County School Board of Arlington County, VA v. Thompson Brief and Appendix of Appellees
Public Court Documents
January 6, 1958

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. County School Board of Arlington County, VA v. Thompson Brief and Appendix of Appellees, 1958. 15b0ce6f-ac9a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/64c0c478-620d-4b3f-b3ce-a30265799d9e/county-school-board-of-arlington-county-va-v-thompson-brief-and-appendix-of-appellees. Accessed July 07, 2025.
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BRIEF AND APPENDIX OF APPELLEES In the UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS for the Fourth Circuit No. 7543 COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD O F ARLINGTON COUNTY, V IRG IN IA , AND T. ED W ARD RU TTER, D IV ISIO N SU P E R IN T E N D E N T O F SCHOOLS OF T H E COUNTY OF ARLINGTON, V IRG IN IA , Appellants, v. CLARISSA S. TH O M PSO N , ET AL., Appellees. Appeal From The United States District Court For The Eastern District o f Virginia, Alexandria Division E d w in C, B row n , 1200 Cameron Street, Alexandria, Virginia. O liver W. H il l , 118 East Leigh Street, Richmond 19, Virginia. S pottswood W . R o bin so n , III, 623 North Third Street, Richmond 19, Virginia. Counsel fo r Appellees. The Press of Lawyers Printing Co., Inc., Richmond 7, Va. SU BJECT IN D EX Page Brief On Behalf Of The Appellees ......................... .......... 1 Statement Of The C ase ....................................................... 1 Questions Involved................... .................................... ....... 3 Statement Of The Facts .......................................... .......... 4 Argument .............................................................................. 4 I. The Pupil Placement Act Did Not Justify Ap pellants In Refusing To Admit The Minor Ap pellees To The Schools To Which They Applied.... 4 II. The Pleadings And Proof W ere Sufficient To Justify The District Court In Granting The Ap pellees The Relief S o u g h t....... ....... 9 III. The District Court Properly Exercised Its Dis cretion In Fixing September 23 As The Effective Date Of Its Injunction .......................................... 16 IV. The Proceedings In The District Court Were Consistent W ith The Federal Rules Of Civil Pro cedure And The Rules Of The District C o u rt...... 19 Conclusion........................... ...................... .......................... 25 TA BLE OF C ITA TIO N S Cases Allen v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, F.2d (C. A. 4th, No. 7463, No vember 11, 1 9 5 7 )........................................ .........18, 22, 23 American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 3 F. R. D. 162 (S. D. N. Y. 1943) ................................................................. ....... Anderson v. Brady, 5 F. R. D. 85 (E. D. Ky. 1945) 23 20 Page Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) .... 17 Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 (1955) .... 24 Carson v. Warlick, 1956, 4 Cir., 238 F.2d 724 .............. 18 County School Board of Arlington County v. Thomp son, 240 F.2d 59 (C. A. 4th 1956), cert, denied 353 U. S. 910 (1957 ) ................................................ 2 ,7 , 16, 18 County School Board of Chesterfield County v. Free man, 171 F.2d 702 (C. A. 4th 1948) ......................... 17 DeFebio v. County School Board of Fairfax County, [ Va. , December 2, 1957] ........................... 7 Lane v. Wilson, 306 U. S. 268 (1939) ........................... 17 Orleans Parish School Board v. Bush, 5 Cir., 242 F.2d 156, cert, denied U. S. , 25 L. W. 3374 ..... 5 Quong W ing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59 (1912) .......... 17 Richmond v. Deans, 37 F.2d 712 (C. A. 4th 1930), aff’d 281 U. S. 704 (1930) .......................................... School Board of Newport News v. Atkins, 246 F.2d 325 (C. A. 4th 1957), cert, denied U. S. 78 S. Ct. (Adv.) 83 (1957) ............................... ......... Tate v. Department of Conservation & Development, 231 F.2d 615 (C. A. 4th 1956), cert, denied 352 U. S. 838 (1956) ............................................................. Wilson v. City of Paducah, 100 F. Supp. 116 (W D Ky. 1951) .........................................................................’ Wolpe v. Poresky, 79 App. D. C. 141, 144 F.2d 505 (1944), cert, denied 323 U. S. 777 (1944) Statutes Va. Code (1950), §§ 22-232.1 to 22-232.16.................. ; Chapter 68, Acts of Assembly of Virginia, Extra Ses sion 1956 8 Rules Page Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 6 (d ) ................ 20 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 83 .................. . 21 Rules of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Rule 13 .... ............... . 21 IN D EX TO A PP E N D IX Excerpts From Reporter’s Transcript Robert A. Eldridge, Jr. ___ ____ ______ ______ ____ __ 1 Dorothy P. Nelson ..................................... ...... ......... ....... 5 A rthur M. Costley, S r..................................... ............ ....... 10 T. Edward Rutter .................................. ........... ........... . H In the UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS for the Fourth Circuit No. 7543 COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF ARLINGTON COUNTY, V IRG IN IA , AND T. ED W ARD RU TTER, D IV ISIO N S U P E R IN T E N D E N T OF SCHOOLS OF T H E COUNTY OF ARLINGTON, VIRG IN IA , Appellants, v. CLARISSA S. TH O M PSO N , E T AL., Appellees. Appeal From The United States District Court For The Eastern District o f Virginia, Alexandria Division BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLEES ST A TEM EN T OF T H E CASE On July 31, 1956, the District Court entered a decree in this action enjoining racial segregation in the public schools of Arlington County and making the injunction effective as to elementary schools at the commencement of the second 2 semester of the 1956-57 school session and effective as to secondary schools at the commencement of the regular 1957- 58 session (R. 179). On appeal, this Court affirmed the de cree, County School Board o f Arlington County v. Thomp son, 240 F.2d 59 (1956), and the Supreme Court of the United States denied a writ of certiorari to review that de cision. 353 U. S. 910 (1957). The then plaintiffs in the action thereafter filed in the District Court a motion seeking modification of the decree by provisions (a) making the injunction/ suspended by the appeal, effective as to elementary schools at the beginning of the regular 1957-58 session and (b) specifying that the re quirement, written into the decree, that administrative rem edies be exhausted prior to further application to the Court, did not necessitate compliance with the requirements sought to be made by the Virginia Pupil Placement Act, Va. Code (1950), §§ 22-232.1 to 22-232.16. (App. 1)*. The District Court granted the first request but considered the second prematurely advanced (App. 2-4), pointing out, however, that “the July 31, 1956 decree recognizes only an adequate administrative remedy—one that is efficacious and expedi tious, even apart from any question of its constitutionality. Pursuit of an unreasonable or unavailing form of redress is not exacted by the decree.” (App. 3-4). On September 9, 1957, three of the Negro plaintiffs and their parents filed a motion for further relief (App. 5-6). On the same day, four other Negro children and their pa- * References “App. ----- ” are to the appendix of the appellants upon this appeal. In an appendix hereto, appellees print additional excerpts from the transcript of testimony. References to the record appear “R. - ”, those to the transcript “T r . ----- ”, those to exhibits ‘ Ex. ----- 3 rents filed a motion to intervene, accompanied by a proposed complaint in intervention (App. 6-10). Each alleged timely application for admission for the 1957-58 session to a pub lic school theretofore attended by white children only and the denial of such admission on the ground that the Pupil Placement Act deprived appellants of authority to so admit (App. 5, 9), and sought a further decree specifically direct ing appellants to admit these children to the schools to which they respectively applied (App. 6, 10). On the same day, the District Court entered an ex parte order granting inter vention and filing the intervention complaint (App. 12), and another fixing September 11 as the date for hearing (App 11- 12). At the hearing, appellants filed motions (a) to continue the hearing on the motion for further relief (App. 15-16), (b) , to vacate the order granting intervention (App. 16-17), (c) to dissolve the injunction of July 29, 1957 (R. 235-236), and (d) to dismiss the motion for further relief (App. 13- 15). The District Court overruled the first three motions (App. 39-40) and, on September 14, made findings of fact and conclusions of law (App. 18-25) and entered a supple mental injunction decree in effect overruling the fourth mo tion and granting the seven children the relief sought (App 26-27). Q U ESTIO N S INVOLVED 1. Did the Pupil Placement Act justify appellants in refusing to admit the minor appellees to the schools to which they applied? 2. Were the pleadings and proof sufficient to justify the District Court in granting appellees the relief soug'ht? 4 3. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in fixing September 23 as the effective date of its injunction? 4. Were the proceedings in the District Court violative of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or the Rules of the District Court? STA TEM EN T OF T H E FACTS In appellees’ view, the statement of facts submitted by appellants is argumentative and omits vital factors estab lished by the evidence. Since, however, the additional facts are so interrelated to the decision of the legal issues, com plete statements of the facts as to specific matters are, for convenience, made in connection with the appropriate por tions of the argument, and, to avoid repetition, are omitted here. ARGUM ENT I T h e P u p il P la c em en t A ct D id N ot J u st ify A ppe ll a n t s I n R e f u s in g T o A d m it T h e M in o r A ppe ll e e s T o T h e S chools T o W h ic h T h ey A p p l ie d . A This appeal presents the third occasion upon which the Virginia Pupil Placement Act, Va. Code (1950), §§22- 232.1 to 22-232.16, is asserted as a basis for resistance to realization of the right of qualified applicants to nonsegre- gated school assignments. When the Act was first here, School Board of Newport News v. Atkins, 246 F. 2d 325 (C. A. 4th 1957), this Court ruled that applicants were not 5 required to pursue the administrative remedies it prescribed because . . this statute furnishes no adequate remedy to plaintiffs because of the fixed and definite policy of the school authorities with respect to segregation and be cause of the provisions of chapter 68 of the Acts of the E xtra Session, which provide for the closing of schools and withdrawal therefrom of state funds upon any de parture from this policy in any school. Orleans Parish School Board v. Bush, 5 Cir. 242 F. 2d 156, 162, cert. den. 25 L. W. 3374, ............ U. S .............. (at pp. 326-327). This decision the Supreme Court of the United States re fused to review. School Board of Newport News v. Atkins, ............U. S................, 78 S. Ct. (Adv.) 83, No. 361, Octo ber 21, 1957). Upon the second such occasion, Allen v. County School Board of Prince Edward C om ity,....... F. 2d ........ (C. A. 4th, No. 7463, November 11, 1957), this Court again stated that “the Pupil Placement Act provides no ade quate' administrative remedy.” And in the instant case the District Court ruled that the Act provided appellants no de fense against the relief sought. It said : “The procedure there prescribed is too sluggish and prolix to constitute a reasonable remedial process. On this point we also rely upon the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for this Circuit in School Board of the City of Newport News, et al. v. A tkins et al., July 13. 1957 (App. 18-19). " . . . the Court finds it cannot fairly require the plaintiffs even to: submit their applications to the 6 [Pupil Placement] Board for school-assignment. The reason is that the form prescribed therefor commits the applicant to accept a school ‘which the Board deems most appropriate in accordance with the provisions’ of the Pupil Placement Act. Submission to that Act amounts almost to assent to a racially segregated school. But even if the form be signed ‘under protest,’ the petitioner would not have an unfettered and free tribunal to act on his request. The Board still delib erates, on a racial question, under threat of loss of State money to the applicant’s school if children of different races are taught there.” (App, 19-20). We believe that the precedents established by this Court are dispositive of the issue raised by appellants, and that the District Court was clearly correct in its conclusion. While A tkins involved the contention that the Act’s admini strative remedies must be pursued, we think that it was implicit in that decision that the attempted transfer of school assignment powers would not benefit the local school authorities. The provision of the Act undertaking to re move those powers from local school boards and to place them in the Placement Board was, of course, enacted legis lation at the time of the District Court decrees in those cases and at the time of the hearing and disposition of the appeals here. There appears to be no suggestion, either in the briefs or the opinions, that this displacement could be successful unless the remedies themselves were adequate. It seems quite anomalous that appellees could be deprived of their constitutional rights on the ground that the only agency em powered to grant them is an agency their remedies before which are inadequate to afford those rights. / We cannot agree with appellants in their contention that the issue is non-Federal in character and should await a definitive decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of V ir ginia. It would perhaps suffice to point out that on De cember 2, 1957, that Court decided DeFebio v. County School Board of Fairfax County without ruling on the point raised by the appellants here. But we consider that the answer is even more fundamental. The provision seeking transfer of the enrollment authority is not only a part of a statute containing no severability clause, but is also inex tricably bound to the remedies themselves. Indeed, the point seems but the resurrection in slightly new form of the same argument that was unavailing in the A tkins and case. We do not have the simple question whether the state has power to transfer the admission power from schools boards to a central agency, but are again faced with the old question whether these applicants are to be remitted to a procedure before an agency that could not afford the relief to which they are legally entitled. As we understand, this insistance upon a state statutory bar to the exercise of a Federal right necessarily presents a Federal question. B The rights of Arlington children to nonsegregated school ing were judicially established prior to the enactment of the Pupil Placement Act. Upon the first appeal in this action, County School Board of Arlington County v. Thompson, 240 F. 2d 59 (1956), this Court had under review the de cree whereby this was accomplished. The District Court then provided: “. . . it is further Adjudged, Ordered and Decreed that effective at the times and subject to the conditions 8 hereinafter stated, the defendants, their successors in office, agents, representatives, servants and employees be, and each of them is hereby, restrained and enjoined from refusing on account of race or color to admit to, or enroll or educate in, any school under their operation, control, direction, or supervision any child otherwise qualified for admission to, and enrollment and educa tion in, such school.” (R. 181). As the Court knows, it was at the 1956 extra session of the General Assembly that the Pupil Placement Act was passed. It did not become law until the latter part of De cember, 1956. Thus, as the District Court stated: “It must be remembered that we are viewing the Act in a different frame from the setting in which it was tested by the Court of Appeals. The Act was then appraised as an administrative remedy which had to be observed before the persons aggrieved could seek a decree of judicial relief. Now the Act is measured against the enforcement of a decree already granted. It is, too, a decree which was passed before the adoption of the Placement Act and bears the approval of the final courts of appeal.” (App. 19). We submit that the prohibitions of the injunction could not be avoided by the simple expedient of an undertaking to transfer the assignment power from the school board to the Placement Board. We think that the District Court was eminently correct in its conclusion in this regard: “The court must overrule the claim of the County School Board and Superintendent that they should not be held to answer for the denial of admittance to the 9 plaintiffs. In this they urge that the Placement Board , had sole control of admissions—that the School Board and Superintendent had been divested by the Act of every power in this respect. As just explained, the Placement Act and the assignment powers of the Place ment Board are not acceptable as regulations or rem edies suspending direct obedience of the injunction. In law the defendants are charged with notice of these in firmities in the Board’s authority. Actually the plain tiffs were denied admission by the defendants’ agents— the school principals—-while the defendants had the custody and administration of the schools in question. “Hence, the refusal by the defendants, immediately or through their agents, to admit the applicants cannot here be justified by reliance upon the Placement Board. The defendants were imputable, also, with knowledge that the injunction was binding on the Placement Board. The latter was the successor to a part of the School Board’s prior duties; as a successor in office to the School Board, the Placement Board is one of those specifically restrained by the injunction.” (App. 20). See also Tate v. Department o f Conservation & Develop ment, 231 F.2d 615 (C. A. 4th 1956), cert, denied 352 U. S 838 (1956). II T h e P leadings A nd P roof W ere S u f f ic ie n t T o J u st ify T h e D istr ic t Court I n Gr a n t in g A ppellees T h e R e l ie f S o u g h t . The motion for further relief and the complaint in inter vention each alleged that the children involved made timely 10 application to appellants for admission for the 1957-58 school session to a public school in the county theretofore maintained for and attended by white children only; that each such child was denied admission to such schools on the ground that the Placement Act deprived appellants of authority to admit such children to such schools; and that defendants denied each such child who had not applied to the Placement Board for assignment admission to any pub lic school in the county (App. 5, 9). Each further alleged that it would have been futile for any such child to apply to the Placement Board in an effort to obtain a racially non- segregated education (App. 5-6, 9-10). These allegations, hardly disputed by appellants, are fully sustained by the evi dence, and both allegation and proof, viewed in the light of their factual antecedents, establish a deprivation of appel lees’ constitutional rights solely on the basis of their race. A Arlington County maintains 4 schools for Negroes (Tr. 111-112, 113, 114) and more than 45 for whites (T r. 114- 115). Prior to the current school session, the school au thorities had formulated boundaries of the areas, denomi nated “districts,” to be respectively served by the various schools, and admission to each school was restricted to pupils residing in the district served by that school and, of course, was further restricted by the practice of racial segre gation. There were 3 elementary and 1 secondary school districts for Negroes (T r. 112-119, 123; PI. Ex. 8, 9 ). The Negro secondary school district was unique in its division into two geographical parts, not contiguous, the centers of which were five or six miles apart, served by a combination junior- 11 senior high school, located in the southern portion of the two-part district, which was and is the sole secondary facil ity for Negroes in the county (T r. 112-113, 117-119; Ex. 8). The classification of school districts as white or Negro was purely a matter of race (T r. 119, 123, 124), and was a long standing practice (T r. I l l , 131). The boundaries of white school districts were fixed in terms of the capacity of school buildings to house a given number of children (Tr. 119-120). To the extent to which a white school facility could accomodate the children in that area, the' district boundaries were arranged so that the white child could go to the school nearest his residence. Upon the opening of schools for the current session, the school authorities followed instructions, issued by the Divi sion Superintendent to principals of the various schools in attempted compliance with the requirements of the Place ment Act, to decline admission of any child who had not applied to the Placement Board for assignment in any in stance where the Placement Act required such application (T r. 124-126). Principals were instructed not to assign new pupils, or those graduating or seeking transfer from one school to another; placement of all such children, if ac complished at all, must be done by the Placement Board (T r. 125). All other children were necessarily frozen in the schools they previously attended (Tr. 133). The county school authorities last formulated district boundaries for use during the 1956-57 school session, and presumably were adopted by the Placement Board in mak ing the assignments it did for the current session (Tr. 132- 133, 134). It assigned more than 2,000 Arlington children 12 (T r. 128-129), and all schools remained segregated—act ually attended by all-white or all-Negro student bodies (T r. 129-130). There is no known instance of an assignment of any student of either race to a school attended by a student of the other race. B In August of 1957, four of the five adult appellees en deavored to arrange for the admission of their children to a public school within the established school districts in which they resided. Appellee Robert A. Eldridge, Jr., after being advised by a school principal that he would have to make application to the Pupil Placement Board to secure the registration of his son in an Arlington County Public School, went to the office of the Arlington County School Board and endeavored to see the Division Superintendent of Schools. He did see Dr. Johnson, the Assistant Superintendent, and explained his situation to him and was again advised that he would have to proceed through the Pupil Placement Board. Mr. Eld ridge then addressed a letter to the Division Superintendent in which he detailed his previous experience and efforts to get his son registered in school, advised the Superintendent that he had not signed the pupil placement form, and re quested that, in view of the decision of this Court concern ing applications to the Pupil Placement Board, the Superin tendent register his son in the public school nearest his home or advise him where he could have him registered in such school. (Ex. 3.) On each occasion when he sought to regis ter his son he had available the son’s birth certificate and a copy of his previous scholastic record. Fillmore Elementary 13 School is one block and a half from the Eldridge home and the Hoffman-Boston School, a Negro facility, is four or five miles distant. Early in August, Mrs. Phyllis S. Costley, the mother of Louis G. Turner and Melvin H. Turner, infant appellees, procured a map of the Arlington County School districts and, it appearing that the Swanson Junior High School was the nearest junior high school to their residence, she then attempted to have her sons enrolled in that school. The prin cipal refused to enroll them. Mrs. Costley advised Mr. Rutter, the Superintendent, of these facts and requested him to have these children enrolled in Swanson Junior High School or the junior high school nearest their home. (Ex. 6.) Swanson Junior High School is not more than three quarters of a mile from the Costley residence and Hoffman- Boston is about six or seven miles distant. On opening day of school the children were again refused admission to Swanson Junior High School, but subsequently on that same day they were admitted to Hoffman-Boston High School, without Mr. or Mrs. Costley ever signing a pupil placement application. On August 23, 1957, Mrs. Dorothy Hamm sought to have her son, Leslie Hamm, Jr., enrolled in Stratford Jun ior High School and was advised that application would have to be made to the Pupil Placement Board. She and her husband then went to Mr. Rutter’s office. They were unable to see him personally, but were able to talk to him over the telephone. Mr. Rutter told them that the only means of registering the child was by signing the pupil placement form. Soon thereafter, Mrs. Hamm wrote Mr. Rutter a letter again requesting the enrollment of her son in S trat ford Junior High School. On opening day of school, Leslie 14 Hamm., Jr. was again refused admission to Stratford Jun ior High School. Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Hamm signed the pupil placement form and at the time of the hearing Leslie was not enrolled in any school. Stratford is about a half mile from the Hamm residence and Hoffman-Boston is about six miles distant. About August 19, 1957, Mrs. Dorothy P. Nelson and her son, George Tyrone Nelson, completed a pupil placement application form and submitted it to Mr. Richmond, the principal of Stratford Junior High School. They never received any reply to the application. On opening day, George Tyrone Nelson sought admission to Stratford Jun ior High School and was denied. Stratford is a half mile from the Nelson residence and Hoffman-Boston is six miles distant. Dr. Harold M. Johnson was the only one of the adult appellees who did not make a pre-school effort to enroll his children. He and his family had been away from the United States from July 27, 1957, until the day before Labor Day. He refused to sign a pupil placement form because he felt that it would prevent his children from attending the school nearest them and that even if he signed the form his chil dren would not be accepted. At the time he applied to W ash ington-Lee High School for the enrollment of his daughters he had their promotion slips and scholastic records available to hand over to the proper authorities. C In the foregoing circumstances, we submit that the Dis trict Court was absolutely correct in finding and concluding that 15 “Nothing in the evidence indicates that any of the plaintiffs is not qualified in his studies to enter the school which he sought to enter. Each applicant applied to a ‘white’ school, but each lives in the district of that or of another nearby ‘white’ school. Nor did the evi dence reveal a lack of space for him, or that the school did not afford the courses suited to the applicant. Coun sel for the defendants explained that they did not ad duce evidence as to the eligibility of the applicants for their respective schools because this was a matter with in the purview of the Placement Board. Anyway, no intimation of disqualification appeared as to any appli cant. “A review of the evidence is convincing that the only ground, aside from the provisions of the Place ment Act, for the rejection of the plaintiffs was that they were of the Negro race. The rejection was simply the adherence to the prior practice of segregation. No other hypothesis can be sustained in any of the seven instances.” (App. 22). Nor can the one assignment of the seven made by the Placement Board be permitted to stand. George T. Nelson filled out a placement application and submitted it to the principal of Stratford Junior High School. The Placement Board assigned him to Hoffman-Boston, and appellants denied him admission to Stratford. His residence is one- half mile from Stratford; Swanson Junior High School is almost as close. But Hoffman-Boston is six miles away. As the District Court concluded: “The basis for the Board’s placement is not given; no reason is evident for ignoring Stratford or Swan- 16 son. It cannot be accepted, for it is utterly without evidence to support it.” (App. 25). I l l T h e D ist r ic t C ourt P roperly E xercised I ts D iscre t io n I n F ix in g Se pte m b e r 23 As T h e E ffe c t iv e D ate O f I ts I n ju n c t io n The 1956 decree of the District Court commanded obedi ence to all nondiscriminatory state and local rules affecting public schooling and required the exhaustion of all suitable administrative remedies. It was thus clear from the begin ning “that the court was not attempting to direct how the school board should handle the problem of assigning pupils but was merely forbidding unconstitutional discrimination on the ground of race or color.” County School Board of Arlington County v. Thompson, 240 F.2d 59, 61 (C. A. 4th 1956). It was likewise clear from its July 27, 1957 mem orandum that, while futile administrative remedies need not be pursued, those “adequate,” “efficacious and expeditious” must be utilized (App. 3-4). And in its September 14, 1957 opinion, it expressed regret that the Placement Act could not be “utilized as a fair and practicable administrative remedy.” (App. 19). It is useless to contend, as appellants do, that the school authorities did not mention race when admission was denied, or that failure to apply to the Placement Board, rather than race, was the reason for the denial. Arlington’s school sys tem had previously been established on the principle of com plete educational segregation. The decision that the school authorities must not re-assign children was necessarily a de termination not to depart from this practice unless so di- 17 l ected by the Placement Board. And it was the school au thorities who barred the seven applicants from admission to the schools they sought to enter, and relegated them to segre gated facilities. Undoubtedly they would have been ad mitted if white; and it is equally without doubt that they were denied because they were not. As the District Court said, “The rejection was simply the adherence to the prior practice of segregation.” (App. 22). The Constitution ex tends its protection where race is at the root of the action as well as where it appears on the surface. Lane v. Wilson, 306 U. S. 268 (1939); Richmond v. Deans, 37 F.2d 712 (C. A. 4th 1930), af f d . 281 U. S. 704 (1930). See also Quong W ing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59 (1912). Nor are appellants excused by the consideration that they assumed that they must await assignments by the Placement Board. That they intended no deprivation of rights does not justify. See County School Board of Chesterfield County v. Freeman, 171 F.2d 702 (C. A. 4th 1948). As the District Court put it: “I t is immaterial that the defendants may not have intended to deny admission on account of race or color. The inquiry is purely objective. The result, not the intend ment, of their acts is determinative.” (App. 20-21). It would be difficult to attribute to the District Court an effort by its latest decree to administer the schools. It is equally difficult to support the contention that injunction should not enter without further opportunity to appellants to reassign the appellee children. For although more than three years had then elapsed since Brown v. Board of Edu cation, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), and more than eight months since the decision of this case on appeal in this Court, and despite the previous injunction, appellants still adhered to local public school segregation. Clearly something further 18 was warranted. County School Board of Arlington County V. Thompson, supra; Allen v . County School Board o f Prince Edward County, ........ F.2d ........ (C. A. 4th, No. 7463, November 11, 1957). As the Court itself said: “. . . the court must examine the evidence in regard to each applicant and ascertain whether it indicates that the denial of admittance was there due solely to race or color. The court is not undertaking the task of assign ing pupils to the schools. That is the function of the school authorities and the court has no inclination to assume that authority. Carson v. Warlick, 1956, 4 Cir., 238 F.2d 724, 728. But it is the obligation of the court to determine whether the rejection of any of the plain tiffs was solely for his race or color.” (App. 21). We submit that there was no further need or justification for continued indulgence of the appellants. The only pros pect for these children lay in a decree specifically directing their admission to particular schools. Any other course might well invite further delay and difficulty. Nor do we perceive any reason why the date fixed by the Court was not appropriate. We do not see in the admission of seven children, appellants’ problems of “proper distribu tion of school population into school districts, transporta tion, efficient use of school buildings and personnel, and others.” (Brief, 16-17). We concur in the judgment of the District Court in this regard : “The injunction will affect the school attendance very slightly. Into a white school-population of 21,245, only 7 Negro children will enter; 1 negro will be with 11,421 white children in the elementary grades; and 19 no more than 6 negroes among the 9,824 white high school students. Of 36 previously ‘all white’ schools in the County, 4 will be affected by the decree, and then not to a greater extent than 2 negroes in any one of the 4 schools.” (App. 25). IV T h e P roceedings I n T h e D ist r ic t Court W ere Co n sist e n t W it h T h e F ederal R u les O f C iv il P rocedure A nd T h e R u les O f T ile D ist r ic t Court The public schools of Arlington opened for the 1957-58 session on September 5. On that day the seven Negro chil dren involved in this appeal sought admission to a public school attended by white children only. Three of the seven, E. Leslie Hamm, Jr., Louis G. Turner and Melvin H. Turn er, were original plaintiffs in the action filed May 17, 1956. A fter admission was denied, these three filed a motion for further relief seeking “a further decree specifically direct ing defendants to admit said plaintiffs to the schools to which they, respectively, sought admission. . .” (App. 5-6). The remaining four, as members of the class on behalf of which the original action was brought, filed a motion to intervene, accompanying their motion by a proposed com plaint in intervention seeking the same relief sought in the motion for further relief (App. 6-10). The motions for intervention and for further relief were filed September 9. (App. 5, 6). On that date, the District Court entered ex parte an order g-ranting intervention and filing the intervention complaint (App. 12), and another order fixing September 11 as the date for the hearing (App. 11-12). Each order specifically directed that the Marshal 20 forthwith serve copies of the order upon the appellants, and the Clerk to immediately mail copies to their counsel of rec ord (App. 12, 13). That appellants actually received notice of hearing- and the proceedings is admitted (Appellants’ Brief p. 10). Rule 6 (d ) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not impose a hard and fast requirement of five days’ notice in all cases. Rather, it invests the Court with ample discre tion in the premises. See Anderson v. Brady, 5 F. R. D. 85 (E . D. Ky. 1945). By its terms, it has no application to a motion which may be heard ex parte and, in any event, au thorizes the Court to make an order fixing a different period. The instant case would seem clearly to be one in which the Court might wisely shorten the five-day period. As the Dis trict Court stated in overruling appellants’ objections to its action : “ . . . I think the motion to vacate the order of inter vention should be denied. The intervention was allowed immediately because interventions of this sort by a person similarly situated are generally allowed. The order permitting the intervention, of course, is always subject thereafter to attack just as it has been attacked today. But the immediate entry of the order did harm to no one. The Court is also of the opinion that the motion to continue should be denied. At the time the order was presented to the Court to set this motion for hearing, it was of the opinion either that the motions had been served, or what would amount practically to the same thing, that they would be immediately served. Counsel for the plaintiff explained that he had not in serted in the certificate the date of the hearing of the 21 motion because he did not know it, and I am sure that counsel was of the same opinion as the Court was, that the subsequent delivery of the motion the same day practically would have the effect of antecedent delivery of it. The Court was well aware of the five days’ rule and practice but fixed a shorter time in view of the known urgency of the situation; fixed it too, having in mind that if there was any serious objection to the time fixed, it could be changed on the motion. It is always difficult in fixing time for hearing- in a case where there are so many counsel. Frequently the Court has to fix a date arbitrarily and then wait for objec tions. It has also to bear in mind the circumstances of the case, the circumstances of counsel, and circum stances of its own docket. Here the Court believes that no injury will be done by proceeding with this case, but should any develop, why, the Court can then con sider further deferment.” (App. 39-40). It is not perceived how appellants can expect assistance from Rule 13 of the District Court, and the claim that this rule affects the issue here is not clear. Since appellees filed statements of points and authorities in support both of the motion to intervene and the motion for further relief (R. 212, 219), the suggestion seems to be that time limitations suggested by the rule were not observed. Rut the District Court rules were necessarily promulgated pursuant to Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure granting Dis trict Courts authority to make rules “not inconsistent with these rules.” It would be vain to argue that Rule 13 of the District Court rigidly imposes a requirement that Rule 6(d) expressly permits all District Courts to vary. 22 Appellants’ claim to prior notice of granting interven tion, and to opportunity to answer the intervention com plaint, could have substance only if in fact the intervention would be opposed, and the intervention complaint would be answered. In Allen v. County School Board of Prince Ed ward County, ........ F. 2 d ........ (C. A. 4th, No. 7463, No vember 11, 1957), intervention was permitted, without ob jection, on the date of hearing without any claim for an opportunity to answer or any answer in fact (Appellants’ Brief, p. 3.) One of the counsel representing appellants in this case represented one of the defendants there. And in the very case now before the Court, a previous intervention was permitted on the date of the hearing of July 31, 1956, without objection, and without any effort to seek or make an answer (Appellants’ Appendix, No. 7310, p. 9). Indeed, the 1957 intervention complaint here presented no question that the original complaint and the motion for further re lief had not already made an issue in the case. Nor do we think that there was any impropriety in the manner in which the claims of the seven children were pre sented and heard. The original proceeding, which was re viewed here, was a class action (R. 3). The original injunc tion, entered July 31, 1956, restrained the school authorities from refusing, on racial grounds, the admission to any school of “any child otherwise qualified for admission to, and enrollment and education in, such school.” (R. 181). The Court therein retained jurisdiction with power to en large or otherwise modify the injunctive provisions (R. 182). Three of the seven children now before the Court on this appeal were original plaintiffs, and the other four are members of the class on behalf of whom the action was initiated. Although the injunction imposed the requirement that adequate administrative remedies be exhausted before 23 litigation, it is clear that, within this limitaton, those orig inally parties plaintiff could appropriately seek further re lief, and members of the class on whose behalf the action was brought should be permitted thereafter to intervene in order to participate in the benefits thereof. Wolpe v. Pore- sky, 79 App. D. C. 141, 144 F.2d 505 (1944), cert, denied 323 U. S. 777 (1944); Wilson v. City o f Paducah, 100 F. Supp. 116 (W . D. Ky. 1951); American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 3 F. R. D. 162 (S. D. N. Y. 1943). See also Allen v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, ........ F.2d ........ (C. A. 4th, No. 7463, November 11, 1957). The claims of each of the seven children presented com mon questions of law and fact, and sought the same char acter of relief. The only defense offered was that the Pupil Placement Act had disabled the appellants from assigning them, and the questions whether this defense was valid, and whether the denials of admission were indeed a consequence of their race, were the legal issues in each instance. The only factual questions were whether the applicants were qualified to enter the schools to which they applied, and were denied admission thereto, and these were common to all cases, and hardly subject to dispute. And in each case there was sought a further decree specifically directing their ad mission to those schools. Although the seven children were presenting their individual grevances for determination, their respective claims, objectives and interests were com mon both to the main action and to each other. We submit that the District Court correctly permitted intervention and heard and determined these claims in the manner presented. While appellants seem to now intimate (Brief, p. 11) that they were precluded by the procedure adopted below from 24 offering evidence, the point does not seem to be well taken. Efforts on behalf of five of the seven children were made substantially ahead of the opening of the current session to enroll them in particular schools, and there were both con ferences and correspondence with the school authorities in this regard (T r. 27, 28, 58, 80, 81, 98; Ex. 2, 3, 5, 6 & 7). Then, and at the opening of this session, these efforts were frustrated, not because of lack of qualifications, or lack of space in the schools to accomodate them, but because of the administrative determination that assignments were the province of the Pupil Placement Board. There was ample opportunity for the authorities to investigate these claims, if investigation was indeed necessary, and to ascertain whether there were additional reasons why they should not be so admitted. More fundamentally, the appellants cannot now support a claim to additional time to investigate even tualities that under previous decrees they were already bound to anticipate and prepare for. For the District Court to have granted the request would have been to ignore “the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis,” Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 300 (1955), and “the known urgency of the situation.” (App. 40). It would have been tantamount to deferring them to the next enrollment date. It seems evident that appellants are presenting contentions as to developments that, in any event, produced no injury. The District Court expressed this opinion at the outset, but safeguarded their right to the protection of the Court should it develop that their rights became jeopardized (App. 39- 40). It appears that no injury resulted, and certainly no further request was made to the District Court for indul gence. 25 The proceedings under review were not a new case, pre senting novel questions, but rather were merely the latest phase of litigation pending for more than a year and involv ing issues and contentions well known to all. Indeed, on July 27, just slightly more than a month before the Septem ber 11 hearing, counsel had extensively argued the prin cipal question in the case—the effect of the Pupil Placement Act upon the Arlington situation. From the beginning ap pellants have been represented by able and experienced coun sel well versed in the law and quite capable of adequately- representing the interests of their clients. We think they did their job well, and now have no cause for complaint. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully submitted that the judgments appealed from should be affirmed. Respectfully submitted, E d w in C. B row n , 1200 Cameron Street, Alexandria, Virginia. O liv er W. H il l , 118 East Leigh Street, Richmond 19, Virginia. S pottswood W. R o bin so n , III, 623 North Third Street, Richmond 19, Virginia. Counsel for Appellees. In the UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS for the Fourth Circuit No. 7543 COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF A RLIN G TO N COUNTY Plaintiff versus TH O M PSO N , etc. Appellees. Appeal From The United States District Court For The Eastern District o f Virginia, Alexandria Division APPENDIX FOR THE APPELLEES EX C ER PTS FROM R E PO R T E R ’S TR A N SC R IPT Testimony of Robert A. Eldridge, Jr. ( tr 23) Q. Did you have any special reason for not sign ing the form? APPENDIX 2 A. I governed my action for two reasons. I had read in ( tr 24) the papers where the form itself had been con sidered to be unconstitutional, and second, it appeared to me that it wouldn’t be any use to fill out the form anyway because I noticed that at one portion of the form it says that it gave me the impression that the Board had the op tion to send your student to any school that it so desired, and it was my idea to have my child in the school nearest to his home. Q. That was your reason for not executing the form? A. That’s right. Q. If the Court please, we would like to offer into evi dence the form that was given to Mr. Eldridge by Mrs. Vance. Any objection? T H E C O U R T : Is there any objection to it? MR. BALL: No, sir. T H E C O U R T : Let it be admitted. T H E CLERK : Plaintiff’s No. 1. (The Clerk so marked the form as Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 1 in evidence.) MR. BROW N: Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 1. BY MR. B R O W N : Q. Mr. Eldridge, did there come a time when you pre sented your child to any other school in Arlington County ? A. Yes, I did on the opening day of school. I decided to go to the nearest school to my house, which was a block 3 APPENDIX ( tr 25) and a half. I t is known as the Fillmore Elementary School. It is located on Fillmore Street and I took my boy there and I was met at the door by a Mrs. Smith, who told me that I would have to— I think her reason, she told me that I would have to go to the Clay Elementary School to register my boy which was at— T H E C O U R T : Have to go where? T H E W IT N E S S : To the Clay Elementary School, lo cated at Seventh and Holland Street, North Arlington. She stated her reason for sending me there was because she didn’t have any more placement forms, so I proceeded to go to this school at Seventh and Holland Street where I asked could I register my boy to go to the school nearest his home, and I was told that I would have to fill out place ment form. BY MR. BROW N: Q. W as this the opening day of school? A. T hat’s right. A t that time I did take my, the birth certificate of my child, and his former record of his school that he previously attended. Q. You had those with you? A. On each occasion. Q. Each occasion ? A. Each occasion I had that with me. * * * ( tr 27) * * * Q. Mr. Eldridge, did you do anything else in order to get your child into school ? APPENDIX 4 A, Yes, I wrote a letter to the Superintendent. I wrote a— I believe before that time I took my boy to theArling- ton County Board and I asked to speak to Mr. T. R. Rutter, the Superintendent of Schools concerning the matter. I was told by a clerk there that Mr. Rutter was in a very important conference but Mr. Johnson would be glad to take care of me, a Dr. Johnson, rather. I went into the office with Dr. Johnson. H e talked to me and I explained to him that it was my desire to have my boy enroll in the nearest school to his home. Dr. Johnson explained to me that I would have to fill out a pupil placement form, that there was nothing that could be done for me other than to fill out the form. I did— I had written a letter previously to— Q. To whom? A. Superintendent T. R. Rutter concerning the matter. Q. Do you have, did you receive any response to that letter ? (tr 28) A. Yes, I did. Q. Do you have that letter with you now ? A. Yes, I do. That is the original copy and this is the registered receipt that I signed for same. Q. You mean this letter was sent to you by registered mail from the Superintendent of Schools, T. R. Rutter ? A. T hat’s correct. Q. And this is in response to the letter you had written to Superintendent of Schools? A. That’s correct. * * * ( tr 32) * * * Q. Where is the Fillmore School in relationship to your 5 APPENDIX home? A, It is one block and a half from my house. Q. One block and a half from your house ? A. That’s right. Q. How far is the Hoffman-Boston School from your home? A. Well, appear to be about four or five miles. It would appear that way to me. I couldn’t say for sure. Q But it is much farther than Fillmore School from your home; is that correct ? A. Very much so. * * * ( tr 34) * * * Q. And what is your race ? A. Negro. Q. That is all. ^ Testimony of Dorothy P. Nelson ( tr 56) * * * Q. And how long have you lived in Arlington County ? A. Seven years. Q. Do you have any children of school age ? A. Two. Q. And did there come a time when you presented, did there come a time when you presented one of your children to the school for admission ? A. Yes. APPENDIX 6 Q. W hat was his name? A. George Tyrone Nelson. ( tr 57) Q. And what is his age? A. Fourteen years. Q. Now is he in school at the present time? A. Yes, he is, Q. And what school? A. Hoffman-Boston. Q. Did he apply for admission to any other school to your knowledge prior to going to Hoffman-Boston? A. To Stratford Junior High. Q. And was he given a pupil placement form to execute? A. Yes. He filled out one, if that is what you mean. Q. Speak up so the Court can hear. A. He filled out a form from the, that he got from the School Board. Q. Did he fill out the form or did his parents? A. Well, he and I together filled it out. Q. Did you file that pupil placement form with the proper authorities ? A. Yes, sir. Q. And with whom did you file the form? A. Mr. Richmond at, Principal of Stratford Junior High. Q. And were you given any instructions to what you should do thereafter ? A. No. Q. W ere you told what school he would be assigned to? ( tr 58) A. No. Q. A fter you had filed this form, with Mr. Richmond, 7 APPENDIX and you say you filed it with him at the school; is that correct ? A. Yes, we gave it to him. Q. You gave it to him personally? A Yes, sir. Q. Have you received any response from it, that partic ular form? A. No, sir. Q. None whatsoever ? A. None whatsoever. Q. When was it that you filed this form with Mr. Rich mond? A. I ’m not certain but it was either the 19th of August or the 26th, but I am sure it was the 19th. I believe it was. Q. In other words, it was before the opening day of school; is that correct ? A. (nodded.) ( tr 59) * * * Q. W hat is the racial identity of your child? A. Negro. Q. Now what did you say your address was ? A. 2005 North Cameron Street. Q. And what is the nearest school to your home ? A. Junior high school, you mean ? Q. Yes. A. Stratford. Q. And about how far is Stratford from your home? A. Approximately a half a mile. 8 APPENDIX Q. And you’re familiar with Hoffman-Boston School, are you not? You know about it? A. Yes. Q. About how far is that school from your home? A. Six miles. Q. Six miles. W as your child presented to school on the opening day of school? ( tr 60) A. Yes. Q. And what school? A. You mean the first school? Q. Opening day of school? A. Stratford. Q. And was your child admitted ? A. No, he wasn’t. * * =1= (tr 70) * * * T H E C O U R T : How did you obtain the form that you subsequently filed on August 19th, or 26th, with Mr. Rich mond? T H E W IT N E S S : My boy went to the Arlington County School Board on Quincy Street in Cherrydale and obtained it himself. T H E C O U R T : And brought it back to you ? T H E W IT N E S S : Brought it home and he and I filled it out and we returned, took it back to Mr. Richmond at S trat ford. T H E C O U R T : Who took it back to Mr. Richmond? T H E W IT N E S S : My son and I. 9 APPENDIX T H E CO URT: Together? T H E W IT N E S S : Yes. T H E C O U R T : Did you have any discussion with Mr. Richmond on that occasion ? (tr 71) T H E W IT N E S S : No, I didn’t. I only asked him one question. T H E C O U R T : And what was that? T H E W IT N E S S : I asked him if we, did he know if we would be notified after the meeting about these, whether the child would go to Stratford or just what they would do. T H E C O U R T : A fter what meeting did you have in mind? T H E W IT N E S S : The meeting that was held in Rich mond on the 29th. T H E C O U R T : And did Mr. Richmond tell you that you would or would not be notified ? T H E W IT N E S S : He told me he couldn’t say because he didn’t know if we would be notified or just what would be the results of it. T H E C O U R T : Now what was that, the last time that you had any contact with the school ? T H E W IT N E S S : W ith Stratford? T H E COURT: Yes. T H E W IT N E S S : Yes, first and last. T H E C O U R T: Now what did you want to ask, Mr. Brown ? (tr 72) MR. B RO W N : I think it has been cleared up, if Your Honor please. That is all. No further questions. APPENDIX 10 T H E C O U R T : I understood she had already said that. MR. BA LL: Just one minute. In view of what she said —do you claim that you specifically asked in your applica tion for admission to Stratford ? T H E W IT N E S S : Yes. MR. BA LL: You wrote that in the application? T H E W IT N E S S : I didn’t write anything in the appli cation. We only filled out what questions were on the form to be filled in. ifc ifc Testimony of A rthur M. Costley, Sr. * * * (tr 82) * * * Q. W here do you live, what section of— A. I live in the section called, or near the section called Hall’s Hill and that is in North Arlington. Q. Northern section of Arlington ? A. Yes. Q. How far is that from Swanson? A. Oh, I would say not more than, couldn’t be more than three quarters of a mile. Q. From your house to the Swanson School? A. T hat’s right. Q. How far do you live from Hoffman-Boston ? A. Oh, about six or seven miles, I ’d say. Q. W here is Hoffman-Boston located? A. That is in South Arlington. 11 APPENDIX Testimony of T. Edward Rutter sfe sfe (tr 111) * * * Q. Your present occupation? A. Division Superintendent of Schools, Arlington County, Virginia. O. How long have you occupied that ? A. 1952 to 1957. Q. Continuous? A. Correct. Q. Mr. Rutter, you are one of the defendants in the case' that is now before the Court, am I correct in that regard ? A. That is correct. Q. How many schools are there, Mr. Rutter, in the Pub lic School System of Arlington County ? A. Approximately forty separate buildings. Q. Would you name, would you first tell me the number of schools that are attended entirely by Negro students ? A. The number? Q. The number ? (tr 112) A. Of schools? Q. The number of schools now attended entirely by Negro students? A. Four. Q. All right. How many of these four schools are high schools ? A. One. Q. W hat is the name of that school ? A. Hoffman-Boston Junior-Senior High School. APPENDIX 12 Q. Now you say it is a junior-senior high school. W hat grades does that school have? A. Sixth through twelve. Q. And which of those grades are junior high school grades and which are senior high school grades ? A. Six through nine are junior high school, and tenth through twelve are senior high school. Q. Now let me clear this up. Under your Arlington School System the first six grades are elementary school grades. Am I correct in that regard ? A. That’s correct. Q. And grades seven through nine are the junior high school grades ? A. T hat’s correct. Q. And nine through twelve are the senior high school grades ? ( tr 113) A. Right. Q. That is true in both Negro and white schools? T H E COURT: Ten through twelve, is it not? T H E W IT N E S S : Ten through twelve. MR. R O BIN SO N : I ’m sorry. BY MR. RO BIN SO N : Q. Is there any other Negro senior high school facility in Arlington County other than a part of the Hoffman-Boston facility ? A. No. Q. Is there any other Negro junior high school facility in Arlington County other than a part of the Hoffman- 13 APPENDIX Boston facility ? A. No. Q. Is Hoffman-Boston more than a single school plant or is it within itself a single educational unit and in a sense that it is a single building? A. It is a single coordinated educational unit. Q. How many buildings ? A. Well, there is really one building, although we have a temporary structure situated within about twenty feet of the building so there actually are two buildings on the site. Q. And what is this temporary structure being used for ? A. Well, it has been used from time to time for various ( tr 114) purposes. I believe most recently for art and music. Q. How temporary is this structure? By that I mean how long has it been used for these various purposes ? A. I don’t know the number of years but I can say it has been used for this purpose since I have known the school in 1950. Q. Since 1950? A. Yes. Q. A t least for the period of the last six or seven years ? A. Yes. Q. All right. Now what are the names of the three re maining Negro schools in Arlington County, all of which are elementary schools? A. The first is Hoffman-Boston Elementary School, lo cated very close to the Hoffman-Boston Junior-Senior High School. The other is the Drew Kemper School, composed of two school buildings but is administered as one elementary school, and the last is the Langston Elementary School. APPENDIX 14 Q. All right, sir. Now without undertaking to name them, how many high school facilities do you have in Arlington County attended exclusively at the present time by white students ? A. Two. Q. W hat are the names of those two schools ? A. Washington-Lee High School and Wakefield High School. ( tr 115) Q. And how many presently all-white junior high school facilities in the county ? A. May I name them one at a time because I ’m not sure that I can give you the exact number ? Q. Surely. A. In the northern part of the county we have Williams burg, Stratford, Swanson; in the central part of the county we would have Thomas Jefferson and in the southern part of the county Kenmore, and a new junior high school pres ently organized this year which will be known as the Gun- ston Junior H igh School. Q. How many? A. I believe that was seven, was it not? Q. Seven. Do you recall the exact number— T H E C O U R T : Let us see. I have six, Williamsburg, Stratford, Swanson, Jefferson, Kenmore, and Gunston. T H E W IT N E S S : I ’m sorry. That is right. T H E COURT: Six? T H E W IT N E S S : I believe that is correct. BY MR. RO BIN SO N : Q. How many all-white elementary schools do you have ? 15 APPENDIX A. I do not know the precise number, sir, but it would be approximately thirty-seven or thirty-eight. ( tr 116) Q. All right, sir. Now, Mr. Rutter, are you familiar with that map that is posted on the board over there ? A. Very familiar. Q. Have you had an occasion to examine that map to be in a position to tell me whether or not it is accurate in so far as the location of your schools are concerned and the boundaries, of the present boundaries of your school dis tricts ? A. I believe that it is, sir. Q. Would you walk over to the map and examine it and state to me positively, if you can, whether or not it does accurately disclose the location of schools and school boundaries ? A. Yes, I believe that it does. Q. How many school districts do you have as shown on that map, Mr. Rutter ? A, This map is an attempt to demonstrate and show the number of secondary school districts. We have a similar map showing the elementary districts. Q. Might I ask you this. When you say secondary, do you include only the senior high schools or do you include the junior high schools as well? A. That’s right. Q. Junior high school, junior and senior ? A. That’s right. Q. All right. Now how would, how many senior high school districts do you have? (tr 117) A. Three. APPENDIX 16 Q. Would you name them, please? A. Hoffman-Boston, Washington-Lee and Wakefield. Q. Are these school districts in each instance all located in a geographically contiguous fashion or do you have any instance of a school district being divided into two or more parts and the parts not being geographically contiguous ? A. We have one like the last you have just described. Q. All right, and which one is that? A. Hoffman-Boston. Q. All right. W hat is the difference, if any, between the school districts so far as the racial classification of the student residing in those districts may be concerned? A. The Hoffman-Boston District is designated as a dis trict for our colored boys and girls on the high school level. Q. And for that purpose only, am I correct? A. That is correct. Q. In assuming. And that district I understand you to say has two parts ? A. T hat’s correct. Q. Would you show me those two parts? A. (Pointed.) ( tr 118) T H E COURT: Would you refer to, for the purposes of the record—call one of them north ? T H E W IT N E S S : For the purpose of the record the northern section is just south of Lee Highway, the southern section is that portion of land surrounding the Hoffman- Boston Junior-Senior High School. 17 APPENDIX BY MR. RO BIN SO N : Q. Now the Hoffman-Boston Junior-Senior High School is physically located within the southern of the two Hoff man-Boston School Districts? A. T hat’s right. Q. There is no Negro junior or senior high school facility geographically situated within the boundaries of the north ern Hoffman-Boston School District? A. T hat’s correct. Q. How much distance would you say there is approxi mately between the northern and the southern, say, esti mating as best you can, from, say, the geographical centers of those districts, how much distance would you say that there is approximately between the northern and the south ern sections of the Hoffman-Boston School District? A. Well, I would judge it to be approximately five miles. I believe the total distance from the northern part of the (tr 119) county to the southern is seven and it would ap pear to me would be about five, five and a half or six miles. Q. Is there any other district in Arlington County at the secondary level embracing Negro students other than the Hoffman-Boston School District? A. No. Q. Now, and that is true with reference to the junior high schools as well as the senior high schools ? A. That is correct. Q. Come back up here. Now as I understand you, Mr. Rutter, the Hoffman- Boston School District with its two parts for secondary students is based entirely upon the race of the student re siding for school administrative purposes within those dis- APPENDIX 18 tric ts ; am I correct in that ? A. I believe that is correct. Q. All right. Now how do you figure out school districts for white students at Arlington County ? A. It is done in terms of the capacity of buildings to house a given number of children. Q. And by that you—well, suppose you explain just a little more fully, if you will, just how you go about working out the lines, the boundary lines of a school district for the purposes of determining the schools to be attended by white students ? ( tr 120) A. I think a good illustration to use would be the construction of the Williamsburg Junior High School. As that area of the community grew and it became evidence that additional space was required for boys and girls of junior high school age, plans were developed and eventually a school building was constructed in that section of the com munity. A very careful study was then made of the sur rounding junior high school areas, specifically Swanson and also Stratford. We then attempted to estimate the future growth of the area to which I have earlier referred and then determine what the boundary lines of the new junior high school would be. Q. Am I correct in concluding from what you have said, Mr. Rutter, that the objective in formulating boundaries of white high school and junior high school districts is to the extent that the capacity of the school geographically located in that district can accommodate students is to get each white child to the school that is closest to the place of his residence? A. Not necessarily closest to his residence, because there are a number of instances throughout the community when that is not the case. In other words, it has been necessary 19 APPENDIX in a number of instances I believe, in the past, of course, to schedule boys and girls to schools that are not necessarily the closest to their place of residence. Q. But the reason for doing that is that the school that ( tr 121) is geographically located in that district doesn’t have sufficient capacity to take care of all the students in that d istrict; isn’t that the reason ? A. That would be right. Q. So that the extent to which a school facility for white students can accommodate the children in that district, the object in fixing these boundaries is to arrange it so that the white student can go to the school that is the nearest to the place of their residence ? A. I believe that is correct. Q. All right. Now, Mr. Rutter, do you happen to have with you a map showing the elementary school districts of Arlington County ? A. Yes, I do. Q. Do you have one that we might— A. Yes. Q. Borrow from you for purposes of putting in the rec ord in this case with the understanding that you might not be able to get it back ? A. Very good. Q. All right, sir. Anybody want to see this ? Mr. Rutter, I hand you this document and I ask you to examine it and state, if you will, what it represents? A. This is a map of Arlington County on which has been (tr 122) superimposed boundary lines indicating the various elementary school districts. APPENDIX 20 MR. RO BINSO N : If Your Honor please, I would like to introduce this into evidence. Could we get it placed on the board ? T H E C O U R T : Before you do that, I think it would be well to mark it with an appropriate exhibit number, the map that is now on there, and let it appear that it is in evidence. I take it there is no objection to it. MR. R O B IN S O N : If Your Honor please, I just under stand that the one that is on the board has never been in troduced in evidence. T H E C O U R T : I say it will have to be admitted now. MR. R O BIN SO N : Oh, I see. T H E C LERK : Plaintiff’s No. 8. T H E C O U R T : Plaintiff’s No. 8. T H E C LERK : You wish to mark this as plaintiff’s No. 9? T H E C O U R T : Let the second map be plaintiff’s No. 9. (tr 123) (The maps were so marked by the Clerk as plaintiff’s Exhibits No. 8 and No. 9, respectively, in evidence.) BY MR. RO BIN SO N : Q. Now, Mr. Rutter, I say, ask you this, how many elementary schools do you have ? A. As many as we have school buildings against approxi mately four. Q. That means that you would have four Negro— 21 APPENDIX A. T hat’s right. Q. Elementary. No, would it be three? A. Hoffman-Boston, Drew Kemper and Langston; three. Q. In other words, you have a Hoffman-Boston Sec ondary School District and a Hoffman-Boston Elementary School District. You determine in each instance the bound ary lines for elementary school districts like you determine the boundary lines for secondary school districts; am I cor rect in that ? A. T hat’s right, fundamentally the same. Q. In other words, the Negro school districts are deter mined, the boundaries are determined entirely by reason of the fact that the Negro student resides in the areas that are surrounded by those boundaries ? A. That is correct. Q. You determine your white school boundaries in about the same way, or precisely the same way for elementary schools that you do for white secondary schools ? (tr 124) A. True. Q. Mr. Rutter, there has been considerable testimony and some amount of correspondence introduced in evidence coming from you indicative of a practice or policy on the part of the school authorities in Arlington County to de cline to admit any child to a school who has not made ap plication for assignment to the Pupil Placement Board in any instance where the Pupil Placement Act would require that application to be made. Is that as a matter of fact the policy and practice that was in effect on the opening date of schools for the 1957-58 school session? A. Yes. Q. In writing the letters that you did, you were simply APPENDIX 22 observing this policy, were you? A. That is correct. Q. And it was a policy established by the School Board or Arlington County ? A. No. I was attempting to follow to the letter of the law the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia. Q. W ho formulated this policy, you or the School Board ? A. Now I believe, sir, that we should distinguish between policy and what the statutes of Virginia happen to be at the present time. So that its always been our policy to observe the law and I don’t, I would not take the position that the Board of Education would have to formalize a policy to do (tr 125) so. Therefore, what we have done this year is what we have done in the past, obviously to observe the law. Q. Observe the law. I see. Now were instructions issued to the Principals of the various schools in the Public School System not to admit students to school who had not applied for assignment by the Pupil Placement Board in instances where the Pupil Placement Act would require an applica tion for assignment ? A. That I believe is essentially correct. The memoranda that went from my office to the Principals always were de signed to implement the statutes of the State of Virginia. Q. And at the risk of being a small amount of repeti tion, Mr. Rutter, I just want to make certain that the record is clear on this. In other words, the practice in Arlington County at the commencement of the current school session pursuant to orders and directives emanating from your of fice, this situation, in other words, the policy and practice were, one, that any assignment of a new student or a gradu ating student or a transferring student would have to be 23 APPENDIX made by the Pupil Placement Board and would not be made by the school authorities of Arlington County. Am I correct to this extent ? A. Placement would not be made by the school authorities of Arlington County but they would be made by the Pupil Placement Board. T hat’s right. y . All right. Secondly, no child would be admitted to (tr 126) the Public Schools of Arlington County who for, for whom an application was required for assignment to be made to the Pupil Placement Board by the Act. In other words, in those instances where the Act undertook to re quire that the Pupil Placement Board make the assignment, you would not admit a child to school unless he applied to the Pupil Placement Board for the assignment and was as signed to a particular school by the Board? A. That’s correct. Q. All right, sir. How many school children do you have in the Public School System of Arlington County? By that, Mr. Rutter, I would like to know the total number white and Negro com bined, elementary and secondary combined ? A. I am sorry, sir, but I cannot give you the precise figures for this school year. Q. Approximately? A. Because these changes are being made every day. We have approximately 23,000. We anticipate 23,000 this academic year, and our experience in the past has been that approximately five percent of that number, of the total num ber of registered would be children of the Negro race. T H E C O U R T : Now that is of all the schools, is it, Mr. Rutter ? T H E W IT N E S S : Yes, that is all the schools. APPENDIX 24 (tr 127) T H E C O U R T : Elementary as well as second ary? T H E W IT N E S S : That is right. MR. R O B IN S O N : In other words, you would have ap proximately 1,500 Negro students and you would have ap proximately 21,500 white students? T H E W IT N E S S : Yes. BY MR. RO BIN SO N : Q. Would you be able to give us any reasonably accurate estimate of the number of children that you would have, white and Negro, in the elementary schools, junior high schools, and senior high schools; would you be able to do that? A. To give you the approximate enrollment? Q. Yes. A. I can’t do it on the stand at this moment, but I can secure it, the information. Q. All right, sir. A. I can’t do that too accurately and I would hesitate to do so. Q. You would be able to supply us with that information before leaving today? A. Yes. Q. I would like for you to do so. (tr 128) T H E C O U R T : Do you have it at the desk? T H E W IT N E S S : I am sure that there are members of my staff here who can supply me with the information. 25 APPENDIX T H E C O U R T : I wonder if you can get it now readily and would save you from coming back to the stand. T H E W IT N E S S : Would you repeat the precise— MR. R O B IN S O N : I would like to know, one, the num ber of Negro elementary students, junior high school students, senior high school students; number of white elementary, junior high, and senior high. T H E W IT N E S S : Well, we’ll be able to get the informa tion in just a few moments. MR. R O B IN S O N : Well, while we are waiting, let me ask you a couple of other questions, Mr. Rutter. BY MR. R O B IN S O N : Q. Do you have any idea, or do you have any reasonably accurate estimate of the number of students, the approxi mate number of students assigned to the Public Schools of Arlington County by the Pupil Placement Board for the current session? (tr 129) A. There are more than 2,000. I am sure of that. Q. More than 2,000. A. Yes. Q. Do you have any information that would be reason ably accurate as to approximately how many of these 2,000 would be Negroes and how many of the 2,000 would be whites ? A. No, I do not. Q. I understand that so far as you know all of the schools in Arlington County are being attended by the members of one race only, by that I mean that there is no single instance APPENDIX 26 of any school in the entire School System attended by a Negro and a white child. They are all either actually a t tended by all-white students or all-Negro students. Am I correct in that conclusion? A. That’s right. Q. And this notwithstanding the fact that 2,000 assign ments approximately have been made by the Pupil Place ment Board ? I mean that has not been affected by reason of the assignment ? A. Presumably not. Q. Would I be correct in my conclusion from that, Mr. Rutter, that out of 2,000 assignments made by the Pupil Placement Board, all 2,000 of those students, if they happen to the extent to which they are white were assigned to white schools and all within that 2,000 figure who happen to be (tr 130) Negroes were assigned to Negro schools without exception so far as you know ? A. So far as I know. * * * Q. Mr. Rutter, were you able to get the information I inquired about before the last recess ? A. Yes. I have these data that are as current as yester day afternoon, September the 10th. Negro elementary enrollment, 946. Negro junior high school enrollment, 311. Negro senior high school enroll ment, 175. Total, 1,432. W hite elementary enrollment, 11,421. W hite junior high school enrollment, 5,697. ( tr 131) T H E COURT: Start again. T H E W IT N E S S : Yes, sir. I am sorry, sir. W hite elementary enrollment, 11,421. Junior high white 27 APPENDIX enrollment, 5,697. Senior high school white enrollment, 4,127. Total white enrollment, 21,245. BY MR. RO BIN SO N : Q. Mr. Rutter, you gave some testimony before the last recess as to how you would formulate for white and Negro students respectively just to districts. Now the processes that have been employed for formulating school districts for both elementary and secondary students, for both whites and Negroes, of the present processes that you have used, have been used for the— isn’t something brand new—they have been used for some period of time, have they ? A. That’s correct. Q. Say during the entire term of office that you have occupied the office ? A. I think it antedates that. Q. Beg pardon? A. It goes beyond that. Q. Goes back beyond that. Thank you very much. That is all. CROSS EX A M IN A TIO N (tr 132) BY MR. BALL: Q. Mr. Rutter, the Wakefield School has been mentioned. Is that a combination junior and senior high school? A. Yes, it is, Mr. Ball. Q. W ith regard to these maps, as I understand, they are last year’s map ? A. Yes, that is correct. APPENDIX 28 Q. Local Board anything to do with making up this year’s maps? A. W e have not made any map this year, sir, inasmuch as we no longer, of course, have any jurisdiction in the placement of children in the schools so we have not made the maps this year. T H E C O U R T : You mean by that there are for this session no district, school districts in Arlington County ? T H E W IT N E S S : The districts are, sir, those that are shown on the map, but the map is last year’s map and we have made no changes in the map this year. T H E C O U R T : Well, do you still observe these district lines for any purpose whatsoever ? T H E W IT N E S S : Well, presumably they are observed (tr 133) by the Pupil Placement Board, sir. MR. R O BIN SO N : Mr. Rutter, by that do you mean that the Pupil Placement Act had the effect when it went into operation, had the effect of freezing all students, white and Negro, in the schools that they were attending on the effective date of the Act, is that what you have reference to in your last answer to the Court’s question ? T H E W IT N E S S : That the description that you have just given seems to me to be quite similar to a clause or a sentence or two, a paragraph in the law itself. MR. R O B IN S O N : By that I mean and I am trying to find out now what the actual operation of this thing has been in Arlington County when the law went into effect, it had the effect in your interpretation of it, it had the effect of keeping all students in the, who were in school, in the schools that they attended when the law went into effect, of keeping them there unless the Pupil Placement Board 29 APPENDIX transferred them to some other school ? T H E W IT N E S S : That is my understanding. ( tr 134) MR. R O BIN SO N : Are you familiar with the actionable results of assignments of Arlington school chil dren made by the Pupil Placement Board? I mean do you know in a general sort of way whether or not so far as the students are concerned the Pupil Placement Board has generally observed the old 1956-57 school district lines in making its own assignments in those instances where it has made assignments? T H E W IT N E S S : That would be my general observa tion. O f course, I couldn’t be familiar with all the forms and it is perfectly possible that some children who'may have attended a given school last year were not assigned to the same school this year. MR. R O B IN S O N : But so far as you know, the state ment that I just made is correct ? T H E W IT N E S S : I believe that is correct. MR. R O BIN SO N : Do the school authorities or the Principals or any other agents, employee or representative of the School Board, or Division Superintendent of Arling ton County make any recommendations to the Pupil Place ment Board as to the school that a child should be assigned ( tr 135) to? T H E W IT N E S S : Absolutely not. MR. R O BIN SO N : That is all. MR. H IL L : Let me see the plaintiff’s Exhibit 5, I think it is. MR. RO BIN SO N : Mr. Rutter, of course, you are familiar with this form, are you not? APPENDIX 30 T H E W IT N E S S : Indeed I am, sir. MR. R O B IN S O N : I am calling your attention to a sec tion of the form that reads as follows: Information and recommendations from local school board, if child is enter ing school for the first time is date of child—wait a minute. No. I beg pardon. Right under that, big bold faced heading that I have just read to you, the third printed line down, recommend to school to which pupil should be assigned. Am I correct in understanding from what you have just said that your employees in Arlington County do not make a recommendation to the Pupil Placement Board as to the school to which a particular student should be assigned as is requested by that form ? (tr 136) T H E W IT N E S S : That is correct. W e do not, and we did not on that form. MR. R O B IN S O N : That is all. Thank you, Mr. Rutter. * * * T H E C O U R T : Let me ask Dr. Rutter one question. Doctor, will you stand right up where you are? Are you familiar with these seven instances that students’ ( tr 137) applications, that we are considering today? T H E W IT N E S S : Yes, sir, T H E C O U R T : To your knowledge.was any one of them disqualified by reason of his scholastic records to enter the school to which he applied ? T H E W IT N E S S : I would have no way of knowing that, Your Honor. In other words, I didn’t attempt to secure that information. T H E C O U R T : You cannot answer that? T H E W IT N E S S : No, sir. T H E COURT: All right.