Briggs v. Arkansas Abstract and Brief for Appellants
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1960
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Briggs v. Arkansas Abstract and Brief for Appellants, 1960. 75ee5e6f-b69a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/64944974-b20e-4ad4-a09b-d4071c18b97d/briggs-v-arkansas-abstract-and-brief-for-appellants. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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IN T H E
S i m Court of Arkansas
CHESTER BRIGGS, ET A L ,................Appellants
vs. No. 4992
STATE OF A R K A N SA S,................. Appellee
Consolidated With
EUGENE D. SMITH, ET A L , Appellants
vs. No. 4994
STATE OF A R K A N SA S,......... ....... Appellee
Consolidated With
JAMES FRANK LUPPER, ET A L ,.. Appellants
vs. No. 4997
STATE OF A R K A N SA S,........... ............. Appellee
APPEAL FROM PULASKI COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT
* * *
HONORABLE WM. J. KIRBY
Judge
ABSTRACT AND BRIEF
FOR APPELLANTS
HAROLD B. ANDERSON and
W ILEY A. BRANTON,
Attorneys for Appellants
Of Counsel:
Thurgood Marshall, Esq.
James M. Nabrit, III, Esq.
ARK, BRIEF PRINTING C O ., PINE BLUFF, ARK.
I N D E X
Page
Statement............................................................... 1
Points To Be Relied U p on .................................... 5
Motions For New T ria ls ................ .... ......... 6
Abstract of Testim ony........................................ 10
CHESTER BRIGGS et al V. STATE,
No. 4992 .......................................................... 10
Testimony of Witnesses for State .......... . 10
Gene Smith, Chief of P olice .................... 10
Lt. H. J. T albert............................... 11
Capt. M aack............................................... 12
Capt. Albert H aynie.......................... ........ 13
Lt. D. M. C o x .................................................. 14
Capt. R. E. B rians............. ........................... 16
J. L. B ailey............................................ IT
Valetta C ates......................................... 19
Helen Holman .................................. 20
Johnny Rives ........................-.............. . 21
Testimony on Behalf of Appellants in Briggs .... 23
Frank James ................................... 23
Vernon Mott ................................. 27
Charles Parker .................................. 32
EUGENE D. SMITH et al V. State No. 4994 .. 36
Testimony of Witnesses for S tate ...................... 36
Paul T erre ll....................... 36
Ernest M. Phillips......................................... 42
Lt. H. J. Talbert............................................. 45
W. T. Mitchell .................................... 46
JAMES FRANK LUPPER et al V. State,
No. 4997 ......................................................... 49
Testimony on Behalf of State in Lupper........ 49
Capt. Paul T errell........................................ 49
H. J. T a lbert............................................... 52
A. F. B a e r .................................................... 54
Joseph Trianfonte........................................ 57
Henry L. H o lt .............................................. 59
Testimony on Behalf of Appellants.................. 63
Frank James Lupper ................................. 63
Thomas B. Robinson.................................... 67
Argum ent............................................................... 72
I. Acts 226 and 14 are Unconstitu
tional in that they deny the De
fendants due process and equal
protection of the L a w s ..................... 72
II. The Acts have been applied in an
Unconstitutional manner.................. 76
III. The Evidence was not Sufficient to
Sustain a Conviction......................... 91
IV. The Court erred in Refusing to
Give Defendants’ Requested In
structions Numbers 3 and 5 in the
Lupper C ase........................................ 95
V. The Judgment was Excessive and
H arsh .................................................. 97
Page
IN TH E
Supreme Court of Arkansas
CHESTER BRIGGS, ET A L ,..............Appellants
vs. No. 4992
STATE OF A R K A N SAS,.......................... Appellee
Consolidated With
EUGENE D. SMITH, ET A L ,..............Appellants
vs. No. 4994
STATE OF A R K A N SAS,.......................... Appellee
Consolidated With
JAMES FRANK LUPPER, ET AL, .. Appellants
vs. No. 4997
STATE OF AR K A N SAS,.......................... Appellee
APPEAL FROM PULASKI COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT
* * *
HONORABLE WM. J. KIRBY
Judge
ABSTRACT AND BRIEF
FOR APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
During the Spring of 1960, several Negro col
lege students were arrested in the City of Little
Rock, Arkansas, in connection with their partici
2
pation in a so-called lunch counter sit-in demon
stration. There were two separate cases in the
Pulaski Circuit Court concerning the alleged vio
lation of Act 226 of the Acts of 1959 of the Gen
eral Assembly of Arkansas, while a third case in
volved the alleged violation of Act 226 and also
Act 14 of the Acts o f 1959. Because of the fact
that all of the cases involved the question of the
constitutionality, application and sufficiency of
the evidence as applied to Acts 14 and Act 226 of
the Acts o f 1959, the Appellants filed a Motion in
the Supreme Court of Arkansas to consolidate the
three cases for briefing and argument, and same
was granted by this Court.
CHESTER BRIGGS, ET AL, V. STATE
NO. 4992
The appellants are five Negro college students,
who entered the F. W. Woolworth Company variety
store, and sat down at the lunch counter to request
food service. The policy of the store has always
been to serve only white persons at the lunch count
er. An anonymous phone call was made to the
Little Rock police, and the Chief of Police arrived
at the store, ordered the lunch counter closed and
ordered the appellants to leave the store. The ap
pellants refused to leave the store and were arrest
3
ed and charged with a violation of Act 226. Upon
a trial before the Court in the Pulaski Circuit
Court, the appellants were each fined the sum of
$500.00 and sentenced to sixty days in jail.
EUGENE D. SMITH, ET AL, No. 4994
In this case the six defendants entered the
Pfeifer’s Department Store in Little Rock, went to
several counters then sat down at the lunch count
er, seeking service. The manager requested some
of them to leave. All of them left. One took a
little longer than the rest. They were arrested by
Officer Terrell as they left the store and charged
with violation of Act 226 of 1959. Upon a trial
before the Court, the appellants were found guilty
and were each given a sentence o f a fine of $500.00
and sixty days in jail, except the appellant Melvin
T. Jackson, who was given a fine of $500.00 and
sentenced to six months in jail. (It is not clear
whether the appellant Jackson’s sentence was sub
sequently reduced to equal that of his co-defend
ants. On page 91 of the SMITH Transcript, the
Court indicated that his sentence would be $500.00
fine and six months, but the judgment of the Court
shown on page 16, assesses a fine of $500.00 and
sixty days imprisonment in each case.)
4
JAMES FRANK LUPPER, ET AL V. STATE
NO. 4997
The appellants Lupper and Thomas B. Robin
son entered the Gus Blass store. Lupper entered
the lunch room on the mezzanine floor and request
ed food service, and there is disputed testimony
that the appellant Robinson, did likewise. There
is disputed testimony to the effect that the man
ager requested that they leave the store, and upon
their failure to leave, the manager went across the
street and found a police officer, and as they re
turned to the store, they met the appellants on the
main floor while appellants were apparently leav
ing the store. The manager stated that he was
only gone two or three minutes in getting the
police officers. The appellants were each charged
with a violation of Act 226 and also Act 14 of the
Acts of 1959. These appellants requested and were
granted a jury trial, and were convicted in the Pu
laski Circuit Court for the violation of both Acts.
They were each assessed a fine of $500.00 and
given jail sentences of six months for the violation
of Act 226, and a fine of $500.00 and a sentence of
thirty days for the violation of Act 14.
5
POINTS TO BE RELIED UPON
FOR REVERSAL
I. ACTS 14 AND 226 OF THE ACTS OF
1959 ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN
THAT THEY DENY TO THE DE
FENDANTS DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
II. THE ACTS HAVE BEEN APPLIED IN
AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL MANNER.
III. THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFI
CIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION.
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO GIVE DEFENDANTS’ REQUEST
ED INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERS 3 AND
5 IN THE LUPPER CASE.
V. THE JUDGMENT WAS EXCESSIVE
AND HARSH.
6
IN THE
PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
FIRST DIVISION
STATE OF ARKANSAS
vs.
CHESTER BRIGGS, ET AL
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
The defendants alleged the following as
grounds for a new trial:
1. Because the Court erred in overruling the
defendants’ Motion to dismiss the charges filed
herein, at which action of the Court, defendants
saved their exceptions.
2. Because the findings and judgment of the
Court are contrary to the law.
3. Because the findings and judgment of the
Court are contrary to the evidence.
4. Because the findings and the judgment
of the Court are contrary to the law and the evi
dence.
WHEREFORE, defendants pray that the
findings and judgment of the Court be set aside,
that they be granted a new trial of this action.
7
IN THE
PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
FIRST DIVISION
STATE OF ARKANSAS
vs.
EUGENE D. SMITH, ET AL
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
The defendants alleged the following as
grounds for a new trial:
1. Because the Court erred in overruling the
defendants’ Motion to Dismiss which was filed
prior to the hearing of the evidence over the ex
ceptions of the defendants.
2. The Court erred in overruling defend
ants’ oral Motion to declare Act 226 unconstitu
tional for vagueness.
3. Because the Court erred in overruling de
fendants’ Motion for a direct verdict after the
State had rested.
4. Because the verdict was contrary to law.
5. Because the verdict was contrary to the
evidence.
6. Because the verdict is contrary to both
the law and the evidence.
8
7. Because the judgment is excessive.
WHEREFORE, defendants pray that the
judgmet heretofore entered in these cases be va
cated and that each of said defendants be granted
a new trial.
IN THE
PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
FIRST DIVISION
STATE OF ARKANSAS
vs.
FRANK JAMES LUPPER, ET AL
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
The defendants alleged the following as
as grounds for a new trial:
1. Because the Court erred in overruling the
defendants’ Motion to Dismiss which was filed
prior to the hearing of the evidence over the ex
ceptions of the defendants.
2. The Court erred in overruling defend
ants’ oral Motion to declare Act 226 unconstitu
tional for vagueness.
3. Because the Court erred in overruling de
fendants’ Motion for a direct verdict after the
State had rested.
9
4. Because the Court erred in overruling de
fendants’ Motion for a directed verdict after the
State and the defendants had rested.
5. Because the Court erred in giving to the
Jury the State’s requested Instructions No. 1 and
1-A over the objections and exceptions of the de
fendants.
6. Because the Court erred in giving to the
Jury the State’s requestion Instruction No. 2, over
the objections and exceptions of the Defendants.
7. Because the Court erred in giving to the
Jury the State’s requestion Instruction No. 3, over
the objections and exceptions of the Defendants.
8. Because the Court erred in giving to the
Jury the State’s requested Instruction No. 4, over
the objections and exceptions of the Defendants.
9. Because the Court erred in refusing to
give to the Jury the Defendants’ requested Instruc
tion No. 3, over the objections and exceptions of
the defendants.
10. Because the Court erred in refusing to
give to the Jury the defendants’ requested Instruc
tion No. 5, over the objections and exceptions of
the defendants.
11. Because the verdict was contrary to law.
10
12. Because the verdict was contrary to the
evidence.
13. Because the verdict was contrary to both
the law and the evidence.
14. Because the judgment is excessive.
WHEREFORE, defendants pray that the
judgment heretofore entered in this case be va
cated and that each of said defendants be granted
a new trial.
ABSTRACT OF TESTIMONY
CHESTER BRIGGS, ET AL
VS. NO. 4992
STATE OF ARKANSAS
GENE SMITH, Chief of Police, Little Rock
Police Department, witness for the State, testified
as follows: (Tr. 51-56)
On March 10,1960,1 went to Woolworth store
having been advised by Capt. Maack that there
was a sit-down strike at the lunch counter. Ac
companying me were Capt. Haynie and Lt. Cox.
Lt. Talbert was there when we arrived. Approxi
mately fifty Negroes were sitting at the lunch
counter which seated fifty-nine people. The Ne
11
groes were reading. I asked the Assistant Man
ager if he had asked them to leave. He said that
he did not have that authority. I asked him to
close the restaurant to everyone. The waitresses
removed the perishables. I told the individuals
sitting at the counter that the restaurant was
closed to everyone and for them to disperse in
order to keep down trouble. All but five left. They
were placed under arrest to get them to leave.
Quite a few people were congregated at the side
entrance of the store in front. People were lined
up three or four feet behind the stools. I was ad
vised that the management did not ask the defend
ants to leave the premises. The defendants did not
talk loud nor did they resist in any manner. I do
not know who placed the call to the police depart
ment.
LT. H. J. TALBERT, Little Rock Police De
partment, witness for the State, testified as fol
lows: (Tr. 56-66)
I was requested by the Radio man to go to
Woolworth’s. Immediately upon arrival, I saw
fifty Negroes seated at the lunch counter. One
white lady was seated about the middle. I asked
the white people who were standing there to move
back from the counter. Some of them were mad.
12
I pushed them from the aisles and back from the
front. I asked for the Manager and was advised
he was on the telephone calling long distance.
Chief Smith arrived and he took over. The crowd
was standing right behind the Negroes. The ten
sion among the whites was very high. Some of
them asked me what I was going to do. I heard
an officer ask the defendants to leave. All left but
five. The lunch counter was closed and no one
was being served. Defendants did not make any
.statement, nor were they loud or using abusive or
profane language. Did not threaten or intimidate
anyone.
CAPT. MAACK, Little Rock Police Depart
ment, witness for the State, testified as follows:
(Tr. 66-78)
I made an investigation at Woolworth’s store
on March 10, 1960, with reference to a complaint
that came to me from Mrs. Shemwell, who stated
that an unknown person had called and stated that
the sit-downers were there on strike. I accompa
nied Chief Smith, Capt. Brians and Lt. Cox. People
lined the counter and crowded the streets in front
and back of the store. The Chief talked to the
Assistant Manager. We advised everybody to
leave the counter. It was closed. Tension seemed
13
high. I talked to the defendant Mott and told him
three times that the counter was closed and if they
didn’t leave we would have to arrest them. He
told me to go ahead he wanted to be arrested. I
informed Chief Smith of this and he said all right,
we will just arrest the whole five. We did. On
leaving the store I placed my hand on Mott’s
shoulder in case he should run. He told me to
take my damn hands o ff of him. I did not notice
any loud, profane or vulgar language by oneone
except Mott. None of the defendants made any
threats.
CAPT. TALBERT HAYNIE, Little Rock Po
lice Department, witness for the State, testified as
follows: (Tr. 78-87)
On March 10, 1960, I assisted in the investi
gation at Wool worth’s with Chief Smith, Lt. Tal
bert, Capt. Brians and Sgt. McNeeley and others.
The five defendants were seated at the counter
with their backs to the counter. Chief Smith had
already given orders that the five were under ar
rest and we filed out with them. When we got to
the door, I made the remark, “ Better get hold of
their arms, they might run when they hit the side
walk.” Capt. Maack got Mott by the arms and
Mott said, “ Get your hands o ff m e!” Capt. Maack
14
told him him “ You are under arrest” and they put
him in the wagon. I know they were ordered to
leave the closed lunch counter. I did not observe
them refusing to do so. When Chief Smith order
ed, “ Let’s go” , they all got off the stools. I did not
hear the officers request them to leave before that
time. I did hear Mott say just what I have testi
fied to. The tension of the crowd was very high
when I arrived. The store was full of people. I
couldn’t guess how many. There were a lot of
people on the sidewalks at the front and at the side
doors. The officers had the aisle clear when I ar
rived there. I did not hear any profane language
or threats from the defendants to this group or
anybody at all. They did not resist arrest. I led
one of the defendants to the patrol wagon myself.
He gave me no trouble at all. I do not know who
placed the call to the police station. I did not talk
to the Assistant Manager at Woolworth’s. I have
not learned yet who placed the call to the station.
LT. D. M. COX, Little Rock Police Depart
ment, witness for the State, testified as follows:
(Tr. 87-94)
I went to Woolworth’s in Little Rock, Arkan
sas, to make an investigation on that date. It was
shortly before noon, accompanied by Capt. Brians
15
and Sgt. Shemwell. I observed approximately
forty Negroes sitting on the stools at the counter
at Woolworth’s. The white people were lined up
in the store at the rear o f them. There was an
aisle and the officers were there at that time hold
ing the crowd back, or the crowd gathered along
an aisle between them. It was more than a normal
crowd in the store. The demeanor attitude of this
crowd was very tense. Some were numbling
threats or they were mumbling, and the officers
were holding them back. I didn’t have to push
anyone back, but they were being held back some.
I estimated forty Negroes sat at the counter. I
heard Chief Smith tell them that the counter was
closed and all but five left. These five are present
today in Court. They did not leave the store. They
continued to read books and newspapers. Only
five were left at the counter. When we were tak
ing them to the patrol wagon, I heard Mott tell
Capt. Maack to take his hands o ff him. I also
heard him say he wanted to be arrested. We went
to Woolworth’s in a patrol wagon, parked it on
Fourth street across the street from Woolworth’s.
I heard one person in the crowd say that we will
do something about it, but there was mumbling to
the effect that they shouldn’t just stand there.
There was some whispering among the defend
16
ants— no loud talking between them and the crowd,
nor any threatening attitude toward the crowd.
On the way out of the store, Mott told the officer
to take his damn hands o ff him, but none of the
defendants said anything or did anything but sit
there. The defendants did not refuse to leave
when we told them they were under arrest.
CAPT. R. E. BRIANS, Little Rock Police
Department, witness for State, testified as follows:
(Tr. 95-105)
I made an investigation at Woolworth’s on
March 10, 1960. We received information that
there was a disturbance. There was people con
gregated inside the building. We pushed our way
through into the lunch counter. There were a
number of white people around the back door and
had the door virtually blocked. The situation was
very tense. There was considerable mumbling
among the white people. The colored people sit
ting at the counter were reading textbooks, news
papers. The colored people were asked to leave
and all left but five, and they were placed under
arrest. I heard Chief Smith when he told the peo
ple to leave, that the counter was closed. The situ
ation was in considerable turmoil. The white peo
ple was at the point of virtually coming to blows.
17
One person made the comment, “ Let’s have a
lynching party.” I did not notice the defendants
make any threatening remarks to anyone. I heard
no loud or profane language or violent noise. I
could see no resistance. So far as I could tell they
cooperated willingly with the police. No one struck
these defendants. I saw no clubs or weapons in
the group. It would have been impossible to iden
tify the man who indicated he wanted a lynching,
because the crowd was there. I didn’t mention
this lynching remark in Municipal Court because
I wasn’t asked that question.
J. L. BAILEY, Assistant Manager, Wool-
worth’s Store, witness for the State, testified as
follows: (Tr. 105-115)
I’m Assistant Manager of Woolworth’s store.
On March 10, 1960, I observed the police coming
in. I did not call them. The lunch counter was
closed when the police got there. I closed it. I
was instructed from my home office to do so. I
did so because Negroes came in and sat down.
The counter was closed to everyone. Charlene
Elliott, Helen Holman and Mildred Wright were
working there. I don’t know the exact number of
colored people that sat at the counter. I did not
ask them to leave. I observed the actions of the
18
police when they got there. They just came in and
stood around. I saw some colored people leave the
counter when the police came in. Five stayed. The
attitude of the other patrons toward the counter—
they seemed to be disturbed. The defendants en
tered during the regular serving hour. We don’t
have any policies regarding Negro patrons. We
will sell anything to anybody. We have a take-out
service for Negroes. I don’t know what percent
age of our business is composed of Negroes. We
do have Negro patrons. I don’t know the policy
of our lunch counter regarding service at the
counter for Negroes. Haven’t had that phase of
training yet. We don’t allow them to come in and
sit down with white folks. We had no facilities
for them to sit down at all. I didn’t call the police
department and don’t know who did. We tried to
find out, but we couldn’t. The counter wasn’t
closed when they took their seats, but I closed it.
I didn’t ask anyone to leave, nor did I request the
police department to do so. The Manager was out
of town and I was in charge at that time. I don’t
know who asked the defendants to leave, but I
didn’t. None of my employees did. I did not hear
any of the defendants use any loud noise or pro
fane language, or anybody saying anything. No
threats were made in my presence. The five just
19
went out with the police. After it was called to
my attention that these defendants and their as
sociates had taken seats at the counter, I called my
home office in St. Louis. I had been instructed
to do so. They told me to close the counter, which
I had already done. They sent a letter out to the
store to close the counter and call the home office.
Woolworth’s is a private corporation.
VALETTA CATES, Fountain Manager at
Woolworth’s witness for the State, testified as fol
lows: (Tr. 115-118)
I have worked at Woolworth’s for four years,
was working there on March 10, 1960. I was up
stairs in the store about noon on that date. I
wasn’t downstairs to observe any large number of
people come in and sit down. When I came down
stairs, I saw a bunch of colored people sitting at
the counter. I didn’t observe anyone of these pa
trons leave. Nor did I observe the police asking
anyone to leave the store. I testified in this case
in the lower court a month ago. I saw the police
talking to these Negroes sitting at the counter. I
don’t know what they were saying. I saw them
take some of them out, but I don’t know whether
they arrested them. There was a crowd up and
down all through the store there — just up and
20
down milling around — just kind of curious on
lookers.
HELEN HOLMAN, Waitress at Woolworth’s,
witness for the State, testified as follows:
I have worked at Woolworth’s about a year
and a half. Was working there on March 10,1960.
On that date, the colored boys came to the counter
and sat down. I guess about half o f the counter.
I had been instructed to leave the counter if they
came in. They came in about 11 :00 or 11:30. I
didn’t stay. I left. I couldn’t say if they occupied
about half of the stools, but they were seating
themselves as I left. There were some white peo
ple sitting there. I had been instructed to leave
the counter by Mrs. Cates. I left Mrs. Wright at
the counter. I did not close the counter, since I
did not have the authority. I don’t know that Mr.
Bailey closed it or not. I left before the police ar
rived. I didn’t call them. I didn’t say that my in
structions were to leave the counter if Negroes
came in. My manager told me to leave the count
er. I don’t remember if I testified in Municipal
Court on March 17th that I was instructed to leave
the counter if Negroes sat down. My manager had
not instructed me with reference to service of Ne
groes at that time. We do have a take-out counter
21
there to serve Negroes, but we don’t serve them
when they sit down. 1 am instructed to have the
take-out service. That is all we have. I have never
served Negroes at the counter. It would take spe
cial instruction from the manager for me to serve
Negroes at the counter.
JOHNNY RIVES, witness for the State, tes
tified as follows:
(Testified in Municipal Court and his testi
mony made a part of the record in Circuit
Court). (Tr. 50).
On March 10, 1960, about 11:30 I was sitting
on the second stool at the front door going in. A f
ter I finished my pie, I looked down the counter
and there were a number of Negroes sitting down.
There was one sitting by me. I got up and left. I
don’t know how many Negroes occupied stools
there, but there were quite a number. More than
half the stools were occupied. I didn’t call the po
lice. I don’t know who called them. I was there
when they were arrested. The police took stations
behind the occupants of the stools, then Chief
Smith came in and walked to the back— came back
up to the front of the store— told each one— not
everyone— but o ff and on— that the counter was
closed. Some got up and left by the front door and
22
back door. There were about half a dozen sitting
near the center of the store. They didn’t leave.
The police took them out the back door, after that
I don’t know. I didn’t hear any conversation be
tween the police and these five. I didn’t see the
police talking to them as they left. A crowd gath
ered after the police arrived in the store — you
know how curious — I had been there only long
enough to eat a piece of pie. There were waitresses
behind the counter and some other patrons sitting
at the counter. After the Negroes arrived and one
took a seat next to me, I got up and left the counter
and walked around behind the cosmetics counter
next to the lunch counter. I didn’t notice anything
going on behind the counter at that time. The girls
left from back of the counter. I noticed them walk
ing to the back of the store, after these defendants
and their associates took seats. I did not notice
them using loud, vulgar or abusive language. They
did not make threats to me nor did I hear them
make threats to anyone else. People wTere coming
in the store curious as to what was going on. I
visit Woolworth’s approximately three times a day,
six days a week. The lunch counter is generally
open during those hours. I did not observe the
waitresses serving anyone — either colored or
white.
23
PRANK JAMES, one of the defendants, tes
tified on his own behalf, as follows; (Tr. 128-144)
I am a student at Philander Smith College. I
am 21 years of age. I am in my third year of
college. I and the defendants here were in Wool-
worth store on March 10th of this year. I have
had occasion to visit Woolworth’s from two to
three times a w7eek since I have been in Philander
to purchase various articles. On March 10th some
where around eleven o’clock, Ledridge Davis, who
is one of the defendants and myself went into
Woolworth’s. He purchased a package of enve
lopes from the counter and then we went to the
lunch counter where we took seats. I had suffi
cient funds in my possession with which to make
purchases at the lunch counter, if I had been
served. The only thing that I did was to look over
the menu and the waitress didn’t approach me for
any request. I saw food out there on the counter,
on the steam table. There were other patrons sit
ting there, white and colored. There were white
people sitting at the counter. I think there was a
lady sitting to my right as I sat down and after
she finished her meal she left. She didn’t get up
until after she had completed her meal. The man
ager of the store did not approach me or ask me to
leave. None of the employees asked me to leave.
24
The first person to contact me in reference to leav
ing was, I think, Chief Smith and he was the only
one. I did not use any profane language or any
threats of any kind to anybody there in the store.
To my knowledge, none of the other Negroes who
were there with me used any profane language or
any threats. I didn’t notice very much of a crowd
in the way of noise because I was facing the count
er and if there was a crowd it was behind me and I
didn’t notice any disturbance until after the of
ficers arrived and began walking up and down the
aisle behind us. I didn’t hear any remarks until
after the officers arrived. I heard one lady, make
a statement like this, “ What are we going to do
now?” She was asking someone, I presume. I
did not make any threatening remarks or any
threatening conduct towards anybody in the rear.
I didn’t see Mott perform any unusual activity. I
didn’t hear Mott make any statements. I did not
hear him say anything. I think Whoever the of
ficer was that had me, we were in front of Mott
while we were proceeding outside. In my opinion,
during my three years at Philander and for my
self and the organizations that I represent, I have
made various purchases at Woolworth’s. This in
cludes the counter where they sell staples, staple
guns, etc., and school supplies there, etc., and I had
25
noticed the lunch counter and I had never seen any
Negroes sitting there, but it was in my opinion,
that since we were of the public and the doors were
open to the public that since we could purchase at
the counters where they sell these toilet articles,
that we should be permitted to sit at the lunch
counter. This was too a part of the store and if
the policy permitted us to purchase at one counter,
in my opinion, I didn’t see any reason why we
shouldn’t try to purchase at another counter.
I have been in Little Rock since I have been
attending school. I have frequently patronized
Woolworth’s to make purchases for the Junior
Class, the Panhelenic Council, for Alpha Phi Fra
ternity. I went there with another person. That
was Davis. I knew ahead of time I, with Davis,
was going to make a purchase and then go to the
lunch counter and ask for service there. I wouldn’t
say it was a scheme. I was not directed to do it
by anybody. The only meeting I would say was
the morning of the attempt as we were getting
ready to go down. The meeting was there in front
of the Student Union Building on the campus. No
one as I know of called that meeting together. I
don’t know how many were present. There were
more than five, I would say, and less than 100.
This discussion had arrived out of a general dis
26
cussion on the campus from association with fel
low students. This had been discussed, I supposed
among the students on the campus since February
when this first demonstration took place in North
Carolina. I and others on this campus discussed
doing the same thing in Little Rock. I don’t know
of any leader. I walked downtown. I assume the
others walked. There was no meeting where some
one directed me and advised me how to do it. I
have never been served at the lunch counter before,
but I had frequently been in the store. I had never
observed colored people sitting there and being
served. I didn’t know it wasn’t the custom then.
I had never seen it done before. I wasn’t told by
anyone what to do if the police came in there. I
expected to be arrested when the police told Mott
that if we didn’t leave that we would be arrested,
I was present when all of them left except me and
these other four defendants. I got up from where
I was sitting, when the police asked me to. As I
stated, I was quite a ways from Mott and some of
these other fellows and I walked down to where
they were, I had really anticipated on leaving at
that time, but then I decided that I wasn’t going
to leave if they weren’t going to leave. I am in the
third year in college. I heard the police ask me
to leave. I didn’t leave until I was told I was un
27
der arrest. I don’t recall hearing distinctly what
Mott said. I didn’t hear him say, “ I want to be
arrested” . While I was sitting at the counter, I
looked over the menu and I had my books in my
hand. I had a book as I have over there now. I
carried a book with me to the store. At the time
I left, I had planned to get back in time for class
I had a class that evening at 1:30. No one ever
approached me so I could place an order. The first
that I realized the counter was closed was when
Chief Smith told me the counter was closed, and
we would have to leave. I refused to leave until
he told me that I was under arrest. I left because
he told me I was under arrest and come go with
him to the paddy wagon or something.
VERNON MOTT, one of the defendants, tes
tified as follows: (Tr. 144-158)
My name is Vernon Mott. I am nineteen years
old, a member of Philander Smith College and am
currently in school at this time. I am in my First
year in Philander Smith College, a Freshman. On
March 10th I had occasion to visit Woolworth’s
store. I went to show the manager and the people
of Little Rock and State of Arkansas and of the
United State sthat we— I disapproved of the dual
service that he had in his store and if I was able
28
to buy one one side of the store I should be able to
buy on the other. I went to the lunch counter as a
patron there to show that, and sat down. I sat
down with my fellow students of Philander Smith
College, and the people that were sitting there be
fore I got there and they continued eating and the
lady that was sitting next to me, well, she finished
her food and she put her money on the table and
she left and all of a sudden I heard police sirens
and they came into the store and they asked some
people to leave the counter. They asked the white
people to leave first and then Chief Smith came in
and told us that the counter was closed and that
we would have to leave. Some fellow students got
up and left and I turned to leave and then I sat
back down. The counter was not closed at that
time to my knowledge. A waitress didn’t approach
me to serve me at any time. After I sat down again
I heard the police chief say that the counter was
closed, that I would have to leave or be arrested.
I don’t remember what officer it was, came to me
and he said the counter was closed, you have to
leave or be arrested and I said, “ Well, I guess I
have to be arrested.” I then left the store with the
police officer. As I left out of the store, leaving
the store, no one had their hands on us. We walk
ed out the door. As soon as I walked out the door
29
on the street, someone grabbed me by the seat of
the pants like he was putting something down the
back o f my pants and I turned around and I said,
“ Don’t put anything on me,” and that is the only
statement I made. I didn’t say “ Take your damn
hands o ff of me.” I said, “ Don’t put anything on
me.” I felt— in the other cities that these demon
strations have been going on, I had heard of people
putting things down in your pants, trying to put
weapons on you and put his hands on me of i f he
was putting something down in my pants. I was
afraid this might be occurring then. I felt I was
asserting my Constitutional right to be served in
a store when I took a seat at the counter. I was
not about to resist the officer in any way. While
sitting in the store, I didn’t make any threatening
gesture toward anyone. I wasn’t using any pro
fanity. I didn’t make any statement to anyone
other than the officer. Nobody in the crowd made
any threats toward me. I saw a crowd gathering
only after the police arrived. They came into the
store and started walking behind us and asked the
white people to leave the counter. The people that
were shopping there is about all was in the store
that day at that time. I didn’t see any kind of
crowd that seemed to be threatening.
I am in college as a first year student. Have
80
traded at Woolworth’s before, quite often, some
times two or three times a week. I have never sat
at the lunch counter before. I hadn’t observed
colored people sitting there before. I didn’t know
that wasn’t the custom then. I had not observed
them doing it. We don’t have a leader. There was
no meeting where I was instructed as to what to
do. It was just a volunteer t hing on my and other
student’s part. I got the idea from the students
demonstrations in North Carolina and other states.
I am not the leader of the group. I didn’t have a
meeting bef ore March 10 as to what I was going to
do and when. As I discussed to the students and
generally in groups they would be talking about
it. You would walk up to the fellows and they
would be talking about it. Nobody told me to do
this. I had discussed it since February. They are
picking on "Woolworth’s store all over the nation
to. This wasn’t a scheme to pick on stores in other
states. We didn’t pick on it. We sat down there
because they were sitting down in other states in
Woolworth’s. We selected stores where we trade.
We were not instructed or taught, nor encouraged
by the NAACP to do this, nor any of its officers.
No one seemed to be the leader among the stud
ents. I didn’t tell the officers I wanted to be ar
rested. I heard the officers say, “ The lunch count
31
er is closed.” The officers asked me to leave then.
I didn’t leave. I refused to leave, because I am an
American citizen and I didn’t feel I was breaking
any law. I just sat there I didn’t say that to the
officers. When I was sitting there people there
were just shopping in the store and after the police
arrived, the people seemed to be looking to see
what happened as far as I know. I sat down in the
store and looked at the menu and saw what I was
going to order. No one said anything to me. I
don’t know the exact number of us there. I walked
there with Chester Briggs. I know what I was go
ing to do when I got there. I went there in mind
to be served. I didn’t know that there was some
Acts o f our Legislature that made that against the
law. I went there in mind with Briggs knowing
that I was going to sit down at the lunch counter.
I don’t know how many were going to be there.
Other said they might go. I told the officer not to
put anything on me. I didn’t see the officer as I
stepped out the door. As I stepped out someone
grabbed me by the seat of my pants and I turned
around and said, “ Don’t put anything on me,” and
it was the officer. I meant by that I thought some
body was going to slip something on me. I wouldn’t
ordinarily go in a store with a weapon on me. I
was fearful that someone would put a weapon on
32
me because I have heard that this was going on in
other states, that they were putting things on
somebody. I read that in the newspapers. Not in
a meeting. I hadn’t been to any meeting. This was
not made a deliberate scheme. I might have seen
this in other instances or even from television I
was fearful that might be the result. I was seek
ing by peaceful means to persuade the manager of
the store that segregation is morally and legally
wrong. I didn’t anticipate disturbing the peace,
becoming violent or abusive or threatening in any
manner.
CHARLES PARKER, one of the defendants,
testified as follows: (Tr. 159-167)
My name is Charles Parker. I am a student
at Philander Smith College. I have been a student
at Philander Smith College for three years. I am
a Junior. I was present at Woolworth’s on March
10, 1960. Myself and a group of the other students
went to Woolworth’s to show the manager that we
were not in accord with his dual system of serving
us on one side of his store and refusing our service
on the other side of the store. While at Philander
I and other students at Philander have quite often
traded with Woolworth’s and we felt that we
should and we deserved to be served at the counter
SB
just as any other citizen of Arkansas of the United
States.
My purpose in going there was to peacefully
persuade the manager to treat me as he would his
other customers. I went and took a seat at the
counter. When I sat down, I sat next to some
white person and there was a large number of
white people, but who were eating when I sat down,
and they continued sitting down until the police
men arrived and told them they would have to
leave. At this time they hadn’t told the students
or the colored people to leave. They only told the
white people eating there to leave. Some of them
got up, but a man that was sitting next to me and
some other people finished eating what they had
been served and after they had finished they got
up and left. There was a waitress behind the
counter. She was doing something with some pies.
There was food on the counter. While sitting there
I looked over the menu, I was waiting to be served.
I didn’t at any time threaten anyone, or use any
profane language. Things were very quiet until
the policemen arrived with sirens blasting and a
lot of them came in. One officer, Officer Talbert,
came in and began pushing people. There were
some people who were objecting and there was a
group of people that was coming to the counter.
34
He pushed these people back and told them all to
move back. He kept going up and down the line
pushing and shoving. Some of the students who
got up from the counter remained on the scene
looking on and there was another group of people
that came in to see what the officers were doing
when they arrived. The officers didn’t say any
thing to me directly. It was my purpose to assert
what I considered to be a normal Constitutional
right. After we had been placed under arrest, we
were walking through the store out the side door.
None of the officers had taken a hold of us at that
time. Immediately after we walked out of the
store we were crossing the street. The officer that
was behind Mott — I was directly behind Mott,
grabbed Mott by the seat of his pants and Mott
said, “ Don’t put anything in my pants.” The man
ner in which the officer grabbed Mott, well, he had
Mott by his back pocket and I was supposing Mott
thought he was going to put something in his pock
et as he said. I saw him put his hands in his back
pocket. One officer said, “ You had better grab
him. He might run.” Mott said, “ Don’t put any
thing in my pocket.”
35
CROSS EXAMINATION
I have never been arrested, convicted of any
thing. I haven’t demonstrated, participated in any
sit-downs before this occurrence and I have not
participated in any sit-downs after this occurrence.
I would say that there wasn’t any leader. This is
more or less a spontaneous reaction by all students
being as how each of us had an obligation as citi
zens to try to get the rights that we deserve. We
hadn’t planned to do this at any time before March
10. There had been general discussion of this whole
problem of segregation before this sit-down demo-
stration in North Carolina, February and after.
I had only discussed this on campus. Since I am
not familiar with many places that are o ff campus,
most of my activities are confined to the campus.
It was strictly a student movement. I walked to
the store with Frank James. I didn’t go to demo-
strate I went to show the manager that I did not
like his policy of dual service. I had never seen
another Negro being served at his counter. Ap
proximately 30 of us sat down there. Everyone
left when the police asked them to leave except the
men that are here as defendants. There was no
type of agreement that all would leave except that
five. I did not know there was any law asserting
that we could not remain at the counter or we
would be punished if we did not leave, I heard the
police ask up to leave.
EUGENE D. SMITH, ET AL
vs. No. 4994
STATE OF ARKANSAS
PAUL TERRELL, Little Rock Police Depart
ment, witness for the State, testified as follows:
(Tr. 44-58)
Was working on April 18, 1960. On that
date, I made an investigation of an alleged act at
Pfeifers Store on Main Street in Little Rock, A r
kansas. Officer Talbert and Officer Phillips were
with me. We observed some Negro boys walking
the street in groups and noticed a lot of people fol
lowing them. We noticed them go into Pfeifer’s
Department Store, and I went in the store and the
lunch counter. Mr. Mitchell, manager of the lunch
counter and Officer Phillips were talking. I walk
ed over and talked to them at the lunch counter.
Six boys came in the store at different intervals
and walked around over the store looking at dif
ferent things, didn’t make a purchase as I saw.
They went to different departments. All came in
about the same time and began taking places at the
lunch counter at Pfeifer’s. They took different
37
intervals about the lunch counter. I was in civilian
clothes. One walked in and made a point to sit
between white ladies and Mr. Mitchell walked in
by him and asked them or told them “ at the pres
ent time we are not equipped to serve colored peo
ple” and asked them if they would please leave.
All left except, I believe him name is Jackson— the
boy with the gray suit on. He refused to leave.
He was sitting there with him hands up in the air
talking— he wanted to be served. There was quite
a commotion. I walked over and identified myself
as a police officer and told him he was under ar
rest and asked him if he would go with us and he
did. We taken him out and there was quite a com
motion there among the white people. I have their
names: Sammy J. Baker, Melvin T. Jackson, Win
ston Jones, McLloyd Buckannan, William Rogers,
Jr., Eugene D. Smith. We took these six defend
ants into custody. Officer Phillips went out when
he saw the commotion he went out with Lt. Talbert
and came in the door and met me at the lunch
counter and taken them in custody and brought
them to headquarters. I consulted another officer
and secured a warrant from the Prosecuting At
torney’s office. They were placed under charge of
Act 226, 1959. The defendants said they were
students of Philander Smith College. All lived at
38
Philander Smith, I think, except two. In addition
to Act 226 of 1959,1 secured a warrant on Melvin
T. Jackson on Act 14. It was about 11 :30 and the
lunch counter was quite crowded. They had sev
eral vacant seats. The lunch counter is more or less
in a horse shoe shape there and a number of peo
ple, mostly ladies, eating. I would say 25 of them
got up and left the place and walked back to see
what was going on. Some of them even left the
store. A lot of people gathered up, fifty or sixty
people gathered in to ask questions. Some were a
little bit angry. We took the boys out as soon as
possible without creating any trouble.
When I first saw the defendants, they were
going in the store. That is what caused me to go
into the store. We had some previous trouble and
were observing them at that time. Had no prior
arrangement or agreement with the manager o f
Pfeifer’s to come into the store when I saw the
Negro students come in the store. I observed these
students when they sat down in the store. They
were at the counter. Best I remember, the counter
is arranged more or less like a horseshoe. In other
words, comes out in a circle and dips back more or
less “ S” shaped. I do not know how many seats
or stools are there. Students were all together
when they came into the store. They split up after
39
they got in the store, walked by different places,
walked by the counters different places and looked
at things, didn’t ask questions whatever about buy
ing anything. They had split up different inter
vals. I am not too familiar with the store. They
were on the lower floor. They scattered out. I
can’t say what department. Am not too familiar.
I would say they covered around forty feet, differ
ent aisles, around the store. I watched them. They
didn’t make any purchases while in there. They
didn’t have anything when we arrested them. They
weren’t in there long enough to buy anything.
Melvin Jackson sat between two white ladies. He
made it a point to sit there because he passed sev
eral vacant seats which he could have set down on,
maybe two or three. I don’t know that all the de
fendants made a point to sit where they did sit.
They were picking different places. They were
walking around the counter and passed up some
places where there was vacant seats in order to sit
down by somebody. Some of the other defendants
sat by someone. I ’m not trying to arouse racial
prejudice by pointing out he made a point of sit
ting between two white ladies. He is the one who
refused to leave when Mr. Mitchell, manager of
the lunch counter, asked him to leave. I heard the
manager ask him to leave. He asked them in a
40
loud voice. He went to each one. I was walking
behind him, probably three feet. Some of them
were more or less together, maybe two or three to
gether. Then he would ask them or tell them “ At
this time we are not equipped to serve colored peo
ple” and asked them if they would please leave the
store, and they got up without any trouble. As
far as I know he got around to all of them. No
other colored persons seated at the counter, as I
know of. I am sure I would have seen them if they
had been there. I didn’t hear defendants saying
anything. When they sat down he walked over.
I wasn’t talking to them myself. Mr. Mitchell was
talking to them and asked them to leave. As far
as what they said I did not hear them say any
thing. They sat down at the lunch counter in my
presence is why I made the arrest. Except Mel
vin Jackson. As far as I could tell they weren’t
carrying on any loud talk, I could hear no offen
sive talk. I could not see that they appeared to be
intimidating anyone other than their presence
which caused quite a disturbance among the peo
ple eating. I made the arrest solely on my own
and not at the request of anyone. The defendants
were sitting at the lunch counter, is why I made
the arrest. That is all. All left when the manager
told them to leave except Jackson. I arrested the
41
other defendants because they had taken seats at
the lunch counter. According to the law, if a Ne
gro sat down at a lunch counter, he was guilty of
some crime. I would have arrested a white person
if he had sat down and caused a commotion. They
caused a commotion because they sat down and
about 26 different people pushed their plates back
and got up and left the lunch counter and began
talking. Only thing these defendants did in my
presence was to go in there and sit down. To me
they weren’t discourteous. They were to the peo
ple who got up and left only by sitting there. They
left immediately when requested to do so by the
manager. Jackson did not. He was talking to
himself “ I want to be served” “ I want to be serv
ed” . You could hear him seven or eight feet away.
I would say he remained there two or three min
utes. It was the time I had talked to the others
and asked them to come over there then I walked
over and identified myself to Jackson and he got
up and left when I asked him to. Mr. Mitchell was
the first one to ask him to leave. Mr. Mitchell had
on a white uniform, white shoes, white trousers.
I coudn’t say he did or didn’t identify himself. I
identified myself. The defendant left when I iden
tified myself and asked him to leave. Mr. Mitchell
had on a white uniform. He told them “ at the
42
present we are not equipped to serve colored peo
ple, will you please leave.” Numerous people got
up and left. There was a reaction from other pa
trons in the store and they came forward. They
wanted to know what we were going to do, and I
said “ just step back there.”
ERNEST M. PHILLIPS, Little Rock Police
Department, witness for State, testified as follows:
(Tr. 60-68)
Was working on the 13th of April, 1960. On
that date, I had occasion to assist in investigating
alleged offenses at Pfeifer’s main store at 6th &
Main in Little Rpck. Around eleven thirty or just
before, the man told me “you better go to Pfeifer’s,
it looks like trouble— I went over to Pfeifer’s these
boys were milling around in there. It wasn’t long
until Lieutenant or Captain Terrell came in. They
made the sit-down and I went over there to pre
vent trouble and wrhen they set down Captain Ter
rell said “go out and get— He is my commanding
officer” . I went out and got Lieutenant Talbert
and brought him in there and as I was coming in
Captain Terrell had them marching out, took them
out there on the sidewalk and then took them to
headquarters. I saw two sit down but I don’t
recognize but one of them today. This fellow Jack
43
son. He seemed to be the head man in the bunch.
He walked up to the counter and somebody got up.
I didn’t see but two sit down. There were several
about the lunch counter. I can’t identify any of
the others I saw sit down. I didn’t hear them talk
ing among themselves. When I went in frist they
were just milling around. Captain Terrell sent me
out for Talbert. I mean by ‘ ‘milling around” , walk
ing around different places, looking at different
places. Didn’t see them buy anything. When they
first came in they kind of stopped and had a talk.
Looked like four or five of them together when
they first came in. No one in particular seemed
to be doing the talking. They broke up and went
in different directions. Took a seat at the counter
just a few minutes later. The two I saw, one sit
down like here and the other one here. They were
a dozen seats apart. Jackson set down right at the
horseshoe and the other one went to the end of the
horseshoe. I wasn’t present when Captain Terrell
talked to them or Mitchell. Saw the defendants
when they went in the store. Saw two sit down.
They were scattered about the counter there. They
were not sitting down. I was there when they left.
Helped take them away. Captain Terrell had them
up bringing them out. I don’t know whether Cap
tain Terrell said anything to them. I wasn’t in
44
there when he was talking to them. He told me to
go get Lieutenant Talbert. I guess there were a
hundred stools on the two counters— swivel chairs.
All of them had backs. I ’m positive about that.
Have been a police officer about 25 years. Have
made numerous investigations as a police officer.
Arrival o f police officers at scene of an investiga
tion does not create a lot of curiosity and anxiety.
For one thing officers are supposed to keep the
peace. Most times a crowd gathers pretty much
any place the police are making an investigation.
I didn’t hear these boys carry on any loud talking.
They didn’t say anything. I didn’t see them do
anything I felt they should not have done other
than sitting down at the counter. All I saw they
just sat down at the counter. I was carrying out
orders when I assisted in the arrest. If these had
been white students sitting at the counter, and
they had created a disturbance, I would have made
the arrest. I saw two sitting at the counter. That
is the only thing they did to create a disturbance.
They violated the law, for a Negro to sit down at
a white counter. All I saw was the Negroes sit
ting down at the counter. I am 64. I don’t have
a regular beat. I have worked on Main Street sev
eral years. Have gone in and out of stores watch
ing crowds in stores over a period of years. The
45
patrons or crowd at Pfeifer’s seemed to be excited
when they were in there. They were expecting
trouble.
LIEUTENANT H. J. TALBERT, Little Rock
Police Department, witness for the State, testified
as follows: (Tr. 70-75)
Was working on April 13, 1960, and assisted
in the investigation of an alleged offense at 6th &
Main at Pfeifer’s store. The officers with we were
Phillips and Terrell. I pulled over to the curb at
6th & Main and parked. Officer Terrell got out
o f the car and went in the store and in a few min
utes Officer Phillips came out of the store. After
he came out, I got out of the car and went in the
store at his command. I saw Officer Terrell in
the store. When I walked in the front door and
started down the aisle. I met Officer Terrell and
six Negroes coming down the aisle. Five of them
there are in the court room today. I now know the
names of the defendants. I took the Negroes out
the front door and stood there and called the patrol
wagon. I sent them to Police headquarters. The
patrons in the store were milling around crowding
up and talking and asking questions. I had been
in the store where the arrests were made before.
The behavior of the crowd was out of the ordinary
46
that is why I took them out to the front to get them
away from other people. I did not go in the store
at first when Captain Terrell went in. Saw noth
ing that went on until Captain Terrell sent for me.
Don’t know anything about what happened in
there only after I got there and met him. At the
time I knew nothing at all. I was present in Mu
nicipal Court when they had a previous trial. It
was my testimony at that time that these people
were just standing on tip toes to see what was go
ing on. I observed the demeanor and attitude of
the crowd. I asked the crowd to stand back so I
could take the boys out of the store. I found that
necessary. I testified I took the boys out in Mu
nicipal Court. I testified I took the boys out and
the crowd was on tip toes trying to see what was
going on and I told them to get back. I don’t re
member that I made a statement in Municipal
Court I told them to get back.
W. T. MITCHELL, Manager of Pfeifer’s de
partment store, Little Rock, Arkansas, witness for
State, testified as follows: (Tr. 77-84)
I am Manager of P feifer’s Department store,
a business place in Little Rock. It is open to busi
ness and also was open to business on April 13,
1960. On that date, I observed the police appearing
47
there. Something happened to attract my atten
tion before the police got there. Well, there were
a few boys — these hoys here — they came in, but
they were not together. They were separated and
I guess they were to meet one another. I don’t
know. That is not for me to say. And they came
in and they stood around the card counter and
went back out, around the card counter. And they
left and in the meantime, Officer Phillips came in,
and I was talking to him and this Officer over here
— Officer Terrell came in and I was talking to
them and I went to use the phone, and while I was
using the phone these fellows came in. I’m talking
of the defendants. They sat down at various places
■— at the lunch counter. I am in charge and the
Manager. And as soon as I got o ff the phone they
all had not sat down when I got o ff the phone.
I went back, however, for my girls to close the
counter down. At that time a man jerked two of
these boys back before they got to sit down. I
don’t know the man. I didn’t get the man’s name.
He is not in the court. I don’t think I know his
name. I had never seen the man before. They
were not sitting. And I walked over to— well— one
of these— one or two of these fellows. I don’t re
member which ones. And I told them at that time
we are not equipped to serve them, and would they
48
leave. Most of them, I think, got up. There was
only one I see that sat there a little longer. I do
not know his name. Actually, I couldn’t identify
him this morning as to which one he was. The
police were— and they were talking then— begin
ning to take them out and things happened rather
— a little fast and I was unaccustomed to it and I
couldn’t tell you which ones they were. The best
I can remember all of them left except one. The
best I can remember all of them left except one,
when I asked them to leave. This had occurred in
my store before. When this happened it was at
our lunch hour, our noon hour rush; we were quite
busy and we do have a large crowd. Actually, I
was too busy to say what was the reaction as to the
attitude of the crowd. I didn’t point out the boy
to the officers who wouldn’t get up. I didn’t re
quest all of them to leave. I didn’t get around to
all of them. I don’t know which one refused to
leave. I couldn’t tell you one of these boys from
the other who sat down there. They weren’t dis
orderly in any manner. Were not loud. Were not
boisterous. Were not discourteous. Did not threat
en anybody. Didn’t try to intimidate me. Could
stop my business. Actually, the problem is this,
the fact that Negroes were at a white lunch count
er. Otherwise their demeanor was all right, as far
49
as I know. My lunch hour is from eleven until
one— until two. This happened around a quarter
of twelve. I have a larger crowd from eleven until
two o’clock than any other part of the day, ordi
narily.
JAMES FRANK LUPPER and
THOMAS B. ROBINSON
vs. No. 4997
STATE OF ARKANSAS
CAPTAIN PAUL TERRELL, Little Rock Po
lice Department, witness for the State, testified as
follows: (Tr. 83-42)
On April 13, 1960, we, Lt. Talbert, myself,
Officer Baer and Officer Thomas were at 4th &
Main, in front of Worthen Bank. It’s about 12
noon. Mr. Holt and Mr. Trianfonte came over
and identified themselves as being the manager
and assistant manager of Blass’ Department store
said they had some colored boys. They asked us if
we would assist them. We went over to Blass’ De
partment store and when we got inside the store,
just about 20 feet from the elevator, we observed
two Negro boys that they pointed out to us and
said they were the ones that had sat. It was in the
presence and hearing of the defendants. They
50
pointed out there two boys, said they were the ones
that— Thomas B. Robinson and Frank James Lup-
per. I asked them, or they said they were the ones
that had been in their lunch counter and sat down.
I asked Robinson in the presence of all o f us, Lieu
tenant Talbert, Mr. Trianfonte, Mr. Holt and my
self, if they were the ones that was at the lunch
counter. Robinson spoke up and said he was. Also
Lupper said he was also present and we arrested
them, brought them both to headquarters. Actual
ly their statement was made in the presence of
Lieutenant Talbert and m self, Mr. Holt. The
lunch counter there is upon the mezzanine floor,
the second floor. This conversation in their pres
ence was directly underneath the lunch counter.
They stated to me that they had sat at the lunch
counter. They stated to me that they had been
asked to leave. They stated to me that they had re
fused to leave. As to the demeanor of the patrons
in the store at the time I was talking to them, as
far as the lunch counter, I couldn’t say, but there
were several white people that followed them and
ganged up around us while we were talking to
them. There as sereval people walked up there
and asked what we were going to do, wanted to
know what was going on, you know, and so forth.
They asked several questions. I was in Municipal
51
Court when this case was tried. I ’m sure I testi
fied to all of that I said here. I don’t remember
just what I did testify there that they had ganged
up, that anybody had to be restrained. Lieutenant
Talbert was. with me. These boys were coming
out of the store, but they were orderly. Had no
reason to arrest them, except from the complaint
of the manager. He requested us to arrest them.
He had requested our assistance to get them out
from the lunch counter when he came over to get
us. He told us that he had two boys that had re
fused to leave the lunch counter and asked that we
assist them. I do not know that they did any of
these things except their word. They said they had
been up there and they had been asked to leave and
refused to leave. I ’m sure Officer Talbert was
standing near me. He was I think close enough to
have heard it. I would think he could have heard
what I heard. I couldn’t say whether he could hear
exactly what I did. I was talking to them. May
be he was talking to some of them. I couldn’t say
just exactly what he heard and what he didn’t. I
talked to both boys, asked both of them had they
been at the lunch counter and they said they had.
I asked each one individually. I asked them were
they the ones at the lunch counter and had Mr.
Holt asked them to leave. They said yes, that they
52
wanted to be served. They said they had been ask
ed to leave. They told me they had been asked to
leave. The time was twelve noon. There was a
large crowd in the store. I believe there was some
thing, I forget what it was, but anyway there was
a large crowd down town that day. I didn’t say
the defendants were leaving the store when I met
them, but they were leaving towards the elevator.
They were about halfway from here to you or may
be a little further from the elevator, but the ele
vator is in the center of the store. There was a
large crowd in there. They were coming from the
elevator which would have been going south from
the elevator. I couldn’t say going toward the south
entrance. There is an aisleway there. I couldn’t
say that they were going out of the store. There
were several aisles there. They could have been
going any direction.
H. J. TALBERT, Little Rock, Police Depart
ment, witness for the State, testified as follows:
(Tr. 43-49)
I assisted in the investigation at Blass’ De
partment store in Little Rock on April 13th. Two
men come running across the street on the corner
in front of the Worthen Bank. They told us they
were managers of the department store. We went
53
in the store, Captain Terrell and I. I observed two
Negroes coming down the aisle in the store, was
pointed out to me. The two men who complained
were with me at that time. These two boys on my
right, the two defendants pointed out to me are in
the court room today. I don’t recall their names.
We had had 12 or 15 that day. It was on the
ground floor. Captain Terrell and I both talked
to them. I asked the big boy there if he had been
sitting at the lunch counter and he said he did. I
asked him if he was asked to leave. He said that
he was. He said he refused to leave. I did not
question the other one as to whether he had re
fused to leave. It was between 11:45 and 12:00
o’clock. I would say, there was over a normal
crowd, a large crowd of people. I didn’t notice the
demeanor of the patrons of the store at that time.
I was present in Municipal Court. Captain Ter
rell talked to the boys and asked them if they were
at the lunch counter. They said they were. He
asked them if they refused to leave. One of them
said he did. The other one denied it to me. This
one here said he refused to leave. I believe this is
the one, this is Robinson. This big boy Lupper
reared up and pointed his finger at Mr. Holt and
said he did not refuse to leave. We put them un
der arrest and took them out of the store. That
54
was my testimony in Municipal Court, I think. I
don’t remember. I testified to what I had done.
I did not testify that both of these boys told me
that. That is not my testimony this morning. One
of them, Robinson said he refused. That one of
them is the one I talked to. We was altogether,
the two men, the two Negroes and Captain Terrell
was all standing in one bunch, and I could hear
what was going on and what was said. This big
boy is the one that said he refused to leave. We
was all standing there together, the two store
managers. As far as I knew and from what I ob
served these boys had done nothing for me to ar
rest them, only on what the men said. Just what
the manager said. They was coming down the aisle
when we stopped them. They weren’t bothering
anybody or weren’t molesting anybody. Weren’t
loud and boisterous. Their conduct wasn’t threat
ening to disturb the peace in any manner when we
stopped them. The big fat man on this end told
me he sat at the lunch counter and refused to leave.
A. F. BAER, Little Rock Police Department,
witness for the State, testified as follows; (Tr.
49-57)
I had occasion on April 13, 1960 with other
officers to make an investigation of an alleged of
55
fense at Blass’ Department Store in Little Rock.
I was with Lieutenant Talbert and Captain Ter
rell. I was working that beat at the particular
time. I observed that there was a group of Ne
groes that proceeded in the store that some went
in the front door and some went in the 4th Street
side and I knew that they were these sit-downers
they have been called because most of them had
their badges on and I followed them in and ob
served them sitting down upstairs. Robinson was
in the group of Negroes. I had seen him once or
twice before. I had come to recognize him, on ac
count o f his glasses and his build. He is the heavy
set on the right. I proceeded down and called head
quarters and advised them. They sent the Lieu
tenant and the Captain down there, talked to Mr.
Trianfonte of the Blass store. He advised us of
the situation there. We went into the store, walk
ed up to Lupper and Robinson. They admitted to
us that they had been upstairs and sat down and
that they were the two that had refused to leave.
When I observed these two defendants, I was up
stairs, in the eating place, the lunch counter, what
ever it is called. I would say between 12, 15, may
be more were sitting there or sat down there. I
am not sure. I wasn’t present when any person
working for the store approached and conversed
56
with them. When I came back outside from using
the phone and the wagon had driven up and sever
al police cars, they were beginning to come out. I
didn’t talk to any of them while they were sitting
at the lunch counter. I talked to the store em
ployee. I don’t know his name and he advised he
was waiting for the manager at the time. I didn’t
talk to the defendants other than advised them
they were under arrest after the Lieutenant and
Captain was talking. We were all three together
there at the same time. I wasn’t there when they*-
requested them to leave. They advised us. I was
present when the Lieutenant and the Captain had
any conversation with them. I was present when
the other officers questioned them. They both ad
mitted that they had been up to the lunch counter
and they were asked then if they had refused to
leave and they both said that they had. When
Captain Terrell and Lieutenant Talbert first made
contact with the defendants, I was standing— we
were all five right to— well, there was six of us
counting the employees standing there, plus there’s
quite a crowd of people there. We were altogether.
Judge, maybe 25-foot from the elevator, maybe a
little farther than that. It was kind of in the
middle of the main floor. This was on the first
floor. As near as I can recall, I believe the defend
57
ants were just standing there when we walked up
to them. They were just standing at the— there
was some going and coming. These two happened
to be just standing there, I believe. As near as I
can recall I believe they were. I am not positive
though. They could have been moving toward the
door. I am not sure. I ’m positive that both of
these defendants admitted that they had refused
to leave. They asked each one as near as I recall.
I was there in the presence of Captain Terrell and
Officer Talbert. I heard everything that was said
to the defendants. I was standing right there at
their elbow. I cannot explain the inconsistency of
the statement of one of the witnesses who preceded
me in stating that one of these defendants denied
that he refused to leave. I am positive about my
testimony. Both defendants stated they refused
to leave.
JOSEPH TRIANFONTE, Assistant Store
Superintendent, Blass Company, witness for the
State, testified as follows: (Tr. 57-63)
I am Assistant Store Superintendent at the
Blass Company, I have been there approximately
about four and half years, in a supervisory capac
ity. The lunch counter is under the supervision of
the Store Superintendent or his assistant when the
58
Store Superintendent is not there. I have some
supervisory power over the lunch counter myself,
also the Store Superintendent, and we have a
luncheon Manager. Mr. Holt has complete author
ity there. I was in the store on April 18, 1960. 1
was sitting in my office, and I received a call that
we had guests up in the dining room. My office is
in the basement. The lunch counter is on the mez
zanine, the main part of the store, the floor above
the first floor. I went up there. I observed a
group of these boys, students sitting at the lunch
counter, also at scattered tables in the forepart o f
the lunch room. They weren’t wearing any sort
of sign on themselves, they were very neatly dress
ed. I would say approximately six or seven were
sitting at the lunch counter, I didn’t count them.
It isn’t any of these boys here. Well, I suggested
that we are not prepared to serve you at this time
and will you kindly excuse yourself and he did not
leave. He insisted that every Blass customer must
be satisfied. That is our slogan and we try to live
up to it. I couldn’t say whether this conversation
was with this other boy in the presence of the two
defendants. This boy came in late, the big boy
here. I don’t know this boy’s name here, the small
er of the two. I don’t recall him, but the other
fellow here, I recall when he came in. I did not
59
speak to either of these two boys. I did not see
either or both of these two defendants in the store.
I saw this fellow here on the outside. The larger
boy. He just came up to the counter and sat down
and went into conversation with the other group
of boys. I didn’t discuss anything with him my
self. No one came in and assisted me. Mr. Holt
was speaking to one group of boys. I got up from
one counter to the table and requested the boys to
leave. I can’t say I requested this defendant whom
I recognized to leave. I didn’t talk to him. I don’t
know why he came in late. After speaking to the
boys individually, and again I requested them to
leave, they refused, so we just turned around and
went out and spoke to Mr. Holt. I went out and
just went on the corner and I went over there and
notified the police that I had guests that would
not leave. The police came with me, they preceded
me. I didn’t observe anything else after I got back
in the store with the police. I went in at the Main
street door. The police went in the Fourth Street
door and I noticed that they stopped some boys and
I didn’t know who they were.
HENRY L. HOLT, Store Manager, Gus Blass
Store, Little Rock, witness for the State, testified
as follows: (Tr. 63-73)
60
I am Store Manager and was on April 13,
1960. I was in the store at that time. It is my
understanding that the Blass Department Store is
a private corporation. Something happened to at
tract my attention and I went and asked for assist
ance from the police. I have supervisory and man
ager’s powers of the store — includes the lunch
counter. I went to the balcony lunch room during
the lunch hour and observed there were five Ne
gro boys sitting in the lunch room. Three of them
at the counter and two of them at tables. I told
each one of them in turn that I didn’t want any
disturbance, but I did ask them to leave. They
didn’t want to leave, refused to leave and wanted
to argue with me about whether they should leave
and I refused to argue with them and just told
them. Of the five I observed, I see these two de
fendants in the court room today. Then after ask
ing them to leave and their refusing to leave, I
left the store to look for assistance and having
them removed. I went across the street, in front
o f the Worthen Bank and found a police officer
and told him that I had asked these people to leave
and they had refused to do so and he came back
with me and found them still there. These two
defendants were in the store when I came back. I
observed Captain Terrell and Lieutenant Talbert
61
talking to them. He accompanied me back, as a
matter of fact. I identified them. I did ask these
two defendants whom I recognize as being two of
five to leave and they refused to do it. I was gone
about two or three minutes, I guess, perhaps five,
when I left to go get the officers until I came back.
It was in the lunch period. I would say somewhere
between 11:30 and 12:00 roughly. I am not sure
of the exact time it was. My busiest hour or time
of day in that store is from eleven to two. There
were a number of people in the tea room when I
arrived there who were all o f them apparently
very interested, perhaps concerned with what was
going on and what would happen. During the time
that I was there talking to them and asked them
to leave no one came in the tea room. Normally I
would have expected a good many people. That is
my busiest time. These boys were quiet. They
weren’t boisterous at all— not disrespectful. I ’m
sure I talked with these two defendants here. It
might have been Mr. Trianfonte who called me.
I got the phone call. I don’t recall who it was that
phoned. The phone call informed me that the boys
were sitting in the restaurant. I saw five boys
sitting there when I was there. They were sitting
there when I came into the room. I didn’t see an
other one enter the room. I wasn’t in a position
62
where I could have observed it. They were on my
right when I went down the row taking each one
in turn and asked him to leave and after I had
finished the conversation with each of the boys
that were at the counter I turned and there were
several boys at the tables and I talked to them.
Now, I can’t say what was going on behind my
back. I can’t say whether or not Robinson came
in afterward. I don’t know the boys by name. I
can’t say whether I saw him come in the tea room,
no, but I did see him in the store. I saw him in
the store when I came back with the police officers.
The two defendants were on the main floor in the
store when I came back. The main floor is a few
feet from the stairs, at the bottom of the tea room.
The elevator is just about eight feet from the bot
tom of the stairs. When I saw these boys they
were facing out and facing toward the street—
possibly on their way out of the store. I don’t
know what Mr. Trianfonte’s conversation was
with any of them, if he had one. I was going about
my business and he was talking to others while I
was talking to some and I made the circuit of
everyone there myself and I believe he had been
talking to some, if not all of them. I did ask each
of them to leave, including these two defendants.
I ’m sure I talked to everyone of the defendants,
63
everyone of the colored boys in the store. I talked
to these two in the store. I asked them to leave
and they said, “ We don’t feel we ought to. Why
should we?” The questions varied and the answers
varied from one to another, something like that.
I identified myself as the manager of the store in
each case. There were five colored men there.
Five are all I talked to and all I saw when I came
in and I talked to each of them. I don’t recall that
there were 12 or 15 in the tea room because I talk
ed to each one that was in the tea room There
could have been some others in the other part of
the store. I was concerned only with those in the
tea room because those are the ones I talked to.
These two were there. It took something like three
minutes to go down and get the officers.
FRANK JAMES LUPPER, one of the de
fendants, testified in his own behalf, as follows:
(Tr. 77-87)
I live at 1817 Bishop, Little Rock. I am nine
teen years old. I was in the Gus Blass store on
April 13, 1960. I am a customer of Gus Blass.
Have been for some time. My mother has an ac
count there, and we have been having an account
there for about 19 or 20 years. My people have
been customers of Gus Blass practically before I
64
was born. On the morning of April 13, 1960, I
entered Blass’ Department Store about 11:35 and
on my way up to the lunch room, I sat down at the
table to be served and while I was there waiting
a man came to me. I believe it was the manager,
for he said so. He asked me did I see the sign up
on the wall, and I told him no, and he pointed to
the wall and showed me a sign that I couldn’t read
at the distance I was at the time. I couldn’t make
out what it was and he said, he told me what was
on the sign. He said that they had the right to
choose who they would like to serve and he said do
I understand. I told him that I was a customer of
Gus Blass. He said he couldn’t help that. He said
do I understand what he had just said . I sat there
and he went to the next person. He did not ask
me to leave. I did not refuse the request of any
one to leave. After I sat there for sometime and
I didn’t get waited on, I decided to leave on my
own and I walked down the stairs and went on out,
turned to my right and as I was going outside, I
stopped at a counter to look at a pair of sunshades
and just then a couple of officers walked in and
asked the manager, “ Is this the one?” And then
he said, “ I don’t know,” and he said, “ Well, all you
have to say is yes or no,” and he said, “ Yes,” and
then he said, “ You are under arrest,” and I said,
65
“ What charge,” and he said, “ Open charge,” and
then he took us down. The officer didn’t ask had I
refused to leave the store, or the alleged tea room.
No officer asked me that at any time. The mana
ger of the store didn’t ask me, nor any person who
was a representative of the Blass store asked me
to leave. I saw Thomas Robinson coming out of
the store while I was there. He was at the top of
the stairs when I saw him. He was coming to
wards me, and as I was leaving out, then every
body else was leaving out, and then he turned
around and followed me out. I didn’t make any
noises of any sort while I was there. I wasn’t
loud or boisterous. I didn’t threaten anybody there
at any time. I didn’t molest anybody. No one
threatened me. I wasn’t molested by anyone. I
didn’t sit down at the lunch counter. I sat at the
table. I don’t know the fellow’s name that sat
with me, but there was another person. It wasn’t
someone with me. It was someone from the store.
There were two boys at the table, the other fellow
and me. I have seen him before. I don’t know his
name. I saw him around Philander Smith College.
He went to school at Philander Smith College. He
was sitting there when I sat down. I don’t know
how long he had been there. I sat down there first
and then he sat down there. I do not belong to the
66
NAACP. I don’t know whether my parents be
long to them, I don’t believe so. Nobody told me
to do this. I went down there alone. I knew what
I was going to do when I got down there. I went
down there to sit down at the table to be served. I
hadn’t done that before. I hadn’t done it at any
other store. I did it this day because I am a cus
tomer of Blass Department Store. It could have
been any other day. It just happened that is the
day I decided to go down. I didn’t pick April 13th.
I didn’t know anybody else was going to sit down
and ask for service. I had not been instructed what
to do if they asked me to leave. Nobody en
couraged me to do this. I don’t know how many
were in the store. There was quite a few. There
was about six. I didn’t say I didn’t have a crowd.
I came in the store by myself. I didn’t know a
crowd was going to sit down there. He didn’t ask
me to leave. I heard all these witnesses testify.
Captain Paul Terrell and Lieutenant Talbert talk
ed with me. They asked me did I sit down. I
said yes. They didn’t ask me if I refused to leave.
Mr. Holt didn’t ask me to leave. I saw the de
fendant Robinson there. He wasn’t sitting with
me. I didn’t see him sitting. I saw him at the
top of the stairs as I was going out. He followed
me out. I have known him about five years, I
67
imagine. I didn’t know that he was going to be
there that day. He didn’t know I was going to be
there that day. I don’t know the names of some of
the other boys there. I go to Philander Smith Col
lege. Some of them just come around the school.
I had no meeting about going in there, several of
us, and sitting down. Not any time before that.
You know, the states, I haven’t seen it, but I have
heard about them. I have been reading about them
in the paper. I decided since I am a Blass cus
tomer, and I buy a lot of things, I decided to go in
and see if we could get served. I am a customer
of Pfeifer’s and Cohn’s, and Blass, a few others
and I just go in every once in a while, not all of
the time. I heard about another sit-down demon
stration happened at Pfeifer’s that day. I saw it
happen. I didn’t know it was going to happen. I
drove to town in my car. I parked it, I believe
on Columbus Street. I say a block away, I imagine.
I got there at eleven thirty-five. I remember it
because I saw it on the clock as I walked in the
place.
THOMAS B. ROBINSON, one of the defend
ants, testified in his own behalf, as follows: (Tr.
88-99).
I was present at the Gus Blass Store on April
68
13, 1960. I guess it was between eleven forty-five
and twelve o’clock. I ’m not sure. It was approxi
mately that time. I entered Gus Blass store and
as I was going upstairs to the mezzanine to get
served I noticed several people leave out of the
store and I didn’t know what reason they was leav
ing and so as I walked in I left when I saw the
other people leave and as I was about to leave out
of the store this officer stopped me and he asked
me was I upstairs and I said yes and he arrested
us and we asked him what was the charge and he
said, “ Open charge.” He didn’t ask me if I re
fused to leave. The only thing he asked us was I
upstairs. The only time I saw Mr. Holt was when
I was leaving the store, leaving with the officers
that arrested us. I didn’t sit down at the table at
Gus Blass, so Mr. Holt couldn’t have talked. I
didn’t have any conversation of any kind. I at
tended school at Philander Smith College. This
will be my third year. I arrived at the store alone.
I wasn’t going to meet no one personally. I wasn’t
expecting to meet no one. I only got in the store
at the top of the stairs, and turned and came out.
As I was leaving out of the store I was stopped by
the officers and placed under arrest. I did not
talk to anybody while I was there. I wasn’t loud
or boisterous. I did not molest anybody. I didn’t
69
have any occasion to say anything to anybody. I
did not have any conversation with any of the per
sonnel in Gus Blass store. I am a customer of Gus
Blass. I have bought clothes at Gus Blass. I will
say about ten years or more. I have been going
there since I cam remember, since I was a child.
I have always been served there. I am twenty. I
have lived in Little Rock twenty years. I used to
belong to the NAACP Junior Council when I was
in high school. I don’t think they have a Junior
Council now. I am not a member of any group out
at the school who has met and worked us a scheme
to go in the stores and sit down. I did go in Blass’
Store, on April 13th. I went in my car. I think
I parked it down on Scott, about 3rd and Scott. It
was close to twelve o’clock when I got there about
lunch time. No one was with me. I don’t think I
was late for lunch. I went to Blass’ store because
I was looking for a suit. I didn’t get a chance to
sit down at the table or lunch counter. I don’t
know why they arrested me. Lupper and I were
together when we got arrested. As he was coming
out, I guess we were coming out of the store at the
same time. I was leaving the store because I was
ready to go. After I got upstairs and saw that it
was impossible for me to get served. I decided to
leave out. I didn’t go there solely to be served food.
70
I got hungry as I was there and I went upstairs to
get served. I didn’t ask to buy a suit while I was
there. They sell suits on the main floor. The lunch
counter is on the mezzanine. They don’t sell suits
up there. I went to the lunch counter to eat. I
don’t know where Lupper was when I got up there.
Lupper and I accidentally, I guess it was accident
ally were coming out of the store. We were leav
ing the same entrance. I didn’t come down the
stairs with him. I walked down the stairs. Lup
per didn’t walk with me. He walked by himself.
I walked, I think I was behind him. I am almost
positive. I remember seeing him as we were going
out of the store. We were together when the of
ficers stopped us. He was looking at some shades.
I didn’t stop to talk to him. We were going out
the same entrance and the police stopped us to
gether. I went there to buy a suit, but I got hun
gry while I was there. I was going up towards
where they served the food. I got as far as the
entrance, the head of the steps. There were a lot
of people sitting around at the tables when I got
up there. There was same colored boys up there.
They were sitting down at the tables and some at
the counter. After when I came up there, they
were leaving. There were some of them leaving
and some o f them sitting down and then all of
71
them leaving as I was coming in. I don’t know
why they left. I didn’t see Lupper up there. I
don’t remember seeing Lupper until I wTas on the
main floor. I got as close to the lunch counter as
to the top of the stairs. I left because I saw a lot
of other people leave. It was obvious that I couldn’t
get served because I saw the other people leave
out. I presumed they left because they couldn’t be
served. I really don’t know why they couldn’t be
served. I guess because they are colored, I don’t
know why these officers would tell a story on me.
I can’t say that I saw any other colored people sit
ting around there or in the store about my size and
wearing glasses. I have never had any trouble with
Mr. Holt or anybody in the store there. I never
have seen him before we got arrested. I don’t know
why he would sit there and say that he saw me sit
ting there and asked me to leave. He might have
made a mistake. There’s a lot of people in the
store that might have been my size and my age.
The officers asked me was I upstairs and I said
yes. He didn’t ask me if I refused to leave. Mr.
Holt didn’t ask me to leave. He didn’t tell me that
he wasn’t prepared to serve me at that time. I
didn’t ask any questions why he wasn’t. I had not
discussed this with anybody about being there on
72
that day, nor at the time I would get there, or what
I would do when I got there.
ARGUMENT
I
ACTS 226 AND 14 ARE UNCONSTITU
TIONAL IN THAT THEY DENY THE
DEFENDANTS DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
The BRIGGS case and the SMITH case in
volve only Act 226 of the Acts of 1959, the perti
nent part of which is now Arkansas Statute 41-
1432, and reads as follows:
41-1432. CREATING DISTURBANCE IN
PUBLIC PLACE OF BUSINESS
OR OTHER PUBLIC PLACE —
PENALTY.—
Any person who shall enter any public place
of business of any kind whatsoever, or upon
the premises of such public place of business,
or any other public place whatsoever, in the
State of Arkansas, and while therein or there
on shall create a disturbance, or a breach of
the peace, in any way whatsoever, including,
but not restricted to, loud and offensive talk,
the making of threats or attempting to in
timidate or any other conduct which causes a
disturbance or breach of the peace or threat
ened breach of the peace, shall be guilty of a
73
misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof
shall be fined not more than five hundred dol
lars ($500.00) or imprisoned in jail not more
than six (6) months, or both such fine and im
prisonment. (Acts 1959, No. 226, § 1, p.
1159.)
The LUPPER case involves the alleged viola
tions of Acts 226 and also Act 14 of the Acts of
1959. The pertinent section of Act 14 is now Ar
kansas Statute 41-1433, and reads as follows:
41-1433. REFUSAL TO LEAVE BUSI
NESS ESTABLISHMENT AF
TER REQUEST — PENALTY.—
Any person who after having entered the
business premises of any person, firm, or cor
poration, other than a common carrier, and
who shall refuse to depart therefrom upon re
quest of the owner or manager of such busi
ness establishment shall be deemed guilty of
a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be
fined not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) nor
more than five hundred dollars ($500.00) or
by imprisonment not to exceed thirty (30)
days, or both such fine and imprisonment.
(Acts 1959, No. 14, §1, p. 29.)
These statutes are so vague, uncertain and in
definite that they afford no fair warning to the
appellants as to what conduct might transgress the
statute, and they provide no ascertainable stand
ard of criminality. Act 226 does not require that
74
the actions of an alleged offender be “ willfully or
maliciously” done as required by a disturbing the
public peace statute which has been on our books
for over a half-century (Ark. Statute 41-1401).
There is absolutely nothing in this Act which
would give fair warning to a person that they
would violate the statute by peacefully occupying
a seat at a public lunch counter and seeking serv
ice, where such service was being accorded to the
public.
Act 14 is even more vague as the only thing
which is required under the statute to make one
guilty of a criminal offense is the mere refusal of
a person to leave a business establishment after
having been requested to do so by the owner or
manager of such business establishment. The Act
does not require or even imply that there must be
any mens re a on the part of the alleged offender
before there could be a violation of the statute, nor
does it require that the alleged offender be doing
or threatening to do any unlawful act as a condi
tion upon which the owner or manager bases his
request to leave. Act 14 could easily be construed
to require the conviction of a customer who, after
having paid cash money for an article in a store
which the owner had not yet delivered to him, re
fused to leave the store upon request of the owner
75
until the purchased article was delivered or his
money refunded.
These are penal statutes and the great weight
of authorities require that a penal statute he suf
ficiently definite and understandable as to fore
warn men of ordinary intelligence as to what con
duct is prohibited. See UNITED STATES V.
MILLER, 17 F. Supp. 65 (W. D. Ky. 1936); LAN-
ZETTA V. NEW JERSEY, 306 U. S. 451 (1939).
It is the legislative, rather than courts or juries,
which must fix the standard of conduct and it
must be done in such a way that an ascertainable
standard of guilt can be reasonably determined by
persons of common intelligence. These Acts are
so vague that a conviction under them would de
prive the appellants of the due process and equal
protection of law required by Amendment Four
teen to the Constitution of the United States and
also Article II, Section 8, of the Constitution of
Arkansas. The Motions to Dismiss for unconsti
tutionality should have been granted.
76
II
THE ACTS HAVE BEEN APPLIED IN
AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL MANNER
Defendants submit on several grounds that
the police officers had no legal right to demand
that they leave their seats as was done in the
BRIGGS case, and that consequently the officers
had no right to arrest them for declining to obey
an order that the police had no authority to make.
I f Act No. 226 of 1959, under which defendants
were convicted, is construed and applied by this
Court to authorize the actions o f the police and to
support criminal convictions of the defendants, the
statute will deprive the defendants of rights pro
tected by the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con
stitution of the United States.
A. The police action in ordering that the de
fendants leave the store, where no such request
had been made by the owner or manager, and in
arresting them was an unconstitutional interfer
ence with the defendants’ rights to emply peaceful
persuasion and advocacy to attempt to obtain an
end to a claimed injustice. It is clear that the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro
tects the citizen against interference by the state
77
and its officials with peaceful speech, assembly
and advocacy of political, religious or social views,
no matter how unpopular the ideas presented may
be in the community, except in rare cases where
advocacy causes a clear and present danger to the
public. There is no doubt that advocacy of an end
to racial discrimination is within the area of pro
tected speech. Cf. SCULL v. VIRGINIA, 359 U. S.
344 (1959); NAACP v. ALABAMA, 357 U. S.
449, 460-466 (1958).
The defendants sought to be served at public
lunch counters in the belief that by so presenting
themselves for service they might persuade the
proprietors to end the discriminatory treatment of
Negro customers. There were no acts by the de
fendants upon which the law officers, or the court
below, could properly make a determination that
the defendants’ advocacy created a danger to the
public that was so clear and present as to justify
suppression by the government. The officers’ tes
timony as to their subjective feeling that there was
“ tension” among the customers in the store is
plainly insufficient by itself. There were no acts
of violence committed by or against the defend
ants ; there was no advocacy of violence; there was
no destruction of property. Indeed there was not
even a request for police assistance from the man
78
ager in charge o f the store or the owner in the
BRIGGS case or the SMITH case, and the students
were leaving Blass’ Department Store when they
were arrested in the LUPPER case.
This Court should make it plain that free
speech cannot endure unless police officers protect
the right to speech and advocacy of persons whose
ideas they deplore as well as persons with whom
they agree, and that the paramount obligation of
the police in these cases was to exercise precau
tions to protect the defendants against any appre
hended violence rather than to suppress their ad
vocacy in order to end the “ tension” in the store.
Numerous decisions support the proposition
that peaceful advocacy such as the defendants were
engaged in when they were arrested is protected
against infringement by law enforcement officers
and the imposition of criminal sanctions. THORN
HILL v. ALABAMA, 310 U. S. 88 (1940); KUNZ
v. NEW YORK, 340 U. S. 290 (1951); CANT
WELL v. CONNECTICUT, 310 U. S. 296 (1940);
HERNDON v. LOWRY, 301 U. S. 242 (1937);
N1EMOTKO v. MARYLAND, 340 U. S. 268
(1951); TERMINIELLO v. CHICAGO, 337 U. S.
1 (1949); DEJONGE v. OREGON, 299 U. S. 353
(1937); MARSH v. ALABAMA, 326 U. S. 501
(1946).
79
It is plain that these defendants merely sat
peacefully at the lunch counter, and that they com
mitted no violence, provoking no violence, used no
offensive language, made no threats, and engaged
in no intimidation. The only thing that the de
fendants did was to fail to heed the police demand
that they give up their seats and leave, in the
BRIGGS case. In the SMITH case the defendants
left the store when requested to do so by the man
ager and were arrested by police officers who act
ed without any request by the manager or owner
of the store.
The defendants did not breach the peace, or
threaten to do so. Nothing in the statute under
which they are charged gives the defendants fair
warning that they would violate the statute by
peacefully occupying seats at a public lunch count
er seeking the end of a policy of racial discrimina
tion and failing to obey a police demand that they
move, which was unaccompanied by any request to
leave from the person owning or in possession of
the store, unaccompanied by any indication of the
policemen’s authority to make such a demand; un
accompanied by any actual authority in the police
to make such a demand, and unaccompanied by
any actual breach of the peace. Particularly where
fundamental constitutional rights are at stake and
80
where the vagueness of a criminal law may inhibit
the advocacy of ideas, vague laws applied so as to
suppress free speech must be struck down as de
nials of due process. HERNDON v. LOWRY,
supra; LANZETTA v. NEW JERSEY, 306 U. S.
451 (1939); RALEY v. OHIO, 360 U. S. 423
(1959); SCULL v. VIRGINIA, supra; WINTERS
v. NEW YORK, 333 U. S. 507 (1948); UNITED
STATES v. CARROLL, 345 U. S. 457 (1953);
UNITED STATES v. COHEN GROCERY CO.,
255 U. S. 81 (1921); CONN ALLY v. GENERAL
CONSTR. CO., 269 U. S. 385 (1926).
A single discriminatory act, supported by
other evidence of intention and purpose to dis
criminate because of race, may well establish a
pattern that must be condemned as illegal.
The Supreme Court, in Snowden v. Hughes,
321 U. S. 1, 8-9, 64 S. Ct. 397, 88 L. E. D. 497, in
construing a statute, fair on its face, made the fol
lowing pronouncement:
“ The unlawful administration by state of
ficers of a state statute fair on its face, re
sulting in its unequal application to those who
are entitled to be treated alike, is not a de
nial of equal protection unless there is shown
to be present in it an element o f intentional
or purposeful discrimination. This may ap
pear on the face of the action taken with re
81
spect to a particular class or person cf. Mc
Farland v. Sugar Co., 241 U. S. 79, 86-7, or it
may only be shown by extrinsic evidence show
ing a discriminatory design to favor one in
dividual class over another not to be inferred
from the action itself, Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U. S. 356, 373-4. But a discriminatory
purpose is not presumed, Terrance v. Florida,
188 U. S. 519, 520; there must be a showing
of ‘clear and intentional discrimination/
Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183, 186; see
Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U. S. 500, 507-8;
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219, 231. Thus
the denial of equal protection by the exclusion
of negroes from a jury may be shown by ex
trinsic evidence of a purposeful discrimina
tory administration of a statute fair on its
face. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 394,
397; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 589;
Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354, 357; Smith
v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128,130-31; Hillv. Texas,
316 U. S. 400, 404.”
In Smith v. People of California, 80 S. Ct.,
215, the Court held:
That where the definition included no ele
ment of scienter — knowledge by appellant of
the contents of the book — and thus the ordi
nance was construed as imposing a “ strict” or
“ absolute” criminal liability. The appellant
made timely objection below that if the ordi
nance were so construed it would be in con
flict with the Constitution of the United
States.
82
California here imposed a strict or absolute
criminal responsibility on appellant not to
have obscene books in his shop. “ The exist
ence o f a mens tea is the rule of, rather than
the exception to, the principles of Anglo-
American criminal jurisprudence.” Dennis
v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, 500, 71 S. Ct.
857, 862, 95 L. Ed. 1137.
Even assuming arqnendo that a threat of a
breach of the peace was created by someone among
the crowd of customers who gathered in the stores
to watch the defendants and the police, the defend
ants may not be held criminally responsible for the
acts of these other persons, as there is no evidence
that the defendants were made aware of the in
tention of any persons to attack them, or even that
there was any likelihood of such an occurrence.
To punish the defendants on the basis of the police
officer’s subjective impression that someone might
cause violence because there was “ tension” would
be to apply Act No. 226 so as to make an arbitary
classification of innocent unknowing acts as crimi
nal offenses. Such a construction of the statute
to allow punishment without evidence of criminal
scienter would be a deprivation of due process in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Wterrain
v. Updegraf, 344 U. S. 183 (1952); Smith v. Cali
fornia, 361 U. S. 147 (1959).
83
B. The action of the police officers in de
manding that the defendants leave the lunch count
er was plainly based upon the policy of the store,
reflecting the custom in the community, that Ne
gro customers are not served at lunch counters
maintained for white persons. The action of the
police in demanding that the defendants leave the
lunch counter and in arresting them for their re
fusal, and the action of the court below in convict
ing them, all represent state actions enforcing
racial discrimination. Such discrimination by the
State or its officers, and such use of the criminal
law machinery of the states to preserve racial seg
regation is prohibited by the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
As the Supreme Court recently wrote in Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, 17:
Thus the prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment extend to all action of the State
denying the equal protection of the laws;
whatever the agency of the State taking the
action, see Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313;
Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City
Trusts of Phila., 353 U. S. 230; Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, or whatever the guise
in which it is taken, see Derrington v. Plum
mer, (CA 5, Tex.) 240 F. 2d 922; Deoartment
of Conservation & Development v. Tate (CA
4 Va.) 231 F. 2d 615.
84
The principle that neither state or federal
courts may use judicial power to enforce racial
discrimination is clearly established. Shelley v.
Kraemer, supra; Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24
(1948); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953).
The principle that police officers may not en
gage in enforcing racially discriminatory practices
has been applied in various cases akin to this one.
In Valle v. Stengel, 176 F. 2d 697 (3rd Cir. 1949)
it was held that state law enforcement officers de
prived Negro citizens of rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment and federal statutes im
plementing that amendment, when they ejected
them from a private amusement park in aid o f the
park’s racial exclusion policy. The court in VaMe
made specific reference to the statutory protec
tion of the equal right of Negroes to make con
tracts as protected by 42 United States Code §1981
(former revised statutes §1977). The principles
applied in Valle v. Stengel are sufficient to dispose
of this case.
In another recent case the same principle was
applied to the actions of police officers who arrest
ed a group of Negroes and charged them with
breach of the peace for refusal to obey a police de
mand to move to the rear portion of a city bus set
85
apart for Negroes by bus company regulation. In
Boman v. Morgan, 4 Race Eel. Law Reporter 1027,
1031 (D. C. N. D. Ala. 1959) the court said:
A charge of “ a breach of the peace” is one
of broad import and may cover many kinds of
misconduct. However, the Court is of the
opinion that the mere refusal to obey a re
quest to move from the front to the rear of a
bus, unaccompanied by other acts constitut
ing a breach of the peace, is not a breach of
the peace. In as far as the defendants, other
than the Transit Company, are concerned,
plaintiffs were in the exercise of rights se
cured to them by law.
* * *
Under the undisputed evidence, plaintiffs
acted in a peaceful manner at all times and
were in peaceful possession of the seats which
they had taken on boarding the bus. Such be
ing the case, the police officers were without
legal right to direct where they should sit be
cause of their color. The seating arrange
ment was a matter between the Negroes and
the Transit Company. It is evident that the
arrests at the barn were based on the refusal
of the plaintiffs to comply with the request to
move since those who did move, though equal
ly involved except as to compliance, were not
arrested.
Under the facts in this case, the officers
violated the civil rights of the plaintiffs in ar
resting and imprisoning them. Ordinance No.
1487-F, and their “ willful” refusal to move
86
when directed to do so, did not authorize or
justify their conduct.
The language given above was quoted on appeal of
the case, though that aspect of the holding indicat
ing that the Negroes were not entitled to relief
against the Transit Company was reversed. Bo-
man v. Birmingham Transit Co.,------ F. 2d. _ _ _ ,
29 Law Week 2028 (5th Cir. July 12, 1960).
In general accord with the principle that state
police officers, and those acting under the state’s
authority, may not enforce racially discriminatory
rules are Baldwin v. Morgan, 251 F. 2d 780 (5th
Cir. 1958); Fleming v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas
Co., 224 F. 2d 752 (4th Cir. 1955); Cf. Whiteside
v. SouthernBusLines, 177 F. 2d 949 953 (6th Cir.
1949) invalidating bus segregation rule on basis
of the Commerce Clause but indicting that if state
action is necessary it may be found in the action
of police officers in ejecting a Negro from a bus.
The principle that the preservation of law and
order cannot be accomplished by the exercise of the
state’s police power to enforce racial discrimina
tion was settled as long ago as Buchanan v. War-
ley, 245 U. S. 60, 81 (1917), so it cannot matter
that the police officers may have sincerely believed
that they were acting properly to prevent disorder.
87
The conviction of the defendants represents a
discriminatory administration of the criminal law
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for the
additional reason that the record is so devoid of
evidence o f guilt that the conviction really rests
upon no evidence. The defendants engaged in no
conduct that is claimed to have been disorderly ex
cept their refusal to obey the police order that they
leave and not continue to seek food service in the
BRIGGS case. In the SMITH case the defendants
were arrested despite the fact that they left im
mediately upon the request of the manager. And
in the LUBBER case the defendants denied that
the manager requested that they leave (although
the manager testified that he requested each de
fendant to leave) and stated that they left when it
became apparent that they would not be served.
Lupper then left the lunch room which was on the
mezzanine floor and Robinson upon seeing other
colored students leaving the lunch room, started
leaving the store, when both defendants were ar
rested on the ground floor. Thus they have been
convicted without any evidence of any disorderly
act or breach of the peace. The rule appliacble in
this case was recently applied in THOMBSON v.
CITY OF LOUISVILLE, 362 U. S. 199 (1960)
where the court struck down convictions for “ dis
88
orderly conduct” and “ loitering” on the ground
that a criminal conviction founded upon no evi
dence of guilt or criminality denies due process and
equal protection of the laws. See also SCHWARE
v. BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS, 853 U. S. 232
(1957); UNITED STATES ex rel. VAJTAUER
v. COMMISSIONER, 273 U. S. 103, 106 (1927);
MOORE v. DEMPSEY, 261 U. S. 86 (1923);
YICK WO v. HOPKINS, 118 U. S. 356 (1886),
and Cf. AKINS v. TEXAS, 325 U. S. 398, 402
(1945); TOT v. UNITED STATES, 319 U. S.
463, 473 (1943) concurring opinion); MOONEY
v. HOLOHAN, 294 U. S. 103 (1935) .
C. Act 14 was alleged only in the LUPPER
case and both defendants were found guilty of
failing to leave Blass Department Store after hav
ing been requested to do so by the manager. All
that has been said here regarding Act 226 is equal
ly applicable to Act 14.
89
It is entirely clear from the record in each
case that the appellants were requested to leave the
respective stores solely on account of their color.1
The appellants argue that Acts 14 and 226
are being used against them solely because of the
fact that they are Negroes who sought service at
lunch counters heretofore reserved for white per-
h In the BRIGGS case, neither the manager or
the owner requested the Negro students to leave,
nor did they request the assistance of the police.
The Assistant Manager of Woolworth’s testified
as follows: (Tr. 106)
Q. Was the lunch counter closed when the
police got there?
A. Yes, sir . . . .
Q. And why did you close it?
A. Because the Negroes came in and sat
down.
In the SMITH case, Officer Terrell testified
as follows: (Tr. 55)
Q. Did they leave when the manager told
them to leave?
A. All except Jackson.
Q. Then, with the exception of Jackson for
the purpose of arrest, why did you arrest
the other defendants?
A. Because they had taken seats at the
lunch counter.
Q. In other words, it was your opinion, as a
police officer, i f a Negro sat down at a
lunch counter, he was guilty o f some
crime?
A. Yes, he is according to the law.
90
sons. The attempt to coerce appellants and other
Negroes to not seek service at lunch counters,* (i) 2
amounts to involuntary servitude in violation of
Amendment 13 to the Constitution o f the United
States. It should be clear to anyone that no white
person would be arrested for doing no more than
the appellants did and hence the use of these
statutes denies to the appellants the equal protec
tion of the laws guaranteed by not only the Four
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, but also violates Article 11, Section
3 and Section 18 of the Constitution of Arkansas.
The motions to dismiss because of the unconstitu
tional application of the statutes in question should
have therefore been granted.
2. Even the trial judge seemed determined tô con
vict the appellants as (i) reflected by his attitude
in the SMITH case before any testimony was
heard and after the testimony was completed, (ii)
(i) (Tr. 40) The Court — This is the law
and I don’t see how you can violate it
deliberately on the claim that it is un
constitutional. What I am trying to
avoid here is serious trouble. I don’t
want a race riot if I can help it.
(ii) (Tr. 90) The Court — la m going to
fine these defendants the same as be
fore, a fine of $500.00 and sixty days.
I am trying to discourage this as
much as I can.
91
III
THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT
TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION
It is undisputed that in none of the three cases
did any of the defendants engage in any of the
acts or conduct enumerated by Act 226. All of the
appellants were quiet, neatly dressed, courteous
and well behaved. There is no testimony that any
of them used any loud or offensive talk or that
they made any threats or attempted to intimidate
anyone. In the BRIGGS case, the police were not
requested by the owner or manager of Wool worth’s
to assist in any way. It was the Chief of Police
who took it upon himself to order the lunch count
er closed down and to order the defendants in that
case to leave. The failure of the appellants in
BRIGGS to comply with the request of the Chief
of Police, that they leave the store, could in no way
support a conviction for the alleged violation of
Act 226.
In the SMITH case, the defendants were re
quested by the manager to leave the lunch counter
at Pfeifer’s Department Store and they left when
requested, although the appellant Jackson alleged
ly took a little longer to leave. The appellants were
nevertheless arrested for the alleged violation of
Act 226 and convicted.
92
In the LUPPER case, when the defendants
were requested to leave the lunch room of Blass’
Department Store by the manager, 3 the manager
stated that they continued to sit there but the ap
pellants did not state positively that they would not
leave. 4 The manager stated that he then left to
get the police, walked downstairs, out of the build
building and across the street where he found a
policeman (Tr. 66), that he was only gone two or
three minutes (Tr. 67) and that he and the of
ficers returned and met the appellants on the first
floor, apparently on their way out. (Tr. 71).
There is no evidence that the appellants en
gaged in any conduct or language prohibited by
Act 226. Indeed, the contrary affirmatively ap
pears from the prosecution’s evidence. Penal stat
utes must be interpreted strictly against the state
and liberally in favor of the accused. (See 50 Am.
Jur., Statutes, Sec. 407, and cases cited therein.)
3. Appellant Lupper testified that the manager
did not ask him to leave (Tr. 79) and the appel
lant Robinson testified that he did not get any
closer to the lunch counter than the top of the
stairs. (Tr. 97).
4. (Tr. 72). “ I asked them to leave and they said,
‘We don’t feel we ought to. Why should we?’ The
questions varied and the answers varied from one
to another, something like that.”
93
Act 226 should be construed and applied in accord
ance with the maxim ejusdem generis. Where gen
eral words follow a designation of particular sub
jects, the meaning of the general words will be con
strued to be restricted by the prior particular
designation, 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, Sec. 249. As
applied to Act 226, this principle requires that the
general words be limited to the particular conduct
and language described prior thereto, e. g.— “ Loud
and offensive talk, the making of threats or at
tempting to intimidate.” The words “ or any other
conduct” must be interpreted to mean acts or con
duct similar to that previously set out and in the
cases at bar there was absolutely no such conduct
or langauge on the part of any of the appellants
which could support a conviction under Act 226.
The evidence will not support a conviction of
the appellants for the violation of Act 226 or Act
14 because there was no evidence of criminal in
tent. The implied basis for prosecution is appar
ently the theory that the appellants’ conduct was
such as to cause “ a disturbance or breach of the
peace or threatened breach of the peace.” These
Acts must be construed to require proof of a speci
fic criminal intent to provoke a breach of the peace
where the conduct does not violate any of the pro
hibited acts which are defined in the statutes. To
94
convict the appellants otherwise would violate
their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
This action on the part of the State of Arkansas
also abridges the appellants’ constitutional right
to freedom of contract. Valle v. Stengel, 176 F. 2d
697 (C. A. 3, 1949).
On the basis of the proof made it would be a
denial of due process of law and the equal protec
tion of the laws to convict the defendants, for such
a conviction would rest upon no evidence of guilt
or culpability and would constitute a discrimina
tory administration of the criminal law. THOMP
SON v. CITY OF LOUISVILLE,____U. S ._____,
4 L. ed. 2d 654 (1960); SCHWARE v. BOARD
OF BAR EXAMINERS, 353 U. S. 232; UNITED
STATES ex rel V AIT AUER v. COMMISSION
ER, 273 U. S. 103, 106; MOORE v. DEMPSEY,
261 U. S. 86, YICK WO v. HOPKINS, 118 U. S.
356, (1886). Compare: AKINS v. TEXAS, 325
U. S. 398, 402; TOT v. UNITED STATES, 319
U. S. 463, 473 (concurring opinion); MOONEY v.
HOLOHAN, 294 U. S. 103.
95
iv.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GIVE DEFENDANTS REQUESTED IN
STRUCTIONS NUMBERS 3 and 5 IN
THE LUPPER CASE.
The appellants in the LUPPER case request
ed that the following instructions be given to the
jury and same were refused by the Court over the
objections of the appellants. (Tr. 100).
Defendant’s Instruction No. 3:
“ You are instructed that if you find from
the evidence that the conduct of other persons
in the Blass Department store at the time
complained of in this lawsuit was such as to
tend to create a disturbance of the peace, or
threaten a breach of the peace, but further
find that the defendants did nothing more to
create or bring about this conduct on the part
of other persons other than by their presence
at the lunch counter or in the restaurant and
their request for service therein, then you
should find the Defendants not guiltv as to
Act 226.
MR. BRANTON: Note the objections of the
Defendants.
THE COURT: Save his exceptions.
Defendant’s Instruction No. 5:
You are instructed as a matter of law that
the Defendants had a legal right to enter the
96
Blass Department Store at the time of the in
cident complained of in the information and
that they had a right to enter the restaurant
or go to the lunch counter in said store and
to request service at said store and that the
actions of the Defendants, or either of them,
in seeking service at the said lunch counter
or restaurant is not in of itself a violation of
itself a violation o f any law.
ME. BEAN TON : Note the objections of the
Defendants.
THE COUET: Save his exceptions.
The Court erred in refusing to give the above
instructions in that the content and matter dis
cussed in these instructions were not covered by
any other instructions given by the Court, and the
requested instructions were applicable to the ap
pellants’ theory o f the case. VAUGHN v. STATE
57 Ark. 1 20 S. W. 588. Further, the appellants
had a right to have these instructions given to the
jury because they were not inconsistent with the
evidence, nor were they conflicting or argumen
tative: JONES v. STATE, 89 Ark. 213, 116 S. W.
230; PRICE v. STATE, 114 Ark. 398, 170 S. W.
235.
97
V
THE JUDGMENT WAS EXCESSIVE AND
HARSH,
The judgment of the Court was excessive and
harsh in BRIGGS and it is apparent from the
Court’s statement that there was passion and prej
udice in the Court’s statement, “ The Court is giv
ing to try to keep the peace in this town, do what
he can to discourage the wilful and deliberate at
tempts to stir up racial strife. The fines will be
$500.00 and 60 days.” In HADLEY v. STATE,
117 SW 2d 352 this honorable Court held: “ Even
if the law of the state does fix 21 years as a maxi
mum penalty for larceny it was not the intention
of the lawmaking body that such maximum should
be invoked except as punishment for represensible
conduct in aggravation of the particular act. Cruel
and unusual punishments are prohibited by our
Constitution.”
There was nothing reprehensible in the acts
of any of the defendants as the State’s witnesses
testified repeatedly.
The Court had apparently made up its mind
before hearing the evidence in the SMITH case as
reflected by a statement on page 40 of Transcript
No. 4494, “ What I am trying to avoid here is seri
98
ous trouble. I don’t want a race riot if I can help
it.” At this time there was no evidence before the
Court upon which it could base this statement.
Upon judgment against these defendants the Court
made the statement, “ I am going to fine these de
fendants the same as before, a fine of $500.00 and
sixty days. I am trying to discourage this as much
as I can.” “ Further, the Court erred in sentenc
ing the defendant Melvin Jackson $500.00 and
costs and six months, stating that “ he is the one
who wouldn’t get up. At least that is the undis
puted testimony before the Court.”
The testimony of the manager o f the store, W.
T. Mitchell, was that he didn’t request all o f the
boys to leave and that he didn’t know which ones
he did. It is apparent that the presumption of in
nocence was not extended to this defendant.
This honorable Court should under the power
granted it by Arkansas Statutes 27-2144 reverse
the decision in these cases, or in the alternative
should reduce the fines and sentences assessed con
siderably. The appellants are all college students,
who have been caught up in one of the great moral
issues of our times. The appellants were using the
only means available to them to get a determina
tion of their constitutional rights and to seek equal
ity of treatment in business establishments. This
99
issue is one which has captured the attention of
the major political parties of our nation, as evi
denced by their respective political platforms, and
our Courts should not permit the machinery of the
State to be used in fostering private racial preju
dices.
CONCLUSION
The appellants in each of the respective cases
herein filed timely motions, both at the beginning
of the trials and at the conclusion of the trials, to
have Acts 14 and 226 of the Acts of 1959, of the
General Assembly of Arkansas, declared uncon
stitutional, and appellants filed other timely mo
tions and objections to protect the errors complain
ed of in the respective records, and it would un
duly burden this Brief to set out each of the said
motions or objections herein.
WHEREFORE, the appellants respectfully
pray that the judgments in each of the cases here
in be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
HAROLD B. ANDERSON and
W ILEY A. BRANTON,
Attorneys for Appellants