Mathis v. New Jersey Supplemental Brief in Support of Petitions for Writs of Certiorari

    I n  t h e

iht^nw OXmtrt of tip Mntfrii
October Term, 1970

No. 5006
Marvin R eginald Mathis,

v.

New  Jersey

No. 5011
V ictor R. Funicello,

y.
New Jersey

Petitioner,

Petitioner,

No. 5023
Robert P age A nderson, et al.,

Y.
California

Petitioners,

and
Nos. 5014. 5027, 5037, 5038, 5039, 5044, 5049, 5059, 
5133, 5136, 5127, 5178, 5256, 5276, 5327, 5413, 5492, 

6006, 6569, 6733, (Full captions listed inside.)

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI

A n t h o n y  G. A m sterdam  
Stanford University 

Law School
Stanford, California 94305

Jack Greenberg 
James M. Nabrit, III  
Charles Stephen Ralston 
Jack H immelstein 
Jeffrey Mintz

10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019

Attorneys for Petitioners 
(full list of counsel inside)



I N D E X

Introduction .......................................................................... 2

I. These Cases Raise Significant Issues Concerning 
the Scope and Effect of Witherspoon v, Illinois _. 7
A. In a Number of Cases Lower Courts Have 

Failed to Give Effect to the Witherspoon 
Rule .................................. .................... ........... . 7
1. Improper exclusion of a small number of

persons ...................   g
2. Failure to require adherence to the With­

erspoon standards..... .......................... ........  9
3. The two issues expressly reserved by this

Court in Witherspoon........ ............   11
4. Waiver of jury trials and pleas of guilty 

under the threat of death-qualified juries 13

II. The Issue of the Applicability of United States
v. Jackson.................................... ............... .............  15

III. The Issue of the Discriminatory Application of
the Death Penalty For Rape ................................... 16

IY. The Issue of the Right to Counsel In the Post-
Appeal Stages of Capital Proceedings .......... . 18

Y. The Issue of the Death Penalty as a Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment ............      19

Conclusion ........        21

A p p e n d i x — •

Treatment of Witherspoon v. Illinois by the Lower 
Courts .............................................................     la

PAGE



11

Aaron v. State, 283 Ala. 52, 214 So.2d 327 (1968) .......  21a
Abram v. State, 216 So.2d 498 (Fla. List. Ct. App.

1968)  ....................................................... ................  14a
Adams v. Illinois, O.T. 1970, No. 6048 ....................._....  6
Alexander v. Louisiana, O.T. 1970, No. 5944 ............... 6
Alexander v. State, 225 Ga. 358, 168 S.E.2d 315 (1969) 4a
Anderson v. State,------N ev.------- , 477 P.2d 595 (1970) 10a
Arkwright v. Smith, 224 Ga. 764, 164 S.E.2d 796 (1968) 4a

Baker v. State, 225 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1969) .............. ...8a, 19a
Barlow v. State, 238 So.2d 602 (Fla. 1970) ____6a, 13a, 17a
Barlow v. Wainwright, N.D. Fla., Civ. Act. No. 1683,

decided February 17, 1971 .............................. 6a, 13a, 17a
Bean v. State,------Nev.------- , 465 P.2d 133 (1970) ....5a, 16a,

17 a, 18a
Bell v. Patterson, 402 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1968) ____8, 12a,

13a,16a
Boulden v. Holman, M.D. Ala., No. 2303-M, decided

May 26, 1969 ................ ........ ....... .......................... . la
Boulden v. State, Cir. Ct. Morgan County, Ala. No.

5532, decided September 4, 1969 ............ ............ ..... la, 6a
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) _______ __  20
Branch v. State, 447 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Cr. App.

1969)  ................... ............. .................. ........ Ha, 20a, 24a
Brawner v. Smith, Superior Ct., Tatnall County, Ga.

No. 5579, decided January 21, 1969.......... .............. . 4a
Brent v. Henderson, Sup. Ct. La., No. 51,060, decided

January 27, 1971 ..................... .......... ............... la, 9a, 14a
Brent v. White, 398 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1968) ............... la
Brent v. White, 19th Judicial District Ct. of La., Crim.

Div. No. 47,265, decided July 31, 1969 _____ _____ la, 14a
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) _____  12
Butler v. State, 285 Ala. 387, 232 So.2d 631 (1970) ....6a, 18a



I l l

Campbell v. State, 227 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1969) .....8a, 14a, 17a
Cardinale v. Henderson, 316 F. Supp. 480 (E.D.La.

1970)  ............. .................................  6a
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) ..... ..... ........ ...... 6,19
Commonwealth v. Flowers,------ Mass. ——, 256 N.E.2d

418 (1970) ............ ........................ ......... ............... ....... 9a, 17a
Commonwealth v. French,------M ass.------- , 259 N.E.2d

195 (1970) ........... .......................................................... 9a, 23a
Commonwealth v. Ladetto, 349 Mass. 237, 207 N.E.2d

536 (1965) ............. ............... ....... .................... ................  14a
Commonwealth v. Robertson, ------  Mass. ------ , 259

N.E.2d 553 (1970) ............................ ........... .......... .....9a, 22a
Crampton v. Ohio, ------  U.S. ------ , 39 U.S.L.W. 4529

(1971) ................................... ....................... ....................  3
Crook v. Henderson, 310 F. Supp. 100 (E.D.La. 1970) .. la  
Cummings v. State, 226 Ga. 46, 172 S.E.2d 395 

(1970) ..................................... .......................... ....... - - 8a, 19a

David v. State, 453 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. Cr. App.
1970) ............................ ......... ............. ........ ... ........ -11a, 18a

Davis v. State, 246 Ark. 827, 440 S.W.2d 244 (1969) ..7a, 15a
Dixon v. State, 224 Ga. 636, 163 S.E.2d 737 (1968)     4a
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) _____ __ ___ 18
Duisen v. State, 441 S.W.2d 688 (Mo. 1969) ........ ......... . 10a

Ellison v. State, 432 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Cr. App. 1968) .. 5a
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) ......................  6
Evans v. State, 430 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. Cr. App. 1968) .... 19a 
Ex parte Aaron, Circuit Court of Montgomery County,

No. 371, decided June 25, 1970 .......................... 6a, 15a, 21a
Ex parte Bryan, 434 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Cr. App. 1968) .. 5a

Furman v. State, 225 Ga. 253,167 S.E.2d 628 (1969) ..8a, 21a

Gaddis v. Page, 455 P.2d 699 (Okl. Ct. Grim. App. 
1969) ................................ - ......................... ............... 11a, 19a

PAGE



IV

Garrison v. Patterson, 405 F.2d 696 (10th. Cir. 1969) .... la  
Grant v. State, 449 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Cr. App.

1969) .............-----............................ -----....... -.............. 11a, 18a
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) ......... ....... ....... .....  18

Hackathorn v. Decker, 5th Cir., No. 30157, decided
February 17, 1971_____ ______ ________ ____  ga

Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) ...................18,19
Harris v. State, 457 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Cr. App.

197°) ...............-........................................... 11a, 13a, 16a, 18a
Hart v. State,------ G a.------- , 179 S.E.2d 346 (1971) ..8a, 15a
Hawkins v. Bhay, 474 P.2d 557 (Wash. 1970) ......... 5a, 17a,

18a,21a
Henderson v. State, ------  Ga. ------ , 179 S.E.2d 76

(19”° ) ...................-................. -.......... -----....... ............. 8a, 23a
Howard v. State, 84 Nev. 599, 446 P.2d 163 (1968) ____ 13a
Hubbard v. State, 285 Ala. 212, 231 So.2d 86 (1970)

6a, 15a, 19a
Huffman v. State, 450 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970)

11a, 12a, 16a, 17a, 20a

In re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d 613, 73 Cal. Bptr. 21, 446
P.2d 117 (1968) ........................... .............. ....... 2a, 17a, 18a

In re Eli, 71 Cal. 2d 214, 77 Cal. Bptr. 665, 454 P.2d
337 (1969) ................. .................. ......... .............. ........... .. 3a

In re Hill, 71 Cal. 2d 997, 80 Cal. Bptr. 537, 458 P.2d
449 d 969) ........- - - - - ............... -................. - ........... ..3a, 18a

In re Hillery, 71 Cal. 2d 857, 79 Cal. Bptr. 733, 457
P.2d 565 (1969) ........ ...... ................. ...............  3a, 16a, 22a

In re Kemp, 1 Cal. 3d 190, 81 Cal. Bptr. 609, 480 P 2d 
481 (1969) ............ ................... ........... ................. .....  4a

In re Mathis, 70 Cal. 2d 467, 74 Cal. Bptr. 914, 450
P.2d 290 (1969) ..................... .................... ....... ......... . 2a

In re Seiterle, 71 Cal. 2d 698, 78 Cal. Bptr. 857, 456 
P.2d 129 (1969) ............... .......................................8, 3a, 16a

PAGE



V

In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d 122, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d
499 (1969) ....................... ........... ................... ..... ...... 3a, 16a

Irving v. Breazeale, 402 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1968) .......  la
Irving v. State, 228 So.2d 266 (Miss. 1969) ....... ...........  5a
Irving v. State, Cir. Ct. Harrison County, Miss., de­

cided May 5, 1969 ........................ ........ ................  la, 5a, 9a

Jackson v. Beto, 428 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1970) .......12a, 18a
Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 790, 171 S.E.2d 501 (1969) 8a, 23a 
Jackson v. State, 285 Ala. 564, 234 So.2d 579 (1970) 6a, 20a
Jackson v. State,------ A la .------- , 239 So.2d 303 (1970) 20a
daggers v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.2d 580 (Ky.

1968) ................................ ........ ................. ........ ..9a, 12a, 15a
Johnson v. State, 226 Ga. 511,175 S.E.2d 840 (1970) ..8a, 19a
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) ...... ............ .......  13
Jones v. State, 224 Ga. 782, 164 S.E.2d 831 (1968) ____ 4a
Joseph v. State, 442 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. Cr. App.

1969) ...... ................ ...................... ................... .......... 11a, 18a

Koonce v. State, 456 P.2d 549 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 
1969) ....................................................11a, 13a, 14a, 15a, 20a

Ladetto v. Commonwealth,------ Mass.------- , 254 jST.E.2d
415 (1969)............................ .........................9a, 13a, 14a, 17a

Liddell v. State, S.Ct. Ala., 7 Div. 693, decided March
4, 1971 ........................... .......................... .........................  21a

Lingo v. State, 226 Ga. 496, 175 S.E.2d 657 (1970) .......  8a
Lingo v. State, Superior Ct., Tatnall County, Ga., No.

5741, decided September 25, 1969 ..............................  4a
Lokos v. State, 284 Ala. 53, 221 So.2d (1969)  ........6a, 18a

Manor v. State, 225 Ga. 538, 170 S.E.2d 290 (1969) ....8a, 23a
Marion v. Beto, 434 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1970) ....... ....8, 6a, 16a
Massey v. Smith, 224 Ga. 721, 164 S.E.2d 786 (1968) .... 4a 
Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970) ..................... 17

PAGE



VI

Maxwell v. Sarver, E.D. Ark., Pine Bluff Division, No.
PB 66-C-52, decided September 18, 1970 ............... ...la, 7a

Maxwell v. Sarver, Sup. Ct. Ark., No. 5522, decided
November 16, 1970 .......... ............ ................... ........... la, 21a

MeGautha v. California, ------ U.S. --------, 39 U.S.L.W.
4529 (1971) .... ....... ........ ....... _....... ............ .................. . 2-3

McKenzie v. State, 450 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Cr. App.
1970) .............................. .................. ......... ......... 11a, 12a, 18a

Miller v. State, 224 Ga. 627,163 S.E.2d 730 (1968).....4a, 16a
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) .......... ......... . 7
Mitchell v. State, 225 Ga. 656,171 S.E.2d 140 (1969) ..8a, 21a
Moore v. Dutton, 432 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1970) ..........  la
Morales v. State, 458 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. Cr. App. 

1970) ................... ..................... ........... 11a, 12a, 17a, 18a, 19a

Ortega v. State, 462 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Cr. App.
1970) ........................... ............ ................ ........... 11a, 15a, 19a

Pa.ramore v. State, 229 So.2d 855 (Fla. 1969) ...........8a, 13a,
17a, 18a, 21a

Park v. State, 225 Ga. 618, 170 S.E.2d 687 (1969) ......8a, 23a
People v. Anderson, 70 Cal.2d 15, 73 Cal. Bptr. 550,

447 P.2d 942 (1969) ....................... ............. ................. . 2a
People v. Bandhauer, 1 Cal.3d 609, 83 Cal. Eptr. 184,

463 P.2d 408 (1970)....... ..... ........................................ 7a, 19a
People v. Bernette, 45 111.2d 227, 258 N.E.2d 793

(1970) ....................................................................8a, 12a, 17a
People v. Beivelman, 70 Cal.2d 60, 73 Cal. Bptr. 521,

447 P.2d 913 (1968) ............. .............. ............ ........ .....7a, 22a
People v. Bradford, 70 Cal, 2d 333, 74 Cal. Bptr. 726,

450 P.2d 46 (1969) __________ _______ ______________  2a
People v. Brawley, 1 Cal. 3d 277, 82 Cal. Bptr. 161, 461 

P.2d 361 (1969)

PAGE

4a



V ll

People v. Chacon, 69 Cal. 2d 765, 73 Cal. .Rptr. 10, 447
P.2d 106 (1968) .............. .......... ..... ............ ........ ......2a, 15a

People v. Coogler, 71 Cal. 2d 153, 77 Cal. Rptr. 790,
454 P.2d 686 (1969) __________ ______ ______ ____ 7a, 22a

People v. Doss, 44 111. 2d 541, 256 N.E.2d 753 (1970) .... 4a 
People v. Durham, 70 Cal. 2d 171, 74 Cal. Rptr. 262,

449 P.2d 198 (1969) ................................... .............. 7a, 22a
People v. Pain, 70 Cal. 2d 588, 75 Cal. Rptr. 633, 451

P.2d 65 (1969) .................. .................. .........................2a, 16a
People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608, 464

P.2d 64 (1970) .................. ..... ........ ...................... .......8a, 15a
People v. Gardner, 71 Cal. 2d 843, 79 Cal. Rptr. 743,

457 P.2d 575 (1969) ........ ........ .......................... ........ . 3a
People v. Goodridge, 70 Cal. 2d 824, 76 Cal. Rptr. 421,

452 P.2d 637 (1969) ........ ............. ................................ 3a
People v. Hill, 70 Cal. 2d 678, 76 Cal. Rptr. 225, 452

P.2d 329 (1969) ................................................. ........ 7a, 22a
People v. Hill, 71 Cal. 2d 983, 80 Cal. Rptr. 345, 458

P.2d 185 (1969) .............................................................. 3a
People v. Hudson, 46 111. 2d 177, 263 N.E.2d 473

(1970) ..... ......... ............ ............. ................................... 4a
People v. Ketchel, 71 Cal. 2d 635, 79 Cal. Rptr. 92,

456 P.2d 660 (1969) ......................................... ............  3a
People v. King, 1 Cal. 3d 791, 83 Cal. Rptr. 401, 463

P.2d 753 (1970) .............................................................. 8a
People v. Lara, 1 Cal. 3d 486, 82 Cal. Rptr. 628, 462

P.2d 380 (1969) .............................................................  4a
People v. Lee, 44 I11.2d 161, 254 N.E.2d 469 (1970) .......  4a
People v. Mabry, 71 Cal.2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 655, 455

P-2.I 759 (1969) ...................... ....... ............ ............. ...7a, 23a
People v. Mallett, 45 111.2d 388, 259 N.E.2d 241 (1970) .. 4a 
People y. McGautha, 70 Cal.2d 550, 76 Cal. Rptr. 434,

452 P.2d 650 (1969)............................. ........................7a, 22a

PAGE



V l l l

People v. Miller, 71 Cal.2d 459, 78 Cal. Rptr. 449, 455
P.2d 377 (1969) ........................ ................................. .7a, 23a

People v. Moore, 42 I11.2d 73, 246 N.E.2d 299 (1969).....  8a,
12a,17a

People v. Morse, 70 Cal.2d 711, 76 Cal. Rptr. 391, 452
P.2d 607 (1969) ..................... ....... .................. ........ .......  2a

People v. Nye, 71 Cal.2d 356, 78 Cal. Rptr. 467, 455
P.2d 395 (1969) .................. ............ ....... ..... ......7a, 19a, 23a

People v. O’Brien, 71 Cal.2d 394, 78 Cal. Rptr. 202, 455
P.2d 138 (1969) ..... ........... ....... ........ ......... ...............  ... :>a

People v. Osuna and Gorman, 70 Cal.2d 759, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 462, 452 P.2d 678 (1969) ........ ....... .......... ....... 3a, 15a

People v. Pike, 71 Cal.2d 595, 78 Cal. Rptr. 672, 455
P.2d 776 (1969) ....... ........... .................. ........ ........... .7a, 23a

People v. Quicke, 71 Cal.2d 502, 78 Cal. Rptr. 683, 455
P 2d 787 (1969) ..... ..... ........ .............. .............................  3a

People v. Risenlxoover, 70 Cal.2d 39, 73 Cal. Rptr. 533,
447 P.2d 925 (1968) ............ ......... ...................... .............  2a

People v. Roberts, 2 Cal.2d 880, 87 Cal. Rptr. 833, 471
P.2d 481 (1970) ........... ............................ ....... ...............  4a

People v. Robles, 71 Cal.2d 924, 80 Cal. Rptr. 123, 458
I‘.2d 67 (1969) ......................... ................. ................ ......  7a

People v. Schader, 71 Cal.2d 761, 80 Cal. Rptr. 1, 457
P.2d 841 (1969) ........................ ................. ................. 3a, 16a

People y . Sears, 70 A. C. 485, 74 Cal. Rptr. 872, 450
P.2d 248 (1969) ................................. ........ ......... 2a. 17a, 18a

People y . Speck, 41 I11.2d 177, 242 N.E.2d 208
(1968)  8a, 17a, 20a

People v. Stanworth, 71 Cal.2d 820, 80 Cal. Rptr. 49,
457 P.2d 889 (1969) ....................... ............. .....................  3a

People v. Teale, 70 Cal.2d 497, 75 Cal. Rptr. 172, 450
P.2d 564 (1969) ..................... ........... ........ ........... .....2a, 22a

People v. Terry, 2 Cal.3d 362, 85 Cal. Rptr. 409, 466 
P.2d 961 (1970) ............................................. .............. 8a, 21a

PAGE



IX

People v. Tolbert, 70 Cal.2d 790, 76 Cal. Rptr. 445, 452
P.2d 661 (1970) .................................................... ....... 7a, 22a

People v. Varnum, 70 Cal.2d 480, 75 Cal. Rptr. 161, 450
P.2d 533 (1969) ....... ......... ................... ...............7a, 20a, 22a

People v. Vaughan, 71 Cal.2d 406, 78 Cal. Eptr. 186,
455 P.2d 122 (1969) ........... ........ ...................................... 3a

People y. Washington, 71 Cal.2d 1061, 80 Cal. Rptr.
567, 458 P.2d 479 (1969) ........................................8, 3a, 16a

People v. Washington, 71 Cal.2d 1170, 81 Cal. Eptr. 5,
459 P.2d 259 (1969) ................................................ 8, 3a, 16a

People v. Williams, 71 Cal.2d 614, 79 Cal. Rptr. 65, 456
P.2d 633 (1969) ..... .................. ........................................ 3a

Perkins v. State, 228 So.2d 382 (Fla. 1969) ________8a, 13a
Peterson v. State, 242 So.2d 420 (Miss. 1970) .....9a, 18a, 22a
Piccott v. State, 116 So.2d 626 (Fla. 1959) ......................  14a
Pittman v. State, 434 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Cr. App.

1968) ............................................................11a, 15a, 18a, 20a
Pitts v. State, 185 So.2d 164 (Fla. 1966) ....................... 14a
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) ........ ......................  20
Powers v. Hauck, 399 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1968) ...............  la

Quintana v. State, 441 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Cr. App.
1969) ...........................................................................11a, 24a

Ralph v. Warden, 4th Cir. No. 13, 757, decided Decem­
ber 11, 1970, reh. den. en banc, March, 1971 ...............3, 21

Reid v. State, 478 F.2d 988 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App.
1970)   ........ ..........................................................11a, 19a

Rideau v. White, E. D. La. No. 970 Misc., decided May
12, 1969 .................... .............................. .......... ...... ........  6a

Rouse v. State, 222 So.2d 145 (Miss. 1969) ................... 5a
Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) ..................... 16

PAGE

Sanchez v. State, 454 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. Cr. App.
1970)  .............................................. 11a, 24a



X

Scott v. State, 434 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Cr. App. 1968)
11a, 16a, 17a, 18a

Segura v. Patterson, 402 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1968)
12a, 19a, 21a

Shmall v. Breazeale, 404 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1968) .......  la
Simmons v. State, 226 Ga. 110, 172 S.E.2d 680 (1970) 4a 
Sims v. Eyman, 405 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1969) ...„12a, 21a, 23a 
Sims v. State, 184 So.2d 217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966)’ 14a 
Smith v. State, 437 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. Cr. App. 1968)

11a, 15a
Smith v. Whisman, 431 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1970) ....12a, 23a 
Snider v. Peyton, Hustings Ct., City of Roanoke, V a ,’

decided September 10, 1969 _______ _____ ___ 5a> ig a i 7a
Spencer v. Beto, 398 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1968) ...... ’ 5a
Spillers v. State, 84 Nev. 23, 436 P.2d 18 (1968) ....... . I4a
State v. Adams, 76 Wash.2d 650, 458 P.2d 558 (.1969)

, , . 12a, 15a, 16a, 20a
State v. Aiken, 75 Wash.2d 421, 452 P.2d 232 (1969) 11a, 20a
State v. Artis, 57 N.J. 24, 269 A.2d 1 (1970) ...........10a’ 14a
State v. Atkinson, 275 N.C. 288, 167 S.E.2d 241 (1969)’ 15a 
State v. Atkinson, 253 S.C. 531, 172 S.E.2d 111 (1970)

, 11a, 24a
State v. Benjamin, 222 So.2d 853 (La. 1969) ............... 4a
State v. Carter, 21 Ohio St.2d 212, 256 N.E.2d 714

(197°) ........................-...... -.................................10a, 14a, 24a
State v. Coleman, 460 S.W.2d 719 (Mo. 1970) ... 10a 23a
State v. Conyers, Sup. Ct. N .J, No. A-55, decided’ " 

March 26, 1971 .................................. . ........... 10a, 15a, 16a,
Q, 17a,20a
State v. Crampton, 18 Ohio St.2d 182, 248 N.E.2d 614

(1969) .... .............. ................ ........................ .10a, 14a, 24a
State v. Crook, 221 So.2d 473 (La. 1969) ...................ga> i 9a
State y. Douglas, 237 So.2d 382 (La. 1970) ..........9a’ 23a
State v. Duling, 21 Ohio St.2d 13, 254 N E 2d 67o’

(197°) ..................................................................10a, 12a, 13a

PAGE



XI

State v. Eaton, 19 Ohio St.2d 145, 249 N.E.2d 897
(1969) ............ ............................................................. 10a, 23a

State v. Elliott, 25 Ohio St.2d 249, 267 N.E.2d 806
(1971) ....... ..... ........... .......... ................... ...10a, 14a, 19a, 20a

State v. Forcella, 52 N.J. 263, 245 A.2d 181
(1968)  - ........................................10a, 15a, 20a.

State v. Harper, 251 S.C. 379, 162 S.E.2d 712 (1968) .... 16 
State v. Hudson, 221 So.2d 484 (La. 1969) .............. 9a, 23a

PAGE

Kelbach, 23 Utah 2d 231, 461 P.2d 297
..11a, 13a

Kremens, 57 N.J. 309, 272 A.2d 537
..10a, 24a

Malumphy, 105 Ariz. 200, 461 P.2d 677
7a(1968)

State v. Mathis, 52 N.J. 238, 245 A.2d 20 (1968)....10a, 12a,
14a, 16a, 17a, 20a

State v. Mejia, 242 So.2d 525 (La. 1970) ....................9a, 23a
State v. Miller, 276 N.C. 681, 174 S.E.2d 481

(1970)... ........... ............. .................. - ....... ........ ..... .. 10a, 23a
State v. Montgomery, Division “A ” , Cir. Ct., 4th

Judicial Cir., Duval County, No. 9588-C, decided
June 9, 1970 ...................... ............................................ . 4a

State v. Peele, 274 N.C. 106,161 S.E.2d 568 (1968)....15a, 18a
State v. Poland, 232 So.2d 499 (La. 1970) .......9a, 14a 22a
State v. Pruett, 18 Ohio St.2d 167, 248 N.E.2d 605

(1969) ....................................................... .......... 10a, 13a, 14a
State v. Roseboro, 276 N.C. 185, 171 S.E.2d 886

(1970) ................. ................................................ ....... 10a, 24a
State v. Royster, 57 N.J. 472, 273 A.2d 574 (1971) .... 5a
State v. Ruth, 266 N.C. 36, 170 S.E.2d 897 (1969) ____ 5a
State v. Sanders, 276 N.C. 598, 174 S.E.2d 487

(1970)  - ....................... ............................... ........ 10a, 23a
State v. Sherrick, 105 Ariz. 514, 467 P.2d 908 (1970) .... 2a



X ll

State v. Sinclair, 57 N.J. 56, 269 A.2d 161 (1970) ...... . 10a,
15a, 16a

State v. Smith, 74 Wash.2d 44, 446 P.2d 571 (1968) ..11a, 24a 
State v. Spence, 274 N.C. 536, 164 S.E.2d 593 (1968) .... 5a
State v. Strong, 236 So.2d 798 (La. 1970) ..... ......... 9a, 23a
State v. Turner, 220 So.2d 67 (La. 1969) ....... .......... . 4a
State v. Tyler, 466 P.2d 120 (Wash. 1970) _______12a, 24a
State v. Vails, 22 Ohio St.2d 103, 258 N.E.2d 225

(1970) ........ ........... .......... ...... ................... ........... .....10a, 24a
State v. Watson, 20 Ohio App.2d 115, 252 N.E.2d

305 (1969) .......................... ........... ..................... ...........  5a
State v. Wigglesworth, 18 Ohio St.2d 171, 248 N E 2d

6»7 (1969) ______ _____________________ ___...10a, 14a, 16a,
17a,18a

State v. Williams, 50 Nev. 271, 257 Pac. 619 (1927) .... 14a
State v. Williams, 229 So.2d 706 (La. 1970) ...........9a, 15a
State v. Wilson, 57 N.J. 39, 269 A.2d 153 (1970) ........ .10a,

15a,16a
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) .................... 18a
Swain v. State, 285 Ala, 292, 231 So.2d 737 (1970) ....6a, 19a

Tea v. State, 453 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970)....11a, 18a 
Thacker v. State, 226 Ga. 170, 173 S.E.2d 186

(197°) ........ -........................... -.................. -.......... 8a, 19a, 23a
Thames v. State, 453 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Cr. App.

^979) ................-..........................................................11a, 15a
Tilford v. Page, 307 F.Supp 7811 (W.D. Okla. 1969) 12a, 19a 
Turner v. State, 462 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970) .... 21a

United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, D. N.J.,
Civ. No. 580-63, decided November 6, 1969 ......... .....  la

United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) .......5,15,16
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) ...............' ’ 19
Veney v. State, 251 Md. 182, 246 A.2d 568 (1968)

9a, 16a, 21a

PAGE



X l l l

Walker v. State, 85 Nev. 337, 455 P.2d 34 (1969)
10a, 14a, 23a

Walker v. State, 226 G-a. 292, 174 S.E.2d 440 (1970) 8a, 19a 
Ward v. Henderson, 317 F.Supp, 344 (W.D. La. 1970) 6a
Watson v. State, 234 So.2d 143 (Fla. 1970) ...............8a, 21a
Whan v. State, 438 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Cr. App. 1969) 11a, 17a 
Whisman v. State, 224 Ga. 793,164 S.E.2d 719 (1968) 8a, 23a
White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) ........................... 18
Williams v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1968) .......  5a
Williams v. Smith, 224 Ga. 800, 164 S.E.2d 798 (1968) 4a 
Williams v. State, 228 So.2d 377 (Fla. 1969) ....8a, 13a, 14a 
Williams v. Wainwright, 308 F.Supp. 81 (S.D. Fla.

1969) ----------------- --------------- ----------------- ------------12a, 14a
Wilson v. State, 225 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1969) .... ...8a, 13a, 21a
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) .......3, 4, 7, 8, 9,

10,11,12,13,14
Woodards v. Cardwell, 430 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1970) ..6a, 17a 
Woodards v. Maxwell, 303 F. Supp. 690 (S.D. Ohio, 

1969) ......... ....................................................................6a, 17a

Yates v. Breazeale, 402 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1968) ........ . la
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 110 TJ.S. 356 (1886) ......................  17
Young v. State, 234 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1970) .................. 8a, 23a

PAGE

Statutes:

42 U.S.C. §1981 ....................................................................  _

La. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 557 ........ .................................. 15

Miss. Code §§2217, 2536 ..................... ................... ...... . 15

Nebraska Revised Stat. §28-417........................ ...............  16

N.Y. Code of Crim. Proc. §3321 .................................... . 15

Revised Code of Washington, Title 9, §9.52.010...... . 16



X IV

S.C. Code §17-553.4 (1967 Cum Supp.) .... ......................  16

Vernon’s Ann. Code of Crim. Proc. of Texas, Art. 1.14, 
as amended, Tex. Acts 1967, p. 1733, ch. 659, § 1 ....._. 16

Wyo. Stat. §7-195 .................................. ................. ...........  16

Other Authorities:

Boehm, Mr. Prejudice, Miss Sympathy, and the Au­
thoritarian Personality: An Application of Psycho­
logical Measuring Techniques to the Problem of Jury 
Bias, 1968 Wis. L. Rev. 734 ......... .......................... ......  13

Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Representa­
tiveness of the Death Qualified Jury. A Study of 
Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. of Colo. L. Rev. 1 (1970) 13

Comment, Dogmatism and the Death Penalty: A Re­
interpretation of the Duquesne Poll Data, 8 Duquesne 
L. Rev. 125 (1969-1970) ............................. ...... .............  13

Comment, Witherspoon—Will the Due Process Clause 
Further Regulate the Imposition of the Death 
Penalty?, 7 Duquesne L. Rev. 414 (1969) ...... .......... . 13

Crosson, An Investigation Into Certain Personality 
Variables Among Capital Trial Jurors, unpublished 
Doctoral Dissertation (Psychology), West. Reserve 
University (1966) ............................. .......................... . 13

Goldberg, Toward Expansion of Witherspoon: Capital 
Punishment Scruples, Jury Bias And Use of Psy­
chological Data to Raise Presumptions in the Law,
5 Harv. Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 53 ......................................... . 13

PAGE



XV

Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a Death Qualified 
Jury on the Guilt Determination Process, 84 Harv.
L. Rev. 567 (1971) .........................................................  13

Note, Jury Selection and the Death Penalty. Wither­
spoon in the Lower Courts, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 759 
(1970) ......................................................... ........ ............  7-8

United States Department of Justice, National Pris­
oner Statistics, Number 45, August 1969 ..................... 17

Wilson, Belief in Capital Punishment and Jury Per­
formance, unpublished study, Univ. of Texas (1964) 13

Zeisel, Some Data on Juror Attitudes Toward Capital 
Punishment, U. of Chicago Press, 1968 .......................  13

PAGE



IN  THE

§>uprrm r C o u r t u f tljr  l u t t r i *  S ta ir s
OCTOBEB TEEM 1970

No. 5006 No. 5038

M AEVIN  BEGINALD M ATHIS, LEA M AN  BUSSELL SMITH,

Petitioner, Petitioner,

NEW  JEBSEY LOUIS E. NELSON

No. 5011 No. 5039

YICTOE E. FTTNICELLO, EDMUND EAEL BEEVES,

Petitioner,
— v.—

Petitioner,

N EW  JEESEY CALIFOENIA

No. 5023 No. 5044

EOBEET PAGE ANDERSON, et al., EOBEET LEE MASSIE,

Petitioner, Petitioner,

CALIFOEN IA CALIFOENIA

No. 5014 No. 5049

ALBEBT BOBBY CHILDS, EABNEST JAM ES AIK EN S, JB.,

Petitioner,
— v.—

Petitioner,

NOETH CAEOLINA CALIFOENIA

No. 5027 No. 5059

JOE SEGITEA, W IL L IA M  H EN BY FUBMAN,

Petitioner, Petitioner,
— v.—

W A Y N E  K. PATTEBSON GEOEGIA

No. 5037 No. 5136
LESTBE E. MOBFOBD, III , M AEIE H ILL,

Petitioner,
---v.— Petitioner,

CAEL HOOKEB, Warden, 
Nevada State Prison NOETH CAEOLINA



2

No. 5127

H ARRY JUNIOR W ILLIAM S,

Petitioner,
— v.—-

C. a  PEYTON

No. 5178

ROBERT LOUIS EOSEBORO,

Petitioner,
— v .—

NORTH CAROLINA

No. 5256

JAM ES C. LEE, alias, 
MOSES KING, JR.,

Petitioner,
— v.—  

GEORGIA

No. 5276 

BARRY ELOYD,

Petitioner,

CALIFORN IA 

No. 5327

ROBERT SW AIN,

Petitioner,

ALA B A M A

No. 5413

JOHNN IE B. W ILLIAM S,

Petitioner,
— v.—■

GEORGIA

No. 5492

ROBERT BUTLER,

Petitioner,

ALA B A M A

No. 6006

PERRY SANDERS,

Petitioner,

NORTH CAROLINA

No. 6733

TOMMIE LEE HENDERSON,

Petitioner,
— v .—

GEORGIA

No. 6569

W IL LIA M  JACK M ILLER,

Petitioner,
— v.—

GEORGIA

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI

Introduction

Petitioners in the above-captioned cases file this joint 
supplemental brief pursuant to Rule 24(5) in support of 
their petitions for writs of certiorari presently pending be­
fore this Court. These cases all involve the issues recently 
decided by the Court in McGcmtha v. California and Cramp-



3

ton v. Ohio,------U .S .------- (39 U.S.L.W. 4529, May 3, 1971).
The purpose of this brief is to call to the Court’s attention 
that these cases also raise other issues relating to capital 
punishment not disposed of by the decisions in McGautha 
and Crampton, and that with regard to certain of these 
issues, there have been cases decided in lower courts since 
the petition for writs of certiorari were filed which have a 
bearing on whether certiorari should be granted. These 
include Ralph v. Warden, 4th Cir., No. 13,757, decided 
Dec. 11,1970, reh. den. en banc, March 1,1971, relating to the 
issue of cruel and unusual punishment, and various decisions 
interpreting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), 
discussed infra in the text and listed in the Appendix 
hereto. In these respects the cases are typical of the ap­
proximately 120 capital cases now pending here on petitions 
for certiorari and remaining to be disposed of by order of 
the Court. The issues that they raise also typify the cases 
of approximately 600 additional condemned men pending 
in the lower courts or otherwise awaiting the outcome of 
McGautha and Crampton. In many of these cases, judicial 
or executive stays of execution granted pending the disposi­
tion of McGautha and Crampton will now be dissolved, and 
executions are imminent. That situation is the more peri­
lous because considerable numbers of these men are indigent 
and unrepresented. One constitutional question presented 
in the pending petitions for certiorari is whether the states 
must appoint counsel for such men. We respectfully sug­
gest that that issue, and the other substantial issues raised 
herein concerning the constitutionality of the death penalty 
and the states’ procedure for imposing it, should be heard 
by this Court before the United States—which has not con­
ducted a legal execution since June of 1967—resumes killing 
these men, and in unprecedented numbers.

This brief will outline the several constitutional issues 
raised. In summary they are:



4

1. Issues arising under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510 (1968), including:

A. Whether the courts below have interpreted and 
applied Witherspoon too restrietively ;x

B. Whether even jurors who are unable to give the 
death penalty in any case may be excluded;1 2

C. Whether a defendant must be given an opportu­
nity to show that exclusion of scrupled jurors from the 
guilt determining phase of his trial violates his con­
stitutional right to a fair and unbiased jury ;3 4

D. Whether a defendant must be given an oppor­
tunity to show that his waiver of the right to jury trial 
was ineffective because he chose to waive the only jury 
that the state made available to him: a jury selected 
unconstitutionally in violation of Witherspoon f

1 Mathis v. New Jersey, O.T. 1970, No. 5006; Funicello v. New 
Jersey, O.T. 1970, No. 5011; Childs v. North Carolina, O.T. 1970, 
No. 5014; Anderson et al. v. California, O.T. 1970, No. 5023; Segura 
v. Patterson, O.T. 1970, No. 5027; Smith v. Nelson, O.T. 1970, No. 
5038; Furman v. Georgia, O.T. 1970, No. 5059; Jackson v. Georgia,
O.T. 1970, No. 5133; Williams v. Peyton, O.T. 1970, No. 5127; 
Boseboro v. North Carolina, O.T. 1970, No. 5178; Floyd v. Cali­
fornia, O.T. 1970, No. 5276; Sanders v. North Carolina, O.T. 1970, 
No. 6006; Henderson v. Georgia, O.T. 1970, No. 6733.

2 Mathis v. New Jersey, O.T. 1970, No. 5006; Funicello v. New 
Jersey, O.T. 1970, No. 5011; Anderson et al. v. California, O.T. 
1970, No. 5023; Smith v. Nelson, O.T. 1970, No. 5038; Furman v. 
Georgia, O.T. 1970, No. 5059; Jackson v. Georgia, O.T. 1970, No. 
5133; Boseboro v. North Carolina, O.T. 1970, No. 5178; Floyd v. 
California, O.T. 1970, No. 5276; Sanders v. North Carolina, O.T. 
1970, No. 6006.

3 Funicello v. New Jersey, O.T. 1970, No. 5011; Anderson et al. 
v. California, O.T. 1970, No. 5023; Smith v. Nelson, O.T. 1970, 
No. 5038; Floyd v. California, O.T. 1970, No. 5276.

4 Morford v. Hooker, O.T. 1970, No. 5037; Beeves v. California, 
O.T. 1970, No. 5039; Massie v. California, O.T. 1970, No. 5044; 
Aikens v. California, O.T. 1970, No. 5049.



5

2. Whether this Court’s decision in United States v. 
Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), invalidates state procedures 
that allow the death sentence to be imposed only by a jury 
on a plea of not guilty;5

3. Whether the discriminatory application of the death 
penalty to Negro defendants in rape cases violates the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;6

4. Whether the failure to appoint counsel to represent 
an indigent condemned man in all proceedings between the 
date when his death sentence is affirmed on direct appeal 
and the date of his execution denies him equal protection 
and due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment ;7

5. Whether the imposition of the death penalty for rape 
or burglary is a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s pro­
hibition against cruel and unusual punishment as incorpo­
rated by the Fourteenth Amendment;8

6. Whether the imposition of the death penalty for mur­
der is a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition

5 Funicello v. New Jersey, O.T. 1970, No. 5011; Childs v. North 
Carolina, O.T. 1970, No. 5014; Hill v. North Carolina, O.T. 1970, 
No. 5136; Roseboro v. North Carolina, O.T. 1970, No. 5178; Sanders 
v. North Carolina, O.T. 1970, No. 6006.

6 Swain v. Alabama, O.T. 1970, No. 5327; Butler v. Alabama, 
O.T. 1970, No. 5492; Williams v. Georgia, O.T. 1970, No. 5413.

7 Anderson et al. v. California, O.T. 1970, No. 5023; Smith v. 
Nelson, O.T. 1970, No. 5038; Williams v. Peyton, O.T. 1970, No. 
5127.

8 Childs v. North Carolina, O.T. 1970, No. 5014 (involves rape 
and burglary) ; Jackson v. Georgia, O.T. 1970, No. 5133 (rape) ; 
Swain v. Alabama, O.T. 1970, No. 5327 (rape) ; Williams v. Georgia, 
O.T. 1970, No. 5413 (ra p e ); Butler v. Alabama, O.T. 1970, No. 5492 
(ra p e ); Miller v. Georgia, O.T. 1970, No. 6569 (rape).



6

against cruel and unusual punishment as incorporated by 
the Fourteenth Amendment;9

In the remainder of this brief we will sketch out each of 
these issues, with illustrations from representative cases. 
We refer the Court to the petitions for writs of certiorari 
for more detailed discussions. We also call the Court’s at­
tention to the fact that many of these cases raise other is­
sues not related to the constitutionality of the death penalty, 
and further that as to certain of these issues there are pres­
ently pending in this Court cases in which certiorari has 
been granted raising these same issues.10

9 Funicello v. New Jersey, O.T. 1970, No. 5011; Anderson v. 
California, O.T. 1970, No. 5023; Segura v. Patterson, O.T. 1970, 
No. 5027; Morford v. 1locker, O.T. 1970, No. 5037; Smith v. Nelson, 
O.T. 1970, No. 5038; Massie v. California, O.T. 1970, No. 5044; 
Aikens v. California, O.T. 1970, No. 5049; Furman v. Georgia; 
O.T. 1970, No. 5059; Bill v. North Carolina, O.T. 1970, No. 5136; 
Williams v. Peyton, O.T. 1970, No. 5127; Roseboro v. North Caro­
lina, O.T. 1970, No. 5178; Lee, a/k/a King v. Georgia, O.T. 1970, 
No. 5256.

101. The issues on which this Court has pending before it other 
cases in which certiorari has been granted, and the present cases 
raising the same issues are:

A. Exclusion of women from juries (cert, granted in 
Alexander v. Louisiana, O.T. 1970, No. 5944) : Butler v. Ala­
bama, O.T. 1970, No. 5492; Swain v. Alabama, O.T. 1970, 
No. 5327.

B. The exclusion of Negroes from juries (cert granted in 
Alexander v. Louisiana, O.T. 1970, No. 5944) : Swain v. Ala­
bama, O.T. 1970, No. 5327; Miller v. Georgia, O.T. 1970, 
No. 6569.

C. Failure to appoint counsel at preliminary hearing, retro­
activity of Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (cert, 
granted on retroactivity question in Adams v. Illinois, O.T. 
1970, No. 6048) : Miller v. Georgia, O.T. 1970, No. 6569.

2. Other issues raised in certain of the present cases are:
A. Whether admission of an incriminating statement with­

out compliance with Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964),



7

I.

These Cases Raise Significant Issues Concerning the 
Scope and Effect of Witherspoon Illinois.

A. In a Number of Cases Lower Courts Have Failed to Give 
Effect to the Witherspoon Rule.

Numerous lower courts, both state and federal, have read 
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), so restrictively

was harmless error: Aikens v. California, O.T. 1970, No. 5049; 
Childs v. North Carolina, O.T. 1970, No. 5014.

B. Whether Miranda v. Arizona, 384 IT.S. 436 (1966), was 
complied with before confession was taken: Hill v. North 
Carolina, O.T. 1970, No. 5136.

C. Whether a minor could waive counsel when confession 
was taken: Hill v. North Carolina, O.T. 1970, No. 5136.

D. Whether waiver of a preliminary hearing without the 
assistance of counsel was proper: Childs v. North Carolina, 
O.T. 1970, No. 5014; Hill v. North Carolina, O.T. 1970, No. 
5136.

E. Whether there was a denial of adequate counsel at tria l: 
Lee afk/a King v. Georgia, O.T. 1970, No. 5256.

F. Whether it is proper to place the burden of proof of 
proving alibi on a defendant : Williams v. Georgia, Oct. Term 
1970, No. 5413.

G. Whether there was a denial of the right to a speedy 
trial: Floyd v. California, O.T. 1970, No. 5276.

H. Whether it was proper to fail to provide a psychiatric 
examination on the issue of competence to stand tria l: Miller 
v. Georgia, O.T. 1970, No. 6569.

I. Whether the admissibility of a confession was decided 
in compliance with Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538 (1967) : 
Henderson v. Georgia, O.T. 1970, No. 6733.

J. Whether a state must furnish adequate post-conviction 
remedies to challenge the constitutionality of the death penalty: 
Morford v. Hocker, O.T. 1970, No. 5037.

K. Whether the state impermissibly encouraged waiver of 
counsel after a defendant has made known his desire to obtain 
counsel: McCants v. Alabama, O.T. 1970, No. 5009. (McCants 
raises none of the non-McGautha-Crampton capital punish­
ment issues listed in the text.)



8

as to nullify this Court’s decision. See, Note, Jury Selec­
tion and the Death Penalty: Witherspoon in the Lower 
Courts, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 759 (1970). It is imperative that 
certiorari he granted so that the Court may resolve both 
the conflicts with the Witherspoon decision itself and the 
conflicts between lower courts.

1. Improper exclusion of a small number of persons.

In Mathis v. New Jersey, O.T. 1970, No. 5006, the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey held that because only a “ small” num­
ber of persons were excluded from service in violation of 
Witherspoon, the death penalty would stand because it was 
not shown that the character of the entire jury was affected. 
This same approach has been taken by the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina in Childs v. North Carolina, O.T. 1970, No. 
5014, and by the Tenth Circuit in Bell v. Patterson, 402 F.2d 
394 (1968), and impliedly in Segura v. Patterson, O.T. 1970, 
No. 5027. On the other hand, that position has been rejected 
by the Supreme Court of California in In re Seiterle, 71 
Cal.2d 698, 78 Cal. Rptr. 857, 456 P.2d 129 (1969); People 
v. Washington, 71 Cal.2d 1061, 80 Cal. Rptr. 567, 458 P.2d 
479 (1969); People v. Washington, 71 Cal.2d 1170, 81 Cal. 
Rptr. 5, 459 P.2d 259 (1969), and by the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit in Marion v. Beto, 434 F.2d 29 (1970). 
The latter courts held, correctly, we urge, that exclusion of 
even a single juror in violation of Witherspoon requires a 
new penalty trial. As the Fifth Circuit said in Marion:

The magnitude of a decision to take a human life is 
probably unparalleled in the human experience of a 
member of a civilized society. . . . Where, as here, 
unanimity of decision is required to impose the death 
sentence, the stark reality is that one improperly ex­



9

eluded juror may mean tlie difference between life or 
death for a defendant. 434 F.2d at 32.

Thus there is squarely presented a conflict between the 
lower courts as to the requirements of this Court’s deci­
sion on a literally vital issue. Unless the Court resolves that 
issue, men will be put to death in some states whose execu­
tions would be halted in other states as violations of the 
federal Constitution. On the merits, we urge that the 
California and Fifth Circuit readings of Witherspoon are 
correct, and this Court should reverse the Supreme Courts 
of New Jersey and North Carolina and the Tenth Circuit 
in their restrictive readings of that case.

2. Failure to require adherence to the Witherspoon standards.

This Court’s decision in Witherspoon made clear that it 
was fully retroactive. Thus, it should have required all 
lower courts carefully to scrutinize pre-Witherspoon voir 
dire transcripts to ensure that the standards of that decision 
were faithfully met. Indeed, petitioners believe that all 
death sentences pronounced by juries which were death- 
qualified prior to Witherspoon should be vacated, since it is 
impossible to determine with the requisite sureness that a 
jury was composed in accordance with the strict standards 
of that case upon the basis of a voir dire examination con­
ducted under pre-Witherspoon state law allowing exclusion 
of jurors for general scruples against capital punishment. 
See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari in Anderson, et al. 
v. California, Oct. Term 1970, No. 5023, at pp. 42-51. At the 
very least, pre-Witherspoon exclusions in states which had 
theretofore allowed the disqualification of jurors upon bases 
declared unconstitutional in Witherspoon should be pre­
sumptively invalid, unless it affirmatively appears that the 
trial judge, in passing upon challenges for cause to death- 
scrupled veniremen, applied the proper constitutional test.



10

See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari in Mathis v. New 
Jersey, O.T. 1970, No. 5006, at pp. 30-35.

However, many lower courts have not only improperly 
cast the burden of doubt against death-sentenced petitioners 
in pre-Witherspoon cases, but have also distorted the 
Witherspoon standard substantively by approving the ex­
clusion of veniremen, both before and after Witherspoon, 
on the basis of equivocal expressions of scruples against 
the death penalty. The New Jersey Supreme Court, for 
example, has developed the rule that a venireman must 
“affirmatively” demonstrate his “ impartiality” concerning 
capital punishment, State v. Mathis, 52 N.J. 238, 245 
A.2d 20 (1968), and has applied that rule in a fashion which 
flouts the explicit holding in Witherspoon that no prospec­
tive juror may be excused for scruples against capital pun­
ishment unless he has made “unmistakably clear” his in­
ability to consider that punishment in any case, or his in­
ability to vote for guilt because of it. 391 TJ.S. at 522, n. 21. 
Other courts have followed this evasion of the plain com­
mand of Witherspoon, see Appendix, infra, pp. 14a-15a for 
a list of these cases, or have tolerated more or less similar 
evasive devices. We catalogue in the Appendix, infra, the 
principal doctrines employed by the lower courts to nullify 
the Witherspoon decision. The wholesale disrespect of 
Witherspoon demonstrated by the Appendix demands, we 
respectfully submit, that the Court grant review in some of 
the presently pending death-case petitions raising Wither­
spoon questions, in order to explicate and enforce the terms 
of that important decision.11 11

11 See Petitions for Writs of Certiorari in Mathis v. New Jersey, 
O.T. 1970, No. 5006; Funicello v. New Jersey, O.T. 1970, No. 5011; 
Childs v. North Carolina, O.T. 1970, No. 5014; Anderson et al. v. 
California, O.T. 1970, No. 5023; Segura v. Patterson, O.T. 1970, 
No. 5027; Smith v. Nelson, O.T. 1970, No. 5038; Furman v. Georgia, 
O.T. 1970, No. 5059; Jackson v. Georgia, O.T. 1970, No. 5133; 
Williams v. Peyton, O.T. 1970, No. 5127; Roseboro v. North Caro-



11

3. The two issues expressly reserved by this Court in 
Witherspoon.

Iii Witherspoon the issue was raised as to whether jurors 
having scruples against capital punishment could be ex­
cluded from the penalty determination in capital cases in 
states where the question of penalty was committed to the 
unlimited discretion of the jury. The Court held that it was 
unconstitutional to excuse venireman for cause upon any 
broader basis than a clear expression of inability to con­
sider the death penalty in any provable set of circumstances 
(or inability fairly to consider the issue of guilt), and care­
fully reserved the question whether even jurors whose be­
liefs regarding capital punishment met one of those tests 
could be excluded. 391 U.S. 513-14, 522-23, n. 21. Despite 
the clear intent of this Court not to express any opinion on 
that issue, the lower courts have generally misread Wither­
spoon as approving exclusion of jurors who meet the 
Witherspoon standards. Those courts have refused to con­
sider the argument that the logic of Witherspoon forbids 
any practice of screening jurors according to their views 
on the death penalty, so long as the state purports to leave 
the penalty question to the jury’s discretion. See, Petitions 
for Writs of Certiorari in Anderson et al. v. California, O.T. 
1970, No. 5023, at pp. 52-57; Mathis v. New Jersey, O.T. 
1970, No. 5006, pp. 38-43; Sanders v. North Carolina, O.T.

Una, O.T. 1970, No. 5178; Floyd v. California, O.T. 1970, No. 5276; 
Sanders v. North Carolina, O.T. 1970, No. 6006; Henderson v. 
Georgia, O.T. 1970, No. 6733. In addition to the cases in which 
we are counsel, the following cases now pending on petitions 
for writs of certiorari also raise Witherspoon issues: Nos. 5007; 
5015; 5018; 5022; 5028; 5031; 5033; 5034; 5041; 5047; 5055;
5056; 5057; 5061; 5063; 5064; 5066; 5072; 5073; 5074; 5075;
5076; 5077; 5080; 5083; 5084; 5086; 5090; 5091; 5093; 5094;
5097; 5100; 5101; 5103; 5104; 5106; 5108; 5110; 5112; 5114;
5117; 5118; 5120; 5133; 5135; 5139; 5142; 5147; 5153; 5160;
5180; 5197; 5265;, 5280; 5288; 5339; 5357; 5460; 5615; 5617;
5695; 5880; 6573; and No. 48, App. Docket.



12

1970, No. 6006, pp. 19-32; Smith v. Nelson, O.T. 1970, No. 
5038, p. 28; Furman v. Georgia, O.T. 1970, No. 5059, pp. 
12-17; Jackson v. Georgia, O.T. 1970, No. 5256, pp. 20-24; 
Roseboro v. North Carolina, O.T. 1970, No. 5178, pp. 22-34; 
Floyd v. California, O.T. 1970, No. 5276, p. 17. That argu­
ment is met, invariably, by the unanalyzed but unshakable 
assumption that Witherspoon validates all death-qualifica­
tion practices that it does not expressly invalidate. Cer­
tiorari should be granted in at least one of the pending 
cases to correct that misconstruction of Witherspoon, and 
to decide the critical issue which Witherspoon reserved.

In addition, Witherspoon and Bumper v. North Carolina, 
391 U.S. 543 (1968), expressly reserved the question whether 
a practice of death-qualifying prospective jurors would be 
held constitutionally impermissible if it could be shown 
that such a practice unfairly biased and slanted the jury 
on the issue of guilt. The Court found the Witherspoon and 
Bumper records inadequate to present that question, but 
plainly implied that a death-sentenced petitioner was en­
titled to an evidentiary hearing in order to prove the factual 
predicate of the claim of bias. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 
516-518; Bumper, 391 U.S. at 545. Yet in a number of the 
pending cases, lower courts have refused to permit these 
petitioners to present evidence of the precise sort that the 
Court in Witherspoon insisted was necessary to support 
the constitutional claim. See, Petitions for Writs of 
Certiorari in Anderson at pp. 22-23; Funicello at pp. 76-89; 
Smith at p. 17; and Floyd at p. 18. The Court should grant 
review to decide whether death-sentenced men are not en­
titled to their day in court on that issue.12

. 12 Since the date of Witherspoon, experts commissioned by peti­
tioners’ counsel have completed a thorough empirical study"which 
demonstrates that death-qualification does produce a jury that is 
unfairly biased on the guilt question. Other studies, somewhat



13

4. W aiver of jury trials and pleas of guilty under the threat 
of death-qualified juries.

Finally, in a number of these cases, petitioners have al­
leged that they elected to be tried by judges rather than by 
juries, or pleaded guilty and were sentenced by judges, be­
cause the only juries available to them under pre-Wither- 
spoon state law were juries stacked in favor of the death 
penalty. Thus, their “waivers” of jury trial were invali­
dated by the attachment of an unconstitutional condition to 
the jury-trial right; or, to put the matter another way, they 
did not make the constitutionally requisite “ intentional re­
linquishment or abandonment of a known right,” Johnson 
v. Zerhst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), since the only “ right” 
they knew or waived was a right to the kind of unconstitu­
tionally composed jury that Witherspoon condemned. Ai-

more limited in scope, support our own. Zeisel, Some Data on 
Juror Attitudes Toward Capital Punishment, U. of Chicago Press, 
1968; Boehm, Mr. Prejudice, Miss Sympathy, and the Author­
itarian Personality: An Application of Psychological Measuring 
Techniques to the Problem of Jury Bias, 1968 Wis. L. Rev. 734; 
Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Representativeness of 
the Death Qualified Jury: A  Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 TJ, 
of Colo. L. Rev. 1 (1970) ; Crosson, An Investigation Into Certain 
Personality Variables Among Capital Trial Jurors, unpublished 
Doctoral Dissertation (Psychology) West. Reserve University 
(1966) ; Comment, Witherspoon— Will the Due Process Clause 
Further Regulate the Imposition of the Death Penalty f 7 Duquesne 
L. Rev. 414 (1969) ; Comment, Dogmatism and the Death Penalty: 
A Reinterpretation of the Duquesne Poll Data, 8 Duquesne L. Rev. 
125 (1969-1970) ; Goldberg, Toward Expansion of Witherspoon: 
Capital Punishment Scruples, Jury Bias And Use of Psychological 
Data to Raise Presumptions in the Law, 5 Harv. Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 
53; Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a Death Qualified Jury on 
the Guilt Determination Process, 84 Harvard L. Rev. 567 (1971) ; 
Wilson, Belief in Capital Punishment and Jury Performance, un­
published study, Univ. of Texas (1964).

Petitioners stand ready to prove the relevant factual propositions 
in a full adversary hearing, as they proffered to do in the Anderson, 
Funicello, Smith, and Floyd cases, if and when this Court instructs 
any lower court that testimony on the issue should be received.



14

kens v. California, Oct. Term 1970, No. 5049; Reeves v. 
California, Oct. Term 1970, No. 5039; Massie v. California, 
Oct. Term 1970, No. 5044; Morford v. Rocker, Oct. Term 
1970, No. 5037.

In all of these cases, trial was held prior to Witherspoon; 
in all of them, state law required the exclusion of jurors 
with scruples against capital punishment; and, therefore, 
each petitioner was faced with the terrible choice between 
having his fate decided by the “ hanging jury” declared un­
constitutional in Witherspoon or foregoing jury trial alto­
gether. Petitioners sought to attack their “waivers” of 
juries in light of this Court’s subsequent decision in With­
erspoon; and, more particularly, they sought evidentiary 
hearings at which they could prove the effect on their 
“waivers” of the practice of empaneling a jury “uncom­
monly willing to condemn a man to die” ( Witherspoon v. 
Illinois, 391 U.S. at 521). See Petition for Certiorari in 
Morford v. Rocker, at p. 32. These cases thus raise an 
important issue concerning the waiver of rights vouchsafed 
by Witherspoon— an issue which should surely be decided 
by this Court before these petitioners or other defendants 
in the same position are put to death.



15

II.

The Issue of the Applicability of United States v. 
Jackson.

Four petitions for writs of certiorari, arising from the 
States of New Jersey and North Carolina, raise the issue 
whether the capital punishment statutes of those States are 
unconstitutional under this Court’s decision in United States 
v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). See Funicello v. New Jer­
sey, Oct. Term 1970, No. 5011; Childs v. North Carolina, 
Oct. Term 1970, No. 5014; Sanders v. North Carolina, Oct. 
Term 1970, No. 6006; Roseboro v. North Carolina, Oct. 
Term 1970, No. 5178. In both instances, the effect of the 
statutes is to limit the death penalty to one who pleads not 
guilty. Thus, a person who asserts his constitutional right 
to contest his guilt is penalized by subjection to electrocu­
tion, the result held unconstitutional in Jackson.

In New Jersey a person can avoid the threat of the death 
penalty by a plea of non vult. If the plea is accepted by the 
trial court the sentence cannot be death (N.J. Statutes Ann. 
2A: 113-3). In North Carolina, a defendant can plead guilty; 
if the plea is accepted by the State with the approval of 
the trial court, he receives an automatic life sentence (North 
Carolina Gen. Stat. §15-162.1).

The Supreme Courts of New Jersey and North Carolina 
have sought to distinguish Jackson on various grounds. The 
Petitions for Writs of Certiorari in Funicello (pp. 19-38) 
and in Childs (pp. 16-25) set out at length why we believe 
those distinctions are unfounded. The New Jersey and 
North Carolina cases therefore involve important issues 
concerning the scope and meaning of Jackson— applicable 
in at least five other states as well ;13 and they squarely pre­

13 (l)Louisiana (La. Code Crim. Proe. Art. 557) ; (2) Missis­
sippi (Miss. Code §§2217, 2536); (3) New York (N.Y. Code of



16

sent the question whether they are in conflict with Jackson 
and the decision of the Supreme Court of South Carolina in 
State v. Harper, 251 S.C. 379, 162 S.E.2d 712 (1968), which 
struck down a similar sentencing scheme under Jackson.

III.

The Issue of the Discriminatory Application of the 
Death Penalty For Rape.

In three petitions there is squarely raised the issue 
whether the States of Alabama and Georgia have discrimi­
nated against Negroes in the imposition of the death pen­
alty for the crime of rape, in violation of the Equal Protec­
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 IT.S.C. 
§1981.14 Swain v. Alabama, Oct. Term 1970, No. 5327; Wil­
liams v. Georgia, Oct. Term 1970; No. 5413; Butler v. Ala­
bama, Oct. Term 1970, No. 5492. The petitions set out at 
length the evidence on which the claim of racial discrimina­
tion is made, and the legal arguments supporting the con­
clusion that the death sentence in each case must be vacated 
under federal law (Swain at pp. 12-30; 55-69; Williams at 
pp. 5-8; 9-14; Butler at pp. 6-8 ; 12-13).

We appreciate, of course, that the issue of discrimina­
tion has been presented to the Court in the past, most 
notably in Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963), and 14

Grim. Proc. §3321) ; (4) South Carolina (S.C. Code §17-553.4 
(1967 Cum. S u p p .)); and (5) Wyoming (W yo. Stat. §7-195 (kid­
naping) ). See also, Nebraska Revised Stat. §28-417 (kidnaping) ; 
Revised Code of Washington, Title 9, §9.52.010 (kidnaping) ; and 
Vernon’s Ann. Code of Crim. Proc. of Texas, Art. 1.14, as amended, 
Tex. Acts 1967, p. 1733, ch. 659, §1.

14 “ All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States . . . 
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties [as white 
citizens], and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, 
or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.”



17

in Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970), and the Court 
has declined to review it. We strongly urge, however, that 
the time is now ripe for consideration of this vital Equal 
Protection question. In light of the Court’s decisions in 
McGautha and Crampton, that juries may be given unlim­
ited discretion in imposing the death penalty, it is partic­
ularly important that the Court make clear that that 
discretion cannot serve as a license for racial discrimina­
tion in capital sentencing. As of December 31, 1968, there 
were 60 men on death row in the United States sentenced 
for rape, 55 of them black. United States Department 
of Justice, National Prisoner Statistics, Number 45, August 
1969, p. 13. For these men, and the many more black men 
who will predictably be sentenced to die in the wake of 
McGautha and Crampton, it is imperative that this Court 
consider the question of equal protection so glaringly raised. 
And it is difficult to imagine better cases than the present 
ones in which to consider that question. Petitioners in each 
case have made overwhelming showings that death as a pen­
alty for rape is today reserved almost exclusively for those 
black men who have committed what the customs of the 
South have always regarded as the one unforgivable act— 
the rape of a white woman. Continuation of the long-time 
practice of racial discrimination in capital sentencing for 
rape not only makes the Equal Protection Clause a “solemn 
mockery,” but undermines decisions of this Court stretch­
ing as far back as Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 110 U.S. 356 
(1886), which seek to establish that, in no manner and 
under no pretext, may the awesome sanctions of the crim­
inal law be converted into instruments of racial persecu­
tion.



18

IV.

The Issue of the Right to Counsel In the Post-Appeal 
Stages of Capital Proceedings.

Three petitions, representing six indigents condemned 
in California and one in Virginia, raise the issue of the 
right to appointed counsel throughout the post-appeal 
stages of a capital case: that is, from the time of termina­
tion of a direct appeal until the prisoner is actually ex­
ecuted. See Anderson et al. v. California, Oct. Term 1970, 
No. 5023; Smith v. Nelson, Oct. Term 1970, No. 5038; and 
Williams v. Peyton, Oct. Term 1970, No. 5178. Petitioners’ 
claim is that because of the unique nature of a capital case, 
every stage in the process prior to execution of the sen­
tence of death is a “critical stage” within the meaning of 
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), and White v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); and, further, that the denial 
of appointed counsel to indigents denies them Equal Pro­
tection and Due Process of Law under the decisions in 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), and Douglas v. Cali­
fornia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).

Simply stated, because of the utter finality of a death 
sentence, every opportunity which the law affords to a con­
demned man to challenge or to seek mitigation of that 
sentence—whether by petitions for writs of certiorari, state 
or federal habeas corpus proceedings, insanity or executive 
clemency proceedings, or stay applications incident to any 
such proceedings—is unquestionably “critical,” lest his 
rights and his very life be unlawfully, but finally and ir­
revocably, extinguished. As set out in the petitions cited 
above, each of these petitioners sought an evidentiary hear­
ing to demonstrate factually why the assistance of counsel 
was crucial in all of these enumerated proceedings. Such



19

factual data concerning the nature of the proceedings and 
the role which counsel may play in them are obviously es­
sential for the proper disposition of the constitutional is­
sue presented. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Alabama, United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Colem,an v. Alabama, 
399 U.S. 1 (1970). Nevertheless, petitioners on one ground 
or another were denied such a hearing. Certiorari should 
be granted and the cases remanded, at the least, so that a 
factual record may be made for this Court’s consideration 
in its ultimate disposition of the question. This is an issue 
which literally cannot wait, for every month that passes 
following McGautha and Crampton threatens scores of un­
represented condemned men with execution.

V.

The Issue o f  the Death Penalty as a Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment.

As shown in footnotes 8 and 9, supra, eighteen of these 
cases raise the issue whether the death p e n a l t y  constitutes 
a cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. Six cases challenge the death 
penalty for rape or burglary;15 the remainder involve 
murder.16

The issue arises in two contexts: decisions below sustain­
ing the death penalty against Eighth Amendment attack on 
the merits,17 and decisions denying requests for evidentiary

15 See footnote 8, supra.
16 See footnote 9, supra.
17 Childs v. North Carolina, No. 5014; Segura v. Patterson, No. 

5027; Smith v. Nelson, No. 5038; Furman v. Georgia, No. 5059; 
Jackson v. Georgia, No. 5133; Hill v. North Carolina, No. 5136; 
Roseboro v. North Carolina, No. 5178; Lee a/k/a King v. Georgia, 
No. 5256; Swain v. Alabama, No. 5327; Butler v. Alabama, No. 
5492; Miller v. Georgia, No. 6569; Williams v. Georgia, No. 5413.



2 0

hearings at which a factual record might he made to dem­
onstrate that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amend­
ment.18 This Court therefore has the option of agreeing 
to hear argument on the cruel-and- unusual-punishment is­
sue immediately, or of remanding one or more cases for 
the development of a full evidentiary record illuminating 
that issue. Petitioners respectfully suggest that the latter 
course is more appropriate. Cf. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 
514, 521-22 (1968).

We again respectfully refer the Court to the petitions 
for certiorari for an elaboration of the reasons that sup­
port our position.19 Here we limit ourselves to emphasis of 
two considerations.

First, the grant of certiorari in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 
IT.S. 238 (1969), demonstrates that the Eighth Amendment 
issue is worthy of consideration. Certainly, it must even­
tually be decided. There can be no better or more pressing 
time than now, when a four-year moratorium on executions 
has been ended by McGautha and Crampton, and resump­
tion of electrocutions and gassings on a scale unknown in 
decades is imminent. We believe that enlightened consider­
ation of the cruel-and-unusual-punishment question re­
quires that the Court have before it the most complete con­
temporary record of the facts surrounding the death pen­
alty. We have attempted in several cases to make such a 
record; our requests for evidentiary hearings, however, 
have uniformly been turned down, apparently on the view 
that the issue is foreclosed in the lower courts. Thus, it is 
imperative that this Court clarify the right of death-sen­

18 Funicello v. New Jersey, No. 5011; Anderson et al. v. Cali­
fornia, No. 5023; Massie v. California, No. 5044; Morford v. Hocker, 
No. 5037; Aikens v. California, No. 5049; Williams v. Peyton, No 
5178.

19 Funicello, pp. 76-89; Anderson, pp. 22-29; Massie, pp. 31-36; 
Morford, pp. 47-52; Aikens, pp. 8-9; Williams, pp. 10-12.



21

tenced men to an adequate adjudication of this basic ques­
tion on which their lives depend.

Second, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit has recently held, in Ralph v. Warden, 4th 
Cir., No. 13,757, Dec. 11, 1970, reh. den. en lane, March 1, 
1971, that—at least in the absence of extreme aggravating 
circumstances—the death penaltjr for rape is a cruel and un- 
uszzal punishment. Ralph was decided after the filing of the 
petitions of certiorari in all of these cases with the exception 
of Miller v. Georgia, O.T. 1970, No. 6569. The logic of the 
Ralph opinion, we think, introduces a compelling new pers­
pective upon the constitutionality of the death penalty. It 
conflicts with the premises upon which not only the present 
rape cases, but all of the pending capital cases, were de­
cided below. We do not know whether the state will seek 
certiorari in Ralph. But, whatever the ultimate disposition 
of the Ralph case itself, and whatever its applicability to 
other rape and non-rape capital cases may be, it is surely 
imperative that no human life be extinguished until the 
fundamental questions that Ralph raises under the Eighth 
Amendment are authoritatively resolved by this Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the petitions for writs of cer­
tiorari should be granted.

CONCLUSION

Respectfully submitted,

A nthony G. A msterdam: 
Stanford University

Law School
Stanford, California 94305

Jack Greenberg 
James M. Nabrit, III 
Charles Stephen Ralston 
Jack H immelstein 
Jeffrey Mintz

10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019



22

Richard Newman 
Gerald T. F oley, Jr.
Claude J. Minter 
Carl R. Soller 

Office o f the Public Defender 
1100 Raymond Boulevard 
Newark, New Jersey 07102

Reuben J. D ailey 
46 South Market Street 
Asheville, North Carolina

J. Le V onne Chambers 
James E. F erguson, II 
James E. Banning 

216 West Tenth Street 
Charlotte, North Carolina

Jerome B. F alk, Jr.
650 California St.
San Francisco, California 

94108

E mil Roy E isenhardt 
333 Pine Street 
San Francisco, California

Harry J. Kreamer 
100 Bush Street, 26th Floor 
San Francisco, California

Gary D. B erger 
One Kearny St.
San Francisco, California

Paul N. H alvonik 
503 Market Street 
San Francisco, California

D emetrios P. A gretelis 
2020 Milvia St.
Berkeley, California 94704

Patrick J. Sampson 
2050 Bonita Ave.
LaVerne, California 91750

W. Reece B ader 
405 Montgomery St.
San Francisco, California

D onald P. MacD onald 
University o f Colorado 
Suite 13, Fleming Law Bldg. 
Boulder, Colorado 80202

Samuel B. F rancovich 
290 South Arlington Ave. 
Reno, Nevada 89501

Elliot B. Steinberg 
510 North Third St.
San Jose, Calif. 95112

Roger S. Hanson 
6265 Lubao Ave.
Woodland Hills, Calif. 91364

Jerry A. Green 
Suite 711 
1255 Post St.
San Francisco, Calif.

B. Clarence Mayfield 
910 West Broad St. 
Savannah, Georgia 31401

B obby L. H ill 
458% W. Broad St.
Room 301 
Savannah, Georgia

R, C. Boddie 
Tarboro, North Carolina

P eter W. Rowe 
900 Plaza One 
Norfolk, Virginia 23510

Conrad O. Pearson 
203% East Chapel Hill St, 
Durham, North Carolina

E mmet F. H agerty 
995 Market St,
San Francisco, Calif. 94103

Peter A. H all 
Orzell B illingsley, Jr.

1630 Fourth Ave., North 
Birmingham, Ala. 35203

H oward Moore 
Peter E. R indskopf 

Suite 1154
Citizens Trust Co. Bank Bldg. 
75 Piedmont Avenue, N.E. 
Atlanta, Ga. 30303



23

Oscar A dams, Jr.
U . W .  C l e m o n

1630 Fourth Ave., North 
Birmingham, Alabama 35203

Carroll, F. Gardner 
Box 866
Mt. Airv, North Carolina 

27030

L ouise T. H ornsby 
Suite 1616
Fulton National Bank Bldg. 
Atlanta, Ga. 30303

John H. Rufein, Jr.
1101 Eleventh St.
Augusta, Ga. 30903



APPENDIX



A P P E N D IX

Treatment of Witherspoon v. Illinois 
by the Lower Courts

This appendix includes all of the cases we have found 
in which Witherspoon has been applied by the lower courts 
where condemned men have challenged the constitutional 
validity of their death sentences on the ground that per­
sons opposed to capital punishment were improperly ex­
cluded from the jury which imposed the death penalty.

A. Decisions setting aside death sentences.1

The California and Georgia Supreme Courts have each 
set aside a number of death sentences under Witherspoon, 
and a few other state courts and a few federal courts 
have set aside a few.

1 A number of decisions are reported in which federal habeas 
corpus courts have remanded death cases to the state courts for 
initial determination of a Witherspoon claim. Brent v. White, 398 
F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1968); Powers v-. Hauck, 399 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 
1968) ; Yates v. Breazeale, 402 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Irving v. 
Breazeale, 402 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Garrison v. Patterson, 405 
F.2d 696 (10th Cir. 1969) ; Boulden v. Holman, M.D. Ala., No. 
2303-M, decided May 26, 1969; Maxwell v. Sarver, E.D. Ark., Pine 
Bluff Division, No. P.B. 66-C-52, decided September 18, 1970. See 
also Crook v. Henderson, 310 F. Supp. 100 (E.D. La. 1970) (peti­
tion dismissed for failure to exhaust state rem edies); United States 
ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, D. N.J., Civ. No. 580-63, decided Novem­
ber 6 1969 (petition dismissed for failure to exhaust state rem­
edies). Cf. Shinall v. Breazeale, 404 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1968) 
(remand to the district court) ; Moore v. Dutton, 432 F,2d 1281 
(5th Cir. 1970) (remand to the district court). In the four of those 
cases with which we are familiar, the State courts thereafter re­
jected the Witherspoon ground in three, Brent v. White, 19th Judi­
cial District Ct. of La., Grim. Div. No. 47, 265, decided July 31,1969, 
aff’d Brent v. Henderson, Sup. Ct. La., No. 51, 060, decided January 
27 1971; Boulden v. State, Cir. Ct. Morgan County, Ala., No. 553̂ 2, 
decided September 4, 1969; Maxwell v. Sarver, Sup. Ct. Ark., No. 
5552, decided November 16, 1970 (denial of Motion for Leave to 
F ile 'R u le 1 Petition), and granted Witherspoon relief in one. 
Irving v. State, Cir. Ct. Harrison County, Miss., decided May 5, 
1969.

la



2a

In those decisions vacating a death sentence and remand­
ing for a new trial, the courts have directed that jurors on 
retrial be death-qualified by the standards whose consti­
tutionality was reserved in Witherspoon. Thus, Wither­
spoon has invariably been incorrectly read as validating 
the forms of death-qualification practice which it did not 
expressly invalidate—or, at the least, the state courts have 
proved absolutely unwilling to reconsider the validity of 
those forms in light of the logic and reasoning of the 
Witherspoon opinion. See supra, pp. 11-12.

See:
Arizona
State v. Sherrick, 105 Ariz. 514, 467 P.2d 908 (1970).
California
In re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d 613, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21, 446 P.2d 117

(1968) ;
People v. Chacon, 69 Cal. 2d 765, 73 Cal. Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d 

106 (1968), rev’d. on other grounds;
People v. Risenhoover, 70 Cal. 2d 39, 73 Cal. Rptr. 533, 447 

P.2d 925 (1968);
People v. Anderson, 70 Cal. 2d 15, 73 Cal. Rptr. 550, 447 

P.2d 942 (1969);
People v. Bradford, 70 Cal. 2d 333, 74 Cal. Rptr. 726, 450 

P.2d 46 (1969);
People v. Sears, 70 A.C. 485, 74 Cal. Rptr. 872, 450 P.2d 

248 (1969);
In re Mathis, 70 Cal. 2d 467, 74 Cal. Rptr. 914, 450 P.2d 290

(1969) ;
People v. Teale, 70 Cal. 2d 497, 75 Cal. Rptr. 172, 450 P.2d 

564 (1969);
People v. Fain, 70 Cal. 2d 588, 75 Cal. Rptr. 633, 451 P.2d 

65 (1969);
People v. Morse, 70 Cal. 2d 711, 76 Cal. Rptr. 391, 452 P.2d 

607 (1969);



3 a

People v. Goodridge, 70 Cal. 2d 824, 76 Cal. Rptr. 421, 452 
P.2d 637 (1969);

People v. Osuna and Gorman, 70 Cal. 2d 759, 76 Cal. Rptr. 
462, 452 P.2d 678 (1969);

In re Eli, 71 Cal. 2d 214, 77 Cal. Rptr. 665, 454 P.2d 337 
(1969);

People v. Vaughan, 71 Cal. 2d 406, 78 Cal. Rptr. 186, 455 
P.2d 122 (1969);

People v. O’Brien, 71 Cal. 2d 394, 78 Cal. Rptr. 202, 455 P.2d 
138 (1969);

People v. Quiche, 71 Cal. 2d 502, 78 Cal. Rptr. 683, 455 P.2d 
787 (1969);

In re Sieterle, 71 Cal. 2d 698, 78 Cal. Rptr. 857, 456 P.2d 
129 (1969);

People v. Williams, 71 Cal. 614, 79 Cal. Rptr. 65, 456 P.2d 
633 (1969);

People v. Ketchel, 71 Cal. 2d 635, 79 Cal. Rptr. 92, 456 P.2d 
660 (1969);

In re Hillery, 71 Cal. 2d 857, 79 Cal. Rptr. 733, 457 P.2d 
565 (1969);

People y . Gardner, 71 Cal. 2d 843, 79 Cal. Rptr. 743, 457 
P.2d 575 (1969);

People v. Schader, 71 Cal. 2d 761, 80 Cal. Rptr. 1, 457 P.2d 
841 (1969);

People v. Stanworth, 71 Cal. 2d 820, 80 Cal. Rptr. 49, 457 
P.2d 889 (1969);

People v. Hill, 71 Cal. 2d 983, 80 Cal. Rptr. 345, 458 P.2d 
185 (1969);

In re Hill, 71 Cal. 2d 997, 80 Cal. Rptr. 537, 458 P.2d 449 
(1969);

People v. Washington, 71 Cal. 2d 1061, 80 Cal. Rptr. 567, 
458 P.2d 479 (1969);

People v. Washington, 71 Cal. 2d 1170, 81 Cal. Rptr. 5, 459 
P.2d 259 (1969);

In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d 122, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 499 
(1969);

(D ecisions Setting A side Death S entences)



4a

People v. Brawley, 1 Cal. 3d 277, 82 Cal. Rptr. 161, 461 P.2d 
361 (1969);

People v. Lara, 1 Cal. 3d 486, 82 Cal. Rptr. 628, 462 P.2d 380 
(1969);

People v. Roberts, 2 Cal. 3d 880, 87 Cal. Rptr. 833, 471 P.2d 
481 (1970);

In re Kemp, 1 Cal. 3d 190, 81 Cal. Rptr. 609, 480 P.2d 
481 (1969).

Florida
State v. Montgomery, Division “A ” , Cir. Ct., 4tli Judicial 

Cir., Duval County, No. 9588-C, decided June 9, 1970.
Georgia
Miller v. State, 224 Ga. 627, 163 S.E.2d 730 (1968) ;
Dixon v. State, 224 Ga. 636, 163 S.E.2d 737 (1968);
Massey v. Smith, 224 Ga. 721, 164 S.E.2d 786 (1968);
Arkwright v. Smith, 224 Ga. 764, 164 S.E.2d 796 (1968);
Williams v. Smith, 224 Ga. 800, 164 S.E.2d 798 (1968);
Jones v. State, 224 Ga. 782, 164 S.E.2d 831 (1968);
Alexander v. State, 225 Ga. 358, 168 S.E.2d 315 (1969);
Simmons v. State, 226 Ga. 110, 172 S.E.2d 680 (1970);
Brawner v. Smith, Superior Ct., Tatnall County, Ga., No. 

5579, decided January 21, 1969;
Lingo v. State, Superior Ct., Tatnall County, Ga., decided 

September 25, 1969.

Illinois
People v. Lee, 44 111. 2d 161, 254 N.E.2d 469 (1970) revd. on 

other grounds;
People v. Doss, 44 111. 2d 541, 256 N.E.2d 753 (1970);
People v. Mallett, 45 111. 2d 388, 259 N.E.2d 241 (1970);
People v. Hudson, 46 111. 2d 177, 263 N.E.2d 473 (1970).

Louisiana
State v. Turner, 220 So.2d 67 (La. 1969);
State v. Benjamin, 222 So.2d 853 (La. 1969).

(D ecisions Setting A side Death S entences)



5a

(Decisions Setting Aside Death Sentences) 
Mississippi

Rouse v. State, 222 So.2d 145 (Miss. 1969);
Irving v. State, Cir. Ct. Harrison County, Miss., decided 

May 5, 1969, aff’cl, Irving v. State, 228 So.2d 266 (Miss. 
1969).

Nevada

Bean v. State, .....N ev ,........., 465 P.2d 133 (1970).

New Jersey

State v. Royster, 57 N.J. 472, 273 A.2d 574 (1971).

North Carolina

State v. Spence, 274 N.C. 536, 164 S.E.2d 593 (1968);
State v. Ruth, 276 N.C. 36, 170 S.E.2d 897 (1969).

Ohio

State v. Watson, 20 Ohio App.2d 115, 252 N.E.2d 305 (1969).

Texas

Ellison v. State, 432 S.W.2d 955 (Tex.Cr.App. 1968);
Ex parte Bryan, 434 S.W.2d 123 (Tex.Cr.App. 1968).

Virginia

Snider v. Peyton, Hustings Ct., City of Roanoke, Va., de­
cided September 10, 1969.

Washington

Hawkins v. Rhay, 474 P.2d 557 (Wash. 1970).

Federal Courts

Spencer v. Beto, 398 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1968);
Williams v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1968);



6a

Marion v. Beto, 434 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1970) rev’g 302 F. 
Supp. 913 (NJD.Tex. 1969);

llackathorn v. Decker, 5th Cir., No. 30157, decided Febru­
ary 17, 1971, rev’g 312 F. Supp. 1304 (N.D.Tex. 1970); 

Rideau v. White, E. D. La. No. 970 Misc., decided May 12, 
1969;

Woodards v. Maxwell, 303 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.Ohio, 1969), 
aff’d, Woodards v. Cardwell, 430 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1970); 

Cardinale v. Henderson, 316 F. Supp. 480 (EJD.La. 1970); 
Ward v. Henderson, 317 F. Supp. 344 (W.D. La. 1970); 
Barlow v. Wainwright, N.D. Fla., Civ. Act. No. 1683, de­

cided February 17, 1971, rev’g, Barlow v. State, 238 So.2d 
602 (Fla. 1970).

B. Decisions refusing to set aside death sentences

In all cases found other than those just cited, lower 
courts have discovered some means to avoid Witherspoon. 
We list below those cases in which courts have rejected a 
Witherspoon challenge to a death sentence, and thereafter 
we attempt to categorize the rules and doctrines in avoid­
ance.

See:

Alabama

Lokos v. State, 284 Ala. 53, 221 So.2d 689 (1969);
Hubbard v. State, 285 Ala. 212, 231 So.2d 86 (1970);
Swain v. State, 285 Ala. 292, 231 So.2d 737 (1970);
Butler v. State, 285 Ala. 387, 232 So.2d 631 (1970);
Jackson v. State,------A la .------- , 239 So.2d 303 (1970);
Ex parte Aaron, Cir. Ct. of Montgomery County, No. 371, 

decided June 25, 1970;
Boulden v. State, Cir. Ct. Morgan County, Ala., No. 5532, 

decided September 4, 1969.

(D ecisions Setting A side Death Sentences)



7a

Arizona
State v. Malumphy, 105 Ariz. 200, 461 P.2d 677 (1969).

Arkansas
Davis v. State, 246 Ark. 827, 440 S.W.2d 244 (1969);
Maxwell v. Sarver, Sup. Ct. Ark., No. 5552, decided Novem­

ber 16, 1970.
California
People v. Bievelman, 70 Cal. 2d 60, 73 Cal. Rptr. 521, 447 

P.2d 913 (1968) ;
People v. Durham, 70 Cal. 2d 171, 74 Cal. Rptr. 262, 449 

P.2d 198 (1969);
People v. Varnum, 70 Cal. 2d 480, 75 Cal. Rptr. 161, 450 

P.2d 533 (1969);
People v. Hill, 70 Cal. 2d 678, 76 Cal. Rptr. 225, 452 P.2d 

329 (1969) ;
People v. McGautha, 70 Cal. 2d 550, 76 Cal. Rptr. 434, 452 

P.2d 650 (1969) ;
People v. Tolbert, 70 Cal. 2d 790, 76 Cal. Rptr. 445, 452 

P.2d 661 (1970) ;
People v. Coogler, 71 Cal. 2d 153, 77 Cal. Rptr. 790, 454 

P.2d 686 (1969) ;
People v. Miller, 71 Cal. 2d 459, 78 Cal. Rptr. 449, 455 P.2d 

377 (1969);
People v. Nye, 71 Cal. 2d 356, 78 Cal. Rptr. 467, 455 P.2d 

395 (1969);
People v. Mabry, 71 Cal. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 655, 455 P.2d 

759 (1969);
People v. Pike, 71 Cal. 2d 595, 78 Cal. Rptr. 672, 455 P.2d 

776 (1969);
People v. Robles, 71 Cal. 2d 924, 80 Cal. Rptr. 123, 458 P.2d 

67 (1969);
People v. Bandhauer, 1 Cal. 3d 609, 83 Cal. Rptr. 184, 463 

P.2d 408 (1970) rev’d on other grounds;

(D ecisions R efusing to Set A side Death S entences)



8a

People v. King, 1 Cal. 3d 791, 83 Cal. Rptr. 401, 463 P.2d 
753 (1970);

People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608, 464 P.2d 
64 (1970);

People v. Terry, 2 Cal. 3d 362, 85 Cal. Rptr. 409, 466 P.2d 
961 (1970).

Florida
Wilson v. State, 225 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1969);
Baker v. State, 225 So.2d 327 (Fla. 1969);
Campbell v. State, 227 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1969);
Williams v. State, 228 So.2d 377 (Fla. 1969);
Perkins v. State, 228 So.2d 382 (Fla. 1969);
Paramore v. State, 229 So.2d 855 (Fla. 1969);
Watson v. State, 234 So.2d 143 (Fla. 1970);
Young v. State, 234 So.2d 341 (Fla, 1970), rev’d on other 

grounds.

Georgia
Whisman v. State, 224 Ga. 793, 164 S.E.2d 719 (1968); 
Furman v. State, 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E.2d 628 (1969); 
Manor v. State, 225 Ga. 538, 170 S.E.2d 290 (1969);
Park v. State, 225 Ga. 618, 170 S.E.2d 687 (1969);
Mitchell v. State, 225 Ga. 656, 171 S.E.2d 140 (1969); 
Jackson v. State, 225 Ga, 790, 171 S.E.2d 501 (1969); 
Cummings v. State, 226 Ga. 46, 172 S.E.2d 395 (1970); 
Thacker v. State, 226 Ga. 170, 173 S.E.2d 186 (1970); 
Walker v. State, 226 Ga. 292, 174 S.E.2d 440 (1970): 
Lingo v. State, 226 Ga. 496, 175 S.E.2d 657 (1970); 
Johnson v. State, 226 Ga. 511, 175 S.E.2d 840 (1970);
Henderson v. State,------ Ga. --------, 179 S.E.2d 76 (1970);
Hart v. State,------ Ga, --------, 179 S.E.2d 346 (1971).
Illinois
People v. Speck, 41 I11.2d 177, 242 N.E.2d 208 (1968); 
People v. Moore, 42 IU.2d 73, 246 N.E.2d 299 (1969); 
People v. Bernette, 45 I11.2d 227, 258 N\E.2d 793 (1970).

(D ecisions R efusing to Set A side Death S entences)



9a

(Decisions Refusing to Set Aside Death, Sentences) 

Kentucky

Jaggers v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.2d 580 (Ky. 1968). 

Louisiana

State v. Crook, 221 So.2d 473 (La. 1969);
State v. Hudson, 221 So.2d 484 (La. 1969);
State v. Williams, 229 So.2d 706 (La. 1970);
State v. Poland, 232 So.2d 499 (La. 1970);
State v. Strong, 236 So.2d 798 (La. 1970);
State v. Douglas, 237 So.2d 382 (La. 1970);
State v. Mejia, 242 So.2d 525 (La. 1970);
Brent v. White, 19th Judicial District Ct. of La. Crim. Div., 

No. 47,265, decided July 31, 1969, aff’d, Brent v. Hender­
son, Sup. Ct. La., No. 51,060, decided January 27, 1971.

Maryland

Veney v. State, 251 Md. 182, 246 A.2d 568 (1968).

Massachusetts

Ladetto v. Commonwealth,------ Mass.------- , 254 N.E.2d 415
(1969) ;

Commonwealth v. Flowers, ------  Mass. ------ , 256 N.E.2d
418 (1970);

Commonwealth v. French, ——  Mass. — —, 259 N.E.2d 195
(1970) ;

Commonwealth v. Robertson,------ Mass. --------, 259 N.E.2d
553 (1970).

Mississippi

Irving v. State, Cir. Ct. Harrison County, Miss., decided 
May 5, 1969;

Peterson v. State, 242 So.2d 420 (Miss. 1970), rev’d on 
other grounds.



10a

(Decisions Refusing to Set Aside Death Sentences) 

Missouri
Duisen v. State, 441 S.W.2d 688 (Mo. 1969);
State v. Coleman, 460 S.W.2d 719 (Mo. 1970).

Nevada
Walker v. State, 85 Nev. 337, 455 P.2d 34 (1969); 
Anderson v. State, -------N ev .------- , 477 P,2d 595 (1970).

New Jersey
State v. Mathis, 52 N.J. 238, 245 A.2d 20 (1968);
State v. Forcella, 52 N.J. 263, 245 A.2d 181 (1968);
State v. Artis, 57 N.J. 24, 269 A.2d 1 (1970);
State v. Wilson, 57 N.J. 39, 269 A.2d 153 (1970);
State v. Sinclair, 57 N.J. 56, 269 A.2d 161 (1970);
State v. Kremens, 57 N.J. 309, 272 A.2d 537 (1970);
State v. Conyers, Sup. Ct. N.J., No. A-55, decided March 

26, 1971, death penalty rev’d on other grounds.

North Carolina
State v. Atkinson, 275 N.C. 288, 167 S.E.2d 241 (1969); 
State v. Roseboro, 276 N.C. 185, 171 S.E.2d 886 (1970); 
State v. Miller, 276 N.C. 681, 174 S.E.2d 481 (1970);
State v. Sanders, 276 N.C. 598, 174 S.E.2d 487 (1970).

Ohio
State v. Pruett, 18 Ohio St.2d 167, 248 N.E.2d 605 (1969); 
State v. Wigglesworth, 18 Ohio St.2d 171, 248 N.E.2d 607 

(1969);
State v. Crampton, 18 Ohio St.2d 182, 248 N.E.2d 614 

(1969);
State v. Eaton, 19 Ohio St.2d 145, 249 N.E.2d 897 (1969);
State v. Carter, 21 Ohio St.2d 212, 256 N.E.2d 714 (1970);
State v. Vails, 22 Ohio St.2d 103, 258 N.E.2d 225 (1970); 
State v. Ruling, 21 Ohio St.2d 13, 254 N.E.2d 670 (1970);
State v. Elliott, 25 Ohio St.2d 249, 267 N.E.2d 806 (1971).



11a

(Decisions Refusing to Set Aside Death Sentences) 
Oklahoma

Gaddis v. Page, 455 P.2d 699 (Okl. Ct. Grim. App. 1969); 
Koonce v. State, 456 P.2d 549 (Olda. Ct. Crim. App. 1969); 
Reid v. State, 478 P.2d 988 (Olda. Ct. Grim App. 1970).

South Carolina

State v. Atkinson, 253 S.C. 531, 172 S.E.2d 111 (1970).

Texas

Pittman v. State, 434 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Cr. App. 1968); 
Scott y. State, 434 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Cr. App. 1968); 
Smith v. State, 437 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. Cr. App. 1968); 
Whan v. State, 438 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Cr. App. 1969); 
Quintana v. State, 441 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Cr. App. 1969); 
Joseph v. State, 442 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. Cr. App, 1969); 
Branch v. State, 447 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Cr. App. 1969); 
Grant v. State, 449 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Cr. App. 1969); 
McKenzie v. State, 450 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970); 
Huffman v. State, 450 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970); 
David v. State, 453 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970);
Tea v. State, 453 SW2d 179 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970);
Thames v. State, 453 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970); 
Sanchez v. State, 454 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970); 
Harris v. State, 457 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970) ; 
Morales v. State, 458 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970); 
Turner v. State, 462 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970); 
Ortega v. State, 462 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970).

Utah

State v. Kelbach, 23 Utah 2d 231, 461 P.2d 297 (1969).

W  ashington

State v .  Smith, 74 Wash. 2d 44, 446 P.2d 571 (1968);
State v. Aiken, 75 Wash. 2d 421, 452 P.2d 232 (1969);



12a

State v. Adams, 76 Wash. 2d 650, 458 P.2d 558 (1969); 
State v. Tyler, 466 P.2d 120 (Wash. 1970).

Federal Courts

Segura v. Patterson, 402 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1968);
Bell v. Patterson, 402 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1968);
Sims v. Eyman, 405 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1969);
Jackson v. Beto, 428 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1970);
Smith v. Whisman, 431 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1970) ;
Til ford v. Page, 307 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Okla. 1969); 
Williams v. Wainwright, 308 F. Supp. 81 (S.D. Fla. 1969).

Rules and doctrines in avoidance:

1. Doctrines distinguishing or “construing” the 'rule of 
Witherspoon:

a. The “different atmosphere” doctrine. The Wither­
spoon decision is said to rest entirely on the fact that the 
trial judge in that case rushed to sweep the jury of con­
scientious objectors. Cases in which the presiding judge 
is more deliberate on the voir dire—albeit equally effective 
in excluding the same veniremen—present a “different at­
mosphere.” In cases with a “different atmosphere,” the 
precise, carefully articulated standards whose elaboration 
comprises the bulk of the Witherspoon opinion are said 
to be simply “not binding” on state courts. People v. 
Speck, 41 111.2d 177, 227, 242 N.E.2d 208 (1968). See also 
People v. Bernette, 45 I11.2d 227, 258 N.E.2d 793 (1970); 
People v. Moore, 42 111. 2d 73, 246 N.E.2d 299 (1969); dag­
gers v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.2d 580 (Ky. 1968); State 
v. Mathis, 52 N.J. 238, 245 A.2d 20 (1968); State v. Duling, 
21 Ohio St.2d 13, 254 N.E.2d 670 (1970); McKenzie v. 
State, 450 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970); Huffman v. 
State, 450 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970); Morales v. 
State, 458 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970); Harris v.

(D ecisions R efusing to S et A side Death S entences)



13a

State, 457 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970). Cf. Bell v. 
Patterson, 402 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1968).

b. The “different statute” doctrine. The highest courts 
of six States have purported to distinguish Witherspoon 
in whole or in part upon the ground that their state 
statutes differ from Illinois’ in that their statutes dis­
qualify only jurors whose scruples would prevent them, 
from finding the defendant guilty. Wilson v. State, 225 
So.2d 321 (Fla. 1969); Williams v. State, 228 So.2d 377 
(Fla. 1969); Perkins v. State, 228 So.2d 382 (Fla. 1969); 
Paramore v. State, 229 So.2d 855 (Fla. 1969); Barlow v. 
State, 238 So.2d 602 (Fla. 1969) (death sentence rev’d, 
Barlow v. Wainwright, N.D. Fla., Civ. Act. No. 1683, 
decided February 17, 1971); Ladetto v. Commonwealth,
------ Mass. ——, 254 N.E.2d 415 (1969); Howard v. State,
84 Nev. 599, 446 P.2d 163 (1968) (dictum); State v. 
Pruett, 18 Ohio St.2d 167, 248 N.E,2d 605 (1969); Koonce 
v. State, 456 P.2d 549 (Okl. Ct. Grim. App. 1969); Til- 
ford v. Page, 307 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Okl. 1969); State 
v. Kelbach, 23 Utah 2d 231, 461 P.2d 297 (1969). These 
statutes are, of course, of the sort which the Witherspoon 
opinion noted are sometimes not construed as meaning 
what they say (391 U.S., at 513-514, n. 5, citing Florida, 
Massachusetts, Nevada and Oklahoma decisions); and, in 
fact, in these States the statutes have been consistently 
read—both before and after the explanation that they 
squared with Witherspoon because directed to “guilt” - 
qualification—as allowing disqualification of jurors whose 
scruples would affect only their votes on penalty, not 
guilt. Piccott v. State, 116 So.2d 626 (Fla. 1959); Pitts 
v. State, 185 So.2d 164 (Fla. 1966); Sims v. State, 184 
So.2d 217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); and see the voir 
dire practice reflected in Abram v. State, 216 So.2d 498 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Commonwealth v. Ladetto, 
349 Mass. 237, 207 N.E.2d 536 (1965); State v. Elliott, 25



14a

Ohio St.2d 249, 267 N.E.2cl 806 (1971)2; State v. Williams, 
50 Nev. 271, 257 Pac. 619 (1927); Spillers v. State, 84 
Nev. 23, 436 P.2d 18 (1968); Walker v. State, 85 Nev. 
337, 455 P.2d 34 (1969). And see the exclusions sustained 
in the Koonce case itself.

A  comparable evasion of Witherspoon appears in Brent v. 
White, 19th Judicial District Ct. of La., Crim. Div., No. 
47265, decided July 31, 1969, aff’d, Brent v. Henderson, Sup. 
Ct. La., No. 51,060, decided January 27, 1971, in which the 
state courts upheld manifestly improper exclusions on the 
ground that since state law allowed also for the exclusion 
of those who could not conscientiously return a life verdict, 
the Witherspoon rule was inapplicable. Cf. State v. Poland, 
232 So.2d 499 (La. 1970).

c. The doctrine that Witherspoon could not have been 
intended to deprive the prosecution of an “impartial” jury 
on the question of penalty; that a juror’s “ impartiality” 
must appear affirmatively; therefore, that exclusion of 
equivocal veniremen is proper. This doctrine, which stands 
the “unmistakably clear” formulation of Witherspoon on 
its head, began with State v. Mathis, 52 N.J. 238, 245 A.2d 
20 (1968). See also Williams v State, 228 So.2d 877 (1969); 
federal habeas corpus denied, Williams v. Waiwwright, 308 
F. Supp. 81 (S.D. Fla. 1969); Campbell v. State, 227 So.2d 
873 (Fla. 1969); Ladetto v. State, ------  Mass. ------ , 254

2 Yet, in State v. Duling, 21 Ohio St.2d 13, 254 N.E.2d 670 
(1970), the Ohio Supreme Court held that because the Ohio statute 
fell within the guilt exception to Witherspoon, failure of defense 
counsel to object to improper exclusions at trial and on appeal 
barred later post-conviction relief. See also State v. Pruett, 18 
Ohio St.2d 167, 248 N.E.2d 605 (1969). It is otherwise difficult 
to determine how much weight the Ohio courts give the un­
founded conclusion that the Ohio statute distinguishes Ohio 
practice from the Witherspoon holding in rejecting Witherspoon 
claims. See, e.g., State v. Wigglesworth, 18 Ohio St.2d 171, 248 
N.E.2d 607 (1969) ; State v. Crampton, 18 Ohio St.2d 182, 248 
N.E.2d 614 (1969); State v. Carter, 21 Ohio St.2d 212, 256 N.E.2d 
714 (1970).



15,a

N.E.2d 415 (1969); State v. Artis, 57 N.J. 24, 269 A.2d 1 
(1970); State v. Wilson, 57 N.J. 39, 269 A.2d 153 (1970); 
State v. Sinclair, 57 N.J. 56, 269 A.2d 161 (1970); State v. 
Conyers, Sup. Ct. N.J., No. A-55, decided March 26, 1971 
(death penalty rev’d on other grounds); State v. Atkinson, 
275 N.C. 288, 167 S.E.2d 241 (1969); Pittman v. State, 434 
S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Cr. App. 1968); cf. Davis v. State, 246 
Ark. 827, 440 S.W.2d 244 (1969); Koonce v. State, 456 P.2d 
549 (Okl. Ct. Crim. App. 1969); Thames v. State, 253 S.W. 
2d 495 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970) (requiring venireman to state 
in advance of trial that he can conceive of circumstances 
in which he would return death penalty). But see People v. 
Chacon, 69 Cal.2d 765, 73 Cal. Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d 106 (1968); 
People v. Osuna and Gorman, 70 Cal.2d 759, 76 Cal. Rptr. 
462, 452 P.2d 678 (1969).

d. The doctrine construing Witherspoon to permit dis­
qualification of a juror who would not vote for the death 
penalty in the particular case being tried, although he could 
vote for death in another sort of case. See Hubbard v. State, 
285 Ala. 212, 231 So.2d 86 (1920); Ex parte Aaron, No. 371, 
Circuit Ct. of Montgomery County, Ala., decided June 25, 
1970; People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608,
464 F.2d 64 (1970); Hart v. State,------ Ga. — , 179 S.E.2d
346 (1971); Jaggers v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.2d 580 (Ky. 
1968); State v. Williams, 229 So.2d 706 (La. 1969); State v. 
Forcella, 52 N.J. 263, 245 A.2d 181 (1968); State v. Peele, 
274 N.C. 106, 161 S.E.2d 568 (1968); Pittman v. State, 434 
S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Cr. App. 1968); Smith v. State, 437 S.W. 
2d 835 (Tex. Cr. App. 1968); Ortega v. State, 462 S.W.2d 
296 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970); State v. Adams, 76 Wash.2d 650, 
458 P.2d 558 (1969). But see 391 U.S., at 522, n. 21.

(e. And the Maryland Court of Special Appeals has sug­
gested that Witherspoon may have no application in that 
State, because a capital jury in Maryland merely recom­
mends and does not impose the death sentence. Veney v.



16a

State, 251 Md. 182, 246 A.2d 568 (1968). But see 391 U.S., 
at 518, n. 12; id., at 522.)

2. Methods of avoiding Witherspoon tvhere jurors were 
unmistakably excluded in violation of the rule of that 
decision:

a. The determination that because only a few jurors 
were unconstitutionally excluded, the requisite representa­
tive quality of the jury was not destroyed. Bell v. Patter­
son, 402 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1968); State v. Mathis, 52 N.J. 
238, 245 A.2d 20 (1968); State v. Wilson, 57 N.J. 39, 269 
A.2d 153 (1970); State v. Sinclair, 57 N.J. 56, 269 A.2d 161 
(1970); State v. Conyers, Sup. Ct. N.J., No. A-55, decided 
March 26, 1971 (death, penalty rev’d on other grounds); 
State v. Wigglesworth, 18 Ohio St.2d 171, 248 N.E.2d 607 
(1969) (alternative ground, semhle) ; Scott v. State, 434 
S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Cr. App. 1968); Huffman v. State, 450 
S.W.2d 858 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970); Harris v. State, 457 
S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Cr. App.. 1970); State v. Adams, 76 
Wash. 2d 650, 258 P.2d 558 (1929).

Contra: Marion v. Beto, 434 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1970), 
rev’g, 302 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. Tex. 1969); People v. Fain, 
71 Cal. 2d 588, 75 Cal. Rptr. 633, 451 P.2d 65 (1969); In re 
Hillery, 71 Cal. 2d 857, 79 Cal. Rptr. 733, 457 P.2d 565
(1969) ; In re Seiterle, 71 Cal. 2d 698, 78 Cal. Rptr. 857, 456
P.2d 129 (1969) ; People v. Schader, 71 Cal. 2d 761, 80 Cal. 
Rptr. 1, 457 P.2d 841 (1969) ; In re Hillery, 71 Cal. 2d 857, 
79 Cal. Rptr. 733, 457 P.2d 565 (1969); People v. Washing­
ton, 71 Cal. 2d 1061, 80 Cal. Rptr. 567, 458 P.2d 479 (1969); 
People v. Washington, 71 Cal. 2d 1170, 81 Cal. Rptr. 5, 459 
P.2d 259 (1969); In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d 122, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577, 
460 P.2d 499 (1969); Miller v. State, 224 Ga. 627, 163 S.E.2d 
730 (1968); Bean v. State, ------  Nev. ------ , 465 P.2d 133
(1970) ; Snider v. Peyton, Hustings Ct., City of Roanoke, 
Va., decided September 10, 1969; Woodards v. Maxwell,



17a

303 F. Supp. 690 (S.D. Ohio 1969), aff’d, Woodards v. Card- 
well, 430 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1970); Barlow v. Wainwright, 
N.D. Fla., Civ. Act No. 1683, decided February 17, 1971, 
rev’g Barlow v. State, 238 So.2d 602 (Fla. 1970).

b. The observation that unexhausted prosecutorial pe- 
remptories outnumbered unconstitutionally excluded veni­
remen. Announced as a “relevant makeweight” in State 
v. Mathis, 52 N.J. 238, 245 A.2d 20 (1968), this considera­
tion frequently appears as an alternative ground of deci­
sion. Campbell v. State, 227 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1969); Para- 
more v. State, 229 So.2d 855 (Fla. 1969); People v. Sped, 
41 111. 2d 177, 242 N.E.2d 208 (1968); People v. Moore, 42 
111. 2d 73, 246 N.E.2d 299 (1969); People v. Bernette, 45 
111. 2d 227, 258 N.E.2d 793 (1970); Ladetto v. Common­
wealth, ------  Mass. ------ , 54 N.E.2d 415 (1969; Common­
wealth v. Flowers,------M ass.------- , 256 N.E.2d 418 (1970),
State v. Conyers, Sup. Ct. N.J., A-55, decided March 26,1971 
(death penalty rev’d on other grounds) ; State v. Wiggles- 
worth, 18 Ohio St. 2d 171, 248 N.E.2d 607 (1969); Scott v. 
State, 434 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Cr. App. 1968); Whan v. State, 
438 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Cr. App. 1969)Huffman v. State, 450 
S.W.2d 858 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970); Morales v. State, 458 
S.W.2d 56 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970).

Contra: In re Anderson, 69 Cal.2d 613, 73 Cal. Rptr. 
21, 446 P.2d 117 (1968); People v. Sears, 70 Adv. Cal. 
485, 74 Cal. Rptr. 872, 450 P.2d 248 (1969); Bean v. State,
____  Rev. ------ , 465 P.2d 133 (1970); Snider v. Peyton,
Hustings Ct., City of Roanoke, Va., decided Sept. 10, 
1969; Hawkins v. Rhay, 474 P.2d 557 (Wash. 1970); Bar- 
low v. Wainwright, N.D. Fla., Civ. Act No. 1683, decided 
February 17, 1971, rev’g Barlow v. State, 238 So.2d 602 
(Fla, 1970). Except in the California Supreme Court, the 
Anderson and Sears cases, supra, no notice seems to be 
taken of the palpable unconstitutionality of a conclusive



18a

judicial presumption that the prosecutor will systemat­
ically employ his peremptories to exclude from the jury 
a class of persons that this Court has held cannot be ex­
cluded. But see Sivain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 222-223 
(1965).

c. The observation that defense counsel did not object, 
or did not inquire further regarding the excluded jurors’ 
attitudes, or did not express his dissatisfaction with the 
jury by exhausting his own peremptories. This, also, is 
usually an alternative ground of decision. Paramore v. 
State, 229 So.2d 855 (Fla. 1969); State v. Peele, 274 N.C. 
106, 161 S.E.2d 568 (1968); State v. Wigglesworth, 18 Ohio 
St. 2d 171, 248 N.E.2d 607 (1969); Pittman v. State, 434 
S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Cr. App. 1968); Scott v. State, 434 S.W.2d 
678 (Tex. Cr. App. 1968); McKenzie v. State, 450 S.W.2d 
341 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970); Harris v. State, 457 S.W.2d 903 
(Tex. Cr. App. 1970); Morales v. State, 458 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. 
Cr. App. 1970); See also State v. Puling, 21 Ohio St. 2d 13, 
254 N.E.2d 670 (1970). Contra: the Anderson and Sears 
cases cited in the preceding paragraph; In re Hill, 71 Cal.2d 
997, 80 Cal. Rptr. 537, 458 P.2d 449 (1969); Bean v. State,
------ N ev.------- , 465 P.2d 133 (1970); Hawkins v. Rhay, 474
P.2d 557 (Wash. 1970).

d) In absence of a transcribed voir dire, the practice 
of placing the burden on capital defendants to show non- 
compliance with Witherspoon. Jackson v. Beto, 428 F.2d 
1054 (5th Cir. 1970); Joseph v. State, 442 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. 
Cr. App. 1969); Grant v. State, 449 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Cr. 
App. 1969); David v. State, 453 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. Cr. App. 
1970); Tea v. State, 453 S.W. 179 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970); 
See also Lokos v. State, 284 Ala. 53, 221 So.2d 689 (1969); 
Butler v. State, 285 Ala. 387, 232 So.2d 631 (1970); Perkins 
y . State, 228 So.2d 382 (Fla. 1969); Cf. Swain v. State, 285 
Ala. 292, 231 So.2d 737 (1970); Reid v. State, 478 P.2d 988



19a

(Okl. Ct. Crim. App 1970). But cf. Evans v. State, 430 S.W. 
2d 502 (Tex. Cr. App. 1968), (reversing for failure of the 
trial court to have voir dire examination transcribed on 
request).

e) Miscellaneous procedural grounds: People v. Band- 
hauer, 1 Cal. 3d 609, 83 Cal. Rptr. 184, 463 P.2d 408 (1970); 
Baker v. State, 225 So.2d 327 (Fla. 1969); State v. Crook, 
221 So.2d 473 (La. 1969); Duisen v. State, 441 S.W.2d 688 
(Mo. 1969); State v. Vails, 22 Ohio St. 2d 103, 258 N.E.2d 
225 (1970); Gaddis v. Page, 455 P.2d 699 (Okl. Ct. Cr. App. 
1969).

3. Methods of interpreting a voir dire transcript so as to 
avoid Witherspoon:

a. Distinguishing Witherspoon if the trial judge con­
ducted any sort of inquiry going beyond general opposition 
to capital punishment. The nature of the inquiry and of 
the juror’s response are in this view apparently imma­
terial. Segura v. Patterson, 402 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1968); 
Hubbard v. State, 285 Ala. 212, 231 So.2d 86 (1970); Whan 
v. State, 438 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Cr. App. 1969); Morales v. 
307 F.Supp. 781 (W.D. Olda. 1969). Indeed, some courts 
have sanctioned restricting defense counsel’ s exploration 
of the strength of a venireman’s scruples. Ortega v. State, 
462 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970). See also: People 
v. Nye, 71 Cal. 2d 356, 78 Cal. Rptr. 467, 455 P.2d 395
(1969) ; Cummings v. State, 226 Ga. 46, 172 S.E.2d 395
(1970) ; Thacker v. State, 226 Ga. 170,173 S.E.2d 186 (1970); 
Walker v. State, 226 Ga. 292, 174 S.E.2d 440 (1970); John­
son v. State, 226 Ga. 511, 175 S.E.2d 840 (1970).

b. Observing that “no particular form of words” is nec­
essary to satisfy Witherspoon, In practice, this means 
that most any form of words, however far from the mark,



20a

will satisfy Witherspoon. People v. Speck, 41 I11.2d 177, 
242 N.E.2d 208 (1968); Koonce v. State, 456 P.2d 549 (Okla. 
Ct. Crim. App. 1969); Pittman v. State, 434 S.W.2d 352 
(Tex. Cr. App. 1968); State v. Aiken, 75 Wash.2d 650, 452 
P.2d 232 (1969). Cf. People v. Varnum, 70 Cal.2d 480, 75 
Cal. Rptr. 161, 450 P,2d 533 (1969); State v. Elliott, 25 
Ohio St.2d 249, 267 N.E.2d 806 (1971) (holding that Boulden 
v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478 (1969) allows for “ equivocation” 
in a juror’s response).

c. According deference to the trial court’s interpreta­
tion of a venireman’s responses in ruling on challenges 
for cause. This constructional canon—proper enough in 
its place, of course—is consistently applied to the construc­
tion of voir dire proceedings conducted prior to the date 
of Witherspoon, at a time when the trial judge would not 
in fact have been using proper Witherspoon standards. 
The court that applies the canon usually does so in an 
opinion that retroactively rewrites the pre-Witherspoon 
law of the State as consistent with Witherspoon. State 
v. Mathis, 52 N.J. 238, 245 A.2d 20 (1968); State v. Forcella, 
52 N.J. 263, 245 A.2d 181 (1968); State v. Conyers, Sup. Ct. 
N.J., No. A-55, decided March 26, 1971 (death penalty rev’d 
on other grounds) ; Pittman v. State, 434 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. 
Cr. App. 1968); Huffman v. State, 450 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. Cr. 
App. 1970); State v. Aiken, 75 Wash.2d 421, 452 P.2d 232 
(1969); State v. Adams, 76 Wash.2d 650, 458 P.2d 558 
(1969).

d. The Alabama practice of conducting a post-convic­
tion hearing, in light of a constitutionally inadequate pre- 
Witherspoon voir dire, in order to recall the veniremen 
excluded at trial and re-examine them. on the issue of the 
strength of their earlier scruples. Jackson v. State, 285 
Ala. 564, 234 So.2d 579 (1970) (remanding for hearing); 
Jackson v. State, 285 Ala. 564, 239 So.2d 303 (1970)



21a

(affirming death sentence after hearing). See also: Aaron 
v. State, 283 Ala. 52, 214 So.2d 327 (1968) (remanding 
for hearing); Ex Parte Aaron, No. 371, Gir. Ct. of Mont­
gomery County, Ala., decided June 25, 1970 (affirming 
death sentence after hearing); Boulden v. State, Cir. Ct. 
Morgan County, Ala. No. 5532, decided September 4, 1969 
(affirming death sentence after hearing); Liddell v. State, 
S. Ct. Ala., 7 Div. 693, decided March 4, 1971 (remanding 
for hearing). Contra: Hawkins v. Rhay, 474 P.2d 557 
(Wash. 1970).

4. Decisions articulating relatively unimpeachable Wither­
spoon standards but manifestly misapplying them:

a. Summarily concluding compliance with Witherspoon 
where the record clearly reflects improper exclusions:

Segura v. Patterson, 402 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1968); Max­
well v. Sarver, Sup. Ct. Ark., No. 5552, decided November 
16, 1970 (denial of Motion for Leave to File Rule 1 Peti­
tion) ; Paramore v. State, 229 So.2d 855 (Fla. 1969); Wat­
son v. State, 234 So.2d 143 (Fla. 1970); Turner v. State, 
462 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970). See also People v. 
Terry, 2 Cal. 3d 362, 85 Cal. Rptr. 409, 466 P.2d 961.

b. Failing to distinguish impartiality on quilt from im­
partiality on penalty. A  common ground of misconstruc­
tion of the voir dire resides in taking literally a juror who 
says that his scruples will affect his ability to return a 
“guilty” verdict, although, in the context of the applicable 
state law, verdict forms and/or voir dire questioning, a 
“guilty” verdict means an unqualified guilty verdict—that 
is, a vote for the death penalty. See Sims v. Eyman, 405 
F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1969); Wilson v. State, 225 So.2d 321 
(Fla. 1969); Furman v. State, 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E.2d 628 
(1969); Mitchell v. State, 225 Ga. 656, 171 S.E.2d 140 
(1969); cf. State v. Forcella, 52 N.J. 263, 245 A.2d 181 
(1968); Veney v. State, 251 Md. 182, 246 A.2d 568 (1968).



22a

c. Permitting an exclusion where the venireman re­
sponded under the misapprehension that the law would re­
quire him to return a death sentence in particular eases. A  
similar confusion is latent in a voir dire transcript that 
reflects a venireman’s statement that he could not return a 
guilty verdict carrying with it the death penalty where the 
venireman has been given the impression that the law re­
quires the death penalty under certain circumstances or 
that there is under law a “proper case” for the death pen­
alty. E.g. State v. Poland, 232 So.2d 499 (La. 1970); Com­
monwealth v. Robertson, ------ Mass. --------, 259 N.E.2d 553
(1970); Peterson v. State, 242 So.2d 420 (Miss. 1970); State 
v. Elliott, 25 Ohio St.2d 249, 267 N.E.2d 806 (1971). But 
see 391 U.S., at 518-519. Only the California Supreme Court 
has clearly stated that the juror must be informed that his 
penalty determination is entirely a discretionary matter. In 
re Hillery, 71 Cal. 2d 857, 79 Cal. Rptr. 733, 457 P.2d 565 
(1969); People v. Teale, 70 Cal. 2d 497, 75 Cal. Rptr. 172, 
450 P.2d 564 (1969).

d. Permitting disqualification of a venireman without 
any injuiry as to whether he could subordinate his scruples 
to his duty as a juror. It should he noted, however, that 
even the California Supreme Court, which has given the 
most generous reception to Witherspoon of any state court, 
permits disqualification of veniremen for scruples without 
instructing them that state law requires them as jurors to 
consider the death penalty, and then inquiring whether they 
are able to subordinate their scruples to this duty. People 
v. Beivelman, 70 Cal. 2d 60, 73 Cal. Rptr. 521, 447 P.2d 
913 (1968); People v. Durham, 70 Cal. 2d 171, 74 Cal. Rptr. 
262, 449 P.2d 198 (1969); People v. Varnum, 70 Cal. 2d 480, 
75 Cal. Rptr. 161, 450 P.2d 533 (1969); People v. Hill, 70 
Cal. 2d 678, 76 Cal. Rptr. 225, 452 P.2d 329 (1969); People 
v. McGautha, 70 Cal. 2d 550, 76 Cal. Rptr. 434, 452 P.2d 
650 (1969); People v. Tolbert, 70 Cal. 2d 790, 76 Cal. Rptr. 
445, 452 P.2d 661 (1970); People v. Coogler, 71 Cal. 2d 153,



23a

77 Cal. Rptr. 790, 454 P.2d 686 (1969); People v. Miller, 
71 Cal. 2d 459, 78 Cal. Rptr. 449, 455 P.2d 377 (1969); 
People v. Nye, 71 Cal. 2d 356, 78 Cal. Rptr. 467, 455 P.2d 
395 (1969); People v. Mabry. 71 Cal. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 
655, 455 P.2d 759 (1969); People v. Pike, 71 Cal. 2d 595, 78 
Cal. Rptr. 672, 455 P.2d 776 (1969); People v. King, 1 Cal. 
3d 791, 83 Cal. Rptr. 401, 463 P.2d 753 (1970). See also 
Smith v. Whisman, 431 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1970); Anderson
v. State,------ Nev.------- , 477 P.2d 595 (1970); State v. Miller,
276 N.C. 681, 174 S.E.2d 481 (1970); State v. Sanders, 276 
N.C. 598, 174 S.E.2d 487 (1970); State v. Eaton, 19 Ohio 
St. 2d 145, 249 N.E.2d 897 (1969). But see 391 U.S., at 
514-515, n. 7, 515-516, n. 9.

5. Opaque decisions: In these eases refusing to vacate 
death sentences it is impossible to evaluate the application 
made of Witherspoon, since not enough appears from the 
respective opinions to appraise the courts’ characterization 
of the voir dire (or relevant parts of it) as consistent with 
Witherspoon standards. Sims v. Eyman, 405 F.2d 439 (9th 
Cir. 1969); People v. Mabry, 71 Cal. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 
655, 455 P.2d 759 (1969); People v. Pike, 71 Cal. 2d 595, 78 
Cal. Rptr. 672, 455 P.2d 776 (1969); Young v. State, 234 
So.2d 341 (Fla. 1970); Whisman v. State, 224 Ga. 793, 164 
S.E.2d 719 (1968); Manor v. State, 225 Ga. 538, 170 S.E.2d 
290 (1969); Park v. State, 225 Ga. 618, 170 S.E.2d 687 
(1969); Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 790,171 S.E.2d 501 (1969); 
Thacker v. State, 226 Ga. 170, 173 S.E.2d 186 (1970); Hen­
derson v. State,------Ga. -- ---- , 179 S.E.2d 76 (1970); State
v. Hudson, 221 So.2d 484 (La. 1969); State v. Douglas, 237 
So.2d 382 (La. 1970); State v. Mejia, 242 So.2d 535 (La. 
1970); State v. Strong, 236 So.2d 798 (La. 1970); Common­
wealth v. French, ------ M ass.--------, 259 N.E.2d 195 (1970);
State v. Coleman, 460 S.W.2d 719 (Mo. 1970); Walker v. 
State, 85 Nev. 337, 455 P.2d 34 (1969); State v. Kremens, 57



24a

N.J. 309, 272 A.2d 537 (1971); State v. Roseboro, 276 
N.C. 185, 171 S.E.2d 886 (1970); State v. Crompton, 
18 Ohio St. 2d 182, 248 N.E.2d 614 (1969); State v. 
Carter, 21 Ohio St. 2d 212, 256 N.E. 714 (1970); State 
v. Atkinson, 253 S.C. 531, 172 S.E.2d 111 (1970); Quintana 
v. State, 441 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Cr. App. 1969); Branch v. 
State, 447 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Cr. App. 1969); Sanches v. 
State, 454 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970); State v .  Smith, 
74 Wash.2d 44, 446 P.2d 571 (1968); State v. Tyler, 466 P.2d 
120 (Wash. 1970).



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