Graham v. Evangeline Parish School Board Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees

    No. 04-30356
IN THE UNITED STATES COURTOF APPEALS 

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

JOANN GRAHAM, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellee,

v.

SCHOOL BOARD OF EVANGELINE PARISH, et al.,
Defendants-Appel lees,

EVANGELINE PARISH CHAPTER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
OF NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOLS; JAMES KIRT GUILLORY; RANDY 

MCCAULLEY; ERIC KENT GUILLORY; GREG ARDOIN; JEFF 
LEBLANC; EDDIE DOUGLAS; GAIL MCDAVID; MATT MARCANTEL; 

JOYCIE MAE THOMAS; ODELIA A. BOYKINS; STEVEN CRAIG 
THIBODEAUX; LEAH D. DUPLECHAIN; LUCY JONES GREEN; 

JOSEPH EUGENE MCDAVID,
Movants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Louisiana

BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES

Marion Overton White
Law Offices of Marion Overton White
511 East Landry Street
Opelousas, LA 70570
(337) 948-8296

Theodore M. Shaw
Director-Counsel 

Norman J. Chachkin 
NAACP Legal Defense & 

Educational Fund, Inc. 
99 Hudson Street, Suite 1600 
New York, NY 10013-2897 
(212) 965-2200

Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees



CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS

No. 04-30356 -  JoAnn Graham, et al. and United States of America vs. School 

Board of Evangeline Parish, et al.; Evangeline Parish Chapter 

National Association of Neighborhood Schools, et al., Movants- 

Appellants.

The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following listed persons 

and entities as described in the fourth sentence of Rule 28.2.1 have a financial interest 

in the outcome of this case. These representations are made in order that the judges 

of this court may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal.

1. Original Plaintiffs-Appellees: JoAnn Graham, Collins Graham, their 

father, James Graham; James Williams, Jr., Benjamin Williams, Hester 

Ruth Williams, their father, James Williams, Sr.

2. Counsel for Original Plaintiffs-Appellees: Marion Overton White, 

Opelousas, Louisiana; Margrett Ford, Shreveport, Louisiana; Theodore 

M. Shaw, Norman J. Chachkin, New York, New York.

3. Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellee: United States of America.

4. Counsel for Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellee: Hon. Alexander Acosta, 

Assistant Attorney General of the United States, Washington, D.C.; 

Lisa Taylor, Franz Marshall, Dennis J. Dimsey, Lisa Wilson Edwards,



U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; Katherine Wharton 

Vincent, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Lafayette, Louisiana.

5. Defendants-Appellees: the School Board of Evangeline Parish,

Louisiana; Lonnie Sonnier, Dr. Bobby Deshotel, Cecil Monier, Wayne 

Dardeau, Peggy Forman, John David Landreneau, Daniel Hoffpauir, 

Wanda Skinner, Scott Limoges, Arthur R. Savoy, James “Jimmy” 

Vidrine, Gervis Lafleur, Clement LaFleur, Jr., members of the School 

Board of Evangeline Parish; Rayford Fontenot, Superintendent of 

Schools of Evangeline Parish.

6. Counsel for Defendants-Appellees: Hammond & Sills, Baton Rouge, 

Louisiana, and Robert L. Hammonds, Kenneth F. Sills, Harold J. 

Adkins, Jon Keith Guice, Karen D. Murphy, Tina D. Darensbourg, 

Sanettria Rose Glasper, members of the firm.

7. Movants for Intervention-Appellants: Evangeline Parish Chapter 

National Association of Neighborhood Schools, James Kirt Guillory, 

Randy McCaulley, Eric Kent Guillory, Greg Ardoin, Jeff Leblanc, Eddie 

Douglas, Gail McDavid, Matt Marcantel, Joycie Mae Thomas,

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS (continued)

ii



CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS (continued)

Odelia A. Boykins, Steven Craig Thibodeaux, Leah D. Duplechain, 

Lucy Jones Green, Joseph Eugene McDavid.

8. Counsel for Movants for Intervention-Appellants: Beard & Sutherland, 

Shreveport, Louisiana, and Fred H. Sutherland and Roy L. Beard, 

members of the firm.

Attorney of Record for Plaintiffs- 
Appellees

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Original Plaintiffs-appellees believe that oral argument in this matter is 

unnecessary, because the appeal is governed by well-established, controlling legal 

principles whose application to the facts of this matter is straightforward.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Certificate of Interested P e rso n s .................................................................................... I

Statement Regarding Oral Argument ...................................................................... if

Table of Authorities..........................................................................................................

Jurisdictional Statement ..............................................................................................1

Issues Presented for Review .......................................................................................... 2

Statement of the Case ................................ ..................................................................2

Statement of F a c ts ...............................................   6

A. Continuing Issues Relating to Student A ssignm ent........................... 6

B. The Current C ontroversy ........................................................................ 9

C. Hearing on Intervention M otion .................  13

Summary of Argument ................................................................................................ 18

Standard of R ev iew ...................................................................................................... 20

ARGUMENT —

I Intervention As of Right Was Properly Denied Because Appellants 
Failed to Establish That They Flad Any Legally Cognizable Interest That 
They Sought to P ro te c t..................................................................................... 21

A. Much of Appellants’ Evidence Below and Argument Here Is
Irrelevant to the Issues on this A p p ea l.................................................21

Page

IV



B. Well-Settled Precedent in this Circuit Compels Affirmance of the
District Court’s Denial of Appellants’ Request for Intervention as 
of R ig h t ....................................   24

II There Was No Abuse of Discretion by the Court Below in Denying
Appellants’ Request for Permissive Intervention...........................................30

Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 33

Certificate of Service........................................     34

Certificate of C om pliance............................................................................................35

Table of Authorities

Cases:

Bradley v. Pinellas County Sch. Bd.,
961 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1992) ....................................................................  32

Cajun Elec. Power Coop. v. Gulf States Utils., Inc.,
940 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1991) ...........................................................................30

Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
179 F.R.D. 505 (W.D.N.C. 1998)............................................................ 28, 29

Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
179 F.R.D. 502 (W.D.N.C. 1998)............................................................  28-29

Edwards v. City of Houston,
78 F.3d 983 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) ..................................................... 1, 30

Table of Contents (continued)
Page



Cases (continued):

Hines v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd.,
479 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1973) ......................................................................... 24

Pate v. Dade County Sch. Bd.,
588 F.2d 501 (5th Cir.), cert, denied sub nom. Beckford
v. Dade County Sch. Bd., 444 U.S. 835 (1979) ....................................  24, 29

Trans Chemical Ltd. v. China Nat’l Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp.,
332 F.3d 815 (5th Cir. 2003) ..................................................................  20,30

United States v. Franklin Parish Sch. Bd.,
47 F.3d 755 (5th Cir. 1995) ....................................  19, 20, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29

United States v. Georgia,
19 F.3d 1386 (11th Cir. 1994) ............................................................ .. . . . 26n

United States v. Perry County Bd. of Educ.,
567 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1998) .................................... .............................  24,29

Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd.,
646 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1981) ......................................................................  26n

Statutes and Rules:

28U.S.C. § 1291 .............................................................................................................1

28U.S.C. § 1331 .............................................................................................................1

28 U.S.C. § 1343 .............................................................................................................1

42U.S.C. § 1983 .............................................................................................................1

Table of Authorities (continued)
Page

vi



Table of Authorities (continued)
Page

Statutes and Rules (continued):

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) ........................................................................... .............. 1,2,21

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) ................................ ..................................................... . . 1 , 2 , 3 1

vii



JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

(A) The district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit brought 

to desegregate the public schools of Evangeline Parish, Louisiana under 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1331 and 1343 (3) and (4) because the action arises under the Constitution and 

laws of the United States and the action is authorized by federal law, including but 

not limited to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(B) This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over so much of 

this appeal as is taken from the ruling below denying Appellants’ motion to intervene 

as of right pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). Edwards v. City o f  Houston, 78 F.3d 

983, 992 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc)} The Court has provisional jurisdiction over so 

much of this appeal as is taken from the ruling of the court below denying permissive 

intervention pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b); if this Court finds no abuse of 

discretion in the denial of permissive intervention, that portion of the appeal must be 

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Edwards, 78 F.3d at 992 and cases cited.

'In Edwards, this Court noted that the Fifth Circuit’s caselaw is inconsistent on the 
question whether jurisdiction to review denials of intervention as of right lies under section 
1291 or whether the Court’s jurisdiction is provisional only, as described in text infra with 
respect to appeals from the denial of permissive intervention. See 78 F.3d at 992-93 n.16. 
Under either approach, the Court is empowered to determine whether the court below erred 
in denying intervention as of right or permissively; only the disposition of the appeal, should 
the Court conclude that the trial judge acted properly, would differ.

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(C) The Order of the District Court denying the Motion to Intervene was filed 

March 26, 2004 (R. 390). A timely Notice of Appeal to this Court was filed on the 

same date, March 26, 2004 (R. 393-95).

(D) This appeal is therefore taken from an order or judgment that is final or 

otherwise appealable with respect to the claims of Movants sought to be pursued in 

this litigation.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Did the District Court err in concluding that Appellants failed to establish 

a legal basis for intervention as of right in this matter pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

24(a)?

2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying Appellants’ alternative 

request for permissive intervention in this matter pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action to desegregate the public schools of Evangeline Parish, Louisiana 

was commenced on May 4, 1965 (R. Exc.Tab 1 [Docket Entries]). The history of the 

proceedings is summarized in the District Court’s September 1, 2004 “Written 

Reasons for the Issuance of this Court’s March 26 Order Denying Motion to

2



Intervene . . which has been transmitted to this Court as a supplemental record (R. 

Exc. Tab 4).2

On June 28,2001, the District Court approved a “Superseding Consent Decree”

in this matter to deal with a variety of specific implementation problems that had been

brought to its attention by the United States (see R. Exc. Tab 1). That decree

explicitly provided (at p. 21) that “[a]ll previous orders entered herein not

inconsistent herewith remain in full force and effect.” It also stated (at p.3):

. . .  in order to monitor compliance with this Superseding Consent 
Decree and all previous orders of the Court issues herein, the Court shall 
meet quarterly with the duly elected President of the Evangeline Parish 
School Board and duly appointed Superintendent or acting 
superintendent and the attorneys of record on dates to be set by the 
Court so that two (2) of the quarterly meetings are conducted within 
thirty (30) days of the filing of the School Board’s June 1st and October 
15 th reports.

Both the Docket Entries (R. Exc. Tab 1) and the “Written Reasons” (WR 51-54) 

reflect that the Court regularly conducted such meetings to monitor progress in 

implementing the Orders in this matter. “It was the Court’s intent by requiring the

2Appellants suggest that the “Written Reasons” contain only the District Judge‘s 
“version of the ‘history’ of this case, about which [they] respectfully suggest he has no 
personal knowledge, and for the most part had no involvement.” App’t Br. at 3 n.l. 
However, the District Judge was assigned to this matter on September 17, 1996 (“Written 
Reasons,” Supp. Rec., R. Exc. Tab 4 [hereinafter, “WR”], at 34) and thus has had extensive 
involvement with the matter and with the parties for more than eight years. In any case, 
Appellants ’ Brief contains virtually no specific disagreement with the District Judge’s factual 
summary of the events in this litigation.

3



quarterly meetings that the Court be kept current on the United States and the original 

plaintiffs^] continuing concerns about the implementation of the Plan and the 

elimination of de jure  segregation and the vestiges of that segregation, as well as the 

School Board’s perspective and problems that were likely to arise as those concerns 

were sought to be addressed” (WR at 52-53).

On September 18, 2003, Appellants filed a Motion to Intervene in the District 

Court (R. 1). They alleged that they had “first learned in the Spring of 2003 that the 

schools of their school system will be consolidated during the 2004-2005 school 

year” (R. 8 |  9) pursuant to a plan being developed in secret, without public input, 

pursuant to “an alleged ‘gag order’ of the court” (R. 9 f  13). In order to avoid this 

result, Appellants alleged, they wished to intervene to “assert and attempt to establish 

that the Evangeline Parish School system is in law and in fact unitary (or at the very 

least, partially unitary) and that the school system is entitled to be released from any 

further court supervision or judicial orders in this case . . .” (R. 10-11117).3 When 

the matter was set for submission on the papers at the next regular motion date,

3Appellants also asserted that “in the event the evidence might show there is a legal 
and/or constitutional basis to consolidate schools, then intervenors, on information and belief, 
will assert, and attempt to show . . .  that voluntary methods of school attendance, integration 
and school improvement can and should be utilized rather than the closing of schools and the 
mandatory reassignment of students, which will result in the destruction of the heart of local 
neighborhoods, communities, towns and villages” (R. 11 19).

4



November 20, 2003 (R. 55), Appellants moved for an expedited evidentiary hearing 

on their motion (R. 67), which the District Court denied by Order filed October 6,

2003 (R. 76) with the comment that “[i]f after reviewing filings made in response to 

the motion the court deems a hearing to be necessary or appropriate, a hearing will 

be scheduled” (id.).

Following a telephone conference with counsel for all parties and for the 

proposed interveners, the District Court set the matter for hearing on March 15,2004, 

establishing a discovery schedule in connection with the intervention request (R. 146- 

47).

Prior to the scheduled hearing on intervention, on March 5, 2004 the School 

Board of Evangeline Parish submitted a motion seeking authorization to implement 

a school reorganization plan in the 2004-05 school year (R. 249). That plan had been 

adopted by the School Board on March 1,2004 (R. 359 [Stipulations of the Parties], 

f  25), and on March 3,2004, following a status conference in open court the previous 

day (R. 215-16), the District Court scheduled a hearing on that plan for March 25,

2004 — after the dates established for hearing the Appellants’ motion for 

intervention (R. 217).

At the conclusion of the March 15-16,2004 evidentiary hearing on Appellants’ 

motion to intervene, the District Court announced that:

5



Now, the Court, based on the evidence adduced and the documents 
admitted into evidence, that’s the evidence through testimony and the 
documents, is going to deny the motion for intervention finding that the 
requirements of Rule 24 as to permissive intervention or intervention of 
right have not been established by the applicants. And, as I said, I’m 
going to give written reasons for that finding and conclusions of law and 
findings of fact.

(R. 419, Vol. II at 548.) A written Order to this effect was entered March 26, 2004 

(R. 390-91) and this appeal followed.4 On September 1, 2004, the District Court 

issued its “Written Reasons” for denying intervention (R. Exc. Tab 4).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Continuing Issues Relating to Student Assignment

Throughout the history of this litigation, student assignment has been a 

continuing concern of the parties and the Court. As the court below summarized in 

its “Written Reasons,” the early years of the case were marked by the School Board’s

4On March 18, 2004, Appellants filed a “Motion for Stay or Injunction Pending 
Appeal and/or Supervisory Writs in the District Court” (R. 372). This motion sought to stay 
“any further proceedings with respect to the authorization for implementation of the 
reorganization plan for Evangeline Parish schools pending an appeal and/or application for 
supervisory writs by” Appellants. A hearing was held on this motion on the same date (R. 
380), at the conclusion of which the District Court endorsed the proposed Order submitted 
by Appellants as follows: “For Oral Reasons assigned in open Court after hearing arguments 
on the motion, MOTION DENIED” (R. 378). On August 13, 2004, following docketing of 
their appeal, Appellants filed with this Court a “Motion to Expedite Appeal and/or for Stay 
of Implementation of School Reorganization Plan Pending Appeal.” On August 18, 2004, 
a panel of this Court granted the motion to expedite the appeal and denied the motion for stay 
“without prejudice to reconsideration by the merits panel.”

6



official and overt support for white students who withdrew from the public schools 

in response to constitutionally required desegregation orders, resulting ultimately in 

the entry of a permanent injunction in May, 1975 prohibiting the Board from 

providing textbooks, transportation, or any other form of public aid to children 

attending Evangeline Academy (WR 19-27). However, failure of students to attend 

the schools to which they were zoned under the student assignment plan approved by 

the Court has continued to be a recurring problem to this day. In 1987, for example, 

Judge Shaw entered an order that

Effective @ beginning of year 1987-1988, all students in Evangeline 
Parish school system must attend school in ward of their domicile, & 
where there is more than 1 school in a Ward, students must attend the 
school designated on attch’d map. Currently enrolled students 
comprising graduating class of 1988 will be allowed to graduate @ 
school they are presently attending.

(R. Exc. Tab 1 [Docket Entries], 06-04-87.) In February, 1992, the District Court 

wrote to the School Board and the Superintendent of Schools about students zoned 

in Ward 1 within Ville Platte attending Vidrine and Bayou Chicot schools, US Exh. 

2 (see WR at 28-29); in August of that year, the United States informed counsel for 

the School Board that it had received complaints about continuing failure to enforce 

zone lines and transfer limitations, resulting in the operation of racially identifiable 

schools, and that these complaints appeared to be substantiated by its investigation,

7



US Exh. 4 (see WR at 29), as well as disparities in the quality of physical facilities

at predominantly black schools such as Ville Platte High School —  concerns that the

government reiterated in December, 1992, US Exh. 5 (see WR at 30).

On October 21, 1998, the District Court approved a Superceding Consent

Decree (see R. Exc. Tab 1 [Docket Entries]) that included specific provisions

requiring that “The E[vangeline] P[arish] Sfchool] B[oard] shall. . . strictly enforce

attendance zone lines, and shall follow the provisions set forth below [governing such

matters as verification of residency, limitations on student transfers, and

establishment of a Transfer Committee].” Nonetheless, on May 11,2001, the United

States moved for a status conference, reciting that:

The Superintendent, Assistant Superintendent, counsel for the Board, 
and other central office staff members were informed [in March of that 
year] that the Board is maintaining and operating the Ville Platte schools 
as racially identifiable schools despite viable alternatives.

(Motion for Setting of Status Conference, May 11, 2001, at 2; see WR at 36.) On

June 28, 2001, the Court approved another Superseding Consent Decree containing

additional provisions regarding verification of residency, enforcement of zone lines,

and restriction of student transfers, see WR at 41-44.

As the court below found (WR at 51):

at the time of the adoption of the Superseding Consent Decree on June 
28, 2001, continuing violations related to facilities and student

8



assignment existed in the Evangeline Parish School system. In order to 
monitor compliance by the School System with the Decree and to afford 
the School Board the opportunity to remedy, as expeditiously as 
possible, the continuing violations related to facilities and student 
assignment, the Court insisted on the inclusion of Section A in the 
decree. Section A required the quarterly meetings of the President of the 
School Board, the Superintendent of Schools and the attorneys for the 
parties.

B. The Current Controversy

Based upon the experience and knowledge gained by the District Court through

the quarterly meetings beginning in 2001, the Court suggested to the School Board

that it was very much in the School system’s interest for the School 
Board to adopt a consolidation plan that resolved the continuing student 
assignment and facilities issues, despite the “political heat” that might 
be occasioned thereby. Such an approach would allow the School Board 
to adopt a plan, as long as it was otherwise constitutional, that was: (1) 
educationally sound; and, (2) to the extent possible, respected the 
cultural integrity of the small towns and villages that comprise 
Evangeline Parish.

(WR at 51 -52.) Ultimately, at the December 20,2002 quarterly meeting (see R. Exc. 

Tab 1), the Court “instructed the Superintendent to form a committee of educators 

of his choosing, assisted by the School Board attorney, to develop a student 

assignment plan fo r  consideration by the School Board” (WR at 53 [emphasis 

added]). In January, 2003 the Court met with the members of the School Board who 

had not attended the December session, to inform them of his instructions to the 

Superintendent; these were also announced publicly by the Superintendent at the

9



Board meeting on February 19, 2003 (WR at 75-76; R. Exc. Tab 1 [Docket Entries], 

02/20/2003).5

According to the Motion to Intervene filed below, although no plan for 

consolidating schools or altering student assignments had yet been presented to or 

acted upon by the School Board, Appellants “first learned in the Spring o f2003 that 

the schools of their school system will be consolidated during the 2004-2005 school

5At the evidentiary hearing on the motion to intervene, the District Judge stated that

a plan, at my instruction, was developed by the superintendent and his 
committee. At my instruction, it was developed among the educators. At my 
instruction, it was not to be made public to anyone, including the members of 
the school board, until there was a plan.

Then it was to be submitted to the school board. The school board, in their 
wisdom, will either approve that plan or reject that plan, the superintendent’s 
plan. The school board could offer any other plan.

If the school board didn’t adopt the superintendent’s committee’s plan or 
didn’t offer another plan, it is my firm belief, based on the record of this 
proceeding over the number of years that I’ve presided, that the federal 
government, through the Department of Justice, was going to file a plan of 
their own.

This was a method whereby the school board would have a plan if they chose 
to adopt it. They weren’t required to adopt it. It was a plan that had been 
developed by the educators who they had hired to run the system. I said that 
earlier, I believe.

But if I could have done this another way, I’m sure I could. You know, the school 
board was at complete liberty to do whatever the school board thought it needed 
to do to develop an alternative plan or do anything else they wanted to.

(R. 419, Vol. I, at 71-72.)

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year” (R. 8). In fact, the Superintendent’s Committee continued to work on 

developing a plan until the fall of 2003 (WR at 76). While that plan was being 

reviewed by the Justice Department prior to its submission to the School Board, 

Appellants on September 18, 2003 filed their Motion to Intervene, and supporting 

papers, in this litigation (R. 1). That motion articulated the interests of Appellants in 

this litigation as follows:

4. Applicants for intervention . . .  are opposed to the “consolidation” of 
schools (the closure or combination of existing schools), the mandatory 
assignment of the students who are the children of applicants for 
intervention and of others similarly situated, because of their race . . . .

5. The student intervenors herein who have been attending their 
neighborhood or community school (as reflected by existing attendance 
zones), are likewise opposed to their mandatory assignment, and to the 
mandatory assignment of others similarly situated and affected, to a 
particular public school within the school district, because of their race.

6. The applicants for intervention believe they have the right and want 
to preserve the right of parents to enroll their children in, and of all 
students to attend, the public school nearest their home . . . .

17. As shown by the attached complaint in intervention, the intervenors 
on information and belief, will assert and attempt to establish that the 
Evangeline Parish School system is in law and in fact unitary (or at the 
very least, partially unitary) and that the school system is entitled to be 
released from any further court supervision or judicial orders in this 
case, and, with particular reference but not limited to, those affecting the 
assignment of students to schools.

(R. 6-7, 10-11.)

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As indicated above in the Statement of the Case section {supra p. 5), the 

Committee appointed by the Superintendent concluded its work on a student 

assignment plan before the scheduled district court hearing on the request for 

intervention. The Committee presented its plan to the Evangeline Parish School 

Board on January 7, 2004.6 Seven public meetings in the Parish were scheduled by 

the School Board during the balance of January, 2004 to gather public input and 

reaction (R. 358 [Stipulations of the Parties], f  22). A number of the applicants for 

intervention appeared at those meetings and voiced opposition to the Committee’s 

recommended plan. For example, Kirt Guillory attended “at least five meetings . . . 

out of seven” and testified that at those hearings; he said that “[w]e provided input. 

We did not get any answers.” But “an overwhelming majority, overwhelming,

6That plan included recommendations to improve the quality of educational offerings 
in the school system as well as elements addressing desegregation. It called for closing three 
elementary grade-level schools (James Stephens, in Ville Platte; Carver, in Chataignier; and 
Hester Heath, in Bayou Chicot), as well as the high school grades in three schools 
(Chataignier, students reassigned to Ville Platte; Vidrine, students reassigned to Mamou; and 
Bayou Chicot, students reassigned to Pine Prairie), regularizing the grade structures of other 
facilities, creating two satellite zones within Ville Platte (students would be reassigned to 
Pine Prairie and Bayou Chicot), and establishing two Career Academies (schools within 
schools) at the high school level to enhance integration through voluntary enrollments: a 
Medical Science Academy at Ville Platte High School and a Visual and Performing Arts 
Academy at Pine Prairie High School. Although the number of high schools was reduced 
from seven to four, the plan retained at least one lower-grade level facility in each of the 
seven communities which had previously offered high school grades. (WR 55-56.)

12



opposed the plan, gave all kinds of reasons why it would be a bad plan” (R. 419, Vol. 

I, at 221).

The School Board first passed upon the Committee’s reorganization plan at a 

February 18, 2004 meeting, at which time the plan was rejected by a vote of 7-6. At 

a subsequent special meeting of the Board on March 1, 2004, the prior vote was 

reconsidered and the plan was approved by a vote of 8-5 (R. 359 [Stipulations], 1 25).

C. Hearing on Intervention Motion

At the hearing on the Appellants’ motion to intervene conducted March 15-16, 

2004 in the District Court, five of the individual applicants for intervention 

(Appellants here) were called to testify, and the parties stipulated that had the other 

nine individual applicants testified, “their testimony would not be substantially 

different” from the five persons who took the stand at the hearing (R. 419, Vol. II, at 

479-81).

Appellants consistently identified their concerns that schools not be closed or 

consolidated, that “neighborhood” schools be preserved, their opposition to student 

assignments based on race, and their desire that the school system be declared to have 

achieved “unitary status” and federal court jurisdiction lifted, as the interests that they 

sought to protect by intervening. See, e.g., Kirt Guillory, id., Vol. I, at 168-69 (“I felt 

that according to what I read and found out, that my rights were being violated . . . .

13



They would be assigning students on the basis of their race. We felt that was 

unconstitutional.”), 169 (“We want neighborhood schools to be kept”), 170 (“One of 

our objectives is to file for unitary status.”), 171 (“But I ’d have no problem with valid 

desegregation. Desegregation based on the assignment of students, again, by your 

race, I believe is just unconstitutional.”), 216 (basis for his belief that school district 

is already desegregated is “Because people are allowed to go to schools where they 

live, and if they’re not - - if they’re in - - and they’re allowed M & M transfers, the 

majority, minority transfers, if they’re not happy, they have the right to leave that 

school and go to another school.”); Randy McCaulley, id., Vol. I, at 230 (“my rights 

will be violated if we continue on with the case, because I truly believe that, in fact, 

the school system is already unitary”), 241 (court should let applicants intervene 

because “I think it’s my rights that are being violated and my children’s rights. I 

don’t think we’re being adequately represented. . . The second part is I truly feel 

we’re unitary, and the Justice Department does not have any - - should not have any 

control over the Evangeline Parish school system and it should be returned back to 

local government.”); Gail McDavid, id., Vol. I, at 262 (“Well, Your Honor, I believe 

that I would try - - or like to intervene because in this case I believe that we are 

unitary in status, and that we want to be able to have the intervention so that we can 

carry through with applying for unitary status or obtaining unitary status for our

14



school district-----My view of the rights of my grandchildren is to go to the school

in their local community, and to be able to do that is why we want to intervene, 

because I believe that to take my grandchildren from Chataignier, Louisiana, and send 

them to another school district based solely on race is u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 278 (“I 

oppose this plan if this plan - - in my opinion, this plan is an illegal plan because it 

violates the rights and constitutionality of my grandchildren, then I guess I oppose it, 

yes. . . . The right that they have to go to school based on their geographic location, 

where they live and to the nearest school, and that they should not have to go to some 

school farther away because of the color of their skin.”), 279 (“the purpose of 

desegregation . . .  is so that people can go to whatever school in the neighborhood 

that they live in. And now this plan says, no, you can’t do that. So either the 

desegregation original order is wrong or the plan is wrong.”); Gregory Ardoin, id., 

Vol. II, at 402 (“The plan, as a desegregation plan from what I could understand, was 

that it did not accomplish further desegregation. All this plan did was to disrupt 

communities. And I thought one of the directions of the Judge was to preserve the 

cultural integrity of the communities. In fact, it’s disrupted communities and did not 

further desegregation.”), 436-37 (“See, I don’t think this plan is desegregation. This 

is just reorganization. The first effect has already occurred. Nineteen white families 

left the Vidrine community and are now in a Catholic school. . . . And so I believe

15



that this plan, which is so disruptive and onerous, that it is actually forcing people to 

consider leaving the system entirely. How can that further desegregation? [White 

flight is] one of the concerns [I have].”); Kent Guillory, id., Vol. II, at 444 (“I feel like 

our constitutional rights are definitely not being represented. I think they have been 

violated, because if we’re unitary as a school board system or school system, then it’s 

against our constitutional rights as black and white citizens alike to being bused 

around based on our race.”), 445 (“I believe we are already desegregated.”), 454 (“I 

think the plan impedes the [desegregation] process because under our already 

desegregated system, now we want to go back and start sending kids around to 

different schools out of their communities because of the basis of race, and I don’t 

think that’s right.), 460-61 (“I don’t think [the desegregation process has] been 

frustrated. I think that we have, as a government body or whoever with this M to M 

transfer, allowed people from minority races to go to schools of majority opposite 

race.. . .  How can that be a problem whenever they have the option to go if they want 

to go?”).

Individual appellants also testified that their interests were not being 

represented because the School Board had not sought a declaration of unitary status 

but had adopted the proposed student assignment plan developed by the 

Superintendent’s Committee. See, e.g., Kirt Guillory, id., Vol. I, at 190 (“No school

16



board members were able to take any of our positions.”), 191 (“[the vote to accept the 

plan on March 1st] was definitely a vote that seemed to violate our rights greatly . . . 

And the school board at that time, there’s no way they would have been helping us, 

and the only way we had to do anything about that was to continue with this motion 

to intervene”), 221 (“by the mere fact that the way the vote went and then rechanging 

their vote is very clear that our school board cannot. . .  that the majority of the board 

should have been voting the same way their constituents felt”); Gail McDavid, id., 

Vol. I, at 271 (“I feel that if I am not allowed to intervene, that my - - that my rights 

and the rights of my grandchildren will not be protected and are not being protected 

by the school board, because at the time that we filed this, the school board, even 

though we believe it to be unitary, had not filed to obtain unitary status.”); Gregory 

Ardoin, id., Vol. II, at 468 (“I feel that the whole board is supposed to represent the 

whole parish, not just because they have a few friends in certain schools or their 

district. . . . [So, if the entire board voted against the plan, they would have 

represented your interests?] If they would have voted against the plan? Yeah.”).

Finally, Appellants presented testimony from the two School Board members 

who changed their positions between the February 18th and March 1st meetings, 

resulting in the Board’s approval of the plan drawn by the Superintendent’s 

Committee. David Landreneau testified that he changed is vote in response to calls

17



and complaints from his constituents (id,  Vol. II, at 328, 341); and that although he 

had a conversation with the District Judge prior to the second Board meeting,7 the 

Court did not advise him that failure to adopt the Committee’s plan would result in 

approval of a Justice Department plan — that was Landreneau’s own opinion, (id. at 

333). Dr. Bobby Deshotel testified that he also called the District Judge after the 

February 18th vote to request “an extension for me to change my vote” (id. at 371) 

because “I had lied to my people, or deceived them, a better word. That same 

afternoon that I voted for the - - against the plan, I had told my principals that I would 

vote for the plan. . . .  I voted just the opposite of what I told them. And I felt that in 

all these years, I had deceived them by telling them that, and that’s why I wanted to 

change it” (id. at 372).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This appeal presents the Court with narrow legal issues governed by settled law 

in this Circuit. Much of what is discussed at length in Appellants’ opening brief is 

simply not relevant to those issues. For example, Appellants criticize the 

development of a student reassignment plan by a committee appointed by the

7Landrenau initiated the call (id. at 352) to inform the Court that he was changing his 
vote (id. at 353) back to the position he had announced to his constituents prior to the 
February 18th Board meeting that he would be taking (id. at 355).

18



Superintendent of Schools pursuant to a suggestion made by the District Court, 

asserting that this prevented Appellants from moving for intervention sooner than 

September, 2003. However, intervention was not denied on timeliness grounds. 

Similarly, while Appellants’ brief is rife with insuations that the District Court 

“intimidated” the School Board members, and threatened that if the Board did not 

approve the Committee’s plan, the Court would order into effect a “worse” plan to be 

drafted by the Department of Justice, there was simply no competent proof of these 

allegations below. Finally, contrary to their complaints, Appellants were not 

prevented from communicating their concerns about school closings or consolidation 

to the School Board; for example, individual Appellants participated in the public 

hearings conducted by the Board once the Superintendent’s committee presented its 

recommendations to the Board.

The District Court’s determination of the issues that are raised by this appeal 

was unquestionably correct. The settled law of this Circuit establishes beyond any 

quibble that parents have no right to intervene in a school desegregation action to 

preserve “neighborhood schools,” to oppose school closings or consolidations, or to 

seek to have a declaration of unitary status entered so that the litigation is dismissed. 

All of these principles were most recently reaffirmed and applied in United States v. 

Franklin Parish Sch. Bd., 47 F.3d 755 (5th Cir. 1995), which controls the outcome

19



here. Appellants’ attempts to distinguish Franklin Parish on its facts are without 

merit.

The District Court also acted well within its discretion in denying permissive 

intervention to Appellants in order not to delay implementation of modifications in 

student attendance that hold potential for materially improving the level of 

desegregation in the public schools of Evangeline Parish.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews denials of intervention as of right de novo. Trans Chemical 

Ltd. v. China N a t’l Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 332 F.3d 815, 822 (5th Cir. 2003). 

Denials of permissive intervention are reviewed for “clear abuse of discretion” and 

this Court would reverse such determinations only if “extraordinary circumstances 

are shown,” id.

20



ARGUMENT

I

Intervention As of Right Was Properly 
Denied Because Appellants Failed to Establish 

That They Had Any Legally Cognizable Interest 
That They Sought to Protect

A. Much of Appellants’ Evidence Below and Argument Here Is Irrelevant to
the Issues on this Appeal.

Much of the discussion in the Brief of the Movants-Appellants is not relevant 

to the issues before this Court. For example, Appellants emphasize their concern that 

the Superintendent’s Committee drafted a new student assignment plan, which 

ultimately involved a reduction in the number of high schools in Evangeline Parish 

and the closing of three lower-grade facilities (see supra note 6), in secret, which 

prevented Appellants from seeking to intervene below at an earlier point in time. But 

the court below did not deny intervention as of right because of untimeliness; rather, 

the request to intervene pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) was denied because, the 

Court found, Appellants could not show they had a legally cognizable interest in the 

subject matter of this case: the desegregation of the Evangeline Parish schools (see 

WR at 64-67); and because, assuming arguendo that Appellants had such an interest, 

it was adequately represented by the United States and the School Board (see WR at 

64-83).

21



Similarly, Appellants expend much effort here, as they did below, trying to 

demonstrate that the District Court prevented Appellants from effectively 

communicating their views on student assignment and school closings to the School 

Board and also forced the School Board to adopt the new plan by “intimidating”the 

members of the Board and threatening them with a “worse” reassignment plan (i.e., 

one drafted by the Department of Justice) if they did not adopt the plan drafted byh 

the Superintendent’s Committee. Whatever impact such “facts” might have had on 

Appellant’s attempt to intervene, had they been established, there was instead a total 

failure of proof. Six of thirteen members of the Evangeline Parish School Board 

voted on February 18, 2004 and March 1, 2004 to adopt the plan drafted by the 

Committee. None was called to testify at the evidentiary hearings on March 15 and 

16 concerning intervention. None of these individuals said under oath that they had 

been pressured or intimidated by anyone (including by the District Judge) other than 

their own constituents to take a particular position on the Committee’s plan. 

Appellants’ allegations to the contrary were based upon speculation and unsupported 

hearsay.

Moreover, Appellants did call as witnesses at the March 15-16 hearing the two 

School Board members who changed their votes between the February 18 and March 

1 meetings, with the result that the School Board adopted rather than rejected the plan

22



drafted by the Superintendent’s Committee. Each testified that he changed his vote 

in accordance with the preferences of his constituents, those citizens who had elected 

him to the School Board. As noted above, Mr. Landrenau specifically denied that the 

District Judge had communicated to him the idea that if the Board rejected the 

Committee’s plan, the Court would enter an Order requiring the school district to 

implement whatever student assignment plan the United States Department of Justice 

might present (R. 419, Vol. II, at 333).

Finally, Appellants’ fervent refrain that they were denied the right to participate 

in the democratic process is belied by the record. The School Board conducted public 

hearings at every high school in the Parish before deciding whether or not to approve 

the plan crafted by the Superintendent’s Committee. Many of the individual 

appellants appeared at those hearings and spoke against the plan. Moreover, by filing 

their Motion to Intervene in September, 2003 —  months before the plan came 

formally before the Board —  Appellants effectively and forcefully communicated to 

their elected representatives their desire that no schools be closed. Appellants’ 

quarrel is not with the process, but with the result, as demonstrated in the testimony 

of Dr. Ardoin that the Board would have represented the interests he sought to protect 

by intervening in this matter if it had voted against the plan (id. at 468).

23



Appellants’ complaints along these lines are nothing more than red herrings 

that should not detain the Court from the straightforward application of well- 

established law in this Circuit governing intervention in school desegregation cases. 

That law compels affirmance of the ruling below.

B. Well-Settled Precedent in this Circuit Compels Affirmance of the District 
Court’s Denial of Appellants’ Request for Intervention as of Right.

For thirty years, the law in this Circuit has been

that parents seeking to intervene [in a school desegregation suit] must 
demonstrate an interest in a desegregated school system. As Judge 
Morgan wrote for the court [in Hines v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 479 
F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1973)]:

Certainly every group must be allowed the opportunity to show 
the court that the desired and legally required school system has 
not been achieved by an earlier court order.

The petition for intervention would bring to the attention of the 
district court the precise issues which the new group sought to 
represent and the way in which the goal of a unitary system had 
allegedly been frustrated.

479 F.2d at 765.

United States v. Perry County Bd. ofEduc., 567 F.2d 277,279 (5th Cir. 1978). Accord 

Pate v. Dade County Sch. Bd., 588 F.2d 501, 503 (5th Cir.), cert, denied sub nom. 

Beckford v. Dade County Sch. Bd., 444 U.S. 835 (1979). Appellants’ motion for

24



intervention in this case did not assert such an interest. As summarized above (see

supra p. 11), and as found by the District Court (see WR at 65-66), Appellants did not

contend that the School Board was failing to take steps to further the goal of a unitary

school system; to the contrary, Appellants claimed that the system had already

reached this goal, and that the suit should be dismissed. They also sought to preserve

“neighborhood schools” and to oppose school consolidation and school closure.8

Under these circumstances, Appellants have no right to intervene in this matter.

This case is controlled by United States v. Franklin Parish Sch. Bd., 47 F.3d

755 (5th Cir. 1995). In that case, as here, parents who objected to a proposed school

consolidation plan approved by the school board moved to intervene as of right in the

school desegregation litigation involving the Parish in order to have the system

declared unitary and the case dismissed (id. at 756-57) and to oppose the

consolidation plan. The district court denied intervention as of right and this Court

affirmed. It observed that the parents’ group

sensibly abandoned its challenge to the consolidation plan in the 
hearing, conceding that it could not intervene to challenge the school 
board’s determination of the number and location of schools in the 
parish. See, e.g., United States v. State o f  Mississippi, 958 F.2d 112,115 
(5th Cir. 1992) (there is no right to intervene to challenge school board 
decisions based on policy matters, except to the extent that a proposed

8 As the District Court noted, Appellants’ motion to intervene “failed to even mention 
the term ‘desegregation.’”

25



plan impacts whether the school board is operating a unitary system);
Pate v. Dade County Sch, Bd.,, 588 F.2d 501, 503 (5th Cir. 1979) (groups 
are not entitled to intervene because they would have voted differently 
had they been members of the school board); United States v. Perry 
County Bd. ofEduc., 567 F.2d 277,279-80 (5th Cir. 1978) (intervenor’s 
concerns about travel and the outlay of public funds are policy concerns 
not related to desegregation which do not justify intervention in federal 
desegregation suit).

Id. at 756-57 n .l.9 It also held that because the United States and the Parish School 

Board shared the parents’ interest in achieving unitary status —  as do the parties in 

the current litigation — the parents’ group was not entitled to intervene as of right 

simply because they disagreed with the decision of the school board as to the timing 

of a motion for declaration of unitary status. “Their remedy for that breach, if any, 

is embodied in their right to select new representatives.” Id. at 757.

Appellants contend this case is distinguishable from. Franklin Parish, pointing 

to language in the opinion in that case that, it says, represents the “holding” of the 

case. See Brief for Appellants, at 35-36. Appellants have taken that language out of 

context and elevated its significance in an unsupportable manner. The panel affirmed 

denial of intervention as of right in Franklin Parish on several grounds:./irs f, that the 

parents’ disagreement with the school board’s failure to seek a declaration of unitary

9To the same effect is this Court’s decision in, e.g., Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 
646 F.2d 925, 941 (5th Cir. 1981), as well as decisions of other Circuits such as United States 
v. Georgia, 19 F.3d 1386, 1394 (11th Cir. 1994).

26



status was not a legally protectable interest that justified intervention, 47 F.3d at 757 

(“SOS is not entitled to intervene based merely on conclusory allegations that their 

duly elected representatives on the school board are not aggressively defending the 

suit, [citation omitted.] Their remedy for that breach, if any, is embodied in their right 

to select new representatives”).

Second, the panel held, intervention also was properly denied on another 

ground:

Further, SOS did not allege that continued federal control of the school 
system injured them in any specific way. To the contrary, SOS wants to 
invoke the power of the federal court to settle their dispute with the local 
school board. We hold that SOS’s stated interest in accelerating release 
from federal control, without any articulation of present or potential 
injury from that control, is insufficient under the facts of this case to 
warrant intervention pursuant to rule 24(a)(2).

Id. (emphasis added).

Finally, the panel held, third, that

[e]ven assuming SOS’s asserted interest in returning control to local 
authorities was sufficient to justify intervention, that interest is 
adequately represented by the existing parties. . . . [citing cases] SOS 
cites no authority for the proposition that they are entitled to intervene 
because no other party is asserting their current position that a unitary 
school system has been achieved. Certainly, after twenty-four years of 
federal control, [the local school board] is in a better position to 
determine when it can successfully seek release from federal court 
control.

Id. at 757-58. (To avoid duplication, we rely upon the arguments of the United States

27



with regard to the failure of Appellants to establish inadequate representation of their 

interests by the other parties.)

Because each of the reasons given by the panel in support of its decision to 

affirm the denial of intervention as of right in the Franklin Parish case is independent 

of the others, even if the present Appellants’ allegations of hann from the failure of 

the Evangeline Parish School Board to move for a declaration of unitary status were 

more substantial than they are, the denial of intervention below was still proper on the 

other grounds discussed by this Court in Franklin Parish.

Appellants also rely on the district court’s intervention ruling in Capacchione 

v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 179F.R.D. 505 (W.D.N.C. 1998). Of course, 

that case did not involve the question of intervention as of right. See 179 F.R.D. at 

510 [§ B]. Rather, permissive intervention was granted not in reliance upon a 

determination that the putative intervenors’ interest in having a declaration of unitary 

status entered was a “legally protectable” interest, but because that issue was already 

raised in the case: William Capacchione had filed a separate lawsuit against the 

Charlotte-Mecklenburg school board seeking such a determination. The original 

plaintiffs in the Swann case then moved to reopen the desegregation litigation and to 

consolidate it with Capacchione. Mr. Capacchione then moved to intervene in the 

underlying Swann litigation. See Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. o f

28



Educ., 179 F.R.D. 502, 504 (W.D.N.C. 1998). The district court granted permissive 

intervention “because the Court previously determined [in consolidating the two 

cases] that the two actions have common questions of law or fact.” Id., § A. In the 

separate decision cited by Appellants (Br. at 42), other parents subsequently moved 

to intervene in the now-consolidated actions to pursue claims similar to those stated 

in the Capacchione suit. Consistent with its ruling on Mr. Capacchione’s request for 

intervention, the district court concluded that the common questions of law and fact 

justified intervention. The Capacchione court distinguished this Circuit’s Franklin 

Parish, Pate, and Perry County decisions because in those matters, as here, the 

question of “unitary status” was not pending before the respective trial courts at the 

time of the intervention requests. 179 F.3d at 508-09. Capacchione, therefore, not 

only involved permissive intervention (not intervention as of right), but it is entirely 

fact-bound and provides no support for Appellants here.

For all of these reasons, the ruling below denying intervention as of right 

should be affirmed.

29



II

There Was No Abuse of Discretion by the Court Below 
in Denying Appellants’ Request for Permissive Intervention

This Court’s review of the denial of permissive intervention is highly 

deferential under the “abuse of discretion” standard. “Under this standard, the Court 

will reverse a district court decision only under ‘extraordinary circumstances. Cajun 

Elec. Power Coop. v. G ulf States Utils., Inc., 940 F.2d 117, 121 (5th Cir. 1991), 

quoted in Edwards v. City o f  Houston, 78 F.3d at 995; see also Trans Chemical Ltd. 

v. China N a t7 Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 332 F.3d 815, 824 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing 

Edwards). There is no basis for disturbing the District Court’s action in this case.

The District Court extensively explained in his “Written Reasons” the manner 

in which he had pressed the parties, since entry of the Superseding Consent Decree 

in 2001, to deal with remaining issues in this matter so that the school system could 

in fact attain unitary status and the case could be terminated. (See WR at 34-54.) The 

reorganization plan drafted by the Superintendent’s Committee and approved by the 

Evangeline Parish School Board is a step forward toward this goal. As noted above, 

see supra note 6, the plan affects the student enrollment ratios at some schools 

through reassignments and also establishes magnet programs at Ville Platte High

30



School and Pine Prairie High School to increase integration at these schools through 

voluntary measures.

In deciding to deny permissive intervention, the District Court explicitly relied 

upon the last sentence of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b), which provides that: “In exercising 

its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or 

prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.” The Di strict Court 

held:

The testimony of the Superintendent of Evangeline Parish Schools 
indicated that, to be implemented for the 2004-2005 school year, the 
Reorganization Plan had to be approved by the Court no later than April 
1, 2004. [citations omitted.] Applicants submit that prior to 
implementing any desegregation plan, a hearing on unitary status shoul d 
be conducted. If the School system is not unitary, then Applicants 
should be allowed to develop or engage in developing another plan. 
Clearly, the proposed intervention would delay the continued efforts to 
desegregate the Evangeline Parish Schools. Accordingly, the Court will 
deny Applicants for Intervention’s motion for permissive intervention 
pursuant to Federal Rule 24(b).

WR at 85. Far from being an abuse of discretion, the District Court’s decision — not 

to delay the implementation of a plan approved by the School Board that held the 

potential for improving desegregation in the Parish —  is unimpeachable.

Appellants present no grounds for overturning the trial court’s exercise of its 

discretion in this fashion. Their entire argument on this point is as follows:

31



Also, permitting the intervention will not unduly delay an actions by the 
existing parties. As mentioned above, there are presently no motions of 
the parties pending before the court to decide, and, to our knowledge, no 
formal action has heretofore been taken by the defendant school board 
actually adopting the plan for the consolidation of schools. . . . [Br. at 
34.]

Allowance of this intervention will not prohibit, prevent, nor delay the 
making of a determination of unitary status, nor will it in any way 
prevent or preclude any negotiations that might result in a prompt 
declaration of unitary status. In fact we believe it may enhance them.
[Br. at 44-45.]

Clearly, Appellants fail to grapple with the history of this litigation, or with the fact 

that the United States continued to press for the elimination of all remaining vestiges 

of the former dual system in the Evangeline Parish public schools, including in 

student assignment. See supra pp. 6-9, Statement of Facts, § A. In this context, it 

would have been an abuse of discretion for the court below to allow intervention to 

delay implementation of the new plan. C f Bradley v. Pinellas County Sch. Bd., 961 

F.2d 1554, 1558 n.9 (11th Cir. 1992) (because “proposed intervenors allege that the 

school board . . .  is engaging in invidious discriminatory practices, . . . before 

entertaining any request to relinquish its supervision, the district court must hold an 

evidentiary hearing and rule on the motion to intervene”).

32



Conclusion

The judgment below should be affirmed.

Marion Overton White 
Law Offices of Marion 
511 East Landry Street 
Opelousas, LA 70570 
(337) 948-8296

Theodore l^L Shaw
Overton White Director-Counsel

Norman J. Chachkin
NAACP Legal Defense &

Educational Fund, Inc. 
99 Hudson Street, Suite 1600 
New York, NY 10013-2897 
(212) 965-2200

Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees

33



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 21st day of October, 2004, the foregoing Brief for 

Plaintiffs-Appellees was filed with the Clerk of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Fifth Circuit by delivering the original and six copies thereof, along with a computer 

diskette containing a .pdf-formatted electronic version thereof, to an agent of 

DHL/Airbome Express for prepaid next-day delivery to the Office of the Clerk, 600 

Camp Street, New Orleans, LA 70130; and that two copies of the Brief, along with 

a computer diskette containing a .pdf-formatted electronic version thereof, were 

served upon counsel for the other parties to the appeal, by delivering them to an agent 

of DHL/Airbome Express for prepaid second-day delivery to each at the following 

addresses:

Fred H. Sutherland, Esq.
Beard & Sutherland 
Suite 1103, 400 Travis Street 
Shreveport, LA 71101 
(Attorney for Appellants)

Robert L. Hammonds, Esq. 
Hammonds & Sills 
1111 South Foster Drive,

Suite C
Baton Rouge, LA 70806 
(Attorney for Defendants-Appellees)

Dennis J. Dimsey, Esq.
Lisa Wilson Edwards, Esq. 
Appellate Section, Civil Rights 

Division, PHB 
U.S. Department of Justice 
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, 

Room 3706
Washington, DC 20530 
(Attorneys for Plaintiff-Intervenor- 

Appellee)

Norman J. Chachkin

34



CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH 
TYPE-VOLUME LIMITATION, TYPEFACE 

REQUIREMENTS. AND TYPE STYLE REQUIREMENTS

1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitations of Fed. R, App. P. 

32(a)(7)(B) and 5th Cir. Rule 32.3 because it contains 8,083 words, excluding the 

parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii) and 5th Cir. Rule 32.2.

2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 

32(a)(5) and 5th Cir. Rule 32.1, and with the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. 

P. 32(a)(6) and 5th Cir. Rule 32.1 because it has been prepared in a proportionately 

spaced typeface using WordPerfect Version 12.0.0.238 in Times New Roman font, 

using 14-point typeface for text and 13-point typeface for footnotes.

3. The undersigned understands that a material misrepresentation in completing 

this certificate may result in striking the brief and in sanctions against the person 

signing the brief.

Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellees

Dated: October 21, 2004

35