as 
relieving such child of the duty of first fully pursuing any 
administrative remedy now or hereafter provided by the 
defendants or by the Commonwealth of Virginia for the 
hearing and decision of such complaint, before ajjplying 
to this court for a decision on whether any such rule or 
assignment violates said injunction.

And jurisdiction of this cause is retained with the power 
to enlarge, reduce, or otherwise modify the provisions of 
said injunction or of this decree, and this cause is con­
tinued generally.

A lbert V. Bryan 
United States District Judge

Order Granting Injunction

July the 31st, 1956.



15a

I n the
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

F or the E astern D istrict oe V irginia 

At Alexandria

Memorandum on Motion to Amend Decree

[ same title]

I. To render it current, the decree of July 31, 1956 will 
be amended so that its injunction will become effective in 
respect to elementary schools at the commencement of the 
1957-1958 session in September, 1957. This date has here­
tofore been fixed, and should stand, for the inception of 
the injunction in regard to secondary schools. Deferment 
of its effectuation, asked by the defendants, is not war­
ranted in the circumstances of this case.

Specifically, the defendants request suspension of the in­
junction while review is sought in the Supreme Court of 
the recent adverse judgment, in other litigation, of the 
Court of Appeals for this circuit upon the Pupil Placement 
Act of Virginia. Declaring that the Act does not provide 
an adequate administrative remedy, the judgment there 
dispenses with compliance with the Act as a prerequisite 
to application to the court for an injunction against the 
maintenance of segregation. But here the right to an in­
junction has already been established. Consideration of 
administrative remedies will not again be reached unless 
and until petition is made to enforce the injunction. Plainly, 
therefore, commencement of the restraint laid in the decree 
should not be postponed to a determination of the validity 
of an administrative remedy.

If and when there are complaints of violations of the de­
cree, the court will then inquire if the complaint has first



16a

submitted, or has adequate means of submitting, his 
grievance for correction administratively. At that time it 
will weigh the complaint and any administrative action 
taken thereon, to ascertain whether the decree has or has 
not been followed, and if not, the reason for the failure. 
Thereupon it will make such further order as is appropri­
ate. In this way specificity and precision will be given to 
each complaint, it will be individualized, and it will be 
appraised in its own peculiar environment, of course in 
the light, too, of the regulations and precedents then at 
hand.

II. The court must deny the plaintiffs’ request that the 
decree be enlarged to include a declaration paralleling the 
ruling of the Court of Appeals, in effect allowing students 
to bypass the Pupil Placement Act. The sufficiency of the 
Act has not been previously an issue in this suit and is 
now advanced prematurely. Also, a ruling on it now would 
be unwise, because for neither party is it in an appealable 
posture. Finally, the holding of the Court of Appeals is 
in abeyance pro tempore.

With propriety, however, we can observe that quite ob­
viously the July 31, 1956 decree recognizes only an ade­
quate administrative remedy—one that is efficacious and 
expeditious, even apart from any question of its constitu­
tionality. Pursuit of an unreasonable or unavailing form 
of redress is not exacted by the decree.

III. Statutory costs will be awarded in accordance with 
the motion.

Memorandum on Motion to Amend Decree

July 27, 1957.

A lbert Y. Bey an 
United States District Judge



17a

Excerpts From Transcript of Testimony—  
September 11, 1957

Testimony of T. Edward Rutter
*  #  *  *  *

—I ll—
# *  *  *  *

Q. Your present occupation? A. Division Superinten­
dent of Schools, Arlington County, Virginia.

Q. How long have you occupied that? A. 1952 to 1957.
Q. Continuous? A. Correct.
Q. Mr. Rutter, you are one of the defendants in the case 

that is now before the Court, am I correct in that regard? 
A. That is correct.

Q. How many schools are there, Mr. Rutter, in the Pub­
lic School System of Arlington County? A. Approximately 
forty separate buildings.

Q. Would you name, would you first tell me the number 
of schools that are attended entirely by Negro students? 
A. The number?

—112—
Q. The number? A. Of schools?
Q. The number of schools now attended entirely by 

Negro students? A. Four.
Q. All right. How many of these four schools are high 

schools? A. One.
Q. What is the name of that school? A. Hoffman-Boston 

Junior-Senior High School.
Q. Now you say it is a junior-senior high school. What 

grades does that school have? A. Sixth through twelve.
Q. And which of those grades are junior high school 

grades and which are senior high school grades? A. Six 
through nine are junior high school, and tenth through 
twelve are senior high school.



18a

Q. Now let me clear this up. Under your Arlington 
School System the first six grades are elementary school 
grades. Am I correct in that regard? A. That’s correct.

Q. And grades seven through nine are the junior high 
school grades? A. That’s correct.

Q. And nine through twelve are the senior high school
— 113-

grades ? A. Right.
Q. That is true in both Negro and white schools?

The Court: Ten through twelve, is it not?
The Witness: Ten through twelve.
Mr. Robinson: I ’m sorry.

By Mr. Robinson:

Q. Is there any other Negro senior high school facility 
in Arlington County other than a part of the Hoffman- 
Boston facility? A. No.

Q. Is there any other Negro junior high school facility 
in Arlington County other than a part of the Hoffman- 
Boston facility? A. No.

Q. Is Hoffman-Boston more than a single school plant 
or is it within itself a single educational unit and in a 
sense that it is a single building? A. It is a single co­
ordinated educational unit.

Q. How many buildings? A. Well, there is really one 
building, although we have a temporary structure situated 
within about twenty feet of the building so there actually 
are two buildings on the site.

Q. And what is this temporary structure being used for? 
A. Well, it has been used from time to time for various

— 114-

purposes. I believe most recently for art and music.

Testimony of T. Edward Rutter•—Direct



19a

Q. How temporary is this structure? By that I mean 
how long has it been used for these various purposes? A. 
I don’t know the number of years but I can say it has been 
used for this purpose since I have known the school in 1950.

Q. Since 1950? A. Yes.
Q. At least for the period of the last six or seven years ? 

A. Yes.
Q. All right, Now what are the names of the three re­

maining Negro schools in Arlington County, all of which are 
elementary schools? A. The first is Hoffman-Boston Ele­
mentary School, located very close to the Hoffman-Boston 
Junior-Senior High School. The other is the Drew Kemper 
School, composed of two school buildings but is admin­
istered as one elementary school, and the last is the Lang­
ston Elementary School.

Q. All right, sir. Now without undertaking to name them, 
how many high school facilities do you have in Arlington 
County attended exclusively at the present time by white 
students? A. Two.

Q. What are the names of those two schools? A. Wash­
ington-Lee High School and Wakefield High School.

—115—
Q. And how many presently all-white junior high school 

facilities in the county? A. May I name them one at a 
time because I ’m not sure that I can give you the exact 
number ?

Q. Surely. A. In the northern part of the county we 
have Williamsburg, Stratford, Swanson; in the central part 
of the county we would have Thomas Jefferson and in the 
southern part of the county Kenmore, and a new junior 
high school presently organized this year which will be 
known as the Gunston Junior High School.

Q. How many? A. I believe that was seven, was it not?

Testimony of T. Edward Rutter—Direct



20a

Q. Seven. Do you recall the exact number—

The Court: Let us see. I have six, Williamsburg, 
Stratford, Swanson, Jefferson, Kenmore, and Gfun- 
ston.

The Witness: I ’m sorry. That is right.
The Court: Six'?
The Witness: I believe that is correct.

By Mr. Robinson:

Q. How many all-white elementary schools do you have? 
A. I do not know the precise number, sir, but it would be 
approximately thirty-seven or thirty-eight.

— 116—

Q. All right, sir. Now, Mr. Rutter, are you familiar with 
that map that is posted on the board over there? A. Very 
familiar.

Q. Have you had an occasion to examine that map to be 
in a position to tell me whether or not it is accurate in so 
far as the location of your schools are concerned and the 
boundaries, of the present boundaries of your school dis­
tricts? A. I believe that it is, sir.

Q. Would you walk over to the map and examine it and 
state to me positively, if you can, whether or not it does 
accurately disclose the location of schools and school 
boundaries? A. Yes, I believe that it does.

Q. How many school districts do you have as shown on 
that map, Mr. Rutter? A. This map is an attempt to 
demonstrate and show the number of secondary school dis­
tricts. We have a similar map showing the elementary 
districts.

Q. Might I ask you this. When you say secondary, do

Testimony of T. Edward Rutter■—Direct



21a

you include only the senior high schools or do you include 
the junior high schools as well? A. That’s right.

Q. Junior high school, junior and senior? A. That’s 
right.

Q. All right. Now how would, how many senior high
— 117-

school districts do you have? A. Three.
Q. Would you name them, please? A. Hoffman-Boston, 

Washington-Lee and Wakefield.
Q. Are these school districts in each instance all located 

in a geographically contiguous fashion or do you have any 
instance of a school district being divided into two or more 
parts and the parts not being geographically contiguous? 
A. We have one like the last you have just described.

Q. All right, and which one is that? A. Hoffman-Boston. 
Q. All right. What is the difference, if any, between the 

school districts so far as the racial classification of the 
student residing in those districts may be concerned? A. 
The Hoffman-Boston District is designated as a district 
for our colored boys and girls on the high school level.

Q. And for that purpose only, am I correct? A. That 
is correct.

Q. In assuming.
And that district I understand you to say has two parts ? 

A. That’s correct.
Q. Would you show me those two parts? A. (Pointed.)

— 118—

The Court: Would you refer to, for the purposes 
of the record—call one of them north?

The Witness: For the purpose of the record the 
northern section is just south of Lee Highway, the 
southern section is that portion of land surrounding 
the Hoffman-Boston Junior-Senior High School.

Testimony of T. Edward Butter—Direct



22a

Testimony of T. Edward Rutter-—Direct 

By Mr. Robinson :

Q. Now the Hoffman-Boston Junior-Senior High School 
is physically located within the southern of the two 
Hoffman-Boston School Districts! A. That’s right.

Q. There is no Negro junior or senior high school facility 
geographically situated within the boundaries of the north­
ern Hoffman-Boston School District! A. That’s correct.

Q. How much distance would you say there is approxi­
mately between the northern and the southern, say, esti­
mating as best you can, from, say, the geographical centers 
of those districts, how much distance would you say that 
there is approximately between the northern and the south­
ern sections of the Hoffman-Boston School District! A. 
Well, I would judge it to be approximately five miles. I 
believe the total distance from the northern part of the

— 119-

county to the southern is seven and it would appear to 
me would be about five, five and a half or six miles.

Q. Is there any other district in Arlington County at 
the secondary level embracing Negro students other than 
the Hoffman-Boston School District! A. No.

Q. Now, and that is true with reference to the junior 
high schools as well as the senior high schools! A. That 
is correct.

Q. Come back up here.
Now as I understand you, Mr. Rutter, the Hoffman- 

Boston School District with its two parts for secondary 
students is based entirely upon the race of the student 
residing for school administrative purposes within those 
districts; am I correct in that! A. I believe that is cor­
rect.

Q. All right. Now how do you figure out school districts 
for white students at Arlington County! A. It is done



23a

in terms of the capacity of buildings to house a given num­
ber of children.

Q. And by that you—well, suppose you explain just a 
little more fully, if you will, just how you go about work­
ing out the lines, the boundary lines of a school district for 
the purposes of determining the schools to be attended by

—1 2 0 -
white students f A. I think a good illustration to use would 
be the construction of the Williamsburg Junior High 
School. As that area of the community grew and it became 
evidence that additional space was required for boys and 
girls of junior high school age, plans were developed and 
eventually a school building was constructed in that section 
of the community. A very careful study was then made 
of the surrounding junior high school areas, specifically 
Swanson and also Stratford. We then attempted to esti­
mate the future growth of the area to which I have earlier 
referred and then determine what the boundary lines of 
the new junior high school would be.

Q. Am I correct in concluding from what you have said, 
Mr. Eutter, that the objective in formulating boundaries 
of white high school and junior high school districts is to 
the extent that the capacity of the school geographically 
located in that district can accommodate students is to get 
each white child to the school that is closest to the place of 
his residence? A. Not necessarily closest to his residence, 
because there are a number of instances throughout the 
community when that is not the case. In other words, it 
has been necessary in a number of instances I believe, in 
the past, of course, to schedule boys and girls to schools 
that are not necessarily the closest to their place of resi­
dence.

Q. But the reason for doing that is that the school that

Testimony of T. Edward Rutter—Direct



24a

Testimony of T. Edward Rutter■—Direct

— 121—

is geographically located in that district doesn’t have suf­
ficient capacity to take care of all the students in that dis­
trict; isn’t that the reason! A. That would he right.

Q. So that the extent to which a school facility for white 
students can accommodate the children in that district, the 
object in fixing these boundaries is to arrange it so that 
the white student can go to the school that is the nearest 
to the place of their residence? A. I believe that is cor­
rect.

Q. All right. Now, Mr. Rutter, do you happen to have 
with you a map showing the elementary school districts of 
Arlington County? A. Yes, I do.

Q. Do you have one that we might— A. Yes.
Q. Borrow from you for purposes of putting in the rec­

ord in this case with the understanding that you might not 
be able to get it back? A. Very good.

Q. All right, sir.
Anybody want to see this ?
Mr. Rutter, I hand you this document and I ask you to 

examine it and state, if you will, what it represents? A. 
This is a map of Arlington County on which has been

—122—
superimposed boundary lines indicating the various ele­
mentary school districts.

Mr. Robinson: If Your Honor please, I would like 
to introduce this into evidence. Could we get it placed 
on the board ?

The Court: Before you do that, I think it would 
be well to mark it with an appropriate exhibit num­
ber, the map that is now on there, and let it appear



Testimony of T. Edward Rutter-— Direct

that it is in evidence. I take it there is no objection 
to it.

Mr. Eobinson: If Your Honor please, I just under­
stand that the one that is on the board has never 
been introduced in evidence.

The Court: I say it will have to be admitted now.
Mr. Eobinson: Oh, I see.
The Clerk: Plaintiff’s No. 8.
The Court: Plaintiff’s No. 8.
The Clerk: You wish to mark this as plaintiff’s 

No. 9?
The Court: Let the second map be plaintiff’s No. 9.

—123—
(The maps were so marked by the Clerk as 

plaintiff’s Exhibits No. 8 and No. 9, respec­
tively, in evidence.)

By Mr. Robinson:

Q. Now, Mr. Eutter, I say, ask you this, how many 
elementary schools do you have? A. As many as we have 
school buildings against approximately four.

Q. That means that you would have four Negro— A. 
That’s right.

Q. Elementary. No, would it be three? A. Hoffman- 
Boston, Drew Kemper and Langston; three.

Q. In other words, you have a Hoffman-Boston Sec­
ondary School District and a Hoffman-Boston Elementary 
School District. You determine in each instance the bound­
ary lines for elementary school districts like you determine 
the boundary lines for secondary school districts; am I cor­
rect in that? A. That’s right, fundamentally the same.

Q. In other words, the Negro school districts are deter­
mined, the boundaries are determined entirely by reason of



26a

the fact that the Negro student resides in the areas that are 
surrounded by those boundaries? A. That is correct.

Q. You determine your white school boundaries in about 
the same way, or precisely the same way for elementary 
schools that you do for white secondary schools? A. True.

—124—
Q. Mr. Rutter, there has been considerable testimony 

and some amount of correspondence introduced in evidence 
coming from you indicative of a practice or policy on the 
part of the school authorities in Arlington County to de­
cline to admit any child to a school who has not made ap­
plication for assignment to the Pupil Placement Board in 
any instance where the Pupil Placement Act would require 
that application to be made. Is that as a matter of fact the 
policy and practice that was in effect on the opening date 
of schools for the 1957-58 school session? A. Yes.

Q. In writing the letters that you did, you were simply 
observing this policy, were you? A. That is correct.

Q. And it was a policy established by the School Board 
or Arlington County? A. No. I was attempting to follow 
to the letter of the law the laws of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia.

Q. Who formulated this policy, you or the School Board? 
A. Now I believe, sir, that we should distinguish between 
policy and what the statutes of Virginia happen to be at the 
present time. So that it’s always been our policy to observe 
the law and I don’t, I would not take the position that the 
Board of Education would have to formalize a policy to do

—125—
so. Therefore, what we have done this year is what we 
have done in the past, obviously to observe the law.

Q. Observe the law. I see. Now were instructions issued 
to the Principals of the various schools in the Public School

Testimony of T. Edward Rutter-—Direct



27a

System not to admit students to school who had not applied 
for assignment by the Pupil Placement Board in instances 
where the Pupil Placement Act would require an applica­
tion for assignment? A. That I believe is essentially cor­
rect. The memoranda that went from my office to the 
Principals always were designed to implement the statutes 
of the State of Virginia.

Q. And at the risk of being a small amount of repeti­
tion, Mr. Rutter, I just want to make certain that the record 
is clear on this. In other words, the practice in Arlington 
County at the commencement of the current school session 
pursuant to orders and directives emanating from your of­
fice, this situation, in other words, the policy and practice 
were, one, that any assignment of a new student or a gradu­
ating student or a transferring student would have to be 
made by the Pupil Placement Board and would not be made 
by the school authorities of Arlington County. Am I cor­
rect to this extent? A. Placement would not be made by 
the school authorities of Arlington County but they would 
be made by the Pupil Placement Board. That’s right.

Q. All right. Secondly, no child would be admitted to
—126—

the Public Schools of Arlington County who for, for whom 
an application was required for assignment to be made to 
the Pupil Placement Board by the Act. In other words, 
in those instances where the Act undertook to require that 
the Pupil Placement Board make the assignment, you 
would not admit a child to school unless he applied to the 
Pupil Placement Board for the assignment and was as­
signed to a particular school by the Board? A. That’s 
correct.

Q. All right, sir.

Testimony of T. Edward Rutter-—Direct



28a

How many school children do yon have in the Public 
School System of Arlington County! By that, Mr. Rutter, 
I would like to know the total number white and Negro com­
bined, elementary and secondary combined? A. I am 
sorry, sir, but I cannot give you the precise figures for 
this school year.

Q. Approximately? A. Because these changes are being 
made every day. We have approximately 23,000. We an­
ticipate 23,000 this academic year, and our experience in the 
past has been that approximately five percent of that num­
ber, of the total number of registered would be children of 
the Negro race.

The Court: Now that is of all the schools, is it, 
Mr. Rutter?

The Witness: Yes, that is all the schools.
—127—

The Court: Elementary as well as secondary?
The Witness: That is right.
Mr. Robinson: In other words, you would have ap­

proximately 1,500 Negro students and you would 
have approximately 21,500 white students?

The Witness: Yes.

By Mr. Robinson'.

Q. Would you be able to give us any reasonably accurate 
estimate of the number of children that you would have, 
white and Negro, in the elementary schools, junior high 
schools, and senior high schools; would you be able to do 
that? A. To give you the approximate enrollment?

Q. Yes. A. I can’t do it on the stand at this moment, 
but I can secure it, the information.

Q. All right, sir. A. I can’t do that too accurately and 
I would hesitate to do so.

Testimony of T. Edward Rutter■—Direct



29a

Q. You would be able to supply us with that information 
before leaving today? A. Yes.

Q. I would like for you to do so.
—128—

The Court: Do you have it at the desk?
The Witness: 1 am sure that there are members of 

my staff here who can supply me with the informa­
tion.

The Court: I wonder if you can get it now readily 
and would save you from coming back to the stand.

The Witness: Would you repeat the precise—
Mr. Robinson: I would like to know, one, the num­

ber of Negro elementary students, junior high school 
students, senior high school students; number of 
white elementary, junior high, and senior high.

The Witness: Well, we’ll be able to get the in­
formation in just a few moments.

Mr. Robinson: Well, while we are waiting, let me 
ask you a couple of other questions, Mr. Rutter.

By Mr. Robinson:

Q. Do you have any idea, or do you have any reasonably 
accurate estimate of the number of students, the approxi­
mate number of students assigned to the Public Schools of 
Arlington County by the Pupil Placement Board for the

^ .12 9 -
current session? A. There are more than 2,000. I am sure 
of that.

Q. More than 2,000. A. Yes.
Q. Do you have any information that would be reasonably 

accurate as to approximately how many of these 2,000 would 
be Negroes and how many of the 2,000 would be whites? 
A. No, I do not.

Testimony of T. Edward Rutter-—Direct



30a

Q. I understand that so far as you know all of the schools 
in Arlington County are being attended by the members of 
one race only, by that I mean that there is no single in­
stance of any school in the entire School System attended 
by a Negro and a white child. They are all either actually 
attended by all-white students or all-Negro students. Am 
I correct in that conclusion? A. That’s right.

Q. And this notwithstanding the fact that 2,000 assign­
ments approximately have been made by the Pupil Place­
ment Board? I mean that has not been affected by reason 
of the assignment? A. Presumably not.

Q. Would I be correct in my conclusion from that, Mr. 
Butter, that out of 2,000 assignments made by the Pupil 
Placement Board, all 2,000 of those students, if they happen 
to the extent to which they are white were assigned to white 
schools and all within that 2,000 figure who happen to be

- 1 3 0 -
Negroes were assigned to Negro schools without exception 
so far as you know? A. So far as I know.

*  % #  #  #

Q. Mr. Butter, were you able to get the information I 
inquired about before the last recess? A. Tes. I have 
these data that are as current as yesterday afternoon, 
September the 10th.

Negro elementary enrollment, 946. Negro junior high 
school enrollment, 311. Negro senior high school enroll­
ment, 175. Total, 1,432.

White elementary enrollment, 11,421. White junior high 
school enrollment, 5,697.

The Court: Start again.
The Witness: Yes, sir. I am sorry, sir.

Testimony of T. Edward Rutter-—Direct

—131—



31a

White elementary enrollment, 11,421. Junior high 
white enrollment, 5,697. Senior high school white 
enrollment, 4,127. Total white enrollment, 21,245.

By Mr. Robinson:

Q. Mr. Eutter, you gave some testimony before the last 
recess as to how you would formulate for white and Negro 
students respectively just to districts. Now the processes 
that have been employed for formulating school districts 
for both elementary and secondary students, for both whites 
and Negroes, of the present processes that you have used, 
have been used for the—isn’t something brand new—they 
have been used for some period of time, have they! A. 
That’s correct.

Q. Say during the entire term of office that you have 
occupied the office! A. I think it antedates that.

Q. Beg pardon! A. It goes beyond that.
Q. Goes back beyond that. Thank you very much. That 

is all.
—132—

Cross Examination by Mr. Ball:
Q. Mr. Rutter, the Wakefield School has been men­

tioned. Is that a combination junior and senior high school! 
A. Yes, it is, Mr. Ball.

Q. With regard to these maps, as I understand, they are 
last year’s map! A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. Local Board anything to do with making up this 
year’s maps! A. We have not made any map this year, 
sir, inasmuch as we no longer, of course, have any juris­
diction in the placement of children in the schools so we 
have not made the maps this year.

Testimony of T. Edward Rutter—Cross



32a

The Court: You mean by that there are for this 
session no district, school districts in Arlington 
County?

The Witness: The districts are, sir, those that are 
shown on the map, but the map is last year’s map 
and we have made no changes in the map this year.

The Court: Well, do you still observe these dis­
trict lines for any purpose whatsoever?

The Witness: Well, presumably they are observed
—133—

by the Pupil Placement Board, sir.
Mr. Robinson: Mr. Rutter, by that do you mean 

that the Pupil Placement Act had the effect when it 
went into operation, had the effect of freezing all 
students, white and Negro, in the schools that they 
were attending on the effective date of the Act, is 
that what you have reference to in your last an­
swer to the Court’s question?

The Witness: That the description that you have 
just given seems to me to he quite similar to a clause 
or a sentence or two, a paragraph in the law itself.

Mr. Robinson: By that I mean and I am trying to 
find out now what the actual operation of this thing 
has been in Arlington County when the law went 
into effect, it had the effect in your interpretation 
of it, it had the effect of keeping all students in the, 
who were in school, in the schools that they attended 
when the law went into effect, of keeping them there 
unless the Pupil Placement Board transferred them 
to some other school?

The Witness: That is my understanding.

Testimony of T. Edward Rutter—Cross



33a

Testimony of T. Edward Rutter—Cross

—134—
Mr. Robinson: Are you familiar with the action­

able results of assignments of Arlington school chil­
dren made by the Pupil Placement Board? I mean 
do you know in a general sort of way whether or 
not so far as the students are concerned the Pupil 
Placement Board has generally observed the old 
1956-57 school district lines in making its own as­
signments in those instances where it has made 
assignments ?

The Witness: That would be my general observa­
tion. Of course, I couldn’t be familiar with all the 
forms and it is perfectly possible that some children 
who may have attended a given school last year were 
not assigned to the same school this year.

Mr. Robinson: But so far as you know, the state­
ment that I just made is correct?

The Witness: I believe that is correct.
Mr. Robinson: Do the school authorities or the 

Principals or any other agents, employee or repre­
sentative of the School Board, or Division Superin­
tendent of Arlington County make any recommenda­
tions to the Pupil Placement Board as to the school

—135—
that a child should be assigned to?

The Witness: Absolutely not.
Mr. Robinson: That is all.
Mr. Hill: Let me see the plaintiff’s Exhibit 5, I 

think it is.
Mr. Robinson: Mr. Rutter, of course, you are 

familiar with this form, are you not?
The Witness: Indeed I am, sir.



34a

Mr. Robinson: I am calling your attention to a 
section of the form that reads as follows: Informa­
tion and recommendations from local school board, 
if child is entering school for the first time is date 
of child—wait a minute. No. I beg your pardon. 
Right under that, big bold faced heading that I have 
just read to you, the third printed line down, recom­
mend to school to which pupil should be assigned. 
Am I correct in understanding from what you have 
just said that your employees in Arlington County 
do not make a recommendation to the Pupil Place­
ment Board as to the school to which a particular 
student should be assigned as is requested by that 
form?

—136—
The Witness: That is correct. We do not, and 

we did not on that form.
Mr. Robinson: That is all. Thank you, Mr. Rutter.

#  #  #  #  #

The Court: Let me ask Dr. Rutter one question. 
Doctor, will you stand right up where you are?

Are you familiar with these seven instances that
—1 3 7 -

students’ applications, that we are considering today?
The Witness: Yes, sir.
The Court: To your knowledge was any one of 

them disqualified by reason of his scholastic records 
to enter the school to which he applied?

The Witness: I would have no way of knowing 
that, Your Honor. In other words, I didn’t attempt 
to secure that information.

The Court: You cannot answer that?
The Witness: No, sir.
The Court: All right.

Testimony of T. Edward Rutter—Cross



35a

Filed: September 14, 1957 

Findings of Fact and Conclusions o f Law

Seven Negro children of school age were refused admis­
sion as pupils in the public schools of Arlington County, 
Va., on the opening day of the current session. The ground 
of the refusal was that the applicants had not complied 
with, or obeyed, the provisions of the Pupil Placement Act 
of Virginia, 1956 Acts, Extra Session, c. 70. That statute 
requires every child before entering a public school for 
the first time, or on graduation from one school to another, 
to apply to the Pupil Placement Board for enrollment. In 
refusing the admission, the school principals were follow­
ing the directions of the defendant County School Board 
and Superintendent who, in turn, were following the Act. 
These children, now called the plaintiffs, assert that the 
refusal violates the injunction previously entered by this 
court restraining the defendants from denying enrollment 
in any public school of the county, on account of race or 
color, to any otherwise qualified child. The plaintiffs move 
for a supplemental decree directing the admission of these 
children to the schools. The court will grant the motion.

I. In its injunctive decree the court took notice of exist­
ing and future State and local rules and administrative 
remedies for the assignment of children to public schools. 
It directed conformance with them before the complainant 
should turn to the court. Of course, the decree only contem­
plated reasonable regulations and remedies. Defendants’ 
position that the Pupil Placement Act is such a regulation 
or remedy is untenable. The procedure there prescribed is 
too sluggish and prolix to constitute a reasonable remedial 
process. On this point we also rely upon the reasoning of



36a

the Court of Appeals for this Circuit in School Board of 
the City of Newport News et al. v. Adkins et al., July 
13, 1957.

It must be remembered that we are viewing the Act in 
a different frame from the setting in which it was tested 
by the Court of Appeals. The Act was then appraised as 
an administrative remedy which had to be observed before 
the persons aggrieved could seek a decree of judicial relief. 
Now the Act is measured against the enforcement of a 
decree already granted. It is, too, a decree which was passed 
before the adoption of the Placement Act and bears the 
approval of the final courts of appeal. For these reasons 
decision here need not await the outcome of the pending 
effort to obtain a review of the Court of Appeals’ judgment.

This court had hoped that the initial step provided in 
the Placement Act might be isolated and utilized as a fair 
and practicable administrative remedy. It thought that a 
requirement that a pupil first entering a school, or transfer­
ring from one school to another, should seek placement 
from some official or board, would not only be a reasonable, 
but a necessary regulation as well, in the administration 
of the school. This agency, it seemed, might validly be a 
State agency exclusively—such as the Placement Board.

However, the court finds that it cannot fairly require the 
plaintiffs even to submit their applications to the Board for 
school assignment. The reason is that the form prescribed 
therefor commits the applicant to accept a school “which 
the Board deems most appropriate in accordance with the 
provisions” of the Pupil Placement Act. Submission to that 
Act amounts almost to assent to a racially segregated 
school. But even if the form be signed “under protest,” 
the petitioner would not have an unfettered and free tri­
bunal to act on his request. The board still deliberates, on

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law



37a

a racial question, under threat of loss of State money to the 
applicant’s school if children of different races are taught 
there.

II. The court must overrule the claim of the County 
School Board and Superintendent that they should not be 
held to answer for the denial of admittance to the plain­
tiffs. In this they urge that the Placement Board had sole 
control of admissions—that the School Board and Superin­
tendent had been divested by the Act of every power in this 
respect. As just explained, the Placement Act and the 
assignment of powers of the Placement Board are not ac­
ceptable as regulations or remedies suspending direct obedi­
ence of the injunction. In law the defendants are charged 
with notice of these infirmities in the Board’s authority. 
Actually the plaintiffs were denied admission by the defen­
dants’ agents—the school principals—while the defendants 
had the custody and administration of the schools in ques­
tion.

Hence, the refusal by the defendants, immediately or 
through their agents, to admit the applicants cannot here 
be justified by reliance upon the Placement Board. The 
defendants were imputable, also, with knowledge that the 
injunction was binding on the Placement Board. The latter 
was the successor to a part of the School Board’s prior 
duties; as a successor in office to the School Board, the 
Placement Board is one of those specifically restrained by 
the injunction.

III. We look, then, to see if race or color was the basis 
for the denial by the defendants and their agents of ad­
mission of the applicants to the named schools. It is im­
material that the defendants may not have intended to deny

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law



38a

admission on account of race or color. The inquiry is purely 
objective. The result, not the intendment, of their acts is 
determinative.

In this inquiry we have no administrative decision with 
which to commence, save in one instance. Consequently, the 
court must examine the evidence in regard to each applicant 
and ascertain whether it indicates that the denial of ad­
mittance was there due solely to race or color. The court 
is not undertaking the task of assigning pupils to the 
schools. That is the function of the school authorities and 
the court has no inclination to assume that responsibility. 
Carson v. Warlick, 1956, 4 cir., 238 F. 2d 724, 728. But 
it is the obligation of the court to determine whether the 
rejection of any of the plaintiffs was solely for his race or 
color. In this light only does the court now review the 
evidence.

IV . Arlington is a small county in size, but thickly popu­
lated and having the appearance of a city. It has 22,677 
(about) pupils in its public schools. Of these 1432 are 
Negroes—946 in the elementary schools, 311 in the junior 
high school (7th, 8th and 9th grades) and 175 in the senior 
high school (10th, 11th and 12th grades).

All together there are 40 school buildings in the County. 
These include 4 schools for Negroes—one high school, Hoff- 
man-Boston (combining junior and senior) located in the 
extreme southern end of the County and embracing an 
elementary school with it; and 2 other elementary schools, 
Drew-Kemper near the Hoffman-Boston, and Langston in 
the district to be mentioned in a moment as the northern 
Hoffman-Boston.

There are 2 high schools for the white children, 'Wash­
ington and Lee in and to serve the northern half, and Wake­

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law



39a

field in and for the south half, of Arlington; there are 
6 junior high schools, Stratford and Swanson among them, 
scattered throughout the County for the white children; and 
there are 28 elementary “white” schools, including Fillmore 
and Patrick Henry.

Each school and its contiguous territory form a school 
district. The boundaries of a district are drawn to include 
the school population in the vicinity of the school as far 
as the facilities of the school will allow. Before the creation 
of the Placement Board the pupils assignable to each school 
were, if otherwise eligible, limited to those who resided in 
the school district. These lines have never been altered by 
the School Board, but the defendants point out that the 
Placement Board may or may not follow these bounds. 
Apparently it has done so.

Nothing in the evidence indicates that any of the plain­
tiffs is not qualified in his studies to enter the school 
which he sought to enter. Each applicant applied to a 
“white” school, but each lives in the district of that school 
or of another nearby “white” school. Nor did the evidence 
reveal a lack of space for him, or that the school did not 
afford the courses suited to the applicant. Counsel for the 
defendants explained that they did not adduce evidence as 
to the eligibility of the applicants for their respective 
schools because this was a matter within the purview of 
the Placement Board. Anyway, no intimation of disquali­
fication appeared as to any applicant.

A review of the evidence is convincing that the only 
ground, aside from the provisions of the Placement Act, 
for the rejection of the plaintiffs was that they were of the 
Negro race. The rejection was simply the adherence to the 
prior practice of segregation. No other hypothesis can be

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law



40a

sustained in any of the seven instances. The evidence as to 
the plaintiffs shows as follows:

(1) Rita and Harolyn Johnson, 15 and 16 years old, per­
sonally presented themselves for admission to the Wash­
ington and Lee High School on the opening day, Sept. 5, 
1957. They desired to enter the 10th and 12th grades, re­
spectively, and carried with them documentary evidence of 
their academic proficiency, having attended schools in the 
District of Columbia during the last school session. Their 
residence is 2901 North Lexington Street, in the northern 
extremity of the County. It was within the Washington 
and Lee School District and a distance of approximately 
2 miles (air line) from the school. The two other senior 
County high schools were twice that distance from the 
Johnsons.

They were refused admission because they had not exe­
cuted the board’s placement forms. Their father declining 
to allow them to complete the forms, they are now attend­
ing school in the District of Columbia.

(2) Robert A. Eldridge, aged 9, wished to enter the 4th 
grade. As a new arrival in the county, his father had made 
application on August 15, 1957, for the enrollment of Rob­
ert in Fillmore, an elementary school. He procured a place­
ment form but did not file it. On the opening of school 
Robert was refused admission into Fillmore for lack of the 
form.

This boy lives at First and Fillmore Street, a distance 
of slightly more than one city block from the Fillmore 
School, but is within the School District of Patrick Henry, 
an elementary school six city blocks away. A white child 
living there would normally enter either Patrick Henry or 
Fillmore. The nearest school used by colored children was 
1.25 miles away.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law



41a

(3) Leslie Haxnm had completed the elementary courses 
at the County’s Langston School and wanted to enter Strat­
ford Junior High School. He was refused admission on 
the opening day of school at Stratford because he had not 
been assigned by the Placement Board, never having made 
application.

He resides at 1900 N. Cameron Street. This address is 
within what we describe as the northern Hoffman-Boston 
District. This district, however, is 3.5 miles from the 
Hoffman-Boston School and from the area around that 
school also designated as a Hoffman-Boston District. The 
northern Hoffman-Boston District is set apart apparently 
because the area is occupied predominantly by negroes. 
However, a white child living in the northern District would 
be eligible to attend either the Swanson or Stratford Junior 
High School. Swanson is something more than a mile from 
the Hamm residence, Stratford slightly less than a mile.

(4) Louis George Turner and Melvin H. Turner, having 
respectively finished the seventh and eighth grades in one 
of the colored schools in the County, sought admission to 
the Swanson Junior High school on Aug. 22, as well as 
on the opening day. Not having filled out the placement 
form, they were both refused admission. They live at the 
intersection of 22d Street, North, and George Mason Drive. 
This is within the northern District of Hoffman-Boston. 
A white child in this section would ordinarily go either to 
Swanson or Williamsburg Junior High School. Swanson 
is less than a mile distant, while Williamsburg is about 
1.25 miles away.

(5) George T. Nelson filled out a placement form and 
filed it on August 19 or 26 with the principal of Stratford 
Junior High School. On this application, the Pupil Place­

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law



42a

ment Board assigned him to Hoffman-Boston School. On 
the opening day of school he was refused admission at 
Stratford.

Nelson lives at 2005 North Cameron Street. This is 
within the northern Hoffman-Boston District. Hoffman- 
Boston School is 6 miles from his home, while Stratford 
is % mile away. Swanson Junior High School is a little 
further away. The basis for the Board’s placement is not 
given; no reason is evident for ignoring Stratford or Swan­
son. It cannot be accepted, for it is utterly without evidence 
to support it.

V. The defendants and their agents, in barring the ad­
mission of the complainants, did not intend any defiance 
of the injunction. The bona tides of their assurance to the 
court—that they believed they should not admit, the appli­
cants without an assignment by the Placement Board— 
cannot be doubted. However, the defendants and their 
agents must now understand that the injunction is para­
mount in the present circumstances and that they can no 
longer refuse admittance to the plaintiffs.

The injunction will affect the school attendance very 
slightly. Into a white school population of 21,245, only 
seven Negro children will enter; one Negro will be with 
11,421 white children in the elementary grades; and no 
more than 6 Negroes among the 9,824 white high school 
students. Of 36 previously “ all-white” schools in the 
County, 4 will be affected by the decree, and then not to a 
greater extent than 2 Negroes in any one of the 4 schools.

The supplemental decree will be effective at the opening 
of the schools Monday morning, September 23, 1957.

A lbert V. Bryan 
United States District Judge

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law



43a

Supplemental Decree of Injunction

I n the
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
F or the E astern D istrict of V irginia 

At Alexandria

[ same title]

Upon consideration of the motion by and on behalf of 
Harolyn Johnson, Rita Johnson, Robert A. Eldridge III, 
George Tyrone Nelson, E. Leslie Hamm, jr., Louis George 
Turner and Melvin M. Turner that the court enter a further 
decree specifically directing the defendants to admit them 
to the schools to which they have applied for admission 
for the session of 1957-58, and upon consideration of the 
evidence and arguments of counsel for all the parties on 
said motion, the court is of the opinion, on the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law this day filed, that said motion 
should be granted, and, therefore, it is

Ordered that the defendants, their successors in office, 
agents, representatives, servants, and employees be, and 
each of them is hereby, restrained and enjoined from re­
fusing to admit the said movants to, or enroll and educate 
them in, the said schools to which they have made applica­
tion for admission, that i s :

1. Harolyn Johnson in the Washington and Lee High 
School;



44a

Supplemental Decree of Injunction

2. Eita Jolinson in the Washington and Lee High School;
3. Robert A. Eldridge III in the Fillmore School or the 

Patrick Henry School;

4. George Tyrone Nelson in the Stratford Junior High 
School or the Swanson Junior High School;

5. E. Leslie Hamm, jr. in the Stratford Junior High 
School or the Swanson Junior High School;

6. Louis George Turner in the Swanson Junior High 
School; and

7. Melvin H. Turner in the Swanson Junior High 
School; upon the presentation by the said movants of 
themselves for admission, enrollment and education in the 
said schools commencing at the opening of said schools on 
the morning of September 23, 1957.

Let copies of this order be forthwith sent to counsel 
in this cause.

A lbert V. B ryan 
United States District Judge

September 14, 1957.



45a

Filed: September 17, 1958 

Findings o f Fact and Conclusions o f Law

In the
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

F ob the E astern D istrict oe V irginia 

At Alexandria

[ same title]

Now, for the first time, this case comes before the court 
upon an assignment of pupils made by State and local 
authorities and founded on local conditions. Decision is 
reduced to an administrative review. The case signally 
demonstrates the soundness and workability of these propo­
sitions: (1) that the Federal requirement of avoiding
racial exclusiveness in the public schools—loosely termed 
the requirement of integration—can be fulfilled reasonably 
and with justice if the guide adopted is the circumstances 
of each child, individually and relatively; (2) that it may 
be achieved through the pursuit of any method wherein 
the regulatory body can, and does, act after a fair hearing 
and upon evidence; and (3) that when a conclusion is so 
reached in good faith, without influence of race, though 
it be erroneous, the assignment is no longer a concern of 
the United States courts.

In this court’s 1956 opinion, referring to the right of the 
pupils to seek enforcement of the injunction, these same 
propositions were suggested. But in 1957 no ground what­
soever was tendered for such considerations. The opinion 
then commented, “ * * * we have no administrative deci­



46a

sion with which to commence, save in one instance”. Now 
the premises are offered.

Weighing these, the court cannot say that as to twenty- 
six of the thirty pupil-plaintiffs their applications for 
transfer to “white” schools were refused without substan­
tial supporting evidence. As to the remaining four, re­
fusal of their applications for transfer is not justified in 
the evidence. They are Ronald Deskins, Michael Gerard 
Jones, Lance Dwight Newman and Gloria Delores Thomp­
son.

These four are all applicants for Stratford Junior High 
School; they have asked to enter the seventh grade, the 
first year of junior high. Before this decision can be 
effectuated by a final decree, ten days or more would 
routinely elapse, carrying the effective date into October. 
In the judgment of the court it would be unwise to make 
the transfers as late as that in the term. The decree, there­
fore, will be made effective at the commencement of the 
next semester, January, 1959. This short deferment will 
not be hurtful. Indeed, if the basic problem can be solved 
by time, the price is not too dear.

I. The evidence upon which the assignments were made 
was taken subject to several motions and these should 
be passed upon before the evidence is considered. Counsel 
for the Pupil Placement Board, appearing in association 
with the attorneys for the defendants, has moved the court 
to dismiss the entire proceeding on the ground that his 
client is an indispensable party to an action of this kind 
and has never been brought into the case. He relies on the 
Pupil Placement Act of Virginia, 1958 Acts of the General 
Assembly, c. 500, 1950 Code of Virginia, as amended, 22- 
232.1, supplementing the 1956 Pupil Placement Act. This

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law



47a

legislation purportedly vests in the Pupil Placement Board, 
exclusively, all authority to determine the school to which 
any child shall be admitted. It is argued that as the 
present action involves the admission of the plaintiff-pupils 
into the schools, the Board should be a party. The motion 
must be denied.

While the Pupil Placement Act. has been amended, since 
the 1957 holding of this court that the procedure there 
stipulated was not an adequate administrative remedy, it 
is still not expeditious. The student would be too far de­
layed into the session before his application would be 
finally determined. Then, at the end, the school closing 
and fund-cut-off statutes automatically shut the school, 
and withhold any money for its operation, should the 
student be assigned to a school then teaching children of 
the other race. Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia, 
1956, Ex. Session c. 68,1950 Va. Code, as amended, 22-188.5; 
Acts, 1958, c. 642, Item 129 (Appropriations for schools).

It may be, however, that the first stage prescribed in the 
Act is adoptable—some State or local authority must 
process the applications and make the assignments—but 
the point is moot. The applications in suit were considered 
by the Placement Board and the Arlington County School 
Board together. The results, the refusals to grant the 
transfers, were in effect assignments. There is no reason 
to decide now whether this was Placement Board or School 
Board action.

Nevertheless, in no event need the Placement Board be 
impleaded here. The impact of any decree would be upon 
the persons immediately in charge of the schools. They 
it is who actually admit or reject the students. Ordinarily 
they would be the employees of the School Board, such as 
the principals and the teachers. From the fact that the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law



48a

School Board and its employees may be controlled in their 
acceptance of students by the Pupil Placement Board, it 
does not follow that the court cannot judge of the validicy 
of such regulations without having the Placement Board 
before it.

The plaintiffs move to strike from the evidence the find­
ings of the Director of Psychological Services of the Vir­
ginia State Department of Mental Hygiene in regard to 
the psychological problems of certain of the applicants. It 
is conceded that the School Board or the Placement Board 
had the right to consider this report. The objection is 
that in trial it is hearsay, because the Director was not 
called as a witness. So far, the motion is good. However, 
it does not preclude the court from considering the report 
in measuring the evidence that was before the Boards.

II. By the assignments of the Boards, thirty Arlington 
County Negro pupils have been refused transfer from the 
previously all-Negro schools to several previously all-white 
schools. The assignments were the result of a screening of 
the pupils against criteria of five categories designated as: 
Attendance Area, Over-crowding at Washington and Lee 
High School, Academic Accomplishment, Psychological 
Problems, and Adaptability. Five of the thirty are the 
children who were ordered admitted by this court in Sep­
tember 1957, but the order was stayed pending appeals. 
Contrary to their argument, however, these pupils have 
not by virtue of that order a vested position for this 
session. Admissions must be judged on current conditions, 
the rule to be applied to all students. In this discussion the 
children will be designated according to the letters and 
numbers used in the trial.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law



49a

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

A : A ttendance A rea—P upils 2, 3, 4, 9, 14, 15, 17,
18, 23, 24 and 25

On the Attendance Area test eleven transfers were de­
clined—students Nos. 2, 3, 4, 9, 14, 15, 17, 18, 23, 24 and 25. 
With the slight exceptions hereinafter noted, the school 
districts have remained the same since the lines were fixed 
long prior to the Supreme Court’s decision of May 17, 
1954. These pupils have been attending the Hoffman- 
Boston School. It has been housing elementary grades, 
as well as both junior and senior high schools, but solely 
for Negroes. The Hoffman-Boston lines were originally 
drawn to embrace an area occupied almost entirely by 
Negroes. In fact, save for a very small area known as the 
north Hoffman-Boston district, it is the only Negro resi­
dential section in the County. These eleven pupils (2, 3, 
15 and 25 being senior high school students and 4, 9, 14, 
17, 18, 23 and 24 junior high school students) live in the 
Hoffman-Boston area.

There is no other high school, white or colored, nearer 
to them than Hoffman-Boston. Nos. 2, 3, 15 and 25 applied 
for admission to Wakefield High School. Among other 
adjustments this change would mean the establishment of 
a new bus route and would mean a longer haul than the 
bus ride now afforded them to Hoffman-Boston.

The others sought entry into either Kenmore Junior 
High School, Glunston or Thomas Jefferson. In distance 
all of these schools are slightly closer to their residences 
than Hoffman-Boston. However, the school authorities had 
other factors to consider, such as the adoption of presently 
established school bus routes, walking distances and the 
crossing of' highways, as well as that Hoffman-Boston was 
but a twenty-minutes bus ride for these pupils.



50a

B : A cademic A ccomplishment Deficiency of T hese and 
A lso B, C, D, E, 5, 6, 8,10,11,12, 21 and 22

Excepting No. 18, all of the immediately considered 
pupils—2, 3, 4, 9, 14, 15, 17, 23, 24 and 25—were also re­
fused transfer because of their academic standing. Besides 
these, pupils B, C, D, E, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 21 and 22 were 
likewise found to be ineligible, on account of academic de­
ficiency, for the transfers requested.

In making the academic determinations the California 
Achievement Test was the principal factor. Other factors 
were the school records and experience. While among 
these twenty-two pupils some were listed on their student 
report cards as making low scholastic averages, just about 
as many had high averages and others were “ on grade 
level” . Their intelligence quotients are not low. The school 
authorities do not deny these evaluations. But they em­
phasize that these standings are related only to the then 
grade and school of the children. The basis for refusal 
of the transfers was not those standings. The basis was 
that the scholastic standing in the classes to which they 
asked entry was above the individual standings of the ap­
plicants to the extent that the transfers could not be justi­
fied under sound educational principles.

The median achievement level in the schools to which 
entrance is sought, the evidence shows, is appreciably 
higher than the national norm. On the other hand, the 
median of the schools from which the applicants would 
come, is more than a year below this norm. Moreover, in 
the schools applied for, two-thirds of the pupils have 
achievement ratings above the national norm; while in the 
schools of origin, four-fifths of the students are well below 
the national norm. So a transfer might result in placing

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law



51a

the pupil in an achievement group one or more years above 
the achievement category of his present group.

With the exception of pupil 18, all of the applicants now 
in discussion—2, 3, 4, 9, 14, 15, 17, 23, 24, 25, B, C, D, E, 
5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 21 and 22, totaling twenty-two—were 
below the median achievement of the ad-schools. Fifteen— 
22, 11, 14, 24, E, C, 10, 5, 8, 25, 15, D, 21, 12, 3—of them 
were below the national norm. Two of them were three 
years below and five others as much as a year or more. 
It must be remembered, though, that some of the ad-school 
students are also below the national norm. In the table 
of average mental maturity, grade for grade, the Hoffman- 
Boston is shown to be more than fifteen points under the 
other schools, the one about 90 and the other 105 plus.

C : P sychological P roblems— P upils C, 1, 2, 6, 8, 21 and 24
Seven applications were declined because of psychological 

problems. Of these seven, six—C, 2, 6, 8, 21 and 24—were 
among those just noted as rejected for academic deficiency. 
No. 1 was not in that group. For this classification the 
Boards chiefly relied upon the conclusions of the State 
Director of Psychological Services. Of course, the school 
records of these children were also at hand. In substance, 
the opinion of the Director was that “ it would be unwise 
and possibly harmful to this child to subject him to the 
pressures which might result from attending a school” 
having children of a different or another race. Instability, 
lack of self-control, extreme shyness and difficulty of 
mingling or making friends are the circumstances generally 
named by him for his conclusions, persuading him that 
entry into such a school would result in severe difficulty 
in the schools as well as to the subject pupil. Thus the 
Director’s determinations do involve race.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law



52a

D : Overcrowding at W ashington and L ee— P upils 
D, 1, 12, 19 and 21

For senior high school attendance allocations, Arlington 
County has been for many years divided into three dis­
tricts. The Washington and Lee District,, taking the name 
from the high school located in the north center of the 
County, originally embraced approximately the north half 
of the county. The second district is Wakefield, named 
for another high school situated on the extreme western 
boundary of the county and in the southwest section. The 
third district is Hoffman-Boston, already described, and 
forming an enclave within the Wakefield District.

Before the commencement of this litigation and without 
anticipation of it, a large area in the northwest corner of the 
County was taken out of the Washington and Lee District, 
because of the over-population of that high school. The 
severed area is not contiguous to but well north of the 
line between the Washington-Lee and the Wakefield dis­
tricts. Since the inception of the present controversy the 
northern district of Hoffman-Boston has been vacated. It 
was entirely surrounded by Washington-Lee District; 
hence it is now thrown into that district. This small ter­
ritory is contiguous to that part of Washington and Lee 
just described as taken off from the latter. Pupils D, 1, 
12, 19 and 21 reside within the territory formerly com­
prising the northern district of Hoffman-Boston. They 
have been assigned to the Hoffman-Boston High School.

Washington and Lee High School is much nearer to their 
residences than is Hoffman-Boston. Indeed, it lies between 
the residences and Hoffman-Boston, away from the resi­
dences about one-fourth of the total distance. Overcrowd­
ing of Washington and Lee is the basis for the assignment 
of these pupils to Hoffman-Boston.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law



53a

Before the necessity arose for considering the as­
signment of senior high school pupils residing in the former 
northern Hoffman-Boston District to any high school other 
than Hoffman-Boston, the Washington and Lee High School 
had become congested. The present population is 2600 as 
against a maximum capacity of 2000. At Hoffman-Boston, 
the current population is 575, with a capacity of 375, 
augmented now by four temporary classrooms accommodat­
ing 100 more pupils and to be increased, further, by the 
addition of five classrooms now under construction, for 
completion in January 1959, to care for 125 pupils. The 
total facilities at Hoffman-Boston will thus be 600. Wake­
field is constructed for 2000 but presently has 2540 students.

In maintaining the assignment of these students to 
Hoffman-Boston, rather than to Washington-Lee, the de­
fendants referred to corresponding treatment of Caucasian 
pupils. They point to the students living in the territory 
severed from Washington-Lee. These white pupils in the 
tenth grade (the first year of the senior high school) must 
go to Wakefield High School. This is a distance as great, 
if not greater, than the trip to Hoffman-Boston from its 
former northern district. They note still another compa­
rable transportation of white students. Those living at 
Fort Myer, in the southeast part of the county, are not 
permitted to go to the nearer Washington-Lee High School 
but are required to attend Wakefield, on the other side of 
the county. The Hoffman-Boston School is superior to 
any of the other schools in the county in its 18.5 pupil- 
teacher ratio.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law



54a

E : A d a p t a b i l i t y — P u p i l s  A ,  7 , 1 3 , 1 6  a n d  2 0

Thus, eighteen of the thirty applicants have been found 
disqualified upon at least two, and sometimes three, of 
the criteria, and seven for the sole reason of overcrowding, 
attendance area, or academic standing. The remaining five 
applicants—A, 7, 13, 16 and 20—were refused transfer for 
failing the test of Adaptability.

On this last criterion the principal witness was the Super­
intendent of Schools. With thirty-two years in segregated 
schools, his experience covers both Negroes and Caucasians, 
though separately. He defines Adaptability as including 
the ability to accept or conform to new and different ed- 
ducation environment. In reference to these five pupils he 
readily concedes that their places of residence would en­
title them to go to the schools of their application—Pupil 
A to Patrick Henry Elementary School, and 7, 13, 16 and 
20 to Stratford Junior High School.

But the point made by the Superintendent is that these 
students would, respectively, be injured by placement in 
Patrick Henry or in Stratford Junior High School. His 
reason is that they would lose their present position of 
school superiority and leadership. At Hoffman-Boston 7, 
13, 16 and 20 rate about two years above the school norm 
of achievement. They are nearly a year ahead of the na­
tional norm. However, if they enter Stratford, they will 
not, as they are in Hoffman-Boston, be in the top group, 
but just above the achievement median of that school. 
They will not be among the leaders. Analogous reasoning 
is applied to A at Patrick Henry. The Superintendent feels 
that this would be discouraging and possibly emotionally 
disturbing to them. Race or color is not the basis for his 
opinion, though, he owns, the necessity for his decision 
is occasioned by the removal of racial bars.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law



55a

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 

Conclusion

1. The very formulation and use of the criteria is pleaded 
by the plaintiffs as racial discrimination. With this the court 
disagrees. True, previously no such tests were known: 
they came into being in the latter part of August 1958 in 
connection with the instant school assignments. But this 
does not prove discrimination.

These tests were not used previously because there was 
no necessity. The removal of the rule and custom of 
segregation was an abrupt change. It was a social epoch, 
beginning a new era. Accommodation to its demands meant 
new methods as well as facilities. The assignment of pupils 
took on an added obligation. At some time and place, 
assignment regulations had to be adopted. Therefore, the 
instant criteria are not discriminatory as born of a social 
change. Otherwise, after the erasure of race as a factor 
in pupil placement, no assignment plan could ever be 
validly adopted.

2. This recital of the evidence is not written with the 
implication that the evidence as to the tests was not ques­
tioned. In refutation the plaintiffs offered evidence of 
considerable weight and relevance. But the court does not 
in a case of this kind resolve such differences. It examines 
the conflicting evidence only to see if the rebuttal evidence 
destroys any weight that might be given to the defendants’ 
proof. Its inquiry is to ascertain if the defendants’ evi­
dence, independently of influence of race or color, was 
sufficient to sustain the action of the Placement Board and 
the School Board.

3. The reasons given for disqualifying the seven students 
upon the test of the Psychological Problems obviously give



56a

consideration to race and color. On the other hand, the 
rejection was not dne solely to these features. The court, 
however, does not rule on the weight to be accorded this 
test because the evidence before it upon the point is too 
scant. The psychologist was not called as a witness and 
the court does not have the benefit of his exposition. There­
fore, this test must be disregarded for this case.

4. Plaintiffs urge that invalidity of the assignments is 
conclusively established by the result, that is, that all 
Negro pupils remain in the Hoffman-Boston School. 
Though plausible, the argument is not sound. Actually, 
the principal reason for the result is the geographical loca­
tion of the residences of the plaintiffs, indeed of the en­
tire Negro population in Arlington County. It is confined 
to two sections, the Hoffman-Boston area and the previous, 
small northern division of the Hoffman-Boston, several 
miles apart. Hoffman-Boston is by far the larger Negro 
area. This situation seemingly would be frequently found 
in areas, like Arlington County, urban in character.

It occurs, too, from the relatively small Negro population 
in the County. The condition now does not differ greatly 
from that noted in this court’s opinion of September 1957. 
Then there were 1432 Negroes in all of the County’s schools. 
This compared to some 21,000 white students. The latter 
are scattered throughout the County. The concentration 
of Negro population is confirmed in this case by the fact 
that only one white-school parent was available to testify 
as a resident of Hoffman-Boston district.

Nor is discrimination proved by the stipulation that 100 
Negro pupils are transported to Hoffman-Boston from the 
now dissolved northern division of Hoffman-Boston. As 
many as 250 white pupils are carried from the severed

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law



57a

portion of Washington-Lee District to Wakefield. Only 
eighteen of these Negroes are complainants here. They 
are D, 1, 12, 19, 21, B, C, E, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 16, 20 and 
22. Without ignoring the record and without presuming 
bad faith in the Boards, it cannot be said that they were 
sent to Hoffman-Boston simply to segregate the Negro 
children. For example, D, 1, 12, 19 and 21 were sent specif­
ically because of the overcrowding at Washington and Lee. 
Either these or some other pupils, white or colored, had 
to be rejected at Washington-Lee. It was not illogical to 
turn away those who had more recently become eligible, 
in favor of those who were already in, or had studied for 
entrance into, Washington and Lee. Again, proof that the 
assignments to the Hoffman-Boston School were not ar­
bitrary is seen in the specific finding in respect to B, C, D, 
E, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 19, 20, 21 and 22—want of academic 
accomplishment.

5. The court is of the opinion that Attendance Area, 
Overcrowding at Washington and Lee, and Academic Ac­
complishment clearly are valid criteria, free of taint of 
race or color. It concludes also that these criteria have 
been applied without any such bias. It cannot say that the 
refusal of transfers on these grounds is not supported by 
adequate evidence.

The court may have made a different decision on this 
evidence; it may not agree with the conclusions of the 
Boards. But that is of no consequence once it is found 
that the administrative action is not arbitrary, capricious 
or illegal. Thus the denial of twenty-five of the applica­
tions must now be sustained.

6. The remaining five applications—A, 7, 13, 16 and 20 
—failed on the test of Adaptability. This is the most dif­

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law



58a

ficult criterion to evaluate. It is certainly not frivolous, 
especially when it is the opinion of an educator of thirty- 
two years experience. In certain circumstances, undoubt­
edly, the line of demarcation between it and racial dis­
crimination can be so clearly drawn, that it can be the 
foundation for withholding a transfer. Pupil A  exemplifies 
this hypothesis.

Ten or eleven years old, with an academic achievement 
“ on a grade level” , this boy wishes to transfer from Hoff- 
man-Boston Elementary School to Patrick Henry, also 
elementary. The latter is nearer his residence than is 
Hoffinan-Boston. But he leaves a school with lowest of 
all pupil-teacher ratio. His only advantage is one of dis­
tance; in good weather and subject to pedestrian traffic 
dangers, he could walk to Patrick Henry, about a half mile 
away, while the school bus would take him to Hoffman- 
Boston, 1.2 miles off, in perhaps less than his walking time.

The median of academic achievement for his grade at 
Hoffman-Boston is 3.9. As he is “ on grade level” this 
would indicate his standing. In Patrick Henry the same 
median is 6.0. The average mental maturity for the fifth 
grade in Hoffman-Boston is 87, while in Patrick Henry 
it is 113, a difference of twenty-six. Laying aside the 
physical circumstances, the court cannot say that Adapt­
ability, in view of the intelligence factors, is a capricious 
standard when applied to A. His transition could well be 
discouraging, if not disparaging, one from which a student 
may be lawfully saved by the judgment of the more ex­
perienced.

The circumstances of 7, 13, 16 and 20 are different from 
A ’s. They live in the former northern district of Hoffman- 
Boston; their homes are near Stratford Junior High School 
and within its region. Each of them stands above the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law



59a

median achievement score of Stratford. They have a com­
mon age of twelve years and they all would enter the first 
year of junior high school. They are a group formerly at­
tending Langston Elementary School together, presumably 
friends having common interests.

In these circumstances, having in mind also their rela­
tive academic standing, Adaptability could hardly bar 
them. The court finds no ground in the record to uphold 
the Boards’ refusal of the transfers of 7, 13, 16 and 20— 
Ronald Deskins, Michael Gerard Jones, Lance Dwight 
Newman and Gloria Delores Thompson.

Colophon

The length and detail of this statement were necessary 
to assure care and solicitude for the actions of State and 
local administrative agencies. It is an effort, too, to es­
tablish for cases of this character some design for decision.

A lbert V. Bryan 
United States District Judge

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

September 17th, 1958.



60a

Supplementary Order of Injunction

I n the

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
F or the E astern D istrict oe V irginia 

At Alexandria

[ same title]

Upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law filed 
herein on September 17, 1958 it is

Ordered that the defendants, their successors in office, 
agents, representatives, servants and employees be, and 
each of them is hereby, restrained and enjoined from re­
fusing to admit, enroll or educate plaintiffs Ronald Deskins, 
Michael Gerard Jones, Lance Dwight Newman and Gloria 
Delores Thompson to, or in, Stratford Junior High School, 
Arlington County, Virginia at the commencement of the 
second semester of the school session of 1958-1959, and the 
court retains jurisdiction of this cause for the purpose of 
enforcing this order and any prior orders, as well as to 
enlarge or restrict any of said orders, from time to time, 
and to grant further relief, general or special, in this 
cause.

Let copies hereof be mailed by the Clerk to counsel of 
record.

September 22, 1958.

A lbert V. B ryan 
United States District Judge



61a

In the

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
P oe the E astern D istrict of V irginia 

At Alexandria

[ same title]

Memorandum on Formulation o f  Decree on Mandate

The Court of Appeals has twice held in this case— 
against the instant contention of the defendants—that the 
enrollment or assignment of pupils need not follow the 
regimen of the Pupil Placement Act of Virginia, even as 
its procedure was shortened in 1958 and although the school 
fund cut-off and closure statutes are no longer effective. 
The history of the litigation clearly reveals these rulings.

September 17, 1958, the District Court concluded that 
the Act did not provide an adequate administrative remedy, 
failing for two basic reasons. Thompson v. County School 
Board, 166 P.Supp. 529. First, the Act’s procedure was 
found to be inexpeditious, and secondly, the apparent im­
partiality of the Act was found to be frustrated by the 
school fund cut-off and closure statutes. On January 19, 
1959 these statutes were unequivocally struck down by the 
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and by a Federal three- 
judge bench of this district. Harrison v. Day, 200 Va. 439, 
106 S.E.2d 636; James v. Almond, 170 F.Supp. 331. (They 
are now repealed.) Thereafter, the first and remaining 
reason for rejecting the Act—the sloth of the procedure— 
was upheld by two opinions of the Court of Appeals,



62a

despite the 1958 curtailment and despite the dissolution of 
the fund cut-off and closure statutes.

Both of these opinions came down after the two statutes 
had been nullified, as just noted, on January 19, 1959. That 
is to say, on January 23, 1959 the appellate court affirmed 
the order of this court of September 17, 1958, already men­
tioned, which we have seen had allowed the Pupil Place­
ment Act to be skipped as an administrative remedy 
because, first, it was not expeditious. Hamm et al. v. County 
School Board of Arlington County, 263 F.2d 226. Then, 
again, on March 19, 1959 the appeals court in the same 
case, in directing that the applications of the twenty-six 
unsuccessful Negro students be reviewed, ordered that the 
re-examination be made by “ the County School Board”, 
thereby shunning the Placement Act. 264 F.2d 945.

At the same time, these decisions held that the Pupil 
Placement Board was not an indispensable party to this 
litigation. Neither of these conclusions was altered by the 
Prince Edward County opinion, May 5, 1959, sub nom. 
Allen et al. v. County School Board. The stipulation then 
made by the Court of Appeals that there be submission to 
“ state laws as to the assignment of pupils” must be read 
against the background of the decisional history. So read, 
the words of the court clearly include only statutes afford­
ing ready administrative relief—a recognition the Court 
had denied to the Pupil Placement Act. Note, too, it is 
the School Board, not the Placement Board, which is re­
quired by the remand “ to receive and consider the appli­
cations” .

The authority having the immediate supervision of the 
schools, that is, the agency actually receiving or rejecting 
the pupils is the County School Board. Constitution of 
Virginia, Sec. 113; Harrison v. Day, supra, 200 Va. 439,

Memorandum on Formulation of Decree on Mandate



63a

106 S.E.2d 636, 646. For this reason, with the Pupil Place­
ment Act unrecognized as an acceptable administrative 
process, applications for school admissions must, semble, 
go to the School Board. The Placement Act, however, is 
still alive as between the School Board and the Placement 
Board. It divests the former, and invests the latter, of 
all assignment powers. Hence, the School Board must sub­
mit these applications to the Placement Board and, in the 
first instance, bow to the latter’s assignment prerogative. 
The court’s disregard of the Placement Act does not annul 
the A ct; it means only that the actual placements made by 
the School Board, even on orders of the Placement Board, 
are subject to review by the court, for racial discrimina­
tion, without resort by the pupil to the Placement Board.

But any order of revision on a review will bear directly 
upon the School Board as the body ultimately responsible, 
and immediately answerable, to the court for the physical 
enrollment and admission of all pupils. Of course the 
School Board must in the reception or rejection of the 
pupils follow the court decree, notwithstanding a different 
direction from the other Board. Nevertheless, if the Place­
ment Board desires to be heard in the review, the court 
will allow it to intervene, as a proper party in this case, 
to assert the validity of any assignment.

Accordingly, pursuant to the mandate of the Court of 
Appeals, an order of injunction will now be entered “direct­
ing the County School Board to re-examine the applica­
tions” of the twenty-six appellants and to advise them, on 
or before June 22, 1959, of the action taken on such re­
examination and the reasons therefor, the School Board to 
file a similar report at the same time with the court. Noth­
ing in the order will prevent the School Board from 
consulting the Pupil Placement Board in such re-examina­

Memorandum on Formulation of Decree on Mandate



64a

tion. The order will require that any exceptions to the 
report be filed within 7 days of the filing of the report, 
and will fix July 7, 1959 as the day for the hearing of any 
such exceptions.

The reconsideration of the applications and the action 
thereon must be without regard to race or color, and with 
the use only of just, reasonable and undiscriminating 
criteria fairly applied. Upon petition, leave will be granted 
the Pupil Placement Board to intervene in this action, as 
a party defendant, and be heard upon the report of the 
re-examination and any exceptions thereto, but the petition 
must be filed on or before July 3, 1959.

A lbebt Y. Bbyan 
United States District Judge

Memorandum, on Formulation of Decree on Mandate

June 3rd, 1959.



65a

I n the

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
F oe the E astern D istrict of V irginia 

At Alexandria

Decree on Mandate

[ same title]
----------------------------<3^ . ----------------------------

This cause came on to be heard on the 28th day of May, 
1959 in conference with all of counsel in chambers for the 
formulation of a decree upon the mandate received from 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
in this action on April 21, 1959, and thereupon counsel for 
the plaintiffs and for the defendants tendered drafts of 
proposed orders to be entered on the said mandate, and 
all parties submitted to the court for decision, without 
argument other than the statements of their respective 
positions as made in said conference, the question whether 
the Pupil Placement Act of Virginia, as amended in 1958, 
controlled the enrollment and assignment of pupils in this 
case, in view of the nullification of the so-called school fund 
cut-off and closure statutes of Virginia.

Upon consideration whereof, the court is of the opinion 
for reasons set forth in its memorandum dated June 3, 
1959, and filed herein, that the said Pupil Placement Act 
does not provide an adequate administrative remedy, and, 
therefore, it does not have to be pursued as a condition 
precedent to application to the court for relief from racial 
discrimination in the admission of pupils to the public



66a

schools of Arlington County, Virginia, and, therefore, it 
is now

Ordered that the defendant County School Board of 
Arlington County, he, and it is hereby, enjoined and 
directed to re-examine the applications for transfer, to be 
effective at the beginning of the 1959-60 school session, 
previously submitted by the twenty-six Negro students who 
were appellants herein; that the said applicants be advised, 
on or before June 22, 1959, of the action taken on their 
respective applications after said re-examination, together 
with the reasons therefor; that a report of said actions, 
with the reasons therefor, be filed with the court by the 
defendant School Board on or before June 22, 1959; that 
nothing herein shall be construed to prevent the defendant 
School Board from consulting with the Pupil Placement 
Board of Virginia in said re-examination; that any and all 
exceptions or objections to the said report be filed with 
the Clerk of this Court within seven (7) days after the 
filing of the said report; and that any and all exceptions 
and objections so filed be heard by the court on July 7, 
1959, commencing at ten o’clock A. M. Daylight Time.

It is further Ordered that leave be, and it is hereby, 
granted to the said Pupil Placement Board to intervene 
in this action, if it be so advised, provided the petition 
therefor be filed on or before July 3, 1959.

The court retains jurisdiction of this cause for the pur­
pose of enforcing this order and any prior orders, as well 
as to enlarge or restrict any of said orders, from time to

Decree on Mandate



67a

Decree on Mandate

time, and to grant further relief, general or special, in 
said cause.

Let copies hereof be mailed by the Clerk to counsel of 
record.

A lbert V. B ryan 
United States District Judge

June 5th, 1959.



68a

Filed: July 25, 1959

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 

I n the

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

F ob the E astern D istrict of V irginia 

At Alexandria

[ same title]

The petitioning twenty-two pupils, with four others,* 
were denied admittance to the “white” schools of Arlington 
County, Virginia for the 1958-59 session. Pursuant to the 
mandate of the Court of Appeals in this case, on the peti­
tioners’ appeal from the judgment here refusing to disturb 
the determination of the School Board, the Board has re­
considered their applications, to be effective in the session 
1959-60, and has again denied them. The applicants now 
ask this court to review the last decision of the School 
Board.

The criteria used by the School Board in 1958, and then 
for the most part approved by the court, have been em­
ployed by the Board in the present assignments. The 
criteria are still approved. But in some instances the ap­
plication of the criteria by the Board this time has not been 
uniform as between the white students and the Negro 
petitioners.

As pointed out in the findings and conclusions of this 
court in September, 1958, 166 F.Supp. 529, 535, reasonable

* These four did not renew their applications for the 1959-60 session.



69a

and fair tests for the applicants’ acceptance were then 
justified even though such criteria had not been used there­
tofore. This was because their admission presented an 
unexperienced situation. It was, of course, understood that 
thereafter the criteria would be applied evenly, without 
regard to the race or color of the pupil. The inequalities 
become apparent as we review each of the applications.

Rejection for Overcrowding

Pupils 1, 12, 19, and 21 were refused admission to Wash­
ington-Lee High School because of its overcrowded condi­
tion. These students, concededly, live in the Washington- 
Lee District. As transfers seeking Washington-Lee as their 
school in September, 1958, there was ground for turning 
them away when the school was already filled beyond capac­
ity. But now they cannot be singled out for rejection for 
overcrowding alone. The Board’s rejection of these four 
on this score cannot stand.

Rejection for Deficiency of Academic Accomplishment

The eighteen pupils—A, B, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 
14, 15, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 —now excluded for failure to 
meet the academic tests were, with the exception of A, 
turned down for the same reason in September, 1958.* A 
was then refused entrance only for want of “ adaptability” . 
That criterion has not been used this year in any instance. 
The reasoning on their rejection last year was that they 
were below the median achievement level of the white 
classes they desired to enter, and some of them under the 
National median as well. There were, of course, white

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

* In this review the parties relied, with slight exceptions, upon the ratings 
as proved at the September, 1958 trial.



70a

students in these classes under those levels, but the School 
Board was warranted in not increasing the number in a 
class below those lines.

Now, however, the classes are about to be constituted 
anew. Therefore, they cannot be declined admission to a 
class if other children of the lower-half standing are to 
be accepted. Should any classes be established with refer­
ence to the National median or some other standard, ad­
mitting only those above it, then any white or Negro pupil 
not possessing these qualifications could be excluded from 
those classes, provided all students were given an equal 
opportunity to enter such classes.

In this connection note is taken of the applicants’ conten­
tion that mental maturity or the intelligence quotient— 
the potential for learning—should be a measure for ad­
mittance rather than actual academic achievement. The 
School Board has, on substantial evidence, preferred the 
latter principle and the court cannot say its selection is 
unfounded.

Specifically, it appears that in academic accomplishment 
none of the eighteen now turned away, except 3 and 25, 
are under the lowest of the other students in the requested 
schools. According to the 1958 chart, the two excepted 
pupils were more than three years under the National norm, 
more than that under the “white” school median, and well 
behind the lowest white pupil’s standing. If this relative 
standing obtained in 1958-9, as the court is led to believe, 
there is a reasonable basis for not putting these two in 
the schools requested. Hence, none of the eighteen, except 
3 and 25, can now be refused admission solely on academic 
grounds.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law



71a

Rejection on Attendance Area Restrictions

The applications of 2, 3, 4, 9, 14, 15, 18, 23, 24, and 25 
have again been denied because they live outside the dis­
tricts of the schools sought. All of them live within the 
Hoffman-Boston School area. Five—2, 3, 14, 15, and 25— 
are senior high school students and Hoffman-Boston is the 
nearest school of that type to them. The Board has placed 
them there. The other five are junior high students. For 
them both Jefferson and Gunston are slightly closer, but 
they have been assigned to Hoffman-Boston Junior High.

Considering school bus routes, safety of access and other 
pertinent factors, it cannot be found that the School Board’s 
assignments are arbitrary or predicated on race or color. 
The bounds of Hoffman-Boston district do not deprive those 
within it of any advantage or privilege. Actually, they are 
afforded schools of better pupil-teacher ratio and of less 
congestion than any in the County. Proximity is not the 
only test. School divisions must at some points disregard 
neighborhood lines. The court cannot draw the boundaries 
for attendance areas.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Conclusion

To repeat, in the present assignments the criterion of 
overcrowding has been unevenly applied. This is also true 
of the test of academic achievement, except as to 3 and 25. 
With this exception, these rejections are contrary to law 
and must be vacated. As formerly, the psychological tests 
have not been sustained. The area attendance require­
ments, however, are upheld and pupils 2, 3, 4, 9, 14, 15, 18, 
23, 24, and 25 will remain as now assigned by the School 
Board. The result is that the following twelve petitioners 
will be admitted to the following schools:



72a

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Robert A. Eldridge to Patrick Henry Elementary

Leslie Hamm to Stratford Junior High

Charles L. Augins to Washington-Lee High

Dwight Carmichael to Stratford Junior High

Lessie Carmichael to Stratford Junior High

Algie Faggins to Stratford Junior High

Barbara Harrison to Stratford Junior High

Yvonne Holmes to Stratford Junior High

Warren Hunter to Washington-Lee High

Joyce Strother to Washington-Lee High

Stephen Thompson to Washington-Lee High

Anita Turner to Stratford Junior High

This statement is adopted by the court as its findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. The motion for a plan for 
desegregation will be denied at this time, as the orders in 
this case provide the relief and remedy contemplated by 
the plan. An appropriate order will be made by the court.

A lbert V. B ryan 
United States District Judge

July 25th, 1959.



73a

Filed: September 10, 1959

Order

I n the

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

F oe the E asteen D istrict oe V irginia 

At Alexandria

[ same title]

This cause came on to be heard on the 2nd day of Septem­
ber, 1959, on the motion of Alice A. Brown, et al. to inter­
vene herein as parties plaintiff and thereupon, counsel for 
defendants having advised the Court that defendants do not 
oppose said motion, it was by the Court Oedeeed that the 
motion of Alice A. Brown, et al. to intervene herein as 
parties plaintiff be and it hereby is granted; and it was 
F urther Ordered, upon consideration of the intervenors’ 
oral motion for summary judgment and the representations 
made in open court by counsel for the respective parties, 
that the defendant County School Board of Arlington 
County should, pursuant to and consistent with the previ­
ous orders of this Court in this cause, examine the applica­
tions for transfer and/or enrollment for the 1959-60 school 
session, previously submitted by the sixteen intervenors 
herein; that counsel for the said intervenors be advised, on 
or before September 7, 1959, of the action taken on their 
respective applications after said examination, together 
with the reasons therefor; that a report of said actions, 
with the reasons therefor, be filed with the Court by the 
defendant School Board on or before September 7, 1959;



74a

Order

that any and all exceptions or objections to the said report 
be filed with the Clerk of this Court within five (5) days 
after the filing of the said report; and that any and all 
exceptions and objections so filed be heard by the Court 
on the earliest convenient date thereafter, upon notice to 
the respective parties.

The Court retains jurisdiction of this cause for the pur­
pose of enforcing this order and any prior order, as well as 
to enlarge or restrict any of said orders, from time to time, 
and to grant further relief, general or special, in said cause.

A lbebt V . B ryan 
United States District Judge

September 10th, 1959



75a

Filed: September 15, 1959 

Order on Motion for Further Relief

1st the
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
F oe the E astern D istrict of V irginia 

At Alexandria

------------------------- — - -------------------- -------—

[ same title]

Upon consideration of the motion of the plaintiffs for 
further relief, filed June 29, 1959, the evidence and coun­
sel’s arguments thereon, it is by the Court, on its statement 
of findings of fact and conclusions of law filed July 25,1959,

Ordered that the defendants, their officers, agents and 
employees do not refuse admission and enrollment of plain­
tiffs Robert A. Eldridge to Patrick Henry School; Leslie 
Hamm, Dwight Carmichael, Lessie Carmichael, Algie Fag- 
gins, Barbara Harrison, Yvonne Holmes and Anita Turner 
to Stratford Junior High School; and Charles R. Augins, 
Warren Hunter, Joyce Strother, and Stephen Thompson to 
Washington-Lee High School, all at the opening of the 
said schools for the session commencing in September for 
1959-1960; and it is further

Ordered that the plaintiffs’ motion for further relief be, 
and it hereby is, denied as to Gary Boswell, Carlene A. 
Brevard, Gloria Brooks, Deidra G. Hallion, George H. 
Moore, Peggy Ann Moore, Gloria E. Rowe, Burnell Walker, 
Helen Walker and Janet Williams; and it is also



76a

Order on Motion for Further Relief

Ordered that the court retain jurisdiction of this cause 
for  the modification or enforcement of any order heretofore 
entered in this action and for any other or further relief.

At.bert V. Bryan 
United States District Judge

September 15th, 1959.



77a

Filed September 16, 1959 

Order on Report Filed September 8, 1959

I n the

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

F oe the E astern D istrict oe V irginia 

At Alexandria

[ same title]

This cause came on to be heard the 14tli day of Septem­
ber, 1959, again upon the Motion for Further Relief filed 
herein by plaintiffs on September 8, 1959 after the oral 
order of the court on September 2, 1959, which is now 
recited in the written order of September 10, 1959, direct­
ing the defendants on or before September 7, 1959 to advise 
the movants, and report to the court, the action taken by 
the defendants on the applications of the movants for trans­
fers, and was argued by counsel.

It appearing from the Report to the Court duly filed 
herein by defendants on September 8, 1959 (September 7 
being a legal holiday), that defendants upon examination of 
the said applications oppose the admission of Alice A. 
Brown, Elliott A. Brown, Mabra V. Brown, Marcia Brown, 
Jewel Green, Rosemarie Carmichael, Lillian L. Thompson, 
William Walker, and Deloris Wright into the schools to 
which they have applied, but that the said report gives no 
ground for refusing the admission of Oliver Brown, Jr., 
Sheila Roberta Eldridge, Jacqueline B. Faggins, Brenda 
B. Faggins, Joyce Battle, Bernard C. Hamm, and Delores 
E. Spinner into the schools to which they have applied, and 
it also appearing to the court from its examination of said



78a

Order on Report Filed September 8, 1959

applications that the last-named seven pupils reside in the 
districts of the schools hereinafter named, and that the said 
applications and the action thereon disclose no ground 
for refusing these pupils admission to the schools of their 
residence districts, it is

Ordered that the defendants, their successors in office, 
agents, representatives, servants and employees be, and 
each of them is now restrained and enjoined from refusing 
to admit, enroll or educate plaintiffs Oliver Brown, Jr., 
Jacqueline B. Faggins, Brenda B. Faggins, Joyce Battle, 
Bernard C. Hamm, and Delores E. Spinner to, or in, Strat­
ford Junior High School, and plaintiff Sheila Roberta Eld- 
ridge to, or in, Patrick Henry Elementary School; and it is 
further

Ordered that a hearing upon the remaning issues raised 
by plaintiffs’ Motion for Further Relief be and it hereby 
is continued to another day to be fixed; provided, that the 
movants not herein afforded immediate relief may be ad­
mitted, enrolled and educated, pendente lite, in the schools 
to which they have heretofore been assigned, without preju­
dice to the determination at the aforesaid hearing of any 
and all rights which they have heretofore asserted or may 
hereinafter assert; and

The Court retains jurisdiction of this cause for the pur­
pose of enforcing this order and any prior orders, as well as 
to enlarge or restrict any of said orders, from time to time, 
and to grant further relief, general or special, in this 
cause.

September 16, 1959.

A lbert V. B ryan 
United States District Judge



79a

Order on Unopposed Admission of Two Pupils

I n the

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

F ob the E astern D istrict of V irginia 

At Alexandria

[ same title]
---------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------ — .............

Upon consideration of the report of July 6, 1960, filed 
by the defendants on July 21, 1960, and of the statements 
of counsel for all parties at the hearings of this case on 
July 21, 1960 and on September 6, 1960, it appears to the 
Court that the defendants do not oppose the grant of the 
request of the following named pupils to the following 
designated schools, and, accordingly, it is

Ordered that the defendants do not further refuse admis­
sion of Vivian V. Funn to the kindergarten classes pro­
vided for the students of Patrick Henry School, the said 
kindergarten classes being held in the Claremont School 
in Arlington County, Virginia, and that the defendants do 
not further refuse admission of Sherman Jones to the 
sight-saving class at Page Elementary School in Arlington 
County, Virginia, a place for him now being available in 
said sight-saving class.

September 7th, 1960.

A lbert V. B ryan 
United States District Judge



80a

Filed: September 16, 1960 

Findings o f Fact and Conclusions o f Law

I n the

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

F oe the E astern D istrict op V irginia 

At Alexandria 
Civil Action 1341

[ same title]

This cause concerns the applications of twenty pupils 
for admission to certain of the public schools of Arlington 
County, Virginia, the petitioners alleging that entry to the 
schools has been denied them because they are of the negro 
race. For the 1960-61 session, now commencing, thirty-four 
negro students previously attending all-negro schools pre­
sented requests to be let into schools predominantly oc­
cupied by white children. Twelve of them were not opposed. 
An additional two applications at first were not acted upon 
because they asked for classes not then available; they 
have since been approved. Thus 14 of the 34 have now 
been admitted.

Of the remaining twenty applications twelve were re­
fused for academic reasons, and eight upon a geographical 
basis. In the use of these tests the Board, so the petitioners 
charge, have violated the injunction in this case against 
racial discrimination, in this: that, to begin with, these 
children unlike white children are automatically assigned 
to a school which is outside their school residence area, as 
prescribed by the regulations of the Board, and always to



81a

one of the all-negro schools of the County; that to enter 
their residence school, therefore, they must, again unlike 
white children, formally seek admission; and that thereupon 
and thereby they become subject to the tests laid down for 
student transfers, such as scholastic qualifications, while 
the white child does not have to stand this examination to 
get into his neighborhood school.

Obviously, any such use of the criteria of geographic and 
academic requisites would be a misuse, and could not be 
permitted. The defendants wholly and sincerely deny any 
thought of discrimination and, particularly, any unfair use 
of the test factors in passing upon the applications of the 
petitioners.

Additionally, the petitioners complain that the school dis­
tricts still follow the old lines that were set up in past 
years under the law to effect racial differentiation. They 
point to the Hoffman-Boston and Langston districts as still 
defined by the boundaries originally established for those 
areas, which are the two parts of the county where the 
negro population has historically been concentrated. These, 
it is urged, are no longer logical divisions and they serve 
to perpetuate the outlawed segregation.

Contra, the defendants aver that the districts are drawn, 
as far as practicable, in relation to the capacity of each 
school building—thirty pupils to the room. The lines effec­
tuate, too, the Board’s aim to keep each natural neighbor­
hood together for school attendance purposes. Other 
determinants of the bounds are the accessibility of the 
schools by foot and the avoidance of traffic hazards.

Considering each of the applications against these con­
tentions, it is found that pupils 1, 2, 14, 19, 20, 22, 26, 27, 
28 and 31, a total of ten, all live in the Stratford Junior 
High School district. They desire to enter that school, but

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law



82a

on academic and like grounds they are refused admission 
to Stratford School but are placed in Hoffman-Boston or 
Langston, both all-negro schools. Pupil 11 is in an analo­
gous position. His residence is the Thomas Jefferson 
Junior High School district but the same factors restrict 
him to the Hoffman-Boston school.

Clearly, as to these eleven students there was no ac­
ceptable foundation for their placement initially. None 
of them resided in the Hoffman-Boston district. The im­
mediate result was to force them to prosecute formal 
transfer proceedings. Thus the assignment was discrimina- 
tory in two obvious aspects. Now, return to their residence 
schools is blocked by their failure to meet the academic 
and related transfer tests.

In these circumstances the validity of the barring fac­
tors is not open for consideration, for even if all of them 
are sustainable in law, nevertheless they cannot stand in 
the way of the transfers here because they have been un­
equally invoked. His residence entitled each of the appli­
cants to enter the school he now asks for unless white 
children in his district, with the same deficiencies as his, 
were also being rejected on that account. Corresponding 
ratings among some of the white students did appear in 
the evidence, but it disclosed no rejections on that score.

For these reasons the Court does not find support in 
the record for the defendants’ denial of the applications of 
these eleven students.

Pupil 29 applied for the 10th grade in Washington-Lee 
High School, the secondary school nearest his home. Last 
session he was in Hoffman-Boston’s 9th grade, but he was 
not promoted at the end of the term. Moreover, Washing­
ton-Lee has no 10th grade. Therefore his application was 
not unreasonably denied.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law



83a

On residence disqualifications, transfers have been denied 
students 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, 24 and 25—eight in all. Nos. 5, 
6, 7 and 8 reside in the Langston attendance area and 4, 
15, 24 and 25 in the Hoffman-Boston. Ignoring the 
Hoffman-Boston lines on the assumption, arguendo, that 
they are vestiges of segregation as the petitioners charge, 
still the assignments there of students 4, 15, 24 and 25 do 
not necessarily evince discrimination. They wish to trans­
fer to Wakefield High School, but their homes are nearer 
Hoffman-Boston. Then, too, there are other reasons under­
girding this allocation, such as neighborhood and traffic 
considerations. Certainly, the decision of the Board is not 
without substantial evidential ground.

Pupils 5, 6, 7 and 8 want to go to Woodlawn School. 
But assuming invalidity, again arguendo, in the Langston 
district boundaries, and with these lines erased, the Board’s 
action still does not appear unreasonable. These four stu­
dents are inhabitants of a single neighborhood, almost as 
close to Langston School as to Woodlawn. Their assign­
ment to Langston can be as consistently accounted for by 
these circumstances as by an intention to foster segrega­
tion. The projection of the two jaws from the Woodlawn 
district northwardly might be argued as demonstrating a 
purpose to effectuate segregation, but this is only so in 
appearance. The suspicion is dispelled both by a considera­
tion of the purpose of the Board to carry neighborhoods 
into the schools intact, as well as by similar extensions of 
Page, Maury, McKinley, and other districts in which only 
white children are concerned. At all events, the determina­
tion was one well within the discretion of the Board, and 
as it may fairly rest on non-racial grounds, the Court will 
not presume the Board was improperly motivated.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law



84a

An order will be made overruling the assignments of 
the Board as to pupils 1, 2, 11, 14, 19, 20, 22, 26, 27, 28 
and 31, and restraining the defendants from further ex­
clusion of these eleven students from the schools for which 
they have petitioned. The Board’s judgment in reference 
to pupils 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, 24, 25 and 29 will not be disturbed. 
This means that Janice Blount, Wade Bowles, Jr., Samuel 
Curtis Graham, Deloris Wright, Carolyn Jones, Claude 
June, David Buffner, Vivian P. Buffner, Lillian Thompson 
and Diana Springs will be taken into Stratford Junior 
High School, and Henry Coleman into Thomas Jefferson 
Junior High School. The requests of the remaining nine 
of the twenty applicants will be refused.

Within ten (10) days the attorneys for the petitioners 
will submit an appropriate order, first presenting it to 
opposing counsel for consideration as to form.

A lbert V. B ey ax 

United States District Judge

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

September 16th, 1960.



85a

Filed: November 13, 1961 

Motion to Dissolve Injunction

I n  the

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
F oe the E astern D istrict of V irginia 

At Alexandria

[ same title]

Now come the defendants, County School Board of 
Arlington County, Virginia, and Ray E. Reid, Superinten­
dent of Schools of Arlington County, Virginia, and move 
this Honorable Court to deny the motion of the plaintiffs 
filed March 10, 1961 with respect to the athletic participa­
tion; to dissolve the permanent injunction heretofore 
entered against them on the 31st day of July, 1956; and 
to strike this case from the docket, on the following 
grounds:

1. The motion of the plaintiffs filed March 10, 1961 with 
respect to participation of certain of the plaintiffs in ath­
letic programs is moot in that the policy complained of 
has been rescinded.

2. The permanent injunction of July 31, 1956 was 
granted upon a finding by this Court that there was en­
forced by the defendants a policy, custom, usage and prac­
tice of segregating white and negro pupils in the public 
schools of Arlington County, Virginia; such policy, custom, 
usage and practice no longer exists and a continuation of 
said injunction is not necessary to protect the rights of 
the plaintiff and those similarly situated.



86a

Motion to Dissolve Injunction

3. The continuing injunction existing in this cause puts 
the defendants under a threat of contempt with respect to 
administrative decisions and actions affecting the limited 
class of persons represented by the plaintiff.

4. Since the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights 
of the plaintiffs no longer exists, the continuing supervi­
sion of the Federal Court by reason of said injunction over 
administration of the school system of Arlington County 
with respect to admission and enrollments, constitutes an 
unnecessary and undesirable interference by the Federal 
Government with officials of the sovereign State of Virginia 
in the conduct of a purely local non-federal activity.

5. The sworn Report of the County School Board of 
Arlington County and the Superintendent of Schools, at­
tached hereto, is adopted as an affidavit in support of this 
motion.

County S chool B oard of 
A rlington County, V irginia

By E lizabeth P. Campbell 
Chairman

R ay E. R eid
Superintendent of Schools

F rank  L. B all

1437 N. Court House Road 
Arlington, Virginia

J ames H. S immonds

1500 N. Court House Road 
Arlington, Virginia
Counsel for Defendants



87a

Filed: November 13, 1961

Report of the County School Board of Arlington 
County Dated November 9, 1961

I n the

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
F ob the E astern D istrict of V irginia 

At Alexandria

[ same title]

Upon allegations in the Bill of Complaint that

“ Pursuant to a policy, practice, custom and usage of 
segregating on the basis of color all children attending 
the public schools of [Arlington] County, defendants, 
and each of them, and their agents and employees, 
maintain and operate separate public schools for negro 
children and children who are not negroes. * * * ”

This Court entered an order on July 31, 1956, by which 
this Board, the Division Superintendent for Arlington 
County and the employees of the Board, etc. were:

“ Restrained and enjoined from refusing on account of 
race or color to admit to, or enroll or educate in, any 
school under their operation, control, direction or super­
vision, any child otherwise qualified for admission to, 
and enrollment and education in, such school.”

On March 27, 1961, pursuant to Section 22-232.30 of the 
Code of Virginia, as amended, the County Board of Arling­
ton County upon a recommendation of this Board, adopted 
an ordinance electing to be bound by Article 1.2 of Chapter 
12, Title 22 of the Code of Virginia, as amended, being



88a

Report of County School Board of Arlington County

Sections 22-232.18 to 22-232.31 inclusive. The authority for 
placement of pupils was thereby given to this Board for 
the school year 1961-62, which commenced in September, 
1961. A certified copy of such ordinance of the County 
Board of Arlington County is attached hereto, marked Ex­
hibit A.

Subject to the anticipated adoption of such ordinance, 
rules and policies as to admission and procedures for place­
ment or assignment of pupils were adopted by this Board 
at a regular meeting held March 16, 1961. A copy is at­
tached marked Exhibit B.

For the school year 1961-62, the Placement Officer ap­
pointed as agent by this Board, received written applica­
tions from 133 negro pupils to be enrolled in schools in 
which a majority, and in some cases, all of the pupils were 
white. All were granted except 18, which were denied by 
the Pupil Placement Officer because the applicants did not 
live in the attendance area of the school to which applica­
tion was made. One such denial was appealed to this Board 
pursuant to said Article 1.2 and the aforesaid Buies, and 
the denial was approved and affirmed. No further action 
was taken by the parents.

At the present time there are 146 negroes attending 12 
schools formerly attended by white pupils only.

On or about March 10, 1961, certain of the plaintiffs in 
this suit filed a motion for an injunction restraining the 
defendants from enforcing any policy or regulation requir­
ing racial segregation in interscholastic sports activities. 
No action has been taken by the Court. However, by action 
of this Board at a regular meeting held September 21, 1961, 
a resolution was adopted rescinding such policy or regula­
tion. A certified copy is attached hereto as Exhibit C.



89a

Report of County School Board of Arlington County

There now exists no policy, practice, custom or usage of 
segregating, on the basis of race or color, any children at­
tending the public schools of Arlington County.

T he County S chool B oard op A rlington 
County, V irginia

B y E lizabeth P. Campbell 
Chairman

B y R ay E. R eid 
Superintendent

State op V irginia,
County of A rlington, To-wit:

This day personally appeared before me, the undersigned 
Notary Public, Elizabeth P. Campbell and Ray E. Reid, 
who being first duly sworn, stated on oath that they have 
read the foregoing report to which their names are signed, 
and that the facts stated therein are true to the best of their 
knowledge and belief.

Given under my hand and seal this 9th day of November, 
1961.

L loyd H. P rosise, Sr. 
Notary Public

My commission expires:

“ My Commission Expires September 8th, 1963”



90a

EXHIBIT A

AN ORDINANCE PROVIDING FOR THE LOCAL 
ENROLLMENT OR PLACEMENT OF PUPILS IN THE 
ARLINGTON COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEMS, 
TO BE DESIGNATED AS SECTION 27-5 OF THE 
CODE OF THE COUNTY OF ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA, 
TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

Sec. 27-5. BE IT ORDAINED, that upon the recom­
mendation of the Arlington County School Board, the 
County of Arlington hereby elects to be bound by the 
provisions of Title 22, Chapter 12, Article 1.2 of the 
Code of Virginia of 1950, as amended, and the provi­
sions of Title 22, Chapter 12, Article 1.2 are hereby 
adopted by reference as though set forth in full herein.

I hereby certify that the above is a true copy of an ordi­
nance adopted by the County Board of Arlington County, 
Virginia, on March 25, 1961.

Given under my hand this 27th day of March, 1961.

/s /  P hyllis L. F errari 
P hyllis L. F errari, 

Cleric to County Board



91a

EXHIBIT B

ARLINGTON COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
Office of the Superintendent

RULES AND POLICIES AS TO ADMISSION 
AND PROCEDURES FOR PLACEMENT OR 

ASSIGNMENT OF PUPILS

I. A uthority.

The enrollment and placement of pupils in the Arling­
ton Schools are made in accordance with Chap. 71, 
Acts of Assembly, Extra Session (1959), Title 22, 
Chapter 12, Article 1.2, Sections 22-232.18 through 
22-232.31, Code of Virginia 1950 as amended, and in 
accordance with the Regulations of the State Board of 
Education and Rules of the School Board of Arlington 
County pertaining to the same.

II. A dmissions.

A. Eligibility. Pupils are eligible to attend the Arling­
ton public schools:
1. If they reach their fifth birthday before October 

1 (Kindergarten); or
2. If the reach their sixth birthday before October 

1 (Primary); and
3. If they have not pased their twenty-first birth­

day; and
4. If they have not been granted a high school 

diploma; and
5. If their parents or guardians live in Arlington 

County.



92a

B. Conditions of Entrance. Pupils entering school for 
the first time must be assigned to a specific school 
under the statutes, regulations and rules governing 
assignments, and in addition, present the following:
1. Birth certificate.
2. Evidence of a successful smallpox vaccination.
3. Evidence of a recent physical examination.
4. Such other information as may be necessary for 

proper assignment.
C. Admissions are on an annual basis and students 

may not initially enter the first grade or kinder­
garten classes after October 15.

III. General P olicy.

Attendance areas or districts are fixed by the School 
Board from time to time. Subject to the School Board 
policy that no child shall be compelled to attend a 
school in which his race is in the minority, students 
shall be placed and assigned to the school district in 
which he resides.

IV. Special Cases.

Special Classes or Schools

A. In those instances wherein the scholastic aptitude, 
academic achievement, mental ability or physical 
ability of a student indicates the desirability of 
assignment to a special class or to a special school 
which may be outside the student’s attendance dis­
trict, such assignment may be made by the Place­
ment Officer on the basis of a recommendation made 
by the Coordinator of Special Services.

Exhibit B



93a

Residence Change Within Arlington
B. Students changing their residence from one school 

district to another within Arlington County may 
be authorized by the Pupil Placement Officer to 
complete the year in the school district from which 
they are moving. In these instances the parents of 
the students shall have the responsibility for trans­
portation.

Residence Change Within Arlington—Seniors
C. Senior high school students changing their residence 

from one school district to another within Arlington 
County and who have completed two years or a 
major portion thereof in the same high school at 
the time of said change in residence, may be re­
quired by the Pupil Placement Officer to return to 
that high school for the 12th grade. In these in­
stances the parents of the students shall have the 
responsibility for transportation.

Residence Change Into Arlington
D. Students changing their residence into Arlington 

County may be assigned to the school which they 
will attend by the Pupil Placement Officer provided:
1. Proof of occupancy of the Arlington residence 

within 30 days is submitted; and
2. Parent agrees to pay tuition if Arlington resi­

dency is not established within 30 days; and
3. Parent assumes responsibility for transporta­

tion.
Custodial Care

E. Elementary students receiving custodial care either 
before or after school, or both, and residing in an-

Exhibit B



94a

other school district, may be assigned by the Pupil 
Placement Officer to the school in the district in 
which he receives such care.

Informal Custody
F. Students who have been temporarily assigned by 

their parents to a relative or other responsible adult 
may be assigned by the Pupil Placement Officer to 
the school in the district in which such custody is 
being provided. In these instances the parents will 
be required to submit:
1. A written statement by the person or persons 

assuming responsibility for the welfare of such 
child.

2. A written statement from the parents assigning 
temporary custody to said person.

V . N o k -B esident P u pils .

Tuition Policy
A. It shall be the policy of the Arlington County School 

Board that non-resident students will not be ac- 
cepted for enrollment in the Arlington schools ex­
cept as follows:

Residence Change Out of Arlington
1. Students whose residence changes to a location 

outside of Arlington County after the start of 
the school year may complete that year in the 
Arlington schools on a tuition basis.

Residence Change-—Seniors
2. A senior high school student who has completed 

two years or a major portion thereof in the same 
high school at the time of change of residence

Exhibit B



95a

may attend the 12th grade in that high school 
on a tuition basis.

Foster Home Cases
3. Children placed in Arlington County foster 

homes by a neighboring Department of Public 
Welfare may attend Arlington Schools on a 
tuition basis under a contractual agreement be­
tween the Arlington County School Board and 
the Department of Welfare concerned.

Non-Resident Staff Members’ Children
4. Children of non-resident staff members may be 

permitted to attend the Arlington schools on a 
tuition basis.

Exceptional Cases
5. In exceptional circumstances an individual stu­

dent may be permitted to attend the Arlington 
schools on a tuition basis.

Tuition Payment
In all instances described above it will be necessary 
that the student be assigned by the Pupl Placement 
Officer before the student may be enrolled. All tuition 
fees will be payable in advance on an annual, semi­
annual or monthly basis.

VI. A ssignment P rocedures.

A. Initial Placements.

1. HowTard R. Bovee is hereby designated the agent 
of the County School Board of Arlington County 
(hereafter called Pupil Placement Officer) to 
make initial placements pursuant to and in ac­
cordance with the authority mentioned in Para-

Exhibit B



96a

graph I, and in accordance with established 
policies of this Board. All such placements 
must be made not later than April 15 preceding 
the school year to which placements are to be 
applicable and shall become final within ten days 
after notices thereof have been mailed to the 
last known address of the parents, guardians or 
other persons having custody of the pupils so 
placed and copies thereof delivered by mail, or 
otherwise, to the office of the principal of the 
school in which the pupil has been placed. The 
mailing of the notices of placement as required 
herein shall be prima facie evidence of receipt 
of same.

2. Application to Particular Schools. Any child 
who has not previously attended the public 
schools, any child whose residence has been 
moved from a county, city or town in which 
such child formerly attended school and any 
child who wishes to attend a school other than 
the school which he attended the preceding 
school year shall not be eligible for placement in 
a particular school unless application is made 
therefor, on or before April 5 preceding the 
school year to which the placement requested is 
to be applicable, by the parent, guardian or 
other person having custody of such child to the 
division superintendent having control of the 
school to which such child seeks admission. 
Such application shall be in writing on forms 
provided therefor by the State Board of Edu­
cation, and which forms may be obtained from 
any principal or from the superintendent’s of­
fice. The parent, guardian or person having

Exhibit B



97a

custody of any child whose residence in Arling­
ton County is established after March 5, shall 
make application for assignment, within 30 days 
after such residence is established. The action 
of the Pupil Placement Officer in making the 
placement of any pupil whose parent, guardian, 
or other person having custody of such pupil 
fails to make application within the time pro­
vided above, shall be final.

3. General Enrollment in Kindergarten and First 
Grade.
Parents of children seeking enrollment in Kin­
dergarten or First Grade shall submit registra­
tion forms to the principals prior to April 5. 
For the convenience of the Pupil Placement 
Officer the principals shall transmit to him not 
later than April 10 addressed forms of notice 
of assignment for each pupil seeking enrollment.

4. General Enrollment in Secondary Schools.
On or before April 5, for the convenience of the 
Pupil Placement Officer, the principal of each 
elementary and junior high school shall prepare 
a written notice of assignment for the coming 
school year, addressed to the parents, guardian 
or person having custody of each sixth and 
ninth grade student who is expected to be pro­
moted. These forms shall be transmitted to the 
Pupil Placement Officer prior to April 10.

5. General Enrollment of Students New to Arling­
ton County.
All students new to Arlington County seeking 
admission in grades above the first shall register

Exhibit B



98a

with the principal of the school in which district 
the student resides, on or before April 5 for 
the next school year. For the convenience of the 
Pnpil Placement Officer the principal shall pre­
pare a written notice of assignment, addressed 
to the parent, guardian or person having cus­
tody of each such new student. These forms 
shall promptly be submitted to the Pupil Place­
ment Officer.

B. Appeals.
An appeal from any placement shall be made in the 
manner and within the time prescribed by Sections 

22-232.21, et seq., of the Code of Virginia, as 
amended.

VII. P recedence of Statutes and R egulations of the 
State B oard of E ducation.

In the event any of Rules and Policies set forth herein 
is, or becomes in conflict with applicable statutes of 
Virginia or Regulations of the State Board of Educa­
tion, the said Statutes and Regulations shall prevail.

Adopted by the County School Board of Arlington 
County, Virginia on the 16th day of March, 1961, sub­
ject to adoption of the ordinance by the County Board 
of Arlington.

By Barnard Joy 
Chairman 

E. J. Braun 
Clerk

Exhibit B



99a

EXHIBIT C

Regular School Board Meeting # 5  
September 21,1961 

1961-62

A regular meeting of the Arlington County School Board 
was held on Thursday, September 21, 1961, at 8 :05 p. m. 
in the Board Room, 1426 North Quincy Street, Arlington, 
Virginia.

Those present were:
Mrs. Elizabeth P. Campbell, Chairman of the Board;
Mr. L. Lee Bean, Vice-Chairman of the Board;
Dr. Barnard Joy )
Mr. Robert A. Peek ) Members of the Board;
Mr. James G. Stockard )
Mr. Ray E. Reid, Division Superintendent;
Dr. E. J. Braun, Asst. Superintendent for Finance & Busi­

ness Management and Clerk of the Board;
Mr. Howard R. Bovee, Asst. Superintendent for General 

Administration and Deputy Clerk of the Board;
Dr. Joseph B. Johnson, Asst. Superintendent for Instruc­

tion, and
Mr. Charles J. Walsh, Asst. Superintendent for Personnel.

Mr. Stockard moved that the Arlington County School 
Board rescind its action of September 21, 1959 adopt­
ing as School Board Policy the Virginia House Joint 
Resolution #97 concerning participation in athletic 
events.

Mr. Bean seconded the motion which was passed by a 
vote of 4-1 with Mr. Peck voting in the negative.



100a

I, Howard R. Bovee, Deputy Clerk of the County School 
Board of Arlington County, Virginia, do hereby certify 
that the foregoing is a true copy of an excerpt from the 
meeting of the County School Board of Arlington County, 
Virginia, held on September 21, 1961; and that the same 
has not been altered, amended or revoked as of this date.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and affixed 
and attested the corporate seal of the County School Board 
of Arlington County, Virginia, this 3rd day of October, 
1961.

ATTEST:

/ s /  H. R. B ovee 

Deputy Clerk,
Arlington County School Board 
Arlington, Virginia

Exhibit C



101a

Filed December 28,1961 

Motion for Further Relief

I n the
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
F oe the E astern D istrict oe V irginia 

Alexandria Division

[ same title]

Plaintiffs move the Court to grant them further, neces­
sary and general relief as herein prayed; and, in support 
of said motion, say:

1. In its May 17, 1954, opinion in Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U. S. 483, the Supreme Court found that 
segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis 
of race deprives the children of the minority group of 
equal educational opportunities and H eld: that Negro 
children are deprived of the equal protection of the laws 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment when, because 
of their race, they are separated in the public schools from 
others of similar age and qualifications.

2. The Supreme Court has further held that state au­
thorities are duty bound to devote every effort toward 
initiating desegregation and bringing about the elimina­
tion of racial discrimination in the public school system; 
and, further, the Supreme Court directed the United States 
District Courts to scrutinize the program of the school 
authorities to make sure that they had developed arrange­
ments pointed toward the earliest possible completion of



102a

desegregation and had taken appropriate steps to pnt this 
program into effective operation.

3. By order herein entered on July 31, 1956, the defend­
ants were “ restrained and enjoined from refusing on ac­
count of race or color to admit to, or enroll or educate in, 
any school under their operation, control, direction, or 
supervision any child otherwise qualified for admission to, 
and enrollment and education in such school.”

4. The defendants have not complied with their duty to 
bring about the elimination of racial discrimination in the 
public school system; neither have they evinced a purpose 
or intention of doing so. To the contrary, as hereinafter 
illustrated and in other particulars as well, the defendants 
have followed and expect to continue a course of action 
which will continue indefinitely, if not perpetually, the 
racially segregated character of certain schools as schools 
which none but Negroes attend and in which none but 
Negroes teach and as the only schools in which Negroes 
may teach, viz: the Hoffman-Boston School (including 
elementary, junior high, and senior high aspects thereof), 
the Drew-Kemper Elementary School (including the sev­
eral units thereof, e.g., Drew School, Drew Annex, and 
Kemper School), and the Langston Elementary School.

5. Before this litigation was commenced, the defendants 
had defined the boundaries of the attendance area of each 
of the above named schools so as to include therein as 
many Negro residents as. practicable and to exclude there­
from as many white residents as could be excluded.

6. Langston Elementary School is located near the cen­
ter of the northwestern one-half of the county. Lee High­
way, a principal traffic artery, separates Nottingham,

Motion for Further Relief



103a

Marshall and Taylor elementary school districts to the 
north from Lee, Langston, Woodlawn, and Page elemen­
tary school districts to the south; except to the extent that 
Langston District has a salient to the north of Lee High­
way, generally bounded by North Dinwiddle Street, North 
Columbus Street, and Lee Highway, wherein Negro fami­
lies reside. The western boundary of Langston District is 
defined by Mason Drive, except for a small rectangle pro­
truding to the west of Mason Drive, where Negro families 
reside. The eastern line of Langston District passes so 
near Langston School that many white families residing 
quite close to Langston School, e.g., in the vicinity of 21st 
and Brandywine Streets, are within the attendance area 
of the much more distant Woodlawn Elementary School.

7. The Drew-Kemper and Hoffman-Boston elementary 
school units are located in the southern part of the county. 
Generally speaking, the Shirley Memorial Highway de­
fines the southeastern boundary of each. One of the two 
noncontiguous divisions of the Fairlington Elementary 
School District lies to the southeast and the other to the 
Southwest of the Drew-Kemper Elementary School Dis­
trict, The Hoffman-Boston Elementary School District, at 
its northern end, extends southwardly across the Shirley 
Memorial Highway, the purpose of this extension having 
been to include therein, and exclude from the Oak Eidge 
Elementary School District, the residences of Negroes 
who lived in the vicinity of Nash Street when the boundary 
was first drawn. The six distinct courses in the northern 
(or northwestern) boundary line of the Hoffman-Boston 
District and the four distinct courses in the northern (or 
northwestern) boundary line of the Drew-Kemper District 
follow lines which generally separate the residences of 
white and Negro families in that part of the county.

Motion for Further Relief



104a

8. Hoffman-Boston School is and continues to be the 
only school unit in the county in which all elementary 
grades, all junior high school grades, and all high school 
grades, or all of the grades at more than one of such 
levels, are taught. Hereto attached as “ Exhibit ‘A ’ ”, and 
by this reference made a part hereof, is a table prepared 
by the Department of Research of Arlington County 
Public Schools showing the name of each school and the 
number of children in each grade at each school as of 
September 30, 1961.

9. The junior high school district of the Hoffman-Boston 
School is identical with the combined elementary sehool 
districts of the Drew-Kemper and Hoffman-Boston schools. 
The Hoffman-Boston Junior High School District geo­
graphically separates the Gunston Junior High School 
District into two distinct parts. Were it not for the pur­
pose and intent of the defendants to deny a racially de­
segregated education to the students now attending Hoff­
man-Boston School, the 428 junior high school students 
now attending Hoffman-Boston School might conveniently 
join the 1149 students of similar age and qualification now 
attending Gunston Junior High School or the 741 students 
of similar age and qualification now attending Jefferson 
Junior High School, or they might be attending other 
junior high schools in the county with children of similar 
age and qualification. Solely because they are Negroes 
they, unlike all others of similar age and qualification, are 
required to attend junior high school classes in a school 
the administration of which must accommodate children of 
all grades from kindergarten through grade twelve.

Motion for Further Relief



105a

10. The senior high school district of Hoffman-Boston 
School is identical with the combined elementary school 
districts of the Drew-Kemper and the Hoffman-Boston 
Schools. As a senior high school district, Hoffman-Boston 
is surrounded by the Wakefield Senior High School Dis­
trict. Solely because they are Negroes, the 191 senior 
high students presently attending Hoffman-Boston are sep­
arated from the 2114 students of similar age and qualifica­
tion now enrolled at Wakefield High School, from the 1997 
students of similar age and qualification now enrolled at 
Washington-Lee High School and from the 1349 students 
of similar age and qualification now enrolled at Yorktown 
High School. Solely because they are Negroes the}7, unlike 
all others of similar age and qualification, are required to 
attend senior high school classes in a school the adminis­
tration of which must accommodate children of all grades 
from kindergarten through grade twelve.

11. The defendants have always permitted and will con­
tinue to permit all white children residing in the attend­
ance area of Langston Elementary School or of Drew- 
Kemper Elementary School or in either of the attendance 
areas of Hoffman-Boston School to attend school outside 
the area of any such child’s residence; but the defendants 
refuse such permission when sought by Negro children 
similarly situated. On or about 16 March 1961 the defend­
ant school board adopted certain Rules and Policies as to 
Admission and Procedures for Placement or Assignment 
of Pupils, Section III of which reads as follows: “Attend­
ance areas or districts are fixed by the School Board from 
time to time. Subject to the School Board policy that no 
child shall be compelled to attend a school in which his 
race is in the minority, students shall be placed and as­
signed to the school district in which he resides.”

Motion for Further Belief



106a

12. Florence B. Jeffries, plaintiff herein, made timely 
request that the defendants permit her children, Julia Ann 
Jeffries and George B. Jeffries, infant plaintiffs, herein, 
to attend Thomas Jefferson Junior High School. Said 
plaintiffs live within the attendance area of Hoffman- 
Boston Junior High School; however, had they been white 
persons similarly situated with respect to residence, their 
requested assignment to Jefferson Junior High School 
would have been granted under and pursuant to Section III 
of the defendants’ Rules quoted in the paragraph next 
preceding. Under date of April 3, 1961, the defendants’ 
pupil placement officer denied said request and assigned 
each of said children to Hoffman-Boston School. * * *

13. The defendants refused the requested assignments 
solely because of race and color; it being their policy, 
practice, custom and usage to require Negro students liv­
ing in the attendance areas of Langston Elementary 
School, Drew-Kemper Elementary School or Hoffman- 
Boston School to attend the school serving the area of 
residence although white students similarly situated as to 
residence are expressly exempted from such requirement.

14. * * * in those schools which children of both races 
attend, the defendants conduct or permit others to conduct 
recreational * * * extracurricular activities in which Negro 
students are not permitted to participate on the same basis 
as white students similarly situated are permitted to par­
ticipate.

# # ■ # #
20. On or about the 9th day of November, 1961, the 

defendants served counsel for the plaintiffs with notice 
that on Monday, November 27, 1961, they would move 
the Court to dissolve the injunction hereinabove referred

Motion for Further Belief



107a

to. Plaintiffs believe and allege that the defendants seek 
dissolution of said injunction in order that the execution 
of their plans and policies designed to continue the racially 
segregated character of Langston, Drew-Kemper and 
Hoffrnan-Boston schools might be facilitated.

21. The past, present and contemplated actions of the 
defendants designed to separate and to continue to sepa­
rate Negro children from others of similar age and quali­
fication solely because of their race deprives such children 
of their rights to liberty and to the equal protection of the 
laws, all to the irreparable injury to the plaintiffs and 
others similarly situated.

W herefore, plaintiffs pray:

A. That the defendants’ Motion to Dissolve Injunction 
be denied.

# * # #
C. That the defendants be enjoined and restrained 

forthwith from requiring any senior high school student 
to attend Hoffman-Boston School; that being not only a 
school which none but Negroes attend, but also being the 
only public school in the county in which senior high school 
students are mingled with students of other ages and 
qualifications and are separated from others of their own 
age and qualification.

D. That the defendants be enjoined and restrained from 
any and all action which regulates or affects or which will 
permit other persons to regulate or affect on a basis of 
race or color the use and enjoyment of any public school 
property or facility.

Motion for Further Relief



108a

Motion for Further Relief

E. That the defendants be required to submit to the 
Court a plan for the racial desegregation of the public 
school system of Arlington County.

F. That the Court will restrain and enjoin the defen­
dants from undertaking or proceeding with any school 
construction or with any addition to any school building 
until such time as the defendants will have proposed and 
the Court will have approved a plan to bring about the 
elimination of racial discrimination in the public school 
system of Arlington County.

# # # #
H. That the Court grant the plaintiff such other, fur­

ther and general relief as the nature of the case may 
require.

N o t e  : See pages 129a-131a and 135a f o r  explanation of 
omissions and amendments.



Excerpts From Transcript o f Proceedings' 
February 8, 1962

—3—
*  *  *  #  #

The Court: All right. Let’s proceed with the Thompson 
case.

Mr. Beeves: Indulge me, Mr. Simmonds.
For purposes of proceeding today, Tour Honor, we 

wish to withdraw the motion for further relief insofar as 
it requests affirmative relief and allow it to stand merely 
as a responsive pleading to the motion to dissolve the 
injunction.

By the same token, we also wish to withdraw the com­
plaint in intervention.

The Court: Let me see the file there, Mr. Clerk.
- 4 —

Mr. Beeves: And the motion.
The Court: It is that one right there.
The Clerk: Complaint for intervention and the motion 

to intervene.
The Court: I assume that Mr. Simmonds and Mr. Ball 

have no objection to withdrawing the motion to intervene.
Mr. Ball: We have no objections, sir.
The Court: On motion for counsel for the Plaintiffs for 

leave to withdraw the motion to intervene together with 
the complaint in intervention and without objection of 
counsel for the Defendants, the motion is granted and the 
papers are withdrawn.

Mr. Beeves: Our second motion is to withdraw the mo­
tion for further relief insofar as it seeks affirmative relief 
and allow it to stand as an answer or response to the motion 
to dissolve the injunction.

The Court: In other words, if I understand you cor­
rectly, Mr. Beeves, you want your motion for further relief



110a

Motions

to be considered as an answer to the Defendants’ motion 
to dissolve the injunction?

Mr. Reeves: That is correct, sir.
—5—

The Court: And that you wish to strike therefrom—
Mr. Reeves: The prayers for affirmative relief.
The Court: All of the prayers recited therein.
Mr. Reeves: Except, I think, the first prayer asks that 

the motion to dissolve to be denied.
The Court: Other than the motion to dissolve be denied.
Mr. Reeves: That is correct, sir.
The Court: All right. Mr. Simmonds and Mr. Ball, do 

you have any objection to that?
Mr. Simmonds: No objections.
The Court: The motion is granted and the motion for 

further relief filed by the Plaintiffs will be considered by 
the Court as an answer to the Defendants’ motion to 
dissolve the injunction, and their motion to withdraw all 
of the prayers recited in the motion for further relief with 
the exception of prayer “A ”, which reads that the Defend­
ants’ motion to dissolve injunction be denied is granted 
and the prayer is stricken from this paper.

That leaves only for the Court’s consideration the motion 
to dissolve filed by the Defendants, of course, to which 
motion the Plaintiffs object.

All right, Mr. Simmonds and Mr. Ball.
*  #  #  #  #

— 10—

The Court: I understand now in Arlington the State 
Pupil Placement Board has no functions whatsoever.

Mr. Simmonds: That is correct.
In March and April of 1961 procedures were adopted 

and announced and the criterion by which the Arlington 
County School Board placed pupils was left solely on the



111a

Colloquy

basis of attendance areas. The psychological tests, adapt­
ability, and even the academic achievement were not used 
as criteria.

There are exceptional cases applying to both colored and 
white where there is an extreme retardation where they 
can be sent to special classes, but I think that presents 
no problem. There is no distinction as to race.

Pursuant to this and after—
The Court: What is this exception, and I am just briefly 

looking over this file, that refers to, I believe, you have an 
exception that is the policy or law! I do not know which 
it is, that does not require any student, colored or white, 
to attend the school even though he lives in that district 
in which a majority of his race is not enrolled or something 
to that effect.

Mr. Simmonds: Yes.
— 11—

The Court: Is that a law or policy or what ?
Mr. Simmonds: It is a policy of the Board which is set 

forth in their assignment provision that in any situation 
in which a pupil is in attendance area which would require 
his attendance at a school in which his race is in a minority, 
he would have the right to apply for transfer to another 
school.

The Court: Is the transfer discretionary or absolute?
Mr. Simmonds: It is absolute.
The Court: If he falls within that category!
Mr. Simmonds: It is, I think, granted in every case 

both in Negroes and to white pupils. If they are in a racial 
minority, they have a right to apply to go out.

The Court: That means in substance from a practical 
standpoint that students living in what we will refer to 
as the Hoffman-Boston or Langston or Fall’s Hill—I do



112a

Colloquy

not know them by name—long existing areas due to where 
they live no white children could be compelled or would 
be assigned to that school, is that correct?

Mr. Simmonds: Not against their wishes, that is right. 
If they wish to move out, they could do so.

The Court: I assume, and I may be incorrect, that there 
are some white families, for example, living in what we will 
call the Langston area. Are they originally assigned to the

— 12—

Langston School and then are re-assigned under this mi­
nority rule on affirmative action on their part or what is 
the policy?

Mr. Simmonds: It can be done two ways and actually the 
first in the first instance in the administration of the plan 
you got a situation where you have, we will have a number 
of people falling in those categories of having the privilege 
of asking for transfer out. They either assign them ini­
tially to attendance areas in which they live or on the 
assumption that they will apply out to assign them there 
with the notice that they have a right to ask for admission 
into the other school.

At the time this thing last June—
The Court: Does that also apply, that same rule apply, 

being in somewhat familiar with the makeup of Arlington, 
I will call it the Lexington Street area, which, of course, 
I know is predominantly, this area is predominantly made 
up of white persons who live in that neighborhood, but 
there are more than one colored family living within that 
neighborhood which the geographical area I assume would 
be to that specific school?. Are those colored students as­
signed to the white school there and then if they want to 
go to a colored school, they ask for a transfer and would be 
transferred?



113a

Colloquy

Mr. Simmonds: As I say, in 1961, it was done in this 
fashion, that when before any assignments were initially

—13—
made by the assignment officer, those persons who were 
in that unique situation of being in an area in which their 
race was a minority, were advised by the placement officer 
that historically people in that area had attended such and 
such school and that it would be assumed that they would 
want to continue in such school unless he was advised 
to the contrary, and that was sent out sometime before the 
necessary date for getting those responses. In every case 
where anyone indicated that they preferred a school either 
in his own attendance area or if he preferred a school 
being in a minority in another area, that request was 
honored and he was assigned to accordingly.

I might say that in connection with the request for trans­
fers in the past year, there were 133 requests or applica­
tions by Negroes to attend schools which were either 
wholly or mostly attended by white pupils. Of those 133 
applications, only 17 were rejected and every one of those 
was rejected on the ground that they lived within either 
the Hoffman-Boston District or the Langston School Dis­
trict, anyway on attendance area basis.

I might say that in connection with applications for trans­
fers by white pupils there were 71 applications for trans­
fer, 36 were granted and 35 denied.

The Court: What was the basis of the white application 
basically?

—14—
Mr. Simmonds: I don’t know. There were various and 

sundry reasons that they preferred to go into the school 
other than the district in which they lived. I am not ac­
quainted with the details.



114a

Colloquy

Of the 17 instances in which the Negroes were denied 
admission, only one appeal was made to the County hoard 
pursuant to the provisions of the code and that after 
hearing before the board, the board affirmed the placement 
officer.

The Court: Let me ask you this, and this is only to 
bring me up to date as to what is going on in Arlington 
since I have not been there for several years. If a white 
student going to Thomas Jefferson or Stratford, both of 
which I am informed and believe they have both colored 
and white students now, if a white student living in that 
area requests a transfer to another junior high school be­
cause it was an integrated school or a school that had both 
races being educated therein, was the transfer honored for 
that reason? I am reversing it, transferring out of a white 
school because some colored students were placed therein.

Mr. Simmonds: No, sir. That was not regarded as a 
valid basis for transfer. It was only in the event that they 
found themselves—

The Court: In case of minority and not majority?
—15—

Mr. Simmonds: That is right.
The Court: In other words, there is not a transfer sys­

tem that permits any student, colored or white, to transfer 
out of an existing school in which he would normally be 
assigned due to his residence because, in fact, the school 
has been integrated?

Mr. Simmonds: That is correct.
The Court: That applies to both races?
Mr. Simmonds: That is right.
The Court: All right.
Mr. Simmonds: I think that brings us up to date in that 

that having occurred and the school being, system being 
completely integrated in the terms that there are no denials



115a

Colloquy

whatsoever based on race or color; the board felt that 
since they were in fall compliance with the Constitutional 
interpretation in Brown v. Topeka, that there was no need 
to keep the injunction in force.

I might say that last March there was filed in this case 
a motion by either some of the Plaintiffs or some intervening 
plaintiffs protesting against a resolution of the school board 
that the school board would honor a certain resolution of 
the Virginia Legislature against having interscholastic 
competitions in both which Negroes and whites competed.

Subsequent to that time, I might say that that motion
—16—

was never pressed, and no date was ever asked to be heard 
upon it.

And in September 1961, the board rescinded that action 
so that there is no bar whatsoever insofar as school policy 
is concerned with respect to participation in athletics or 
any school sponsored function as far as that is concerned.

The Court: Does that include both scholastic competi­
tion such as debating and social activities if they are 
sponsored by the school?

Mr. Simmonds: Yes, sir. Everything that is sponsored 
by the school is open.

The Court: Dramatics and debating and all the other 
extra—I call them extracurricular activities ?

Mr. Simmonds: Yes, sir. Everything a school sponsored 
is open to all pupils alike in the schools whether they be 
Negro or white.

Now, attached to our motion is a report, sworn report, by 
the superintendent and the principal, I mean, and the chair­
man of the board and that sets forth the fact that they 
have adopted their own assignment plan, that they no 
longer use race as a basis for making assignments to school 
and that no person is denied assignment to a particular



116a

Colloquy

school because of his race which is the thrust of the Brown 
v. Topeka Case.

First, let me say that we believe that we are justified at
—17—

this stage to request a dissolution of the injunction. In 
support we have set forth in our points and authorities 
several cases which bear this out.

# * # * *
The Court: Let the record show that Exhibits A, B, and 

C, attached to the Defendants’ motion to dissolve the in­
junction will be made Exhibits to be considered by the 
court in the determination of this case.

(Defendants’ Exhibits A, B, and C were received in evi­
dence.)

* * * # *
—36—

Mr. Beeves: * * * Now, Your Honor asks the question 
about the manner in which these attendance areas had been 
determined and whether or not there had been any evidence 
or allegation of Gerrymandering for the purpose of accom­
plishing or continuing or maintaining racial segregation in 
the public school system of Arlington County. I would 
like to refer your Honor to the transcript in this case, 
transcript page 117, back in 1958, where Mr. Rudder who 
was then the superintendent was testifying, and I will read 
it in question and answer form. The questioner was Mr.

—37—
Robinson who was of counsel for the plaintiffs in that 
instance. Reading from transcript page 117.

“ Question: All right. What is the difference if any 
between the school districts so far as the racial classi-



117a

Colloquy

fication of the student residing in those districts may­
be concerned?

“Answer: The Hoffman-Boston District is desig­
nated as a district for our colored boys and girls on 
the high school level.

“ Question: And for that purpose only, am I correct?
“ Answer: That is correct.”

Beading from transcript page 119:

“ Question: Is there any other district in Arlington 
County at the secondary level embracing Negro stu­
dents other than the Hoffman-Boston School District?

“Answer: No.
“ Question: And that is true with reference to the 

junior high schools as well as the senior high schools?
“Answer: That is correct.
“ Question: Come back up here.”

And I assume parenthetically that had reference to map
—38—

that was displayed.

“As I understand you, Mr. Budder, the Hoffman- 
Boston School District with its two parts for second­
ary students is based entirely upon the race of the 
student residing for school administrative purposes 
within those districts. Am I correct in that?

“Answer: I believe that is correct.
“ Question: All right. Now, how do you figure out 

school districts for white students in Arlington County?
“Answer: It is done in terms of capacity of build­

ings to house a given number of children.
“ Question: And by that, suppose you explain.”



118a

Colloquy

We won’t go into that. At page 121 of the transcript:
“ Question: So that the extent to which a school 

facility for white students can accommodate the chil­
dren in that district, the object in fixing these bound­
aries is to arrange it so that the white students can go 
to the school that is the nearest of the place of resi­
dence.

“Answer: I believe that is correct.”

Again on page 123 of the transcript:

“ Question: In other words, Negro school districts, 
and referring now to elementary schools, are deter-

—39—
mined, the boundaries are determined entirely by 
reason of the fact that the Negro student resides in 
the areas that are surrounded by those boundaries.

“Answer: That is correct.
“ Question: You determine your white school bound­

aries in about the same way or precisely the same 
way for elementary schools that you do for white 
secondary schools?

“Answer: True.”

So that unquestionably on the record in this case the 
school districts in Arlington County as originally conceived 
and determined were not on any geographic basis without 
reference to race but were specifically designed and de­
termined to accommodate the Negro students on the one 
hand and the white students on the other hand.

As a matter of fact, the reference Mr. Si mm ends made 
to the so-called North Hoffman-Boston School District is 
a typical illustration of this fact because the fact is that 
prior not to the Brown decision but prior to the loss of



119a

Colloquy

the appeal by Arlington County in this case they main­
tained a separate school district in the Hall’s Hill area, 
completely non-contiguous to the balance of the Hoffman- 
Boston School District, which served the Negroes who 
lived in that area and made them a part of a district 
removed by, I think, the testimony one time was approxi-

—40—
mately five miles from the schools to which they are as­
signed.

The Court: There is not any question, Mr. Reeves, 
prior to the final determination under the Brown decision 
that the law of Virginia required segregated schools.

Mr. Reeves: No question about that.
The Court: So, telling me what they did prior to that 

decision is obvious. There is no question that Arlington 
County by necessity or by choice or by both had segregated 
schools.

Mr. Reeves: But, we submit it has.
The Court: The question is what have they done since 

then.
Mr. Reeves: No, sir, that is our point. In other words, 

our point is that since then they have done nothing to 
change the purpose and effect of the existing school dis­
tricts as they relate to Negroes. As a matter of fact,—

The Court: What do you contend they should do?
Mr. Reeves: I contend, sir, and I would like to intro­

duce at this point, because I think it will help Your Honor 
to see this graphically, I would like to introduce as exhibits 
the attendance areas maps for the school districts ele­
mentary, kindergarten, and senior high school districts 
in Arlington County at this time.

—41—
The Court: Do you have any objection, Mr. Simmonds?
Mr. Simmonds: These are the 1961-62 maps?



120a

Colloquy

The Court: Do you have any objection?
Mr. Simmonds: Just a question of whether or not we 

re-open the matter of attendance districts, if Your Honor, 
please. We take the position that it has become the law 
of the case here that attendance areas in particular—

The Court: I am assuming that what he is offering here 
is what you say is the law of the case, the specific attend­
ance record. Is that right?

Mr. Simmonds: Yes, sir.
The Court: Any objection?
Let them be admitted.

(The above mentioned maps were received in evidence 
as exhibits.)

Mr. Beeves: Here is the junior high.
The Court: I understand these are the same geographi­

cal boundaries that you say Judge Bryan approved in one 
of the decisions in this case.

Mr. Simmonds: May I remark as far as the Hoffman- 
Boston and Langston they are almost identical, just one 
or two slight changes of no significance. There have been 
some other changes, of course, in the other schools because 
of the erection of new schools and shift of population.

—68—
Mr. Beeves: * # # I would like to call to your Honor’s 

attention further, that in response to your question about 
there being nonsegregation in schools sponsored extracur­
ricular activities, Mr. Simmonds neglected to inform your

- 6 9 -
Honor that on 21 September 1959, the school board adopted 
a resolution on the motion of Mr. Joy, who was formerly 
chairman of the board, and although I am reading from



121a

Colloquy

our transcript taken from the record, we will be happy 
to seek and obtain and furnish to you the actual resolution, 
but it reads as follows:

“Whereas, the State of Virginia has made it possible 
to continue our public schools in spite of the entry of 
Negro children into previously all-White schools pur­
suant to Federal Court order”—and note that, not 
because the school wished it that way—“And;

“ Whereas, the overwhelming sentiment in the State 
is opposed to integrated dances;

“Now, Therefore, Be it Resolved, That for the 
1959-60 school year school sponsoring of dances be 
discontinued,”—and then going on.

“Whereas, most of the students and parents of our 
junior and senior high schools feel that social activities 
contribute to the growth of young people,

“Now, Therefore, Be it Resolved, That school facili­
ties be rented at the rate of $6 per night to responsible 
adult citizens groups sponsoring non-integrated social 
events, similar to those held last year and limited to 
students of the school and their dates.”

—70—
Mr. Bean seconded the motion, and the motion made by 

Mr. Joy and seconded by Mr. Bean was passed by a vote 
of 4 to 1 with Mr. Stockard voting in the negative.

So the elimination of school sponsored segregated extra­
curricular activities was accomplished by the very conven­
ient device of saying we will sponsor no dances but will 
let any group that wants to sponsor a non-integrated dance. 
So you have the situation where the public school facilities 
at the cost of $6 a night are still being used to maintain



122a

Colloquy

segregated extracurricular activities because they are lim­
ited to school students and must be on a nonintegrated 
basis in order to receive the approval of the school board 
under this resolution.

The Court: Has that resolution been rescinded by the 
new policy?

Mr. Simmonds: That is not the one that has been re­
scinded.

Mr. Eeeves: No, sir, that resolution is still in effect, sir. 
# # # * #

— 83—

# # # # #
The Court: You pose two questions in this case which I 

think that you have an absolute right, if you elect to have 
judicially determined, that is, whether or not the school 
board innocently or wilfully, whatever you allege it might 
be, is, in fact, violating the present injunction which you 
infer they are; you infer they are violating it by adopting 
this minority policy.

Mr. Reeves: That is right.
The Court: You say that is a plain violation, No. 1, and 

you also tell me in argument that it is a plain violation 
of the constitution of the United States.

Mr. Reeves: Right, sir.
The Court: Well, now, in all fairness I have to accept 

that they do not think it is, and they are just as conscien­
tious in their beliefs as you are in yours. You will both

— 84—

not be better off to get this matter finally adjudicated so 
that everybody knows their rights, so that everybody can 
go along in peace and harmony without having to run over 
to somebody, call it a court or whatever you will, in the



123a

Colloquy

same category as a young child runs to mother or the 
teacher and says, “Teacher, look what he did to me.” If 
it is basic it ought to be adjudicated.

You raise another question. You say they are in vio­
lation of the injunction or you argue that, because they 
have allowed to remain with very little deviations the 
Hoffman-Boston geographical location and that they have 
done it for an expressed purpose, and that is to circumvent 
or to evade or to defeat the law as laid down in Brown v. 
Topeka and as a wilfull violation of the injunction. You 
may be right.

Why do you not, then, under those circumstances file 
an appropriate proceeding which is within your right to 
have those two questions adjudicated? And if this Court 
plus the appropriate appellate courts so decrees, then you 
will know, and every colored citizen in the State of Vir­
ginia, as far as that is concerned, will know what his rights 
are.

That is where I just do not quite understand it. You 
withdraw it, but I cannot rule on those questions in a 
motion.

Mr. Reeves: We will be very happy, sir, to file—
—85—

The Court: I am not asking. You are arguing some­
thing, and you had it in there but took it out.

Mr. Reeves: We withdrew the motion for further relief 
for another reason, but the fact of the matter is—

The Court: I do not know why you did it. You did with­
draw it.

Mr. Reeves: We withdrew the motion for further relief, 
as I pointed out to the Court, so far as we are concerned 
the primary issue before the Court today is the question 
of motion to dissolve. Obviously, if the Court grants a



124a

motion to dissolve, then we cannot litigate within this case 
the two issues which are raised. What we are saying to 
the Court, in effect, is because those two issues exist is 
more reason why this injunction should not be dissolved. 
Your Honor raised the question—

The Court: Let me ask you this: If, and again I am 
merely talking out loud, I did not dissolve the injunction, 
because I think it is absolutely essential for everyone to 
have his or her rights, and the school board is in that 
category—they have just as much right in the Court as 
the colored citizen, because it is supposed to be equal, and 
it is equal, so they have rights, too—and that is to deter­
mine what their duties are, if there is any question about 
it. Certainly I do not think that you ought to allow the 
school board to go ahead and engage in an announcement

— 86—

of public policy and have all of the citizens understand that 
policy. You allow it to go on and then you come in and 
say it is illegal or in violation of this injunction. By the 
same token—

Mr. Beeves: Your Honor,—
The Court: —would everybody not be better off to know 

whether or not the boundaries of Hoffman-Boston and use 
of that facility is legal or not even before maybe they 
spend all this money that you read about in the paper? 
If it is not legal, if it is void, if it is illegal properties, 
why are we not doing anything about it?

Mr. Beeves: We will be very happy, and I assure your 
Honor without—

The Court: You can reach that very simply, and I am 
not suggesting how you do it, and I will like to—

Mr. Beeves: We will file a proper motion.
The Court: I never like to go around the bush. If I

Colloquy



125a

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say something I like everybody to understand what I am 
talking about. So it is not hard to file a petition to show 
cause why the school board should not be held in contempt, 
and that is why you are talking about either innocent or 
wilful! disobedience of the injunction, and then the Court 
has something tangible, something concrete, something 
definite. They can say they are right or they can say you 
are right. And that is the end of it so far as this Court.

—87—
Mr. Reeves: So far as we are concerned, we avoided in 

in this case proceeding by motion for contempt because 
we believe whatever, at least we hope whatever the school 
board has done is not necessarily a wilful effort to avoid 
but a mistaken belief on their part as to what the law is.

The Court: You can have a violation of an injunction 
without being wilful.

Mr. Reeves: We will certainly file an appropriate plead­
ing very quickly to raise these specific issues. Your Honor
may be assured of that.

#  #  * #  #

— 101—

# # # # #
The Court: Let me ask you this, Senator, to see if we 

can get this matter brought to a head. Mr. Reeves has 
indicated that he thinks that on the present record the 
Court can and should rule on the validity or constitutional­
ity of the minority policy phase of your Arlington County 
plan and likewise upon the isolation of the Hoffman-Boston 
territory by making an island out of it, basing it upon the 
record. You say it has been before the Court in each of

—102—
the pleadings. Do you agree that I can and should pass 
on those two questions in passing on this question?



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Mr. Ball: Has lie asked that that be done?
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Ball: We have no—
The Court: I am asking—that is I do not think frankly 

I can do it on the present state of the pleadings in view 
of his withdrawal of his motion, but if everybody agrees 
I am a very accommodating fellow, at least at times, if 
everybody agrees, I will allow him to amend at the bar 
of the Court right now to ask those two specific reliefs 
and let him put on such evidence he got today and let you 
put on such evidence or submit it to the Court on the 
record and the Court will pass on the two questions and 
then we will get this issue determined if that is what you 
want done.

Mr. Ball: I cannot answer that question right now with­
out talking to senior counsel.

The Court: I will tell you what you do. Without an­
swering it now, it is five minutes after one, I do not want 
to cut you off, as I always enjoy hearing from you, I have 
done it for years and I want to hear some more.

Mr. Ball: Do not do it as a matter of politeness. If I 
am not helping you any, tell me so.

The Court: After lunch, how about you gentlemen, coun­
sel on both sides get together and see if you can agree on

—1 0 3 -
having those two issues, because I am very serious. I do 
not think the County school board of Arlington should be 
under a cloud. I do not think anybody ought to be allowed 
to have anything hanging over their heads that is in doubt 
as to whether they are doing the right thing legally or 
not. There has been, as you know, there was a motion 
raising those questions and the motion was withdrawn—-

Mr. Ball: Yes, sir.



127a

Colloquy

The Court: For reasons best known to the plaintiffs. 
I am going to let you answer it. And if you gentlemen 
will agree, Mr. Reeves very frankly and candidly stated 
that he thinks that since they are set forth in his answer 
that I can rule on them as an incidental portion of the 
ruling of the motion now before the Court.

To obviate any technical difficulties I have indicated that
1 will allow them to amend now at the Bar right after 
lunch and insert those two grounds where they say the 
school board is not doing what it ought to be doing, if it 
is agreeable to you; and I will listen to such further argu­
ment or evidence that either side has to put on, and I will 
rule accordingly and at least as far as this Court is con­
cerned both the school board and the colored citizens are 
going to know exactly what their rights are. I do not want 
you to answer now. You can answer after the luncheon 
recess.

All your people are here and you can discuss it with
—104—

them, and they can discuss it. Let us take a recess to 2 
o’clock.

Mr. Ball: We came here expecting to argue.
The Court: You confer with them. I will meet you at

2 o’clock.
Mr. Reeves: Before you recess, I would just like to 

clarify the record. We withdrew our motion for further 
relief for one simple reason.

The Court: I do not want to know the reason. It does 
not make the difference.

Mr. Reeves: I wanted to say because it is continually 
referred to. The brief of the defendants raised the issue 
of the exhaustion of administrative remedies. We concede 
that these people had not exhausted their remedy. So to 
avoid a hassel—



128a

Colloquy

The Court: I am not talking about those two people. 
I am talking about administrative remedies have nothing 
to do with the minority policy and have nothing to do 
with the geographical question. That is only for the pupil.

The Court will take a luncheon recess until 2 o’clock.
(After recess.)

—2—
# # * # #

The Court: If I understand you correct, Senator, the 
counsel for the defendants, speaking for the defendants, 
have agreed to permit the plaintiffs to amend the present 
suit, that is, the original No. 1341, to include an allega­
tion in their own language, if they do not want to adopt 
the exact language in this motion that they now have, that 
will in substance allege that these two grounds, that is, 
the geographical layout either of the whole or part of the 
system is in contravention of the injunction and basic law 
and this minority policy was designed for that purpose 
and, in fact, was accomplishing that and, per se, is illegal.

Is that correct?
Mr. Ball: Yes, sir.
The Court: All right.
Mr. Ball: We have no objection to an amendment that 

brings in these two questions for decision.
The Court: That is what I understand.
Mr. Ball: We object to an amendment going outside of 

that unless we have notice.
The Court: I understand, just those two.

Mr. Ball: Yes, sir.
The Court: All right.

— 3—



129a

Mr. Reeves, the Court now grants you leave to amend 
Civil Action No. 1341, that is, the original suit at the bar 
of this Court to include those two issues for determination 
by the Court in addition to this motion to dissolve the 
injunction.

Mr. Reeves: I raise this question.
The Court: You may put it in such language as you want 

to or incorporate the language that you already have in 
the motion.

Mr. Reeves: If the Court would agree what we would 
do would be to use all of the motion for further relief with 
the following exceptions.

The Court: Let us take it—
Mr. Reeves: Paragraph by paragraph.
The Court: —paragraph by paragraph.
Mr. Reeves: Paragraph 1.
The Court: Your amendment is to include Paragraph 1.
Mr. Reeves: Paragraph 2.
The Court: Paragraph 2.
Mr. Reeves: Paragraph 3.
The Court: All right.
Mr. Reeves: Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and all

—4—
of 12 with the exception of the last two sentences. We 
would strike from the sentence beginning “ Thereupon, said 
Florence B. Jefferies request” down to the end of that 
paragraph, strike that because we did not and we concede 
that she did not exhaust her administrative remedies, but 
insofar as that, the first part of that paragraph alleges 
that she was treated different^ than a white student would 
have been because of the action of Section 3 of the general 
policy statement. We leave that in.

Paragraph 13 we would take all of it as it is.

Colloquy



130a

Colloquy

Paragraph 14.
The Court: You are including 13.
Mr. Eeeves: Include 13.
The Court: You want to include 13.
Mr. Eeeves: Include 13, sir.
Paragraph 14 we would eliminate the first sentence, and 

on Page 7 of the motion the first line down to the word 
“and even,” and would begin that paragraph with the word 
“ In.” “ In those schools which children of both races at­
tend the defendants conduct or permit others to conduct 
extra-curricular recreation,” and strike the word “athletic 
activities which negro students are not permitted to par­
ticipate.”

This is an issue raised by the resolution which we sub­
mitted to the Court earlier.

—5—
We leave in 15 as is, Paragraph 16 as is, Paragraph 17 

as is, 18, 19, 20, 21, and then we would substitute by way 
of prayers that would include the pleading, the allegations 
by way of prayer we would continue Prayer A ; we would 
substitute for prayer B that the defendants’ policy—I am 
sorry. Strike that. That the Court declare the defendants’ 
policy or procedure as stated in Section 3 of its—I am 
sorry. I am trying to read someone else’s writing, but it 
is the Exhibit Attached here, the regulations—

The Court: Exhibit B.
Mr. Eeeves: To the Defendants’ motion,—adopted March 

16, 1961 is unconstitutional and invalid and denies to negro 
pupils equal protection of the law and due process of the 
law as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the Con­
stitution of the United States.

We would substitute for Prayer C the following: that 
the Court declare that the defendants’ continued enforce-



131a

Colloquy

ment of the attendance area boundaries for the city’s all- 
Negro schools which were established on the basis of race 
as a part of the segregated system and remain substantially 
unchanged is unconstitutional, invalid and in violation of 
the injunction herein.

We would include again Paragraph (d) as it now stands. 
We would ask the Court to rule on Paragraph (e) as it 
now stands. W e would ask the Court to rule on Para-

— 6— -

graph (f) as it now stands. We would strike Paragraph 
(g) and leave (h).

We would submit, then, as evidence in support of these 
allegations as set forth in this amended pleading (1) the 
testimony which we have already referred to by Mr. Rutter 
which appears in the transcript for September 11 and 12, 
1957.

The Court: You agreed you can specify any part of it, 
but all of the evidence heretofore taken in this case shall 
be considered as evidence by the Court in determining these 
issues.

Mr. Reeves: As merely pointing to certain—
The Court: You can point to any particular parts.
Mr. Reeves: But particularly refer to Mr. Rutter’s testi­

mony.
We refer to the school zone maps which have been in­

troduced here. We would assume that the defendants are 
prepared to stipulate as they have argued that there has 
been no substantial change in the school zones affecting the 
negro schools since their original establishment under the 
segregated system.

The Court: Let’s stop there.
Are you willing to stipulate that, Mr. Simmonds?
Mr. Simmonds: We stipulate to the substantial change



132a

Colloquy

with the exception of elimination of the North Hoffman-
—7—

Boston District as it is.
The Court: You accept as amended.
Mr. Beeves: That is right, sir.
The Court: It will be so stipulated and made a part of 

the record in this case.
Mr. Beeves: We assume, of course, that a policy of 

the school board with reference to these minority trans­
fers is in evidence. We would ask that the Court accept in 
evidence Exhibit A to our motion for further relief.

The Court: Exhibit what 1
Mr. Beeves: A to the motion for further relief.
The Court: Let’s see what that is.
Mr. Beeves: That is a list of the schools.
The Court: Membership by grades.
Mr. Beeves: That is right, sir.
The Court: Do you have any objection to that being 

made an exhibit in this case, Mr. Simmonds?
Mr. Simmonds: No.
The Court: All right. Let Exhibit A, titled Member­

ship by Grades, September 30,1961 of the Arlington County 
Public Schools be made an exhibit in this case and will 
be considered by the Court as part of the evidence.

Mr. Beeves: We would direct the Court’s attention to 
Exhibit 5 introduced in this case on September 4, 1958, 
which is a list of the capacity of the various schools which

— 8—

are involved in this particular issue.
Mr. Simmonds: Your Honor, with respect to that, it 

must be remembered that that is the 1958 capacity of the 
various schools which I am sure have changed in some in­
stances considerably.



133a

Colloquy

The Court: I will permit, if there is any change in it 
the school system. They can do it right now, if they have 
it, to file a new exhibit showing the capacity of any schools 
in issue here or all of them, whatever they want, as of 
this date or as of the last date they made an accurate 
survey thereof. So we will bring it up to date. I mean you 
can introduce that now, if you have it here, Mr. Simmonds; 
if not, I will let you submit it.

Mr. Simmonds: I don’t know whether it is here or not.
The Court: All right.
Mr. Eeeves: We think, Your Honor, it might be help­

ful in looking at the total picture if you had it for all 
schools so we request that they submit it for all schools.

The Court: All right.
Let the defendants furnish as an exhibit, and the Court 

will consider it as evidence, a statement showing—you are 
talking about physical capacity.

Mr. Eeeves: Physical capacity.
—9—

The Court: Not rooms.
Mr. Eeeves: The number of students.
The Court: —number of students now enrolled and the 

capacity of the school that the building was designed for 
in all the schools in Arlington as of the latest figures that 
they have. I do not require them to make a new survey. 
The latest one they have.

Mr. Eeeves: We feel there is no purpose, Your Honor, 
in rearguing our position, but I would just like to make 
one point.

Senator Ball on several occasions has referred to the 
Court of Appeals approval of the attendance area. I would 
like to point out that the plaintiffs in this case who are 
the ones who have, as he points out, consistently raised



134a

this issue only appealed once in the series of appeals in 
this case and on that particular occasion the Court re­
manded the case without deciding any of the issues that 
were raised except I think as to four students who had 
been admitted, ordered admitted by Judge Bryan. The 
fact of the matter is that the appeals to which he refers 
have all been by the school board from orders of Judge 
Bryan ordering students in the school in which the Court 
of Appeals has affirmed Judge Bryan’s decisions, so the 
Court of Appeals has not been called upon to pass on the 
question as to whether Judge Bryan has used or has ap-

—10—
proved the attendance area contrary to the position of the 
plaintiffs because that issue in that posture has never been 
before the Court of Appeals.

The Court: If it has not been and Judge Bryan’s ruling 
is final until it is.

Mr. Reeves: I am not disagreeing with that. I wanted 
Your Honor not to believe or assume that you were bound 
not just by the rule of the law of the case which, of course, 
we say if Your Honor would believe it not to be ap­
plicable or not to be justice could change it, but I cer­
tainly wanted you to be aware that you are not bound by 
any appellate court decision on this issue.

The Court: I understand.
Let me ask you one final question. Do I understand that 

the allegations, and I will even grant those, so there will 
be no misunderstanding about it, that you now have in 
your amended action which was granted at the Bar all of 
the allegations that in any manner so far as you know in­
dicate that the Arlington County School Board is not, in 
fact and in law, fully complied with the law of the United 
States and with the injunction? I want to get them all 
before—

Colloquy



135a

Mr. Reeves: I would say advisedly insofar as—
The Court: Insofar as you know!
Mr. Reeves: Insofar as counsel is aware unhappily and

—11—
had Your Honor—

The Court: I am not trying to get you to say something 
you do not know. I say insofar as you know.

Mr. Reeves: Insofar as we know I merely wanted to 
say this. In the event this matter had not been placed 
before Your Honor today and we are in favor of its being 
placed before you on the discovery we might have dis­
covered other things. We will be satisfied and are satisfied 
to proceed on the basis of the existing record.

The Court: All right.
Mr. Reeves: I wonder if Your Honor will indulge us. 

There is one slight disagreement among counsel. Will you 
indulge us a few minutes to confer on this point?

The Court: How much time do you want?
Mr. Reeves: Five minutes will be more than ample.
The Court: The Court will give you a five-minute recess.

(After recess.)

Mr. Reeves: If Your Honor please, we would like to 
clear away some more debris. We would like to strike 
Paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 of the motion for further 
relief.

The Court: All right.
Mr. Reeves: And I am told by my associate that I 

omitted in stating the prayer relative to the declaration
— 12—

concerning the second declaration relative to school bounda­
ries that we submit that this is also in violation of the 14th 
Amendment.

Colloquy



136a

Colloquy

The Court: All right.
Mr. Simmonds: Will you say that again!
The Court: He said in violation of the 14th Amendment. 

That is the prayer in reference to geographical districts.
Mr. Reeves: I would like to ask counsel if we may also 

have a stipulation that negro teachers are employed and 
assigned only to Langston, Hoffman-Boston and New 
Kemper school and no white teachers are assigned to or 
employed in those schools.

Mr. Simmonds: If Your Honor please, I do not think 
that is relevant to any of the issues before the Court. This 
suit is an injunction to compel the admission—

The Court: Whether it is or is not, if that is a fact.
Mr. Simmonds: Not altogether. It is my understanding 

that there are not white class-room teachers teaching in 
Hoffman-Boston High School and elementary school, New 
Kemper or Langston and no colored teachers in the other 
schools, except in certain classes there are white and 
colored teachers who are in both groups. Is that correct! 
Special areas and crossing the lines.

—13—
We accept the stipulation.
The Court: All right. The Court will consider that as 

a fact. Whether it is particularly material or not is another 
matter.

Mr. Reeves: Thank you.
The Court: All right.
Mr. Simmonds and Mr. Ball, the Court will accept the 

amendment that they have made with these deletions. So 
that the Court has it I will ask the Court Reporter to write 
up just that portion that pertains to the amendments so 
that we will have it officially in the record.



Colloquy

'V' --Y.TP w  w  w

The Court: Do you people have any stipulations you 
want or do you have any facts, additional facts you want 
to put on now for the court to consider in determining 
these questions, either by stipulation or by putting the 
superintendent or anybody else on that you want to?

Mr. Simmonds: If Your Honor, please, Mr. Ball men­
tioned, I think, in his argument we would like to ask the 
Plaintiffs to stipulate that last spring in 1961 when the 
attendance areas were being adopted by the school board 
for the coming year, public notice was given to that fact 
and an opportunity to object was given to the public and no

- 121-

objection whatsoever was made with respect to the Hoff- 
man-Boston School District nor to the Langston District.

Mr. Beeves: We would only be able to say that we are 
one part of the public and can escape that notice. We 
were not aware of it.

The Court: Begardless of whether you were aware of 
it, are you willing to stipulate that as being a fact?

Mr. Beeves: For that reason we cannot.
The Court: I will let Mr. Beed or anybody else take 

the stand and he can testify what the facts are.
Mr. Simmonds: Don’t you want to stipulate that?
The Court: Will Mr. Beed testify about it?
Mr. Simmonds: Yes, sir, we have someone who can.
The Court: You have somebody to testify about it. Put 

him on the stand now and we will put it in the record.
Any other facts? If you have any other facts you want 

to put on either in support or any fact you want the court 
to consider in determining these issues, I will hear them

— 120—

now.



138a

E lizabeth B. Campbell, called as a witness and having 
first been duly sworn, testified as fo llow s:

—122—
Direct Examination by Mr. Simmonds:

Q. Will you please state your name and address? A. 
Elizabeth B. Campbell, 2912 North Glebe Road, Arlington, 
Virginia.

Q. You have some position with the School Board of 
Arlington County? A. I am the Chairman of the School 
Board.

Q. Have you served on the School Board prior to your 
most recent term? A. Yes.

Q. Will you please tell the Court the years that you 
have served on the Arlington County School Board? A. 
From 1947 to 1955, and then I was returned 3 years ago. 
This is my third year.

Q. Mrs. Campbell, calling your attention to your first 
term during the year 1949, were there any maps as such 
which set forth the attendance areas in the schools of 
Arlington County? A. Not that we could find.

Q. You don’t know what occurred before that time as 
far as going to school? A. No, sir.

Q. What was done at that time and why with respect 
to making attendance area maps? A. Well, we needed

—123—
the attendance area maps because though there were at­
tendance areas, Mr. Kemp seemed to be the person who 
knew where they were and we were increasing the staff 
and getting ready to build new schools to take care of the 
increased enrollment and needed the maps for reference 
so the attendance maps were made.

Q. What were the principal purposes of making those 
attendance areas or what were the criteria used in arriving

Testimony of Elisabeth B. Campbell—Direct



139a

at attendance areas? A. Our first criteria was the capacity 
of the school. It had to he. And the second consideration 
was the accessibility of the school. There was no bus 
transportation at that time, no school bus transportation 
and then we tried to consider the safety of the pupils. 
There were in many instances no sidewalks. There were 
some main highways to be crossed. Those were the chief 
considerations.

Q. Calling your attention to that first map, isn’t it true 
that the Hoffman-Boston District, School District as shown 
on that map for the southern part of the county is almost 
identical with the Hoffman-Boston High School Area that 
is shown on the present map ? A. As far as I know. There 
have been no actions of the board to change any of these, 
so they must have been related. Any changes would have 
been related to land.

Q. Was it necessary to have put all the colored high
— 1 2 4 -

school students within an attendance area in 1949 if you 
want to do it for the purpose of segregation? A. Yes, sir. 
We had segregated schools in Virginia.

Q. I mean the colored children would have had to go 
to colored schools regardless of whether they were in at­
tendance area, would they not? A. Yes, because we had 
segregated schools.

Q. Isn’t it true that the attendance area around the 
Hoffman-Boston High School was made with respect to 
the capacity of that school and the safety of the children 
attending the school?

Mr. Reeves: Objection, if Your Honor, please. I 
think this is a leading question.

The Court: I will admit it is a trifle leading.

Testimony of Elizabeth B. Campbell—Direct



140a

Mr. Simmonds: Yes, sir.
The Court: Frame it otherwise, Mr. Simmonds. 

By Mr. Simmonds:

Q. Mrs. Campbell, can you tell us to what extent, if 
any, the actual lines around Hoffman-Boston were drawn 
insofar as any segregation requirement was concerned?

The Court: You mean in 1949?
Mr. Simmonds: 1949.
The Witness: We had a segregated school sys-

—125—
tern, Mr. Simmonds.

The Court: That was not the question, in 1949, was 
it?

Mr. Simmonds: That is the point I am bringing 
out.

The Witness: We had a segregated school system. 

By Mr. Simmonds:

Q. But, nevertheless, in 1949 you did draw lines around 
Hoffman-Boston to indicate the capacity and safety ele­
ments? A. Oh, yes.

Q. That has remained fairly constant since, has it not? 
A. Yes.

Q. Now, Mrs. Campbell, was Mr. Rudder with the Arling­
ton School System in 1949 when these attendance areas 
were first made up? A. No, sir.

Q. And do you recall when he first came with the school 
system? A. I don’t recall the year. Mr. Early was our 
first superintendent after Mr. Kemp and then Mr. Rudder 
succeeded Mr. Early.

Testimony of Elizabeth B. Campbell—Direct



141a

Q. But, Mr. Rudder was after that first attendance map
—126—

was gotten up, was he not? A. Oh, yes.
Q. So, he would not be in a position to know of his own 

knowledge the reasons why the area was set up, would he 
not?

Mr. Reeves: Objection, if Your Honor, please. I 
do not think this witness can tell what Mr. Rudder 
knew.

The Court: Objection sustained. It is obvious if 
he were not there he could not have participated 
in it.

Mr. Simmonds: All right.
The Court: Objection sustained.

By Mr. Simmonds-.

Q. Mrs. Campbell, in the spring of 1961, pursuant to 
state law did the Board consider an attendance area map 
for the distribution of pupils in the County? A. Yes.

Q. And do you know what was done prior to the time 
the School Board adopted that attendance area map? A. 
We held public hearings. These were advertised as public 
hearings so that the citizens could come and look at the 
maps. The maps were there. We had many citizens who 
came in and talked about it because people do not like to 
change their attendance areas.

—127—
Q. Do you know whether there was any objection at any 

of these public meetings to the Hotfman-Boston attendance 
area? A. There was not to my knowledge.

Q. Were you present at those meetings? A. I was 
present.

Testimony of Elizabeth B. Campbell—Direct



142a

Q. Now, in connection with making changes in the at­
tendance area maps, what is the policy with respect to 
changing those lines or not changing them, Mrs. Campbell? 
A. First of all, we change as few as possible because 
people don’t like to change their schools. Most of them 
don’t. So, we make as little change as possible and that 
has always been the policy.

Q. But, at that meeting there was no objection to making 
the Hoffman-B oston District as it is shown on the map as 
it is in evidence today? A. No, sir.

Mr. Simmonds: That is all the questions we have 
at the present time.

Cross Examination by Mr. Beeves:

Q. You say that you were a member of the School Board 
in 1949, that was your first term? A. Yes, I was elected 
to the School Board.

Q. Do you recall, Mrs. Campbell, how much personal
—1 2 8 -

knowledge or personal participation you had in the draw­
ing of the school zones at that time? A. Well, I had a 
great deal.

Q. You did. You worked with the superintendent? A. 
The superintendent had the map of the schools that were 
then located. When we began to talk about building the 
new schools for increased enrollment then the new school 
board had participation.

Q. Who did the actual drawing, the board or the super­
intendent? A. The superintendent.

Q. He did the drawing merely submitted to the board 
for approval? A. That is right.

Testimony of Elizabeth B. Campbell—Cross



143a

Q. So that you personally did not draw any of the lines? 
A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know of your own personal knowledge whether 
the lines as drawn in 1949 represented any change between 
then and as they were originally conceived and drawn? A. 
I wouldn’t know because Mr. Kemp, the superintendent, 
had all of these district lines in his head and we ask him 
to put them down.

Q. So, you don’t know whether they represented any 
change from the time they were originally drawn? A.

—1 2 9 -
No, sir.

Q. You stated, I think, that in drawing the lines or im­
proving or in approving the drawing of lines— A. Yes.

Q- —that the members of the school board had in mind 
these criteria of capacity of school, accessibility, transporta­
tion and safety of pupils? A. Yes, sir.

Q. You also stated, I believe, that in addition to these 
criteria as applied to the Negro schools there was a neces­
sity of course that Negro students where they live attend 
the schools? A. We were in an integrated, segregated 
system, Mr. Reeves, as you know, so the question was not 
raised.

Q. So, then the question of whether or not these schools 
were also accessible to the Negro student was not in issue 
either? A. No, sir.

Q. Or whether capacity— A. Capacity in the elemen­
tary schools was quite an issue.

Q. But, not in the Hoffman-Boston Junior-Senior High? 
A. Yes, that was issue there, too.

Q. Under the segregated system, did you discuss any
—1 3 0 -

alternatives in the event there was not adequate capacity?

Testimony of Elizabeth B. Campbell—Cross



144a

The Court: Are you talking about 1949 ?
Mr. Beeves: 1949, sir.
The Witness: No.

By Mr. Reeves:

Q. So, then the Hoffman-Boston was in whether or not 
in the light of the segregated system so far as Negro 
students were concerned, Negro high school and junior high 
school? A. Mr. Reeves, if you knew the story in Arlington 
you would know one of the first things that we did was to 
improve the facilities at Hoffman-Boston and to make 
Hoffman-Boston the right capacity for the number of Negro 
students. This was one of the first things that the board 
did.

Q. Whether they lived within the boundaries or not? A. 
Yes. Well, the Hoffman-Boston School was the school that 
was the high school for the Negroes in the segregated 
system.

Q. Whether they lived within the lines drawn around that 
school or not? A. Oh, yes. Actually there was only one 
Negro high school.

Q. As a matter of fact, the area in which it was located 
and around which the lines were drawn was also with the

- 1 3 1 -
exception of this North Hoffman-Boston District the area 
in which the majority, if not all the Negroes in Arlington 
County, resided at that time, is that correct? A. No, sir. 
I live in North Arlington and as I remember it, there was 
a large community in Halls Hill because we have the 
Langston School there.

Q. I am saying with the exception of the area that pre­
viously was called North Hoffman-Boston which was Halls 
Hill area the line as drawn around Hoffman-Boston School

Testimony of Elisabeth B. Campbell—Cross



145a

itself encompassed the geographical area in which most of 
the Negroes in Arlington then lived with the exception of 
those in this other? A. I think so.

Q. Do you know whether Mr. Rudder was with the school 
system in any capacity in 1949? A. No, he ivas not.

Q. Do you know when he came? A. I just don’t know 
the year, but—

Q. Was it while you were still on the board? A. Yes, 
I was still on the board. I think it was 1955, 56.

Q. Could it have been 1952 as he testified? A. Well, he 
was the superintendent. He was the superintendent—I 
mean the principal of Washington and Lee High School, 
you see.

—132—
Q. So, he was in the school system? A. He w7as in the 

school system but the principal of Washington and Lee 
High School is the principal of Washington and Lee High 
School.

Q. Agreed. But, he is an officer in the school system? A. 
Yes.

Testimony of Elisabeth B. Campbell—Cross

The Court: As principal, he has no responsibility 
insofar as the administrative policy is—of the school 
are concerned, isn’t that correct?

The Witness: No, indeed.

By Mr. Reeves:

Q. But, as principal he would not have knowledge of the 
administrative policies? A. Not necessarily. Of certain 
ones. Not in the general lines that the school board and 
the superintendent of schools have.

Q. Would he have knowledge of them? A. No, sir.
Q. As it applied to him in the administering of one of



146a

the schools? A. He would have knowledge of what was 
necessary for his administration, Mr. Eeeves.

Q. This notice that you say went out prior to the 1961 
meeting, do you know by whom that notice was sent out?

—133—
A. It was advertised in the papers. It was sent out to the 
PTA’s.

Q. My question is: do you know by whom? A. It was 
authorized as a public meeting.

Q. My question is do you know by whom in the school 
administration the notice was sent out?

The Court: You mean who authorized it?
Mr. Reeves: No. Who actually sent it out.
The Witness: The School Board sent it out.

By Mr. Reeves:

Q. Do you know by whom it was sent out?

The Court: You mean the individual person?
Mr. Reeves: That is right.
The Witness: I couldn’t.

By Mr. Reeves:

Q. Do you know by whom it was prepared? A. Yes.
Q. By whom? A. It was prepared by Mr. Bogy in 

Reed’s office I imagine. That is the way all our notices 
are done. I can’t say specifically, Mr. Reeves. There was 
no difference between this notice and any other notice.

Q. Do you know what the notice stated? Do you know 
it stated that one of the considerations to be determined 
at these public hearings was approval of attendance areas,

—1 3 4 -
do you not? A. That was the purpose.

Testimony of Elisabeth B. Campbell—Cross



147a

Q. That was included in the notice? A. That was the 
only purpose of the hearings.

Q. Did you see such a notice in any publication yourself? 
A. I think that I could say that I saw it in the Northern 
Virginia Sun, Mr. Beeves.

Q. As you recall seeing it, did it include reference to 
the fact that the attendance areas would be— A. That 
was the only purpose.

Q. I am asking if you recall what you saw that was in 
there. A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know whether it was a paid advertisement? 
A. No, sir.

Q. You don’t know? A. It was not.
Q. It was not. Was this then, so far as you know, just 

a story based on an announcement by someone in the 
school board? I am trying to get the form of this notice, 
Mrs. Campbell, if you know. A. Yes.

Q. The reason I am asking that is because some of the
- 1 3 5 -

people associated with this case have no recollection of 
having seen it. A. I see. I can tell you that Mrs. Hume 
was there at the meeting and protested that she did not 
wish her children to be transferred from Stratford I think 
to Swanson. That was when we were discussing whether 
all the children from Halls Hill who were going to junior 
high school should go to Swanson—I mean to Stratford or 
some of them should go to Swanson. I recall this because 
we were really surprised that there was—

Q. —no objection? A. —that there was a discussion as 
to whether they should or should not go to Swanson. We 
thought that this was good.

Q. In so far as you can recall being present at all of 
these meetings no one objected to the attendance area for

Testimony of Elisabeth B. Campbell—Cross



148a

any of the Negro schools? A. Except this one I am tell­
ing you about, Mrs. Hume.

Q. Do you know, Mrs. Campbell, whether notices of these 
meetings were sent in any form to the parents of school 
children or was it just public notice in the newspapers? 
A. Well, I think they were sent through the schools as 
well as in the newspaper, but the reason I think this, Mr. 
Reeves, is because this is our policy about public meetings

—136—
and this was just a public hearing.

Q. You make the policy but you don’t know exactly how 
it is carried out, is that true? A. This is the way it is 
usually carried out.

Redirect Examination by Mr. Simmonds:

Q. Do you recall whether or not Mr. Tucker was present 
at that meeting? A. No, I don’t, Mr. Simmonds.

Q. You don’t recall? A. I don’t recall. There were a 
number of Negro persons present.

Q. Do you happen to— A. I remember Mrs. Hume be­
cause I know her quite well and we talked about it after­
wards.

Q. Do you happen to know of residences as far as com­
munities are concerned of other counsel at the table other 
than Mr. Tucker? A. No, I don’t.

Mr. Simmonds: All right.
The Court: Mrs. Campbell, just to complete the 

record, in your knowledge has there been a material 
increase in the population in Arlington from 1949 
to 1960, particularly in and around the vicinity of 
what is referred to as Green Valley or the south- 
side?

Testimony of Elizabeth B. Campbell—Redirect



149a

Colloquy

The Witness: Yes, sir.
The Court: There has been a material increase in 

both colored and white population, has there not?
The Witness: Yes, sir.
The Court: That is all.
Mr. Simmonds: Thank you. Step down.
(Witness excused.)

Mr. Simmonds: I think that is all.
The Court: Do you have any other facts you want 

to stipulate or put in?
All right. Now, we have the amendment and the 

Court knows what it is going to have to rule on so 
everybody can say that they had a full opportunity 
to say everything they wanted to say in behalf or 
against the new issues—calling them newx issues— 
I will ask first, since they are now in the form of 
petitioners Mr. Reeves and his co-counsel, and I do 
not want you to repeat anything you said, anything 
additional you want to say in support of these amend­
ments without repeating what has already been said.

Mr. Reeves: No, sir.
The Court: All right.
I will ask Mr. Simmonds and Mr. Ball the same 

question.
— 1 3 8 —

Mr. Simmonds: I think that is all.
The Court: All right.
Gentlemen, I will give you as early a decision as 

is possible and in the hopes that it will terminate 
the litigation insofar as Arlington County is con­
cerned, at least, insofar as this Court is involved.

— 137—



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151a



152a

EXHIBIT

(See opposite) Glr’



A M J .im m  county pu b lic  S 'a r  <; r -
Department o f Research L  X H ift  IT  February 7, .1962

COMF11AT10M OF BOXUHNG CAPACITIES AM) KEMBEBSHIF FOE 1961-62 AS OF 1 0 /l/6 1
AMD ESTIMATED FOE 1992*63

School

Elementary unless noted

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10/1/61 Estimated 1962*63

Building Capacity 
(Present 0se)a

Pupil
Membership Building Capacity 

{froposed Use)a
Pupil

Membership

Abingdon 280 262 280 270
Ashlawn 414 420 414 409
B arcroft 455 462 433 421
B arrett 498 -’433 437 428
Cherrydale 380 370 358 314

Claremont 470 463 470 481
Clay*' Fillm ore 436 417 436 413
Custia 330 335 330 355
Ores' 488 490 488 480
Drear Annex 385 407 413 434

Edison 20 15 20 15
F airlin g ton 462 403 514 492
G lenearlyn 414 405 414 406
Henry 660 646 660 654
Hof f  nan-Boston 190 155 190 182

Jackson 548 528 548 541
Jamestown 560 580 582 557
Kemper 112 129 112 117
langaton 330 322 ' 330 311
Lee 218 191 218 195

Madison 392 374 392 364
M arshallb 280 254 «* «*.

M arshall Annex 200 196 200 184
Maury 224 205 224 192
McKinley 436 402 436 421

Monroe 364 349 386 394
Nottingham 560 544 838b 648
Oakridge 392 440 392 376
fage 487 480 487 478
Sandolph 436 470 564 551

Eeed 554 504 554 501
Stewart 196 194 196 196
Taylor 380 372 604b 556
Tuckahoe 434 430 414 424
W ilson 252 270 302 277

food lawn 168 175 168 172
Woodaoat 205 183 168 132
Georgs Mhson Center 50 39 50 4 0

Gunston J r . 1050 1149 1050 1115
J efferson  Jr® 725 741 725 670
Kenaore Jr® 1200 1248 1300 1160
S tra tford  Jr® 950 1048 950 990
Sssanson J r . 700 779 700 770

W illiam sburg Jr® 1200 1337 1200 1305
Hoffman*Boston J r .-S r , 650 619 650 641
W akefield S r . 2000 2114 2000 2235
feafoingten~Lee Sr® 2000 1997 2000 2110
Yorktown S r. 1400 1349 1400 1515

George Mason Center 20 13 20 20

^B uildings which house kindergarten p u p ils and pu p ils w ith sp ecia l needs, e.g®, mental 
reta rd a tio n , learning ia p a ira en t, hearing and sig h t problem s,, reading cen ters, and physical 
handicap#, have a cap acity set by p o licy  fo r  each (category.

■^Marshall School i© to be abandoned in  1962*63® Capacity is  to be increased at Taylor and 
Nottingham Schools ®



153a



154a

I n  the

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

F oe the E astern D istrict oe V irginia 

Alexandria Division

[ same title]

Memorandum Opinion

Another facet of this case is now before the Court for 
adjudication, namely, the defendants’ motion to dissolve 
the injunction entered herein on the 31st day of July, 1956, 
upon the grounds hereinafter discussed.

Proper consideration requires a brief review of the events 
leading up to the institution of this suit and the numerous 
proceedings had subsequent thereto.

Prior to May 17, 1954, in compliance with the laws of 
Virginia, Arlington County maintained a segregated school 
system. On that date the Supreme Court of the United 
States in a unanimous opinion1 invalidated the “ separate 
but equal doctrine” . Under date of May 31, 1955, the Su­
preme Court of the United States1 2 remanded the cases to 
the district courts “to take such proceedings and enter such 
orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are 
necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a ra­
cially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the 
parties to these cases.” The Court further stated:

“ School authorities have the primary responsibility 
for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems;

1 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U. S. 483.
2 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 TJ. S. 294.



155a

courts will have to consider whether the action of 
school authorities constitutes good faith implementa­
tion of the governing constitutional principles.”

In compliance therewith, the Arlington County School 
Board on January 14, 1954, assuming that the Virginia 
Legislature would enact the recommendations of the Gray 
Commission, adopted a resolution, providing among other 
things that the Board would continue the policy of de­
termining school attendance areas on a geographical basis 
and that integration would be permitted in certain elemen­
tary schools in the Fall of 1956, in certain junior high 
schools in the Fall of 1957, and in certain high schools in 
the Fall of 1956.

Shortly thereafter the Virginia Legislature adopted cer­
tain statutes affecting the publie school system in Virginia, 
among which was one creating the State Pupil Placement 
Board and divesting the local school boards of the power 
to assign and place students in the local school system.

The plaintiffs instituted this suit May 17, 1956, praying 
for a permanent injunction enjoining the School Board, 
the Division Superintendent, their successors in office, their 
agents and employees from refusing to admit the infant 
plaintiffs or other children similarly situated in the Arling­
ton schools on a non-diseriminatory basis.

After a full hearing, this Court, on July 31, 1956, entered 
an injunction, the pertinent portion of which is as follows:

“ Effective at the time and subject to the conditions 
hereinafter stated, the defendants, their successors in 
office, agents, representatives, servants, and employees 
be, and each of them is hereby, restrained and enjoined 
from refusing on account of race or color to admit to, 
or enroll or educate in, any school under their opera-

Memorandum Opinion



156a

tion, control, direction, or supervision any child other­
wise qualified for admission to, and enrollment and 
education in, such school.”

Subsequent proceedings in this Court involved the power 
of the defendants to admit the plaintiffs to Arlington 
County schools in view of the existing state law divesting 
them of placement duties; the establishment of proper 
criteria for the assignment of students; the review of cer­
tain assignments; the placement of some of the plaintiffs 
by court order; and other matters not germane to a de­
termination of the motion now before the Court.

Defendants’ motion to dissolve the aforesaid injunction 
was filed November 13, 1961. In response thereto, plain­
tiffs on December 28, 1961, filed a motion for further relief 
and a motion to intervene. On February 5, 1962, the date 
set for hearing of all pending motions, the plaintiffs re­
quested that they be permitted to withdraw their motions 
and that the Court consider the motion for further relief 
as an answer to the motion to dissolve; the request, with­
out objection, was granted. During the hearing, the Court, 
on its own motion and without objection, permitted the 
plaintiffs to amend their original suit, to allege that con­
tinued enforcement of the attendance area boundaries for 
Arlington’s all-negro schools which were established on 
the basis of race as a part of a segregated system and 
have remained subsequently unchanged, is unconstitutional, 
invalid and in violation of the injunction of this Court, 
and that the policy of the Arlington County School Board 
as enumerated in paragraph 3 of its rules and policies as 
to admissions, namely, “ that no child shall be compelled 
to attend a school in which his race is in the minority” , 
is unconstitutional and invalid and denies to Negro pupils

Memorandum Opinion



157a

equal protection of the law and due process as guaranteed 
by the 14th Amendment.

Pursuant to Section 22-232.18 to .31 of the Code of Vir­
ginia, the authority for the placement of pupils in the 
Arlington County schools was revested in the School Board 
of Arlington County. Pursuant thereto, under date of 
March 16, 1961, the Board adopted Buies and Policies as 
to Admission and Procedures for Placement and Assign­
ment of Pupils in the Arlington County School System.

A careful examination of these rules clearly indicates 
that they are facially nondiscriminatory. The evidence dis­
closes that they have been strictly enforced as to all, re­
gardless of race, color or creed. All students in all grades 
are placed and assigned to the school district in which 
they reside. Attendance areas or districts are fixed by 
the school board from time to time. They have remained 
substantially unchanged since 1949 except where neces­
sitated by a growing population which required the erec­
tion of many new school buildings.

Originally, school boundaries were established by tak­
ing into consideration the size and location of the physical 
plant, the number of pupils to be accommodated, the dis­
tance between the residence of the child and the school, 
the traffic encountered en route, together with the purpose 
of carrying neighborhoods into the schools intact. These 
criteria have been followed in the establishment of at­
tendance areas for new schools as erected and in the amend­
ments of old attendance areas when and as necessitated.

There is no evidence in this case to sustain the charge 
that the geographical boundaries of the PIoffinan-Boston 
and Langston schools were either established or are being 
maintained to perpetuate segregation.

Memorandum Opinion



158a

The validity of the attendance areas of the Arlington 
schools and particularly the areas for the Iloffman-Boston 
and Langston schools, has been before this Court in several 
of the proceedings involving the placement of individual 
pupils. Judge Bryan, in his findings of fact and conclu­
sions of law, reported in 166 F. Supp. 529, stated:

“The court is of the opinion that Attendance Area, 
Overcrowding at Washington and Lee, and Academic 
Accomplishment clearly are valid criteria, free of taint 
of race or color. It concludes also that these criteria 
have been applied without any such bias.”

Again on July 25, 1959, Judge Bryan affirmed the use 
of the foregoing criteria and upheld the denial of the ap- 
plication for transfer of ten pupils on the ground that they 
lived within the Hoffman-Boston High School Attendance 
Area (which is substantially the same now as it was then).

As to the Hoffman-Boston Attendance Areas, this Court 
said:

“ Considering school bus routes, safety of access and 
other pertinent factors, it cannot be found that the 
School Board’s assignments are arbitrary or predicated 
on race or color. The bounds of Hoffman-Boston dis­
trict do not deprive those within it of any advantage 
or privilege. Actually, they are afforded schools of 
better pupil-teacher ratio and of less congestion than 
any in the County. Proximity is not the only test. 
School divisions must at some points disregard neigh­
borhood lines. The court cannot draw the boundaries 
for attendance areas.”

Again on September 16, 1960, Judge Bryan, speaking 
for this Court, upheld the denial of the application of

Memorandum Opinion



159a

eight pupils for transfers to other schools solely because 
they lived in the Hoffman-Boston High School Attendance 
Area or the Langston Elementary School Area. He stated:

“Additionally, the petitioners complain that the 
school districts still follow the old lines that were set 
up in past years under the law to effect racial dif­
ferentiation. They point to the Hoffman-Boston and 
Langston districts as still defined by the boundaries 
originally established for those areas, which are the 
two parts of the county where the negro population 
has historically been concentrated. These, it is urged, 
are no longer logical divisions and they serve to per­
petuate the outlawed segregation.

“ On residence disqualifications, transfers have been 
denied [certain students]. [Some of them] reside in 
the Langston attendance area and [some] in the Hoff­
man-Boston. Ignoring the Hoffman-Boston lines on 
the assumption, arguendo, that they are vestiges of 
segregation as the petitioners charge, still the assign­
ments there of [certain of these students] do not neces­
sarily evince discrimination. They wish to transfer to 
Wakefield High School, but their homes are nearer 
Hoffman-Boston. Then, too, there are other reasons 
undergirding this allocation, such as neighborhood and 
traffic considerations. Certainly, the decision of the 
Board is not without substantial evidential ground.

“ [Certain pupils] want to go to Woodlawn School. 
But assuming invalidity, again arguendo, in the Lang­
ston district boundaries, and with these lines erased, 
the Board’s action still does not appear unreasonable. 
These four students are inhabitants of a single neigh­
borhood, almost as close to Langston School as to 
Woodlawn. Their assignment to Langston can be as

Memorandum Opinion



160a

consistently accounted, for by these circumstances as 
by an intention to foster segregation. The projection 
of the two jaws from the Woodlawn district north­
wardly might be argued as demonstrating a purpose 
to effectuate segregation, but this is only so in ap­
pearance. The suspicion is dispelled both by a con­
sideration of the purpose of the Board to carry neigh­
borhoods into the schools intact, as well as by similar 
extensions of Page, Maury, McKinley, and other dis­
tricts in which only white children are concerned. At 
all events, the determination was one well within the 
discretion of the Board, and as it may fairly rest on 
non-racial grounds, the Court will not presume the 
Board was improperly motivated.”

This case has been before the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit on several occasions, wherein the aforesaid 
holdings of Judge Bryan have been under review. His 
opinion was affirmed in each instance. In fact, the plain­
tiffs did not question or contend the established attendance 
areas for these schools were invalid.

In Jones v. School Board of the City of Alexandria, 278 
F. 2d 72, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ex­
pressly recognized that residence and academic tests may 
be applied in determining what schools children shall at­
tend, provided factors of race or color are not considered.

The same principle was reaffirmed in Dodson v. School 
Board of Charlottesville, 289 F. 2d 439. See also Brown v. 
Board of Education of Topeka, 139 F. Supp. 468, wherein 
it was stated:

“ If it is a fact, as we understand it is, with respect 
to Buchanan School that the district is inhabited en­
tirely by colored students, no violation of any consti­

Memorandum Opinion



161a

tutional right results because they are compelled to 
attend the school in the district in which they live.”

See also Allen v. School Board of the City of Charlottes­
ville, decision rendered December 18, 1961, wherein Judge 
Paul upheld the geographical assignment of public elemen­
tary students and eliminated from the plan of assignment 
(for high schools) all factors except that of residence.

The plaintiffs, without specifically contending that as­
signment based solely on residency is discriminatory per se, 
contend that the attendance areas as fixed by the Arling­
ton County School Board for the Hoffman-Boston and 
Langston schools are unconstitutional, because the attend­
ance areas of these schools were defined so as to include 
therein as many Negroes as practical and to exclude there­
from as many white residents as could be excluded.

This contention is not supported by the evidence. The 
attendance areas of these schools were established prior 
to the Brown decision and have been publicly reviewed 
as late as 1960, on which occasion no citizen of Arlington, 
Negro or white, objected to the attendance areas as es­
tablished for these schools. A very substantial number of 
Negro junior and senior high school students reside in 
sections of Arlington County not within the Hoffman- 
Boston Attendance Area, all of whom are assigned to the 
school (predominantly white) nearest their residences. 
Likewise, Negro students attending elementary schools re­
siding in various sections of the county are assigned to 
the schools (predominantly white) nearest their homes.

The plaintiffs cannot assign themselves to the schools 
of their choice. That responsibility must rest with the 
proper school authorities. The Federal Courts manifestly 
cannot operate the schools. All that they have the power

Memorandum Opinion



162a

to do in the premises is to enjoin violation of constitutional 
rights in the operation of schools by state authorities.1

The evidence further discloses that all Arlington County 
schools are being operated on a non-discriminatory basis 
not only in assignments but also in educational, athletic, 
dramatic and social activities.

In support of their contentions the plaintiffs rely upon 
Taylor v. Board of Education of the City School District 
of New Rochelle, 195 F. Supp. 231. In that case the Court 
had found that

“ the Board of Education had gerrymandered school dis­
trict lines so as to confine Negroes within the Lincoln 
District, and had allowed white children living within 
the District to transfer to other schools.”

Such is not the fact in this case.
Having found that the Arlington County School Board 

acted in good faith and in accordance with governing con­
stitutional principles in establishing and maintaining school 
attendance areas, we next turn to the question of the 
validity of Rule 3, Paragraph 3 of the Rules of Admission 
which provides “no child shall be compelled to attend a 
school in which his race is in the minority” . The plaintiffs 
contend this section of the rules is unconstitutional and 
invalid and denies to Negro plaintiffs equal protection of 
the law and due process guaranteed by the 14th Amendment. 
However, they have failed to cite any authority, and the 
Court has found none, that supports this contention. The 
Brown ease does not require complete or enforced integra­
tion of the public school system. The late Chief Judge

Memorandum Opinion

1 Carson v. Board of Education of McDowell County, 227 F. 2d 789.



163a

Parker of the Fourth Circuit expressly so held in Briggs 
v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, wherein he stated:

“It (the Brown case) has not decided that the fed­
eral courts are to take over or regulate the public 
schools of the states. It has not decided that the states 
must mix persons of different races in the schools or 
must require them to attend schools or must deprive 
them of the right of choosing the schools they attend. 
What it has decided, and all that it has decided, is 
that a state may not deny to any person on account of 
race the right to attend any school that it maintains. 
* # # . rjr̂ g Constitution, in other words, does not re­
quire integration. It merely forbids discrimination. 
It does not forbid such segregation as oecurs as the 
result of voluntary action. It merely forbids the use of 
governmental power to enforce segregation.”

It is obvious that Rule 3 contemplates that there should 
be no compulsory integration.

The only charge of discrimination in this case is that 
Negro children residing in the Hoffman-Boston Attend­
ance Area are not permitted to transfer to other schools 
of their choice, whereas certain children residing in the 
same attendance area are permitted to transfer. But a 
similar condition in converse obtains in other attendance 
areas, where resident Negro children are permitted to 
transfer to Hoffman-Boston while certain children are 
restricted to the school located within their residential 
attendance area. The School Board, in requiring Negroes 
residing in the Hoffman-Boston and Langston areas to 
attend those schools, is merely following the principle of 
requiring pupils to attend the schools within their area 
of residence.

Memorandum Opinion



164a

To prohibit the right of transfer, granted to both Negro 
and white pupils under like condition, would be to require 
assignment of all pupils solely on the basis of residence, 
resulting in the enforced integration of all public schools. 
It is not believed that the Constitution or the cases cited 
so require. Further, the evidence in this case indicates that 
a substantial number of both Negro and white parents de­
sire the right to send their children to a school in which 
a majority of their race attend because they have both 
applied for and been granted such transfers.

Another alternative would be to allow pupils of both 
races to attend any school they might choose anywhere in 
the county. To do so would bring only chaos to the orderly 
administration of the public schools. Some schools would 
be practically deserted; others would be crowded far be­
yond physical capacity.

A similar right of transfer has been adopted by the 
Charlottesville public schools and was approved by Judge 
Paul on December 18, 1961.

Both the Fifth1 and Sixth1 2 Circuit Courts of Appeals 
have expressed views on this subject. The Sixth Circuit, 
in upholding the constitutionality of the Voluntary Trans­
fer procedure incorporated in the Nashville plan said:

“ If the child is free to attend an integrated school, 
and his parents voluntarily choose a school where only 
one race attends, he is not being deprived of his con­
stitutional rights. It is conceivable that the parent 
may have made the choice from a variety of reasons-— 
concern that his child might otherwise not be treated 
in a kindly way; personal fear of some kind of economic

1 Boson v. Rippy, 285 F. 2d 43.
2 Kelley v. Board of Education of the City of Nashville, 270 F. 2d 209.

Memorandum Opinion



165a

reprisal; or a feeling that the child’s life will he more 
harmonious with members of his own race. In common 
justice, the choice should be a free choice, uninfluenced 
by fear of injury, physical or economic, or by anxie­
ties on the part of a child or his parents. The choice, 
provided in the plan of the Board, is, in law, a free 
and voluntary choice. It is the denial of the right to 
attend a non-segregated school that violates the child’s 
constitutional rights.”

The Fifth Circuit, in declaring a somewhat similar pro­
vision in the Dallas Plan1 unconstitutional, noted that “ its 
application might tend to perpetuate racial discrimination” 
and was at variance with the Texas statute giving the 
School Board wide discretion in transferring pupils.

There is no evidence in this case indicating the voluntary 
transfer provision of the Arlington Buies of Admission 
either has been or will be used to perpetuate racial dis­
crimination. To the contrary, all vestige of racial discrimi­
nation has been eliminated from every facet of the Arling­
ton school system. Further, there is no Virginia statute, 
such as exists in Texas, establishing criteria guiding local 
school boards in assigning and transferring pupils within 
the public schools.

Buie 3 is not unconstitutional on its face, or as applied 
in Arlington County.

1 “6. The following will he regarded as some of the valid conditions to
support application for transfer:

“a. When a white student would otherwise be required to attend a school 
previously serving colored students only;

“b. When a colored student would otherwise be required to attend a school 
previously serving white students only;

“c. When a student would otherwise be required to attend a school where 
the majority of students in that school or in his or her grade are of a different 
race.” Boson v. Eippy, supra.

Memorandum Opinion



166a

We next come to the merits of defendants’ motion to 
dissolve.

The Supreme Court of the United States in setting forth 
the procedure to be followed in eliminating racial discrimi­
nation in public education stated:

* * * “ Full implementation of these constitutional 
principles may require solution of varied local school 
problems. School authorities have the primary re­
sponsibility * # * . * # *

“ In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the 
courts will be guided by equitable principles. * * *

“ * * * . They will also consider the adequacy of any 
plans the defendants (school authorities) may propose 
to meet these problems and to effectuate a transition 
to a racially nondiscriminatory school system. During 
this period of transition, the courts will retain juris­
diction of these cases.” 1

None of the plaintiffs in this case are now asserting a 
denial of any constitutional right. All issues raised by the 
pleadings have been adjudicated. All pupils residing in 
Arlington County are assigned to the school district in 
which they reside, regardless of race or color. All of the 
facilities and activities under the control of the Arlington 
County School Board are being administered on a non­
discriminatory basis—education, athletic, dramatic, social.

This Court is of the opinion that the Arlington County 
public schools are being administered on a racially non­
discriminatory basis and that the transition period referred 
to by the Supreme Court has expired, and that there is 
no evidence before the Court indicating that the Arlington 
County School Board will not continue to operate the public

Memorandum Opinion

1 See Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294.



167a

schools in accordance with the governing constitutional 
principles.

Therefore there is no further justification for the in­
junction of July 31, 1956.

“It is well settled that an injunctive order may be 
modified or dissolved in the discretion of the court 
when conditions have so changed that it is no longer 
needed or as to render it inequitable.” Tobin v. Alma 
Mills, 192 F. 2d 133 (4 Cir., 1951).

An order striking this suit from the current docket of 
this Court will be accordingly entered.

Nothing herein contained shall be construed as prohibit­
ing any person from instituting an appropriate suit as­
serting the denial of any of his constitutional rights.

Orest E. Lewis 
United States District Judge

Memorandum Opinion

Alexandria, Virginia

March 1, 1962



168a

Order

I n the
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

F or the E astern D istrict of V irginia 

Alexandria Division

[ same tit l e ]

In accordance with memorandum opinion, this day filed, 
it is

Ordered that the above styled matter be dismissed and 
stricken from the current docket of this Court.

Oren R. L ewis 
United States District Judge

Alexandria, Virginia

March 1, 1962



169a

Notice of Appeal

Isr the
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
F oe the E astern D istrict of V irginia 

at A lexandria

[ same title ]

Notice is hereby given that Gloria Brooks, an infant, by 
Ethel A. Brooks, her mother and next friend, Alice Brown, 
Mabra Brown, and Marcia Brown, infants by Oliver Brown, 
their father and next friend, Deidra Hallion, an infant, 
by Mary H. Hallion, her mother and next friend, George 
Moore, an infant, by Johnnie M. Moore, his parent and 
next friend, Gloria Rowe, an infant, by Ruth M. Rowe, 
her mother and next friend, and Ethel A. Brooks, Oliver 
Brown, Mary H. Hallion, Johnnie M. Moore and Ruth M. 
Rowe plaintiffs in this cause, for themselves and all other 
persons similarly situated hereby appeal to The United 
States Court Of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit from the 
final judgment dismissing the action entered in this cause 
on March 1st, 1962.

Otto L. T tjcker 
Of Counsel

F rank D. R eeves 
1343 H Street, N.W.
Washington 5, D. C.

James M. Nabrit
10 Columbus Circle, Suite 1790 
New York 19, New York

S. W. T ucker 
214 East Clay Street 
Richmond 19, Virginia 

Counsel for Plaintiffs



170a

CERTIFICATE

I certify that the foregoing Notice of Appeal was served 
you Frank L. Ball, Esquire, 1437 N. Court House Road, 
Arlington, Virginia and James H. Simmonds, Esquire, 1500 
N, Court House Road, Arlington, Virginia, Counsel of 
Record, by the mailing of copies thereof to their addresses 
herein above mentioned this 2nd day of May, 1962.



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