Briggs v. Arkansas Abstract and Brief for Appellants
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1960

Cite this item
-
Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Briggs v. Arkansas Abstract and Brief for Appellants, 1960. 75ee5e6f-b69a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/64944974-b20e-4ad4-a09b-d4071c18b97d/briggs-v-arkansas-abstract-and-brief-for-appellants. Accessed October 09, 2025.
Copied!
IN T H E S i m Court of Arkansas CHESTER BRIGGS, ET A L ,................Appellants vs. No. 4992 STATE OF A R K A N SA S,................. Appellee Consolidated With EUGENE D. SMITH, ET A L , Appellants vs. No. 4994 STATE OF A R K A N SA S,......... ....... Appellee Consolidated With JAMES FRANK LUPPER, ET A L ,.. Appellants vs. No. 4997 STATE OF A R K A N SA S,........... ............. Appellee APPEAL FROM PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT * * * HONORABLE WM. J. KIRBY Judge ABSTRACT AND BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS HAROLD B. ANDERSON and W ILEY A. BRANTON, Attorneys for Appellants Of Counsel: Thurgood Marshall, Esq. James M. Nabrit, III, Esq. ARK, BRIEF PRINTING C O ., PINE BLUFF, ARK. I N D E X Page Statement............................................................... 1 Points To Be Relied U p on .................................... 5 Motions For New T ria ls ................ .... ......... 6 Abstract of Testim ony........................................ 10 CHESTER BRIGGS et al V. STATE, No. 4992 .......................................................... 10 Testimony of Witnesses for State .......... . 10 Gene Smith, Chief of P olice .................... 10 Lt. H. J. T albert............................... 11 Capt. M aack............................................... 12 Capt. Albert H aynie.......................... ........ 13 Lt. D. M. C o x .................................................. 14 Capt. R. E. B rians............. ........................... 16 J. L. B ailey............................................ IT Valetta C ates......................................... 19 Helen Holman .................................. 20 Johnny Rives ........................-.............. . 21 Testimony on Behalf of Appellants in Briggs .... 23 Frank James ................................... 23 Vernon Mott ................................. 27 Charles Parker .................................. 32 EUGENE D. SMITH et al V. State No. 4994 .. 36 Testimony of Witnesses for S tate ...................... 36 Paul T erre ll....................... 36 Ernest M. Phillips......................................... 42 Lt. H. J. Talbert............................................. 45 W. T. Mitchell .................................... 46 JAMES FRANK LUPPER et al V. State, No. 4997 ......................................................... 49 Testimony on Behalf of State in Lupper........ 49 Capt. Paul T errell........................................ 49 H. J. T a lbert............................................... 52 A. F. B a e r .................................................... 54 Joseph Trianfonte........................................ 57 Henry L. H o lt .............................................. 59 Testimony on Behalf of Appellants.................. 63 Frank James Lupper ................................. 63 Thomas B. Robinson.................................... 67 Argum ent............................................................... 72 I. Acts 226 and 14 are Unconstitu tional in that they deny the De fendants due process and equal protection of the L a w s ..................... 72 II. The Acts have been applied in an Unconstitutional manner.................. 76 III. The Evidence was not Sufficient to Sustain a Conviction......................... 91 IV. The Court erred in Refusing to Give Defendants’ Requested In structions Numbers 3 and 5 in the Lupper C ase........................................ 95 V. The Judgment was Excessive and H arsh .................................................. 97 Page IN TH E Supreme Court of Arkansas CHESTER BRIGGS, ET A L ,..............Appellants vs. No. 4992 STATE OF A R K A N SAS,.......................... Appellee Consolidated With EUGENE D. SMITH, ET A L ,..............Appellants vs. No. 4994 STATE OF A R K A N SAS,.......................... Appellee Consolidated With JAMES FRANK LUPPER, ET AL, .. Appellants vs. No. 4997 STATE OF AR K A N SAS,.......................... Appellee APPEAL FROM PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT * * * HONORABLE WM. J. KIRBY Judge ABSTRACT AND BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS STATEMENT OF THE CASE During the Spring of 1960, several Negro col lege students were arrested in the City of Little Rock, Arkansas, in connection with their partici 2 pation in a so-called lunch counter sit-in demon stration. There were two separate cases in the Pulaski Circuit Court concerning the alleged vio lation of Act 226 of the Acts of 1959 of the Gen eral Assembly of Arkansas, while a third case in volved the alleged violation of Act 226 and also Act 14 of the Acts o f 1959. Because of the fact that all of the cases involved the question of the constitutionality, application and sufficiency of the evidence as applied to Acts 14 and Act 226 of the Acts o f 1959, the Appellants filed a Motion in the Supreme Court of Arkansas to consolidate the three cases for briefing and argument, and same was granted by this Court. CHESTER BRIGGS, ET AL, V. STATE NO. 4992 The appellants are five Negro college students, who entered the F. W. Woolworth Company variety store, and sat down at the lunch counter to request food service. The policy of the store has always been to serve only white persons at the lunch count er. An anonymous phone call was made to the Little Rock police, and the Chief of Police arrived at the store, ordered the lunch counter closed and ordered the appellants to leave the store. The ap pellants refused to leave the store and were arrest 3 ed and charged with a violation of Act 226. Upon a trial before the Court in the Pulaski Circuit Court, the appellants were each fined the sum of $500.00 and sentenced to sixty days in jail. EUGENE D. SMITH, ET AL, No. 4994 In this case the six defendants entered the Pfeifer’s Department Store in Little Rock, went to several counters then sat down at the lunch count er, seeking service. The manager requested some of them to leave. All of them left. One took a little longer than the rest. They were arrested by Officer Terrell as they left the store and charged with violation of Act 226 of 1959. Upon a trial before the Court, the appellants were found guilty and were each given a sentence o f a fine of $500.00 and sixty days in jail, except the appellant Melvin T. Jackson, who was given a fine of $500.00 and sentenced to six months in jail. (It is not clear whether the appellant Jackson’s sentence was sub sequently reduced to equal that of his co-defend ants. On page 91 of the SMITH Transcript, the Court indicated that his sentence would be $500.00 fine and six months, but the judgment of the Court shown on page 16, assesses a fine of $500.00 and sixty days imprisonment in each case.) 4 JAMES FRANK LUPPER, ET AL V. STATE NO. 4997 The appellants Lupper and Thomas B. Robin son entered the Gus Blass store. Lupper entered the lunch room on the mezzanine floor and request ed food service, and there is disputed testimony that the appellant Robinson, did likewise. There is disputed testimony to the effect that the man ager requested that they leave the store, and upon their failure to leave, the manager went across the street and found a police officer, and as they re turned to the store, they met the appellants on the main floor while appellants were apparently leav ing the store. The manager stated that he was only gone two or three minutes in getting the police officers. The appellants were each charged with a violation of Act 226 and also Act 14 of the Acts of 1959. These appellants requested and were granted a jury trial, and were convicted in the Pu laski Circuit Court for the violation of both Acts. They were each assessed a fine of $500.00 and given jail sentences of six months for the violation of Act 226, and a fine of $500.00 and a sentence of thirty days for the violation of Act 14. 5 POINTS TO BE RELIED UPON FOR REVERSAL I. ACTS 14 AND 226 OF THE ACTS OF 1959 ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THAT THEY DENY TO THE DE FENDANTS DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS. II. THE ACTS HAVE BEEN APPLIED IN AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL MANNER. III. THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFI CIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION. IV. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANTS’ REQUEST ED INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERS 3 AND 5 IN THE LUPPER CASE. V. THE JUDGMENT WAS EXCESSIVE AND HARSH. 6 IN THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT FIRST DIVISION STATE OF ARKANSAS vs. CHESTER BRIGGS, ET AL MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL The defendants alleged the following as grounds for a new trial: 1. Because the Court erred in overruling the defendants’ Motion to dismiss the charges filed herein, at which action of the Court, defendants saved their exceptions. 2. Because the findings and judgment of the Court are contrary to the law. 3. Because the findings and judgment of the Court are contrary to the evidence. 4. Because the findings and the judgment of the Court are contrary to the law and the evi dence. WHEREFORE, defendants pray that the findings and judgment of the Court be set aside, that they be granted a new trial of this action. 7 IN THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT FIRST DIVISION STATE OF ARKANSAS vs. EUGENE D. SMITH, ET AL MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL The defendants alleged the following as grounds for a new trial: 1. Because the Court erred in overruling the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss which was filed prior to the hearing of the evidence over the ex ceptions of the defendants. 2. The Court erred in overruling defend ants’ oral Motion to declare Act 226 unconstitu tional for vagueness. 3. Because the Court erred in overruling de fendants’ Motion for a direct verdict after the State had rested. 4. Because the verdict was contrary to law. 5. Because the verdict was contrary to the evidence. 6. Because the verdict is contrary to both the law and the evidence. 8 7. Because the judgment is excessive. WHEREFORE, defendants pray that the judgmet heretofore entered in these cases be va cated and that each of said defendants be granted a new trial. IN THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT FIRST DIVISION STATE OF ARKANSAS vs. FRANK JAMES LUPPER, ET AL MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL The defendants alleged the following as as grounds for a new trial: 1. Because the Court erred in overruling the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss which was filed prior to the hearing of the evidence over the ex ceptions of the defendants. 2. The Court erred in overruling defend ants’ oral Motion to declare Act 226 unconstitu tional for vagueness. 3. Because the Court erred in overruling de fendants’ Motion for a direct verdict after the State had rested. 9 4. Because the Court erred in overruling de fendants’ Motion for a directed verdict after the State and the defendants had rested. 5. Because the Court erred in giving to the Jury the State’s requested Instructions No. 1 and 1-A over the objections and exceptions of the de fendants. 6. Because the Court erred in giving to the Jury the State’s requestion Instruction No. 2, over the objections and exceptions of the Defendants. 7. Because the Court erred in giving to the Jury the State’s requestion Instruction No. 3, over the objections and exceptions of the Defendants. 8. Because the Court erred in giving to the Jury the State’s requested Instruction No. 4, over the objections and exceptions of the Defendants. 9. Because the Court erred in refusing to give to the Jury the Defendants’ requested Instruc tion No. 3, over the objections and exceptions of the defendants. 10. Because the Court erred in refusing to give to the Jury the defendants’ requested Instruc tion No. 5, over the objections and exceptions of the defendants. 11. Because the verdict was contrary to law. 10 12. Because the verdict was contrary to the evidence. 13. Because the verdict was contrary to both the law and the evidence. 14. Because the judgment is excessive. WHEREFORE, defendants pray that the judgment heretofore entered in this case be va cated and that each of said defendants be granted a new trial. ABSTRACT OF TESTIMONY CHESTER BRIGGS, ET AL VS. NO. 4992 STATE OF ARKANSAS GENE SMITH, Chief of Police, Little Rock Police Department, witness for the State, testified as follows: (Tr. 51-56) On March 10,1960,1 went to Woolworth store having been advised by Capt. Maack that there was a sit-down strike at the lunch counter. Ac companying me were Capt. Haynie and Lt. Cox. Lt. Talbert was there when we arrived. Approxi mately fifty Negroes were sitting at the lunch counter which seated fifty-nine people. The Ne 11 groes were reading. I asked the Assistant Man ager if he had asked them to leave. He said that he did not have that authority. I asked him to close the restaurant to everyone. The waitresses removed the perishables. I told the individuals sitting at the counter that the restaurant was closed to everyone and for them to disperse in order to keep down trouble. All but five left. They were placed under arrest to get them to leave. Quite a few people were congregated at the side entrance of the store in front. People were lined up three or four feet behind the stools. I was ad vised that the management did not ask the defend ants to leave the premises. The defendants did not talk loud nor did they resist in any manner. I do not know who placed the call to the police depart ment. LT. H. J. TALBERT, Little Rock Police De partment, witness for the State, testified as fol lows: (Tr. 56-66) I was requested by the Radio man to go to Woolworth’s. Immediately upon arrival, I saw fifty Negroes seated at the lunch counter. One white lady was seated about the middle. I asked the white people who were standing there to move back from the counter. Some of them were mad. 12 I pushed them from the aisles and back from the front. I asked for the Manager and was advised he was on the telephone calling long distance. Chief Smith arrived and he took over. The crowd was standing right behind the Negroes. The ten sion among the whites was very high. Some of them asked me what I was going to do. I heard an officer ask the defendants to leave. All left but five. The lunch counter was closed and no one was being served. Defendants did not make any .statement, nor were they loud or using abusive or profane language. Did not threaten or intimidate anyone. CAPT. MAACK, Little Rock Police Depart ment, witness for the State, testified as follows: (Tr. 66-78) I made an investigation at Woolworth’s store on March 10, 1960, with reference to a complaint that came to me from Mrs. Shemwell, who stated that an unknown person had called and stated that the sit-downers were there on strike. I accompa nied Chief Smith, Capt. Brians and Lt. Cox. People lined the counter and crowded the streets in front and back of the store. The Chief talked to the Assistant Manager. We advised everybody to leave the counter. It was closed. Tension seemed 13 high. I talked to the defendant Mott and told him three times that the counter was closed and if they didn’t leave we would have to arrest them. He told me to go ahead he wanted to be arrested. I informed Chief Smith of this and he said all right, we will just arrest the whole five. We did. On leaving the store I placed my hand on Mott’s shoulder in case he should run. He told me to take my damn hands o ff of him. I did not notice any loud, profane or vulgar language by oneone except Mott. None of the defendants made any threats. CAPT. TALBERT HAYNIE, Little Rock Po lice Department, witness for the State, testified as follows: (Tr. 78-87) On March 10, 1960, I assisted in the investi gation at Wool worth’s with Chief Smith, Lt. Tal bert, Capt. Brians and Sgt. McNeeley and others. The five defendants were seated at the counter with their backs to the counter. Chief Smith had already given orders that the five were under ar rest and we filed out with them. When we got to the door, I made the remark, “ Better get hold of their arms, they might run when they hit the side walk.” Capt. Maack got Mott by the arms and Mott said, “ Get your hands o ff m e!” Capt. Maack 14 told him him “ You are under arrest” and they put him in the wagon. I know they were ordered to leave the closed lunch counter. I did not observe them refusing to do so. When Chief Smith order ed, “ Let’s go” , they all got off the stools. I did not hear the officers request them to leave before that time. I did hear Mott say just what I have testi fied to. The tension of the crowd was very high when I arrived. The store was full of people. I couldn’t guess how many. There were a lot of people on the sidewalks at the front and at the side doors. The officers had the aisle clear when I ar rived there. I did not hear any profane language or threats from the defendants to this group or anybody at all. They did not resist arrest. I led one of the defendants to the patrol wagon myself. He gave me no trouble at all. I do not know who placed the call to the police station. I did not talk to the Assistant Manager at Woolworth’s. I have not learned yet who placed the call to the station. LT. D. M. COX, Little Rock Police Depart ment, witness for the State, testified as follows: (Tr. 87-94) I went to Woolworth’s in Little Rock, Arkan sas, to make an investigation on that date. It was shortly before noon, accompanied by Capt. Brians 15 and Sgt. Shemwell. I observed approximately forty Negroes sitting on the stools at the counter at Woolworth’s. The white people were lined up in the store at the rear o f them. There was an aisle and the officers were there at that time hold ing the crowd back, or the crowd gathered along an aisle between them. It was more than a normal crowd in the store. The demeanor attitude of this crowd was very tense. Some were numbling threats or they were mumbling, and the officers were holding them back. I didn’t have to push anyone back, but they were being held back some. I estimated forty Negroes sat at the counter. I heard Chief Smith tell them that the counter was closed and all but five left. These five are present today in Court. They did not leave the store. They continued to read books and newspapers. Only five were left at the counter. When we were tak ing them to the patrol wagon, I heard Mott tell Capt. Maack to take his hands o ff him. I also heard him say he wanted to be arrested. We went to Woolworth’s in a patrol wagon, parked it on Fourth street across the street from Woolworth’s. I heard one person in the crowd say that we will do something about it, but there was mumbling to the effect that they shouldn’t just stand there. There was some whispering among the defend 16 ants— no loud talking between them and the crowd, nor any threatening attitude toward the crowd. On the way out of the store, Mott told the officer to take his damn hands o ff him, but none of the defendants said anything or did anything but sit there. The defendants did not refuse to leave when we told them they were under arrest. CAPT. R. E. BRIANS, Little Rock Police Department, witness for State, testified as follows: (Tr. 95-105) I made an investigation at Woolworth’s on March 10, 1960. We received information that there was a disturbance. There was people con gregated inside the building. We pushed our way through into the lunch counter. There were a number of white people around the back door and had the door virtually blocked. The situation was very tense. There was considerable mumbling among the white people. The colored people sit ting at the counter were reading textbooks, news papers. The colored people were asked to leave and all left but five, and they were placed under arrest. I heard Chief Smith when he told the peo ple to leave, that the counter was closed. The situ ation was in considerable turmoil. The white peo ple was at the point of virtually coming to blows. 17 One person made the comment, “ Let’s have a lynching party.” I did not notice the defendants make any threatening remarks to anyone. I heard no loud or profane language or violent noise. I could see no resistance. So far as I could tell they cooperated willingly with the police. No one struck these defendants. I saw no clubs or weapons in the group. It would have been impossible to iden tify the man who indicated he wanted a lynching, because the crowd was there. I didn’t mention this lynching remark in Municipal Court because I wasn’t asked that question. J. L. BAILEY, Assistant Manager, Wool- worth’s Store, witness for the State, testified as follows: (Tr. 105-115) I’m Assistant Manager of Woolworth’s store. On March 10, 1960, I observed the police coming in. I did not call them. The lunch counter was closed when the police got there. I closed it. I was instructed from my home office to do so. I did so because Negroes came in and sat down. The counter was closed to everyone. Charlene Elliott, Helen Holman and Mildred Wright were working there. I don’t know the exact number of colored people that sat at the counter. I did not ask them to leave. I observed the actions of the 18 police when they got there. They just came in and stood around. I saw some colored people leave the counter when the police came in. Five stayed. The attitude of the other patrons toward the counter— they seemed to be disturbed. The defendants en tered during the regular serving hour. We don’t have any policies regarding Negro patrons. We will sell anything to anybody. We have a take-out service for Negroes. I don’t know what percent age of our business is composed of Negroes. We do have Negro patrons. I don’t know the policy of our lunch counter regarding service at the counter for Negroes. Haven’t had that phase of training yet. We don’t allow them to come in and sit down with white folks. We had no facilities for them to sit down at all. I didn’t call the police department and don’t know who did. We tried to find out, but we couldn’t. The counter wasn’t closed when they took their seats, but I closed it. I didn’t ask anyone to leave, nor did I request the police department to do so. The Manager was out of town and I was in charge at that time. I don’t know who asked the defendants to leave, but I didn’t. None of my employees did. I did not hear any of the defendants use any loud noise or pro fane language, or anybody saying anything. No threats were made in my presence. The five just 19 went out with the police. After it was called to my attention that these defendants and their as sociates had taken seats at the counter, I called my home office in St. Louis. I had been instructed to do so. They told me to close the counter, which I had already done. They sent a letter out to the store to close the counter and call the home office. Woolworth’s is a private corporation. VALETTA CATES, Fountain Manager at Woolworth’s witness for the State, testified as fol lows: (Tr. 115-118) I have worked at Woolworth’s for four years, was working there on March 10, 1960. I was up stairs in the store about noon on that date. I wasn’t downstairs to observe any large number of people come in and sit down. When I came down stairs, I saw a bunch of colored people sitting at the counter. I didn’t observe anyone of these pa trons leave. Nor did I observe the police asking anyone to leave the store. I testified in this case in the lower court a month ago. I saw the police talking to these Negroes sitting at the counter. I don’t know what they were saying. I saw them take some of them out, but I don’t know whether they arrested them. There was a crowd up and down all through the store there — just up and 20 down milling around — just kind of curious on lookers. HELEN HOLMAN, Waitress at Woolworth’s, witness for the State, testified as follows: I have worked at Woolworth’s about a year and a half. Was working there on March 10,1960. On that date, the colored boys came to the counter and sat down. I guess about half o f the counter. I had been instructed to leave the counter if they came in. They came in about 11 :00 or 11:30. I didn’t stay. I left. I couldn’t say if they occupied about half of the stools, but they were seating themselves as I left. There were some white peo ple sitting there. I had been instructed to leave the counter by Mrs. Cates. I left Mrs. Wright at the counter. I did not close the counter, since I did not have the authority. I don’t know that Mr. Bailey closed it or not. I left before the police ar rived. I didn’t call them. I didn’t say that my in structions were to leave the counter if Negroes came in. My manager told me to leave the count er. I don’t remember if I testified in Municipal Court on March 17th that I was instructed to leave the counter if Negroes sat down. My manager had not instructed me with reference to service of Ne groes at that time. We do have a take-out counter 21 there to serve Negroes, but we don’t serve them when they sit down. 1 am instructed to have the take-out service. That is all we have. I have never served Negroes at the counter. It would take spe cial instruction from the manager for me to serve Negroes at the counter. JOHNNY RIVES, witness for the State, tes tified as follows: (Testified in Municipal Court and his testi mony made a part of the record in Circuit Court). (Tr. 50). On March 10, 1960, about 11:30 I was sitting on the second stool at the front door going in. A f ter I finished my pie, I looked down the counter and there were a number of Negroes sitting down. There was one sitting by me. I got up and left. I don’t know how many Negroes occupied stools there, but there were quite a number. More than half the stools were occupied. I didn’t call the po lice. I don’t know who called them. I was there when they were arrested. The police took stations behind the occupants of the stools, then Chief Smith came in and walked to the back— came back up to the front of the store— told each one— not everyone— but o ff and on— that the counter was closed. Some got up and left by the front door and 22 back door. There were about half a dozen sitting near the center of the store. They didn’t leave. The police took them out the back door, after that I don’t know. I didn’t hear any conversation be tween the police and these five. I didn’t see the police talking to them as they left. A crowd gath ered after the police arrived in the store — you know how curious — I had been there only long enough to eat a piece of pie. There were waitresses behind the counter and some other patrons sitting at the counter. After the Negroes arrived and one took a seat next to me, I got up and left the counter and walked around behind the cosmetics counter next to the lunch counter. I didn’t notice anything going on behind the counter at that time. The girls left from back of the counter. I noticed them walk ing to the back of the store, after these defendants and their associates took seats. I did not notice them using loud, vulgar or abusive language. They did not make threats to me nor did I hear them make threats to anyone else. People wTere coming in the store curious as to what was going on. I visit Woolworth’s approximately three times a day, six days a week. The lunch counter is generally open during those hours. I did not observe the waitresses serving anyone — either colored or white. 23 PRANK JAMES, one of the defendants, tes tified on his own behalf, as follows; (Tr. 128-144) I am a student at Philander Smith College. I am 21 years of age. I am in my third year of college. I and the defendants here were in Wool- worth store on March 10th of this year. I have had occasion to visit Woolworth’s from two to three times a w7eek since I have been in Philander to purchase various articles. On March 10th some where around eleven o’clock, Ledridge Davis, who is one of the defendants and myself went into Woolworth’s. He purchased a package of enve lopes from the counter and then we went to the lunch counter where we took seats. I had suffi cient funds in my possession with which to make purchases at the lunch counter, if I had been served. The only thing that I did was to look over the menu and the waitress didn’t approach me for any request. I saw food out there on the counter, on the steam table. There were other patrons sit ting there, white and colored. There were white people sitting at the counter. I think there was a lady sitting to my right as I sat down and after she finished her meal she left. She didn’t get up until after she had completed her meal. The man ager of the store did not approach me or ask me to leave. None of the employees asked me to leave. 24 The first person to contact me in reference to leav ing was, I think, Chief Smith and he was the only one. I did not use any profane language or any threats of any kind to anybody there in the store. To my knowledge, none of the other Negroes who were there with me used any profane language or any threats. I didn’t notice very much of a crowd in the way of noise because I was facing the count er and if there was a crowd it was behind me and I didn’t notice any disturbance until after the of ficers arrived and began walking up and down the aisle behind us. I didn’t hear any remarks until after the officers arrived. I heard one lady, make a statement like this, “ What are we going to do now?” She was asking someone, I presume. I did not make any threatening remarks or any threatening conduct towards anybody in the rear. I didn’t see Mott perform any unusual activity. I didn’t hear Mott make any statements. I did not hear him say anything. I think Whoever the of ficer was that had me, we were in front of Mott while we were proceeding outside. In my opinion, during my three years at Philander and for my self and the organizations that I represent, I have made various purchases at Woolworth’s. This in cludes the counter where they sell staples, staple guns, etc., and school supplies there, etc., and I had 25 noticed the lunch counter and I had never seen any Negroes sitting there, but it was in my opinion, that since we were of the public and the doors were open to the public that since we could purchase at the counters where they sell these toilet articles, that we should be permitted to sit at the lunch counter. This was too a part of the store and if the policy permitted us to purchase at one counter, in my opinion, I didn’t see any reason why we shouldn’t try to purchase at another counter. I have been in Little Rock since I have been attending school. I have frequently patronized Woolworth’s to make purchases for the Junior Class, the Panhelenic Council, for Alpha Phi Fra ternity. I went there with another person. That was Davis. I knew ahead of time I, with Davis, was going to make a purchase and then go to the lunch counter and ask for service there. I wouldn’t say it was a scheme. I was not directed to do it by anybody. The only meeting I would say was the morning of the attempt as we were getting ready to go down. The meeting was there in front of the Student Union Building on the campus. No one as I know of called that meeting together. I don’t know how many were present. There were more than five, I would say, and less than 100. This discussion had arrived out of a general dis 26 cussion on the campus from association with fel low students. This had been discussed, I supposed among the students on the campus since February when this first demonstration took place in North Carolina. I and others on this campus discussed doing the same thing in Little Rock. I don’t know of any leader. I walked downtown. I assume the others walked. There was no meeting where some one directed me and advised me how to do it. I have never been served at the lunch counter before, but I had frequently been in the store. I had never observed colored people sitting there and being served. I didn’t know it wasn’t the custom then. I had never seen it done before. I wasn’t told by anyone what to do if the police came in there. I expected to be arrested when the police told Mott that if we didn’t leave that we would be arrested, I was present when all of them left except me and these other four defendants. I got up from where I was sitting, when the police asked me to. As I stated, I was quite a ways from Mott and some of these other fellows and I walked down to where they were, I had really anticipated on leaving at that time, but then I decided that I wasn’t going to leave if they weren’t going to leave. I am in the third year in college. I heard the police ask me to leave. I didn’t leave until I was told I was un 27 der arrest. I don’t recall hearing distinctly what Mott said. I didn’t hear him say, “ I want to be arrested” . While I was sitting at the counter, I looked over the menu and I had my books in my hand. I had a book as I have over there now. I carried a book with me to the store. At the time I left, I had planned to get back in time for class I had a class that evening at 1:30. No one ever approached me so I could place an order. The first that I realized the counter was closed was when Chief Smith told me the counter was closed, and we would have to leave. I refused to leave until he told me that I was under arrest. I left because he told me I was under arrest and come go with him to the paddy wagon or something. VERNON MOTT, one of the defendants, tes tified as follows: (Tr. 144-158) My name is Vernon Mott. I am nineteen years old, a member of Philander Smith College and am currently in school at this time. I am in my First year in Philander Smith College, a Freshman. On March 10th I had occasion to visit Woolworth’s store. I went to show the manager and the people of Little Rock and State of Arkansas and of the United State sthat we— I disapproved of the dual service that he had in his store and if I was able 28 to buy one one side of the store I should be able to buy on the other. I went to the lunch counter as a patron there to show that, and sat down. I sat down with my fellow students of Philander Smith College, and the people that were sitting there be fore I got there and they continued eating and the lady that was sitting next to me, well, she finished her food and she put her money on the table and she left and all of a sudden I heard police sirens and they came into the store and they asked some people to leave the counter. They asked the white people to leave first and then Chief Smith came in and told us that the counter was closed and that we would have to leave. Some fellow students got up and left and I turned to leave and then I sat back down. The counter was not closed at that time to my knowledge. A waitress didn’t approach me to serve me at any time. After I sat down again I heard the police chief say that the counter was closed, that I would have to leave or be arrested. I don’t remember what officer it was, came to me and he said the counter was closed, you have to leave or be arrested and I said, “ Well, I guess I have to be arrested.” I then left the store with the police officer. As I left out of the store, leaving the store, no one had their hands on us. We walk ed out the door. As soon as I walked out the door 29 on the street, someone grabbed me by the seat of the pants like he was putting something down the back o f my pants and I turned around and I said, “ Don’t put anything on me,” and that is the only statement I made. I didn’t say “ Take your damn hands o ff of me.” I said, “ Don’t put anything on me.” I felt— in the other cities that these demon strations have been going on, I had heard of people putting things down in your pants, trying to put weapons on you and put his hands on me of i f he was putting something down in my pants. I was afraid this might be occurring then. I felt I was asserting my Constitutional right to be served in a store when I took a seat at the counter. I was not about to resist the officer in any way. While sitting in the store, I didn’t make any threatening gesture toward anyone. I wasn’t using any pro fanity. I didn’t make any statement to anyone other than the officer. Nobody in the crowd made any threats toward me. I saw a crowd gathering only after the police arrived. They came into the store and started walking behind us and asked the white people to leave the counter. The people that were shopping there is about all was in the store that day at that time. I didn’t see any kind of crowd that seemed to be threatening. I am in college as a first year student. Have 80 traded at Woolworth’s before, quite often, some times two or three times a week. I have never sat at the lunch counter before. I hadn’t observed colored people sitting there before. I didn’t know that wasn’t the custom then. I had not observed them doing it. We don’t have a leader. There was no meeting where I was instructed as to what to do. It was just a volunteer t hing on my and other student’s part. I got the idea from the students demonstrations in North Carolina and other states. I am not the leader of the group. I didn’t have a meeting bef ore March 10 as to what I was going to do and when. As I discussed to the students and generally in groups they would be talking about it. You would walk up to the fellows and they would be talking about it. Nobody told me to do this. I had discussed it since February. They are picking on "Woolworth’s store all over the nation to. This wasn’t a scheme to pick on stores in other states. We didn’t pick on it. We sat down there because they were sitting down in other states in Woolworth’s. We selected stores where we trade. We were not instructed or taught, nor encouraged by the NAACP to do this, nor any of its officers. No one seemed to be the leader among the stud ents. I didn’t tell the officers I wanted to be ar rested. I heard the officers say, “ The lunch count 31 er is closed.” The officers asked me to leave then. I didn’t leave. I refused to leave, because I am an American citizen and I didn’t feel I was breaking any law. I just sat there I didn’t say that to the officers. When I was sitting there people there were just shopping in the store and after the police arrived, the people seemed to be looking to see what happened as far as I know. I sat down in the store and looked at the menu and saw what I was going to order. No one said anything to me. I don’t know the exact number of us there. I walked there with Chester Briggs. I know what I was go ing to do when I got there. I went there in mind to be served. I didn’t know that there was some Acts o f our Legislature that made that against the law. I went there in mind with Briggs knowing that I was going to sit down at the lunch counter. I don’t know how many were going to be there. Other said they might go. I told the officer not to put anything on me. I didn’t see the officer as I stepped out the door. As I stepped out someone grabbed me by the seat of my pants and I turned around and said, “ Don’t put anything on me,” and it was the officer. I meant by that I thought some body was going to slip something on me. I wouldn’t ordinarily go in a store with a weapon on me. I was fearful that someone would put a weapon on 32 me because I have heard that this was going on in other states, that they were putting things on somebody. I read that in the newspapers. Not in a meeting. I hadn’t been to any meeting. This was not made a deliberate scheme. I might have seen this in other instances or even from television I was fearful that might be the result. I was seek ing by peaceful means to persuade the manager of the store that segregation is morally and legally wrong. I didn’t anticipate disturbing the peace, becoming violent or abusive or threatening in any manner. CHARLES PARKER, one of the defendants, testified as follows: (Tr. 159-167) My name is Charles Parker. I am a student at Philander Smith College. I have been a student at Philander Smith College for three years. I am a Junior. I was present at Woolworth’s on March 10, 1960. Myself and a group of the other students went to Woolworth’s to show the manager that we were not in accord with his dual system of serving us on one side of his store and refusing our service on the other side of the store. While at Philander I and other students at Philander have quite often traded with Woolworth’s and we felt that we should and we deserved to be served at the counter SB just as any other citizen of Arkansas of the United States. My purpose in going there was to peacefully persuade the manager to treat me as he would his other customers. I went and took a seat at the counter. When I sat down, I sat next to some white person and there was a large number of white people, but who were eating when I sat down, and they continued sitting down until the police men arrived and told them they would have to leave. At this time they hadn’t told the students or the colored people to leave. They only told the white people eating there to leave. Some of them got up, but a man that was sitting next to me and some other people finished eating what they had been served and after they had finished they got up and left. There was a waitress behind the counter. She was doing something with some pies. There was food on the counter. While sitting there I looked over the menu, I was waiting to be served. I didn’t at any time threaten anyone, or use any profane language. Things were very quiet until the policemen arrived with sirens blasting and a lot of them came in. One officer, Officer Talbert, came in and began pushing people. There were some people who were objecting and there was a group of people that was coming to the counter. 34 He pushed these people back and told them all to move back. He kept going up and down the line pushing and shoving. Some of the students who got up from the counter remained on the scene looking on and there was another group of people that came in to see what the officers were doing when they arrived. The officers didn’t say any thing to me directly. It was my purpose to assert what I considered to be a normal Constitutional right. After we had been placed under arrest, we were walking through the store out the side door. None of the officers had taken a hold of us at that time. Immediately after we walked out of the store we were crossing the street. The officer that was behind Mott — I was directly behind Mott, grabbed Mott by the seat of his pants and Mott said, “ Don’t put anything in my pants.” The man ner in which the officer grabbed Mott, well, he had Mott by his back pocket and I was supposing Mott thought he was going to put something in his pock et as he said. I saw him put his hands in his back pocket. One officer said, “ You had better grab him. He might run.” Mott said, “ Don’t put any thing in my pocket.” 35 CROSS EXAMINATION I have never been arrested, convicted of any thing. I haven’t demonstrated, participated in any sit-downs before this occurrence and I have not participated in any sit-downs after this occurrence. I would say that there wasn’t any leader. This is more or less a spontaneous reaction by all students being as how each of us had an obligation as citi zens to try to get the rights that we deserve. We hadn’t planned to do this at any time before March 10. There had been general discussion of this whole problem of segregation before this sit-down demo- stration in North Carolina, February and after. I had only discussed this on campus. Since I am not familiar with many places that are o ff campus, most of my activities are confined to the campus. It was strictly a student movement. I walked to the store with Frank James. I didn’t go to demo- strate I went to show the manager that I did not like his policy of dual service. I had never seen another Negro being served at his counter. Ap proximately 30 of us sat down there. Everyone left when the police asked them to leave except the men that are here as defendants. There was no type of agreement that all would leave except that five. I did not know there was any law asserting that we could not remain at the counter or we would be punished if we did not leave, I heard the police ask up to leave. EUGENE D. SMITH, ET AL vs. No. 4994 STATE OF ARKANSAS PAUL TERRELL, Little Rock Police Depart ment, witness for the State, testified as follows: (Tr. 44-58) Was working on April 18, 1960. On that date, I made an investigation of an alleged act at Pfeifers Store on Main Street in Little Rock, A r kansas. Officer Talbert and Officer Phillips were with me. We observed some Negro boys walking the street in groups and noticed a lot of people fol lowing them. We noticed them go into Pfeifer’s Department Store, and I went in the store and the lunch counter. Mr. Mitchell, manager of the lunch counter and Officer Phillips were talking. I walk ed over and talked to them at the lunch counter. Six boys came in the store at different intervals and walked around over the store looking at dif ferent things, didn’t make a purchase as I saw. They went to different departments. All came in about the same time and began taking places at the lunch counter at Pfeifer’s. They took different 37 intervals about the lunch counter. I was in civilian clothes. One walked in and made a point to sit between white ladies and Mr. Mitchell walked in by him and asked them or told them “ at the pres ent time we are not equipped to serve colored peo ple” and asked them if they would please leave. All left except, I believe him name is Jackson— the boy with the gray suit on. He refused to leave. He was sitting there with him hands up in the air talking— he wanted to be served. There was quite a commotion. I walked over and identified myself as a police officer and told him he was under ar rest and asked him if he would go with us and he did. We taken him out and there was quite a com motion there among the white people. I have their names: Sammy J. Baker, Melvin T. Jackson, Win ston Jones, McLloyd Buckannan, William Rogers, Jr., Eugene D. Smith. We took these six defend ants into custody. Officer Phillips went out when he saw the commotion he went out with Lt. Talbert and came in the door and met me at the lunch counter and taken them in custody and brought them to headquarters. I consulted another officer and secured a warrant from the Prosecuting At torney’s office. They were placed under charge of Act 226, 1959. The defendants said they were students of Philander Smith College. All lived at 38 Philander Smith, I think, except two. In addition to Act 226 of 1959,1 secured a warrant on Melvin T. Jackson on Act 14. It was about 11 :30 and the lunch counter was quite crowded. They had sev eral vacant seats. The lunch counter is more or less in a horse shoe shape there and a number of peo ple, mostly ladies, eating. I would say 25 of them got up and left the place and walked back to see what was going on. Some of them even left the store. A lot of people gathered up, fifty or sixty people gathered in to ask questions. Some were a little bit angry. We took the boys out as soon as possible without creating any trouble. When I first saw the defendants, they were going in the store. That is what caused me to go into the store. We had some previous trouble and were observing them at that time. Had no prior arrangement or agreement with the manager o f Pfeifer’s to come into the store when I saw the Negro students come in the store. I observed these students when they sat down in the store. They were at the counter. Best I remember, the counter is arranged more or less like a horseshoe. In other words, comes out in a circle and dips back more or less “ S” shaped. I do not know how many seats or stools are there. Students were all together when they came into the store. They split up after 39 they got in the store, walked by different places, walked by the counters different places and looked at things, didn’t ask questions whatever about buy ing anything. They had split up different inter vals. I am not too familiar with the store. They were on the lower floor. They scattered out. I can’t say what department. Am not too familiar. I would say they covered around forty feet, differ ent aisles, around the store. I watched them. They didn’t make any purchases while in there. They didn’t have anything when we arrested them. They weren’t in there long enough to buy anything. Melvin Jackson sat between two white ladies. He made it a point to sit there because he passed sev eral vacant seats which he could have set down on, maybe two or three. I don’t know that all the de fendants made a point to sit where they did sit. They were picking different places. They were walking around the counter and passed up some places where there was vacant seats in order to sit down by somebody. Some of the other defendants sat by someone. I ’m not trying to arouse racial prejudice by pointing out he made a point of sit ting between two white ladies. He is the one who refused to leave when Mr. Mitchell, manager of the lunch counter, asked him to leave. I heard the manager ask him to leave. He asked them in a 40 loud voice. He went to each one. I was walking behind him, probably three feet. Some of them were more or less together, maybe two or three to gether. Then he would ask them or tell them “ At this time we are not equipped to serve colored peo ple” and asked them if they would please leave the store, and they got up without any trouble. As far as I know he got around to all of them. No other colored persons seated at the counter, as I know of. I am sure I would have seen them if they had been there. I didn’t hear defendants saying anything. When they sat down he walked over. I wasn’t talking to them myself. Mr. Mitchell was talking to them and asked them to leave. As far as what they said I did not hear them say any thing. They sat down at the lunch counter in my presence is why I made the arrest. Except Mel vin Jackson. As far as I could tell they weren’t carrying on any loud talk, I could hear no offen sive talk. I could not see that they appeared to be intimidating anyone other than their presence which caused quite a disturbance among the peo ple eating. I made the arrest solely on my own and not at the request of anyone. The defendants were sitting at the lunch counter, is why I made the arrest. That is all. All left when the manager told them to leave except Jackson. I arrested the 41 other defendants because they had taken seats at the lunch counter. According to the law, if a Ne gro sat down at a lunch counter, he was guilty of some crime. I would have arrested a white person if he had sat down and caused a commotion. They caused a commotion because they sat down and about 26 different people pushed their plates back and got up and left the lunch counter and began talking. Only thing these defendants did in my presence was to go in there and sit down. To me they weren’t discourteous. They were to the peo ple who got up and left only by sitting there. They left immediately when requested to do so by the manager. Jackson did not. He was talking to himself “ I want to be served” “ I want to be serv ed” . You could hear him seven or eight feet away. I would say he remained there two or three min utes. It was the time I had talked to the others and asked them to come over there then I walked over and identified myself to Jackson and he got up and left when I asked him to. Mr. Mitchell was the first one to ask him to leave. Mr. Mitchell had on a white uniform, white shoes, white trousers. I coudn’t say he did or didn’t identify himself. I identified myself. The defendant left when I iden tified myself and asked him to leave. Mr. Mitchell had on a white uniform. He told them “ at the 42 present we are not equipped to serve colored peo ple, will you please leave.” Numerous people got up and left. There was a reaction from other pa trons in the store and they came forward. They wanted to know what we were going to do, and I said “ just step back there.” ERNEST M. PHILLIPS, Little Rock Police Department, witness for State, testified as follows: (Tr. 60-68) Was working on the 13th of April, 1960. On that date, I had occasion to assist in investigating alleged offenses at Pfeifer’s main store at 6th & Main in Little Rpck. Around eleven thirty or just before, the man told me “you better go to Pfeifer’s, it looks like trouble— I went over to Pfeifer’s these boys were milling around in there. It wasn’t long until Lieutenant or Captain Terrell came in. They made the sit-down and I went over there to pre vent trouble and wrhen they set down Captain Ter rell said “go out and get— He is my commanding officer” . I went out and got Lieutenant Talbert and brought him in there and as I was coming in Captain Terrell had them marching out, took them out there on the sidewalk and then took them to headquarters. I saw two sit down but I don’t recognize but one of them today. This fellow Jack 43 son. He seemed to be the head man in the bunch. He walked up to the counter and somebody got up. I didn’t see but two sit down. There were several about the lunch counter. I can’t identify any of the others I saw sit down. I didn’t hear them talk ing among themselves. When I went in frist they were just milling around. Captain Terrell sent me out for Talbert. I mean by ‘ ‘milling around” , walk ing around different places, looking at different places. Didn’t see them buy anything. When they first came in they kind of stopped and had a talk. Looked like four or five of them together when they first came in. No one in particular seemed to be doing the talking. They broke up and went in different directions. Took a seat at the counter just a few minutes later. The two I saw, one sit down like here and the other one here. They were a dozen seats apart. Jackson set down right at the horseshoe and the other one went to the end of the horseshoe. I wasn’t present when Captain Terrell talked to them or Mitchell. Saw the defendants when they went in the store. Saw two sit down. They were scattered about the counter there. They were not sitting down. I was there when they left. Helped take them away. Captain Terrell had them up bringing them out. I don’t know whether Cap tain Terrell said anything to them. I wasn’t in 44 there when he was talking to them. He told me to go get Lieutenant Talbert. I guess there were a hundred stools on the two counters— swivel chairs. All of them had backs. I ’m positive about that. Have been a police officer about 25 years. Have made numerous investigations as a police officer. Arrival o f police officers at scene of an investiga tion does not create a lot of curiosity and anxiety. For one thing officers are supposed to keep the peace. Most times a crowd gathers pretty much any place the police are making an investigation. I didn’t hear these boys carry on any loud talking. They didn’t say anything. I didn’t see them do anything I felt they should not have done other than sitting down at the counter. All I saw they just sat down at the counter. I was carrying out orders when I assisted in the arrest. If these had been white students sitting at the counter, and they had created a disturbance, I would have made the arrest. I saw two sitting at the counter. That is the only thing they did to create a disturbance. They violated the law, for a Negro to sit down at a white counter. All I saw was the Negroes sit ting down at the counter. I am 64. I don’t have a regular beat. I have worked on Main Street sev eral years. Have gone in and out of stores watch ing crowds in stores over a period of years. The 45 patrons or crowd at Pfeifer’s seemed to be excited when they were in there. They were expecting trouble. LIEUTENANT H. J. TALBERT, Little Rock Police Department, witness for the State, testified as follows: (Tr. 70-75) Was working on April 13, 1960, and assisted in the investigation of an alleged offense at 6th & Main at Pfeifer’s store. The officers with we were Phillips and Terrell. I pulled over to the curb at 6th & Main and parked. Officer Terrell got out o f the car and went in the store and in a few min utes Officer Phillips came out of the store. After he came out, I got out of the car and went in the store at his command. I saw Officer Terrell in the store. When I walked in the front door and started down the aisle. I met Officer Terrell and six Negroes coming down the aisle. Five of them there are in the court room today. I now know the names of the defendants. I took the Negroes out the front door and stood there and called the patrol wagon. I sent them to Police headquarters. The patrons in the store were milling around crowding up and talking and asking questions. I had been in the store where the arrests were made before. The behavior of the crowd was out of the ordinary 46 that is why I took them out to the front to get them away from other people. I did not go in the store at first when Captain Terrell went in. Saw noth ing that went on until Captain Terrell sent for me. Don’t know anything about what happened in there only after I got there and met him. At the time I knew nothing at all. I was present in Mu nicipal Court when they had a previous trial. It was my testimony at that time that these people were just standing on tip toes to see what was go ing on. I observed the demeanor and attitude of the crowd. I asked the crowd to stand back so I could take the boys out of the store. I found that necessary. I testified I took the boys out in Mu nicipal Court. I testified I took the boys out and the crowd was on tip toes trying to see what was going on and I told them to get back. I don’t re member that I made a statement in Municipal Court I told them to get back. W. T. MITCHELL, Manager of Pfeifer’s de partment store, Little Rock, Arkansas, witness for State, testified as follows: (Tr. 77-84) I am Manager of P feifer’s Department store, a business place in Little Rock. It is open to busi ness and also was open to business on April 13, 1960. On that date, I observed the police appearing 47 there. Something happened to attract my atten tion before the police got there. Well, there were a few boys — these hoys here — they came in, but they were not together. They were separated and I guess they were to meet one another. I don’t know. That is not for me to say. And they came in and they stood around the card counter and went back out, around the card counter. And they left and in the meantime, Officer Phillips came in, and I was talking to him and this Officer over here — Officer Terrell came in and I was talking to them and I went to use the phone, and while I was using the phone these fellows came in. I’m talking of the defendants. They sat down at various places ■— at the lunch counter. I am in charge and the Manager. And as soon as I got o ff the phone they all had not sat down when I got o ff the phone. I went back, however, for my girls to close the counter down. At that time a man jerked two of these boys back before they got to sit down. I don’t know the man. I didn’t get the man’s name. He is not in the court. I don’t think I know his name. I had never seen the man before. They were not sitting. And I walked over to— well— one of these— one or two of these fellows. I don’t re member which ones. And I told them at that time we are not equipped to serve them, and would they 48 leave. Most of them, I think, got up. There was only one I see that sat there a little longer. I do not know his name. Actually, I couldn’t identify him this morning as to which one he was. The police were— and they were talking then— begin ning to take them out and things happened rather — a little fast and I was unaccustomed to it and I couldn’t tell you which ones they were. The best I can remember all of them left except one. The best I can remember all of them left except one, when I asked them to leave. This had occurred in my store before. When this happened it was at our lunch hour, our noon hour rush; we were quite busy and we do have a large crowd. Actually, I was too busy to say what was the reaction as to the attitude of the crowd. I didn’t point out the boy to the officers who wouldn’t get up. I didn’t re quest all of them to leave. I didn’t get around to all of them. I don’t know which one refused to leave. I couldn’t tell you one of these boys from the other who sat down there. They weren’t dis orderly in any manner. Were not loud. Were not boisterous. Were not discourteous. Did not threat en anybody. Didn’t try to intimidate me. Could stop my business. Actually, the problem is this, the fact that Negroes were at a white lunch count er. Otherwise their demeanor was all right, as far 49 as I know. My lunch hour is from eleven until one— until two. This happened around a quarter of twelve. I have a larger crowd from eleven until two o’clock than any other part of the day, ordi narily. JAMES FRANK LUPPER and THOMAS B. ROBINSON vs. No. 4997 STATE OF ARKANSAS CAPTAIN PAUL TERRELL, Little Rock Po lice Department, witness for the State, testified as follows: (Tr. 83-42) On April 13, 1960, we, Lt. Talbert, myself, Officer Baer and Officer Thomas were at 4th & Main, in front of Worthen Bank. It’s about 12 noon. Mr. Holt and Mr. Trianfonte came over and identified themselves as being the manager and assistant manager of Blass’ Department store said they had some colored boys. They asked us if we would assist them. We went over to Blass’ De partment store and when we got inside the store, just about 20 feet from the elevator, we observed two Negro boys that they pointed out to us and said they were the ones that had sat. It was in the presence and hearing of the defendants. They 50 pointed out there two boys, said they were the ones that— Thomas B. Robinson and Frank James Lup- per. I asked them, or they said they were the ones that had been in their lunch counter and sat down. I asked Robinson in the presence of all o f us, Lieu tenant Talbert, Mr. Trianfonte, Mr. Holt and my self, if they were the ones that was at the lunch counter. Robinson spoke up and said he was. Also Lupper said he was also present and we arrested them, brought them both to headquarters. Actual ly their statement was made in the presence of Lieutenant Talbert and m self, Mr. Holt. The lunch counter there is upon the mezzanine floor, the second floor. This conversation in their pres ence was directly underneath the lunch counter. They stated to me that they had sat at the lunch counter. They stated to me that they had been asked to leave. They stated to me that they had re fused to leave. As to the demeanor of the patrons in the store at the time I was talking to them, as far as the lunch counter, I couldn’t say, but there were several white people that followed them and ganged up around us while we were talking to them. There as sereval people walked up there and asked what we were going to do, wanted to know what was going on, you know, and so forth. They asked several questions. I was in Municipal 51 Court when this case was tried. I ’m sure I testi fied to all of that I said here. I don’t remember just what I did testify there that they had ganged up, that anybody had to be restrained. Lieutenant Talbert was. with me. These boys were coming out of the store, but they were orderly. Had no reason to arrest them, except from the complaint of the manager. He requested us to arrest them. He had requested our assistance to get them out from the lunch counter when he came over to get us. He told us that he had two boys that had re fused to leave the lunch counter and asked that we assist them. I do not know that they did any of these things except their word. They said they had been up there and they had been asked to leave and refused to leave. I ’m sure Officer Talbert was standing near me. He was I think close enough to have heard it. I would think he could have heard what I heard. I couldn’t say whether he could hear exactly what I did. I was talking to them. May be he was talking to some of them. I couldn’t say just exactly what he heard and what he didn’t. I talked to both boys, asked both of them had they been at the lunch counter and they said they had. I asked each one individually. I asked them were they the ones at the lunch counter and had Mr. Holt asked them to leave. They said yes, that they 52 wanted to be served. They said they had been ask ed to leave. They told me they had been asked to leave. The time was twelve noon. There was a large crowd in the store. I believe there was some thing, I forget what it was, but anyway there was a large crowd down town that day. I didn’t say the defendants were leaving the store when I met them, but they were leaving towards the elevator. They were about halfway from here to you or may be a little further from the elevator, but the ele vator is in the center of the store. There was a large crowd in there. They were coming from the elevator which would have been going south from the elevator. I couldn’t say going toward the south entrance. There is an aisleway there. I couldn’t say that they were going out of the store. There were several aisles there. They could have been going any direction. H. J. TALBERT, Little Rock, Police Depart ment, witness for the State, testified as follows: (Tr. 43-49) I assisted in the investigation at Blass’ De partment store in Little Rock on April 13th. Two men come running across the street on the corner in front of the Worthen Bank. They told us they were managers of the department store. We went 53 in the store, Captain Terrell and I. I observed two Negroes coming down the aisle in the store, was pointed out to me. The two men who complained were with me at that time. These two boys on my right, the two defendants pointed out to me are in the court room today. I don’t recall their names. We had had 12 or 15 that day. It was on the ground floor. Captain Terrell and I both talked to them. I asked the big boy there if he had been sitting at the lunch counter and he said he did. I asked him if he was asked to leave. He said that he was. He said he refused to leave. I did not question the other one as to whether he had re fused to leave. It was between 11:45 and 12:00 o’clock. I would say, there was over a normal crowd, a large crowd of people. I didn’t notice the demeanor of the patrons of the store at that time. I was present in Municipal Court. Captain Ter rell talked to the boys and asked them if they were at the lunch counter. They said they were. He asked them if they refused to leave. One of them said he did. The other one denied it to me. This one here said he refused to leave. I believe this is the one, this is Robinson. This big boy Lupper reared up and pointed his finger at Mr. Holt and said he did not refuse to leave. We put them un der arrest and took them out of the store. That 54 was my testimony in Municipal Court, I think. I don’t remember. I testified to what I had done. I did not testify that both of these boys told me that. That is not my testimony this morning. One of them, Robinson said he refused. That one of them is the one I talked to. We was altogether, the two men, the two Negroes and Captain Terrell was all standing in one bunch, and I could hear what was going on and what was said. This big boy is the one that said he refused to leave. We was all standing there together, the two store managers. As far as I knew and from what I ob served these boys had done nothing for me to ar rest them, only on what the men said. Just what the manager said. They was coming down the aisle when we stopped them. They weren’t bothering anybody or weren’t molesting anybody. Weren’t loud and boisterous. Their conduct wasn’t threat ening to disturb the peace in any manner when we stopped them. The big fat man on this end told me he sat at the lunch counter and refused to leave. A. F. BAER, Little Rock Police Department, witness for the State, testified as follows; (Tr. 49-57) I had occasion on April 13, 1960 with other officers to make an investigation of an alleged of 55 fense at Blass’ Department Store in Little Rock. I was with Lieutenant Talbert and Captain Ter rell. I was working that beat at the particular time. I observed that there was a group of Ne groes that proceeded in the store that some went in the front door and some went in the 4th Street side and I knew that they were these sit-downers they have been called because most of them had their badges on and I followed them in and ob served them sitting down upstairs. Robinson was in the group of Negroes. I had seen him once or twice before. I had come to recognize him, on ac count o f his glasses and his build. He is the heavy set on the right. I proceeded down and called head quarters and advised them. They sent the Lieu tenant and the Captain down there, talked to Mr. Trianfonte of the Blass store. He advised us of the situation there. We went into the store, walk ed up to Lupper and Robinson. They admitted to us that they had been upstairs and sat down and that they were the two that had refused to leave. When I observed these two defendants, I was up stairs, in the eating place, the lunch counter, what ever it is called. I would say between 12, 15, may be more were sitting there or sat down there. I am not sure. I wasn’t present when any person working for the store approached and conversed 56 with them. When I came back outside from using the phone and the wagon had driven up and sever al police cars, they were beginning to come out. I didn’t talk to any of them while they were sitting at the lunch counter. I talked to the store em ployee. I don’t know his name and he advised he was waiting for the manager at the time. I didn’t talk to the defendants other than advised them they were under arrest after the Lieutenant and Captain was talking. We were all three together there at the same time. I wasn’t there when they*- requested them to leave. They advised us. I was present when the Lieutenant and the Captain had any conversation with them. I was present when the other officers questioned them. They both ad mitted that they had been up to the lunch counter and they were asked then if they had refused to leave and they both said that they had. When Captain Terrell and Lieutenant Talbert first made contact with the defendants, I was standing— we were all five right to— well, there was six of us counting the employees standing there, plus there’s quite a crowd of people there. We were altogether. Judge, maybe 25-foot from the elevator, maybe a little farther than that. It was kind of in the middle of the main floor. This was on the first floor. As near as I can recall, I believe the defend 57 ants were just standing there when we walked up to them. They were just standing at the— there was some going and coming. These two happened to be just standing there, I believe. As near as I can recall I believe they were. I am not positive though. They could have been moving toward the door. I am not sure. I ’m positive that both of these defendants admitted that they had refused to leave. They asked each one as near as I recall. I was there in the presence of Captain Terrell and Officer Talbert. I heard everything that was said to the defendants. I was standing right there at their elbow. I cannot explain the inconsistency of the statement of one of the witnesses who preceded me in stating that one of these defendants denied that he refused to leave. I am positive about my testimony. Both defendants stated they refused to leave. JOSEPH TRIANFONTE, Assistant Store Superintendent, Blass Company, witness for the State, testified as follows: (Tr. 57-63) I am Assistant Store Superintendent at the Blass Company, I have been there approximately about four and half years, in a supervisory capac ity. The lunch counter is under the supervision of the Store Superintendent or his assistant when the 58 Store Superintendent is not there. I have some supervisory power over the lunch counter myself, also the Store Superintendent, and we have a luncheon Manager. Mr. Holt has complete author ity there. I was in the store on April 18, 1960. 1 was sitting in my office, and I received a call that we had guests up in the dining room. My office is in the basement. The lunch counter is on the mez zanine, the main part of the store, the floor above the first floor. I went up there. I observed a group of these boys, students sitting at the lunch counter, also at scattered tables in the forepart o f the lunch room. They weren’t wearing any sort of sign on themselves, they were very neatly dress ed. I would say approximately six or seven were sitting at the lunch counter, I didn’t count them. It isn’t any of these boys here. Well, I suggested that we are not prepared to serve you at this time and will you kindly excuse yourself and he did not leave. He insisted that every Blass customer must be satisfied. That is our slogan and we try to live up to it. I couldn’t say whether this conversation was with this other boy in the presence of the two defendants. This boy came in late, the big boy here. I don’t know this boy’s name here, the small er of the two. I don’t recall him, but the other fellow here, I recall when he came in. I did not 59 speak to either of these two boys. I did not see either or both of these two defendants in the store. I saw this fellow here on the outside. The larger boy. He just came up to the counter and sat down and went into conversation with the other group of boys. I didn’t discuss anything with him my self. No one came in and assisted me. Mr. Holt was speaking to one group of boys. I got up from one counter to the table and requested the boys to leave. I can’t say I requested this defendant whom I recognized to leave. I didn’t talk to him. I don’t know why he came in late. After speaking to the boys individually, and again I requested them to leave, they refused, so we just turned around and went out and spoke to Mr. Holt. I went out and just went on the corner and I went over there and notified the police that I had guests that would not leave. The police came with me, they preceded me. I didn’t observe anything else after I got back in the store with the police. I went in at the Main street door. The police went in the Fourth Street door and I noticed that they stopped some boys and I didn’t know who they were. HENRY L. HOLT, Store Manager, Gus Blass Store, Little Rock, witness for the State, testified as follows: (Tr. 63-73) 60 I am Store Manager and was on April 13, 1960. I was in the store at that time. It is my understanding that the Blass Department Store is a private corporation. Something happened to at tract my attention and I went and asked for assist ance from the police. I have supervisory and man ager’s powers of the store — includes the lunch counter. I went to the balcony lunch room during the lunch hour and observed there were five Ne gro boys sitting in the lunch room. Three of them at the counter and two of them at tables. I told each one of them in turn that I didn’t want any disturbance, but I did ask them to leave. They didn’t want to leave, refused to leave and wanted to argue with me about whether they should leave and I refused to argue with them and just told them. Of the five I observed, I see these two de fendants in the court room today. Then after ask ing them to leave and their refusing to leave, I left the store to look for assistance and having them removed. I went across the street, in front o f the Worthen Bank and found a police officer and told him that I had asked these people to leave and they had refused to do so and he came back with me and found them still there. These two defendants were in the store when I came back. I observed Captain Terrell and Lieutenant Talbert 61 talking to them. He accompanied me back, as a matter of fact. I identified them. I did ask these two defendants whom I recognize as being two of five to leave and they refused to do it. I was gone about two or three minutes, I guess, perhaps five, when I left to go get the officers until I came back. It was in the lunch period. I would say somewhere between 11:30 and 12:00 roughly. I am not sure of the exact time it was. My busiest hour or time of day in that store is from eleven to two. There were a number of people in the tea room when I arrived there who were all o f them apparently very interested, perhaps concerned with what was going on and what would happen. During the time that I was there talking to them and asked them to leave no one came in the tea room. Normally I would have expected a good many people. That is my busiest time. These boys were quiet. They weren’t boisterous at all— not disrespectful. I ’m sure I talked with these two defendants here. It might have been Mr. Trianfonte who called me. I got the phone call. I don’t recall who it was that phoned. The phone call informed me that the boys were sitting in the restaurant. I saw five boys sitting there when I was there. They were sitting there when I came into the room. I didn’t see an other one enter the room. I wasn’t in a position 62 where I could have observed it. They were on my right when I went down the row taking each one in turn and asked him to leave and after I had finished the conversation with each of the boys that were at the counter I turned and there were several boys at the tables and I talked to them. Now, I can’t say what was going on behind my back. I can’t say whether or not Robinson came in afterward. I don’t know the boys by name. I can’t say whether I saw him come in the tea room, no, but I did see him in the store. I saw him in the store when I came back with the police officers. The two defendants were on the main floor in the store when I came back. The main floor is a few feet from the stairs, at the bottom of the tea room. The elevator is just about eight feet from the bot tom of the stairs. When I saw these boys they were facing out and facing toward the street— possibly on their way out of the store. I don’t know what Mr. Trianfonte’s conversation was with any of them, if he had one. I was going about my business and he was talking to others while I was talking to some and I made the circuit of everyone there myself and I believe he had been talking to some, if not all of them. I did ask each of them to leave, including these two defendants. I ’m sure I talked to everyone of the defendants, 63 everyone of the colored boys in the store. I talked to these two in the store. I asked them to leave and they said, “ We don’t feel we ought to. Why should we?” The questions varied and the answers varied from one to another, something like that. I identified myself as the manager of the store in each case. There were five colored men there. Five are all I talked to and all I saw when I came in and I talked to each of them. I don’t recall that there were 12 or 15 in the tea room because I talk ed to each one that was in the tea room There could have been some others in the other part of the store. I was concerned only with those in the tea room because those are the ones I talked to. These two were there. It took something like three minutes to go down and get the officers. FRANK JAMES LUPPER, one of the de fendants, testified in his own behalf, as follows: (Tr. 77-87) I live at 1817 Bishop, Little Rock. I am nine teen years old. I was in the Gus Blass store on April 13, 1960. I am a customer of Gus Blass. Have been for some time. My mother has an ac count there, and we have been having an account there for about 19 or 20 years. My people have been customers of Gus Blass practically before I 64 was born. On the morning of April 13, 1960, I entered Blass’ Department Store about 11:35 and on my way up to the lunch room, I sat down at the table to be served and while I was there waiting a man came to me. I believe it was the manager, for he said so. He asked me did I see the sign up on the wall, and I told him no, and he pointed to the wall and showed me a sign that I couldn’t read at the distance I was at the time. I couldn’t make out what it was and he said, he told me what was on the sign. He said that they had the right to choose who they would like to serve and he said do I understand. I told him that I was a customer of Gus Blass. He said he couldn’t help that. He said do I understand what he had just said . I sat there and he went to the next person. He did not ask me to leave. I did not refuse the request of any one to leave. After I sat there for sometime and I didn’t get waited on, I decided to leave on my own and I walked down the stairs and went on out, turned to my right and as I was going outside, I stopped at a counter to look at a pair of sunshades and just then a couple of officers walked in and asked the manager, “ Is this the one?” And then he said, “ I don’t know,” and he said, “ Well, all you have to say is yes or no,” and he said, “ Yes,” and then he said, “ You are under arrest,” and I said, 65 “ What charge,” and he said, “ Open charge,” and then he took us down. The officer didn’t ask had I refused to leave the store, or the alleged tea room. No officer asked me that at any time. The mana ger of the store didn’t ask me, nor any person who was a representative of the Blass store asked me to leave. I saw Thomas Robinson coming out of the store while I was there. He was at the top of the stairs when I saw him. He was coming to wards me, and as I was leaving out, then every body else was leaving out, and then he turned around and followed me out. I didn’t make any noises of any sort while I was there. I wasn’t loud or boisterous. I didn’t threaten anybody there at any time. I didn’t molest anybody. No one threatened me. I wasn’t molested by anyone. I didn’t sit down at the lunch counter. I sat at the table. I don’t know the fellow’s name that sat with me, but there was another person. It wasn’t someone with me. It was someone from the store. There were two boys at the table, the other fellow and me. I have seen him before. I don’t know his name. I saw him around Philander Smith College. He went to school at Philander Smith College. He was sitting there when I sat down. I don’t know how long he had been there. I sat down there first and then he sat down there. I do not belong to the 66 NAACP. I don’t know whether my parents be long to them, I don’t believe so. Nobody told me to do this. I went down there alone. I knew what I was going to do when I got down there. I went down there to sit down at the table to be served. I hadn’t done that before. I hadn’t done it at any other store. I did it this day because I am a cus tomer of Blass Department Store. It could have been any other day. It just happened that is the day I decided to go down. I didn’t pick April 13th. I didn’t know anybody else was going to sit down and ask for service. I had not been instructed what to do if they asked me to leave. Nobody en couraged me to do this. I don’t know how many were in the store. There was quite a few. There was about six. I didn’t say I didn’t have a crowd. I came in the store by myself. I didn’t know a crowd was going to sit down there. He didn’t ask me to leave. I heard all these witnesses testify. Captain Paul Terrell and Lieutenant Talbert talk ed with me. They asked me did I sit down. I said yes. They didn’t ask me if I refused to leave. Mr. Holt didn’t ask me to leave. I saw the de fendant Robinson there. He wasn’t sitting with me. I didn’t see him sitting. I saw him at the top of the stairs as I was going out. He followed me out. I have known him about five years, I 67 imagine. I didn’t know that he was going to be there that day. He didn’t know I was going to be there that day. I don’t know the names of some of the other boys there. I go to Philander Smith Col lege. Some of them just come around the school. I had no meeting about going in there, several of us, and sitting down. Not any time before that. You know, the states, I haven’t seen it, but I have heard about them. I have been reading about them in the paper. I decided since I am a Blass cus tomer, and I buy a lot of things, I decided to go in and see if we could get served. I am a customer of Pfeifer’s and Cohn’s, and Blass, a few others and I just go in every once in a while, not all of the time. I heard about another sit-down demon stration happened at Pfeifer’s that day. I saw it happen. I didn’t know it was going to happen. I drove to town in my car. I parked it, I believe on Columbus Street. I say a block away, I imagine. I got there at eleven thirty-five. I remember it because I saw it on the clock as I walked in the place. THOMAS B. ROBINSON, one of the defend ants, testified in his own behalf, as follows: (Tr. 88-99). I was present at the Gus Blass Store on April 68 13, 1960. I guess it was between eleven forty-five and twelve o’clock. I ’m not sure. It was approxi mately that time. I entered Gus Blass store and as I was going upstairs to the mezzanine to get served I noticed several people leave out of the store and I didn’t know what reason they was leav ing and so as I walked in I left when I saw the other people leave and as I was about to leave out of the store this officer stopped me and he asked me was I upstairs and I said yes and he arrested us and we asked him what was the charge and he said, “ Open charge.” He didn’t ask me if I re fused to leave. The only thing he asked us was I upstairs. The only time I saw Mr. Holt was when I was leaving the store, leaving with the officers that arrested us. I didn’t sit down at the table at Gus Blass, so Mr. Holt couldn’t have talked. I didn’t have any conversation of any kind. I at tended school at Philander Smith College. This will be my third year. I arrived at the store alone. I wasn’t going to meet no one personally. I wasn’t expecting to meet no one. I only got in the store at the top of the stairs, and turned and came out. As I was leaving out of the store I was stopped by the officers and placed under arrest. I did not talk to anybody while I was there. I wasn’t loud or boisterous. I did not molest anybody. I didn’t 69 have any occasion to say anything to anybody. I did not have any conversation with any of the per sonnel in Gus Blass store. I am a customer of Gus Blass. I have bought clothes at Gus Blass. I will say about ten years or more. I have been going there since I cam remember, since I was a child. I have always been served there. I am twenty. I have lived in Little Rock twenty years. I used to belong to the NAACP Junior Council when I was in high school. I don’t think they have a Junior Council now. I am not a member of any group out at the school who has met and worked us a scheme to go in the stores and sit down. I did go in Blass’ Store, on April 13th. I went in my car. I think I parked it down on Scott, about 3rd and Scott. It was close to twelve o’clock when I got there about lunch time. No one was with me. I don’t think I was late for lunch. I went to Blass’ store because I was looking for a suit. I didn’t get a chance to sit down at the table or lunch counter. I don’t know why they arrested me. Lupper and I were together when we got arrested. As he was coming out, I guess we were coming out of the store at the same time. I was leaving the store because I was ready to go. After I got upstairs and saw that it was impossible for me to get served. I decided to leave out. I didn’t go there solely to be served food. 70 I got hungry as I was there and I went upstairs to get served. I didn’t ask to buy a suit while I was there. They sell suits on the main floor. The lunch counter is on the mezzanine. They don’t sell suits up there. I went to the lunch counter to eat. I don’t know where Lupper was when I got up there. Lupper and I accidentally, I guess it was accident ally were coming out of the store. We were leav ing the same entrance. I didn’t come down the stairs with him. I walked down the stairs. Lup per didn’t walk with me. He walked by himself. I walked, I think I was behind him. I am almost positive. I remember seeing him as we were going out of the store. We were together when the of ficers stopped us. He was looking at some shades. I didn’t stop to talk to him. We were going out the same entrance and the police stopped us to gether. I went there to buy a suit, but I got hun gry while I was there. I was going up towards where they served the food. I got as far as the entrance, the head of the steps. There were a lot of people sitting around at the tables when I got up there. There was same colored boys up there. They were sitting down at the tables and some at the counter. After when I came up there, they were leaving. There were some of them leaving and some o f them sitting down and then all of 71 them leaving as I was coming in. I don’t know why they left. I didn’t see Lupper up there. I don’t remember seeing Lupper until I wTas on the main floor. I got as close to the lunch counter as to the top of the stairs. I left because I saw a lot of other people leave. It was obvious that I couldn’t get served because I saw the other people leave out. I presumed they left because they couldn’t be served. I really don’t know why they couldn’t be served. I guess because they are colored, I don’t know why these officers would tell a story on me. I can’t say that I saw any other colored people sit ting around there or in the store about my size and wearing glasses. I have never had any trouble with Mr. Holt or anybody in the store there. I never have seen him before we got arrested. I don’t know why he would sit there and say that he saw me sit ting there and asked me to leave. He might have made a mistake. There’s a lot of people in the store that might have been my size and my age. The officers asked me was I upstairs and I said yes. He didn’t ask me if I refused to leave. Mr. Holt didn’t ask me to leave. He didn’t tell me that he wasn’t prepared to serve me at that time. I didn’t ask any questions why he wasn’t. I had not discussed this with anybody about being there on 72 that day, nor at the time I would get there, or what I would do when I got there. ARGUMENT I ACTS 226 AND 14 ARE UNCONSTITU TIONAL IN THAT THEY DENY THE DEFENDANTS DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS The BRIGGS case and the SMITH case in volve only Act 226 of the Acts of 1959, the perti nent part of which is now Arkansas Statute 41- 1432, and reads as follows: 41-1432. CREATING DISTURBANCE IN PUBLIC PLACE OF BUSINESS OR OTHER PUBLIC PLACE — PENALTY.— Any person who shall enter any public place of business of any kind whatsoever, or upon the premises of such public place of business, or any other public place whatsoever, in the State of Arkansas, and while therein or there on shall create a disturbance, or a breach of the peace, in any way whatsoever, including, but not restricted to, loud and offensive talk, the making of threats or attempting to in timidate or any other conduct which causes a disturbance or breach of the peace or threat ened breach of the peace, shall be guilty of a 73 misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not more than five hundred dol lars ($500.00) or imprisoned in jail not more than six (6) months, or both such fine and im prisonment. (Acts 1959, No. 226, § 1, p. 1159.) The LUPPER case involves the alleged viola tions of Acts 226 and also Act 14 of the Acts of 1959. The pertinent section of Act 14 is now Ar kansas Statute 41-1433, and reads as follows: 41-1433. REFUSAL TO LEAVE BUSI NESS ESTABLISHMENT AF TER REQUEST — PENALTY.— Any person who after having entered the business premises of any person, firm, or cor poration, other than a common carrier, and who shall refuse to depart therefrom upon re quest of the owner or manager of such busi ness establishment shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500.00) or by imprisonment not to exceed thirty (30) days, or both such fine and imprisonment. (Acts 1959, No. 14, §1, p. 29.) These statutes are so vague, uncertain and in definite that they afford no fair warning to the appellants as to what conduct might transgress the statute, and they provide no ascertainable stand ard of criminality. Act 226 does not require that 74 the actions of an alleged offender be “ willfully or maliciously” done as required by a disturbing the public peace statute which has been on our books for over a half-century (Ark. Statute 41-1401). There is absolutely nothing in this Act which would give fair warning to a person that they would violate the statute by peacefully occupying a seat at a public lunch counter and seeking serv ice, where such service was being accorded to the public. Act 14 is even more vague as the only thing which is required under the statute to make one guilty of a criminal offense is the mere refusal of a person to leave a business establishment after having been requested to do so by the owner or manager of such business establishment. The Act does not require or even imply that there must be any mens re a on the part of the alleged offender before there could be a violation of the statute, nor does it require that the alleged offender be doing or threatening to do any unlawful act as a condi tion upon which the owner or manager bases his request to leave. Act 14 could easily be construed to require the conviction of a customer who, after having paid cash money for an article in a store which the owner had not yet delivered to him, re fused to leave the store upon request of the owner 75 until the purchased article was delivered or his money refunded. These are penal statutes and the great weight of authorities require that a penal statute he suf ficiently definite and understandable as to fore warn men of ordinary intelligence as to what con duct is prohibited. See UNITED STATES V. MILLER, 17 F. Supp. 65 (W. D. Ky. 1936); LAN- ZETTA V. NEW JERSEY, 306 U. S. 451 (1939). It is the legislative, rather than courts or juries, which must fix the standard of conduct and it must be done in such a way that an ascertainable standard of guilt can be reasonably determined by persons of common intelligence. These Acts are so vague that a conviction under them would de prive the appellants of the due process and equal protection of law required by Amendment Four teen to the Constitution of the United States and also Article II, Section 8, of the Constitution of Arkansas. The Motions to Dismiss for unconsti tutionality should have been granted. 76 II THE ACTS HAVE BEEN APPLIED IN AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL MANNER Defendants submit on several grounds that the police officers had no legal right to demand that they leave their seats as was done in the BRIGGS case, and that consequently the officers had no right to arrest them for declining to obey an order that the police had no authority to make. I f Act No. 226 of 1959, under which defendants were convicted, is construed and applied by this Court to authorize the actions o f the police and to support criminal convictions of the defendants, the statute will deprive the defendants of rights pro tected by the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con stitution of the United States. A. The police action in ordering that the de fendants leave the store, where no such request had been made by the owner or manager, and in arresting them was an unconstitutional interfer ence with the defendants’ rights to emply peaceful persuasion and advocacy to attempt to obtain an end to a claimed injustice. It is clear that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro tects the citizen against interference by the state 77 and its officials with peaceful speech, assembly and advocacy of political, religious or social views, no matter how unpopular the ideas presented may be in the community, except in rare cases where advocacy causes a clear and present danger to the public. There is no doubt that advocacy of an end to racial discrimination is within the area of pro tected speech. Cf. SCULL v. VIRGINIA, 359 U. S. 344 (1959); NAACP v. ALABAMA, 357 U. S. 449, 460-466 (1958). The defendants sought to be served at public lunch counters in the belief that by so presenting themselves for service they might persuade the proprietors to end the discriminatory treatment of Negro customers. There were no acts by the de fendants upon which the law officers, or the court below, could properly make a determination that the defendants’ advocacy created a danger to the public that was so clear and present as to justify suppression by the government. The officers’ tes timony as to their subjective feeling that there was “ tension” among the customers in the store is plainly insufficient by itself. There were no acts of violence committed by or against the defend ants ; there was no advocacy of violence; there was no destruction of property. Indeed there was not even a request for police assistance from the man 78 ager in charge o f the store or the owner in the BRIGGS case or the SMITH case, and the students were leaving Blass’ Department Store when they were arrested in the LUPPER case. This Court should make it plain that free speech cannot endure unless police officers protect the right to speech and advocacy of persons whose ideas they deplore as well as persons with whom they agree, and that the paramount obligation of the police in these cases was to exercise precau tions to protect the defendants against any appre hended violence rather than to suppress their ad vocacy in order to end the “ tension” in the store. Numerous decisions support the proposition that peaceful advocacy such as the defendants were engaged in when they were arrested is protected against infringement by law enforcement officers and the imposition of criminal sanctions. THORN HILL v. ALABAMA, 310 U. S. 88 (1940); KUNZ v. NEW YORK, 340 U. S. 290 (1951); CANT WELL v. CONNECTICUT, 310 U. S. 296 (1940); HERNDON v. LOWRY, 301 U. S. 242 (1937); N1EMOTKO v. MARYLAND, 340 U. S. 268 (1951); TERMINIELLO v. CHICAGO, 337 U. S. 1 (1949); DEJONGE v. OREGON, 299 U. S. 353 (1937); MARSH v. ALABAMA, 326 U. S. 501 (1946). 79 It is plain that these defendants merely sat peacefully at the lunch counter, and that they com mitted no violence, provoking no violence, used no offensive language, made no threats, and engaged in no intimidation. The only thing that the de fendants did was to fail to heed the police demand that they give up their seats and leave, in the BRIGGS case. In the SMITH case the defendants left the store when requested to do so by the man ager and were arrested by police officers who act ed without any request by the manager or owner of the store. The defendants did not breach the peace, or threaten to do so. Nothing in the statute under which they are charged gives the defendants fair warning that they would violate the statute by peacefully occupying seats at a public lunch count er seeking the end of a policy of racial discrimina tion and failing to obey a police demand that they move, which was unaccompanied by any request to leave from the person owning or in possession of the store, unaccompanied by any indication of the policemen’s authority to make such a demand; un accompanied by any actual authority in the police to make such a demand, and unaccompanied by any actual breach of the peace. Particularly where fundamental constitutional rights are at stake and 80 where the vagueness of a criminal law may inhibit the advocacy of ideas, vague laws applied so as to suppress free speech must be struck down as de nials of due process. HERNDON v. LOWRY, supra; LANZETTA v. NEW JERSEY, 306 U. S. 451 (1939); RALEY v. OHIO, 360 U. S. 423 (1959); SCULL v. VIRGINIA, supra; WINTERS v. NEW YORK, 333 U. S. 507 (1948); UNITED STATES v. CARROLL, 345 U. S. 457 (1953); UNITED STATES v. COHEN GROCERY CO., 255 U. S. 81 (1921); CONN ALLY v. GENERAL CONSTR. CO., 269 U. S. 385 (1926). A single discriminatory act, supported by other evidence of intention and purpose to dis criminate because of race, may well establish a pattern that must be condemned as illegal. The Supreme Court, in Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1, 8-9, 64 S. Ct. 397, 88 L. E. D. 497, in construing a statute, fair on its face, made the fol lowing pronouncement: “ The unlawful administration by state of ficers of a state statute fair on its face, re sulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a de nial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element o f intentional or purposeful discrimination. This may ap pear on the face of the action taken with re 81 spect to a particular class or person cf. Mc Farland v. Sugar Co., 241 U. S. 79, 86-7, or it may only be shown by extrinsic evidence show ing a discriminatory design to favor one in dividual class over another not to be inferred from the action itself, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 373-4. But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, Terrance v. Florida, 188 U. S. 519, 520; there must be a showing of ‘clear and intentional discrimination/ Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183, 186; see Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U. S. 500, 507-8; Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219, 231. Thus the denial of equal protection by the exclusion of negroes from a jury may be shown by ex trinsic evidence of a purposeful discrimina tory administration of a statute fair on its face. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 394, 397; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 589; Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354, 357; Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128,130-31; Hillv. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 404.” In Smith v. People of California, 80 S. Ct., 215, the Court held: That where the definition included no ele ment of scienter — knowledge by appellant of the contents of the book — and thus the ordi nance was construed as imposing a “ strict” or “ absolute” criminal liability. The appellant made timely objection below that if the ordi nance were so construed it would be in con flict with the Constitution of the United States. 82 California here imposed a strict or absolute criminal responsibility on appellant not to have obscene books in his shop. “ The exist ence o f a mens tea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo- American criminal jurisprudence.” Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, 500, 71 S. Ct. 857, 862, 95 L. Ed. 1137. Even assuming arqnendo that a threat of a breach of the peace was created by someone among the crowd of customers who gathered in the stores to watch the defendants and the police, the defend ants may not be held criminally responsible for the acts of these other persons, as there is no evidence that the defendants were made aware of the in tention of any persons to attack them, or even that there was any likelihood of such an occurrence. To punish the defendants on the basis of the police officer’s subjective impression that someone might cause violence because there was “ tension” would be to apply Act No. 226 so as to make an arbitary classification of innocent unknowing acts as crimi nal offenses. Such a construction of the statute to allow punishment without evidence of criminal scienter would be a deprivation of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Wterrain v. Updegraf, 344 U. S. 183 (1952); Smith v. Cali fornia, 361 U. S. 147 (1959). 83 B. The action of the police officers in de manding that the defendants leave the lunch count er was plainly based upon the policy of the store, reflecting the custom in the community, that Ne gro customers are not served at lunch counters maintained for white persons. The action of the police in demanding that the defendants leave the lunch counter and in arresting them for their re fusal, and the action of the court below in convict ing them, all represent state actions enforcing racial discrimination. Such discrimination by the State or its officers, and such use of the criminal law machinery of the states to preserve racial seg regation is prohibited by the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. As the Supreme Court recently wrote in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, 17: Thus the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to all action of the State denying the equal protection of the laws; whatever the agency of the State taking the action, see Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313; Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts of Phila., 353 U. S. 230; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, or whatever the guise in which it is taken, see Derrington v. Plum mer, (CA 5, Tex.) 240 F. 2d 922; Deoartment of Conservation & Development v. Tate (CA 4 Va.) 231 F. 2d 615. 84 The principle that neither state or federal courts may use judicial power to enforce racial discrimination is clearly established. Shelley v. Kraemer, supra; Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24 (1948); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953). The principle that police officers may not en gage in enforcing racially discriminatory practices has been applied in various cases akin to this one. In Valle v. Stengel, 176 F. 2d 697 (3rd Cir. 1949) it was held that state law enforcement officers de prived Negro citizens of rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and federal statutes im plementing that amendment, when they ejected them from a private amusement park in aid o f the park’s racial exclusion policy. The court in VaMe made specific reference to the statutory protec tion of the equal right of Negroes to make con tracts as protected by 42 United States Code §1981 (former revised statutes §1977). The principles applied in Valle v. Stengel are sufficient to dispose of this case. In another recent case the same principle was applied to the actions of police officers who arrest ed a group of Negroes and charged them with breach of the peace for refusal to obey a police de mand to move to the rear portion of a city bus set 85 apart for Negroes by bus company regulation. In Boman v. Morgan, 4 Race Eel. Law Reporter 1027, 1031 (D. C. N. D. Ala. 1959) the court said: A charge of “ a breach of the peace” is one of broad import and may cover many kinds of misconduct. However, the Court is of the opinion that the mere refusal to obey a re quest to move from the front to the rear of a bus, unaccompanied by other acts constitut ing a breach of the peace, is not a breach of the peace. In as far as the defendants, other than the Transit Company, are concerned, plaintiffs were in the exercise of rights se cured to them by law. * * * Under the undisputed evidence, plaintiffs acted in a peaceful manner at all times and were in peaceful possession of the seats which they had taken on boarding the bus. Such be ing the case, the police officers were without legal right to direct where they should sit be cause of their color. The seating arrange ment was a matter between the Negroes and the Transit Company. It is evident that the arrests at the barn were based on the refusal of the plaintiffs to comply with the request to move since those who did move, though equal ly involved except as to compliance, were not arrested. Under the facts in this case, the officers violated the civil rights of the plaintiffs in ar resting and imprisoning them. Ordinance No. 1487-F, and their “ willful” refusal to move 86 when directed to do so, did not authorize or justify their conduct. The language given above was quoted on appeal of the case, though that aspect of the holding indicat ing that the Negroes were not entitled to relief against the Transit Company was reversed. Bo- man v. Birmingham Transit Co.,------ F. 2d. _ _ _ , 29 Law Week 2028 (5th Cir. July 12, 1960). In general accord with the principle that state police officers, and those acting under the state’s authority, may not enforce racially discriminatory rules are Baldwin v. Morgan, 251 F. 2d 780 (5th Cir. 1958); Fleming v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 224 F. 2d 752 (4th Cir. 1955); Cf. Whiteside v. SouthernBusLines, 177 F. 2d 949 953 (6th Cir. 1949) invalidating bus segregation rule on basis of the Commerce Clause but indicting that if state action is necessary it may be found in the action of police officers in ejecting a Negro from a bus. The principle that the preservation of law and order cannot be accomplished by the exercise of the state’s police power to enforce racial discrimina tion was settled as long ago as Buchanan v. War- ley, 245 U. S. 60, 81 (1917), so it cannot matter that the police officers may have sincerely believed that they were acting properly to prevent disorder. 87 The conviction of the defendants represents a discriminatory administration of the criminal law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for the additional reason that the record is so devoid of evidence o f guilt that the conviction really rests upon no evidence. The defendants engaged in no conduct that is claimed to have been disorderly ex cept their refusal to obey the police order that they leave and not continue to seek food service in the BRIGGS case. In the SMITH case the defendants were arrested despite the fact that they left im mediately upon the request of the manager. And in the LUBBER case the defendants denied that the manager requested that they leave (although the manager testified that he requested each de fendant to leave) and stated that they left when it became apparent that they would not be served. Lupper then left the lunch room which was on the mezzanine floor and Robinson upon seeing other colored students leaving the lunch room, started leaving the store, when both defendants were ar rested on the ground floor. Thus they have been convicted without any evidence of any disorderly act or breach of the peace. The rule appliacble in this case was recently applied in THOMBSON v. CITY OF LOUISVILLE, 362 U. S. 199 (1960) where the court struck down convictions for “ dis 88 orderly conduct” and “ loitering” on the ground that a criminal conviction founded upon no evi dence of guilt or criminality denies due process and equal protection of the laws. See also SCHWARE v. BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS, 853 U. S. 232 (1957); UNITED STATES ex rel. VAJTAUER v. COMMISSIONER, 273 U. S. 103, 106 (1927); MOORE v. DEMPSEY, 261 U. S. 86 (1923); YICK WO v. HOPKINS, 118 U. S. 356 (1886), and Cf. AKINS v. TEXAS, 325 U. S. 398, 402 (1945); TOT v. UNITED STATES, 319 U. S. 463, 473 (1943) concurring opinion); MOONEY v. HOLOHAN, 294 U. S. 103 (1935) . C. Act 14 was alleged only in the LUPPER case and both defendants were found guilty of failing to leave Blass Department Store after hav ing been requested to do so by the manager. All that has been said here regarding Act 226 is equal ly applicable to Act 14. 89 It is entirely clear from the record in each case that the appellants were requested to leave the respective stores solely on account of their color.1 The appellants argue that Acts 14 and 226 are being used against them solely because of the fact that they are Negroes who sought service at lunch counters heretofore reserved for white per- h In the BRIGGS case, neither the manager or the owner requested the Negro students to leave, nor did they request the assistance of the police. The Assistant Manager of Woolworth’s testified as follows: (Tr. 106) Q. Was the lunch counter closed when the police got there? A. Yes, sir . . . . Q. And why did you close it? A. Because the Negroes came in and sat down. In the SMITH case, Officer Terrell testified as follows: (Tr. 55) Q. Did they leave when the manager told them to leave? A. All except Jackson. Q. Then, with the exception of Jackson for the purpose of arrest, why did you arrest the other defendants? A. Because they had taken seats at the lunch counter. Q. In other words, it was your opinion, as a police officer, i f a Negro sat down at a lunch counter, he was guilty o f some crime? A. Yes, he is according to the law. 90 sons. The attempt to coerce appellants and other Negroes to not seek service at lunch counters,* (i) 2 amounts to involuntary servitude in violation of Amendment 13 to the Constitution o f the United States. It should be clear to anyone that no white person would be arrested for doing no more than the appellants did and hence the use of these statutes denies to the appellants the equal protec tion of the laws guaranteed by not only the Four teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, but also violates Article 11, Section 3 and Section 18 of the Constitution of Arkansas. The motions to dismiss because of the unconstitu tional application of the statutes in question should have therefore been granted. 2. Even the trial judge seemed determined tô con vict the appellants as (i) reflected by his attitude in the SMITH case before any testimony was heard and after the testimony was completed, (ii) (i) (Tr. 40) The Court — This is the law and I don’t see how you can violate it deliberately on the claim that it is un constitutional. What I am trying to avoid here is serious trouble. I don’t want a race riot if I can help it. (ii) (Tr. 90) The Court — la m going to fine these defendants the same as be fore, a fine of $500.00 and sixty days. I am trying to discourage this as much as I can. 91 III THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION It is undisputed that in none of the three cases did any of the defendants engage in any of the acts or conduct enumerated by Act 226. All of the appellants were quiet, neatly dressed, courteous and well behaved. There is no testimony that any of them used any loud or offensive talk or that they made any threats or attempted to intimidate anyone. In the BRIGGS case, the police were not requested by the owner or manager of Wool worth’s to assist in any way. It was the Chief of Police who took it upon himself to order the lunch count er closed down and to order the defendants in that case to leave. The failure of the appellants in BRIGGS to comply with the request of the Chief of Police, that they leave the store, could in no way support a conviction for the alleged violation of Act 226. In the SMITH case, the defendants were re quested by the manager to leave the lunch counter at Pfeifer’s Department Store and they left when requested, although the appellant Jackson alleged ly took a little longer to leave. The appellants were nevertheless arrested for the alleged violation of Act 226 and convicted. 92 In the LUPPER case, when the defendants were requested to leave the lunch room of Blass’ Department Store by the manager, 3 the manager stated that they continued to sit there but the ap pellants did not state positively that they would not leave. 4 The manager stated that he then left to get the police, walked downstairs, out of the build building and across the street where he found a policeman (Tr. 66), that he was only gone two or three minutes (Tr. 67) and that he and the of ficers returned and met the appellants on the first floor, apparently on their way out. (Tr. 71). There is no evidence that the appellants en gaged in any conduct or language prohibited by Act 226. Indeed, the contrary affirmatively ap pears from the prosecution’s evidence. Penal stat utes must be interpreted strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. (See 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, Sec. 407, and cases cited therein.) 3. Appellant Lupper testified that the manager did not ask him to leave (Tr. 79) and the appel lant Robinson testified that he did not get any closer to the lunch counter than the top of the stairs. (Tr. 97). 4. (Tr. 72). “ I asked them to leave and they said, ‘We don’t feel we ought to. Why should we?’ The questions varied and the answers varied from one to another, something like that.” 93 Act 226 should be construed and applied in accord ance with the maxim ejusdem generis. Where gen eral words follow a designation of particular sub jects, the meaning of the general words will be con strued to be restricted by the prior particular designation, 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, Sec. 249. As applied to Act 226, this principle requires that the general words be limited to the particular conduct and language described prior thereto, e. g.— “ Loud and offensive talk, the making of threats or at tempting to intimidate.” The words “ or any other conduct” must be interpreted to mean acts or con duct similar to that previously set out and in the cases at bar there was absolutely no such conduct or langauge on the part of any of the appellants which could support a conviction under Act 226. The evidence will not support a conviction of the appellants for the violation of Act 226 or Act 14 because there was no evidence of criminal in tent. The implied basis for prosecution is appar ently the theory that the appellants’ conduct was such as to cause “ a disturbance or breach of the peace or threatened breach of the peace.” These Acts must be construed to require proof of a speci fic criminal intent to provoke a breach of the peace where the conduct does not violate any of the pro hibited acts which are defined in the statutes. To 94 convict the appellants otherwise would violate their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. This action on the part of the State of Arkansas also abridges the appellants’ constitutional right to freedom of contract. Valle v. Stengel, 176 F. 2d 697 (C. A. 3, 1949). On the basis of the proof made it would be a denial of due process of law and the equal protec tion of the laws to convict the defendants, for such a conviction would rest upon no evidence of guilt or culpability and would constitute a discrimina tory administration of the criminal law. THOMP SON v. CITY OF LOUISVILLE,____U. S ._____, 4 L. ed. 2d 654 (1960); SCHWARE v. BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS, 353 U. S. 232; UNITED STATES ex rel V AIT AUER v. COMMISSION ER, 273 U. S. 103, 106; MOORE v. DEMPSEY, 261 U. S. 86, YICK WO v. HOPKINS, 118 U. S. 356, (1886). Compare: AKINS v. TEXAS, 325 U. S. 398, 402; TOT v. UNITED STATES, 319 U. S. 463, 473 (concurring opinion); MOONEY v. HOLOHAN, 294 U. S. 103. 95 iv. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANTS REQUESTED IN STRUCTIONS NUMBERS 3 and 5 IN THE LUPPER CASE. The appellants in the LUPPER case request ed that the following instructions be given to the jury and same were refused by the Court over the objections of the appellants. (Tr. 100). Defendant’s Instruction No. 3: “ You are instructed that if you find from the evidence that the conduct of other persons in the Blass Department store at the time complained of in this lawsuit was such as to tend to create a disturbance of the peace, or threaten a breach of the peace, but further find that the defendants did nothing more to create or bring about this conduct on the part of other persons other than by their presence at the lunch counter or in the restaurant and their request for service therein, then you should find the Defendants not guiltv as to Act 226. MR. BRANTON: Note the objections of the Defendants. THE COURT: Save his exceptions. Defendant’s Instruction No. 5: You are instructed as a matter of law that the Defendants had a legal right to enter the 96 Blass Department Store at the time of the in cident complained of in the information and that they had a right to enter the restaurant or go to the lunch counter in said store and to request service at said store and that the actions of the Defendants, or either of them, in seeking service at the said lunch counter or restaurant is not in of itself a violation of itself a violation o f any law. ME. BEAN TON : Note the objections of the Defendants. THE COUET: Save his exceptions. The Court erred in refusing to give the above instructions in that the content and matter dis cussed in these instructions were not covered by any other instructions given by the Court, and the requested instructions were applicable to the ap pellants’ theory o f the case. VAUGHN v. STATE 57 Ark. 1 20 S. W. 588. Further, the appellants had a right to have these instructions given to the jury because they were not inconsistent with the evidence, nor were they conflicting or argumen tative: JONES v. STATE, 89 Ark. 213, 116 S. W. 230; PRICE v. STATE, 114 Ark. 398, 170 S. W. 235. 97 V THE JUDGMENT WAS EXCESSIVE AND HARSH, The judgment of the Court was excessive and harsh in BRIGGS and it is apparent from the Court’s statement that there was passion and prej udice in the Court’s statement, “ The Court is giv ing to try to keep the peace in this town, do what he can to discourage the wilful and deliberate at tempts to stir up racial strife. The fines will be $500.00 and 60 days.” In HADLEY v. STATE, 117 SW 2d 352 this honorable Court held: “ Even if the law of the state does fix 21 years as a maxi mum penalty for larceny it was not the intention of the lawmaking body that such maximum should be invoked except as punishment for represensible conduct in aggravation of the particular act. Cruel and unusual punishments are prohibited by our Constitution.” There was nothing reprehensible in the acts of any of the defendants as the State’s witnesses testified repeatedly. The Court had apparently made up its mind before hearing the evidence in the SMITH case as reflected by a statement on page 40 of Transcript No. 4494, “ What I am trying to avoid here is seri 98 ous trouble. I don’t want a race riot if I can help it.” At this time there was no evidence before the Court upon which it could base this statement. Upon judgment against these defendants the Court made the statement, “ I am going to fine these de fendants the same as before, a fine of $500.00 and sixty days. I am trying to discourage this as much as I can.” “ Further, the Court erred in sentenc ing the defendant Melvin Jackson $500.00 and costs and six months, stating that “ he is the one who wouldn’t get up. At least that is the undis puted testimony before the Court.” The testimony of the manager o f the store, W. T. Mitchell, was that he didn’t request all o f the boys to leave and that he didn’t know which ones he did. It is apparent that the presumption of in nocence was not extended to this defendant. This honorable Court should under the power granted it by Arkansas Statutes 27-2144 reverse the decision in these cases, or in the alternative should reduce the fines and sentences assessed con siderably. The appellants are all college students, who have been caught up in one of the great moral issues of our times. The appellants were using the only means available to them to get a determina tion of their constitutional rights and to seek equal ity of treatment in business establishments. This 99 issue is one which has captured the attention of the major political parties of our nation, as evi denced by their respective political platforms, and our Courts should not permit the machinery of the State to be used in fostering private racial preju dices. CONCLUSION The appellants in each of the respective cases herein filed timely motions, both at the beginning of the trials and at the conclusion of the trials, to have Acts 14 and 226 of the Acts of 1959, of the General Assembly of Arkansas, declared uncon stitutional, and appellants filed other timely mo tions and objections to protect the errors complain ed of in the respective records, and it would un duly burden this Brief to set out each of the said motions or objections herein. WHEREFORE, the appellants respectfully pray that the judgments in each of the cases here in be reversed. Respectfully submitted, HAROLD B. ANDERSON and W ILEY A. BRANTON, Attorneys for Appellants