REA Holding Corporation v. Sowerwine Opinion
Public Court Documents
April 14, 1977 - July 27, 1977

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. REA Holding Corporation v. Sowerwine Opinion, 1977. b2c3afdc-c19a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/658d1c6d-86f4-471a-8be4-bd4dfe32f1fc/rea-holding-corporation-v-sowerwine-opinion. Accessed July 06, 2025.
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fflARCP Legal Defense Fund 10 C-.l.itnb’ is Civr-le New YC;:\ ; l-Soi9 ' ■ ■ . . ‘ i Y AUG 5 ^ ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F ob th e S econd C iboxjit *• ------■ ».xw^*r?v.- . Hjjc . _<9l No. 789—September Term, 1976. (Argued April 14, 1977 Decided July 27, 1977.) Docket No. 76-5039 In the Matter of REA H olding C orporation, T h e E xpress C o m pan y , REA E xpress, I n c ., f/k /a Railway Express Agency, Inc., R exco S u p pl y C orporation, Bankrupts. M atth e w E. M a n n in g , A n t h o n y S atriano , D an iel S. G il - h u l y , V in ce n t P ontillo , W illiam R. W egl, E dm und F. N ovitski, E dward J. C ox, A n t h o n y J. J a n u z z i, C harles F. M cG overn and J am es J. K ilco yn e , C r editor s-Appellants, B rotherhood oe R ailw a y , A ir lin e and S team ship Clerks , F reight H andlers, E xpress and S tation E m ployees, Intervenor, v. C. O rvis S o w erw in e , Trustee in Bankruptcy, Appellee. 4993 Cl ark , Associate Justice,* and M oore and M u lligan , Circuit Judges. Appeal from order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Lloyd F. Mac- Mahon, Judge, dismissing the petition of a group of cred itors for reorganization of a debtor corporation under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C, §501 et seq. Affirmed. A r t h u r M. W iseh art , Esq., New York, N.Y. (Wisehart, Friou & Koch, of counsel), for Creditors-Appellants. W illiam M. K a h n , Esq., and J oshua J. A ngel , Esq., New York, N.Y. (Whitman & Eanson, Marcus & Angel, co-counsel, Donald L. Wal lace, Jeffrey A. Oppenheim, of counsel), for Appellee. J o h n O’B. Clarke , J r ., Esq., Washington, D. C. (Reilly, Fleming, & Reilly and Highsaw, Mahoney & Friedman, on the brief; David J. Fleming, James L. Highsaw, William J. Donlon, General Counsel for Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks, Rosemont, Illinois, of counsel), for Intervenor. Honorable Tom 0. Clark, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, Retired, sitting by designation. Mr. Justice Clark died on June 13, 1977, before this case could be decided. Pursuant to $0.14 of the Rules of this Court, this petition is being determined by Judges Moore and Mulligan, who are in agreement. Prior to his untimely death, Mr. Justice Clark had voted to affirm the petition. 4994 M o o re , Circuit Judge: Four companies, REA Holding Corporation, The Ex press Company, Inc., REA Express, Inc., f/k /a Railway Express Agency, Inc. and Rexco Supply Corporation (col lectively referred to as “REA” ), have been adjudicated as bankrupts. Out of the welter of charges and countercharges a few salient facts emerge. For many years prior to 1975 REA had been engaged in the express shipping business in the United States by land and by air, and to some ex tent internationally. Its Railway Express Agency trucks were a common sight to the American public. It operated under both Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) authority. Unlike the Biblical seven fat years alternating with seven lean years,1 for some 30 years REA’s were all lean with a modest exception in 1974. The natural consequence of such financial debility was the filing of a petition for an arrange ment under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §701 et seq., which occurred on February 18, 1975. Honor able John J. Gralgay, the Bankruptcy Judge in charge of these proceedings, by order permitted the Bankrupts to continue to operate their business as Debtors-In-Possession. A Creditors Committee (confirmed April, 1975), in co operation with the Bankrupts, endeavored by operating economies to restore REA to a profitable operation. One of the economy measures was a motion to reject a contract with the Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks (BRAC), a union of which most employees were members. From the time of the motion until ultimate rejection of the contract, the BRAC employees were paid only 90% of their then going wage and no vacation or holiday pay. These deficits constitute the bulk of the large claims which the 1 Genesis, Chap. 41. 4995 BEAC employees assert and are the source of the claims of the ten petitioning creditors in this proceeding. Despite high hopes and substantial economies, REA con tinued to suffer losses which during the Chapter XI pro ceeding—February 18, 1975 through September 28, 1975—- amounted to some $15,790,000, with a discouraging prog nostication of additional losses of some $5,681,000 for the next three months (October through December). Unable to meet their payrolls, the bankrupts on Novem ber 6, 1975 requested that they be adjudicated bankrupt. Then ensued rapid developments. On November 6,1975 the bankruptcy order was signed and entered. The next day, C. Orvis Sowerwine, Esq. was appointed and qualified as Trustee. The Trustee straightaway proceeded to collect claims and to liquidate the bankrupts’ assets—including terminals and rolling stock—so that REA had no operat ing facilities. There remains, however, REA’s “operating- authorities”—rights obtained through the ICC and CAB to operate various routes. In the liquidation process, these operating authorities were put up for sale. Six hearings were held before the Bankruptcy Judge during the period from June 23, 1976 to July 9, 1976. Judge Calgay, in an opinion and order- dated July 16, 1976, held that of the four2 proposals sub mitted for the acquisition of REA’s operating authorities, customer lists and trade names and marks, the Alltrans Express—U.S.A. proposal was the “best offer” : that it represented “a fair and reasonable value for the Prop erty” ; that “acceptance of the Alltrans offer is in the best interests of the bankrupt estate” ; and that it “provides 2 Alltrans Express-—U.S.A. ("Alltrans” ), BEAEMCO, Ine., All Truck Express, Inc. ("A ll Truck” ) and ABC Freight Forwarding Corpora tion ("ABC” ). 4996 the probability of the greatest realization to the bankrupt estate from the sale of the property” . The Bankruptcy Judge had eliminated All Truck and ABC as submitting either partial or contingent offers, so that the choice was between Alltrans and BEAEMCO. In the July 16, 1976 order, the Judge found in favor of All trans and directed the Trustee to accept the Alltrans offer and to prepare a contract for submission to, and approval by, the Judge. An appeal from this order is pending before Judge Werker. Although not particularly material to the narrow issue before us, a word about Alltrans and BEAEMCO may not be amiss. Alltrans is represented to be a subsidiary of Thomas Nationwide Transport, Ltd., with consolidated assets of $190,000,000. Pursuant to its proposal, Alltrans was to pay the bankrupts $2,500,000 in cash upon ICC approval of a temporary transfer to it of the operating authorities. Additionally, pending decision on a permanent transfer, Alltrans would make interim payments of certain percent ages of gross revenues over a ten year period. If such approval of a permanent transfer were obtained, Alltrans and Thomas together guaranteed payments of at least some $9,500,000. BEAEMCO was organized in the interest of BEA’s em ployees who desired to continue to operate BEA. It was without funds and without operating facilities. Its chief asset was “hope” and a hypothetical plan portrayed in minute detail during 3% days of testimony by an acknowl edged expert in the transportation field, Mr. F. Balph Nogg. It was Mr. Nogg’s opinion that $3,000,000 would be needed at the outset; that equipment could be rented or purchased by the employees; that employees could con tribute 10% of their salaries; and that large anticipated 4997 profits might enable substantial payments to be made to creditors. However, no part of the REAEMCO plan called for the production and presentation of new money because there was none. Thereafter, a group of ten former REA employees, as creditors (claims aggregating $22,000) filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §501 et seq. That petition, assigned to District Judge Lloyd F. MacMahon, was referred to Bankruptcy Judge Galgay who since February 18, 1975 had been thoroughly familiar with all the facts and proceedings in connection with the bankrupt estate. Judge Galgay held a hearing on the petition on September 27,1976. It is on that occasion that appellants claim that they were deprived of a fair hearing. The deprivation, however, is that Mr. Nogg was not permitted to repeat his contention that “ the reorganization of REA would be feasible” . (Appellants’ Brief, p. 13a). But the Bankruptcy Judge considered all of the testimony and exhibits from November 5, 1975 to September 27, 1976, including all of the Nogg testimony in support of feasibility. The only issue before the Judge and before us is whether the Chapter X petition was filed in good faith. The Bankruptcy Act provides: “Without limiting the generality of the meaning of the term ‘good faith’, a petition shall be deemed not to be filed in good faith if * * * (3) It is unreasonable to expect that a plan of re organization can be effected . . . .” 11 U.S.C. §546. Thus the Bankruptcy Judge did not have to look behind the petition to discover an improper or unethical purpose. He only had to look at the petition against the background 4998 of all the facts known to Mm and decide whether it was “ reasonable to expect that a plan of reorganization can be effected.” To this end, he not only had opinion testimony before him, but the actual experience of a debtor using substantial economy measures and accumulating a $15,- 790,000 deficit in seven and a half months and a further estimated deficit of $5,681,000 in three additional months. He knew that there were no terminals, no operating equip ment and no operating personnel; even the operating au thorities were in jeopardy. The period taken for decision was short, but he -was entitled to rely on a non-legal con cept—“deja vu” . The Bankruptcy Judge’s Report of September 28, 1976 was submitted to Judge MacMahon who, on September 30, 1976, after oral argument from the parties on September 29, 1976, found the bankruptcy Judge’s findings supported by substantial evidence and adopted them in all respects. Judge MacMahon was mindful that “more time might im prove the fullness of this [his] memorandum” , but wisely refrained from adding to the volumes which already over tax the space of our law libraries and held that the petition was not filed in good faith. This holding is clearly correct on the facts and the law, 11 TT.S.C. §546(3), and we there fore affirm. Appellant argues in extenso (it may be said—in exten- sissimo) that the bankruptcy proceedings have been tainted by a conflict of interest on the part of the Trustee. This is no occasion to do more than touch upon the subject which seems to be an obsession of the appellants. In the first place, it is completely irrelevant to the issue of the likeli hood of a feasible reorganization. This decision is solely for the Bankruptcy Judge and the court. The recom mendation by the Trustees that the Alltrans offer should be accepted was quite in accord with the facts—Alltrans 4999 offered realty; EEAEMCO offered unfulfilled, speculative hopes. Nor did the Bankruptcy Judge follow the Trustee’s recommendation blindly, as his report clearly shows. Con flict of interest did not create the u n fortu n ate financia l situation in which EEA found itself. Conflict of interest did not create the facts which after full and fair explora tion proved the Alltrans. offer to be superior. The appeal from the July 16, 1976 order (acceptance of Alltrans offer) is pending. Proceedings before the ICC are unfinished. There are still problems for the Bank ruptcy Judge and on the facts, there is no n eed f o r a re ceiver. Appellants are still free to raise the issue of con flict of interest in appropriate proceedings in which facts, if any, may be adduced in support thereof. Conflict of interest is a conclusion and conclusions should rest upon a solid foundation of fact. The order dismissing the Chap ter X petition and vacating the stay was proper and ac cordingly we affirm. 5000 480-7-29-77 . U8CA—4221 M E IIE N PRESS IN C ., 4 4 5 G R E E N W IC H ST., N E W YO R K, N . Y. 1 0 0 1 3 , (2 12 ) 9 6 6 -4 1 7 7