REA Holding Corporation v. Sowerwine Opinion
Public Court Documents
April 14, 1977 - July 27, 1977
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. REA Holding Corporation v. Sowerwine Opinion, 1977. b2c3afdc-c19a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/658d1c6d-86f4-471a-8be4-bd4dfe32f1fc/rea-holding-corporation-v-sowerwine-opinion. Accessed December 04, 2025.
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AUG 5 ^ ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
F ob th e S econd C iboxjit
*• ------■ ».xw^*r?v.- . Hjjc . _<9l
No. 789—September Term, 1976.
(Argued April 14, 1977 Decided July 27, 1977.)
Docket No. 76-5039
In the Matter of
REA H olding C orporation, T h e E xpress C o m pan y , REA
E xpress, I n c ., f/k /a Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
R exco S u p pl y C orporation,
Bankrupts.
M atth e w E. M a n n in g , A n t h o n y S atriano , D an iel S. G il -
h u l y , V in ce n t P ontillo , W illiam R. W egl, E dm und
F. N ovitski, E dward J. C ox, A n t h o n y J. J a n u z z i,
C harles F. M cG overn and J am es J. K ilco yn e ,
C r editor s-Appellants,
B rotherhood oe R ailw a y , A ir lin e and S team ship Clerks ,
F reight H andlers, E xpress and S tation E m ployees,
Intervenor,
v.
C. O rvis S o w erw in e , Trustee in Bankruptcy,
Appellee.
4993
Cl ark , Associate Justice,* and
M oore and M u lligan , Circuit Judges.
Appeal from order of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, Lloyd F. Mac-
Mahon, Judge, dismissing the petition of a group of cred
itors for reorganization of a debtor corporation under
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C, §501 et seq.
Affirmed.
A r t h u r M. W iseh art , Esq., New York, N.Y.
(Wisehart, Friou & Koch, of counsel), for
Creditors-Appellants.
W illiam M. K a h n , Esq., and J oshua J. A ngel ,
Esq., New York, N.Y. (Whitman & Eanson,
Marcus & Angel, co-counsel, Donald L. Wal
lace, Jeffrey A. Oppenheim, of counsel), for
Appellee.
J o h n O’B. Clarke , J r ., Esq., Washington, D. C.
(Reilly, Fleming, & Reilly and Highsaw,
Mahoney & Friedman, on the brief; David
J. Fleming, James L. Highsaw, William J.
Donlon, General Counsel for Brotherhood
of Railway and Airline Clerks, Rosemont,
Illinois, of counsel), for Intervenor.
Honorable Tom 0. Clark, Associate Justice, United States Supreme
Court, Retired, sitting by designation.
Mr. Justice Clark died on June 13, 1977, before this case could be
decided. Pursuant to $0.14 of the Rules of this Court, this petition is
being determined by Judges Moore and Mulligan, who are in agreement.
Prior to his untimely death, Mr. Justice Clark had voted to affirm the
petition.
4994
M o o re , Circuit Judge:
Four companies, REA Holding Corporation, The Ex
press Company, Inc., REA Express, Inc., f/k /a Railway
Express Agency, Inc. and Rexco Supply Corporation (col
lectively referred to as “REA” ), have been adjudicated as
bankrupts. Out of the welter of charges and countercharges
a few salient facts emerge. For many years prior to 1975
REA had been engaged in the express shipping business
in the United States by land and by air, and to some ex
tent internationally. Its Railway Express Agency trucks
were a common sight to the American public. It operated
under both Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) authority.
Unlike the Biblical seven fat years alternating with seven
lean years,1 for some 30 years REA’s were all lean with a
modest exception in 1974. The natural consequence of such
financial debility was the filing of a petition for an arrange
ment under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.
§701 et seq., which occurred on February 18, 1975. Honor
able John J. Gralgay, the Bankruptcy Judge in charge of
these proceedings, by order permitted the Bankrupts to
continue to operate their business as Debtors-In-Possession.
A Creditors Committee (confirmed April, 1975), in co
operation with the Bankrupts, endeavored by operating
economies to restore REA to a profitable operation. One
of the economy measures was a motion to reject a contract
with the Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks
(BRAC), a union of which most employees were members.
From the time of the motion until ultimate rejection of the
contract, the BRAC employees were paid only 90% of their
then going wage and no vacation or holiday pay. These
deficits constitute the bulk of the large claims which the
1 Genesis, Chap. 41.
4995
BEAC employees assert and are the source of the claims
of the ten petitioning creditors in this proceeding.
Despite high hopes and substantial economies, REA con
tinued to suffer losses which during the Chapter XI pro
ceeding—February 18, 1975 through September 28, 1975—-
amounted to some $15,790,000, with a discouraging prog
nostication of additional losses of some $5,681,000 for the
next three months (October through December).
Unable to meet their payrolls, the bankrupts on Novem
ber 6, 1975 requested that they be adjudicated bankrupt.
Then ensued rapid developments. On November 6,1975 the
bankruptcy order was signed and entered. The next day,
C. Orvis Sowerwine, Esq. was appointed and qualified as
Trustee. The Trustee straightaway proceeded to collect
claims and to liquidate the bankrupts’ assets—including
terminals and rolling stock—so that REA had no operat
ing facilities. There remains, however, REA’s “operating-
authorities”—rights obtained through the ICC and CAB
to operate various routes.
In the liquidation process, these operating authorities
were put up for sale. Six hearings were held before the
Bankruptcy Judge during the period from June 23, 1976
to July 9, 1976. Judge Calgay, in an opinion and order-
dated July 16, 1976, held that of the four2 proposals sub
mitted for the acquisition of REA’s operating authorities,
customer lists and trade names and marks, the Alltrans
Express—U.S.A. proposal was the “best offer” : that it
represented “a fair and reasonable value for the Prop
erty” ; that “acceptance of the Alltrans offer is in the best
interests of the bankrupt estate” ; and that it “provides
2 Alltrans Express-—U.S.A. ("Alltrans” ), BEAEMCO, Ine., All Truck
Express, Inc. ("A ll Truck” ) and ABC Freight Forwarding Corpora
tion ("ABC” ).
4996
the probability of the greatest realization to the bankrupt
estate from the sale of the property” .
The Bankruptcy Judge had eliminated All Truck and
ABC as submitting either partial or contingent offers, so
that the choice was between Alltrans and BEAEMCO. In
the July 16, 1976 order, the Judge found in favor of All
trans and directed the Trustee to accept the Alltrans offer
and to prepare a contract for submission to, and approval
by, the Judge. An appeal from this order is pending
before Judge Werker.
Although not particularly material to the narrow issue
before us, a word about Alltrans and BEAEMCO may not
be amiss.
Alltrans is represented to be a subsidiary of Thomas
Nationwide Transport, Ltd., with consolidated assets of
$190,000,000. Pursuant to its proposal, Alltrans was to
pay the bankrupts $2,500,000 in cash upon ICC approval
of a temporary transfer to it of the operating authorities.
Additionally, pending decision on a permanent transfer,
Alltrans would make interim payments of certain percent
ages of gross revenues over a ten year period. If such
approval of a permanent transfer were obtained, Alltrans
and Thomas together guaranteed payments of at least
some $9,500,000.
BEAEMCO was organized in the interest of BEA’s em
ployees who desired to continue to operate BEA. It was
without funds and without operating facilities. Its chief
asset was “hope” and a hypothetical plan portrayed in
minute detail during 3% days of testimony by an acknowl
edged expert in the transportation field, Mr. F. Balph
Nogg. It was Mr. Nogg’s opinion that $3,000,000 would
be needed at the outset; that equipment could be rented
or purchased by the employees; that employees could con
tribute 10% of their salaries; and that large anticipated
4997
profits might enable substantial payments to be made to
creditors. However, no part of the REAEMCO plan called
for the production and presentation of new money because
there was none.
Thereafter, a group of ten former REA employees, as
creditors (claims aggregating $22,000) filed a petition for
reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 11
U.S.C. §501 et seq. That petition, assigned to District
Judge Lloyd F. MacMahon, was referred to Bankruptcy
Judge Galgay who since February 18, 1975 had been
thoroughly familiar with all the facts and proceedings in
connection with the bankrupt estate. Judge Galgay held a
hearing on the petition on September 27,1976. It is on that
occasion that appellants claim that they were deprived of
a fair hearing. The deprivation, however, is that Mr.
Nogg was not permitted to repeat his contention that “ the
reorganization of REA would be feasible” . (Appellants’
Brief, p. 13a). But the Bankruptcy Judge considered all
of the testimony and exhibits from November 5, 1975 to
September 27, 1976, including all of the Nogg testimony
in support of feasibility. The only issue before the Judge
and before us is whether the Chapter X petition was filed
in good faith.
The Bankruptcy Act provides:
“Without limiting the generality of the meaning of
the term ‘good faith’, a petition shall be deemed not
to be filed in good faith if * * *
(3) It is unreasonable to expect that a plan of re
organization can be effected . . . .” 11 U.S.C. §546.
Thus the Bankruptcy Judge did not have to look behind
the petition to discover an improper or unethical purpose.
He only had to look at the petition against the background
4998
of all the facts known to Mm and decide whether it was
“ reasonable to expect that a plan of reorganization can be
effected.” To this end, he not only had opinion testimony
before him, but the actual experience of a debtor using
substantial economy measures and accumulating a $15,-
790,000 deficit in seven and a half months and a further
estimated deficit of $5,681,000 in three additional months.
He knew that there were no terminals, no operating equip
ment and no operating personnel; even the operating au
thorities were in jeopardy. The period taken for decision
was short, but he -was entitled to rely on a non-legal con
cept—“deja vu” .
The Bankruptcy Judge’s Report of September 28, 1976
was submitted to Judge MacMahon who, on September 30,
1976, after oral argument from the parties on September
29, 1976, found the bankruptcy Judge’s findings supported
by substantial evidence and adopted them in all respects.
Judge MacMahon was mindful that “more time might im
prove the fullness of this [his] memorandum” , but wisely
refrained from adding to the volumes which already over
tax the space of our law libraries and held that the petition
was not filed in good faith. This holding is clearly correct
on the facts and the law, 11 TT.S.C. §546(3), and we there
fore affirm.
Appellant argues in extenso (it may be said—in exten-
sissimo) that the bankruptcy proceedings have been tainted
by a conflict of interest on the part of the Trustee. This is
no occasion to do more than touch upon the subject which
seems to be an obsession of the appellants. In the first
place, it is completely irrelevant to the issue of the likeli
hood of a feasible reorganization. This decision is solely
for the Bankruptcy Judge and the court. The recom
mendation by the Trustees that the Alltrans offer should
be accepted was quite in accord with the facts—Alltrans
4999
offered realty; EEAEMCO offered unfulfilled, speculative
hopes. Nor did the Bankruptcy Judge follow the Trustee’s
recommendation blindly, as his report clearly shows. Con
flict of interest did not create the u n fortu n ate financia l
situation in which EEA found itself. Conflict of interest
did not create the facts which after full and fair explora
tion proved the Alltrans. offer to be superior.
The appeal from the July 16, 1976 order (acceptance of
Alltrans offer) is pending. Proceedings before the ICC
are unfinished. There are still problems for the Bank
ruptcy Judge and on the facts, there is no n eed f o r a re
ceiver. Appellants are still free to raise the issue of con
flict of interest in appropriate proceedings in which facts,
if any, may be adduced in support thereof. Conflict of
interest is a conclusion and conclusions should rest upon
a solid foundation of fact. The order dismissing the Chap
ter X petition and vacating the stay was proper and ac
cordingly we affirm.
5000
480-7-29-77 . U8CA—4221
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