McGautha v California Brief for Petitioner

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OCTOBER TERM, 1970

No. 203

DENNIS COUNCLE McGAUTHA,

v.

CALIFORNIA,

Petitioner,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF CALIFORNIA

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

Herman F. Selvin

270 North Canon Drive,
Beverly Hills, Califor ria 90210

Attorney for Petitioner
MBTraffTmc**.: i-wymaani z  aasKts^/s^^r. ■n,7zxtts*aa&  . ideea2v-swA5ZU»,e«uiV.atnin̂ton. D. C. TrtiEL PfteiS - 202 • 3jJ-G02S



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINION BELOW .................................................
JURISDICTION......................................................

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND
STATUTE INVOLVED.......................................

QUESTION PRESENTED ..................................
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............................

1. The Crime and Sentence.............................
2. The Evidence and Instructions at the

Penalty Phase of the T ria l.........................

3. California’s Penalty-Imposition Procedure .
4. Review of the Penalty..................................

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . ; .........
ARGUMENT

1. California’s Procedure, By Which The Death 
I enalty Is Imposed, Denied Petitioner Due 
Process of Law, For It Subjected Him To 
The Extreme Penalty As The Result Of A 
Choice Not Required To Conform To 
Standards Fixed By The Law, But Which 
Was Permitted By The State To Be Made In 
Response To The Unguided And Unrestrained 
Subjective Reactions Or Emotions Of A Jury

II. California’s Procedure, In Respect Of Its 
Vulnerability To The Requirements Of Due 
Process, Is Materially Different From A 
Procedure Whereby The Penalty Is Certainly 
Imposed By Law...................................

III. The Unconstitutionality Of The Present 
Capital Sentencing Procedure In California 
Requires Reconsideration By The State 
Court To Determine Whether A Constitu­
tional Procedure Is Available And Applicable 
To Petitioner......................

Pace

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5
5
5

7
10
17
17

20

29

CONCLUSION
34
35



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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Anderson, In re, 69 Cal.2d 613, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21,
447 P.2d 117 ............................................................. 10 ,15 ,17 ,28

Andres v. United States, 330 U.S. 740 .................................. 39, 30
Baldwin v. New York,____U.S......  ............................................  31
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 .................................................  31
Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal.2d 166, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129,

417 P.2d 673 ............................................................................  39
Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 ............... 33. 24
Clark v. State, 169 Ark. 717, 276 S.W. 849 .............................. 32
Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413 ......................... --
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 .................  ~3
Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 9 7 ............................................  21
Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co.,

18 How. 272   21
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145   22
Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 .............................. 20, 21, 24
Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897 .....................................  24, 25
Hawthorne v. State, 135 Ark. 247, 204 S.W. 841......................  32
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 .............................................. 23, 25
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 ..........................................21, 22
Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 ............................................... 31
Kelley v. State, 133 Ark. 261,202 S.W. 49 ........................... 32, 33
Kemmler, Ex parte, 136 U.S. 436 .................................................  30
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 ................................................ 30
Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 ............................................  22
Louisville & N.R.R. Co. v. Central Stock Yards, 212 U.S. 132 . . 22
McGautha v. California, 70 Cal.2d 770, 76 Cal. Rptr. 434,

452 P.2d 650 ..............................................................................  1
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 ........................................................... 22
Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138 .......................................  30, 32, 33
Maxwell v. Bishop, No. 13, O.T. 1969 .....................................  31, 33

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Maxwell v. Bishop, ___ U .S.__ , 90 S.Ct. 1578 ..................... 30, 34
Musser v. Utall, 333 U.S. 95 ..................................................  23, 24
People v. Bollinger, 196 Cal. 191, 237 Pac. 25 .........................  11
People v. Borchers, 50 Cal.2d 321, 325 P.2d 97 .........................  16
People v. Boss, 210 Cal. 245, 290 Pac. S S I ...................................  g
People v. Brice, 49 Cal.2d 434, 317 P.2d 9 6 1 ..............................  jo

People v. Friend, 47 Cal.2d 749, 306 P.2d 463  passim
People v. Green, 47 Cal.2d 209, 302 P.2d 307 ..........  11, 15, 16, 32
People v. Hamilton, 60 Cal.2d 105, 32 Cal. Rptr. 4,

383 P.2d 412 ................................................................................  10

People v. Hines, 61 Cal.2d 164, 37 Cal. Rptr. 622, 390 
P-2d 398 .................................................................................. 10, 13, 14

People v. Howk, 56 Cal.2d 687, 16 Cal. Rptr. 370,
365 P.2d 426 ................................................................................  14

People v. Jones, 52 Cal.2d 636, 343 P.2d 577 ............................ 10, 12
People v. Ketchell, 59 Cal.2d 503, 30 Cs- Rptr. 538 

381 P.2d 394 .............................................................................. 13 J5

People v. Leary, 3 05 Cal. 486, 39 Pac. 24 jq

People v. Linden, 52 Cal.2d 1,338 P.2d 397 ......................  1 1, 36, 17
People v. Lookadoo, 66 Cal.2d 307. 57 Cal. Rptr. 608 

425 P.2d 208 ...............................................................’................7> ]6

People v. Love, 56 Cal.2d 720, 16 Cal. Rptr. 777,
17 Cal. Rptr. 481, 366 P.2d 33, 809 ..............................  13,14,15

People v. Machado, 150 Cal. App. 2d 190, 309 P.2d 903 ..........  8
People v. Morse, 60 Cal.2d 631,36 Cal. Rptr. 201,

388 P.2d 3 3 .................................................................9, 10, 13, 16, 26
People v. Nye, 71 Cal.2d___, 71 A.C. 376, 78 Cal. Rptr.

467, 455 P.2d 395 ............................................................  10, 12, 14
People v. Polk, 63 Cal.2d 443, 47 Cal. Rptr. 1,

406 P.2d 641 ................................................’ ............ 1 0 ,1 1 ,1 4 ,2 2
People v. Rittger, 54 Cal.2d 720, 7 Cal. Rptr. 901 

335 P.2d 645 ...................................................................... - 15

People v. Terry, 61 Cal .2d 137, 37 Cal. Rptr. 605,
390 P.2d 381 ......................................................................  10, 13, 14



People v. Turvillc, 51 Cal.2d 620, 335 P.2cl, 678 ......................... ]3
People v. Varnum, 61 Cal .2d 425, 38 Cal. Rptr. 881 

392 P.2d 961 ......................................................... ’ ]3

People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 44 Cal. Rptr. 44~>
402 P.2d 130 ......................................................... .. ’ 8

People v. Welch, 49 Cal. 174 .................................................. j j

Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 ....................................................  21
Ricks v. District of Columbia, 414 F.2d 1097 .................... 23, 24, 25
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 ............................................  30
Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 ........................................ 27 30
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 9 1 ............................................  24
Sims v. Eyman, 405 F.2d 439 .................................................  39 32
Stewart v. State, 233 Ark. 458, 345 S.W.2d 472 ......................... 32
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 .................................................  25
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 ......................................................  30, 32
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 ............................................  21
United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 ............................................  25

Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 ................................... 31,34
Will on v. Utah, 99 U.S. 1 30 ......................................................  32
With.: spoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 5 1 0 .......................................  25, 28
Wright v. City of Montgomery, Ala., 406 F.2d 867 .................... 24

CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES

California Military and Veterans Code, §§1670, 1672(a) ..........  4
California Penal Code, §37 ....................................................  4
California Penal Code, §128 ...................................................  4
California Penal Code, §187 .................................................  3
California Penal Code, §189 ...............................................  3 j
California Penal Code, §190 .........................................................  3 ^ 0

California Penal Code, §190.1 ............... ...................  3, 6, 12, 33, 34
California Penal Code, §209 ....................................................  4

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California Penal Code, §211 ...........................................................  3
California Penal Code, §213 ...........................................................  ~,4

California Penal Code, §219 ...........................................................  4
California Penal Code, §1168 ......................................................  35
California Penal Code, §1181, subd. 6 ........................................ ^
California Penal Code, §1181, subd. 7 ........................................ ^
California Penal Code, part 3, title 1, chaps. 7, 8 .................... 34, 35
California Penal Code, §2900 ......................................................  35
California Penal Code, §2940 ......................................................  35
California Penal Code, §3020 ......................................................  35
California Penal Code, §3040 ....................................................... 35
California Penal Code, §3046 ......................................................  35
California Penal Code, §4500 ......................................................  4
California Penal Code, §5077 ....................................................... 35
California Statutes, 1957, vol. 2, chap. 1968, p. 3509 ............. 3, 11
California Statutes, 1958, vol. 1, chap. 738, p. 2727 ...............  3
Delaware Laws, vol. 53, chap. 310, §2 ........................................ 29
United States Code, title 28, §1257(3) ........................................ 2
United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment.............................. 22
United States Constitution, Eight .Amendment.............................. 30
United States Constitution, Due Process Clause . . . .  20, 23, 24, 27
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment...............2, 5, 22
Vermont Stat. Ann., tit. 13, §2303 ............................................. 29

TEXTBOOKS AND LAW REVIEWS

California Law Review, vol. 52, p. 386 13
California Law Review, vol. 56, p. 1268 ........................................ 13
Harvard Law Review, vol. 52, p. 77 ................................... 23, 25, 27
Harvard Law Review, vol. 83, p. 1173 29, 30
Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police 

Science, vol. 53, p. 3 1 7 .....................................



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Kentucky Law Review, vol. 6, p. 107 ........................................ 26
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 101, p. 1099 .......... 30
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 108, p. 434 .........  27
Virginia Law Review, vol. 24, p. 462 ............................................. 26
Wigmore, Evidence, 3d cd. vol. 7, p. 55, §1944 .........................  2S

MISCELLANEOUS

California Jury Instructions, Criminal, p. vii .............................. 6
California Jury' Instructions, Criminal, p. 257 .............................. 6
California Jury Instructions, Criminal, p. 260 ..............................  10
Magna Carta, art. 39, West’s Calif. Ann. Codes,

Constitution, vol. 3, p. 764 ......................................................  21
Model Penal Code, §210.6................................................................  27
Rules, Supreme Court of the United States, rule 2 6 .................... 5
Standards Relating To Sentencing Alternatives and 

Procedures (A.B.A. Project), §2.2 ............................................. 28



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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1970

No. 203

DENNIS COUNCLE McGAUTHA,

Petitioner,

v.

CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME 
COURT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

Opinion Below

The opinion of the Supreme Court of California is re­
ported in 70 Cal.2d 770, 76 Cal. Rptr. 434, 452 P.2d 650. 
There was no other opinion in the cause.

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Jurisdiction

1. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked on the ground 
that there is brought here for review a final judgment cf the 
Supreme Court of California, the highest court of the State 
in which a decision could be had, rendered in a cause in 
which the validity of a State statute was drawn in question 
on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution of 
the United States; and in which there was drawn in question 
a right, privilege and immunity claimed by the petitioner 
under the Constitution of the United States. [A. 249, 265.]

2. The statutory provision upon which that jurisdiction 
rests is 28 U.S. Code, sec. 1257(3).

3. The time factors upon which that jurisdiction rests are: 
The date of the judgment to be reviewed, as well as the 
time of filing and entry, was April 14, 1969. A timely peti­
tion for rehearing was filed on April 29, 1969, and denied, 
without opinion, on May 14, 1969. The judgment, there­
fore, became final on May 14, 1969. [A. 2^9, 266.] The 
petition for certiorari was filed on June 21, 1969, and 
granted on June 1, 1970.

Constitutional Provision and Statute Involved

1. The constitutional provision here involved is section 1 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States.

“All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State where­
in they reside. No State shall make or enfoicc any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with­
out due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”



2. The statute involved is the Penal Code of the State of 
California, sections 190 and 190.1, as amended. It may be 
found in the official edition, as amended in 1957, in Cali­
fornia Statutes, 1957. vol. 2, chap. 1968, p. 3509; and, as 
amended in 1959, in California Statutes, 1959, vol. 1, chap. 
738, p. 2727. At the time of the trial hereof, it read and 
still reads as follows:

Ҥ190. Ever,' person guilty of murder in the first 
degree shall suffer death, or confinement in the state 
prison for life, at the discretion of the court or jury 
trying the same, and the matter of punishment shall 
be determined as provided in Section 190.1, and 
every person guilty of murder in the second degree 
is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison 
from five years to life.'1'

Ҥ190.1. The guilt or innocence of every' person 
charged with an offense for which the penalty is in

'A t all times material here, murder in the first degree and murder 
in the second degree were respectively defined in Cal. Penal Code, as 
follows:

Ҥ187. Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with 
malice aforethought.

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Ҥ189. All murder which is perpetrated by means of a bomb, 
poison, lying in wait, torture, or by another land of willful, 
deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which is committed 
in (lie perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, 
robbery, burglary, mayhem, or any act punishable under 
Section 288 [lewd or lascivious acts upon the body of a child 
under the age of 14 years], is murder in the first degree; and 
all other kinds of murders are of the second degree.'"’

At the times material here “robbery”  was defined as follows:
Ҥ211. Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property 
in the possession of ano.hcr, from his person or immediate 
presence, and against Iiis will, accomplished by means of 
force or fear.

All section references arc to the Penal Code of California, of which 
there is no official edition, but which, in either West’s or Deering’s 
annotated edition, is generally accepted by the Courts and Bar of 
California as authentic.



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the alternative death or imprisonment for life shall 
first be determined, without a finding as to penalty.121 
If such person has been found guilty of an offense 
punishable by life imprisonment or death, and has 
been found sane on any plea of not guilty by reason 
of insanity, there shall thereupon be further pro­
ceedings on the issue of penalty, and the trier of fact 
shall fix the penalty. Evidence may be presented at 
the further proceedings on the issue of penalty, of 
the circumstances surrounding the crime, of the de­
fendant’s background and history, and of any facts 
in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty. The 
determination of the penalty of life imprisonment 
or death shall be in the discretion of the court or 
jury trying the issue of fact on the evidence presented, 
and the penalty fixed shall be expressly stated in the 
decision or verdict. The death penalty shall not be 
imposed, however, upon any person who was under 
the age of 18 years at the time of the commission 
of the crime. The burden of proof as to the age of 
said person shall be upon the defendant.

“If the defendant was convicted by the court 
sitting without a jury, the trier of fact shall be the 
court. If the defendant was convicted by a plea of 
guilty, the trier of fact shall be a jury unless a jury 
is waived. If the defendant was convicted by a jury, 
the trier of fact shall be the same jury unless, for 
good cause shown, the court discharges that jury, in 
which case a new jury' shall be drawn to determine 
the issue of penalty. 2

2Therc are four crimes in California, in addition to first-degree 
murder, for which the punishment is in the alternative death or life 
imprisonment. These are: Kidnapping with bodily harm [Cal. Penal 
Code, sec. 209]; train wrecking [Cal. Penal Code, sec. 219]: sabotage 
of war or defense effort, causing death or great bodily injury [Cal 
Military and Vet. Cole, secs. 1670, 1672(a)]; and assault with a 
deadly weapon by a life prisoner [Cal. Penal Code, sec. 4500]. There 
are two other crimes-treason and procurement of the conviction and 
execution of an innocent person by perjury or subornation of perjury -  
foi which the penal’.)' is death, without the alternative o‘~ life 
imprisonment. [Cal. Penal Code, secs. 37, 128.]



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“In any case in which defendant lias been found 
guilty by a jury, and the same or another jury7, try­
ing the issue of penalty, is unable to reach a unani­
mous verdict on the issue of penalty, the court shall 
dismiss the jury7 and either impose the punishment 
for life in lieu of ordering a new trial on the issue 
of penalty, or order a new jury impaneled to try' 
the issue of penalty, but the issue of guilt shall not 
be retried by such jury7.”

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Question Presented

Docs California’s procedure, which allows capital trial 
juries absolute discretion, uncontrolled by7 standards, direc­
tions or guidelines of any kind, to impose either the penalty 
of death or imprisonment for life upon a defendant con­
victed of murder in the first degree, deny to that defendant 
due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend­
ment to the Constitution of the United States?

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

1. The Crime and Sentence

On February 14, 1967 two men, both armed and 
ultimately identified as petitioner iMcGautha and his co- 
defendant below, William Rodney Wilkinson, robbed a small 
market in Los Angeles, California. [Rep. Tr., p. 105, line 
1, to p. 109, line 11 3.] In the course of the robbery a shot

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Because the question here relates solely to the penalty imposed, 
only the evidence at the penalty phase of the trial has been printed ’ 
in the Appendix. However, to put the matter of penalty in its con­
text of the crime for which it was imposed, we briefly summarize the 
circumstances ox the enme. References to the record, in that connec­
tion, are made, pursuant to Rule 26, to the Reporter’s Transcript of 
the trial, which is here in four volumes. The references arc identified 
by the abbreviation “ Rep. Tr.”

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was fired by one of the two men, but which one the 
evidence leaves in conflict. That shot killed Benjamin 
Smetana, husband of the market owner. [Rep. IT., p. 116. 
line 17, to p. 118, line 20; p. 362, line 13, to p. 364, iine 8; 
p. 385, lines 1-26; p. 394, lines 1-15.)

In due course, the two men were apprehended and charged 
by information with one count of murder in the first degree 
and two counts of armed robbery. [A. 1-4.) They were 
then put upon their trial before a jury. [A. 6-8, i l.j The 
trial, as required in California in cases in which the penalty 
may be cither deatii or life imprisonment [Cal Penal Code, 
sec. 190.1], was held in two stages, with separate verdicts 
on guilt and penalty. In the first stage the jury returned a 
verdict finding both men guilty of murder in the first degree 
and armed robbery. [A. 11-14. See, also, note 24, p. 
34, infra.)

The second stage of the trial-choice of the penalty to be 
imposed for the murder—was then had before the same jury. 
[A. 15-16, 30.) After the taking of additional evidence [see, 
section 2 of this Statement of the Case, infra] the jury were 
instructed that a person guilty of murder in the first degree 
“ shall suffer death or confinement in the state prison for 
life, at the discretion of the jury . . and, that, beyond 
prescribing the two alternative penalties, the law itself pro­
vides no standard for the guidance of the jury in the selec­
tion of the penalty, but, rather, commits the whole matter 
of determining which of the two penalties shall be fixed to 
the judgment, conscience, and absolute discretion of the 
jury . . [A. 222-223.) The jury, by their verdict, ordered * 4

~ Two of the four volumes relate to voir dire examination of jurors 
and are so identified on their covers. No references .to those two 
volumes are made in this brief.

4The instruction given the jury was strictly in accord with the law 
of California. [See, the cases cited in section 3 of this Statement of 
the Case, infra.) It is, indeed, the standard instruction upon the sub­
ject, colloquially identified as “CALJIC 8.SO. ’ It comes from a com­
pilation of approved instructions to be used in criminal cases, prepared 
by a committee of the Bench and Bar. [See, California Jury Jnstnit- 
tions, Criminal, 3d. cd. (West Pub. Co. 1970), p. 257; also, p. vii.)

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tliat McGautha be put to death. but that Wilkinson be im­
prisoned for life. [A. 231-232.1

2. The Evidence and Instructions at the 
Penalty Phase of the Trial

First: Each of the defendants-they had not testified in 
the guilt phase of the trial-took the stand in the penalty 
phase. No testimony in behalf of McGautha was offered 
other than his own. [A. 159-194.] Wilkinson produced the 
testimony of a number of witnesses; friends and the like, 
who testified to his work habits, church attendance and 
similar matters. [A. 82-83.1 The prosecution added nothing 
except a file of documents from Texas [A. 81], among 
which were records of McGautha’s prior convictions. There 
were four of them charged in the information lA. 3-4], and 
admitted by him. [A. 35-36.]

A 1 part of the penalty phase of the trial consisted of 
an i ation of the conflicting testimony of the two de­
fend about which one of them had fired the fatal shot.5 
The j, A was immaterial to the question of their legal 
responsibility for the crime charged.6

5 According to McGautha, he did not fire, but Wilkinson did; at the 
time of the shot lie (McGautha) was holding a customer, using both 
hands in the process. [A. 159-161] Wilkinson, on the other hand, 
testified, in effect, that not he, but McGautha fired. [A. 98-99, 119- 
120.] Eye-witness testimony, at the guilt phase of the trial-tire 
evidence at which the jury' were instructed to consider in the penalty 
phase [A. 221]-corroborated McGautha. [Rep. Tr., p. 105, line 1, 
to p. 110, line 2; p. 112, line 9, to p. 119, line 6.] Other evidence, 
indirect in nature, and some confused and contradictory admissions 
by McGautha, tended to support Wilkinson’s version. [Rep. Tr., p. 
35, lines 7-9; p. 67, line 16 to p. 68, line 5; p. 112, line 9 to p. 116, 
line 9; p. 202, line 6, to p. 203, line 4; p. 204, line 11, to p. 205, 
line 7; p. 216, line 16, to p. 221, line 10; p. 325, line 21, to p. 326, 
line 13; p. 345, line 13, to p. 351, line 3.]

6The crime was “felony murder” [see. Cal. Panel Code, sec. 189; 
People v. Lookadoo, 66 Cal.2d 307, 314, 57 Cal. Rptr. 60S, 612-613, 
425 P.2d 208, 212-213 (1967)], of which each of them was equally



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Apart from his description of the events in the market. 
McGautha’s testimony was brief. He was born February 2, 
1926, in New Orleans, La. His parents separated when Ire 
was four. He seems to have had little, if any, education. He 
entered the military service in 1942. (A. 159, 161-162, 164.] 
Up to the time of his instant trial (when he was 41 years 
old), he had spent more than ten years of his life in prison. 
[A. 159, 162-163.] lie suffered his first convictions at the 
age of 17—the crimes were theft and robbery—for which, on 
Octo1 r 26, 1943, lie was sentenced to prison. Later he was 
convicted and sent to prison for the crime that in Texas is 
called “murder without malice” (November 23, 1948), and 
robbery by assault (May 16, i 952), for which he was also 
sent to prison. All of the crimes were commuted in Texas. 
[A. 35-37.]

Between terms in prison he worked for a produce com-' 
p; y in Houston, Texas. [A. 162, 163.] Upon his release 
from prison in 1958 he came to California, where he worked 
as a chauffeur and man-servant for such people as Hon. 
Alfred Gitleson (a California Superior Court Judge), Peter 
Lawford and others. [A. 163-164.]

Second: At the conclusion of the taking of the evi­
dence, the jury were again instructed. [A. 221-223.] They 
were told that, contrary to what they had been instructed 
in the guilt phase of the trial, the law did not f bid them 
from being influenced by pity for the defendant: and they 
could be governed “by mere sentiment and sympathy” for 
the defendants; but the law did forbid “mere conjecture, 
prejudice, public opinion or public feeling.” [A. 221-222.]

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guilty so long as the death was brought about by one of them in the 
course of “ the perpetration jf  or attempt to perpetrate . . . robbery 
. . .” [Cal. Penal Code, see. !89; People v. Boss, 210 Cal. 245, 249, 
290 Pac. 881 (1930); People v. Washington, 62 Cal.22 111, 780-781, 
783, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 445446, 402 P.2d 130, 133-134 (1965); 
People v. Machado, 150 Cal. App. 2d 190, 193-194, 309 P.2d 903, 
904-905 (1957).]

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They were also told that they should consider all the evi­
dence received throughout the whole trial, and also “all of 
the evidence of the circumstances surrounding the crime, of 
each defendant's background and history, and of the facts 
in aggravation or mitigation of tire penalty . . but, that 
it was “not essential to [their] decision that [they] find 
mitigating circumstances on the one hand or evidence in ag­
gravation of the offense on the other hand. ’ [A. 222.]

All of the foregoing was merely preface to that part of 
the charge w hich definitively expounded to the jury the ab­
solute and unguided power confided in them. [A. 222-223. 
And, see, section 1 of this Statement of the Case, p. 6, supra. ] 
Nothing in it bound them in any way, in relation to choice 
of penalty, to measure or weigh “all the evidence” by any 
standard that the law may have required be met. Nothing 
in the charge required a finding of any particular facts, evi­
dentiary or ultimate, as a foundation upon which to rest 
their choice of penalty.

During the penalty jury’s deliberations, they returned to 
the court to ask whether a sentence of life imprisonment 
precluded the possibility of parole. [A. 224] The court 
responded by reading to them the so-called “Morse Instruc­
tion,” which, in effect, told them that while a person serv­
ing a life term might or might not be paroled, the matter of 
parole was none of their concern in fixing the penalty at 
death or life imprisonment.7 [A. 224-225]

7The possibility of parole is plainly relevant to the consideration 
of imprisonment as a penally. Until People r. Morse, 60 Cal.2d 631, 
36 Cal. Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33, was decided in 1964, that possibi­
lity was an appropriate subject of evidence, argument and instruction 
iir a capital-ease penalty trial. [See, e.g., People v. Friend, 47 Cal.3d 
749, 764, 306 P.2d 463, 472 (1957).] In Morse lire State Supreme 
Court disapproved of tha. practice and, to that extent, overruled the 
cases permitting it. [People i\ Morse, supra, 60 Cal.2d at 642-649, 65o, 
36 Cal. Rptr. at 207-212, 215,388 P.2d at 39-44,47.] The Court rec­
ognized, however, that a jury might very well be interested ir. tire 
subject, and ask a question about it. Accordingly, the Court prepared 
the so-called “Morse Instruction” to be used in that event. [60 Cal.



10

3. California's Penalty-Imposition Procedure

First: The penalty for murder in the first decree is ei­
ther death or imprisonment for life, at the discretion ot the 
jury. [Cal. Pc,ml Cede. sec. 190.J As the State Supreme 
Court has frequently pointed out, “there is no requirement 
of or preference for either of the applicable penalties . . . 
the selection of penalty is in every instance completely 
within the absolute discretion of the jury and that
discretion is an unguided one, not confined or conditioned 
by any standards fixed by the law. [People v. Jones. 52 
Cal. 2d 636, 649; 343 P.2d 577, 585 (1959), quoting 
People v. Brice, 49 Cal. 2d 434, 437, 317 p.2d 961, 962 
(1957). To the same effect, among others, are: People v. 
Hamilton. 60 Cal. 2d 105, 134, 32 Cal. Rptr. 4, 21, 383 
P. 2d 412, 429 (1963); People v. Leary. 105 Cal. 486, 495- 
496, 39 Pac. 24, 26 (1895); People r. Friend, supra, 47 Cal. 
2d at 759, 765, 306 P. 2d at 473; People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 
2d 63i, 643, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201, 207, 3SS P. 2d 33, 39 
(1964); People v. Terry, 61 Cal. 2d 137, 141,37 Cal. Rptr. 
605, 60S, 390 P.2d 381, 384 (1964); People r. Hines, 61 
Cal. 2d 164, 173, 37 Cal. Rptr. 622, 628, 390 P.2d 39S, 
404 (1964); People v. Polk, 63 Cal. 2d 443, 451, 47 Cal. 
Rptr. 1, 6, 406 P.2d 641, 646 (1965); In re Anderson. 69 
Cal. 2d 613, 622-623. 73 Cal. Rptr. 21, 27-28, 447 P.2d
117, 123-124 (1968); People v. Aye, 71 Cal. 2d ___, 71
Adv. C-al., 376, 389 (fn. 5) (1969).]

The jury are required, as they were told in the instant 
case [A. 222], to consider all the evidence. They are not, 
however, required to find any given fact or set of facts, as 
a condition to imposing one or the other of the two per­
mitted penalties. Their discretion is absolute; and the State 
Supreme Court has ruled that they should never be in­
structed “as to how the discretion should be exercised . . .”

2d at 647-6- 9, 36 Cal. Rpti. at 211-212, 383 P.2d at 43-44.] That 
instruction is another one of the standard ones used in California. 
[See, California Jury Instructions, Criminal, 3d ed., p. 260. C/., note 
4, p. 6, sup-c.]



4 i
,'i i

t i

[People i. Bollinger, 196 Cal. 191, 207, 2c>7 Pac. 25, 3i 
(1925).] They are “ free to act according to [their] own 
judgment and discretion’ [People r. Linden, 52 Cal. 2d 1,
25 On. 5), 338 P.2d 397, 409 (fn. 5) (1959)]; . . the
law does not itself prescribe, nor authorize the court to in­
novate, any rule cir- inscribing the exercise of their discre­
tion. but rather, commits the whole matter oi its exercise 
to the judgment and the consciences of the jury . . .” [Peo­
ple v. Friend, supra, 47 Cal. 2d at 767, 306 P.2d at 474.]

Although two conflicting lines of authority or. the mat­
ter once co-existed, it has been settled, at least since 1956, 
that it is not necessary, as a condition of their choice be­
tween the two penalties, that the jury find an absence of 
mitigating or the presence of aggravating circumstances to 
fix the penalty at death.8 [.People v. Bollinger, supra, 196 
Cal. at 205-207, 237 Pac, at 30-31; People v. Friend, supra, 
47 Cal. 2d at 755-756, 306 P.2d at 466-467; People v. 
Green, 47 Cal. 2d 209, 21S, 224, 302 P.2d 307, 313-314, 
317 (1956).]

The trial judge may “aid the jury by stating the kinds of 
factors that may be considered, thereby setting the tone for 
the jury’s deliberation . . [ People v. Polk, supra, 63 Cal.

11

8At. one time, before adoption of the two-stage procedure, Califor­
nia recognized the so-called “silent verdict,” so that a verdict of guilty, 
silent as to penalty, meant the death penalty; if the jury intended to 
impose life imprisonment, they had to say so in their verdict. [People 
v. Welch, 49 Cal. 174, 179-180 (1874); People i>. Green, 47 Cal.2d 
209, 221-222, 302 P.2d 307, 316 (1956).] And, as well, juries were 
frequently instructed, notwithstanding the Supren e Court's disappioval, 
“that in the absence of extenuating circumstances it war their duty to 
bring in a simple verdict of minder in the first degree and to 
‘leave with the law the responsibility of affixing the punishment.’ ” 
[People v. Green, supra, 47 Cal.2d at 221, 302 P.2d at 315; People r. 
Bollinger, supra, 196 Cal. at 205-209, 237 Pac. at 30-32.]

The silent-verdict practice and its associated instruction about the 
necess ty of finding extenuation in order to impose life imprisonment, 
were definitely brought to an end by Green in 1956. The two-stage 
trial procedure was adopted in 1957. [California Statutes, 1957, vol. 
2, chap. 1968, sec. 2, p. 3509.]



. »  s - v

• £

I
. . .I

iS

i

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"j,
■ i V I

i

12

2d ;it 451,47 Cal. Rptr. at 6, 406 P.2d at 646. And, cj'.. 
People i’. Friend, supra, 47 Cal. 2d at 766-767, 306 I ._d at 
473-474.] But, he is not compelled to give that aid; and. 
as we have seen, he cannot, in any event, circumscribe their 
absolute discretion or tell them how to exercise it.

Second: The statute providing for separate trial of pen­
alty [Cal. Penal Code, sec. 190.1] expressly prescribes the 
admissibility of evidence of the circumstances suriounoing 
the crime; defendant’s background and history; and any 
facts in aggravation or mitigation of penalty. Admittedly, 
this sets a broad and liberal standard of admissibility Isee, 
e.g.. People v. Jones, supra, 52 Cal. 2d at 647, o43P.2d at 
584]; but it is not a limitless one. Generally speaking, the 
evidence must not be incompetent; it must not be irrele­
vant, that is, of such a nature that its prejudice to defend- 9

9 In one of the latest decisions on the subject fPeople v. Nyc, supra,
71 Cal.2 d __ , 71 Adv. Cal. at 388-389, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 473-474,
455 P.2d at 401-4C2], it was held not error to refuse an instruction 
that would have told the jury in considerable detail that they “may 
properly take into consideration factors which impel human conduct 
. . . the effect of human passion, ignorance and weakness . . . possi­
ble uncertainties attaching to life imprisonment as against the irrevo- 
cableness of death . . . choose between stern retribution or the 
exercise of pity . . . the view that . . . punishment should be fitted 
to the perpetrator ot the crime, not merely tne crime . . . and so 
forth. 171 Adv. Cal. at 388 (fn. 4), 78 Cal. Rptr. at 474 (In. 4), 
455 p gd at 402 (fn. 4).] It was not error to refuse that instruc­
tion for the reason, among otheis, that “a proper instruction” on 
the subject was given. This “proper instruction” told them to con­
sider all the evidence of the circumstances surrounding the crime, 
the defendant’s background and history, and of the facts in aggra­
vation or mitigation, but that it was not essential to their ̂ decision 
to find mitigating circumstances on the one hand or evidence in 
aggravation on the other. It then concluded with California’s usual 
statement that “ [bjeyond prescribing the two alternative penalties, 
the law itself provides no standard for the guidance of the jury . . . 
but rather commits the whole matter of determining which of the 
two penalties shall be fixed to the judgment, conscience and absolute 
discretion of the jury . . [71 Adv. Cal. at 389 (fn. 5), 78 Cal. Rptr.
at 474 (fn. 5), 455 P.2d at 402 (fn. 5).]

'



. .

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13

ant outweighs its probative value; and it must not be di­
rected solely to an attack upon the legality of the prior 
adjudication [of guilt] . . [People r. Terry, supra, 61 
Cal. 2d at 144-145, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 610. 390 P.2d at 386.] 
Nonetheless, competent evidence that seems upon its face 
to be relevant and significantly material to the choice of 
penalty the jury have to make, is excluded; and evidence 
that on its face is highly prejudicial to the defendant, is ad­
mitted.10 [Generally, see, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 Cal. 
Law Rev., 1268, 1406-1412 (1968); The California Penalty 
Trial, 52 California Law Review, 386 (1964).]

In the category of relevant and material evidence that is 
excluded come such matters as the likelihood of parole or 
pardon, if a life sentence is given [see, People r. Morse, 
supra, 60 Cal. 2d at 637-653, 36 Cal. Rptr., at 204-215, 
388 P.2d at 36-47; People v. Varnum, 61 Cal. 2d 425, 428-’ 
429, 38 Cal. Rptr. 881, 882-8S3, 392 P.2d 961, 962-963 
(1964)] and the deterrent effect of the penalty. [People 
v. Ketehell, 59 Cal. 2d 503, 536-538, 30 Cal. Rptr. 538, 
556-557, 381 P.2d 394, 412-413 (1963).] On the other 
hand, in the category of the prejudicial but admissible, is 
evidence of the defendant’s prior crimes—even those of 
which he has not been convicted.11 [People v. Ketehell,

a -

10For the most part, the question of whet m3y be properly put 
before a jury in a penalty trial arises on appeal in the form of an 
objection to an instruction given or an argument made to the jury. 
Instructions, however [see, People v. Turvillc, 51 Cal.2d 626,632-633, 
335 P.2d 678, 685-686], and argument, as well [see, People v. Love, 
56 Cal.2d 720, 730, 756-757, 16 Cal. Rptr. 777, 782, 17 Cal. Rptr.. 
481,486-487,366 P.2d 33, 38, 809,814-315 (1961)], must be based 
on the evidence and facts judicially noticed. To exclude certain facts 
as a proper subject of instruction or argument, therefore, necessarily 
connotes inadmissibility of evidence of those facts. As was said in 
People r. Love, supra, 56 Cal.2d at 731, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 783, 366 P. 

.2d at 39, since the evidence is inadmissible, the argument is improper.
11 There is a limitation on this rule, but one which does not 

materially hamper oi deter use of such evidence—a defendant’s admis­
sion or confession of another crime is inadmissible without extrinsic 
proof that the crime was committed. [People v. Ilines, 61 Cal.2u 164,



14

supra. 59 Cal. 2d a! 541-542, 50 Cal. Rptr. 
P.2d ' 415-416.]

it 559-560, 381

V' cr may be the scope of the evidence, the jury are
reqm to do no more than consider it [see, People v.
Howk, 56 Cal. 2d 687, 697-699, 16 Cal. Rptr. 570, 375- 
o76, 365 P.2d 426, 451-432 (1961)1; nothing can limit 
their absolute discretion to choose which of the two alter­
native penalties should be imposed. [See, c.g., People r 
Friend, supra, 47 Cal. 2d at 759-767, 306 P.2d at 469-475; 
People v. 'ferry, supra. 61 Cal. 2d at 146-147, 37 Cal. Rptr. 
at 611-612, 390 P. 2d at 3S7-38S; People v. Iiiues, supra, 61 
Cal. 2d at 173, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 628, 390 P.2d at 404.]

Third: Limitation upon the range of the instructions to 
be given, and the argument that may permissibly be made, 
to the jury, follows the pattern just discussed in relation to 
the admission of evidence. [See, note 10, p. \3, supra.] The 
significant consideration, as we have already shown [see, sec­
tion 3, subd. First, of this Statement of the Case] , is that 
they need not be told in the charge anything more than 
that theirs is the absolute discretion to select the penalty; 
they are not to be told how that discretion should be exer­
cised; nor may they be told what factors are to be con­
sidered in determining the penalty.

Argument, of course, must stay within the limits of the 
evidence. [People r. Love, supra, 56 Cal. 2d at 730-731, 
16 Cal. Rptr. at 782-783, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 486-4S7, 366’ 
P.2d at 38-39, 814-815.] The State Supreme Court has 
said that the objectives and the deterrent effect of punish­
ment, and the aggravating cr mitigating effect cf the evi­
dence, are proper subjects of argument to the jury. [/Co-

174, 37 Cab Rptr. 622, 629, 390 F.2d 398, 405 (1964); People v. 
Nyc, supra, 71 Adv. Cal. at a87-388, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 473, '155 P. 
2d at 401]; and its commission must be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt [People v. P< 'k, supra, 63 Cal .2d at 450, 47 Cab Rptr. at 5-6 
406 P.2d at 645-648].



N7
m

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supra. Cu!. 2ti at 766-767, 306 P.2d at
Green, supra . 47 Cal. 2d at 218-224. 231,

113-317 .1 The present vita lity of that pro­
liOWCVCO ic s i s in substanti;d doubt. Iuder
. expiresmV OVOrruli ng or limiting Friend or
eld it ort or to pernlit arguni'ent or evidetice as

to the deterrent effect of punishment, fPeople r. Lore, 
supra. 56 Cal. 2d at 725-726, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 779, 366 
P.2d at 35; People r. Fetched, supra. 59 Cal. 2d at 536- 
538, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 556-557, 381 P.2d at 412-413.] 
The cases that permitted this kind of argument did so upon 
a record showing that the jury were “adequately and fully 
instructed as to the full scope of their functions . . and 
had been told, in that, respect, that the choice of penalty is 
“committed to their absolute discretion . . .” and that 
there is “no rule of law that the punishment should be 
death unless there is evidence of extenuation or mitigating 
circumstances [nor that it] shall be life imprisonment un­
less there is evidence in aggravation of the offense . . .”
I People i’. Friend, supra. 47 Cal. 2d at 766-767, 306 P.2d 
at 474. See, also, People i>. Green, supra, 47 Cal. 2d at 
218-224, 231, 302 P.2u at 313-317.]

Fourth: The jury’s imposition of the death penalty is 
subject to only limited review, and that by the trial court 
in passing upon a motion for a new trial. “ . . .Only the 
trial court has power to reduce the punishment originally 
selected by the trier of fact . . .” [People v. Rittgcr, 54 
Cal. 2d 720, 734, 7 Cal. Rptr. 901, 909, 355 P.2d 645, 
653 (I960).] When a new trial motion is made, and upon 
an independent review of the evidence, which it is the trial 
court’s duty to make, the trial court, if it concludes that 
the jury’s verdict is not supported by the weigh- of tire evi­
dence, may reduce tire penalty to life imprisonment. [Cal. 
Penal Code, sec. 1 181. subd. 7; In re Anderson, supra, 69 
Cal. 2d at 623, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 28, 447 P.2d at 124; Peo­
ple v. Lore, supra, 56 Cal. 2d at 728, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 780- 
781, 366 P.2d at 36-37 ]

v - .. -

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16

An appellate court in Ca.iiforrii;.\ including the St: preme
Court itself, lias no such power; it “cannot suitsUnite its

• judgment as to choice of punlshment . . .” even if it “may
doubt the appropriateness of the death penalty" in the
case before it.12 [People r. Linden, supra, 52 Cal . 2d at
26, 338 P.2d at 410. To the same effect arc: Pe•OplC
Green, supra, 47 Cal. 2d at 235, 302 P.2d at 324-3115;Pco-
pie v. Morse, supra. 60 Cai. 2d at 650, 36 Cal. Rptr . at 212.
338 P.2d at 44; People r. Lore, supra. 56 Cal. 2d ar 727- 
'; 'S , 16 Cal. Rptr. at 780-781, 366 P.2d at 36-37.J The 

preme Court “has uniformly rejected requests to reduce 
tne penalty from death to life imprisonment . . [People 
v. Lookadoo, supra, 66 Cal. 2d at 327, 57 Cal. Rptr. at
621, 425 P.2d at 2 Ot course, if there is error of law
involved, the appellate court may reverse; but “it cannot 
correct the error by reducing the punishment, but must re­
verse and remand the question to the trier of fact . . .  It is 
only the trial court which is empowered to reduce the de­
gree or class of offense based on its view of the weight of
the evidence [People v. Linden, supra, 52 Cal. 2d at
27, 338 P.2d at 410. See, also, People v. Borchers, 50 Cal. 
2d 321, 330, 325 P.2d 97, 101 (1958).]

both trial and appellate courts, when the verdict is “con­
trary to law or evidence, but if the evidence shows the de­
fendant to be not guilty of the degree of the crime of 
which he was convicted, but guilty of a lesser degree 
thereof, or of a lesser crim included therein . . . may mod­
ify the verdict, finding or judgment accordingly . . .” [Cal 
Penal Code, sec. 1181, subd. 6.] As the quoted language 
would lead one to expect, lire power may not be exercised

1 This seems to be an anomalous result, because the statutory 
provision that empowers the trial court to reduce the penalty, also 
provides that “ this power shall extend to any court to which the case 
may be appealed.” [Cal. Pena! Coda, sec. 1181, subd. 7.] The 
anomaly is explained by the Supreme Court as a necessary one, “be­
came unuci trie pertinent statutes as construed by this court the trier 
of fact is vested with exclusive discretion to determine unishmont 
. . .” [People v. Green, supra, 47 Cal.ild at 235, 302 P.2u at 324-325.]

-. -jgrv.;

*



17

to reduci' a verdict of murder in the first degree to second 
degree, even though it may appear to the appellate court 
ti. ; only a second-degree murder was committed, “ if there 
is evidence of and the trier of fact finds first degree mur­
der [People Linden, supra, 52 Cal. 2d at
338 I’.2d at 410.]

4. Review cf the Penalty.

McGautha made and the trial court denied a motion for 
a reduction of sentence and for a new trial. [A. 239, 243.] 
On appeal to the State Supreme Court the judgment of 
death was affirmed. [A. 24S, 265.] The question here pre­
sented was raised by petitioner in the Supreme Court; it 
was expressly decided in favor of the constitutionality of 
the standardless death-penalty procedure, on the authority 
of In re Anderson, supra, 69 Cal. 2d 613, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21, 
447 P.2d 11 7.13 [A. 265] A petition for rehearing was de­
nied; and the instant certiorc. i proceedings ensued.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The penalty for murder in the first degree in California 
is not fixed by the law. The determination whether in any 
given case it shall be death or life imprisonment is confided 
to the jury, in its absolute discretion. The law provides no 
standards or guidelines by which the jury arc to determine 
which of the two penalties should be imposed. They need 
not be instructed as to what are the legal considerations 
that should be taken into account when deciding whether

Anderson was decided, by a 4-3 division of the Court, iri favor 
of constitutionality of the procedure. A comprehensive discussion of 
oui immediate problem is to be found in it. especially in the dr - ant­
ing opinion of Mr. Justice Tobriner, in which then Mr. Chief Justice 
Traynor and Mr. Justice Peters concurred [63 Cal .2d at 635-669, 73 
Cai. Rptr. at 36-59, 447 P.2d at I f f -155.] We respectfully suggest 
examination of that opinion as an elaboration of and supplement to 
the argument wc have made.

-A -



18

-vi • .»

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.4

the penally should be deal!; or !iie imprisonnu nl. 1 bat :s
'C the 'law docs not prow : any sue n cun side!
leaves the decision to the aibsoluite aml ungmded
of the jur;y. Accord.ii '.dv, ;i jury■ faced with i!le
making that decision need only be to id. and in
t bar it was only told. that in detern tining wlii all

punishment should be inflicted, they were “entirely free ter 
act according to | their] own judgment, conscience and ab­
solute discretion . . and that “the law itself provides no 
standard for the guidance of the jury in the selection of the 
penalty . . So instructed in the instant case, which in­
volved two men jointly committing and equally godly of a 
murder, the jury chose life imprisonment for one of them, 
and death for the other, the petitioner here. Because of 
the .absolute discretion vested in the jury to choose tne 
penalty, their choice is unrcviewable on appeal in the State 
courts.

Inherent in this procedure, and necessarily permitted by 
it, is the choice of penalty for reasons tnat arc or may bo 
discriminatory, irrational, arbitrary or otherwise constitu­
tionally impermissible. It provides no assurance-it is the 
law, not judicial grace, which must provide the a sura ice 
that the penalty decision will be reached on valid grounds 
and by application of a standard that is applicable to ail 
and thus will achieve or tend to achieve substantial equality 
of treatment of those similarly situated. And, because of 
the absolute nature of the jury’s statutory power and the 
absence of any standard imposed by law, there is no way of 
reviewing tire jury’s exercise of its discretion for abusive de­
parture from the law’s standard.

The determination readied in the instant case to put pe­
titioner to death, while sparing his co-defendant, and the 
statutorily authorized procedure by which tire determina- 
ti. i was brought about, denied petitioner due process of 
law. It did so, because basic to tire whole notion of due 
process is the principle that a man s Inc or hbciiy sh d! not 
be taken save in accordance with certain and ascertainable

»•->» *  .-. - - ,p - .  •



19

standards axed by the law. It is not enough in that regard 
that a statute may he sufficiently certain to inform one of 
what is or is not prohibited in the way of his own conduct. 
K is also necessary that it be certain enough to guide courts 
i'* tllc ma!;;nS of the determinations of guilt end punish­
ment that are inherent in the process of adjudicating a 
charge that the prohibited act has been committed. In this 
regard, fixing oi the penalty cannot be rationally differen­
tiated ftom determination of guilt; in either event it is the 
defendant's life or liberty that is at hazard.

The California procedure is substantively different from 
other systems of imposing the death penalty-^.#., one 
where, the offense being certainly defined, a specified pen­
alty is required to be imposed upon the person found guilty 
°f that offense; or. one where that penalty must be W  
posed, except when the jury recommends mercy. Decision 
th.it California s procedure is unconstitutional, therefore, 
does not mean, or require that it be decided that the death 
penalty per se is. Nor does it mean or require that jury- 
determination of penalty be proscribed. It means only that 
when the choice of penalty is not fixed by the law. but is 
ictt to the jury s discretion, standards to guide appropriate 
exercise of that discretion must be provided. The provision 
of such standards is an attainable objective, as the work of 
the American Law Institute in its Model Penal Code, and 
other similar studies, show.



i
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I

•'•X ^

■i

ARGUMENT

1

CALIFORNIA'S PROCEDURE, BY MUCH THE BE VTH 
PENALTY IS IMPOSED, DENIED PETITIONER DUE 
PROCESS CF LAW, FOR IT SUBJECTED HIM TO Tali 
EXTREME PENALTY AS THE RESULT OF A CHOICE 
NOT REQ N. ID TO CONFORM TO STANDARDS FIXED 
BY THE LAW, BUT WlnCH WAS PERMITTED BY THE 
STATE TO RE MADE IN RESPONSE TO THE UNGUIDED 
AND UNRESTRAINED SUBJECTIVE REACTIONS OR 
EMOTIONS CF A JURY.

First: The procedure we have described, by which peti­
tioner McGauthu was sentenced to death, raises squarely the 
question to which tire writ of certiorari was directed- 
whetlier he was denied due process of law by leaving to tire 
jury', at its absolute and unguided discretion, the choice 
whether to send him to his death or to imprison him for 
life. It is our submission that the procedure did deny him 
due process of law, precisely because of its standardicss or 
unprincipled operation.

. . Certainly one of the basic purposes of the Due 
Process Clause,” this Court has sa: . ‘‘has always been to 
protect a person against, having the Government impose 
burdens upon him except in accordance with the valid laws 
of the land. Impi it in the constitutional safeguard [of the 
Fourteenth Amendment ■ is the premise that the law must 
be one that carries an understandable meaning with legal 
standards that courts must enforce . . .” [Giaccio r. Penn­
sylvania, 382 U. S. 399, 403 (1966).14 ] The phrase “laws

14We aie aware of the debate that has gone on over the meaning 
of this Court’s footnote 8 ir Giaccio. supra, 3S2 U.S. at 405, where 
it is said that in holding as it did, the court intended “ to cast no 
dcxbt whatever on the constitutionality of the settled practice of ̂ 
many States to leave to juries finding defendants guilty of a crime the 
power to fix punishment within legally prescribed limits.” Having 
regard to this Court’s practice of not deciding serious constitutional 
questions when it is not in« .'.capably necessary' to do so-a practice

20



;1 I v.*l ,
in

o f liiO land m tin'; quotation front Giaccio, is, o f  com
reminiscent o f fori-- t i , , - •, • ..... '“J r la - Jiie ’-tsc oi it is significant
as it • i as in the Great Charter, and as it was used
G/accto. it connotes ascertainable standards, fixed by i ,
as a condition upon the depri on o f a m an’s life."lib-
or property . • This Court, ot. more than one a c c a -e -
assimdatcd “ due process of law” to the “ law o f the inn
ot Mui.na Carta. [Davidson v. New Orleans 96 U C

Or IS how. 272. 276 (1855); Bar thus v. Illinois ■
;S- - - 1’ 126427 (1959); Hurtado r. California, 1 10 1 

5 6’ ~32 (iS84); ■ :,inS v. New Jersey, 21 1 U .’s. 78.'100

y t .

if O 
’ c

which, the Court has sa:d it 1r‘s .< >.m
Ift-WS ... Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 N f i  J C ”" “ early toe"
that in this almost oTha-'d manner i i 7  ' '  0t to bc suP?osed
tion was not hvoiv-» ml r  « ' *i,’u 10 a case ,n which the cue*?.1,Jl in/oj.tu, the Court intended to ....... /
era tion, on a prop ir occ ' - ; ^
law ttm is J  . . - c d d r d 'C ; , fce «<■ ■>
and cspaaisliv't-c;.;,:;,. t  dMll! Procedure. R.fcr,
would v em 'in h- 71 wai 1101 i:*’-.'!vc-d in the case, it

3, ' tm to be ni0,;- b^ely that care was b-in» t-1--, •
intimate an opinion one w,-.- or t i -  nt i , r 1In ■ , 1101 to
appropriate consideration when it aro'--’ in *. n ,c v -  •
he decided. Ceru-injv nothin.* ;n - r . . ,  , 9 Ji* *6 *-'— «
anv ur-w .1,. 1 J. " inc in uie 10.lino.e iimited or o r  Pfr 1 > '-a}- the basic principle of th^ Dup* p-r ■ - r': t • V ’ J ‘;inn,rn,-l.vl , . \  lIlv UdL 1 1 Ci-iUSC which V. pv.pounded and applied in the case.

l i l '’ P‘̂ raS' iS fouad ln t!lc 39lh Article, which reads as follows: 

seised or outlawed or banished w h ^ y  ^

|.;C !:• Cara T ' ! b? the ,aw ° r
ConsthutionlVo!. 3 ’ 7^  ? Camori,Ia A'-notated Codes.litution, vo!. 3, p. 764.1

- law of the land, ’ cor notes1 tion of the taking, imp; sonn 
other condemnation for v'hie.h'

*:4 •
1
i *

there must be prc-cxistii p Jaw.

7

T-^-------------- a'- ■'■2 '  ' f '

t or^icstrucii .n of a freeman, or 
lawful judgment” may be p. ^



1908).1b Sc.'., also. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.$. 145. 
169 (196S), Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring; L >: is; a ...

■v. Resu'cber, 329 U. S. 459, 467 (1947), Frankfurter. J„ 
concurring.]

Thus, it follows that, before one may be deprived of Ids 
life or liberty, the law itwlf must fix the stand. - from 
which a judgment of deprivation may be rationally de- 
; rived, and by which the prep iety of that judgment may 
be tested. If judgment without guidance from such t. 
ards is permissible, whet is done is not to determine the de­
fendant’s fate by the law of the land, but to leave it to the 
ad hoc determination of the particular jury before wi 
the case chances to come. That is not due process of law. 
but whim or caprice; it is no more than “the arbitrary ex­
ercise of government unrestrained by the established princi­
ples of private right and distributive justice.” [See, Hurtado 
v. California, supra, 110 U. S. at 527.]

This requirement of standards is not met by the discre­
tionary power the trial judge has to “aid the jury by .-tar­
ing the kinds of factors that may be cc: -.idered, titer.dry 
setting tlie tone for the jury's deliberation.” [People r. 
Polk, supra, 63 Cal. 2d at 451,47 Cal. Rptr. at 6, 405 P.2d 
at 641.] The judge need not give any such aid; and, if. as 
a matter of grace or discretion he essays to give it, the law 
docs not tell him, any more than he cam tell the jury, what 
“kinds of factors” are to be considered. In any c.er.t, it is 
the “law itself [that] must save the parties’ rights, and not 
leave them to the discretion of the courts as such . . 
[Louisville and N.R.R. Co. v. Central Stock Yards, 212 
U. S. 132, 143-144 (1909); it is the statute that must se­
cure the defendant’s rig'. not merely the court as a mat­
ter of discretionary or gracious choice. [See, Coe r. Armour 
Fertilizer Forks, 237 U. S. 413, 424-425 (1915).] 16

22

16So far as the precise holding of Twining is concerned— that tl e 
Fourteenth Amendment does not apply, as ay inst a State, the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against testimonial compulsion-it has been 
oven .-led. [See, MaUoy v, Hogan, 378 U.5. j, 2, 6 (1964).]



V. i  ~  ■ \ l k J j x d d i~ .  \  --J- i  « . < ' ! -----

7 1

j  *
Sen 1; l  ( t I -  is no* C i lough t h e t a cri.n i'i;ii st.J  title be ’ S U 1

tier• ill : i
l y  vid it.' to . X • e notice ctf  the re v J! conduct to

one v ] ho wiould a.e-i v.i jC pcnalti •- n . . . ’ ii mu st also •j i . 1

the * 1-* i.ige ii • its apnl.iv-a tion and . i lawyer in del ’ending 0 U l
cha r e e 1 wi: its vio i ion” [ U o \ , < V  / / (> / < ’>■■■ L i t ! cs r .  Chi
Shi! cs, ■ j j n Li.S. 2,3' 3 *n- 0 (  ] 2 ) 1 :  O i . as till s Court : j j y 0
pu t it m Afnsscr r .  i ' •• Cl : 333 U . S. 95. 97 (19 48), * ’ [ ! ] ; ■“
1 avis1:1 m c. v run afoul 01r t h e  D u e Proce ■Claus;> bec.'w -e iv
fails, to ( • i • •.** 2 • ' Utk'CpUU t'.- (■'1 • ."J . iJlit b ,. . . t o g „ouris in t ry-
ing the»s. e who are ac l i.Scii . . . Tide Court o f A . . 1 - ior
the Di : (r i • j r o f Colt; mtua wireui t has ]•■; t  the m atter ;i  Q -
g c n lh : . “a lew fai is to  nice t the reelluirem ents o f t:
Due p r

X 1QCCSS C. i a u se inot. only u it is so \'ague and sterna ■ ■
less the t it leaves the pi.iMic uncc rte.’e. as to tire: conduct it
pro! tibi ts, ij tit also it' it ‘leaves jv. dees anc! juror s free to Li 0 ”
cide V,'itiiout any let all y fixed si undards. what is pro bib ited
and wrtat is net in ea c!i particula:r case.’” r D ,y. / L *\t( f\is v. Dinr■ j t
o f Coin i;J bln . D. C. Cit . .. 414 F.2<:I 1077, 1101 (1968).]

It is settle d that a sta tute coul;d not constiluidona” b.a
so vague as to permit every jury  to bee- ..e a legislature ad 
hoc, formula tiny its own but unnscertaiuable standards for 
llie occasion of the case in which it sits. [See, Herndon r. 
I  ’w v . 301 U. S. 242. 262 (1937); Connolly v. Genera! 
Construction Co., 269 li.S. 385, 391 (1926).] No one, 
therefore, could reasonably quarrel with the proposition 
“that due process requires the adjudication of an individ­
ual s rignts and unties to be governed by rules of suffici nr

ity to guarc) a. if* hi ! an arl:;in ary or ad hot)lih, an re-
Vsee , Notc, 62 Ilarva rd Lav,i Rev. , 77 (1948g

I, at s a prcunise. it follov.is "‘th.’.it such rubcs. when1 ;vd )1‘ :.1 statute , must! be de finft/.,i «.L- enougl 1 to enable
 ̂ 1 0 in ake rulings of law and cbarges to the jury

re ;:-0 cfoselv refer;dole tc1 tiic statute as to as. m
1 cy O:i aoniica tion.” \Jbia' ! ■ 1
mrsi til is is void-for-vagi icss doetri ;ie; but the
,t ajnnr tJiy the uoctrine n rn. c no ted this dual aspect 0 :
no on!y tiia *■ * 1t Li lC crime irr 1st be so certainlv d

■ s - X • •



■i
*

i9
1

V. IH' \\T.

.. _ • .j-i5 -.‘ >... _

24

the statu te g \ c ; ‘•nd-ecu. cuidan .v ’■» thes
be law abiding . . .“ and ■iwses defe!to. lit.' of
o f the offense wi !h which they are c lr.: ycJ

it is also necessary, if The1 statu te is not to “ run afe of ::;j
Due Process Clause . . . [that it] guide courts iin Irvine
those who are accused,' ’17 \Masscr v. Utah, sir ■s  ̂^■/J, no.'
U. S. at 97. j No doubt. in California the crime of murder
is defined w ith sufficient certainty to give the git id. ■* •. s * * t ~
those who would be las\ aoioing tnai the Due Process
Clause requires. No dot d 't, too. the meaning o f '’oua in
and “ life im prisonm ent’' in the statu tory  context j n c • c a r
enough to  inform  those cioncerned of what is mean c. The
s ta tu te ’s deficiency is that it does not itself fix a gcnaltv. 
ami does not tell those to whom tha t power is given, when 
and in what circumstances the one penalty rather than the 
o ther should be chosen.

If “ the jury  m ust take instruction from the court, at 
least the trial court must be possessed of the means of 
know ing with sufficient definiteness the range of right-' 
that are ‘constitu tional’. . ."’—in our case, the rarue of con­
siderations bearing on the choice o f penalty that are con­
stitu tionally  permissible. [See, Screws r. Unit. J  States, 
325 U.S. 91, 151-152 (1945;, Roberts, F rankfurter and 
Jackson, JJ., dissenting.] So. if, as the cases cited show, 
standards are neeessarv to cuide counts in decii i , \  * -♦«%'UIll L.•g wiio is

iro eq ,y ~
be d ; to or

w ith those found guilty. In either aspect of the adjudic: 

17To the same general effect are: Chccio Pcnnsvlveatta.
382 U.S. at 4.O'i a _ * v a law tails to n t the requin
the Dua Process Cl:m..0 if it is so vaque a:u.1 slandardkss ;
the pul.lie uwert.'f n ;:;s to tho C07.viuct it pro,hibits or la..
andju: ors free to cicc: ! r, ,.. . u. i.hhout any .’ :g.. .V fixed stand;
prohihi tod and win.i is not .in eac’’• particu!' j  r case . . (i
Boyce .Motor Jakes V. Unite..-/ r* ,es. supra. A.1-2 U.S. e. 3
City of’ Montgomer\\ A lube. ;.7? 5 Cir., 406 ITj .2d 867, 87!
Ricks ;■. Distiict of Cobaa! 1A Slip}v, 414 F. at 1100-11C
r. Kneeat. D. Colo. (3-judge court ). 295 r . Supp.897,902

sup .. 
.s of
• V -  -, \

1 i
s ou:s >;
. ’? ' ii l
: (i965i 
olJma.1 
(1965i

4
1

r



L i U .  u A -U a  i c .  ■ t-E.-m.Ei '  .

,'D

lory proves the :ib* •;. rue of stun denis “licenses tliO jury
(or cour: ( to ere:lie its own st a ;ida rd in each c;ISC . ' *

[ l nr; v, J  -m a. I. over V,npra. X M U. S. a t 263 (193 7); .f/V.'/ii’-
war. i A./"’; hi. .YU(;ra <OO - j ■ Sup>p. at 904.1 Titat is the
“ opri i 1 ■! V ! i 1itio  i . to virti ji . rm: ■-trained acinii;! *(. ti'C*-
lion” o f tile' law (V : * ‘ • Ricks r. Di'Strict o f  Coin w l >!(i, :.‘upra
414 rh.Yi at i ! 01 i! 1 hat the c; ises cond emu. as vie LI t V -  ̂r C Of
*  ̂ V> lu .  1)ilC Pnjice vs CLiU Ne.

T h '  :S 'lltcl 1Cine procer.s is not., of course , outside e lin'd-
tatioi imp; 1J'-u! upon cour is by the Due Process Cl:
[See, n S-< T() Vi •’ S'::nd v. Ii H i 1 134 U.S. 736, 740 ( i 3 d 3 • ■ * ■ j ?
Wither c* iPOO’! r. in7 no is. 391 u .s C]Q *̂>9 . fn. 5 (196 C 1
And ii:ere is t!\2 lnine neccs:city for stand;: rds, and for the
same \i':,;mat0 resnon. to guide the courts; in da Par ining
which tw0 01 liervvisc un fixed ponaltie s should be im-
pOSCd . there for standc■rfiS to guide 1! e;n in the deter-
minat ion of Clu:i. f C f . Uni: cd Slates r. Evans. 333 U.S.
483, <485-4 8 (■> ( 1943).] In eithc:r event it iis tire defeiu.’ant's
life o:, |liberty the t is :at s?a!:e. (Sec. 62 Harvard La-
view. pro, at / s I

• J

i i u i d :  1 Jus very case illustrates the capricious and arbi­
trary way in which the standardiess death-penalty procedure 
may and is permuted by the State of California to work.

w o  n r c n ,  e q u a l \ y g u i ! t y  r r . d j o i n t l y  t I  I t
t

; u , o n l y  o r ■>.' h  •: e. S. . » U j
s o l v e * ■ r\ U  w  - 1 t v  i i  u y  i n i j u r y ■ t o b e p u t  t o  d CD t h . T h e r e r o d .

b e e n a  c o n ‘. L i t U  i i o n ; ; ’ i y p e r i b ! c r e a s o n  f o r  t ! n r  i f . s>*

i r e . t i c n ;  t h e r e i n : ■ y  i r a v e * b e o n  a n  i n A »■>
* r e r m i s ;  b l e o n e ;

.■ m a y h a v e  b e O i-' •• ■ 1 n o a r t i c u ! a b l e  r e a : s o ; n  n t  a i l .  ' i : C ^ ! o

k n o w ; w e  c a n 01 d y g u e : ;s . B u t  t h e v i c e of t h e p r c . '  ■■. _

g o e s b e y o n d  t
1
1.0 r a n i g e  ( ) f  a r b l t r a i  i n 0  b,s  O l • i r r c . t i o n a l i t >

i l  p c : u n i t s ;  i n o c l u e p r e ) C 0 : , s  s e n s e , i t i s : o  d c , Q [ ]YQ

u s e  i t r e  c j  u  r e s n  r> r e ; ; . s c  n a t a h .  A s
« i
111!-  C  ‘>. -j I o  - » C  , ,c Cl t  k . ..• 1 . , . ' f c j u 'C

t  h a s s a i d ,  t h e c c n s i .
l  r .

t i e r l  t h a t  d e t o r m i m  %. f K , \  U v J  111L J c b ' ’ s

: e  m a y  h e  a n y t h : n g t h a t i ■ t p p e a r s  it o t h i : m  t o  t >e  i i :

r n t ’ '  [ P e o p l e  v. / - n c i i u ,  $ !■:}:. a ,  .47 Cc:1. 2 d a t  7 6 8 . )

a t  4 7 • i -H  /  5  —  l i i l d t h e * > 11 j I c. 'U  t <1 ] iV L Li i d . dine >, st .  .  i

or cri l  L i  ca. l» V. w • r i e l ; to u v ; sluatc lh a t impor-ancc cr to
determine its relevance to the objects of the criminal law.

• vt}*- ••





26

■ • — suprc
Lj!- ^Pii. ul 208, 3SR !* '-j 4<-, i , .
premc Court W  « to  *M , hat fa

; .acU>';1 we,- ‘t to the considerations of
jeetives of punishment of -j ^  v“:i ° t‘'_ lu,-nr’ 01 tlK di:terrence ol cri-r- o f iiv  
PiOttcuon of sociriy. of th0 desiribilitv of « .........
U'-oU. or Oi SV’P 1J a I II ->•- n- __ , rJ w uemency ot
sion, ignorance or weakness . . "  
which a jury might be likely to
!l1F,/cnc/’ 47 Cal. 2d at 7
Tims, the procedure, by the au 
permits the jury, in case after ca 
bat, to doom one man to death, 
reasons that arc uriasceriainabie.
evoit, unreviewable, because ft... , »  no jaw-pres'- ib -1

Q by wh,ch to weigh or measure them even F iU „ 
are ascertained [See n w  c, ’ ul' ysec r. , r . 1 ’ tases Clk“> Statement o f the Cum

3 suod. First, supra.} For all that we know th......
sons that moved KcGuitha's jury m a y  hav~ I " ’ ‘t  X

e ° ‘f Even i f «“ > • « « .
2  Z Z ;  "  ‘,n,n’?cac,ab:e- “  *  *  M M *  bv, is

es:rability of Si'■ '•'! retribu*
:y. of aye. sex, iiLiJr.;*';

and others of this sort,
take into ;tccoinit. f/Vo/Fc
68, 306 P..2d at 474-475 I
therity of the State's k.w.
sc, as it did in fite case at
V.'Itile saving another f; rT ,

X i tor; ra isons arc, in any
lore is no law-prescribed

ceJ lK.‘ j  lhe C ' f  ° rlhe O ttw h rd b s  do.1t!, p a r.ttv  r-o - 
,Ced“re’ " rcra!f unconttolPJ poicmi.il in ,

(lie Due P ro ilf  a t "  2 2  I?" ^  «•«*>>» >° « * »
Plica,ior o f t e  ,a„ . -*•
o f in J in  corfbrrMy , itIl feed
“  •tecordancc wit], ti,e subjective and unrcslr.2  
f the individual members of a “a jo ‘'

f Co,I . ....................-  .................. .......  , . -462, 464-465
. r n  . T!' i / occdure.

, men ibi-:f: a jnrV 'jplinrT
24 ViJpnia Law Review,

A A t \ ,'ca Reform ,’• Crimf:
Review, 107, 108- i :0 fI91i

s sometiiting more inan notie
heard. That rninimnl re

does nof lead to judgmeio
v £ 0 a sc



. ■ C ... . .

i• 2 7

■ 1......  1 u ,.l a  -.v. , M ■\ 6 2 t ’.;: r\ u m ! L c ' v R e v i e w ,  sup.tv/, a t  7 8 . i T i n i t  is

|* t h e  g r e a t p r i m -if-:1C \ V i i . ■h ! h ; s  a !  i h c  l i e : . ' t o f  t h e  D u c Pi o -

' . CCSS f l a i l . SG. 1. i d am M o s t w i n i c n  l iv e  s L i m h a r t ! l e s s  d e e . : } |V%m -

■J a l t y  p r o c e i l r . r c v.1Mi.' .. i . - t h e p r i n c i p l e  t h e 4  n o  m a n  si .,■11 b e

d e p r i v e d o f  h i ■, l b e VC: b y t h e  l a w  o f  t! ;e  l a n d .

■ 1 F o u r:! ; ■ R ; I t l 1o n : i i  St! . L : Gei r d s  b y  w h i c h t o  g u i d e  t b e  c ’* 'V im

b e t w e e n d e a t h 1 ^ .. t: l yi 1 /1 c i m p r i s < m m e n t  a n : c a p a b l e  o f f o r in  a -

l a t i r m  I n t h e t ' t ' >liv; y - m : ‘*j r \c, b im r .c  l i e s  c f  G o v e r n ’, : , e l i t . A

-•} s p e c i f i c SC t  (J i St e n d a ĵ . l i a s  b e e n  v.■oricecl o u t b y t h e

A m e r i c a ! ' ; L a w r T ,nst. i t u t  c i n  i * • .j 0 Pvi —ib A.; OCiCi ‘ C • ia l  C o d e ,  se c \  2 1 0 . 6
si . - -'j ( M a y  1 4 , 1 9 6 1

■» '
- ). 1 s A  r o r  ;o m o d  f o r m u l a t i o n  a l o n e :  t ' i e  s: m t e

l i n e s ,  s u e g e s t e i 1 1o r t h e S t a t e  o f  P e n t i s y h • a n i o ,  w i l l  b.  ̂ f r.,,r Tl i : : i

i n  1 0 8  LL P ; : . j .: w T> %d e w , 4 3 4 ,  4 4  5 -4 • I S  ( I 9 6 0 ) . i ii

s h o w  Lira t t h e j o b  c a n  1;\ n m e .

I t  i s ,  o f  c o n r s ;- . J \0  n:a r t  c • f  p e t i t i o n e r ’?. b u r d e n  i n  't i l  li .'a-

1
v i e w  l o  f o n r i u 1 , 4i*a Le  o r  sit m m s t  a c c e p t a b l e  :s t a n d a r d s . 1;; T i ;e

1
-1 . ' 1BT h c  jt e n e r J :hej— ̂  > t i: A O i■ th e C o d e  is t h a t  th .c l e s s e r  p e n a l ty v. •;]! : ; n

j i m p o s e d  ifd r o n e o f ?!k• en u :m ei:; tcJ apryav: t ; c ir c u ra s tc u c e r : i own
-1 o r  s u b s t a i ’tied mil vlC. -11* r7 '̂0c a m s t a n c e s  e s t a b l ih : ; J  b y  t h e  e v id e n c . :• e :  i!1
i f o r  Icn ic ; ; y : o r ti ie  d e f e m :nn t is  u n d e r  t h e  ap;e o f  18 ye a r s ,  o. h is

i p ’m cal o!r m e m CGIid : t i c •i cal i 3 f G < o r .  e v e n  t h o v \rr\- *Le
■( e v id e n c e  s>i f  dices 10 s ta in t h e  \re r d ic i  o f  g u i l t , i t  d o e s  n o t  f o r c e i r.. %
3

v i
,,n  j i.. i , i  , dii U e U J i  I a s p e c t ii-' „ 4. i ■. illic d e l on l a n t ’s g u i l t .  T h e j u r y  is g iven Ii Wi c  a

i d i s c r e t i o n , b i  t it u ; y n o t im p c :c.‘ t h e  d e a l t  ; n e n e l t y  u n le s s iT T

j* o n e  o f  t h e on u n i e r i r te t . v s : it:g c ircaru .s tanc- w  a n d  t h a t  l h e r e  ;'.re

i n o  m i l i g n t ‘ * - J- *» * ̂ cm it: 31 --•ICC 2; iiUl i i c i e n t ly  s u b s ia n d ia l  to  c a ll  f o r hrrr
St)-, 4 A g g ra v a t in .1- 111 w m i tig - -time circit m s t a n c e s ,  re  pc e t i ’. e l y ,  a r e  ca.tegc ■>

a n d  e n i i n v n i ' e d \  v i :h  imir  sj^cc if; c i t y .
-.1 
. -M 19 a r w  tx  S '- ' r ra! s [ io n  im.:y n e v e r t h e l e s s  b e v e n t u r e d .  T.h e re is .
ja

«

m o d e r n l y ,  
t h e y  a r e ,  j:

p  t t y  
:o t a !o

c 
! 'C Of

ral :m
i ll  id ]

reerv 
. r e t ;

e n t  u p o n  ; h c  o 
i h c h o n ,  b u t  d e

b j e c t s  o f  p u n i  
t e r r c n c e ,  relta!bil it ;7 t i<j|1

a n d  p r o l e , : l io i  <3f SCK■ ip.ti- co n e ra l ly .  [S e e ,  r. r . , People v. Frit w  7,-7

*i supra. 4 7  \fa !  .2d 2 t *7/ (’ -  (f t: • 8 ) , 3 0 5  I \ 2 d  a t  47 '4  A n. 8 ) ;  R:>.■do1.:; / ;  !.
■ i A h b a n u u  .2 7 5  U .s. 8 i ; 9 .  O ’; 4  (J 9 6 3 ) .  C o lu b e r . : t ,  D o u g la s ,  l b cm: ,

J J . ,  d r :  , .. . 1
•• .. j C o m : id ere l i o n Gi. th a  c l io ic e v>j' p e n a l t y  c. l ■ : j b e

c e n t e i - d  a r o u n d 1 3 i o b je c tive s. w i t h  a v iew o f  c h o o s i n g  t oii e
w h i c h ,  h r . •ing re m> :d tto  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e ?  o f  Ithe case  a n d i ;. 'J c h a r-
a c t e r  a n d te rnpe:ran p j! t o f t h e  d e f e n d a n t ,  w o n U  m o s t  n e a r ! \ f uli t!, or
r a t h e r  th e ; I i T vl a v’.Ci.0 Lh e m .

m

1 *



28

-3

■1
ia

■ 4
•■1
3

arviur.cn! based
st*action, but one v h u h  points at 
r  •■•'.-cdi.ue V

tin:c to the matte-' is on!v to show t!let tire
on the absence of skin: lards is no an ai>-

;! IS i\ •••-
defect in the Ca’ilTrm i 

The procedure, t'--.-relore.

is not oelensibic a:s the most or best
actual practice.

The day 's  fu n d ion in penally dote:
feren t in kind frorn tkei: usual facl-fu

deU-rnvnation is quite dn* 
id-finding function. [See, 

3 9 1 U.S. at 522 (fu. 20): In 
1 at 62 1. 73 Cal. Rptt- at j 9- 
nting opinion).] It is n or 

•a of prescribing the penalty 
A n t e .  That kind of function 

involves consideration of basic policies of punishment and 
the puldic purpose to be achieved. Since the jury are given 
a legislative function, they should also be guided toward the 
cor. iterations of policy they ought in fairness and lesson

Withers:icon r. Illinois,
re Anile r-on. suprj. 69
40, 447 k.2d at 135-13
akin to the .legislative !
for the crimes defined

take into th e reckons nn

No dotibl , the job ... r L- i' formula! n would not be an easy

one. But o policy-mainn<> brand : of government, suitably

inform d b;y the rclc•va ' t sc’Tilti fic di' ciplines, sit ould be

equal to 
the form

th
uk

e job. To 
Aion and a*

..old that 
'.plication

toe Constitution 
of standards wo

rcc u i re 
aid net,

therefore , hc to requ ire the unat tainable or the in'.practical.

The case is sub star.tr. .. i.y differen t from one—say t he putting

of a mo net ary value o:n pain an : ufforing from a wror.g-

fully inT rated persorml injurv-v .lucre there is no r'**0ct * cal

st and a i u thrat car. be 1devised [c. 7 YTuntorc, ■ - id., nee

(3d ed. 194C). p. 55. § 19-14] anid where, th tr tb.e lav/

, .......n To tet’V'nrw s-l'emctth'esarJ r'reced:ms,
sec. 2.2, the American Bar A socrctinn iVejsct on •.unt.'ncM
of Criminal Justice takes r. similar approach to discretionary sem-.v
cing generally. (The death penalty ts a meim.eih s .v .su  in
position on retention of that penalty is taken.) It is lucre ^  .
the sentence ‘‘should cell for the minkmun amount oi cun.ouy or
confinement which is consistent with the protection o.
the gravity of the offense and the rehabilitative nceus oi u.~ ....... •

" • m  • • •



i TO

J}* d o ‘s the liest it cm
view for abuse, to ni;

•Jt prox i mu lion. (See, cJ 172, 179-180. 57 Cal
i
- 680-:7S1 ( 1 9ou). 1

by par::..•*:!in*: the jorv. subject 10 f:
ke a ro>.:;rh and, : . ’bans . arbitr.. ry r •
g., Bv-j}.:!■: Coe/./, 65 Cal. 2d ! P ‘,
. Ilptr. 129. 136-137, 4! 7 P. 2ti 673.

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CAI : 1 vOsNI.C • ’ ■ r- --J » . V\> a -. r*_y . - , f : :i . i r b . .P E C T  I 0  IT5
VU! L A ltC r y  t o

- piLklC . ■•' ry LO TS 01F D U li
p :  * Ci "• •I V e£. is, i s : , i t >/ n vi ̂  .y. i ■« A C T  FROM t r / . r -
CIZL>UMe  w i : .•T.LV Y  i i i —\T l * ’<2Y iS CL;vT. *, r *. 1 \/
IMP OSE,D P.Y L A W .

The f<»f  c poing argument is d i u icier] • It (J . rll\_ -icsl atin : the
unconsti Ui l iOi: aliiy of the■ Cab’3 -r dce.’i-pena ] |  v'

di.ire. as it now e:s; s t s and is dppl icd. For the purposes of
tl • we need } •' «TQ ’’wood that rc' lively l i mi ted cb-
jeotivc. Ace■ordindy. it imay seree to concentrate atCntion
upon an;.1 ei-, , , i , .. i/C tiiC !i!"j u m c ; it if ’we slate what we rSvR
not a rime.

F irst:  W e 11. , ,d  1 l  tl n o t  a r p t l >.• 111 a t  tl! c  d m ;4 b  p e r m ! t \ p e r  . .  . s
u i i c o n : i t i t u t i c > n a l .2<- All bn. i t *V v: n e e d  t o a r g u e  is 4 1 % r  i 1 i • 1t i r u l \ *jli s.n

20a s u r v e y o f  th e d e a t h - p e r tall e a t u t cs ih e r. ( 1 9 4 8 ) in f c  ce in
t h e  U n i t e d  S t  a ? . S IS .f o r  el in  til'.v5 Cc- r .cu r r ing  o p in io n  o f y t (r. JytSticc
F r a n ! : ' : t r ie r  in A t . ; ,.cs v. Uiti: Ci ‘1 r-O'rates. O J J» U.S. 74C), / o 7, / c' 7
( 1 9 4 8 ) . 7  h e s i t u a t i o n  as o f tin• i :rteseu it ti - :■ n o t si m ; . • /..■
d i f n . r c i i t .  [See • o r . , 8 3  11a;. a ?-1 L :- 1 vC’•; 0 . , i 7 7 3 ,  .178 * y4 9 " 0  it 5 1
J o u r n a l o f  C rii n in a ! L a v . . Cm: ill] o! o ; y  as

,
ic e  S c i . 'n , 3  i .

5 ) . ]  A sur\ e y o f  it t.• S u . ! U l C S ( ■ i of til • 5 l . i t . ;-s, m a d e r .  . lO.r t * -* - .
pores elr this b:: i . s! t o  .vs, l x , v.'i * ? t h e r e a r c  ik vw e leven1 S! CI *. . •
h a v e  a b o l i s ’ied t i l l ' d i ■ p, '• j ';y (b

, . >,. 5:.
3 V er i"M v3' * l , VVJ,21C1 j.

SO lei! f u s t  o f h; Uvic; s o n l y  (V ' t . St; ,, - A 1-1. /  i.m i  ^h .  1 3 ,  52i • ,JV';y ( i .  ;  p
a m e n d e .1 1 9 6 5 N o . 3 0  ( i 9 6 7 C i i re. Poe;1. , i p

M ) ] t ar.d! e ,i
As a ' . . : .  0

D el a  w a r c w id e h ,  C a ' ing  a b : - ’: ! thtC cx( .i'L'iiwC j '2 o cl t y  »ia  1O 7 0 y .-

stored i: a y e a r la te r [5 3  D e i .  ! y'S c h .  3 i o ,  {.: ])■
The :s t a t u t e s a p p e : r to  b e  of i! ' I C ’ g e m ;:•! ty I - : -  b i n r  ' C ' • • o * ’■

m a n J a h >ri!v fix:i::g tli « P e n a ' t y at tie:-.th uPS’-'i C-. >r.\ici io n O; a s p .
f i e d  c r i [S e i?, C . , n o t e  2 .  p. t . ,v.v;r.-.. 1 Sc co i' .2, a r e  th0  ;
per  : rit cl c: l.h, but giving t'ic that fh  ” * •; fm il t  the p;. v/:r to
p e n s e  oi re  comm . n d m m o  p ( , e . £ . .. sul d i v i . . . • T*/ ; 1 ■ ■ ; ;  ar.J

; .)
(

1 '



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-VCcfttki-*’ -Urn..

30

the law i t s-.lt ' do;as not in;pci S ■,• the pem.lt;y, but le i\x:S it to
the trie r of fa t l . ■ , ..y^, 1 - tv"con it and ;t lesser pe 2 .ii s.ent
the lave 11 1 us t on ii!e the colore-e by rational standards th.p v, iil
tend to) lOiKi to tl 1C aprr op :::itc decision in the par ticular
circuits■ lance:s of die ease.

Of e<i’;r-e. the California Pi•oecdure r.eeessarily fa’ if the
de.aih r'enall'y, as such, is vm jonsti utk al under :i • e Due
Process Clous:e. c,v propria vipo.’\ \  or Ivc; tuse of tlie appliea-
lion to the S4 , 4 s throteeh 1i, -.: Clause of the stand: !,!■’ of
the E h !i th Ame ridmcnt 23 [S ee, Robinson j>. C.P.ifrm.>:w, 370
U.S. 660, 66 6. 6 75 (1962!.] e do not reject this ;nc.-ition
as one iof the u t! 1e process at■(T ! f  Kmients fairly included within

J.
third, those, like California's, that fir. no penalty, but leave i; to the 
jury to fix it. [Generally, sec, R. Know! ton, Problems of Jury Dis­
cretion In Capital Crises, !0! IJ. Pa. Lav Rev. 1099, 1101-1102
( 1 9 5 3 ) . ]  M r .  J u s l i C‘w F r a n k f u r t e r ' s suiTV.nrtio■n o f  h i s  cu rv e y o f  t l..j

s t a t u t es  w a s  t h a t  ",ill*a s t  o f  t h e  S ta t 'es v d . r f i  1tave r e t a i n e d  :lie  cier fV>

se n t . ■re h a v e  e n t r i :{c d  1.11o j u r y  wi rc i o n  o f  t h e  d e a l h  SCi
iX-i m'n s e n te n c in g is t r a d i t i o n a l l y t h e  c o u r t ' s f u n c t i o n ,  nni4 \ K a It! is is
t r u e  e v e n  in  t h e r e te t e s  w h e r e  t h e le g is la te ire l ia s  n o t  in SO 1 :iy
w o r d s p j t  t l i i s  p ev .•cr in  t h e  j u r y ’s !s e e p i n g  . .. .”  [Andies v J  '. i-' • it, ;)/

Slates , supra, 3 3 3 u ,S. a t  7 5 9 . j 1No d o u b t t h e  e x i s t e n c e o i ’ Sttch
s t a tu t : es is “ w o r t h  co;a s i d e r iu g . ”  b u t t h e  “ fa c t t h a t  a  p r a c t ’c is
f o l io c;l b y  a  la re.; 11u m b e r  o f  s t a t e $ is n o t  exin c l u s i v e  in  n <dec i no*!i
a s  t o  ' ']l5 ihcT tr ia l 1 1, e n t i c e  a c c o r u s w i t h  d u e p r o c e s s  . . [Ltlji. Cl
v. Ore.port, 3 4 3  U .S . 1190, 7 9 8  (1 9 5 3 !)•]

23 T h e  t r e n d  o f  <T i n o n  s e e m s  to b e  q u i t e m a r k e d l y  in t! . 2i t ' Jin?c-
tiom O n e  o f  th e  la tc st e x p o s i t i o n s o f  t h e  su! p e c t  is t h  u  o f e>;-.I f :
G o l d b e:;: a n d  A la n \ A D  r r h o v i t z in Deck -i ;tr The Demi; i ‘ •f / -7'fV
Uncoil Utio id , S N H a rv a rd  L a w  v\--r.nn, 177 3 ( 1 9 7 0 ) .  [. \ lor. (
G o ! . r r g .  D o u g la s *, r- J  B r e n n a n ,  J J ., d i s t e n t : n g  f r o m  t h e  d . r v :.i o f
c c r t i o r a n  in  Ruth!. , .r• /.labor,tx, supra, 3 7 5 '■ 1 Q£Ci } Co  f; :r.
r e s u l t l ia s  n o t  b e  u rca . L ed  'ey a n y c o u r t  o f  \v h ic h  w e  a r e  a W i.! ; ; i. a
t h e  in ; !icc-tior-o Oi ii:io J e e r .  Io n s  in w l i i c h  t h e q u e s t i o n  h a s b e  ■ r • .

c u u e d , t h o u g h  n o t , tor . m a p . , th e i r  p r e c i s e  h o l t Pings, h a v e  b ee n . ) t fiC
conus [ S e c ,  cm. , Prop r. Dulles, 3 5 6  U .S . 8 6 ,  9 9 - 1 0 0 ,  ' 1 1 ( i (;!53
£ .v  / . .  ; Ki : hr, 1. to  U .S .  4 3 6 ,  4 4-1-44 S (1 ); Maxwell v. i ,'j if,
8  C ir . , 3 9 8  F . 2 d  13 o. 1 4 5 - 1 4 9  ( 1 9 6 id ,  vacateiJ o :. o t h e r  g ro a rm > _

U.S. __ ,  90 S. Ct. 1:>78 ( 1 9 7 0 ) ;  Si. rc. v. Lym an ,  9 (A r . ,  4 0 5 F 2d
439, 447-4 IS (1969) j

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p a w ' . <i.r ms ; co«,i <.-'L. ,'v ;°  CI- I> •' and

s;vo;'d !l;ic: ^  y> «)\. so
tier- f . ‘ p i !r if,. - r tP^uf/oj" .... 7

'■ ' •• ...... ' “u-v />«■ ,sr» m  k„ .. .......' -•
sr ^ 'd .  ;-.:.:!j;ri„ ;■ l!i“ Jv u ^ , c ■ ■J * j w j . 
tion:.f ’■ . . ‘ pc:I-:it,- . * rcPuattoiy
wc !,...?.. ” r  ‘ - c:s‘--ry p ic in C ^o f^  SC <w bc unco:*-;;-” 
Of ,. ••»•'• viiic r:n . ••:. , •'“i-OVVcr ;»r ••-■' c-0 IO ... .. .. •— ■'wulj J!'-re ... , e ■ .Jl;i
u»  *••■■:«. p .;;:,;.

,:, •:,,, ; ~. winacd in f - <>y *..-f«Vh
b|7t it no,.., ..... ,......................................., ,,lc ;

">’«■ « *  <mc0„s^ ° f Y f tr  « «  S '01* '
7!,o Wc« ‘V. °;':= « y  O ft,v  d . ' Y f o; 

dec^e VS.IC'U !or standards f0 r n . ; as sueft,
‘° -"WO* ii. Sod,'• wh°  irnsf

OC il-M , ^V]^;:;ri0n fj , - Jt iS Wj]C; V Co,,
J  10 a c ° w > t i t u t i n n  d c a t h  n c n a i v

< vn ;:h ^  '•■"■» *> K 1. ABO,...

T’nnn. _  1 . “ ‘ OCllir.M , - paisua j(o.Yr, .. ' J ", 'cu Pursuant

p e n a /ry  fo r c r i r ^  r JiiSi t ,,e
Ji- i.s n o f :■■ o f  such
A >., '•'••v'Cporficjv.j., ..... ° r ‘ - ininos-it-'r... r^■-cn,.n}e;v -0 / . , .  ds 10 ofi'c^i ' ^  °* ° r
5 /S ( i s w , ;  , />/•/*,„ "•••■■ Hi,,:..,,
•oo, i n  ^  ’’• A///"  F-2«i57i

3*6-307 7-. t W  'fe<' U.S. ;t oo.
for ' O P C M , , . , ; ; n o ,  r ,  Y ; 0  U s. p .,,

f l  V  , ■ 1 , i- f  x 7 7 .  ■,  n . ,  ' 7 ( i .  i  J I 0  , 7 .  . .  . ’

■ •’ Ul~iliun;- thi' n.-- - pe; ; ,  . .... xli° w/j;-e T'. ‘-“3 c.re ]*... .... ,
J " , - - a  ncccsirui’., r,- -

2?t ,'w  a'.,i,-rn„ , „
°i sfaadarj  ̂v , »,

thc s ’- ^ .  ] r r '; /:  ::otP ^ j ov,:}... ..../ /q*t,i . , '  j/j r .  •.,. 3-, i-iuuer f  r “ l -‘t: ,

b c ” fu chc.jne v--*« ■ 1 ‘ v i,LCPk:' at b-- ■ ,s v' K‘t'> i»:d • . T "
‘ 1 ‘ 1 *; J i . i> . ’ ;Y-U-  ̂i OCC • ’.MJV



A  \

. --... P*t'r '—a. ■-..'cV-v- . ■...; -£.. U.

j« from One fu.o-tri-.:r's Jeter iviiu it ion t : ■at the criir.
has been cumrni trod Uf.. WiT. arson : Utah. 99

j i 130 (! 879); and see. To,,e r. Dulles. supra, 556
3
i Ex p. rU: Kona:!’cr, supra . 136 15.S. ;i ■ r a ‘. j  _ , •
11 mar. supra, 403 F.2J at 44 /— r48. i Dec! Aon at

the V.-J v.4'1 .:dd oiiir tlic TC«;:;irmcnt th.P 
the per ally is not fixed by the in ve. but is left to ih:- 5 ■ 
tion of tlic fact trier, standards to guide lire exercise o-.
crvtt’on inu:-t lw p »v>. »i.

Third: Statute? that impure the death penalty f.~ 
defined or specified crime, but give to tiie jUi.. o. ... .
dispe: ing power of mercy I e. e.g., the Arkansas st tv. 
i: ' cd hi Maxwell v. Bishop, supra. 398 F.2d 15 a art
i rari’y affected by acceptance of the proposition • 
v acre. Such statutes are quite different from Cuhictr 
Under them, as the Court of Appeals noted in Max'--, 
supra. 398 F.2d at 149, “ the basic punishment is dr 
. . . The life imprisonment alternative . . . [i]n ope;Stic: 
gave the Arkam as jury the power to alv.v:aie pun; -w • - 
extend clemency . . . where death had been tlic c :  y pun 
ment theretofore prescribed . . So. wlien a-' happ.-n.- 
MaxwelFs case, the jury d; i not exorcise its option o. c, 
ency, tire pen: Ivy. certainly fixed by the law. was dea 
| Sec, Maxwell r. PV top, supra, 398 F.dd at 139.] 
Arkansas cases su; . rt t 
yok ed in Ida iwcV. 1 Kcl 
202 SAY. 49. 54 (191 8).
Ark. 247, 250-251, 204 
Stela, 109 Ark. 717, 721 
Stewart v. S la te , 233 Ar 
(1961).]

if,;

one to be impO'

See. a1 so . flaw Pica-:,;
5,7. 841. §/ (191 f
276 5 .Tv' V •• 0 . u •* - cc ~_<i. W

. 458. 46 9 A5 SAY.2d

f. ■ ,»e t: the jurv
Pconte r. Crcan. su ,r

17): hie iaw ■s no ;:re
I .! tic5>. arui fixes n-.d

at. ir. C:5 •fw/’ii a. there i
.5 o '  mu:T"'C. 9T la the fi;

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The ju. ’em. ore. a r c  i p e t i t i o n e r be pat to <J e • .

short I. • hr , :iu e:.u. e re:;; !e<.i wiiii direct1
to r. eorc-i ,’;r the e of pePiety in the 1ylit of thA (. ■

■ J. ii' it i . m determine i that t i v : e  is no e: :
•f ir.s proe - v :: b;. .vi neh the pei'tionr: in;y . e co. si.it.

sen:, r.eed lo d'oniss the ii* of live ir.fonnatu it ch;
petitioner with inure'

-
•

Res pee; ful»; • submit

HERMAN i S E L Y ' N

Attorusv for Petitioner

see. 213.1 Con to  Ced. • • ;*.M i s In;! i. . . .  c .: ’.v

[Cal. Poult C ii.. ]! i 3, T ide . : ", ft, cove.vie’ Ann v.id; *-

ft d o e  e ' b e be veill ee  e ieibie or ; '...vrttt s e r v e  seven
yc'ur:.; ,e.3 -.... tee e v e . : : • e •;. .1 >f CO . . . . . .  1 veil! let d :  t!

in due e c u - e  'ev t ’ A J ,. ; ■ v . ' /. i !y [Gif. /  Col . s o . .. 1 EA
2 e .  3 0 2 . 3 r c /:" j If t! e ‘ r  .: i ; n o t  so  : v 3
t f r  An then ire. the ten;. !. : n; J. j L 0 served is the ns..*- i : r  . [Gil.
/V;ia/ Co-Jc ■ ■ .0  ■

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