Lowery v. Circuit City Stores Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of the Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants

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September 8, 1997

Lowery v. Circuit City Stores Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of the Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants preview

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  • Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Lowery v. Circuit City Stores Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of the Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, 1997. b063dcfe-bb9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/67205a00-d3c2-465d-b6fd-670a2d4422c4/lowery-v-circuit-city-stores-brief-amicus-curiae-in-support-of-the-plaintiffs-appelleescross-appellants. Accessed July 01, 2025.

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    No. 85-999

31 n ttje Suprem e C o u rt of tfje Mmteti s ta te d
October Term, 1986

U nited States of A merica, petitioner

v.
P hillip Paradise, Jr., et al.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

JOINT APPENDIX

Dennis N. Balske, Esquire 
400 Washington Avenue 
P.O. Box 2087 
Montgomery, AL 36101 
(Counsel for Respondents 

Paradise, et al.)
Edward L. Hardin, Esquire 

Hardin & Hollis 
1825 Morris Avenue 
Birmingham, AL 35203 
(Counsel fo r  Defendants in 

Support o f Petitioner)
James S. Ward 

Corley, Moncus, Bynum 
& DeBuys

2100 16th Avenue South 
Suite 300
Birmingham, AL 35205 
(Counsel fo r Defendants/ 

Intervenors in Support o f  
Petitioner)

Charles Fried 
Solicitor General 
Department o f  Justice 
Washington, D.C. 20530 
(202) 633-2217

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
FILED DECEMBER 10, 1985 

CERTIORARI GRANTED JULY 7, 1986



INDEX TO JOINT APPENDIX

Document Date Page
1) District Court Docket Sheet- 

Civil Action No. 3561-N (Rele­
vant Docket Entries)

3/15/84 1

2) Order (enjoining racially dis­
criminatory policies and prac­
tices and imposing one-for-one 
hiring requirement)

2/10/72 23

3) Order (enjoining artificial re­
striction of size of state trooper 
force)

8/5/72 30

4) Proposed Partial Consent 
Decree and Order (entering 
decree)

2/16/79 37

5) Agreement of Counsel for the 
Parties

2/16/79 46

6) Consent Decree 8/18/81 49
7) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Enforce 

the Terms of the February 16, 
1979 Partial Consent Decree and 
the August 18, 1981 Consent 
Decree

4/7/83 58

8) Motion to Intervene 4/15/83 81
9) Amendment to Motion to In­

tervene
4/18/83 96

10) Complaint of Intervenors 
(♦lodged 4 /1 5 /8 3 ; filed 
10/28/83)

4/15/83 98

11) Order (setting motions to en­
force and to intervene for hear­
ing)

5/3/83 114

12) Order (granting intervention) 10/28/83 116

(i)



11

13)

14)
15)

16)
17)

18)

19)

20)

21)

22)

23)
24)

Document Date
Order (prohibiting use of 
defendants’ promotion pro­
cedure and directing them to 
submit a new promotion plan) 
Proposed Promotion Procedure 
Order (granting motion to en­
force and imposing one-for-one 
promotion requirement) 
Memorandum Opinion 
Order (denying motions to alter 
or amend judgment)
Statement of Completion of
Procedure for Promotion to
Rank of Corporal
Motion to Approve Selection
Procedure for Promotion to
Corporal
Response to D efendant 
Prescott’s Motion to Approve 
Selection Procedure for Promo­
tion to Corporal 
Plaintiffs’ Response to Defend­
ants’ Motion to Approve Selec­
tion Procedure for Promotion to 
Corporal
Plaintiffs’ Response to In- 
tervenor’s Objection to Im­
plementation of New Promotion 
Procedure 
Response to Order 
Response of the United States to 
Defendants’ Motion to Approve 
Selection Procedure

10/28/83

11/10/83
12/15/83

12/15/83
1/13/84

6/18/84

6/18/84

6/28/84

6/29/84

6/29/84

6/29/84
7/2/84

Page
117

125
128

130
138

142

144

146

151

155

157
159



Ill

Document Date Page
25) Order 7/27/84 163
26) Notice of Appeal 8/24/84 165
27) Intervenors Objection to Op­

posed Corporal Promotion
9/10/84 168

28) Motion for Stay 10/25/84 171
29) Order 10/25/84 175
30) Order 10/25/84 176



RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES

Date
1972 
Jan. 3

Jan. 12

Jan. 13

Feb. 2 
Feb. 10

NR Proceedings

Complaint filed. Injunctive relief re­
quested.

ORDER designating the United States to 
appear and participate in all pro­
ceedings in this action as a party and 
amicus curiae. (Copies mailed to Gor­
don Madison, defts. Stanley Frazer 
and Walter L. Allen; copies handed to 
U.S. Attorney and Morris Dees; copy 
also mailed to David Norman.)

Temporary Restraining ORDER. De­
fendants temporarily enjoined and 
restrained from recruiting, hiring, or 
making any commitment to hire any 
additional Alabama State troopers un­
til this Court can conduct a hearing on 
plaintiffs motion for a preliminary in­
junction and until this Court can 
determine the issued involved. (Copies 
mailed to counsel; copy handed to 
U.S. Attorney’s secretary; copies 
delivered to Marshal for service on 
defts.)

Defendants’ answer to complaint.
ORDER/(l) denying defendants’ motion 

to dismiss; (2) enjoining defendants 
John S. Frazer, as Director, Ala. Per­
sonnel Dept, and Walter L. Allen, as 
Director, Ala. Department of Public 
Safety, their agents, officers, etc. 
from engaging in any employment 
practices, including recruitment, ex-

(1 )



2

Date NR Proceedings
amination, appointment, training, 
promotion, retention or any other per­
sonnel action for the purpose or with 
the effect of discriminating against 
any employee, or actual or potential 
applicant for employment on the 
ground of race or color; (3) enjoining 
defendants from failing to hire and 
permanently employ after the proba­
tionary period 1 Negro trooper for 
each white trooper hired until approx­
imately 25 percent of the Ala. state 
trooper force is comprised of Negroes; 
(4) enjoining defendants from con­
ducting any training courses for the 
purpose of training new troopers until 
the groups to be given said training 
courses are comprised of approx­
imately 25 percent black trooper can­
didates; (5) enjoining defendants from 
failing to hire supporting personnel 
for the Dept, of Public Safety in the 
ratio of 1 Negro for each white until 
approximately 25 percent of the sup­
porting personnel are black; (6) 
abrogating eligible and promotional 
registers heretofore used for the pur­
pose of hiring troopers to the extent 
necessary to comply with this decree; 
(7) requiring defendants to assign 
employees on the basis of their train­
ing and ability, without regard to race. 
Defts. shall advise the public in all 
advertisements and announcements 
that they will appoint and employ per-



3

Date

Mar. 7

NR Proceedings
sons on an equal opportunity, merit 
basis, without discrimination on the 
ground of race or color. Defts. shall 
adopt and implement a program of 
recruitment and advertising which will 
fully advise the Negro citizens of the 
State of Ala. of the employment op­
portunities now available to them with 
the Ala. Dept, of Public Safety. No 
commitments of employment given by 
either of the defts. or any of their 
agents to any applicant or potential 
applicant, short of actual hiring prior 
to 1/13/72, the date the temporary 
restraining order was entered in this 
case, shall be given any priority over 
the hiring ratio set out in decree. 
Defendants to file within 90 days from 
this date a written report setting forth 
in detail the efforts which have been 
undertaken to recruit and hire black 
applicants. Costs taxed against 
defendants in this case. Jurisdiction 
retained. AMENDMENT FILED 
8/5/75 and 2/16/79.

Defendants’ notice of appeal to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit from 
the order entered in this Court 
2/10/72. (Copies of notice mailed to 
Morris Dees and Joseph J. Levin, Jr.; 
U.S. Attorney; Edward W. Wads­
worth, Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals; 
David L. Norman.)



4

Date 
1973 
Jan. 5

1974 
Apr. 22

May 15

1975 
Aug. 5

ORDER that record in this case be sup­
plemented to include all evidence 
received in case of U.S. v. Frazer, 
Civil Action No. 2709-N inter­
rogatories and answers, depositions 
and stipulations of the parties filed in 
this case since Nov. 12, 1973, and a 
copy of this order. Attorneys for U.S. 
ordered to file with Clerk of CCA 
within 7 days all evidence received by 
this Court in Civil Action No. 
2709 —N; Clerk ordered to forward 
forthwith to Clerk of CCA, the other 
supplemental materials. (Copies 
mailed to counsel.)

Plaintiffs’ motion for further relief. (Re­
ferred to Judge Johnson)

JUDGMENT of U.S. Court of Appeals 
(issued as mandate 5/13/74). Judg­
ment of Judgment of district court af­
firmed; defendant-appellant to pay 
plaintiff, intervenor-appellee, and 
plaintiff and amicus curiae-appellee 
costs on appeal. Certified copy of 
opinion attached.

41 ORDER denying plaintiffs’ motion for 
further relief insofar as the motion 
seeks modification of the terms of the 
Court’s order of 2/10/72; further 
ordered (1) denying Governor George 
C. Wallace’s motion to be dismissed as 
a party defendant; (2) enjoining 
defendants George C. Wallace, John

NR Proceedings



5

Date NR Proceedings
S. Frazer, E. C. Dothard, their agents, 
officers, successors in office, 
employees and all persons acting in 
concert or participation with them 
from taking any action or failing to 
take any action, which action or inac­
tion results in the artificial restriction 
of the size of the Alabama state 
trooper force; (3) continuing the mo­
tion for further relief filed 4/22/74, 
insofar as it seeks an adjudication of 
the validity of the employment criteria 
and tests of the Alabama Department 
of Public Safety until further order of 
the Court; (4) denying defendants’ 
motion for “Modification and/or 
Reconsideration of Certain Findings 
in the Court’s Order of January 5, 
1974” and (5) directing defendants to 
file with this Court on or before 
1/20/76, a comprehensive report 
reflecting as of 1/1/76, the number of 
troopers by race, the number of sup­
port personnel by race, the number of 
troopers and support personnel hired 
since this order and the number of 
troopers hired since this order that 
have achieved permanent status. 
(Copies mailed to counsel.) AMEND­
MENT FILED 2/16/79.

1977
Sept. 23 Plaintiffs’ motion for supplemental re­

lief. Referred to Judge Johnson. Ex­
hibit attached. SEE ORDER OF 
2/16/79.



NR

6

ProceedingsDate 
1979 
Feb. 16

Feb. 16

Feb. 21

Apr. 13 

Apr. 13

1981 
Apr. 13

Agreement of counsel for the parties re­
lating to promotions to the rank of 
corporal. Referred to Judge Johnson. 

50 Parties’ proposed partial consent decree
57 (referred to Judge Johnson) and 

ORDER approving said partial con­
sent decree; directing that said decree 
be implemented in accordance 
therewith and in accordance with the 
orders of the Court of 2/10/72 and 
8/5/75. (Copies furnished to counsel.)

58 SEE AMENDMENT FILED 2/16/79. 
Defendants’ motion to more fully define

quota relief or, in the alternative, mo­
tion for supplemental relief. Referred 
to Judge Johnson. Hearing requested. 
SEE ORDER OF 2/22/79. SEE 
ORDER 4/13/79.

61 MEMORANDUM. (Copies furnished to 
counsel.)

65 ORDER denying defendants’ motion to
define quota relief or, in the alter­
native, for supplemental relief filed 
2/21/79. (Copies furnished to 
counsel.)

66 Defendants’ motion for approval to
utilize the Corporal’s Promotional Ex­
amination along with a Report of a 
Validation Study prepared by the 
State of Alabama, Personnel Depart­
ment and for a hearing on same. 
Referred to Judge Thompson.



7

Date NR
1981
July 20 83

Aug. 18 . 101

1983
Apr. 7 108

Apr. 13 129

Apr. 15 130

Memorandum brief of plaintiffs and 
U.S. to the proposed examination for 
State Trooper Corporal. Referred to 
Judge Thompson.

Consent DECREE and ORDER that the 
proposed selection procedure for State 
Trooper Corporal, shall be admini­
stered and used as set out in this order. 
Exhibit attached. (Copies furnished to 
counsel.)

Plaintiffs’ motion to enforce the terms of 
the 2/16/79 partial consent decree the 
8/18/81 consent decree. Exhibits at­
tached. Referred to Judge Thompson.

ORDER that the other parties file writ­
ten responses to the plaintiffs’ 4/????? 
motion to enforce the terms of the 
2/16/79, partial consent decree and 
8/18/81, consent decree. If any of the 
parties desires to engage in dis??? to 
present evidence, or for the court to 
set a briefing schedule on the motion, 
the party must request the same in 
writing by 4/29/83; otherwise motion 
and any responses thereto shall be 
deemed under submission as of 
4/29/83. (Copies mailed to counsel; 
copy furnished to U.S. Attorney.)

Motion of V. E. McClellan, William M. 
Bailey, D. B. Mansell and Dan Daven­
port; intervene. Exhibits attached. 
Referred to Judge Thompson.

Proceedings



8

Date
Apr. 18

Apr. 18

Apr. 26

Apr. 26 
Apr. 26 
Apr. 26 
Apr. 26 
Apr. 26

Apr. 29

May 2

NR Proceedings
145 Amendment to motion to intervene of 

V. E. McClellan, William M. Bailey, 
D. Mansell and Dan Davenport. 
Referred to Judge Thompson.

147 ORDER setting the motion to intervene 
filed 4/15/83, for submission, without 
oral agrument, on 4/29/83; DIRECT­
ING the movants for intervention to 
file their brief and any evidentiary 
materials by 4/22/83; DIRECTING 
the other parties to respond by 
4/29/83. (Copies mailed to counsel; 
copy furnished to U. S. Attorney.)

150 Memorandum of applicants for inter­
vention in support of motion to in­
tervene.

166 Affidavit of Dan Davenport.
170 Affidavit of V. E. McClellan.
174 Affidavit of D. B. Mansell.
178 Affidavit of William M. Bailey.
182 Motion of applicants for intervention 

for evidentiary hearing or in the alter­
native request for oral argument. 
Referred to Judge Thompson.

184 United States’ response to motion of 
V. E. McClellan, et al. to intervene. 
Referred to Judge Thompson.

191 Defendants’ response to plaintiffs’ 
motion to enforce the terms of the 
2/16/79 partial consent decree and the 
8/18/81 consent decree. Referred to 
Judge Thompson.



9

May 6

May 12 

June 1 

Oct. 28

Date
May 5

Oct. 28

NR Proceedings
195 Response of the U.S. to plaintiffs’ mo­

tion to enforce decrees.
269 Plaintiffs’ response to motion to inter­

vene and defendants’ request for 
discovery. Referred to Judge Thomp­
son.

282 Applicants for intervention file ob­
jection and response to 5/3/83 order. 
Referred to Judge Thompson.

290 Defendants’ response to plaintiffs’ mo­
tion to enforce consent decrees. Re­
ferred to Judge Thompson.

309 ORDER granting 4/15/83 motion to 
intervene filed by McClellan, Bailey, 
Manson and Davenport, to the extent 
that the movants may participate in 
these proceedings on a prospective 
basis only and may not challenge 
previously entered orders, judgments, 
and decrees since intervention is un­
timely as to these denying motion in 
all other respects. (Copies mailed to 
counsel and furnished to U.S. At­
torney’s office.)

311 ORDER (1) that the plaintiffs’ 4/7/83 
motion to enforce the terms of the 
2/???? partial consent decree and the 
8/18/81 consent decree, be and it is 
hereby granted to the extent hereafter 
set forth; (2) that it is hereby declared 
the defendants’ selection procedure 
for promotion to corporal has an 
adverse racial impact and that said 
selection procedure may not be used



10

Date

Oct. 28 

Nov. 3

Nov. 10

NR Proceedings
by the defendants for promotion; (3) 
that on or before 11/10/83, the de­
fendants file with the court a plan to 
promote to corporal, from qualified 
candidates at least 15 persons in a 
manner that will not have an adverse 
racial impact; (4) that on or before 
11/18/83, the plaintiffs, the United 
States and the defendant-intervenors 
may file any objections and counter­
proposals; (5) if by 11/25/83, the 
plaintiffs, the United States, and the 
defendants have filed a promotion 
plan agreed to by all said parties, the 
issue of corporal promotions shall be 
deemed submitted for resolution by 
the court; and (6) if the plaintiffs, the 
United States and the defendants file 
an agreed-to promotion plan, the 
defendant-intervenors are allowed 7 
days from the date of filing to file any 
objections to the plan. (Copies mailed 
to counsel; furnished to U.S. At­
torney.)

320 Complaint in intervention of McClellan, 
Bailey, Mansell and Davenport.

332 Intervenors’ motion to amend or to
clarify order allowing intervention. 
Referred to Judge Thompson.

344 Defendant State of Alabama Depart­
ment of Public Safety’s motion for 
reconsideration. Exhibits A and B At­
tached. Referred to Judge Thompson.



11

Nov. 10 359

Nov. 14 365

Nov. 17 382

Nov. 17 420

Nov. 18 423

Nov. 21 437

Nov. 28 441

Nov. 28 444

Nov. 28 450

Date NR
Nov. 10 356

Proceedings
Defendant State of Alabama Depart­

ment of Public Safety’s proposed pro­
motion procedure. Referred to Judge 
Thompson.

Defendant State of Alabama Personnel 
Department’s response to 10/28/83 
order to submit a plan to promote to 
Corporal from qualified candidates. 
Referred to Judge Thompson.

Defendant Department of Public 
Safety’s response to defendant-inter- 
venor’s motion to amend or to clarify 
order allowing intervention.

Plaintiffs’ response to defendants’ pro­
posed promotion procedure Exhibits 
A & B attached. Referred to Judge 
Thompson.

Plaintiffs’ response to intervenors’ mo­
tion to amend.

Response of the United States of defend­
ants’ proposed promotion procedure.

Response of the United States to inter­
venors’ motion to amend or clarify 
order allowing intervention.

Defendant-Intervenors’ response to 
order of 11/4/83. Referred to Judge 
Thompson.

Defendant-Intervenors’ response to pro­
posed promotion procedure of defen­
dant Department of Public Safety. 
Referred to Judge Thompson.

Response of personnel defendants to 
intervenors’ motion. Referred to 
Judge Thompson.



12

Date NR Proceedings
Nov. 30 452 ORDER denying defendants’ motion of

10/19/83; denying defendants’ 
11/10/83 motion for reconsideration; 
granting the U.S.’s motion for leave to 
file a response to proposed protective 
order; granting defendants’ 10/19/83 
motion for protective order as further 
set out in order. (Copies mailed to 
counsel.)

Dec. 7 454 ORDER (entered 12/8/83) vacating the
11/30/83 order and entering this order 
in its place. ORDERED that the 
defendants’ 10/19/83, motion to allow 
administration of entry-level test be 
denied; that the defendants’ 11/10/83 
motion for reconsideration be denied 
and that the United States’ 11/16/83, 
motion for leave to file response to 
proposed protective order be granted; 
that the defendants’ 10/19/83 motion 
for protective order be granted; that 
counsel for the plaintiffs, the U.S., 
and defendant-intervenors shall notify 
the entry-level examination or permit 
the examination to be used or seen by 
anyone except in connection with this 
lawsuit; and that said counsel shall 
make any use or distribution of the ex­
amination designed to or having the 
probable effect of getting into the 
hand of those who may take the ex­
amination. (Copies mailed to 
counsel.)



13

Date
Dec. 7

Dec. 9

Dec. 15 
Dec. 15

NR Proceedings
456 Semi-annual report of the State of 

Alabama of persons employed by the 
State; filed by plaintiff. Referred to 
Judge Thompson.

473 ORDER granting the motion of
defendant-intervenors, filed 11/3/83, 
to amend or clarify order, with leave 
to the defendant-intervenors to file ap­
propriate motion for class certifica­
tion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 
(Copies mailed to counsel.)

474 MEMORANDUM OPINION.
482 ORDER (1) that the plaintiffs’ 4/7/83 

motion to enforce the terms of the 
2/16/?? partial consent decree and 
8/18/81 consent decree be granted to 
the extent hereafter set forth; (2) that 
the defendants and their agents and 
employees and each is hereby en­
joined and restrained from failing to 
promote from this day forward, for 
each white trooper promoted to a 
higher rank, one black trooper to the 
same rank, if there is a black trooper 
objectively qualified to be promoted 
to the rank; (3) that the promotion re­
quirement shall remain in effect as to 
each trooper rank above the entry- 
level rank until either approximately 
25% of the rank is black or the 
defendants have developed and im­
plemented a promotion plan for the 
rank which meets the prior orders and



14

Date

Dec. 23

Dec. 27

Dec. 27

Dec. 27

NR Proceedings
decrees of the court and all other rele­
vant legal requirements; (4) that 
within 35 days from the date of this 
order the defendants shall submit to 
the court for the approval a schedule 
for the development of promotion 
procedures for all ranks above the 
entry-level position; (5) that the plain­
tiff be allowed 21 days from this date 
to file a request for interim attorney 
??? and (6) that all other relief re­
quested by the plaintiffs in their mo­
tion not specifically granted be denied. 
(Copies furnished U.S. Attorney; mail 
remaining counsel.)

487 The United States’ motion to alter or 
amend judgment of 12/15/83. Re­
ferred to Judge Thompson.

492 Defendants’ motion to alter or amend 
judgment of 12/15/83 and to stay 
order, and request for hearing. Re­
ferred to Judge Thompson.

503 Motion of the defendant-intervenors to 
alter or amend the judgment of 
12/15/83 and to stay its enforcement. 
Affidavit of William P. Cobb, II at­
tached. Referred to Judge Thompson.

509 Defendant Personnel Director of the 
State of Alabama’s motion for recon­
sideration of the court’s order of 
12/15/83. Referred to Judge Thomp­
son.



15

Date
Dec. 30

Dec. 30

1984 
Jan. 6

Jan. 6

Jan. 6

Jan. 13

NR Proceedings
557 Defendant-Intervenors’ supplement or 

amendment to motion to alter or 
amend judgment of 12/15/83 and to 
stay its enforcement. Referred to 
Judge Thompson.

562 Plaintiffs’ response to defendants’ mo­
tions for reconsideration, to alter or 
remand judgment, and to stay en­
forcement of the 12/15/83 order.

569 Defendant Alabama Department of 
Public Safety’s response to 12/15/83 
court order.

571 The United States’ motion for stay of 
this court’s order of 12/15/83. Re­
ferred to Judge Thompson.

574 Defendant-intervenors’ motion for stay 
of enforcement of the Order rendered 
12/15/83. Referred to Judge Thomp­
son.

578 ORDER that the following motions be 
and they are hereby denied: 
defendant-intervenors’ 1/6/84 motion 
to stay; to the United States’ 1/6/84 
motion to stay defendant Prescott, et 
al.’s 12/27/83 motion to alter or 
amend judgment and ??? of order; 
defendant Alabama Personnel Direc­
tor’s 12/27/83 motion for reconsidera­
tion; defendant-intervenors’ 12/27 
and 12/30/83 motions to alter or 
amend and to stay enforcement; and



16

Date

Jan. 19 

Jan. 23

Jan. 24

the United States’ 12/23/83 motion to 
alter or amend judgment. (Copies fur­
nished U.S. Attorney and mailed to 
remaining counsel.)

582 Personnel defendant’s response to Court 
Order of 12/15/83

585 ORDER directing all parties to show 
cause within 14 days from this date as 
to why the schedule for development 
of promotion procedures for all ranks 
above entry-level filed 1/6/84, should 
not be approved by the court. (Copies 
furnished to U.S. Attorney; mailed to 
remaining counsel.)

595 Defendant, the Department of Public 
Safety’s Notice of Appeal to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit from 
the Order granting plaintiffs’ 4/7/83 
motion in part and enjoining and re­
straining defendants from failing to 
promote one black trooper for each 
white trooper promoted to a higher 
rank entered 12/15/83, and all other 
orders relating thereto, and the Order 
denying all motions filed by defendants 
to amend, alter, or stay the 12/15/83 
order entered 1/13/84. [Copies mailed 
to: John Carroll, Dennis Balske, Cyn­
thia Drabek, Charles Graddick, 
Richard Meadows, Rosa Davis, Ed­
ward L. Hardin, Jr., Ray Acton, Ken 
Wallis, James S. Ward-furnished to 
Judge Thompson, John Bell & W.H.

NR Proceedings



17

Harris, J r .—certified to: Clerk,
USCA w/docket entries —appeal in­
formation sheet furnished Edward L. 
Hardin, Jr.

Jan. 27 599 Defendants-Intervenors, V.E. Mc­
Clellan, William M. Bailey, D.B. 
Mansell and Dan Davenport’s Notice 
of Appeal to the U.S. Court of Ap­
peals, 11th Circuit from the Order 
entered 12/15/83 granting plaintiffs’ 
motion to enforce the terms of 
2/16/79 partial consent decree and the 
8/18/81 consent decree and further 
enjoining and restraining the defend­
ants from failing to promote from 
12/15/83, forward, for each white 
trooper promoted to a high rank, one 
black trooper to the same rank, if 
there is a black trooper qualified to be 
promoted to the rank, until approx­
imately 25% of all rank are black, and 
from the Order denying these defend­
ants’ motion to alter, amend or stay 
the 12/15/83 Order entered 1/13/84. 
[Copies mailed to: John Carroll, Den­
nis Balske, Cynthia Drabek, Charles 
Graddick, Richard Meadows, Rosa 
Davis, Edward L. Hardin, Jr., Ray 
Acton, Ken Wallis, James S. 
Ward —furnished to: Judge Thomp­
son, John Bell & W.H. Harris, 
J r .— certified to Clerk, USCA 
w/docket entries —appeal information 
sheet furnished James S. Ward.]

Date NR Proceedings



18

Date NR Proceedings
Feb. 3 603 Plaintiff United States of America’s re­

sponse to schedule for development of 
promotion procedures.

Feb. 6 610 Intervenors’ response to the order of 
1/23/84. Referred to Judge Thomp­
son.

Feb. 8 627 ORDER (1) that the schedule for devel­
opment of promotion procedures for
all above entry-level, filed 2/6/84, by 
defendant Department of Public Safe­
ty adopted 1/19/84 by defendant Per­
sonnel Department, be approved; and 
that defendants be and they are hereby 
DIRECTED to develop and submit to 
the promotion procedures in accor­
dance with said schedule; (2) that 
defendant intervenors’ 2/6/84 motion 
for temporary retention of record in 
district be and it is hereby granted; (3) 
that the plaintiffs’ 2/6/84 motion for 
to dismiss, etc., be and it is hereby 
granted; and that the plaintiffs’ mo­
tion for order to enforce consent 
decree, etc., and motion for pre­
liminary injunction be and they are 
dismissed; and (4) that the plaintiffs’ 
2/6/84 supplemental motion for in­
terim attorney fees, be set for submis­
sion, with oral argument, on 2/17/84. 
Any briefs, evidentiary materials, and 
request for a hearing must be filed by 
said date. (Copies furnished U.S. At­
torney and mailed to remaining 
counsel.) (Certified copy mailed to 
Clerk, USCA docket entries.)



19

Date
Mar. 13

June 19

June 19

June 27

June 28

June 29

NR Proceedings
3 Plaintiff, United States’ Notice of Ap­

peal to the U.S. Court of Appeals, 
11th Circuit, from the Order entered 
12/15/83; and from the Order entered 
1/13/84, denying plaintiffs motion to 
alter or amend judgment entered 
12/23/83. (Copies mailed to: John 
Carroll, Cynthia Drabek, Richard 
Meadows, Ray Acton, Ken Wallis, 
James S. Ward, Edward L. Hardin, 
Jr. —furnished to: Ken Vines along 
with appeal information sheet and 
W.H. Harris J r .—certified to USCA 
w/orders appealed from and docket 
entries.)

9 Defendant Prescott’s statement of com­
pletion of procedure for promotion to 
rank of corporal. Referred to Judge 
Thompson.

12 Defendant Prescott’s motion to approve 
selection procedure for promotion to 
corporal. Referred to Judge Thomp­
son.

19 Plaintiff United States’ response to de­
fendants’ motion to approve selection 
procedure.

27 Defendant-intervenors’ response to de­
fendant Prescott’s motion to approve 
selection procedure for promotion to 
corporal. Referred to Judge Thomp­
son.

33 Plaintiffs’ response to Defendants’ mo­
tion to approve selection procedure 
for promotion to corporal. Referred 
to Judge Thompson.



20

Date
June 29

July 2

July 27

Aug. 16

Aug. 16

Aug. 24

NR Proceedings
38 Plaintiffs’ response to intervenors’ ob­

jection to implementation of new pro­
motion procedure. (Copy of brief at­
tached.) Referred to Judge Thomp­
son.

101 Defendant Personnel Board of State of 
Alabama response to court order of 
reference defendant Prescott’s motion 
to approve selection procedure for 
promotion to corporal. Referred to 
Judge Thompson.

115 ORDER that defendants are permitted 
to make promotions as requested; 
shall make selections from the group 
as set forth in order; that the one-for- 
one quota shall not apply in this in­
stance; that the parties may proceed 
with discovery; the court shall conduct 
further proceedings to determine if 
further review would be necessary. 
(Copies mailed to counsel.)

118 Defendant Byron Prescott’s motion to 
approve selection procedure for pro­
motion to sergeant. Referred to Judge 
Thompson.

121 Defendant Byron Prescott’s statement of 
completion of procedure for promo­
tion to sergeant. Referred to Judge 
Thompson.

126 Defendants-Intervenors, V. E. Mc- 
Cellan, William M. Bailey, D. B. 
Mansell and Dan Davenport’s Notice 
of Appeal from the Order entered



21

Date

Sept. 10

Sept. 14 

Oct. 25

Oct. 25

Oct. 25

NR Proceedings
7/27/84. (Certified copy to Clerk, 
USCA along w/certified copies of 
docket entries and order appealed 
from; copies mailed to James S. Ward 
[furnished appeal information sheet], 
Cynthia Drabek, Richard N. 
Meadows, Dennis N. Balske, Edward 
L. Hardin, Jr., Ray Acton, Ken 
Wallis; furnished Ken Vines and 
Court Reporter, Dub Harris) 

Defendant Prescott’s response to court 
order requesting summary of selection 
procedure for promotion to sergeant. 
Attachments. [SEALED per Court’s 
instructions.]

140 Intervenors’ objection to proposed cor­
poral promotion.

168 Defendant-intervenors’s motion for stay 
of order entered on 7/27/84. Referred 
to Judge Thompson.

173 ORDER denying the defendant-inter-
venors’ 10/25/84 motion to stay. 
(Copies mailed to counsel; furnished 
to John Bell.)

174 ORDER that 1) subject to the limitations
set forth in this order, defendants 
Prescott, et al., are permitted to make 
promotions to State Trooper Sergeant 
from the group of 13 persons 
designated “most qualified” pursuant 
to the selection procedure described in 
defendants’ 9/10/84, submission; 2) 
defendant Prescott, et al, shall select



22

Date NR Proceedings
sergeants from the “most qualified” 
group in a non-discriminatory manner 
and shall provide actual notice of such 
promotions to counsel for the parties 
not less than 5 working days prior to 
the effective date of such promotions 
as further set out in this order; 3) that 
the one-for-one quota for sergeant 
promotions, ordered 12/15/83, shall 
not apply to the use of this selection 
procedure as described in paragraphs 
1 and 2 of this order; 4) that the court 
shall conduct further proceedings 
upon motion of a party to determine 
whether the results of future ad­
ministrations of the selection pro­
cedure presented by defendants 
Prescott, et al., or a similar procedure, 
may be used to select State Trooper 
Sergeants without further review. Un­
til further order of this Court, defend­
ants shall make no promotions to 
State Trooper Sergeant positions other 
than from the group they have iden­
tified as the 13 “most qualified” can­
didates. (Copies mailed to counsel; 
furnished U.S. Attorney.)

Dec. 11 182 Defendant Prescott’s motion to promote
eight lieutenants and three captains. 
Referred to Judge Thompson.

Dec. 26 201 ORDER granting the defendants’
12/11/84, motion to promote eight 
lieutenants and three captains. (Copies 
mailed to counsel; furnished to U.S. 
Attorney.)



23

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3561-N 
NAACP, plaintiff, P hillip P aradise, Jr.,

INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THE CLASS SIMILARLY 
SITUATED, INTERVENING PLAINTIFF,

U nited States of A merica, plaintiff and amicus curiae,

v.
W alter L. A llen, as D irector of the A labama 

Department of P ublic Safety, his agents, assigns, and
SUCCESSORS IN OFFICE; STANLEY FRAZER, AS PERSONNEL
D irector, P ersonnel Dept., State of A labama, his

AGENTS, ASSIGNS, AND SUCCESSORS IN OFFICE, DEFENDANTS.

Civil Action No. 2709-N
U nited States of A merica by John N. M itchell, 

A ttorney General, plaintiff,

v.
John S. Frazer, as D irector, A labama Personnel 

D epartment, et al., defendants.

ORDER

This action was originally brought by the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People on 
behalf of its members and all similarly situated Negroes in 
the State of Alabama. The complaint alleged that defend­
ant Allen as Director of the Alabama Department of 
Public Safety and defendant Frazer as Personnel Director



24

of the Alabama Personnel Department have followed a 
continuous and pervasive pattern and practice of ex­
cluding Negroes from employment in the Department of 
Public Safety. At the commencement of the hearing in this 
case, a motion by Phillip Paradise, Jr., to intervene as a 
party plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the class 
similarly situated, was granted.

The Department of Public Safety has two major com­
ponents: the state troopers and those secretaries, clerks 
and others who comprise the supporting personnel. There 
are two other groups closely associated with the depart­
ment: the trooper cadets and auxiliary troopers. The 
cadets are men too young to qualify as regular troopers 
but who receive training from the department toward 
becoming troopers. The auxiliary force is a group of un­
paid volunteers which performs trooper functions under 
department direction in time of emergency and which is 
selected on the basis of a recommendation.

Because the agency’s supporting staff is essentially iden­
tical to those personnel who were the focus of this Court’s 
order in United States v. Frazer, 317 F.Supp. 1079 (M.D. 
Ala. 1970) and because these employees are obtained from 
the defendant Frazer’s department, this Court has deter­
mined that the appropriate relief as to these positions will 
be treated as a motion for supplemental relief under the 
Frazer decision.

The state troopers, however, are a different matter. This 
group is a distinct, specialized force which is unlike the 
relatively fungible secretaries and clerks who populate 
every office. For example, the troopers have their own 
height, weight and age requirements, maintain a separate 
testing program and require an oral interview. The trooper 
force has an extensive and specialized training program.



25

For these reasons, it is clear that the state trooper aspect of 
this case justifies the filing and prosecution of separate 
litigation and requires separate adjudication.

The defendants have raised an objection to the 
NAACP’s right to bring this suit. It was, however, the un­
controverted testimony of the association’s state president, 
Mr. Thomas Reed, that some of its members have sought 
jobs with the department and have been refused. It is well 
established that the NAACP has standing to assert the 
rights of its members. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 
428 (1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 
U.S. 293, 296 (1961); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patter­
son, 357 U.S. 449, 458 (1958). Any standing question in 
this case was further obviated by the intervention of plain­
tiff Paradise. His testimony at the hearing for a temporary 
restraining order was undisputed that he was refused a 
trooper application. He contends that the refusal was 
racially motivated. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to 
dismiss is due to be denied.

Plaintiffs have shown without contradiction that the 
defendants have engaged in a blatant and continuous pat­
tern and practice of discrimination in hiring in the 
Alabama Department of Public Safety, both as to 
troopers and supporting personnel. In the thirty-seven- 
year history of the patrol there has never been a black 
trooper and the only Negroes ever employed by the depart­
ment have been nonmerit system laborers. This unex­
plained and unexplainable discriminatory conduct by state 
officials is unquestionably a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 
365 U.S. 715 (1961); Brown v. Board o f Education, 347 
U.S. 483 (1954); United States v. Frazer, supra.

Under such circumstances as exist in these cases, the 
courts have the authority and the duty not only to order an 
end to discriminatory practices, but also to correct and 
eliminate the present effects of past discrimination.



26

Hutchins v. United States Industries, Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 
310 (5th Cir. 1970); Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 
407 F.2d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir. 1969). The racial discrimina­
tion in this instance has so permeated the Department of 
Public Safety’s employment policies that both mandatory 
and prohibitory injunctive relief are necessary to end these 
discriminatory practices and to make some substantial 
progress toward eliminating their effects.

While further discrimination will be enjoined, this 
Court is not inclined to order new tests or testing pro- 

, cedures. This Court recognizes that Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) is authority for the view that if an 
employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes is 
unrelated to job performance, the practice is prohibited. 
Yet there are persuasive reasons for avoiding the imposi­
tion of new procedures. First, the Government’s selection 
technique expert, John E. Furcon, testified that it would 
require a minimum of six months to properly analyze the 
job of state trooper and compile proper selection methods. 
The plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Richard S. Barrett, estimated 
that the process may take as much as four or five years, 
particularly in light of the fact that there are presently no 
black troopers. Thus, it would in all likelihood take 
several years to implement the selection procedures which 
these experts envision.

Second, Dr. Barrett described Mr. Furcon’s cost 
estimate of $40,000 for the completion of such an analysis 
as perhaps too low. Imposition of such a study would be 
an undue burden upon the state. Moreover, in light of the 
affirmative relief which this Court will require, primary 
concern over the testing procedures is unnecessary. This is 
not to say that the state may not undertake some revision 
of its selection methods if it desires to do so. In fact, the 
testimony reflects that changes are appropriate and 
necessary. This Court will simply not order it at this time.



27

This particular aspect of the state trooper case will be 
reserved pending receipt of implementation reports to be 
filed by the defendants.

Accordingly, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT and 
DECREE of this Court:

I. That defendants’ motion to dismiss be and the same 
is hereby denied.

II. That the defendants John S. Frazer, as Director, 
Alabama Personnel Department and Walter L. Allen, as 
Director, Alabama Department of Public Safety, their 
agents, officers, successors in office, employees and all 
persons acting in concert or participation with them, be 
and they are hereby enjoined from engaging in any 
employment practices, including recruitment, examina­
tion, appointment, training, promotion, retention or any 
other personnel action, for the purpose or with the effect 
of discriminating against any employee, or actual or 
potential applicant for employment, on the ground of race 
or color.

III. It is further ORDERED that the defendants be 
and they are each hereby enjoined from failing to hire and 
permanently employ after the probationary period, one 
Negro trooper for each white trooper hired until approx­
imately twenty-five (25) percent of the Alabama state 
trooper force is comprised of Negroes. This injunction ap­
plies to the cadet and auxiliary troopers as well as to the 
regular troopers. It shall be the responsibility of the 
Department of Public Safety and the Personnel Depart­
ment to find and hire the necessary qualified black 
troopers.

IV. It is further ORDERED that the defendants be 
and they are hereby enjoined from conducting any train­
ing courses for the purpose of training new troopers until



28

the groups to be given said training courses are comprised 
of approximately twenty-five (25) percent black trooper 
candidates.

V. It is further ORDERED that the defendants be and 
they are each hereby permanently enjoined from failing to 
hire supporting personnel for the Department of Public 
Safety in the ratio of one Negro for each white until ap­
proximately twenty-five (25) percent of the supporting 
personnel are black. The decree in United States v. Frazer, 
317 F.Supp. 1079 (M.D. Ala. 1970) is hereby amended in­
sofar as the Department of Public Safety’s employment 
practices are concerned.

VI. It is further ORDERED that eligible and promo­
tional registers heretofore used for the purpose of hiring 
troopers be and they are hereby abrogated to the extent 
necessary to comply with this decree.

VII. It is further ORDERED that:
1. The defendants shall assign employees on the basis 

of their training and ability, without regard to race. Negro 
employees shall not be assigned to serve exclusively or 
predominantly Negro clientele.

2. The defendants shall advise the public in all adver­
tisements and announcements that they will appoint and 
employ persons on an equal opportunity, merit basis, 
without discrimination on the ground of race or color. In 
such public announcements, the defendants shall advise 
potential and actual applicants and employees of their 
right to be free from discrimination. Said announcements 
shall be made throughout the State of Alabama within 
thirty days from the date of this order.

3. The defendants shall adopt and implement a pro­
gram of recruitment and advertising which will fully ad­
vise the Negro citizens of the State of Alabama of the 
employment opportunities now available to them with the



29

Alabama Department of Public Safety. The defendants 
shall institute regular recruitment visits to predominantly 
Negro schools (vocational, high and college) throughout 
the State of Alabama, such visits to be made in person by 
appropriate officials of the Alabama Department of 
Public Safety.

4. No commitments of employment given by either of 
the defendants or any of their agents to any applicant or 
potential applicant, short of actual hiring prior to January 
13, 1972, the date the temporary restraining order was 
entered in the state trooper case, shall be given any priority 
over the hiring ratio set out in this decree. The present hir­
ing lists, compiled as a result of the discriminatory prac­
tices, may be used to hire the white troopers, white trooper 
cadets and white supporting personnel. New lists, 
however, must be compiled and utilized for the black 
troopers, black trooper cadets and black supporting per­
sonnel.

5. The defendants shall file through their counsel with 
this Court within ninety days from the date of this decree a 
written report setting forth in detail the efforts which have 
been undertaken to recruit and hire black applicants. The 
report shall also include the number of vacancies filled 
among the state troopers, the auxiliary troopers, the 
cadets and the supporting personnel of the Department of 
Public Safety during this period and the number of each 
race hired into each of these groups.

VIII. It is further ORDERED that the costs of this 
proceeding be and they are hereby taxed to the defendants 
in Civil Action No. 3561-N, for which execution may 
issue.

The Court retains jurisdiction over these cases.
Done, this the 10th day of February, 1972.

[SIGNATUREl___________
United States District Judge



30

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3561-N 
Phillip Paradise, Jr.,

INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THE CLASS SIMILARLY 
SITUATED, PLAINTIFF,

U nited States of A merica, plaintiff and amicus curiae,

v.
E. C. Dothard, as D irector of the A labama 

D epartment of Public Safety, etc., et al., defendants.

ORDER

This action was originally brought by the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People on 
behalf of its members and all similarly situated Negroes in 
the State of Alabama. In its order of February 10, 1972, 
this Court found that the original defendants had “en­
gaged in a blatant and continuous pattern and practice of 
discrimination in hiring in the Alabama Department of 
Public Safety, both as to troopers and supporting person­
nel.”1 In order to end these practices and correct their ef­
fects, the Court ordered mandatory and prohibitory in­
junctive relief. After an interim order of this Court, 
entered January 5, 1974, the original order was affirmed 
by the Court of Appeals.1 2

1 N A A C P  v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 705 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
2 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).



31

The current phase of the case arises from a motion for 
further relief filed by plaintiffs April 22, 1974. A hearing 
on this motion was held on September 26, 1974. The hear­
ing focused on two principal issues: the allegation that the 
defendants had artifically restricted the size of the trooper 
force in order to frustrate the Court’s hiring order, and the 
problem of “black attrition” in the force —the dispropor­
tionate failure of blacks hired to achieve permanent 
trooper status.3

The then-Director of the Department of Public Safety 
testified at the hearing that at the time of the Court’s 1972 
order there was a critical shortage of troopers and that at 
least 100 additional troopers were required immediately. 
The current Director testified that when he took office the 
need for troopers was at least as great as before. In the 
1971 session of the Alabama legislature the administration 
introduced a bill which would have funded 100 new 
trooper positions. The evidence is clear that at the time of 
the Court’s hiring order and at all material times thereafter 
the responsible state officials recognized the need for 
substantially increasing the size of the trooper force.

In the eight years prior to the Court’s 1972 order, the 
department had hired on the average 40 troopers per year. 
In the three years immediately preceding the order, the 
average was over 50. In the two and one-half years follow­
ing the Court’s order, approximately 70 new troopers were 
hired, of whom 56 were permanently employed. This post­
order level of hiring was insufficient to cover normal attri­
tion.

3 Plaintiffs’ motion for further relief was directed in part to the 
question of validation of the department’s employee selection pro­
cedures and tests. By stipulation of the parties, resolution of the 
validation issue was continued pending the development of new selec­
tion procedures.



32

The Department of Public Safety has two sources of 
state funds: unconditional appropriations and appropria­
tions conditioned on the state of the general fund and the 
approval of the Governor. The evidence reflects that the 
department traditionally spends less than its full uncondi­
tional appropriation and that in the five years preceding 
the 1972 order in this case the approximate average unex­
pended amounts in the major budget categories were 
these: salaries —$50,000; equipment purchases —$7,200; 
other expenses —$121,300. For the fiscal year in which the 
hiring order was entered and the following fiscal year, the 
approximate average unexpended amounts were these: 
salaries —$170,400; equipment purchases —$164,700; 
other expenses —$461,700. These unexpended amounts 
revert to the general fund and are not recoverable by the 
department. These figures establish that the reversions in 
each category at least tripled after the entry of the hiring 
order and that during those two years the department had 
unconditional funds available to cover both the salaries 
and ancillary expenses associated with the hiring of addi­
tional troopers.4 The evidence further reflects that, con­
trary to general state policy, appropriations within the 
“salaries” category were, in the years following the 1972 
order, shifted from troopers to support personnel.5

On February 10, 1972, the Alabama legislature condi­
tionally appropriated 1.25 million dollars to the Depart­
ment of Public Safety for fiscal 1971-72 and the same 
amount for fiscal 1972-73 —a total of 2.5 million dollars.6

4 The salary reversion for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1974, 
was approximately $479,100.

5 From 1964 to 1971, an average of approximately 83 percent of the 
department’s salary appropriation was spent on troopers and cadets. 
This figure fell to 78 percent in fiscal 1971-72 and 75 percent in fiscal 
1972-73.

6 Act No. 254, 1971 Ala. Acts 4519. This is the final, substantially 
modified version of the administration’s “hundred trooper bill.”



33

The appropriation Act provided that part of the funds 
be used for an across-the-board salary increase, but the 
balance could be used in any fashion. The language of the 
statute by implication authorized the use of the funds for 
the hiring of new troopers. Release of the funds was condi­
tioned on the state of the general fund and the approval of 
the Governor. The closing balances for fiscal 1971-72 and 
1972-73 were approximately $12 million and $17 million.7 
None of the conditional appropriation for 1971-72 was 
utilized; $785,000 of the second year’s funds were 
released.8

The evidence outlined above establishes and this Court 
now finds that, at the time of and in the years following 
the Court’s 1972 order, the administration and the heads 
of the Department of Public Safety perceived a need for 
additional troopers —a need characterized as critical; that 
there were appropriated and available to the defendants 
funds in excess of $3 million, a substantial portion of 
which could have been used for salaries and ancillary ex­
penses for new troopers; and that this money was not 
spent for the critically needed additional troopers but went 
unspent or was diverted to other uses. These findings, 
when combined with the considerable testimony regarding 
the defendants’ reluctance to implement the Court’s 
remedial order by placing black troopers on the state’s 
highways, necessitate the conclusion that the defendants

7 The State Budget Officer, James V. Jordan, testified that it is 
sound fiscal practice to end the fiscal year with approximately a 10 
percent “cushion” of unexpended general fund revenues. The evidence 
indicates that this cushion would have existed even if the entire $2.5 
million had been spent.

8 Mr. Jordan also testified to the percentage of conditionally ap­
propriated funds actually released. For 1971-72, the figure was 35 per­
cent overall and 0 percent for the department; in 1972-73, 65 percent 
overall and 62 percent for the department.



34

have, for the purpose of frustrating or delaying full relief 
to the plaintiff class, artificially restricted the size of the 
trooper force and the number of new troopers hired.

Between February 10, 1972, and the September 26, 
1974, hearing in this case, the Department of Public Safety 
hired 40 black troopers, of whom 27 remained on the force 
at the time of the hearing.9 During the same period, the 
department hired 29 white troopers, all of whom remained 
on the force. Evidence was presented at the hearing which 
supports a finding that the high attrition rate among 
blacks resulted from the selection of other than the best 
qualified blacks from the eligibility rosters, some social 
and official discrimination against blacks at the trooper 
training academy, preferential treatment of whites in some 
aspects of training and testing, and discipline of blacks 
harsher than that given whites for similar misconduct 
while on the force. Most of these incidents of discrimina­
tion against new black troopers occurred during the early 
phases of the implementation of the Court’s hiring order. 
The Court sees no reason at this time to modify the hiring 
order in this regard but reiterates and emphasizes the perti­
nent portion of that order:

It is further ORDERED that the defendants be and 
they are each hereby enjoined from failing to hire and 
permanently employ after the probationary period, 
one Negro trooper for each white trooper hired until 
approximately twenty-five (25) percent of the 
Alabama state trooper force is comprised of Negroes.

By order dated August 7, 1974, George C. Wallace, 
Governor of the State of Alabama, was made a party 
defendant in this case. The Court subsequently denied the 
Governor’s motion seeking his dismissal as a defendant. In

9 As of July 16, 1975, the Attorney General for the State of 
Alabama advised that the state now has 40 black troopers.



35

his briefs filed in this case, the Governor again questions 
the necessity of his inclusion as a defendant. The evidence 
presented at the September 26, 1974, hearing demonstrates 
clearly that the Governor is a necessary party if the Court’s 
remedial order is to be fully implemented. The Governor, 
as noted above, has the ultimate authority for releasing 
conditionally appropriated funds. In addition, it has been 
the practice of the directors of the Department of Public 
Safety to consult with the Governor prior to hiring 
substantial numbers of new troopers, and in practice the 
Governor possesses and sometimes exercises the authority 
to deny such requests for additional troopers.

Upon consideration of the findings and conclusions 
discussed above, it is ORDERED that the motion for fur­
ther relief, filed by plaintiffs April 22, 1974, be and is 
hereby denied insofar as the motion seeks modification of 
the terms of the Court’s order of February 10, 1972, in this 
case.

It is further ORDERED that:
1. Governor George C. Wallace’s motion to be 

dismissed as a party defendant be and the same is hereby 
denied.

2. Defendants George C. Wallace, as Governor, State 
of Alabama; John S. Frazer, as Director, Alabama Per­
sonnel Department; and E. C. Dothard, as Director, 
Alabama Department of Public Safety; their agents, of­
ficers, successors in office, employees, and all persons act­
ing in concert or participation with them be and each is 
hereby ENJOINED from taking any action, or failing to 
take any action, which action or inaction results in the ar­
tificial restriction of the size of the Alabama state trooper 
force, for the purpose of or which has the effect of delay­
ing or frustrating the achievement of the hiring goal 
specified in paragraph III of this Court’s order in this case 
dated February 10, 1972.



36

3. The motion for further relief filed April 22, 1974, 
insofar as it seeks an adjudication of the validity of the 
employment criteria and tests of the Alabama Department 
of Public Safety, be and is hereby continued until further 
order of the Court.

4. Defendants’ motion for “Modification and/or 
Reconsideration of Certain Findings in the Court’s Order 
of January 5, 1974,” be and the same is hereby denied.

5. Defendants file with the Court on or before 
January 20, 1976, a comprehensive report reflecting, as of 
January 1, 1976, the number of troopers by race, the 
number of support personnel by race, the number of 
troopers and support personnel hired since this order and 
the number of troopers hired since this order that have 
achieved permanent status.

Done, this the 5th day of August, 1975.

[SIGNATURE!___________
United State District Judge



37

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3561-N 
P hillip Paradise, Jr., individually and on behalf of

THE CLASS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS,

United States of A merica, plaintiff and amicus curiae, 

Clifton Brown, plaintiff-intervenor, 

v.
M. L. H ilyer, as D irector of the A labama D epartment 

of Public Safety, etc., et al., defendants.

PROPOSAL PARTIAL CONSENT DECREES

Come the parties, plaintiff Phillip Paradise, Jr., in­
dividually and on behalf of the class similarly situated, 
plaintiff and amicus curiae the United States of America 
(hereinafter referred to collectively as “plaintiffs”) and de­
fendants, M. L. Hilyer, as Director of the Alabama 
Department of Public Safety, his agents, assigns, etc., and 
Stanley Frazer, as Director of the Alabama Department of 
Personnel, his agents, assigns, etc., and enter into a con­
sent agreement as to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Supplemental 
Relief as follows:

1. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

Defendants recognize the continuing effect of the orders 
issued by this Court on February 10, 1972 and August 5, 
1975. Defendants will have as an objective within the 
Department of Public Safety an employment and promo­
tion system that is racially neutral. In this respect, defend­
ants and their officers, agents and employees, successors



38

and all persons acting in concert with them or any of them, 
in the performance of their official functions, agree not to 
engage in any act or practice which has a purpose or effect 
of unlawfully discriminating against blacks. In addition, 
defendants agree not to engage in any act or practice 
which discriminates on the basis of race in hiring, promo­
tion, upgrading, training, assignment, discharge or other­
wise discriminate against any employee of, or any appli­
cant, or potential applicant for employment with respect 
to compensation, terms and conditions or privileges of 
employment because of such individual’s race. Defendants 
agree that any time after entry of this partial consent 
decree the plaintiffs may apply to this Court for an order 
which would enforce the terms of the partial consent 
decree or apply for any other relief which may be ap­
propriate.

II. NEW DISCIPLINARY REVIEW PROCEDURES

Defendants will distribute the attached Notice of 
Disciplinary Review Procedures to all Department 
employees of the trooper rank. In this way, all troopers 
will be apprised of the availability of procedures for them 
to obtain a review of certain disciplinaries contained 
within their files, including oral and written counseling, 
oral reprimands, written reprimands, suspensions, 
transfers and pay raise denials, which said troopers con­
tend were the result of racial discrimination. These pro­
cedures are fully described in the attached Notice of 
Disciplinary Review Procedures and are fully incorporated 
herein and agreed to by the parties.

This notice will be distributed to all employees of the 
trooper rank no later than thirty (30) days from the date of 
this decree. Plaintiffs and defendants will submit names of 
the persons they have selected for the Disclipinary Review 
Board within thirty (30) days of the date of this decree,



39

and they request the Court to select the third Board 
member at its earliest convenience. Board members who 
are not members of the Department of Public Safety will 
be compensated at a reasonable rate by the Department 
for Board service.

III. RACE RELATIONS PROGRAM

In order to further their objective of a racially neutral 
employment and promotion system, defendants will 
establish a comprehensive Equal Employment Opportuni­
ty (EEO) Program. This program will be designed to pro­
vide a vehicle for airing grievances concerning allegations 
of racially disparate treatment and to further and promote 
race relations within the Department. Defendants agree to 
appoint an employee of the Department of Public Safety 
as the Department-wide EEO officer. This officer will 
have responsibility for supervising the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Program within the Department and 
monitoring Departmental compliance with this and other 
court decrees. This officer will also conduct a class or 
series of classes concerning race relations for each state 
trooper academy class and for each supervisory in-service 
training program held by the Department. This officer will 
also be responsible for instituting an EEO grievance pro­
cedure, which will provide all troopers with access to 
specially trained EEO officers when such troopers have 
complaints of a racial nature. This grievance procedure 
will be implemented as an addition to present grievance 
procedures. The Department-wide EEO officers will make 
recommendations to the Director concerning resolutions 
of these racial grievances.

Defendants also agree to appoint an EEO officer for 
each state trooper district in the State and to provide him 
with special training in the field of race relations. These



40

district EEO officers will process racial grievances and for­
ward them to the Department-wide EEO officer for 
resolution, and will promote and further race relations 
within each individual district.

Defendants will, within 60 days, publish a comprehen­
sive description of the EEO program and distribute it to all 
state trooper personnel, along with a letter from the Direc­
tor encouraging all personnel to utilize the program.

IV. PROMOTIONS

A. The defendants agree to have as an objective the 
utilization of a promotion procedure which is fair to all 
applicants and which promotion procedure when used 
either for screening or ranking will have little or no 
adverse impact upon blacks seeking promotion to corporal 
(hereinafter referred to as the “objective” or “above-stated 
objective.”) In accordance with that objective defendants 
agree to utilize a promotion procedure which is in confor­
mity with the 1978 Uniform Guidelines o f Selection Pro­
cedures, 43 Fed. Reg. 38290, and which, in addition, when 
used either for screening or ranking will have little or no 
adverse impact on blacks seeking promotion to corporal.

B. In accordance with the above-stated objective de­
fendants agree to develop for the position of corporal a 
promotion procedure which (1) would be developed by de­
fendants no later than one year from the signing of this 
Consent Decree, (2) would be submitted upon completion 
of the formulation of the promotion procedure to counsel 
for plaintiffs who would have at least 60 days to review the 
promotion procedure and would be able to request from 
defendants any information relevant to the proposed pro­
motion procedure, and (3) would be submitted upon com­
pletion of plaintiffs’ review to this court for approval on 
the basis of the above-stated objective.



41

In the interim, defendants agree to utilize the state merit 
system for all promotions to corporal, during which time 
defendants will promote at least three black troopers to 
the rank of corporal.

Upon completion of validation of a new procedure for 
promotion to corporal, defendants, in accordance with the 
above-stated objective, agree to begin validation of a pro­
motional procedure for the position of sergeant and, in 
turn, for the positions of lieutenant, captain and major.

V. TERMINATIONS

Defendants agree to review all terminations of state 
troopers made from August 5, 1975 through March 1, 
1979. If the Department finds that any termination 
resulted in whole or in part from racial discrimination, 
each such person shall be offered re-employment at the 
level at which he was terminated, unless such termination 
occurred prior to graduation from the trooper Academy, 
in which case such person shall be required to complete the 
entire Academy training course.

A report of this review will be presented to counsel for 
plaintiffs as soon as practicable, but not later than April 
15, 1979. All reinstatements will be made by April 15, 
1979, with the exception of any individual terminated dur­
ing his Academy training, who shall be reinstated at the 
next Academy training session. Plaintiffs except from this 
portion of the decree with respect to class member Charles 
Gregory Potts. Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Potts should be 
reinstated irrespective of the review conducted by defen­
dants.



42

VI. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

The defendants hereby agree to pay all court costs and 
related expenses incurred by plaintiffs, as well as 
reasonable attorneys fees to counsel for the plaintiffs.

/ s /  Edward L. Hardin, Jr. 
Edward L. Hardin, Jr. 

Attorney for Defendants

/ s /  D ennis N. Balske______
Dennis N. Balske 
John L. Carroll 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

/ s /  Gerald S. H artman 
Gerald S. Hartmann 

Attorney for United States 
o f America



43

TO: All Department Employees Holding the Rank
of State Trooper 

FROM: M. L. Hilyer, Director

NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY REVIEW PROCEDURES

Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr. has approved of a new 
procedure whereby the Department of Public Safety will 
review certain disciplinary actions taken by the Depart­
ment against its employees holding the rank of state 
trooper, which disciplines were given between August 5, 
1975 and March 1, 1979.

All troopers are hereby given permission to review their 
201 files. Any trooper who, after reviewing his file, feels 
that any discipline given him during this period, including 
oral and written counselings, oral and written reprimands, 
suspensions, transfers and pay denials, was given him as a 
result of racial discrimination, shall give notice thereof to 
the Department in writing. This written notice shall 
specify the dates and nature of the disciplinary which the 
trooper contends was racially motivated, as well as the 
name(s) of the Department personnel whose conduct the 
trooper contends was racially motivated.

Each claim so presented will then be assigned a date, at 
which time each trooper will be given an opportunity to 
present his contentions to an impartial review board. This 
board will consist of three persons, as follows: one private 
citizen chosen by Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr.; one per­
son chosen by the attorneys representing the plaintiff 
class; and one person chosen by the Department of Public 
Safety. Troopers presenting such claims may, on their 
own, obtain an attorney, who will be given an opportunity 
to participate in the hearing. The Department may re­
spond to such claims through an attorney of its choice.



44

Attorneys for both sides will be afforded an opportunity 
to present opening statements, to examine and cross- 
examine witnesses, to introduce documentary evidence 
and to give closing arguments. Although the hearing will 
be conducted in a trial-like manner, formal rules of 
evidence will not be followed.

If after hearing both sides, a majority of the Board finds 
the claim to be established by a preponderance of the 
evidence, any and all records relating to such disciplinaries 
shall be removed from all three of said trooper’s personnel 
files and given to the trooper. No copies shall be retained 
by the Department. If the Board finds that a trooper has 
not established his claim, no action will be taken. Neither 
side has a right to appeal from the determination of the 
Board.

All written request for review in accordance with this 
notice must be submitted within sixty (60) days of the date 
of this notice. The Department gives its assurance that no 

.adverse action will be taken against troopers who utilize 
these procedures.

M.L. Hilyer

Date



45

ORDER

Upon consideration of the foregoing proposed partial 
consent decree executed and presented by all parties in this 
case, and with the specific understanding by this Court 
that the orders made and entered herein on February 10, 
1972, and August 5, 1975, continue in full force and ef­
fect, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT and DECREE of this 
Court that said partial consent decree be and is hereby ap­
proved and the parties are hereby ORDERED to imple­
ment same in accordance therewith and in accordance with 
the orders of this Court of February 10, 1972, and August 
5, 1975.

Done, this the 16th day of February, 1979.

[SIGNATURE!_________
United States District Judge



46

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3561-N 
Phillip Paradise, Jr., individually and on behalf of

THE CLASS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS,

U nited States of A merica, plaintiff and amicus curiae, 

Clifton Brown, plaintiff-intervenor,

v.
M. L. H ilyer, as D irector of the A labama Department 

of Public Safety, etc., et al ., defendants.

AGREEMENT OF COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES

Defendants hereby agree to utilize the following promo­
tion procedure for all promotions to the rank of corporal 
during the period in which a new promotion procedure is 
being validated. Defendants further agree to move to in­
corporate this letter into the attached Consent Decree on 
March 1, 1979.

1. Defendants will administer a written examination to 
all troopers seeking promotion to the rank of corporal as 
soon as practicable (the same examination that was given 
in 1975).

2. The examination will be considered in conjunction 
with other factors, as follows:

a) Examination — 40%
b) Supervisory interviews — 40%
c) Seniority— 10%
d) Last three evaluations—10%



47

3. When these categories are combined, a list of results 
will be compiled, a copy of which will be provided to 
plaintiffs (this list will include each trooper’s scores in all 
four categories).

4. If three or more blacks score in the upper fifty 
percentile, at least three blacks will be promoted to cor­
poral as described below. If less than three black troopers 
score in the upper fifty percentile, no promotions to cor­
poral will be made from this list during the interim period, 
and defendants will develop an alternate procedure which 
will insure the promotion of at least three black troopers 
during the interim period.

5. During the interim period, defendants will promote 
at least three, but not more than ten, troopers to the rank 
of corporal. The actual number of promotions will be 
determined by the number of vacancies which open during 
the interim period.

6. If four or more blacks score in the upper fifty 
percentile, the procedure, will work as follows:

a) The first three vacancies will be filled by blacks 
scoring in the upper fifty percentile;

b) The next three available vacancies will be filled by 
those with the highest rankings on the list;

c) If a seventh vacancy becomes available, provided 
that vacancies four through six were filled by 
whites, it will be filled by a fourth black who 
scored in the upper fifty percentile; and



48

d) If any other vacancies after the seventh vacancy 
become available, they will be filled by the 
troopers ranking highest on the list, irrespective of 
race.

/s /  Edward L. Hardin, Jr, 
Edward L. Hardin, Jr. 

Attorney for Defendants

/s / D ennis N, Balske______
Dennis N. Balske 
John L. Carroll 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

/ s /  Gerald S. Hartman 
Gerald S. Hartmann 

Attorney for United States 
o f America



49

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3561-N 
Phillip Paradise, Jr., individually and on behalf of

THE CLASS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS,

United States of A merica, plaintiff and amicus curiae,

v.
Jerry Shoemaker, as D irector of the 

A labama D epartment of Public Safety, etc., et al.,
DEFENDANTS.

CONSENT DECREE

On February 16, 1979, this Court entered a Partial Con­
sent Decee in resolution of certain issues raised in Plain­
tiffs’ Motion for Supplemental Relief. Part IV of the Par­
tial Consent Decree provides in part as follows:

The defendants agree to have as an objective the 
utilization of a promotion procedure which is fair to 
all applicants and which promotion procedure when 
used either for screening or ranking will have little or 
no adverse impact on blacks seeking promotion to 
corporal . . .  In accordance with that objective de­
fendants agree to utilize a promotion procedure 
which is in conformity with the 1978 Uniform 
Guidelines [on Employee] Selection Procedures, 43 
Fed. Reg. 38290, and which, in addition, when used 
either for screening or ranking will have little or no 
adverse impact on blacks seeking promotion to cor­
poral.

Defendants have submitted to plaintiffs Paradise, et al., 
and the United States [hereinafter referred to collectively 
as plaintiffs] and to the Court a proposed selection proce­



50

dure for State Trooper Corporal positions and a validity 
study for the written examination component of that selec­
tion procedure. Defendants have presented no validity 
evidence in support of the components of the proposed 
selection procedure other than the written examination. 
Plaintiffs and defendants disagree whether the proposed 
selection procedure is in conformity with the Uniform 
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 43 Fed. 
Reg. 38290, 28 C.F.R. Sec. 50.14 (1978) [hereinafter, 
Uniform Guidelines]. Because the selection procedure has 
not yet been administered, the adverse impact of the selec­
tion procedure, if any, is not known.

Defendants recognize their obligation under the Partial 
Consent Decree to utilize a selection procedure which has 
little or no adverse impact on blacks seeking promotion to 
corporal. The parties agree that it would be in the best in­
terest of all parties to avoid unnecessary litigation and to 
put a selection procedure for State Trooper Corporals in 
place as soon as possible. Accordingly, the parties have 
entered into this Consent Decree governing the use of the 
proposed selection procedure for promotion of State 
Troopers to State Trooper Corporal positions.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
the proposed selection procedure for State Trooper Cor­
poral, submitted to this Court May 21, 1981, shall be ad­
ministered and used as follows:

1. The proposed selection procedure shall be ad­
ministered and scored as set out in defendants’ letter to 
plaintiffs and this Court dated May 21, 1981 and in the 
proposed selection procedure and validation report ac­
companying that letter. Each of the four components of 
the procedure shall comprise the percentage of the total 
score for the selection procedure that is set out in defend­
ants’ May 21, 1981 letter.

2. Any State Trooper with permanent status for at 
least 24 months as of October 15, 1981 shall be permitted 
to take the written examination for State Trooper Cor­



51

poral. It is recognized that the selection procedure pro­
vides for a score for length of service such that thirty 
months’ service at the time the selection procedure is ad­
ministered shall equal seventy points and sixty months’ 
service (or more) shall equal one hundred points. Accord­
ingly, one point more than seventy shall be awarded to 
each applicant for each month of service more than thirty 
months, up to a maximum of one hundred points.

3. Defendants shall compile a list of candidates for 
promotion for State Trooper Corporal positions based 
upon the composite numerical scores of applicants on the 
selection procedure. In determining eligibility, defendants 
may apply the standards for length of service set out in the 
proposed selection procedure. Under this Decree, defend­
ants shall not be required to promote any State Trooper 
who does not have at least 30 months’ service as a State 
Trooper at the time of the promotion, provided that the 
length of service requirement is applied consistently. 
Defendants shall provide a copy of this list, identifying 
each applicant by race, to plaintiffs.

4. The list of candidates for promotion shall be 
reviewed to determine whether the selection procedure has 
an adverse impact against black applicants. Adverse im­
pact shall be determined by reference to the Uniform 
Guidelines, by comparing the numbers (by race) of ap­
plicants with the numbers (by race) of persons passing the 
procedure and by comparing the numbers (by race) of ap­
plicants with the number (by race) of persons ranking high 
enough on the selection procedure to be promoted if pro­
motions were made in rank order from the list of eligible 
candidates. For purposes of this Decree, “applicants” shall 
include all persons who take the written examination for 
State Trooper Corporal. Adverse impact shall be deter­
mined for each of the following groups of “persons rank­
ing high enough on the selection procedure to be promoted 
if promotions were made in rank order:” (a) the first eight



52

corporal promotions, which are expected to be awarded as 
soon as selections based upon the proposed selection pro­
cedure are approved by the Court; (b) all corporal promo­
tions expected within one year of the administration of the 
selection procedure, based upon the good faith estimate of 
the Department of Public Safety; and (c) all corporal pro­
motions expected during the life of the list of eligible can­
didates, based upon the good faith estimate of the Depart­
ment of Public Safety as to the length of time the list will 
be used and the Department’s anticipated staffing needs 
during that time. Adverse impact shall be determined by 
reference to Section 4D of the Uniform Guidelines, supra, 
and the answer to question 12 of the Questions and 
Answers to Clarify and Provide a Common Interpretation 
o f the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Pro­
cedures, 44 Fed.Reg. 11996, March 2, 1979.

5. If the selection procedure has little or no adverse 
impact against black applicants, selections shall be made 
in rank order from the list described in paragraph 2 of this 
Decree. Whether or not the selection procedure has “little 
or no adverse impact” will be measured by the “four-fifths 
rule” set forth in Section 4 D of the Uniform Guidelines, 
supra. If the parties cannot agree whether the selection 
procedure has an adverse impact, the matter shall be sub­
mitted to the Court for resolution. No promotions to State 
Trooper Corporal positions shall be made pending resolu­
tion of the question of adverse impact.

6. If the parties agree, or the Court finds, that the 
selection procedure has an adverse impact, promotions 
shall be made in a manner that does not result in adverse 
impact for the initial group of promotions or cumulatively 
during use of the procedure. Defendants shall submit to 
plaintiffs their proposal for making promotions in confor­
mity with the Partial Consent Decree and with this Decree.



53

If the parties do not agree on the method for making pro­
motions, the matter shall be submitted to the Court for 
resolution. No promotions to State Trooper Corporal 
positions shall be made until the parties have agreed in 
writing or the Court has ruled upon the method to be used 
for making promotions with little or no adverse impact.

7. If the selection procedure has an adverse impact 
against blacks seeking promotion to corporal, defendants 
shall examine the results of each component of the selec­
tion procedure to identify the source(s) of the adverse im­
pact and shall revise the procedure so as to avoid adverse 
impact in the future. Defendants shall provide plaintiffs 
with data showing the impact of each component of the 
selection procedure and an item-by-item analysis of the 
impact of the written test. The parties shall attempt to 
agree upon modifications in the selection procedure for 
future administrations. If the parties are unable to agree 
upon the procedure to be used after the first administra­
tion of the selection procedure and the method of using 
that procedure, the matter shall be submitted to the Court 
for resolution.

ORDERED this 18th day of August, 1981.

[SIGNATURE]___________
United States District Judge



54

AGREED AND CONSENTED TO:

/ s /  Cynthia D rabek 
Cynthia Drabek 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 
United States o f America

/s /  Dennis N. Balske 
Dennis N. Balske 

Attorney for plaintiffs 
Paradise, et al.

/ s /  Leon Kelly, Jr.______
Leon Kelly, Jr.

Attorney for Defendants



55

LAW OFFICE OF
E d w a r d  L. H a r d i n , J r ., P.C.
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 

ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
1025 NORRIS AVENUE 

BIRMINGHAM, AL 35203 
(203) 220-2679

May 21, 1981

Hon. John Carroll 
Southern Proverty Law Center 
1001 S. Hull Street 
Montgomery, Alabama 36101
Re: Paradise v. Shoemaker

U.S. District Court of Alabama 
Case No. 3561-N * 1

Dear John:
As per the Court’s order of May 16, I am enclosing to 

you one copy of each of the following:
1. Proposed Examination of State Trooper Cor­

poral;
2. Alabama Merit System Report of Validation 

Study State Trooper Corporal;
3. Alabama Department of Public Safety Service 

Rating Form;
4. Procedure for Evaluating Length of Service State 

Trooper Corporal;
5. Supervisory Promotional Evaluation State 

Trooper Corporal Form;
6. Definitions of Evaluation Factors State Trooper 

Corporal;



56

7. Promotional Examination Rating Form (Defines 
terms used in form described in #5 above);

8. Information and Guides Supervisory Evaluation 
State Trooper Corporal.

Our proposed promotional procedure accords the 
following weights to the above factors:

1. Written test 60%
2. Length of Service 10%
3. Supervisory Evaluation 20%
4. Service Ratings 10%

The Service Ratings score to be used in the above pro­
cedure would be the average of the candidate’s three most 
recent service ratings.

It is my understanding that we have agreed that our pro­
duction of this material relieves the Defendant of the 
obligation to answer the Interrogatories and Request for 
Production filed by the Southern Poverty Law Center on 
April 16, and that, should you have any questions after 
your examination of the material we are producing today, 
you will pursue the answers to those questions thru deposi­
tions or additional interrogatories. Please inform me im­
mediately if I have misunderstood our agreement on this 
matter.

Regarding any questions you might have, if you will 
convey them to me informally first via telephone or letter, 
it may be that I can get them answered for you without the 
necessity of formal discovery proceedings, thereby ex­
pediting this whole matter.



57

If I can be of further assistance, please feel free to call 
me.

Your truly,

/ s /  Buddy____________
Leon (Buddy) Kelly, Jr.

LKjr/jws
Enel.

cc: Honorable Myron Thompson 
U.S. District Judge
Mr. Tommy Flowers
State of Alabama Personnel Department



58

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3561-N 
P hillip Paradise, Jr., individually and on behalf of

THE CLASS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS,

U nited States of A merica, plaintiff and amicus curiae,

v.
Jerry Shoemaker, as D irector of the 

A labama D epartment of P ublic Safety, etc., et al.,
DEFENDANTS.

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO ENFORCE THE TERMS OF 
THE FEBRUARY 16, 1979 PARTIAL CONSENT DECREE 

AND THE AUGUST 18, 1981 CONSENT DECREE * 1

Plaintiffs, by the undersigned counsel, respectfully 
move the Court for an order enforcing the terms of the 
February 16, 1979 Partial Consent Decree and the August 
18, 1981 Consent Decree. Specifically, plaintiffs seek an 
order requiring defendant:

(1) to implement “a promotion procedure which is 
fair to all applicants and which promotion procedure 
when used either for screening or ranking will have 
little or no adverse impact upon blacks seeking pro­
motion to corporal.” See Partial Consent Decree of 
February 16, 1979, p.4 § IV(A).

(2) to develop and implement a new procedure for 
promotion to the positions of sergeant, lieutenant, 
captain and major, which will have little or no 
adverse impact upon blacks seeking promotion to 
these positions. See id. at § B.



59

(3) to promote qualified blacks to the corporal 
position at a rate that does not result in adverse im­
pact and which is within the spirit of this Court’s 
previous orders and the parties’ consent decrees. See 
Consent Decree of August 18, 1981, p.4 f  6.

(4) to pay reasonable attorney’s fees to plaintiffs’ 
counsel in this matter. The following paragraphs 
disclose the reasons why this Court should grant 
plaintiffs’ request.

A. History of this Litigation

On February 10, 1972, the Court found that the 
Alabama Department of Public Safety had “engaged in a 
blatant and continuous pattern and practice of discrimina­
tion in hiring. . . .” NAACP v. Allen, 340 F.Supp. 703, 
705 (M.D.Ala. 1972). The Court ordered defendants to 
hire one black trooper for each white trooper hired “until 
approximately twenty-five (25) percent of the Alabama 
state trooper force is comprised of Negroes.” Id. at 706. 
This order was affirmed on appeal and, in 1975, restated 
emphatically in granting plaintiffs’ motion for supplemen­
tal relief.

On February 16, 1979, a partial consent decree was ap­
proved by the Court, following the second reopening of 
the case by plaintiffs. This decree required, inter alia, that 
defendants institute “a promotion procedure which is in 
conformity with the 1978 Uniform Guidelines o f Selection 
Procedure, 43 Fed. Reg. 38290, and which, in addition, 
when used either for screening or ranking will have little or 
no adverse impact on blacks seeking promotion to cor­
poral.” See Decree at p.4, § IV(A). It gave defendants one 
year to accomplish this objective, after which defendants 
were “to begin validation of a promotional procedure for 
the position of sergeant and, in turn, for the positions of 
lieutenant, captain and major.” Id. § IV(B).



60

On April 9, 1981, the defendants moved the Court to 
approve its newly developed “Corporal’s Promotional Ex­
amination.” Plaintiffs objected to it on the ground that it 
did not conform to the requirements of the Uniform 
Guidelines, but in view of the defendants’ expression of an 
urgent need for more corporals, eventually entered into 
the August 18, 1981 Consent Decree. This Decree permit­
ted defendants to utilize the protested promotional pro­
cedure, but required that the results by reviewed to deter­
mine whether they adversely impacted black applicants 
prior to the making of any promotions. The Decree fur­
ther provided that if the new procedure adversely im­
pacted black candidates: (1) “promotions shall be made in 
a manner that does not result in adverse impact;” (2) 
“[djeTendants shall submit to plaintiffs their proposal for 
making promotions in conformity with the Partial Con­
sent Decree and with this Decree;” and (3) “[i]f the parties 
do not agree on the method for making promotions, the 
matter shall be submitted to the Court for resolution.” See 
Consent Decree of August 18, 1981, p.4, 16.

Finally, in the event of adverse impact, the Decree re­
quires defendants to “examine the results of each compo­
nent of the selection procedure to identify the source(s) of 
the adverse impact and . . . revise the procedure so as to 
avoid adverse impact in the future.” According to the 
Decree, defendants must provide this data to plaintiffs, 
whereafter the parties shall attempt to agree upon 
modifications. In the event of disagreement, “the matter 
shall be submitted to the Court for resolution.” Id. p.5,
17.

B. Factual Developments

The new selection procedure unquestionably adversely 
impacted black applicants. Two hundred sixty-two



61

troopers applied for promotion to the rank of corporal. 
Black applicants were ranked as follows: 96, 100, 121, 
130, 132A, 137, 144, 154, 157, 161, 163, 165, 169, 183,
191, 193, 194, 195, 197, 204, 205, 206, 210, 211, 212, 213,
218, 220, 221, 223, 224, 226, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 234,
236, 238, 241, 243, 244, 246, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254,
255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262. See Promotion 
Register, attached hereto as Exhibit 1. Whites held the top 
95 positions, whereas blacks held the bottom 14 positions. 
Of the 59 blacks who applied, only 4 ranked in the top 
half, and they were at the bottom of the top half (#’s 96, 
100, 121 and 130).

In apparent recognition of the adverse impact of this 
register, defendants have recently offered to promote 
black applicants at a rate of 20% (1 of every 5 promotions 
will be black).1 Plaintiffs have rejected this offer. Defend­
ants have not “revisefd] the procedure so as to avoid 
adverse impact in the future” and have not “provide[d] 
plaintiffs with data showing the impact of each compo­
nent of the selection procedure and an item-by-item 
analysis of the impact of the written test.” See August 18, 
1981 Decree at p.5, f7.

Thus, no blacks (or whites) have been promoted to cor­
poral in the last four years. There is no valid promotion 
procedure in place for promotions to corporal, sergeant, 
lieutenant, captain or major. Under the terms of the 1979 
Partial Consent Decree and the 1981 Consent Decree, this 
Court must now decide: (1) what percentage of the forth­
coming 18-20 promotions to corporal should be black; (2) 
when to require defendants to implement a valid pro­
cedure for promotions to corporal; and (3) when to re­
quire defendants to implement valid procedures for pro­
motions to sergeant, lieutenant, captain and major. 1

1 Defendants stated that they need to promote approximately 18 to 
20 troopers to the rank of corporal.



62

C. Plaintiffs’ Position

Plaintiffs submit that blacks should be promoted to cor­
poral at the same rate at which they have been hired, 1 for 
1, until such time as the defendants implement a valid pro­
motional procedure. Such an order will serve two pur­
poses: (1) it will encourage defendants to develop a valid 
promotional procedure as soon as possible; and (2) it will 
help to alleviate the gross underrepresentation of blacks in 
the supervisory ranks of the Department.

At the present time there are four black corporals. All 
four were promoted in 1979 under the terms of the Partial 
Consent Decree. There are 67 corporals. Thus, blacks 
comprise 6% of the corporals at this time. Assuming the 
Department promotes 20 troopers to the rank of corporal, 
blacks will comprise 16% of the corporals if plaintiffs’ 1 
for 1 suggestion is implemented, whereas they will only 
comprise 9.2% if defendant’s 1 for 5 plan is followed.2

Plaintiffs’ request is much more in line with the Court’s 
previous orders than is defendants’ plan. The ultimate goal 
of the Court’s orders is a force that is 25% black. At the 
present time, according to defendants, the force is approx­
imately 22-23% black. However, due to defendants’ reluc­
tance to promote its black troopers, all but four of these 
troopers hold the lowest trooper rank. If the Department 
is ever to be truly integrated, approximately 25% of its 
force at every rank should be black. A requirement that 
defendants promote 10 black of the next 20 corporals, 
thereby raising black representation in the corporal rank 
from 6% to 16% is both a reasonable and necessary3 step 
to the attainment of this Court’s stated goal.

2 After 20 promotions there will be a total of 87 corporals. Under 
Plaintiffs’ plan, there would be 14 black corporals, whereas under 
defendants’ plan, only 8 corporals would be black.

3 It would perhaps not be necessary if the defendants had developed 
their own valid promotion procedure as required by the 1979 Decree. It 
is defendants’ perennial non-compliance that necessitates this action.



63

If the Court has any hesitation to order this relief, it 
need look no further than Judge Johnson’s Order and 
Memorandum of April 13, 1979. There, the Court rejected 
the defendants’ request for an amendment to the original 
order changing the requirement for black employment 
from 25% of the trooper force to 25% of entry-level 
troopers. Judge Johnson’s reasoning fits the instant situa­
tion. It is reproduced here with the hope that the Court 
will restate it in an order granting plaintiffs’ present re­
quest:

In 1972, defendants were not just found guilty of 
discriminating against blacks in hiring to entry-level 
positions. The Court found that in thirty-seven years 
there had never been a black trooper at any rank. One 
continuing effect of that discrimination is that, as of 
November 1, 1978, out of 232 state troopers at the 
rank of corporal or above, there is still not one black. 
The quota fashioned by the Court provides an im­
petus to promote blacks into those positions. To 
focus only on the entry-level positions would be to ig­
nore that past discrimination by the Department was 
pervasive, that its effects persist, and that they are 
manifest. As the Fifth Circuit has recognized, the 
order in this case does not seek to grant proportional 
representation in public employment to the black 
citizens of Alabama. NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d at 
621. The order in this case is but the necessary remedy 
for an intolerable wrong.

It has been four years since Judge Johnson wrote these 
words. Yet the only change in the makeup of the Depart­
ment was the promotion of four blacks to Corporal as 
mandated by the 1979 Partial Consent Decree. Not only 
has the Department failed to promote any of its black 
troopers, but it had done nothing to insure that its black 
troopers will ever play a truly representative role in the 
operation of the Department. No valid promotion



64

mechanism has yet been developed by which they can 
begin moving from the lowest rank, trooper, toward the 
highest rank, major, even though blacks have been 
employed in the Department for eleven years.

In order to insure that blacks finally gain the opportuni­
ty to move toward positions of responsibility within the 
Department, the Court should order defendants: (1) to im­
mediately promote 18 to 20 employees to the corporal 
position, depending on need, on a 1 for 1 basis; (2) to 
develop and implement a valid promotional procedure for 
the corporal’s position within one year;4 to develop and 
implement valid promotional procedures for sergeant, 
lieutenant, captain and major within two years;5 and to 
pay plaintiffs’ counsel reasonable attorneys fees for the 
prosecution of this action.6

Respectfully submitted,

/s / Dennis N. Balske________
Dennis N. Balske
John L. Carroll 

1001 S. Hull Street 
P.O. Box 2087 
Montgomery, AL 36103-2087

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

4 In order to insure compliance, certain procedural safeguards 
should be included, such as open discovery to plaintiffs’ counsel, a 
deadline for production of the finished product to plaintiffs’ counsel, 
etc. Moreover, the Court should order that all future necessary pro­
motions to corporal be made on a 1 for 1 basis until the Court has ap­
proved a valid promotional procedure.

5 The procedural safeguards discussed in n.4 should be included, 
and the Court should order that beginning two years from the entry of 
its order, all promotions to sergeant, lieutenant, captain and major be 
made on 1 for 1 basis if a valid procedure for promotions, approved 
by the Court, is not in place.

6 Bryon Prescott was recently appointed by Governor Wallace to 
replace defendant Shoemaker. His name should be substituted for 
that of defendant Shoemaker in future pleadings and orders.



65

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing have been 
served upon Ed Hardin and Cynthia Drabek by U.S. first 
class mail, postage prepaid, this 7th day of April, 1983.

/s / D ennis N. Balske 
Attorney for Plaintiffs



66

State of A labama 
Personnel Department 

402 State Administrative Building 
Montgomery, Alabama 36130-2301

December 30, 1981

MEMORANDUM

TO: Ms. Cynthia Drabek
Mr. Edward L. Hardin 
Mr. Dennis Balske 
Mr. Frank Ussery

FRANK: Thomas G. Flowers, Chief
Recruitment and Examination

SUBJECT: Enclosed Register

Enclosed for your review is a computer listing of names, 
grades, sex/color, and rank of individuals on the promo­
tional register for State Trooper Corporal as a result of the 
examination administered October 24, 1981, in accord­
ance with Judge Thompson’s order.

The sex/color code should be interpreted as follows:
1. White Male
2. White Female
3. Black Male
4. Black Female
5. Other Male
6. Other Female

TGF/brh
Enclosure

Exhibit 1



STATE OF ALABAMA 
PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT 

EXAMINATION REGISTER CARDS 
DECEMBER 30, 1981

Name
Class
Code Grade V.P. Age

Sex & 
Color Rank Option

Parsons, Gerald R. 7222 96.79 31 1 001
Johnson, Lindon, C. 7222 96.00 32 1 002
Smith, Jimmie W. 7222 95.79 41 1 003
Cox, James F. 7222 95.77 34 5 004
Cawyer, Larry D. 7222 95.66 38 1 005
Abrett, James H. 7222 95.65 32 1 006
Luther, Curtis W. 7222 95.64 30 1 007
Wolfe, Steven P. 7222 95.61 34 1 008
Hall, Danny B. 7222 95.54 31 1 009
Davis, Puger W. 7222 95.51 40 1 010
Sanderson, Roy L. 7222 95.46 30 1 011
Yates, Joseph L. 7222 95.45 31 1 012
Livingston, Donald L. 7222 95.44 40 1 013
Legg, John M. 7222 95.40 36 1 014



Name
Class
Code Grade

Sumja, Roy G. 7222 95.36
Mansell, Donald B. 7222 95.30
Bailey, William M. 7222 95.20
Kipp, Philip H. Jr. 7222 95.09
Sides, Frederick G. 7222 94.99
Hulak, Michael G. 7222 94.89
Conrad, David J. 7222 94.76
Duncan, Marvin B. 7222 94.62
Kelley, Wilburn L. 7222 94.48
Taylor, Gerald R. 7222 94.48
Cheatham, Tommy W. 7222 94.46
Yance, John E. 7222 94.45
Goree, Donald E. 7222 94.42
Atwell, Donald H. 7222 94.33
Thompson, Harold 7222 94.32
Branum, W. Albert 7222 94.31
Condrey Kenneth H. 7222 94.25
Jordan, Wiley O. 7222 94.19
Woody, Robert A. 7222 94.11

V.P.
Sex &

Age Color Rank
32 1 015
33 1 016
35 1 017
40 1 018
40 1 019
32 1 020
34 1 021
34 1 022
29 1 023
32 1 023
35 1 025
38 1 026
33 1 027
34 1 028
31 1 029
46 1 030
30 1 031
34 1 032
33 1 033

Option

o\
00



Name
Class
Code Grade

Ward, James S. 7222 94.08
Wright, Curtis A. 7222 94.08
Taylor, Thomas G. 7222 94.06
Warlick, Arthur H. 7222 93.98
Scheer, Robert S. 7222 93.92
Pouncey, James E. 7222 93.90
Bell, Jack O. Jr 7222 93.88
McElvaine Cecil A. 7222 93.85
Rhegness, William L. 7222 93.81
Steward, Rober V. 7222 93.78
Smith, Seaborn A. Jr. 7222 93.71
Smith, Richard M. 7222 93.53
Ruye, Marvin J. Ill 7222 93.51
Silveira, Steven H. 7222 93.48
McClellan Victor E. 7222 93.46
Tucker, Donald H. 7222 93.40
Green, Roy R. 7222 93.37
Roberts, Sanders P. 7222 93.36
Strickland, Elree M. 7222 93.32

V.P.
Sex &

Age Color Rank
41 1 034
32 1 034
32 1 036
46 1 037
34 1 038
31 1 039
42 1 040
32 1 041
34 1 042
46 1 043
40 1 044
38 1 045
33 1 046
35 1 047
40 1 048
30 1 049
30 1 050
40 1 051
33 1 052

Option

ONNO



Name
Class
Code Grade

Halcomb, Philip W. 7222 93.30
Brock, Thomas L. 7222 93.28
Yates, Alfred M. 7222 93.23
Neal, William A. 7222 93.24
Davenport, Henry D. 7222 93.23
Galin, Frederick C. 7222 93.20
Carson, Harold L. 7222 93.18
Hamlet, Thomas L. 7222 93.16
Elliott, Jerry W. 7222 93.15
Arrington, Loyd C. 7222 93.12
Small, Gene P. 7222 93.07
Sutton, Cary P. 7222 93.06
Cribbs, Ronnie 7222 93.04
Womack, Williams H. 7222 93.01
Jackson, Bob M. 7222 92.98
Robbins, Kermit V. 7222 92.94
Atwell, Jerry R. 7222 92.90
Reid, Johnny R. 7222 92.85
Fox, Gary L. 7222 92.83

V.P.
Sex &

Age Color Rank
32 1 053
32 1 054
31 1 054
31 1 056
37 1 057
34 1 058
48 1 059
33 1 060
31 1 061
34 1 062
28 1 063
34 1 064
33 1 065
40 1 066
33 1 067
35 1 068
29 1 069
34 1 070
35 1 071

Option

o



Name
Class
Code Grade

Cox, Robert J. 7222 92.82
Johnson, James W. 7222 92.81
Williams, Don A. 7222 92.77
Maschi, Joseph P. 7222 92.72
Tucker, Donald G. 7222 92.65
Kearley, Harry N. 7222 92.60
Bibb, Wiley L. 7222 92.55
Cook, Abner C. 7222 92.54
Brown, Cliffton L. 7222 92.51
Strength, Freddie L. 7222 92.49
Willis, Willie 7222 92.49
Barnett, Michael E. 7222 92.43
Brzezinski, Joseph 7222 92.42
Hassett, George H. 7222 92.35
Gorman, Robert W. 7222 92.32
Harrison, Robert A. 7222 92.31
Odom, Edward L. 7222 92.30
Phelps, William J. 7222 92.27
Peevy, Mark D. 7222 92.24

V.P. Age
Sex & 
Color Rank

44 1 072
43 1 073
33 1 074
29 1 075
36 1 076
32 1 077
30 1 078
52 1 079
32 3 080
32 1 081
47 1 081
34 1 083
34 1 084
36 1 085
34 1 086
36 1 087
34 1 088
43 1 089
36 1 089A

Option

-j



Name
Class
Code Grade

(Nottingham, Jerry F. 7222 92.22
Pridmore, Marvin L. 7222 92.17
Slayton, Charles F. 7222 92.13
Williams, Larry 7222 92.12
Callihan, Brent L. 7222 92.11
Hampton, Leon 7222 92.03
Berry, Donald R. Jr. 7222 91.93
Mobley, Richard R. 7222 91.86
Snell, Ralph L. 7222 91.83
Calvin, Roy E. 7222 91.78
Mothershed, Willie E. 7222 91.63
Lee, Fred A. Jr. 7222 91.66
Fant, James S. 7222 91.63
Butts, Timothy P. 7222 91.60
Linder, Joseph L. 7222 91.59
Mize, Noel J. 7222 91.59
Colbert, Walter L. 7222 91.57
Richardson, Bernard 7222 91.48
Yeager, Edward C. 7222 91.44
Wise, Benny L. 7222 91.36

Age
Sex & 
Color Rank Option

40 1 090 '
42 1 091
34 1 092
39 1 093
28 1 094
35 3 096
32 1 097
33 1 098
46 1 099
34 3 100
37 1 101
38 1 102
32 1 103
30 1 104
39 1 105
50 1 105
46 1 107
?? 1 108
45 1 109
34 1 110



Name
Class
Code Grade

Blakely, Michael A. 7222 91.31
Hattaway, Howard D. 7222 91.30
Mays, Kenneth N. 7222 91.29
Christenberry, John J. 7222 91.21
Stubes, Waymon E. 7222 91.21
Davidson, Jeffrey N. 7222 91.20
Reeves, Freddie R. 7222 91.17
Green, William F. 7222 91.10
Holmes, Marvette 7222 90.95
Holt, Roger W. 7222 90.92
Kyser, David C. 7222 90.91
Walden, Joseph E. 7222 90.89
Harris, Ronald E. 7222 90.86
Waller, Jack A. 7222 90.83
Mayfield, Charlie C. 7222 90.82
Walden, Carter D. 7222 90.80
Cook, David W. 7222 90.75
Clements, Paul J. 7222 90.71
Golden, John M. 7222 90.71

V.P. Age
Sex & 
Color Rank

30 1 111
43 1 112
30 1 113
37 1 114
44 1 114
33 1 116
34 1 117
34 1 118
44 1 119
30 1 120
32 3 121
35 1 122
33 1 123
32 1 124
35 1 125
38 1 126
32 1 127
46 1 128
30 1 128

Option

-jUJ



Name
Class
Code Grade

Smith, Raymon D. 7222 90.70
Flanagan, Elam E. 7222 90.65
Jenkins, Lenon E. 7222 90.61
Isaac, Johnny L. 7222 90.61
Mahaney, Patrick D. 7222 90.57
Lusk, Bobby B. 7222 90.55
West, Charles G. 7222 90.55
Garner, Karen D. 7222 90.51
Leak, George W. 7222 90.41
Means, Arthur Jr. 7222 90.41
Duke, David L. 7222 90.32
Hartzog, Henry B. 7222 90.31
Burnette, James L. 7222 90.25
Thomas, Roy J. 7222 90.25
Hood, James A. 7222 90.23
Dawson, Elbert Jr. 7222 90.14
Adams, Dale W. 7222 90.12
Beasley, Perry A. 7222 90.10
Burgess, Buford R. 7222 90.02

Age
Sex & 
Color

28 3
51 1
32 1
31 3
30 1
40 1
34 1
32 1
34 1
38 3
27 1
35 1
34 1
38 1
27 1
34 3
32 1
30 1
47 1

Rank Option
130
131
132 
132A
133
134 
134
136
137 
137
139
140
141 
141
143
144
145
146
147



Name
Class
Code Grade

Turner, Jackie P. 7222 90.02
Bowen, Tommy J. 7222 90.00
Olive, William R. 7222 89.96
Brown, Bobby W. 7222 89.90
Blackwood, James W. 7222 89.87
Worthey, Paul E. 7222 89.83
Lawler, Roane T. 7222 89.77
Shannon, Eldon E, 7222 89.75
Stewart, Harold 7222 89.72
Howell, Claudus R. 7222 89.71
Wooten, Billy R. 7222 89.66
Blue Clarence M. Ill 7222 89.62
Anderson, Tyrone 7222 89.57
McCarty, William R. 7222 89.52
Hood, Harvey J. 7222 89.47
Raburn, Willie D. 7222 89.47
Watkins, Cleveland R. 7222 89.45
Dit, Catherine M. 7222 89.44
Bush, Paul W. 7222 87.38

V.P. Age
Sex & 
Color Rank

38 1 147
37 1 150
40 1 151
37 1 152
39 1 153
29 3 154
35 1 155
30 1 156
30 3 157
29 1 158
44 1 159
32 1 160
34 3 161
?? 1 162
30 3 163
45 1 163
36 3 165
25 2 166
40 1 167

Option



Name
Class
Code Grade

Grimmett, Elwin D. 7222 89.35
Thomas, Charles E. 7222 89.34
Kirk, Michael E. 7222 89.32
Helms, Robert W. 7222 89.21
Batson, William F. 7222 89.18
Noles, Thurman C. Jr. 7222 89.12
Mason, Bobby G. 7222 89.10
Canterbury, Charles E. 7222 89.04
Griffin, Johnny E. 7222 89.02
Patrick, Lonnie D. 7222 88.98
Bryant, Michael R. 7222 88.97
Lindsey, Norman R. 7222 88.94
Coffey, Lavdid R. 7222 88.87
Harris, James B. 7222 88.86
Paustian, William H. 7222 88.80
Head, Bobby J. 7222 88.77
Passmore, Joseph C. 7222 88.71
Kelley, Roy W. 7222 88.68
Parker, Robert L. 7222 88.60

V.P. Age
Sex & 
Color Rank

39 1 168
32 3 169
34 1 170
36 1 171
38 1 172
38 1 173
41 1 174
35 1 175
34 1 176
34 1 177
32 1 178
41 1 179
41 1 180
35 1 181
37 1 182
29 3 183
41 1 184
38 1 185
44 1 186

Option

-jo\



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Name
Class
Code Grade

Herring, Gerard W. 7222 87.05
Jones, Robert W. 7222 87.02
Tapley, John R. 7222 86.97
Price, Lindsey E. 7222 86.92
Taylor, William H. 7222 86.90
Flowers, Archie Jr. 7222 86.79
Palmore, Herbert N. 7222 86.77
Cunningham, Maurice L. 7222 86.72
Rines, David A. 7222 86.66
Pritchett, Luther J. 7222 86.59
Green, Howard A. 7222 86.52
Dean, James E. 7222 86.50
Johnson, Rector Jr. 7222 86.38
Cobb, Larry B. 7222 86.18
White, Willie L. 7222 86.15
Darden, Daniel M. IV 7222 86.06
Smith, Billy E. 7222 86.06
Reid, Andre L. 7222 85.89
White, Willie J. 7222 85.52

V.P. Age
Sex & 
Color Rank

29 3 206
31 .1 207
34 1 208
46 1 209
33 3 210
30 3 211
34 3 212
32 3 213
35 1 214
48 1 215
?? 1 216
35 1 217
26 3 218
48 1 219
27 3 220
37 3 221
30 3 221
30 3 223
32 3 224

Option

oo



Name
Class
Code Grade

Lambert, Randolph 7222 85.42
Abrams, Gregory 7222 85.29
Pall, Michel A. 7222 85.21
Taylor, William H. Jr. 7222 85.17
Allen, Zack W. Jr. 7222 84.95
Bonner, Lester, Jr. 7222 84.92
Hughes, John M. 7222 84.67
Berry, Arthur S. 7222 84.54
Maynor, Benny L. 7222 84.45
Stanford, Lannie 7222 84.41
McLeod, Jesse M. Ill 7222 84.13
Johnson, Peter 7222 84.04
Pynes, Ronald D. 7222 84.03
Wright, Nathaniel 7222 83.98
Higgins, Robert L. 7222 83.95
Vardaman, James C. 7222 83.93
Knox, Jim H. 7222 83.34
Day, Robert S. Jr. 7222 83.26
Malls, Clifford W. 7222 83.19

V.P. Age
Sex & 
Color Rank

39 1 225
27 3 226
26 1 227
26 3 228
28 3 229
28 3 230
33 3 231
33 3 232
37 1 233
30 3 234
42 1 235
34 3 236
32 1 237
31 3 238
50 1 ' 239
46 1 240
28 3 241
31 1 242
?? • 3 243

Option

VO



Name
Class
Code Grade

Barren, Charles 7222 83.09
Stanton, Nathan L. 7222 82.82
Steele, Gerald 7222 82.77
White, Billy M. 7222 82.57
Crittenden, Bobby L. 7222 82.54
Vaughner, Willie 7222 82.41
Finch, Hubert Jr. 7222 82.34
Marbury, Curtis L. 7222 81.92
Bagby, James A. 7222 81.78
Stallworth, Warren A. 7222 81.48
Ligon, Robert L. 7222 81.40
Jackson, Ira Jr. 7222 80.86
Sewell, Joseph M. 7222 80.74
Tyson, Ernest E. 7222 80.46
Mahomes, Nathan 7222 79.73
Hawkins, William G. 7222 78.73
Montgomery, Isaac L. 7222 77.47
Knox, Richard R. 7222 76.03
Morse, Glenn D. 7222 73.70

V.P. Age
Sex & 
Color Rank

36 3 244
33 1 245
32 3 246
37 1 247
36 1 248
32 3 249
29 3 250
41 3 251
33 3 252
28 3 253
36 3 254
31 3 255
25 3 256
34 3 257
27 3 258
44 3 259
38 3 260
26 3 261
29 3 262

Option

ooo



81

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3561-N 
Phillip Paradise, Jr., individually and on behalf of

THE CLASS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS,

United States of A merica, plaintiff and amicus curiae,

v.
Jerry Shoemaker, as D irector of 

the A labama D epartment of Public Safety, etc., et al.,
DEFENDANTS.

V. E. McClellan, W illiam M. Bailey, D. B. Mansell 
and Dan Davenport, on behalf of themselves and all

OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
APPLICANTS FOR INTERVENTION

MOTION TO INTERVENE

Come now V. E. McClellan, William M. Bailey, D. B. 
Mansell and Dan Davenport, on behalf of themselves and 
all others similarly situated, by and through their attorney 
of record, and move this Court for leave to intervene as a 
matter of right in this cause pursuant to Rule 24(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or permissibly pursuant 
to Rule 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure so as 
to assert the claims set forth in their complaint, a copy of 
which is attached hereto, and as grounds therefor set down 
and assign the following, separately and severally:

1. V. E. McClellan, William M. Bailey, D. B. Mansell 
and Dan Davenport are citizens of the State of Alabama 
and are regular employees holding positions in the classi­



82

fied service of the State of Alabama as defined in Code of 
Alabama 1975, § 36-26-1, et seq. and who are currently 
merit system employees of the Alabama Department of 
Public Safety in positions or ranks below that of Cor­
poral. They seek to intervene and file a complaint on 
behalf of themselves and the following similarly situated 
individuals: all those persons who are citizens of the State 
of Alabama and who are regular employees holding posi­
tions in the classified service of the State of Alabama as 
defined in Code of Alabama 1975, § 36-26-1, et seq. and 
who are currently merit system employees of the Alabama 
Department of Public Safety in positions or ranks below 
that of Corporal who have taken the Corporal’s Promo­
tional Examination pursuant to the Consent Decree 
entered in this cause on August 18, 1981, and who after 
taking the same were placed or ranked in terms of eligibili­
ty for promotion from one (1) through seventy-nine (79) 
on the Corporal Promotional Register which was com­
piled thereafter. (Hereinafter referred to as “the class’). 
McClellan, Bailey, Mansell and Davenport and the class 
described above are all white and took the Corporal’s Pro­
motional Examination described above as did all eligible 
applicants for the same, whether said applicants were 
white or black.

2. McClellan, Bailey, Mansell and Davenport and the 
class they represent, although not parties thereto and 
although their interests were not adequately considered or 
protected thereby, are substantially effected and are in 
fact governed in any attempt to be promoted from their 
current rank or position to Corporal, including their 
eligibility therefor, by the terms and provisions of a partial 
consent decree entered in this cause on February 16, 1979, 
and a subsequent consent decree entered in this cause on 
August 18, 1981, as well as, if granted, either in whole or 
in part, the Plaintiffs’ Motion To Enforce The Terms Of 
The February 16, 1979, Partial Consent Decree And The



83

August 18, 1981, Consent Decree filed on April 7, 1983, a 
copy of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof as 
set out in full as exhibit “A”.

3. McClellan, Bailey, Mansell and Davenport and the 
class they represent are currently eligible for promotion 
from their current or present rank or position to that of 
Corporal as the need and number for the same are re­
quired by their employer and have successfully passed and 
accomplished the requirements of and the Corporal’s Pro­
motional Examination described above, as is further 
evidenced by the Promotion Register attached as exhibit 
one to the April 7, 1983, motion of the Plaintiffs referred 
to above.

4. As a result, McClellan, Bailey, Mansell and Daven­
port and the class they represent have an interest in the 
subject matter of this action and they are so situated that 
the disposition of this matter may, as a practical matter, 
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests and 
therefore they should be permitted to intervene in this ac­
tion on the following grounds:

A. That the terms and provisions of the February 16, 
1979, partial consent decree and the August 18, 1981, con­
sent decree as they relate to Corporal promotion, as well 
as the relief sought by the Plaintiffs in their April 7, 1983, 
motion attached hereto as exhibit “A,” impede, impair, 
contradict, conflict with, limit, abbrogate or otherwise in­
terfere with the provisions of Code of Alabama 1975, 
§ 36-26-1, et seq., also known as the Merit System Act, 
and any rules or regulations promulgated thereunder, 
relating to or concerning promotions.

B. That the terms and provisions of the February 16, 
1979, partial consent decree and the August 18, 1981, con­
sent decree as they relate to Corporal promotion, as well 
as the relief sought by the Plaintiffs in their April 7, 1983, 
motion attached hereto as exhibit “A”, are unreasonable, 
illegal, unconstitutional or against public policy.



84

C. That the terms and provisions of the February 16, 
1979, partial consent decree and the August 18, 1981, con­
sent decree as they relate to Corporal promotion, as well 
as the relief sought by the Plaintifffs in their April 7, 1983, 
motion attached hereto as exhibit “A”, unnecessarily tram­
mel the interests of McClellan, Bailey, Mansell, Daven­
port and the class they represent.

D. That the terms and provisions of the February 16, 
1979, partial consent decree and the August 18, 1981, con­
sent decree as they relate to Corporal promotion, as well 
as the relief sought by the Plaintiffs in their April 7, 1983, 
motion attached hereto as exhibit “A”, amount to 
unlawful reverse racial discrimination in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States and the violation of rights guaranteed to McClellan, 
Bailey, Mansell, Davenport and the class they represent by 
42 USCA § 1983.

E. That the terms and provisions of the February 16, 
1979, partial consent decree and the August 18, 1981, con­
sent decree as they relate to Corporal promotion, as well 
as the relief sought by the Plaintiffs in their April 7, 1983, 
motion attached hereto as exhibit “A”, violate the rights 
guaranteed to McClellan, Bailey, Mansell, Davenport and 
the class they represent by 42 USCA § 1981.

F. That the terms and provisions of the February 16, 
1979, partial consent decree and the August 18, 1981, con­
sent decree as they relate to Corporal promotion, as well 
as the relief sought by the Plaintiffs in their April 7, 1983, 
motion attached hereto as exhibit “A”, are unreasonable, 
unconstitutional, illegal or against public policy in that 
there is not sufficient or adequate statistical evidentiary 
support concerning the number of black troopers eligible 
for promotion to Corporal, in that the various orders and 
consent decrees entered in this cause contain detailed pro­
visions which reach the objectives of the Plaintiffs’ claims 
for relief and in that the provisions and terms of the



85

February 16, 1979, partial consent decree, the August 18, 
1981, consent decree and the Plaintiffs’ motion of April 7, 
1983, have a harsh impact on innocent third parties who, 
despite merit, suffer from the blemish of race, to-wit: 
McClellan, Bailey, Mansell, Davenport and the class they 
represent.

G. That the terms and provisions of the February 16, 
1979, partial consent decree and the August 18, 1981, con­
sent decree as they relate to Corporal promotion, as well 
as the relief sought by the Plaintiffs in their April 7, 1983, 
motion attached hereto as exhibit “A”, are unreasonable, 
illegal, unconstitutional or against public policy in that 
they substantially interfere and effect a protectable in­
terest of McClellan, Bailey, Mansell, Davenport and the 
class they represent, to-wit: the right to compete for the 
benefits of public employment on the basis of individual 
worth and accomplishment, fairly ascertained, without the 
influence of irrelevant factors such as race.

H. That the terms and provisions of the February 16, 
1979, partial consent decree and the August 18, 1981, con­
sent decree as they relate to Corporal promotion, as well 
as the relief sought by the Plaintiffs in their April 7, 1983, 
motion attached hereto as exhibit “A,” are unreasonable, 
illegal, unconstitutional or against public policy in that 
they severely impair the career aspirations and promo­
tional expectations of McClellan, Bailey, Mansell, Daven­
port and the.class they represent.

I. That the terms and provisions of the February 16, 
1979, partial consent decree and the August 18, 1981, con­
sent decree as they relate to Corporal promotion, as well 
as the relief sought by the Plaintiffs in their April 7, 1983, 
motion attached hereto as exhibit “A”, bind or may bind 
McClellan, Bailey, Mansell, Davenport and the class they 
represent without affording them an opportunity to be 
heard and present evidence concerning the claims outlined 
above.



86

5. The interests of McClellan, Bailey, Mansell, Daven­
port and the class they represent are not adequately 
represented by the existing parties.

6. The claims of McClellan, Bailey, Mansell, Daven­
port and the class they represent and the main action have 
questions of law or fact in common and intervention will 
not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the 
rights of the original parties.

Alternatively, because they are subject to service of 
process and because their joinder will not deprive the 
Court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of this ac­
tion, McClellan, Bailey, Mansell, Davenport and the class 
they represent move this Court to enter an Order pursuant 
to Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure joining 
them as indispensible parties in that in their absence com­
plete relief cannot be accorded among those already par­
ties or that they claim an interest relating to the subject of 
the action and are so situated that the disposition of the 
action in their absence may as a practicable matter impair 
or impede their ability to protect that interest or leave any 
of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk 
of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations by reason of their claimed interest. In support 
of this motion, McClellan, Bailey, Mansell, Davenport 
and the class they represent adopt and incorporate herein 
by reference all the grounds, separately and severally, 
alleged in support of their motion to intervene.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Mc­
Clellan, Bailey, Mansell, Davenport and the class they 
represent respectfully pray that they be allowed to in­
tervene in this proceeding pursuant to either Rule 24(a) or 
24(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the 
reasons so stated and that the Court permit them to file 
their proposed Complaint in Intervention or in the alter­



87

native enter an Order joining them as indispensible parties 
pursuant to Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro­
cedure.

Respectfully submitted 

Stuart & Ward

/s / James S. Ward______
James S. Ward 

Attorney for Applicants 
for Intervention

OF COUNSEL 
Stuart & Wood
1933 Montgomery Highway Suite 200 
Birmingham, Alabama 35209 
939-0276

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I have served a copy of the above and 
foregoing pleading on the Honorable Dennis N. Balske, 
P.O. Box 2087, Montgomery, Alabama 36103-2087, the 
Honorable Edward L. Hardin, Jr., P.O. Box 1214, Birm­
ingham, Alabama 35201 and the Ms. Cynthia Drabek, 
Federal Enforcement Section, United States Department 
of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530 by placing a copy of 
same in the United States mail, postage prepaid and prop­
erly addressed on this the 13th day of April, 1983.

/ s /  James S. W ard

Of Counsel



88

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3561-N 
P hillip Paradise, Jr., individually and on behalf of

THE CLASS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS,

U nited States of A merica, plaintiff and amicus curiae,

v.
Jerry Shoemaker, as D irector of 

the A labama D epartment of Public Safety, etc., et al.,
DEFENDANTS.

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO ENFORCE THE TERMS OF 
THE FEBRUARY 16, 1979 PARTIAL CONSENT DECREE 

AND THE AUGUST 18, 1981 CONSENT DECREE

Plaintiffs, by the undersigned counsel, respectfully 
move the Court for an order enforcing the terms of the 
February 16, 1979 Partial Consent Decree and the August 
18, 1981 Consent Decree. Specifically, plaintiffs seek an 
order requiring defendant:

(1) to implement “a promotion procedure which is fair 
to all applicants and which promotion procedure when 
used either for screening or ranking will have little or no 
adverse impact upon blacks seeking promotion to cor­
poral.” See Partial Consent Decree of February 16, 1979, 
p.4 § IV(A).

(2) to develop and implement a new procedure for pro­
motion to the positions of sergeant, lieutenant, captain 
and major, which will have little or no adverse impact 
upon blacks seeking promotion to these positions. See id. 
at § B.



89

(3) to promote qualified blacks to the corporal position 
at a rate that does not result in adverse impact and which is 
within the spirit of this Court’s previous orders and the 
parties’ consent decrees. See Consent Decree of August 18, 
1981, p.4 16.

(4) to pay reasonable attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs’ 
counsel in this matter. The following paragraphs disclose 
the reasons why this Court should grant plaintiffs’ request.

A. History of this Litigation

On February 10, 1972, the Court found that the 
Alabama Department of Public Safety had “engaged in a 
blatant and continuous pattern and practice of discrimina­
tion in hiring. . . .” NAACP v. Allen, 340 F.Supp. 703, 
705 (M.D.Ala. 1972). The Court ordered defendants to 
hire one black trooper for each white trooper hired “until 
approximately twenty-five (25) percent of the Alabama 
state trooper force is comprised of Negroes.” Id. at 706. 
This order was affirmed on appeal and, in 1975, restated 
emphatically in granting plaintiffs’ motion for supplemen­
tal relief.

On February 16, 1979, a partial consent decree was ap­
proved by the Court, following the second reopening of 
the case by plaintiffs. This decree required, inter alia, that 
defendants institute “a promotion procedure which is in 
conformity with the 1978 Uniform Guidelines o f Selection 
Procedure, 43 Fed. Reg. 38290, and which, in addition, 
when used either for screening or ranking will have little or 
no adverse impact on blacks seeking promotion to cor­
poral.” See Decree at p.4, § IV(A). It gave defendants one 
year to accomplish this objective, after which defendants 
were “to begin validation of a promotional procedure for 
the position of sergeant and, in turn, for the positions of 
lieutenant, captain and major.” Id. § IV(B).



90

On April 9, 1981, the defendants moved the Court to 
approve its newly developed “Corporal’s Promotional Ex­
amination.” Plaintiffs objected to it on the ground that it 
did not conform to the requirements of the Uniform 
Guidelines, but in view of the defendants’ expression of an 
urgent need for more corporals, eventually entered into 
the August 18, 1981 Consent Decree. This Decree per­
mitted defendants to utilize the protested promotional 
procedure, but required that the results be reviewed to 
determine whether they adversely impacted black ap­
plicants prior to the making of any promotions. The 
Decree further provided that if the new procedure adverse­
ly impacted black candidates: (1) “promotions shall be 
made in a manner that does not result in adverse impact,”
(2) “[defendants shall submit to plaintiffs their proposal 
for making promotions in conformity with the Partial 
Consent Decree and with this Decree; and (3) “[i]f the par­
ties do not agree on the method for making promotions, 
the matter shall be submitted to the Court for resolution.” 
See Consent Decree of August 18, 1981, p. 4, 16.

Finally, in the event of adverse impact, the Decree re­
quires defendants to “examine the results of each compo­
nent of the selection procedure to identify the source(s) of 
the adverse impact and . . . revise the procedure so as to 
avoid adverse impact in the future.” According to the 
Decree, defendants must provide this data to plaintiffs, 
whereafter the parties shall attempt to agree upon 
modifications. In the event of disagreement, “the matter 
shall be submitted to the Court for resolution.” Id. p.5, 
17.

B. Factual Developments

The new selection procedure unquestionably adversely 
impacted black applicants. Two hundred sixty-two 
troopers applied for promotion to the rank of corporal. 
Black applicants were ranked as follows: 96, 100, 121,



91

130, 132A, 137, 144, 154, 157, 161, 163, 165, 169, 183,
191, 193, 194, 195, 197, 204, 205, 206, 210, 211, 212, 213,
218, 220, 221, 223, 224, 226, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 234,
236, 238, 241, 243, 244, 246, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254,
255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262. See Promotion 
Register, attached hereto as Exhibit 1. Whites held the top 
95 positions, whereas blacks held the bottom 14 positions. 
Of the 59 blacks who applied, only 4 were ranked in the 
top half, and they were at the bottom of the top half (#’s 
96, 100, 121 and 130).

In apparent recognition of the adverse impact of this 
register, defendants have recently offered to promote 
black applicants at a rate of 20% (1 of every 5 promotions 
will be black).1 Plaintiffs have rejected this offer. Defend­
ants have not “revise[d] the procedure so as to avoid 
adverse impact in the future” and have not “provide[d] 
plaintiffs with data showing the impact of each compo­
nent of the selection procedure and an item-by-item 
analysis of the impact of the written test.” See August 18, 
1981 Decree at p.5, \1 .

Thus, no blacks (or whites) have been promoted to cor­
poral in the last four years. There is no valid promotion 
procedure in place for promotions to corporal, sergeant, 
lieutenant, captain or major. Under the terms of the 1979 
Partial Consent Decree and the 1981 Consent Decree, this 
Court must now decide: (1) what percentage of the forth­
coming 18-20 promotions to corporal should be black; (2) 
when to require defendants to implement a valid pro­
cedure for promotions to corporal; and (3) when to re­
quire defendants to implement valid procedures for pro­
motions to sergeant, lieutenant, captain and major.

1 Defendants stated that they need to promote approximately 18 to 
20 troopers to the rank of corporal.



92

C. Plaintiffs’ Position

Plaintiffs submit that blacks should be promoted to cor­
poral at the same rate at which they have been hired, 1 for 
1, until such time as the defendants implement a valid pro­
motional procedure. Such an order will serve two pur­
poses: (1) it will encourage defendants to develop a valid 
promotional procedure as soon as possible; and (2) it will 
help to alleviate the gross underrepresentation of blacks in 
the supervisory ranks of the Department.

At the present time there are four black corporals. All 
four were promoted in 1979 under the terms of the Partial 
Consent Decree. There are 67 corporals. Thus, blacks 
comprise 6% of the corporals at this time. Assuming the 
Department promotes 20 troopers to the rank of corporal, 
blacks will comprise 16% of the corporals if plaintiffs’ 1 
for 1 suggestion is implemented, whereas they will only 
comprise 9.2% if defendant’s 1 for 5 plan is followed.5

Plaintiffs’ request is much more in line with the Court’s 
previous orders than is defendants’ plan. The ultimate goal 
of the Court’s orders is a force that is 25% black. At the 
present time, according to defendants, the force is approx­
imately 22-23% black. However, due to defendants’ reluc­
tance to promote its black troopers, all but four of these 
troopers hold the lowest trooper rank. If the Department 
is ever to be truly integrated, approximately 25% of its 
force at every rank should be black. A requirement that 
defendants promote 10 black of the next 20 corporals, 
thereby raising black representation in the corporal rank 
from 6% to 16% is both a reasonable and necessary2 3 step 
to the attainment of this Court’s stated goal.

2 After 20 promotions there will be a total of 87 corporals. Under 
plaintiffs’ plan, there would be 14 black corporals, whereas under 
defendants’ plan, only 8 corporals would be black.

3 It would perhaps not be necessary if the defendants had developed 
their own valid promotion procedure as required by the 1979 Decree. It 
is defendants’ perennial non-compliance that necessitates this action.



93

If the Court has any hesitation to order this relief, it 
need look no further than Judge Johnson’s Order and 
Memorandum of April 13, 1979. There, the Court rejected 
the defendants’ request for an amendment to the original 
order changing the requirement for black employment 
from 25% of the trooper force to 25% of entry-level 
troopers. Judge Johnson’s reasoning fits the instant situa­
tion. It is reproduced here with the hope that the Court 
will restate it in an order granting plaintiffs’ present re­
quest:

In 1972, defendants were not just found guilty of 
discriminating against blacks in hiring to entry-level 
positions. The Court found that in thirty-seven years 
there had never been a black trooper at any rank. One 
continuing effect of that discrimination is that, as of 
November 1, 1978, out of 232 state troopers at the 
rank of corporal or above, there is still not one black. 
The quota fashioned by the Court provides an im­
petus to promote blacks into those positions. To 
focus only on the entry-level positions would be to ig­
nore that past discrimination by the Department was 
pervasive, that its effects persist, and that they are 
manifest. As the Fifth Circuit has recognized, the 
order in this case does not seek to grant proportional 
representation in public employment to the black 
citizens of Alabama. NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d at 
621. The order in this case is but the necessary remedy 
for an intolerable wrong.

It has been four years since Judge Johnson wrote these 
words. Yet the only change in the makeup of the Depart­
ment was the promotion of four blacks to Corporal as 
mandated by the 1979 Partial Consent Decree. Not only 
has the Department failed to promote any of its black 
troopers, but it had done nothing to insure that its black 
troopers will ever play a truly representative role in the 
operation of the Department. No valid promotion



94

mechanism has yet been developed by which they can 
begin moving from the lowest rank, trooper, toward the 
highest rank, major, even though blacks have been 
employed in the Department for eleven years.

In order to insure that blacks finally gain the opportuni­
ty to move toward positions of responsibility within the 
Department, the Court should order defendants: (1) to im­
mediately promote 18 to 20 employees to the corporal 
position, depending on need, on a 1 for 1 basis; (2) to 
develop and implement a valid promotional procedure for 
the corporal’s position within one year;4 to develop and 
implement valid promotional procedures for sergeant, 
lieutenant, captain and major within two years;5 and to 
pay plaintiffs’ counsel reasonable attorneys fees for the 
prosecution of this action.6

Respectfully submitted,

/s / D ennis N. Balske________
Dennis N. Balske
John L. Carroll 

1001 S. Hull Street 
P.O. Box 2087 
Montgomery, AL 36103-2087

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

4 In order to insure compliance, certain procedural safeguards 
should be included, such as open discovery to plaintiffs’ counsel, a 
deadline for production of the finished product to plaintiffs’ counsel, 
etc. Moreover, the Court should order that all future necessary pro­
motions to corporal be made on a 1 for 1 basis until the Court has ap­
proved a valid promotional procedure.

5 The procedural safeguards discussed in n.4 should be included, 
and the Court should order that beginning two years from the entry of 
its order, all promotions to sergeant, lieutenant, captain and major be 
made on 1 for 1 basis if a valid procedure for promotions, approved 
by the Court, is not in place.

6 Bryon Prescott was recently appointed by Governor Wallace to 
replace defendant Shoemaker. His name should be substituted for 
that of defendant Shoemaker in future pleadings and orders.



95

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing have been 
served upon Ed Hardin and Cynthia Drabek by U.S. first 
class mail, postage prepaid, this 7th day of April, 1983.

/ s /  D ennis N. Balske 
Attorney for Plaintiffs



96

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3561-N 
P hillip Paradise, Jr., individually and on behalf of

THE CLASS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS,

U nited States of A merica, plaintiff and amicus curiae,

v.
Jerry Shoemaker, as D irector of 

the A labama Department of Public Safety, etc., et al.,
DEFENDANTS.

V. E. McClellan, William M. Bailey, D. B. Mansell 
and Dan Davenport, on behalf of themselves and all

OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
APPLICANTS FOR INTERVENTION

AMENDMENT TO MOTION TO INTERVENE

Come now V. E. McClellan, William M. Bailey, D. B. 
Mansell and Dan Davenport on behalf of themselves and 
all others similarly situated, by and through their attorney 
of record, and hereby amend their motion to intervene by 
adding the following to the end of paragraph two of their 
original motion to intervene:

Specifically, V. E. McClellan, William M. Bailey, D. B. 
Mansell, Dan Davenport and the class they represent aver 
that the provisions and terms of the consent decrees 
aforementioned allow rank order promotion to Corporal



97

only if there is little or no adverse impact upon blacks and 
that the aforesaid decrees recite or contain no evidentiary 
support to justify this limitation.

Respectfully submitted

Stuart & Ward

/s/ James S. W ard_______
James S. Ward 

Attorney for Applicants 
for Intervention 

1933 Montgomery Highway 
Suite 200

Birmingham, Alabama 35209 
939-0276

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I have served a copy of the above and 
foregoing Amendment to Motion to Intervene on the 
Honorable Dennis N. Balske, P.O. Box 2087, Mont­
gomery, Alabama 36103-2087, the Honorable Edward L. 
Hardin, Jr., P.O. Box 1214, Birmingham, Alabama 35201 
and Ms. Cynthia Drabek, Federal Enforcement Section, 
United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 
20530, by placing a copy of same in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid and properly addressed on this the 15 day 
of April, 1983.

/ s /  James Ward

Of Counsel



98

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3561-N 
Phillip Paradise, Jr., individually and on behalf of

THE CLASS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS,

United States of A merica, plaintiff and amicus curiae,

v.
Jerry Shoemaker, as D irector of 

the A labama D epartment of Public Safety, etc., et al.,
DEFENDANTS.

V. E. McClellan, W illiam M. Bailey, D. B. Mansell 
and Dan Davenport, on behalf of themselves and all

OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
APPLICANTS FOR INTERVENTION

COMPLAINT OF INTERVENORS I

I
JURISDICTION

1. This action for appropriate equitable relief and 
declaratory judgment arises under the Fourteenth Amend­
ment of the United States Constitution and 42 USC §1981 
and § 1983. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant 
to 28 USC § 1343 and § 2201 and § 2202. In this action, 
Intervenors and the class they represent seek to have the 
provisions of the consent decrees entered in this cause on 
February 16, 1979, and August 18, 1981, which deal with 
corporal promotion, as well as the relief prayed for in the 
Plaintiffs’ Motion To Enforce The Term Of The Febru-



99

ary 16, 1979, Partial Consent Decree And The August 18, 
1981, Partial Consent Decree declared unreasonable, il­
legal, unconstitutional or against public policy, seek ap­
propriate equitable relief enjoining the operation of these 
provisions and motion and seek relief which ensures that 
any future or further promotions to Corporal be ac­
complished in a constitutional and non-discriminatory 
manner without infringing upon the Intervenors’ and the 
class they represent constitutional rights guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and rights guaranteed to them by 42 USC § 1981 and 
§ 1983.

PARTIES

2. V. E. McClellan, William M. Bailey, D. B. Mansell 
and Dan Davenport (hereinafter referred to as “In- 
tervenors”) are white citizens of the State of Alabama and 
are regular employees holding positions in the classified 
service of the State of Alabama as defined in Code of 
Alabama 1975, § 36-26-1, et seq. and who are currently 
merit system employees of the Alabama Department of 
Public Safety in positions or ranks below that of Cor­
poral. Intervenors have taken the Corporal’s Promotional 
Examination pursuant to the consent decree entered in this 
cause on August 18, 1981, as did all eligible applicants for 
the same, whether said applicants were white or black and 
are substantially effected and are currently governed in 
any attempt to be promoted from their current rank or 
position to Corporal, including eligibility for that posi­
tion, by the terms and provisions of a partial consent 
decree entered in this cause on February 16, 1979, and a 
subsequent consent decree entered in this cause on August 
18, 1981, as well as, if granted, either in whole or in part, 
the Plaintiffs’ Motion To Enforce The Term Of The 
February 16, 1979, Partial Consent Decree And The 
August 18, 1981, Consent Decree. Intervenors are cur­



100

rently eligible for promotion from their current or present 
rank or position to that of Corporal as the need and 
number for the same are required by their employer and 
have successfully passed and accomplished the re­
quirements of and the Corporal’s Promotional Examina­
tion described above.

The remaining parties in this action have been identified 
in previous pleadings filed in this cause. Intervenors and 
the class they represent allege that the Defendants in this 
cause are now and at all times material hereto were acting 
under the color and pretense of the statutes, ordinances, 
regulations, customs and/or usages of the State of 
Alabama.

II

CLASS ACTION AVERMENTS 

A. INTERVENORS’ CLASS

1. This action is brought by the Intervenors in­
dividually and pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure as a class action on behalf of the following 
described individuals:

(a) All those persons who are white citizens of the 
State of Alabama and who are regular employees 
holding positions in the classified service of the State 
of Alabama as defined in Code of Alabama 1975, 
§ 36-26-1, et seq. and who are currently merit system 
employees of the Alabama Department of Public 
Safety in positions or ranks below that of Corporal 
who have taken the Corporal’s Promotional Ex­
amination pursuant to the consent decree entered in 
this cause on August 18, 1981, along with all eligible 
applicants for the same, whether said applicants were 
white or black, and who after taking the same were 
placed or ranked in terms of eligibility for promo­
tion from one (1) through seventy-nine (79) on the



101

Corporal Promotional Register which was compiled 
thereafter and who are substantially effected and who 
are now governed in any attempt to be promoted 
from their current rank or position to that of Cor­
poral, including their eligibility for that position, by 
the terms and provisions of a partial consent decree 
entered in this cause on February 16, 1979, and a 
subsequent consent decree entered in this cause on 
August 18, 1981, as well as, if granted, either in whole 
or in part, the Plaintiffs’ Motion To Enforce The 
Terms Of The February 16, 1979, Partial Consent 
Decree And The August 18, 1981, Consent Decree 
and who are currently eligible for promotion from 
this current or present rank or position to that of Cor­
poral as the need and number for the same are re­
quired by their employer and who have successfully 
passed and accomplished the requirements of and the 
Corporal’s Promotional Examination described 
above.

B. PRE-REQUISITE TO CLASS ACTION

2. Intervenors aver as follows:
(a) The class is so numerous that joinder of all 

members is impracticable.
(b) There are questions of law and fact common to 

the class in that it must be determined whether the 
terms and provisions of the February 16, 1979, partial 
consent decree and the August 18, 1981, consent 
decree as they relate to Corporal promotion, as well 
as the relief sought by the Plaintiffs in their April 7, 
1983, Motion To Enforce The Terms Of The February 
16, 1979, Partial Consent Decree And The August 18, 
1981, Consent Decree (a) impede, impair, contradict, 
conflict with, limit, abborgate or otherwise interfere 
with provisions of Code of Alabama 1975, § 36-26-1,



102

et seq. also known as the Merit System Act, and any 
rules or regulations promulgated thereunder, relating 
to or concerning promotions, (b) are unreasonable, il­
legal, unconstitutional or against public policy, (c) are 
unreasonable, illegal, unconstitutional or against 
public policy in that they unnecessarily trammel the 
interests of the Intervenors and the class, (d) amount 
to unlawful reverse racial discrimination in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States and the violation of rights 
guaranteed to the Intervenors and the class by 42 USC 
§ 1981 and § 1983, (e) are unreasonable, unconstitu­
tional, illegal or against public policy in that there was 
not sufficient and adequate statistical evidentiary sup­
port concerning the number of black troopers eligible 
for promotion to Corporal recited or contained in the 
decrees, in that the various orders and consent decrees 
entered in this cause contain detailed provisions 
which reach the objectives of the Plaintiffs’ claims for 
relief and in that the impact of the provisions and 
terms of the aforementioned consent decrees and mo­
tion have a harsh impact on innocent third parties 
who, despite merit, suffer from the blemish of race, 
(f) are unreasonable, illegal, unconstitutional or 
against public policy in that they substantially in­
terfere and effect a protectable interest of the In­
tervenors and the class, to wit: the right to compete 
for the benefits of public employment on the basis of 
individual worth and accomplishment, fairly ascer­
tained, without the influence of irrelevant factors 
such as race, (g) are unreasonable, illegal, unconstitu­
tional or against public policy in that they severely im­
pair the career aspirations and promotional expecta­
tions of the Intervernors and the class, (h) bind or



103

may bind the Intervenors and the class without af­
fording them an opportunity to be heard and present 
evidence concerning the claims outlined above.

3. The claims of the Intervenors are typical of the 
claims of all the members of the class.

4. The Intervenors and their attorneys will fairly and 
adequately protect the interest of all the members of the 
class.

COUNT ONE

1. On February 10, 1972, over eleven (11) years ago, 
the Court entered an order in this cause finding that prior 
to that date, the Defendants had engaged in a blatant and 
continuous pattern and practice of discrimination in hiring 
in the Alabama Department of Public Safety, both as to 
troopers and supporting personnel. Concommitantly, the 
Court enjoined the Defendants from engaging in employ­
ment practices, including recruitment, examination, ap­
pointment, training, promotion, retention or any other 
personnel action, for the purpose or with the effect of 
discriminating against any employee, or actual or poten­
tial applicants for employment, on the ground of race or 
color, (paragraph two). Intervenors aver that this prohibi­
tion prevented the Defendants from engaging in the ac­
tivities described above in a manner which discriminated 
against whites as well as blacks.

In addition, the Court ordered the Defendants to hire 
one black trooper for each white trooper hired until ap­
proximately twenty-five (25) percent of the Alabama State 
Trooper force comprised of Negros (paragraph three). In­
tervenors are informed and believe and on such informa­
tion and belief aver that the Defendants have substantially 
complied with this requirement.

2. On February 16, 1979, a partial consent decree was 
executed by the parties and approved by the Court. In this 
decree, Defendants agreed to have as an objective the utili­
zation of a promotion procedure which was fair to all ap­



104

plicants and which promotion procedure when used either 
for screening or ranking would have little or no adverse 
impact upon blacks seeking promotion to Corporal. In ac­
cordance with that objective, Defendants agreed to utilize 
a promotion procedure which is in conformity with the 
1978 Uniform Guidelines o f Selection Procedures, 43 Fed. 
Reg. 38290, and which, in addition, when used either for 
screening or ranking will have little or no adverse impact 
on blacks seeking promotion to Corporal (paragraph 
1VA). However, this decree neither recites nor contains 
any appropriate statistical evidentiary support for the 
Defendants’ agreement contained therein or for their 
agreement to utilize a promotion procedure which will 
have little or no adverse impact upon blacks seeking pro­
motion to Corporal.

Moreover, Plaintiffs aver that Defendants also agreed 
in this consent decree to have as an objective within the 
Department of Public Safety, “. . . an employment and 
promotion system that is racially neutral.” and agreed not 
to engage in any act or practice which discriminates on the 
basis of race in hiring, promoting, upgrading, training, 
assignment, discharge or otherwise discriminated against 
any employee of, or any applicant, or potential applicant 
for employment with respect to compensation, terms and 
conditions or privileges of employment because of such in­
dividual’s race, (paragraph I) Intervenors aver that these 
agreements prohibit discrimination against whites as well 
as blacks.

3. On August 18, 1981, another consent decree was 
entered in this cause. In that decree, the parties agreed that 
the proposed selection procedure for Corporal promotion 
shall be administered and scored as set out in the Defend­
ant’s letter to Plaintiffs and the Court dated May 21, 1981, 
and in the proposed selection procedure and validation 
report accompanying that letter, that information being 
attached to and made a part of this consent decree.



105

Intervenors allege that it is clear from a reading of 
paragraphs one and two of that consent decree that the 
provisions thereof were to apply equally to all applicants 
for the examination for State Trooper Corporal, regard­
less of the race of the applicant. Intervenors further aver 
that the Plaintiffs agreed to the procedure for, the make­
up, including the components thereof, the administering 
and scoring of the written examination for State Trooper 
Corporal outlined in that consent decree by their approval 
of that consent decree.

4. The August 18, 1981, consent decree provided that 
the Defendants shall compile a list of candidates for pro­
motion for State Trooper Corporal positions based upon 
the composite numerical scores of applicants on the selec­
tion procedure and allow Defendants, in determining 
eligibility, to apply the standards for length of service set 
out in the proposed selection procedure, (paragraph three)

5. Despite the provisions described in Paragraphs 
three and four above, the August 18, 1981, consent decree 
allowed selections or promotions to Corporal to be made 
in rank order from the list described in paragraph two of 
the decree only if the selection procedure had little or no 
adverse impact againt black applicants, that determination 
to be made based upon reference to the Uniform 
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 43 Fed. 
Reg. 38290, 28 C.F.R. Sec. 50.14 (1978). (paragraph five). 
Intervenors aver that there is absolutely no appropriate 
statistical evidentiary data recited or contained in the 
August 18, 1981, consent decree to support or justify the 
limitation that selections shall be made in rank order for a 
Corporal only if the selection procedure has little or no 
adverse impact against black applicants.

6. The August 18, 1981, consent decree permitted De­
fendants to utilize the Corporal promotional procedure 
outlined therein but mandated that the results be reviewed



106

by reference to the Uniform Guidelines cited above, to 
determine whether they had an adverse impact against 
black applicants prior to the Department being allowed to 
make any promotions. The decree dictated that if the new 
procedure had an adverse impact upon blacks then promo­
tion shall be made in a manner that does not result in 
adverse impact on the initial group of promotions or 
cumulatively during the use of the procedure, that the De­
fendant shall submit to Plaintiffs a proposal for making 
promotions in conformity with the February 16, 1979, 
partial consent decree and with the August 18, 1981, 
decree and that if the parties do not agree on a method for 
making promotions, the matter shall be submitted to the 
Court for resolution, (paragraph six) Intervenors aver that 
the decree cites or refers to no appropriate statistical infor­
mation or statistical evidentiary support to justify the 
limitation of, “little or no adverse impact upon blacks” 
before promotions to Corporal could be made by the 
Alabama Department of Public Safety. Intervenors fur­
ther aver that the decree cites or refers to absolutely no ap­
propriate statistical evidentiary support, or finding or in­
formation to justify the use of the Uniform Guidelines re­
ferred to above and the answer to question 12 of the Ques­
tions and Answers to Clarify and Provide a Common In­
terpretation o f the Uniform Guidelines on Employee 
Selection Procedures, 44 Fed. Reg. 11996, March 2, 1979, 
in determining adverse impact.

7. Intervenors aver that there is no appropriate 
statistical evidentiary support cited or referred to in the 
decree which supports or justifies the provisions of 
paragraph seven thereof and further aver that they have an 
interest, for themselves and the class they represent as 
those eligible for promotion to Corporal pursuant to the 
test conducted and given as outlined in the August 18, 
1981, consent decree, to conduct discovery and proffer to 
the Court statistical evidence concerning any modifica­



107

tions on the existing selection procedure, on the use of the 
existing selection procedure for future administrations, to 
aid the Court in resolving this matter, or to demonstrate 
that the provisions of the February 16, 1979, partial con­
sent decree and the August 18, 1981, consent decree 
relating to Corporal promotion are unreasonable, un­
constitutional, illegal or against public policy.

8. Intervenors aver that the Corporal Promotional Ex­
amination which was given subsequent to the consent 
decree entered in this cause on August 18, 1981, was con­
ducted, administered, graded and analyzed in a racially 
neutral and non-discriminatory manner without any con­
sideration or regard to race and that the said examination 
was given and conducted under these conditions to all 
those eligible applicants for the same, whether those ap­
plicants were white or black.

9. Intervenors aver that they are governed and covered 
by the provisions of Code of Alabama 1975, § 36-26-1, et 
seq., also known as the Merit System Act, and any rules or 
regulations promulgated thereunder, which relate to or 
concern promotions and further aver that those statutes 
and rules grant upon them a vested right to be promoted to 
Corporal in the same manner as those previously pro­
moted to that position and without any regard or influence 
based on race but rather on merit and competition. See 
Code of Alabama 1975, § 36-26-23.

10. Intervenors aver that they are innocent of any 
wrongdoing nor did they participate in any of the activities 
or practices which necessitated the granting of any orders 
or decrees in this cause and are innocent victims whose 
career aspirations and expectations should not be blem­
ished or impeded because of their race.

11. Intervenors aver that there are other detailed pro­
visions of the orders and decrees entered in this cause 
which reach the objectives of the Plaintiffs’ claims for 
relief.



108

12. Intervenors aver that the partial consent decree of 
February 16, 1979, and the consent decree of August 18, 
1981, as they relate to promotion generally and to Cor­
poral promotion specifically, including but not limited to 
those provisions which require that any selection pro­
cedure for Corporal promotion utilized have little or no 
adverse impact against black applicants, this determina­
tion to be made by reference to the Uniform Guidelines on 
Employee Selection Procedures, 44 Fed. Reg. 11996 28
C.F.R Sec. 5014 and the answer to question 12 of the 
Questions and Answers to Clarify and Provide a Common 
Interpretation of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee 
Selection Procedures, 44 Fed. Reg. 11996, March 2, 1979, 
as well as the relief sought in Plaintiffs’ Motion to Enforce 
The Terms Of The February 16, 1979, Partial Consent 
Decree And The August 18, 1981, Consent Decree, 
amount to hiring and promotional quotas and affirmative 
action plans or procedures for promotion which have the 
effect of reverse racial discrimination on the Intervenors 
and their class in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States, which violates 
their rights guaranteed by 42 USC § 1981 and § 1983 in 
that, inter alia they deprive them of the full and equal 
benefit of all laws free of racial discrimination or which 
are unreasonable, unconstitutional, illegal or against 
public policy.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

13. That the terms and provisions of the February 16, 
1979, partial consent decree and the August 18, 1981, con­
sent decree as they relate generally to promotion and 
specifically to Corporal promotion, as well as the relief 
sought by the Plaintiffs in their motion of April 7, 1983, 
which is referred to above, impede, impair, contradict, 
conflict with, limit, abbrogate or otherwise interfere with 
the provisions of Code of Alabama 1975, § 36-26-1, et



109

seq., also known as the Merit System Act, and any rules or 
regulations promulgated thereunder, relating to or 
concerning promotions and are therefore unreasonable, il­
legal, unconstitutional or against public policy.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

14. That the terms and provisions of the February 16, 
1979, partial consent decree and the August 18, 1981, con­
sent decree as they relate generally to promotion and 
specifically to Corporal promotion, as well as the relief 
sought by the Plaintiffs in their motion of April 7, 1983, 
which is referred to above, are unreasonable, illegal, un­
constitutional or against public policy.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

15. That the terms and provisions of the February 16, 
1979, partial consent decree and the August 18, 1981, con­
sent decree as they relate generally to promotion and 
.specifically to Corporal promotion, as well as the relief 
sought by the Plaintiffs in their motion of April 7, 1983, 
which is referred to above, unnecessarily trammel the in­
terest of the Intervenors and the class they represent and 
are therefore unreasonable, illegal, unconstitutional or 
against public policy.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

16. That the terms and provisions of the February 16, 
1979, partial consent decree and the August 18, 1981, con­
sent decree as they relate generally to promotion and 
specifically to Corporal promotion, as well as the relief 
sought by the Plaintiffs in their motion of April 7, 1983, 
which is referred to above, amount to unlawful reverse 
racial discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and 
the violation of rights guaranteed to the Intervenors and



110

the class they represent by 42 USC § 1983 in that the De­
fendants have now and at all material times hereto acted 
under the color and pretense of the statutes, ordinances, 
regulations, customs and usages of the State of Alabama 
in relation to the carrying out of the terms and provisions 
of the consent decrees referred to above.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

17. That the terms and provisions of the February 16, 
1979, partial consent decree and the August 18, 1981, con­
sent decree as they relate generally to promotion and 
specifically to Corporal promotion, as well as the relief 
sought by the Plaintiffs in their motion of April 7, 1983, 
which is referred to above, violate the rights guaranteed to 
the Intervenors and the class they represent by 42 USC 
§1981 in that they have been deprived of the full and 
equal benefit of all laws in relation to the provisions and 
terms of the decrees and motions referred to above and in 
relation to promotion free of racial discrimination or 
without regard to race.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

18. That the terms and provisions of the February 16, 
1979, partial consent decree and the August 18, 1981, con­
sent decree as they relate generally to promotion and 
specifically to Corporal promotion, as well as the relief 
sought by the Plaintiffs in their motion of April 7, 1983, 
which is referred to above, are unreasonable, unconstitu­
tional, illegal or against public policy in that the decrees 
neither recite not contain any appropriate statistical 
evidentiary support concerning the number of black 
troopers eligible for promotion to Corporal or concerning 
the requirement of little or no adverse impact against 
blacks before there can be promotion in rank order, in 
that the various orders and consent decrees entered in this



I l l

cause contain detailed provisions which reach the objec­
tives of the Plaintiffs’ claims for relief and/or in that the 
provisions and terms of the February 16, 1979, partial 
consent decree, the August 18, 1981, consent decree and 
the Plaintiffs’ motion of April 7, 1983, have a harsh im­
pact on innocent third parties who, despite merit, suffer 
from the blemish of race.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

19. That the terms and provisions of the February 17, 
1979, partial consent decree and the August 18, 1981, con­
sent decree as they relate generally to promotion and 
specifically to Corporal promotion, as well as the relief 
sought by the Plaintiffs in their motion of April 7, 1983, 
which is referred to above, are unreasonable, illegal, un­
constitutional or against public policy in that they substan­
tially interfere and effect a protectable interest of the In- 
tervenors and the class they represent, to-wit: the right to 
compete for the benefits of public employment on the 
basis of individual worth and accomplishment, fairly 
ascertained, without the influence of irrelevant factors 
such as race.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION

20. That the terms and provisions of the February 17, 
1979, partial consent decree and the August 18, 1981, con­
sent decree as they relate generally to promotion and 
specifically to Corporal promotion, as well as the relief 
sought by the Plaintiffs in their motion of April 7, 1983, 
which is referred to above, are unreasonable, illegal, un­
constitutional or against public policy in that they severely 
impair the career aspiration and promotional expectations 
of the Intervenors and the class they represent.



112

21. There is between the parties an actual controversy 
as set forth herein. The Intervenors and the class they 
represent have suffered and will continue irreparable in­
jury and damage by reason of the acts and the provisions 
of the consent decrees and motion complained of herein. 
Intervenors and the class they represent have no plain, 
adequate or complete remedy to address the wrongs, 
unlawful acts, and the terms and provisions of the consent 
decrees and motions complained of herein other than this 
action for a declaration of rights and appropriate 
equitable relief. Any remedy to which Intervenors and the 
class they represent could be remitted would be attended 
with such uncertainties and delays as to deny substantial 
relief, and would involve multiplicity of suits causing fur­
ther irreparable injury, damage and inconvenience.

WHEREFORE, Intervenors, on behalf of themselves 
and all others similarly situated, respectfully pray that this 
Court will take jurisdiction of this cause and do the 
following:

A. Certify this action as a class action pursuant to 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

B. Following a hearing on this complaint, issue a 
preliminary injunction, to be made permanent later, en­
joining the Defendants or any other party from promoting 
any individual to the rank of Corporal pursuant to the 
terms and provisions of the partial consent decree of 
February 16, 1979, the consent decree of August 18, 1981, 
or pursuant to the Plaintiffs’ Motion To Enforce The 
Terms Of The February 16, 1979, Partial Consent Decree 
And The August 18, 1981, Consent Decree.

C. Declare the terms and provisions of the partial con­
sent decree of February 16, 1979, the consent decree of 
August 18, 1981, or pursuant to the Plaintiffs’ Motion to 
Enforce The Terms Of The February 16, 1979, Partial 
Consent Decree And The August 18, 1981, Consent 
Decree to be unreasonable, illegal, unconstitutional or 
against public policy.



113

D. Enter an order which ensures that any future or 
further promotion of any individual employed by the 
Alabama Department of Public Safety to the rank of Cor­
poral be accomplished without infringing upon the In- 
tervenors’ or the class they represent constitutional rights, 
including but not limited to, those guaranteed by the Four­
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution or 
infringing upon their rights guaranteed to them by 42 USC 
§ 1981 and § 1983.

E. Grant and award Intervenors their costs and 
reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses.

F. Award Intervenors all other, different and further 
relief to which they are entitled.

Respectfully submitted

Stuart & Ward

/s / James S. Ward_______
James S. Ward 

Attorney for Intervenors

OF COUNSEL 
Stuart & Wood
1933 Montgomery Highway Suite 200 
Birmingham, Alabama 35209 
939-0276



114

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3561-N 
P hillip Paradise, Jr., individually and on behalf of

THE CLASS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS,

U nited States of A merica, plaintiff and amicus curiae,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF

ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

v.
Jerry Shoemaker, as D irector of 

the A labama D epartment of P ublic Safety, etc., et al.,
DEFENDANTS.

ORDER

Upon consideration of (i) the defendants’ April 21, 
1983, motion for extension of time, (ii) the applicants for 
intervention’s April 26, 1983, motion for evidentiary hear­
ing or in the alternative for oral argument, and (iii) the 
United States of America’s April 29, 1983, motion for ex­
tension of time, it is ORDERED:

(1) That the April 21,26 and 29 motions be and they are 
hereby granted to the extent

(a) That the submission of the April 7, 1983, mo­
tion to enforce consent decree and the submission of 
the April 15, 1983, motion to intervene be and they 
are hereby continued to May 27, 1983;

(b) That the parties and movants for intervention 
are allowed until May 6, 1983, to file any responses or 
briefs in connection with the April 7 and 15 motions; 
and



115

(c) That the April 7 and 15 motions be and they are 
hereby set for oral argument on May 27, 1983, at 
10:00 a.m. in the fourth floor courtroom of the 
federal courthouse in Montgomery, Alabama; and

(2) That the April 21, 26, and 29 motions be and they 
are hereby denied in all other respects.

DONE, this the 3rd day of May, 1983.

[SIGNATURE]
United States District Judge



116

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3561-N 
P hillip Paradise, Jr., individually and on behalf of

THE CLASS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS,

U nited States of A merica, plaintiff and amicus curiae,

v.
Byron Prescott, as D irector of 

the A labama Department of Public Safety, etc., et al„
defendants.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA,

NORTHERN DIVISION

ORDER

Upon consideration of the April 15, 1983, motion to in­
tervene, filed by V. E. McClellan, William M. Bailey, D. 
B. Mansell and Dan Davenport, four white troopers with 
the Alabama Department of Public Safety; and for good 
cause, it is ORDERED that the motion be and it is hereby 
granted to the extent that the movants may participate in 
these proceedings on a prospective basis only and may not 
challenge previously entered orders, judgments, and 
decrees since intervention is untimely as to these; and that 
the motion be and it is hereby denied in all other respects. 
United States v. California Cooperative Canneries, 279 
U.S. 553, 556, 49 S.Ct. 423, 424 (1929); Smith v. Missouri 
Pac. R. Co., 615 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1980). See Thaggard v. 
City o f Jackson, 687 F.2d 66, 68 (5th Cir. 1982), petition 
for cert, filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3635 (U.S. February 16, 1983) 
(No. 82-1390). See also 3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, 
Moore’s Federal Practice f 24.16[5]; 7A C. Wright &.A. 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1920.

DONE, this the 28th day of October, 1983.
[SIGNATURE]___________
United States District Judge



117

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3561-N 
Phillip Paradise, Jr., individually and on behalf of

THE CLASS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS,

United States of A merica, plaintiff and amicus curiae,

v.
Byron Prescott, as D irector of 

the A labama D epartment of Public Safety, etc., et al.,
DEFENDANTS.

V. E. McClellan, et al., defendant-intervenors.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA,

NORTHERN DIVISION

ORDER

This cause is now before the court on the plaintiffs’ 
April 7, 1983, motion to enforce the terms of two 
previously entered consent decrees. A hearing was held on 
the motion on May 27, 1983. For reasons which follow, 
the plaintiffs are entitled to relief.

I.
On February 10, 1972, the court found that the defend­

ant officials of the Alabama Department of Public Safety 
had “engaged in a blatant and continuous pattern and 
practice of discrimination in hiring . . .  as to troopers.” 
NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 705 (M.D.Ala. 1972), 
affd, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974). The court ordered the 
defendants to hire one black trooper for each white 
trooper hired “until approximately twenty-five (25) per­
cent of the Alabama state trooper force is comprised of 
Negroes.” 340 F. ’Supp. at 706.



118

On February 16, 1979, a partial consent decree was ap­
proved and entered by the court, following a reopening of 
the case by the plaintiffs. This decree required, among 
other things, that the defendants institute

a promotion procedure which is in conformity with 
the 1978 Uniform Guidelines o f Selection Procedure, 
43 Fed. Reg. 38290, [28 C.F.R. 50.14,] and which, in 
addition, when used either for screening or ranking 
will have little or no adverse impact on blacks seeking 
promotion to corporal.

On August 18, 1981, another consent decree was approved 
and entered by the court in response to the defendants’ re­
quest that the court approve their newly developed selec­
tion procedure, which included a written examination 
component. The plaintiffs and the United States had ob­
jected to the selection procedure on the ground that it 
failed to comply with the Uniform Guidelines, as required 
by the 1979 decree. The 1981 decree provided in relevant 
part as follows:

5. If the selection procedure has little or no adverse 
impact against black applicants, selections shall be 
made in rank order. . . . Whether or not the selection 
procedure has “little or no adverse impact” will be 
measured by the “four-fifths rule” set forth in Section 
4 D of the Uniform Guidelines, supra. If the parties 
cannot agree whether the selection procedure has an 
adverse impact, the matter shall be submitted to the 
Court for resolution. No promotions to State 
Trooper Corporal positions shall be made pending 
resolution of the question of adverse impact.
6. If the parties agree, or the Court finds, that the 
selection procedure has an adverse impact, promo­
tions shall be made in a manner that does not result in 
adverse impact for the initial group of promotions or 
cumulatively during use of the procedure. Defendants 
shall submit to plaintiffs their proposal for making



119

promotions in conformity with the Partial Consent 
Decree and with this Decree. If the parties do not 
agree on the method for making promotions, the mat­
ter shall be submitted to the Court for resolution. No 
promotions to State Trooper Corporal positions shall 
be made until the parties have agreed in writing or the 
Court has ruled upon the method to be used for mak­
ing promotions with little or no adverse impact.
7. If the selection procedure has an adverse impact 
against blacks seeking promotion to corporal, de­
fendants shall examine the results of each component 
of the selection procedure to identify the source(s) of 
the adverse impact and shall revise the procedure so 
as to avoid adverse impact in the future. Defendants 
shall provide plaintiffs with data showing the impact 
of each component of the selection procedure and 
item-by-item analysis of the impact of the written 
test. The parties shall attempt to agree upon 
modifications in the selection procedure for future 
administrations. If the parties are unable to agree 
upon the procedure to be used after the first ad­
ministration of the selection procedure and the 
method of using that procedure, the matter shall be 
submitted to the Court for resolution.

After the 1981 decree was approved and entered, the de­
fendants administered the selection procedure to all ap­
plicants seeking promotion to corporal. The procedure 
was administered to 262 persons —202 (77.1%) white per­
sons and 60 (22.9%) black persons. The highest ranked 
black persons,1 based on the selection procedure, holds 
the 80th place on the list of rankings.

There is no dispute among the parties that the defend­
ants need additional corporals and that they need at least 
15 of them as soon as possible. The plaintiffs and the

1 This number includes one trooper, James Cox, whose race is iden­
tified as “other.”



120

United States contend that the selection procedure has an 
adverse impact and, in accordance with the 1981 decree, 
may not be used by the defendants. The defendants con­
tend that the procedure does not have an adverse impact 
and may be used.

By another order entered this date the court has allowed 
four white employees of the Alabama Department of 
Public Safety to intervene as defendant-intervenors. Their 
intervention is on a prospective basis only; they are not 
allowed to challenge prior orders, judgments, and decrees 
of the court.

II.
Since the parties have been unable to agree on whether 

the selection procedure has an impermissible adverse racial 
impact, the court in accordance with the 1981 decree must 
now make that determination. To determine whether the 
selection procedure has an adverse impact, the decree 
refers to the four-fifths rule set forth in section 4 D of the 
Uniform Guidelines, which provides in relevant part:

Adverse impact and the “four-fifths rule. ” A selection 
rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less 
than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate 
for the group with the highest rate will generally be 
regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evi­
dence of adverse impact, while a greater than four- 
fifths rate will generally not be regarded by Federal 
enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact. 

Applying the four-fifths rule and assuming fifteen candi­
dates are to be promoted in rank order based on the selec­
tion procedure results, the success rate for white persons 
would be 15/202 or 7.4%, and the success rate for black 
persons would be 0/60 or 0%. Zero is, of course, less than 
four-fifths of 7.4. Indeed, even if seventy-nine corporals 
were promoted in rank order, none would be black. Short



121

of outright exclusion based on race, it is hard to conceive 
of a selection procedure which would have a greater dis­
criminatory impact.

Also relying on section 4 D, the defendants contend that 
their selection procedure nonetheless does not have an 
adverse impact. The portion of the section relied upon 
provides as follows:

Greater differences in selection rate may not con­
stitute adverse impact where the differences are based 
on small numbers and are not statistically significant, 
or where special recruiting or other programs cause 
the pool of minority or female candidates to be 
atypical of the normal pool of applicants from that 
group.

The defendants contend that the one-to-one hiring ratio 
for state troopers is a “special program” which has resulted 
in an atypical pool because black troopers scored lower on 
a “hiring test” than did white troopers. The defendants 
contend that the court should afford them an opportunity 
to show this. The court agrees with the position of the 
United States and the plaintiffs that a hearing is unneces­
sary. Accepting the defendants’ anticipated evidence as 
true, this court must nonetheless conclude that the evi­
dence is an unacceptable basis to rest a claim of atypi­
cality. The hiring test, to which the defendants wish to link 
their promotion procedure, has not been subjected to an 
adverse impact determination, nor has it been validated.2

For the above reasons, the court concludes that the 
selection procedure has an adverse impact against black 
candidates. United States v. City o f Montgomery, 19 
E.P.D. 1 9239, pp. 7412-15 (M.D.Ala. 1979).

2 The defendants do not contend that the candidate pool in some 
way distorts the labor market to the advantage of the plaintiffs.



122

III.

Since the defendants’ selection procedure has an adverse 
impact on black candidates for the position of corporal, 
the 1981 decree prohibits the defendants’ use of the pro­
cedure. Furthermore, the defendants are now required by 
the decree to fashion and submit to the court a proposal to 
promote to corporal, from among qualified candidates, at 
least 15 persons in a manner which which will not have 
adverse impact. And if the plaintiffs, the United States, 
and the defendants cannot agree to a promotion plan, they 
are required by the decree to submit the matter to the court 
for resolution.

As already noted, this lawsuit is now before the court on 
the plaintiffs’ motion to enforce the terms of two previous­
ly entered decrees. The court will grant the plaintiffs’ mo­
tion to enforce to the extent the motion seeks compliance 
with the immediately preceding requirements in the 1981 
decree. An appropriate order will be entered declaring that 
the selection procedure has an adverse racial impact and 
may not be used by the defendants; requiring that the 
defendants submit an appropriate proposal for the needed 
promotions; and setting a deadline for submission of the 
matter to the court if the plaintiffs, the United States, and 
the defendants are unable to agree upon a promotion plan. 
If the plaintiffs, the United States, and the defendants 
should agree to a promotion plan, the plaintiff-intervenors 
will be allowed an opportunity to file responses and objec­
tions to the plan.

Also, as a result of the finding of adverse impact, the 
defendants are required by the 1981 decree to “examine the 
results of each component of the selection procedure to 
identify the sources of the adverse impact,” to “revise the 
procedure so as to avoid adverse impact in the future,” to 
“provide plaintiffs with data showing the impact of each 
component of the selection procedure and an item-by-item 
analysis of the impact of the written test,” and, if the par­



123

ties cannot agree upon modifications to cure the adverse 
impact, to petition the court to resolve the disputed mat­
ters. It does not appear, however, that the plaintiffs —who 
are the movants at this stage of the proceedings —are seek­
ing enforcement of this part of the 1981 decree, and the 
court will therefore not enter an order compelling enforce­
ment.3

Accordingly, for the above reasons, it is ORDERED:
(1) That the plaintiffs’ April 7, 1983, motion to enforce 

the terms of the February 16, 1979, partial consent decree 
and the August 18, 1981, consent decree, be and it is 
hereby granted to the extent hereafter set forth;

(2) That it is hereby declared that the defendants’ selec­
tion procedure for promotion to corporal has an adverse 
racial impact and that said selection procedure may not be 
used by the defendants for promotion purposes;

(3) That on or before November 10, 1983, the defend­
ants shall file with the court a plan to promote to corporal, 
from qualified candidates, at least 15 persons in a manner 
that will not have an adverse racial impact;

(4) That on or before November 18, 1983, the plaintiffs, 
the United States, and the defendant-intervenors may file 
any objections and counter-proposals;

(5) That, if by November 25, 1983, the plaintiffs, the 
United States, and the defendants have not filed a promo­
tion plan agreed to by all said parties, the issue of corporal 
promotions shall be deemed submitted for resolution by 
the court; and

(6) That, if the plaintiffs, the United States, and the 
defendants file an agreed-to promotion plan, the defend­

3 However, if the plaintiffs are seeking enforcement of the part of 
the 1981 decree regarding modifications of the selection procedure, 
then the plaintiffs should file a pleading so indicating.

Also, if the defendants desire to invoke this part of the decree then 
they need only carry out their responsibilities under this part and, if 
the parties are unable to agree upon the modifications, petition the 
court to resolve the matter.



124

ant-intervenors are allowed seven days from the date of 
filing to file any responses and objections to the plan. 

DONE, this the 28th day of October, 1983.

[Signature]_______________
United States District Judge



125

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3561-N 
Phillip Paradise, Jr ., individually and on behalf of

THE CLASS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS

United States of A merica, plaintiff and amicus curiae

v.

Byron Prescott, as director of the Alabama
. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, ETC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS

V. E. McClellan, et al., defendant-intervenors

PROPOSED PROMOTION PROCEDURE

This cause is now before the Court on the Court’s Oc­
tober 28, 1983 Order which provided that “the defendants 
shall file with the Court a plan to promote to Corporal, 
from qualified candidates, at least fifteen (15) persons in a 
manner that will not have an adverse racial impact”. Pur­
suant to the Order, this defendant submits to the Court 
herewith a proposal for making promotions to Corporal 
within the Department of Public Safety. The defendant, 
the Department of Public Safety, proposes to make pro­
motions to Corporal as follows:

1. The defendant, the Department of Public Safety, 
proposes to promote to Corporal fifteen (15) troopers. Of 
these fifteen (15) individuals promoted, the defendant pro­
poses to promote eleven (11) whites and four (4) blacks, on 
a one time basis only. In support of this proposal, the de­
fendant would say:

(a) That by promoting four (4) blacks and eleven (11) 
whites the requirements of the four-fifths rule of the Uni­



126

form Guidelines concerning adverse impact is met;
(b) That this percentage of blacks to whites reflects the 

percentage of blacks to whites who took the Corporal’s ex­
amination;

(c) That there is an immediate need for at least fifteen 
(15) Corporals to be promoted within the Department of 
Public Safety; and,

(d) That this procedure should only be used for this ini­
tial group of promotions.

(e) That this defendant, while it does not waive any ob­
jections previously made, proposes that the selections will 
be made from the current Corporal Promotion List, in 
rank order, utilizing the “rule of three” as provided in the 
Alabama Merit System Law. The promotion of black can­
didates will necessarily be made by consideration of black 
candidates in the order in which they appear on the current 
promotional register.

(f) The Department of Public Safety does not agree that 
this method is an appropriate method for promotion of 
candidates based on merit and request the Court to enter 
an Order permitting the Department of Personnel of the 
State of Alabama to develop a procedure for promoting 
Troopers to Corporals in a nondiscriminatory manner for 
use in subsequent promotions. Said procedure to be sub­
mitted to the Court for prior approval within a specified 
time period. The defedant, Department of Public Safety, 
will cooperate with the Department of Personnel in devel­
oping such a promotional procedure in order that such be 
accomplished as soon as possible.

Respectfully submitted,
By: Edward L. H ardin, Jr.
Edward L. Hardin, Jr., 
Special Assistant Attorney 
General for Alabama Depart­
ment of Public Safety



127

OF COUNSEL:
Edward L. Hardin, Jr.
Hardin & Hollis 
1825 Morris Avenue 
Birmingham, Alabama 35203 
Telephone: (205) 328-2675

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the above and foregoing 
Proposed Promotion Procedure has been served upon all 
counsel of record by placing same in the United States 
mail, postage prepaid and properly addressed on this the 
10th day of November, 1983.

/ s /  Edward L. Hardin, Jr .
Edward L. Hardin, Jr.



128

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3561-N 
P hillip Paradise, Jr ., individually and on behalf of

THE CLASS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS

U nited States of A merica, plaintiff and amicus curiae

v.

Byron P rescott, as director of the Alabama
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, ETC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS

V. E. McClellan, et al., defendant-intervenors

ORDER

In accordance with the memorandum opinion entered 
this date, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE 
of the court:

(1) That the plaintiffs’ April 7, 1983, motion to enforce 
the terms of the February 16, 1979, partial consent decree 
and August 18, 1981, consent decree, be and it is hereby 
granted to the extent hereafter set forth;

(2) That the defendants and their agents and employees 
be and each is hereby enjoined and restrained from failing 
to promote from this day forward, for each white trooper 
promoted to a higher rank, one black trooper to the same 
rank, if there is a black trooper objectively qualified to be 
promoted to the rank;

(3) That this promotion requirement shall remain in ef­
fect as to each trooper rank above the entry-level rank un­
til either approximately 25% of the rank is black or the de­
fendants have developed and implemented a promotion 
plan for the rank which meets the prior orders and decrees 
of the court and all other relevant legal requirements;



129

(4) That within 35 days from the date of this order the 
defendants shall submit to the court for the court’s ap­
proval a schedule for the development of promotion pro­
cedures for all ranks above the entry-level position;

(5) That the plaintiffs be and they are hereby allowed 21 
days from this date to file a request for interim attorney 
fees, which request shall be supported by affidavits and 
shall address each of the criteria set forth in Hensley v.
Eckerhart, U.S— , 103 S.Ct. 1933 (1983), and Johnson
v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 
1974); and

(6) That all other relief requested by the plaintiffs in 
their motion and not specifically granted be and it is here­
by denied.

DONE, this the 15th day of December, 1983.
[SIGNATURE]
United States District Judge



130

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3561-N 
P hillip P aradise, Jr., individually and on behalf of

THE CLASS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS

U nited States of A merica, plaintiff and amicus
curiae,

v.

Byron P rescott, as director of the Alabama
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, ETC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS

V. E. McClellan, et al., defendant-intervenors 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The present phase of the proceedings in this lawsuit 
began on April 7, 1983, when the plaintiffs filed a motion 
to enforce the terms of two previously entered consent 
decrees. In accordance with these decrees and as a result of 
recent developments, this court must determine what pro­
cedure the Alabama Department of Public Safety must use 
in promoting troopers. The court understands that the de­
partment is in need of at least 15 new corporals immediate­
ly.

I.

In 1972, then Chief District Judge Frank M. Johnson, 
Jr., remarked in this case that “[i]n the thirty-seven-year 
history of the patrol there has never been a black trooper 
and the only Negroes ever employed by the department 
have been nonmerit system laborers.” NAACP v. Allen, 
340 F. Supp. 703, 705 (M.D. Ala. 1972). The court found



131

that the department had “engaged in a blatant and con­
tinuous pattern and practice of discrimination in hiring 
. . . both as to troopers and supporting personnel;” and 
the court ordered that the department hire one black 
trooper for each white trooper hired “until approximately 
twenty-five (25) percent of the Alabama state trooper 
force is comprised of Negroes.” Id. at 705, 706. The order 
was affirmed on appeal. 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).

In a later proceeding in this case, Judge Johnson was 
asked to clarify “whether the twenty-five percent hiring 
quota applies to the entire state trooper force or just to 
entry-level troopers.” Paradise v. Shoemaker, 470 F. 
Supp. 439, 440 (M.D. Ala. 1979). The court responded 
that “there is no ambiguity” and that the twenty-five per­
cent quota applies “to the entire force of sworn officers, 
not just to those in the entry-level rank.” Id. at 440-41. 
The court observed that the defendants were guilty of dis­
crimination not just in hiring, but in all ranks of the 
patrol. The court then emphasized that,

One continuing effect of that discrimination is that, 
as of November 1, 1978, out of 232 state troopers at 
the rank of corporal or above, there is still not one 
black. The quota fashioned by the Court provides an 
impetus to promote blacks into those positions. To 
focus only on the entry-level positions would be to ig­
nore that past discrimination by the Department was 
pervasive, that its effects persist, and that they are 
manifest.

Id. at 442 (emphasis in original).
On February 16, 1979, the parties entered into a consent 

decree which required that the department develop and 
implement a valid promotion procedure for the rank of 
corporal. The decree gave the department a year to meet 
this objective, after which the department was to do the 
same, in turn, for the ranks of sergeant, lieutenant, cap­
tain and major. This time schedule was not met, and on



132

August 18, 1981, the parties entered into another consent 
decree which allowed the department to administer a new­
ly developed promotion procedure for the rank of cor­
poral, but prohibited any promotions under the procedure 
until it had been first determined that the procedure had 
“little or no adverse impact against black applicants.” Ac­
cording to the decree, adverse impact was to be deter­
mined and measured by the “four-fifths rule” set forth in 
Section 4 D of the Uniform Guidelines of Employee Selec­
tion Procedures, 28 C.F.R. § 50.14 (1983).

On April 7, 1983, the plaintiffs filed a motion seeking 
enforcement of the 1979 and 1981 consent decrees and, in 
particular, a determination whether the department’s pro­
motion procedure for corporal had an adverse racial im­
pact. The department needed at least 15 new corporals, 
and the parties were unable to agree whether the pro­
cedures developed in 1981 could be used for the promo­
tions. On October 28, 1983, the court found that the pro­
cedure did have an adverse racial impact on black appli­
cants and, in accordance with the 1981 consent decree, 
prohibited use of the procedure.

The parties have been unable to agree upon another 
selection procedure for the 15 needed corporals; and, as 
required by the 1981 consent decree, they have requested 
that the court fashion a procedure.

II.

On February 10, 1984, less than two months from to­
day, twelve years will have passed since this court con­
demned the racially discriminatory policies and practices 
of the Alabama Department of Public Safety. Neverthe­
less, the effects of these policies and practices remain per­
vasive and conspicuous at all ranks above the entry-level 
position. Of the 6 majors, there is still not one black. Of 
the 25 captains, there is still not one black. Of the 35 lieu­
tenants, there is still not one black. Of the 65 sergeants,



133

there is still not one black. And of the 66 corporals, only 
four are black. Thus, the department still operates an up­
per rank structure in which almost every trooper obtained 
his position through procedures that totally excluded 
black persons. Moreover, the department is still without 
acceptable procedures for advancement of black troopers 
into this structure, and it does not appear that any pro­
cedures will be in place within the near future. The pre­
ceding scenario is intolerable and must not continue. The 
time has now arrived for the department to take affirma­
tive and substantial steps to open the upper ranks to black 
troopers.

In light of the severe racial imbalances in the upper 
ranks, the court agrees with the plaintiffs that for a period 
of time at least 50% of all those promoted to corporal and 
above must be black troopers, as long as there are quali­
fied black troopers available.1 The court also agrees with 
the plaintiffs that if there is to be within the near future an 
orderly path for black troopers to enter the upper ranks, 
any relief fashioned by the court must address the depart­
ment’s delay in developing acceptable promotion pro­
cedures for all ranks. The court will therefore enter an 
order requiring that, for each white trooper promoted to a 
higher rank, the department shall promote one black 
trooper to the same rank, if there is a black trooper objec­
tively qualified for the promotion. This requirement shall 
remain in effect as to each rank above entry level until 
either 25% of the rank is black or the department has de­
veloped and implemented for the rank a promotion pro­
cedure which meets the requirements of the prior orders

1 In light of the department’s failure after almost twelve years to 
eradicate the continuing effects of its own discrimination and to 
develop acceptable promotion procedures and in light of the severity 
of the existing racial imbalances, a credible argument could be made 
that all 15 of the new corporals should be black, followed perhaps by a 
one-to-one ratio. However, the plaintiffs are not seeking this relief.



134

and decrees of this court and all other relevant legal re­
quirements.2 The court will also require that the depart­
ment submit to the court for the court’s approval a 
schedule for the development of promotion procedures for 
all ranks above the entry-level position. The schedule 
should be based upon realistic expectations.

III.

The relief fashioned by the court today is warranted by 
law. Where there has been unlawful discrimination, a 
district court has not only the power but the responsibility 
to fashion a remedy that will as much as possible eliminate 
the discriminatory effects of past discrimination as well as 
bar like discrimination in the future. Albemarle Paper Co. 
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2372 (1972). 
As the evidence in the present case dramatically demon­
strates, these effects will not wither away of their own ac­
cord. Furthermore, in fashioning relief, a court should in­
clude race-conscious requirements if they are necessary, 
reasonable, and otherwise appropriate under the circum­
stances.3 United States v. City o f Miami, 664 F.2d 435 (5th 
Cir. Dec. 3, 1981) (en banc) (former Fifth Circuit); United 
States v. City o f Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 
1980).

2 According to the 1980 Census o f Population published by the 
U.S. Department of Commerce, the State of Alabama is approxi­
mately 26% black. In International Brotherhood o f Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n. 20, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1857 n.20 
(1977), the Supreme Court stated that “absent explanation, it is or­
dinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in 
time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and 
ethnic composition of the population in the community from which 
employees are hired.”

3 In an earlier order this court demonstrated dramatically the-ef­
ficacy of quotas, over other remedies, in instances where blacks have 
historically been completely excluded or almost completely excluded 
from employment. NAACPw. Dothard, 373 F. Supp. 504 (M.D.Ala. 
1974) (Johnson, C.J.)



135

The promotional quotas imposed by the court today are 
clearly necessary. The racial imbalances in the upper ranks 
of the Alabama Department of Public Safety remain egre­
gious and are now of long duration; and, furthermore, it is 
apparent from the history of this lawsuit that without im­
mediate, affirmative, race-conscious action these in­
tolerable disparities will not dissipate within the near 
future.

The promotional quotas are also reasonable. They are 
specifically tailored to redress the continuing effects of 
past discrimination, but they do “not unnecessarily tram­
mel the interest of white employees.” 4 United Steel­
workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09, 99 S.Ct. 2721, 
2730 (1979). They do not require the discharge or demo­
tion of a white trooper or his replacement with a black 
trooper; nor do they create an absolute bar to the advance­
ment of white troopers. Moreover, the quotas are but a 
temporary measure, designed not to maintain a racial 
balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest and chronic 
racial imbalance. Finally, only qualified black troopers 
will be considered for promotion under the quotas. See,
e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, supra; United States 
v. City o f Miami, supra; United States v. City o f Alexan­
dria, supra.

The quotas imposed by the court are also not without 
legal precedent. In United States v. City o f Alexandria, 
supra, the former Fifth Circuit approved a consent decree

4 The court has allowed four white troopers to intervene as defend- 
ant-intervenors. Their intervention is on a prospective basis only; they 
are not allowed to challenge prior orders, judgments, and decrees of 
the court. United States v. California Co-operative Canneries, 279 
U.S. 553, 556, 49 S.Ct. 423, 424 (1929); Smith v. Missouri Pac. R. 
Co., 615 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1980). See Thaggard v. City o f Jackson, 
687 F.2d 66, 68 (5th Cir. 1982), cert, denied sub nom. Ashley v. City 
of Jackson, _  U.S. _ ,  104 S.Ct. 255 (1983). See also 3B J. Moore & 
J. Kennedy, Moore’s Federal Practice  ̂ 24.16 [5]; 7A C. Wright & A. 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1920.



136

imposing on a municipality promotional quotas ranging 
from 25 to 50%. Under the decree, the quotas are to re­
main in effect until the municipality achieves the same 
percentages of blacks and women as are in the overall 
work force in the affected localities. See also, e.g., 
E.E.O.C. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Com­
pany, 556 F.2d 167 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 
915, 98 S.Ct. 3145 (1978).

Two factors in the present case make the claim for pro­
motional quotas even stronger than it was in City o f Alex­
andria. In contrast to the earlier case, here the court has 
made a specific finding of long-term, open and pervasive 
racial discrimination. Moreover, this court has before it a 
record demonstrating that without promotional quotas the 
continuing effects of this discrimination cannot be 
eliminated. Nevertheless, the quotas imposed by this court 
are substantially less constraining than those imposed in 
City o f Alexandria. Under the order this court will enter 
today, the Alabama Department of Public Safety has the 
prerogative to end the promotional quotas at any time, 
simply by developing acceptable promotion procedures. It 
is thus possible for the use of the quotas to be a one-time 
occurrence.

IV.

Finally, as this lawsuit moves into its twelfth year, it is 
clear that the court and the parties should now con­
template bringing this litigation to an end. The court 
therefore hopes that, in addition to achieving the above 
objectives, the remedy imposed today will hasten the day 
when the Alabama Department of Public Safety is no 
longer under the supervision of this court.



137

An appropriate order will be entered in accordance with 
this memorandum opinion.

DONE, This the 15th day of December, 1983.
[SIGNATURE]___________
United States District Judge



138

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3561-N 
P hillip Paradise, Jr., individually and on behalf of

THE CLASS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS

U nited States of A merica, plaintiff and amicus curiae

v.

Byron P rescott, as director of the Alabama
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, ETC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS

V. E. McClellan, et al., defendant-intervenors

ORDER

The court now has before it several motions seeking 
reconsideration or, in the alternative, a stay pending ap­
peal of the court’s December 15, 1983, order imposing a 
temporary promotional quota on the Alabama Depart­
ment of Public Safety. A hearing was held on the motions 
on January 5, 1984.*

Since the opinion accompanying the December 15 order 
addressed in detail most of the issues raised by the mo­
tions, the court will now address only those issues not ad­
dressed earlier or in need of further explanation.

Of particular concern to the court is the department’s 
new contention that it “is without legal authority and suf­
ficiently trained personnel to design any promotional pro­
cedures.” The Department of Public Safety now maintains 
that this “function is allocated by statute to the Depart­

* Although some motions were not filed until January 6, they were 
argued on January 5. At the January 5 hearing the court was informed 
that the additional motions were forthcoming.



139

ment of Personnel of the State of Alabama.” In 1979 and 
1981, the Public Safety Department entered into consent 
decrees providing for advancement of black troopers into 
the upper ranks of the patrol. The decrees require the 
department to fashion acceptable promotion procedures. 
The department’s counsel acknowledged at the January 5 
hearing that it was anticipated that development of these 
procedures would take only a few months. It is now years 
later and this court will not entertain the excuse that the 
department is now without legal authority to meet its 
obligations under the consent decrees. The department 
entered into the consent decrees and now has no right to 
refute those decrees. Moreover, the Department of Per­
sonnel, which is also a party to these proceedings, assured 
the court at the January 5 hearing that it would work 
closely with the Public Safety Department to develop ac­
ceptable promotion procedures. The Public Safety De­
partment’s contention that it is without legal authority is 
not only meritless, it is frivolous.

Moreover, that the Department of Public Safety would 
even advance this argument dramatically demonstrates the 
need for the relief imposed by this court. Such frivolous 
arguments serve no purpose other than to prolong the dis­
criminatory effects of the department’s 37-year history of 
racial discrimination. As the court stated in its December 
15 opinion,

the department is still without acceptable procedures 
for advancement of black troopers into this structure, 
and it does not appear that any procedures will be in 
place within the near future. The preceding scenario is 
intolerable and must not continue. The time has now 
arrived for the department to take affirmative and 
substantial steps to open the upper ranks to black 
troopers.

The Public Safety Department also seeks clarification of 
the words “qualified black trooper” in the court’s Decern-



140

ber 15 opinion and order. Counsel for the department 
stated at the January 5 hearing that while he thought he 
understood what the court meant, he was not certain. The 
court sees no need for clarification at this time. The proper 
procedure for the department and its counsel is to submit 
to opposing counsel their understanding of the words. 
Unless the parties differ on the meaning of the words, 
there is no need to clarify them.

Furthermore, the court sees no need to stay its Decem­
ber 15 order. All parties, except defendant-intervenors, 
agree that at least 4 of the 15 new corporals must be black. 
The December 15 order requires that 7 or 8 be black. 
Thus, the immediate impact of the order is to increase the 
number of black corporals by 3 or 4. These promotions 
come after almost half a century in which blacks have been 
unable to enter the upper ranks of the troopers: For 37 
years the department operated under a regime of racism 
which totally excluded blacks from all ranks in the patrol; 
and for the last 12 years there have been no acceptable 
promotion procedures by which blacks could advance in 
the patrol. In light of this history, the 7 or 8 black troopers 
promoted as a result of the December 15 order are, if any­
thing, far from enough; and to decrease this number now 
would be nothing less than a “blow upon a wound.”

Moreover, the equities, when balanced, favor keeping in 
place the temporary promotional quota imposed by the 
court. Black persons waited almost half a century to get 
the 7 or 8 promotions required by the December 15 order. 
Surely, those dissatisfied with the relief can wait the few 
months needed for appellate review. And should the ap­
pellate court find the relief imposed by this court is inap­
propriate, adjustments can be made in future promotions 
to correct the effects of this court’s relief.

Finally and perhaps most significantly, it appears likely 
that the temporary promotional quota will not extend be­
yond the present 15 promotions. At the January 5 hearing,



141

the Personnel Department pledged that it would now 
devote its full resources to assisting the Public Safety De­
partment in not only developing acceptable promotion 
procedures as required by the consent decrees, but in do­
ing so within the near future. If these two departments 
hold fast to this promise, the temporary promotional 
quota should be, as this court hoped and expressed in the 
December 15 opinion, “a one-time occurrence.” It thus ap­
pears that the December 15 order will have an effect which 
will please all parties: the development of acceptable pro­
motion procedures and the mooting of the temporary pro­
motional quota. This is not the time to stay the order.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the following mo­
tions be and they are hereby denied: defendant-inter­
veners’ January 6, 1984, motion to stay; the United State’s 
January 6, 1984, motion to stay; defendant Prescott, et 
al.’s December 27, 1983, motion to alter or amend judg­
ment and stay of order; defendant Alabama Personnel 
Director’s December 27, 1983, motion for reconsideration; 
defendant-intervenors’ December 27 and 30, 1984, mo­
tions to alter or amend and to stay enforcement; and the 
United State’s December 23, 1983, motion to alter or 
amend judgment.

DONE, this the 13th day of January, 1984.
[SIGNATURE]___________
United States District Judge



142

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3561-N
P hillip Paradise, Jr., etc., plaintiffs

U nited States of A merica, plaintiff and amicus
curiae,

v .

Byron P rescott, etc., et al„ defendants

V. E. McClellan, et al„ defendant-intervenors.

STATEMENT OF COMPLETION OF PROCEDURE 
FOR PROMOTION TO RANK OF CORPORAL

Comes now Byron Prescott, Director of the Alabama 
Department of Public Safety, by and through his attorney 
of record and states to this Honorable Court as follows:

(1) that the procedure designed for use in selecting can­
didates for promotion to the rank of Corporal has been 
completed;

(2) that the procedure has been implemented;
(3) that a final ranking of candidates eligible for promo­

tion has been completed; and
(4) that the selection procedure conforms with the appli­

cable statutes and Orders entered in this case.
As a result of this procedure, thirteen (13) persons have 

been certified as “best qualified” for promotion to Cor­
poral. From this number, the Director will select the per­



143

sons to be promoted as the need for Corporals arises, if 
the procedure is approved for use by this Court.

Respectfully submitted, 
HARDIN & HOLLIS 
/s / Edward L. Hardin, Jr. 
Edward L. Hardin, Jr.,
Of Counsel for Defendants

OF COUNSEL:
Edward L. Hardin, Jr.
Hardin & Hollis 
Post Office Box 11328 
Birmingham, Alabama 35202-1328 
Telephone: (205) 328-2675

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the above and foregoing 
Motion has been served upon all counsel of record, as 
below listed, by placing a copy of same in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid and properly addressed on 
this the 18th day of June, 1984:

Dennis N. Balske 
1001 South Hull Street 
Post Office Box 2087 

Montgomery, Alabama 36103-2087 
Louise A. Lerner, Esquire 

Department of Justice 
Post Office Box 23991 

L’Enfant Plaza 
Washington, D.C. 20026-3991 

James S. Ward, Esquire 
Ward & McKnight 

2100 16th Avenue South 
Suite 302

Birmingham, Alabama. 35205
Edward L. H ardin, Jr .
Of Counsel



144

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3561-N 
P hillip Paradise, Jr., etc., plaintiffs 

U nited States of A merica, plaintiff and amicus
CURIAE,

V.

Byron P rescott, etc., et al., defendants

V. E. McClellan, et al., defendant-intervenors.

MOTION TO APPROVE SELECTION 
PROCEDURE FOR PROMOTION TO CORPORAL

Comes now Byron Prescott, as Director, Alabama 
Department of Public Safety, and moves this Honorable 
Court for an Order approving the procedure designed for 
use in selecting persons best qualified for promotion from 
the rank of State Trooper to Corporal and to authorize the 
Director of the Department to promote persons from the 
list of persons ranked “best qualified” to the rank of Cor­
poral as the need arises.

Counsel for this Defendant has kept counsel for the 
Plaintiffs generally informed of the procedure used and 
will furnish counsel any additional information requested 
upon receipt of an Order from this Court that all con­
fidential information not be disclosed to any other person 
unless specifically approved by the Court.

Counsel for this Defendant requests that the Court 
order all hearings held in connection with this motion be 
confidential in order to protect the validity of the selection 
procedure utilized. If confidentiality is not maintained,



145

certain aspects of the procedure could not be used in the 
future.

Respectfully submitted, 
HARDIN & HOLLIS 
/s /  Edward L. Hardin, Jr. 
Edward L. Hardin, Jr.,
Of Counsel for Defendants

OF COUNSEL:
Edward L. Hardin, Jr.
Hardin & Hollis 
Post Office Box 11328 
Birmingham, Alabama 35202-1328 
Telephone: (205) 328-2675

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the above and foregoing 
Motion has been served upon all counsel of record, as 
below listed, by placing a copy of same in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid and properly addressed on 
this the 18th day of June, 1984:

Dennis N. Balske 
1001 South Hull Street 
Post Office Box 2087 

Montgomery, Alabama 36103-2087
Louise A. Lerner, Esquire 

Department of Justice 
Post Office Box 23991 

L’Enfant Plaza 
Washington, D.C. 20026-3991 

James S. Ward, Esquire 
Ward & McKnight 

2100 16th Avenue South 
Suite 302

Birmingham, Alabama 35205
/s / Edward L. H ardin, Jr.
Of Counsel



146

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3561-N 
P hillip Paradise, Jr., etc., plaintiffs 

U nited States of A merica, plaintiff and amicus
CURIAE,

V.

Byron P rescott, etc., et al., defendants

V. E. McClellan, et al., defendant-intervenors.

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT PRESCOTT’S 
MOTION TO APPROVE SELECTION 

PROCEDURE FOR PROMOTION TO CORPORAL

Come now the defendant-intervenors in the above styled 
cause, by and through their attorney of record, and pur­
suant to this Court’s Order of June 21, 1984, submit the 
following as their response to defendant Prescott’s Motion 
to Approve Selection Procedure for Promotion to Cor­
poral:

1. While defendant Prescott may have kept counsel for 
the plaintiffs generally informed of the procedure used for 
promotion for corporal, the intervenors have been told 
nothing, they have been informed of nothing and have not 
in any way been privy to the procedure used. Consequent­
ly, without being allowed to conduct some discovery or to 
be fully informed of the procedure utilized, the inter­
venors are not in a position to assert whether they approve 
of the promotion system to be utilized.

2. Without being informed of or having the knowledge



147

of the procedure utilized for promotion to corporal, the 
intervenors would object to any promotions which are 
based on any factor other than merit and would object to 
any promotion system which in any way violates the rights 
guaranteed to them by state or federal law or by the 
United States Constitution. Further, intervenors would 
object to any selection procedure for promotion to cor­
poral which benefits, to the detriment of the intervenors, 
persons who have not shown to be actual victims of dis­
crimination in promotion. Defendant-intervenors further 
object to the utilization of any selection procedure for pro­
motion to corporal or for an Order approving the same 
which goes beyond the remedial authority and policy of 
§ 706(g) of Title VII as recently expressed by the United 
States Supreme Court in Memphis Fire Department, et al, 
v. Stotts, 52 U.S.L.W. 4767, 4771-4773 (June 12, 1984).

3. The consent decrees previously entered in this cause 
were done so when the defendant-intervenors were not 
parties to this litigation, yet those decrees substantially af­
fect their rights to employment and career aspirations. The 
consent decrees previously entered in this cause also im­
pose a racial quota or preference in any promotional 
scheme to corporal. This is so because no matter how con­
tent valid, scrupulously fair or otherwise valid the cor­
poral examination may be, rank order promotion will not 
be allowed if a finding of adverse impact against blacks is 
made, that finding to be determined by the utilization of 
the four-fifths rule. As a result, promotions will then be 
made by “awarding” to blacks, at the expense and to the 
detriment of the intervenors, who are either equally or bet­
ter qualified, guaranteed promotions. This system of 
racial quota or preference in promotion, by the utilization 
of the four-fifths rule, ignores not only the content validi­
ty of any examination, but more importantly the now im­
perative requirement that any black afforded preferential 
treatment in promotion, be an actual victim or discrimina­



148

tion in promotion. See Memphis Fire Department, et al., 
v. Stotts, 52 U.S.L.A. 4767 (June 12, 1984).

It then follows, based on Stotts, supra., that any cor­
poral promotional scheme pursuant to the previously 
entered consent decrees which allows a black to be pro­
moted over an equally or better qualified white, simply be­
cause he is black, without a showing that he was an actual 
victim of discrimination in promotion, violates the de- 
fendant-intervenors rights as guaranteed by state and 
federal law and the United States Constitution and goes 
beyond the remedial authority granted unto District 
Courts by § 706(g) of Title VII.

Consequenly, any corporal promotion or Orders allow­
ing corporal promotion pursuant to the previously entered 
consent decrees which set aside guaranteed places for 
blacks or which allow blacks to be promoted over equally 
or better qualified whites, simply because that person was 
black, without any showing that that person was an actual 
victim of discrimination in promotion, is invalid. See 
M e m p h is  Fire Department, et al., v. Stotts, 52 U.S.L.W. 
4767 (June 12, 1984).

Moreover, and as a result of Stotts, supra., the consent 
decrees must now be modified to allow promotions to cor­
poral only in a manner that does not violate the rights of 
the defendant-intervenors and in a way which does not ex­
ceed the remedial authority granted unto District Courts 
by § 706(g) of Title VII or the policy behind the same as 
expressed in Stotts, supra.

4. Defendant-intervenors would object to any promo­
tion until it can be determined that any promotional 
schemes would be in accordance with the principals set 
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Memphis Fire 
Department, et al., v. Stotts, 52 U.S.L.W. 4767 (June 12, 
1984) and request that the consent decrees previously 
entered, after discovery and hearing, be modified in ac­
cordance with that opinion.



149

5. For that defendant Prescott states that the selection 
procedure conforms with applicable statutes and Orders 
entered in this case. If by this it is meant that the pro­
cedure conforms with the previously entered consent 
decrees, defendant-intervenors object on the grounds 
heretofore stated.

Respectfully submitted,
Ward & McKnight
/ s /  James S. Ward_________
James S. Ward 
Attorney for 

defendant-intervenors 
2100 16th Avenue South 
Birmingham, Alabama 35205 
(205) 933-7000

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the above and foregoing 
Response has been served upon all counsel of record, as 
below listed, by placing a copy of same in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid and properly addressed on 
this the 27th day of June, 1984:

John Bell 
U.S. Attorney 
P.O. Box 711 

Montgomery, AL 
36101

Richard Meadows 
Assistant Attorney General 
Office of Attorney General 

Montgomery, Alabama 
36101

Dennis N. Balske 
1001 South Hull Street 
Post Office Box 2087 

Montgomery, Alabama 
36103-2087

Edward L. Hardin, Jr.
Hardin & Hollis 

Post Office Box 11328 
Birmingham, Alabama 

35202-1328



150

Louise A. Lerner 
Department of Justice 
Post Office Box 23991 

L’Enfant Plaza 
Washington, D.C. 20026-3991

/ s /  James S. Ward 
James S. Ward



151

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3561-N 
Phillip Paradise, Jr., individually and on behalf of

THE CLASS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS

United States of A merica, plaintiff and amicus
curiae,

v.

Byron P rescott, as director of the Alabama
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, ETC., ET AL„ DEFENDANTS

V. E. McClellan, et al., defendant-intervenors.

PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 
TO APPROVE SELECTION PROCEDURE 

FOR PROMOTION TO CORPORAL

On June 18, 1984, defendants filed a Statement of Com­
pletion of Procedure for Promotion to Rank of Corporal, 
along with a Motion to Approve Selection Procedure for 
Promotion to Corporal. These pleadings were filed in 
compliance with a February, 1984 schedule for the devel­
opment of promotion procedures, in which defendants 
agreed to develop a promotion procedure for the position 
of corporal within five months that would have little or no 
adverse impact on black promotion applicants.

Due to the confidential nature of the data involved here, 
defendants have requested an order from this court insur­
ing confidentiality of any data they provide to plaintiffs, 
before they will release any of it to plaintiffs. Accordingly, 
plaintiffs hereby request any and all data in the possession 
of defendants that will enable plaintiffs to evaluate this 
new procedure, including but not limited to:



152

1. The rankings of promotional candidates, including 
appropriate racial designations;

2. A copy of the written examination that was admin­
istered, along with any relevant validation data;

3. A written description of the entire procedure;
4. The names, races and qualifications of the three per­

sons who served as interviewer/panelists.
5. A list of the questions asked by the panelists during 

interviews, including all relevant validation data for each 
question;

6. Copies of any and all forms/records kept by panelists 
during interview sessions, or any other relevant documents 
reflecting written accounts of the individual evaluations 
given by the panel and individual panelists.

7. The name, address, and qualifications of the 
person(s) responsible for the development of this pro­
cedure, as well as copies of all written documents/reports 
authored by this person with respect to the procedure 
under review.

8. All documents, reports, etc. prepared by officials 
and/or agents of the defendants respecting this procedure, 
including but not limited to writings and data supplied to 
defendants’ expert(s) and interview panelists and docu­
ments exchanged between Department officials/agents.

9. Copies of all written instructions given to defendants’ 
expert(s) and interview panelists, as well as descriptions of 
any oral instructions.

10. A written description of how selections will be made 
from the list of 13 “best qualified” candidates, including a 
statement of any affirmative action commitment defend­
ants will undertake in order to comply with the “little or no 
adverse impact on blacks” provisions of the 1979 and 1981 
decrees.

11. Copies of any and all evaluations of the new 
test/procedure that were procured from applicants by de­
fendants, including designations of the race of those mak­



153

ing such evaluations and a statement of the purpose for 
which these evaluations were procured.

12. Copies of any and all documents exchanged between 
the Department of Public Safety and the Department of 
Personnel regarding any and all of the matters listed 
above, as well as any documents exchanged between the 
Department of Personnel and defendants’ expert(s) and in­
terview panelists.

13. A statement of whether and, if so, how the rule of 
three will be followed in the selections of promotion can­
didates.

14. Any and all other written documents relevant to the 
implementation of defendants’ new promotion procedure 
not specifically requested above, that are in the possession 
of the Alabama Department of Public Safety, the Depart­
ment of Personnel, and/or any and all officials/agents of 
those Departments, or that were retained/commissioned 
by those Departments, with respect to this promotion pro­
cedure.

15. A projection of the life of this promotion list, as well 
as a description of the relevant factors which will deter­
mine its life.

16. A description of any and all supervisory training 
programs developed, and/or implemented by defendants 
to train troopers for entry into supervisory positions, in­
cluding but not limited to the affirmative action goals 
which are involved and future plans for this or any other 
supervisory training programs.

17. A statement of reasons why the proposed procedure 
will have little or no adverse impact on black applicants 
for promotion, both under the present and future promo­
tion lists.

Plaintiffs do not object to, and specifically agree to 
comply with, an appropriate order from the court protect­
ing the confidentiality of the information described in 
paragraphs one through seventeen. Upon receipt of this 
information, plaintiffs will evaluate it with due speed and



154

file a supplemental written response to defendants’ mo­
tion, addressing the issue of whether the new procedure 
meets the specific requirements of the 1979 and 1981 
decrees and relevant legal requirements.

Respectfully submitted,
/s / Dennis N. Balske_______
Dennis N. Balske 
P.O. Box 2087
Montgomery, AL 36102-2087 
205/264-0286
Attorney for Plaintiffs 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing have been 
served upon Ed Hardin, Rick Meadows, Cynthia Drabek, 
James S. Ward and John Bell, by U.S. First Class Mail, 
this 29th day of June, 1984.

/ s /  D e n n i s  N. B a l s k e ___________

Attorney for Plaintiffs



155

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3561-N 
P hillip Paradise, Jr., individually and on behalf of

THE CLASS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS

U nited States of A merica, plaintiff and amicus
curiae,

v.

Byron P rescott, as director of the Alabama
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, ETC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS

V. E. McClellan, et al., defendant-intervenors.

PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO INTERVENORS’ 
OBJECTION TO IMPLEMENTATION OF 

NEW PROMOTION PROCEDURE

On June 27, 1984, intervenors filed a Response to De­
fendants Motion to Approve Selection Procedure for Pro­
motion to Corporal, in which they asserted, inter alia, that 
the 1979 and 1981 consent decrees would have to be modi­
fied in order to comply with the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision respecting bona fide seniority systems. Plaintiffs 
submit that intervenors’ assertion is meritless and should 
be rejected.

Plaintiffs this data have filed their brief in the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals supporting this Court’s Order of 
December 15, 1984. Section IV of the brief addresses the 
limited effect of the Supreme Court’s recent decision on 
the case sub judice. It conclusively demonstrates the in­
validity of intervenors’ instant contention.

Rather than repeat the discussion of the limited effect of 
the Court’s recent seniority decision here, plaintiffs have



156

attached a copy of the brief hereto and specifically incor­
porate it herein as its response to intervenors contention. 
For the reasons stated therein, intervenors assertions 
should be rejected.

Respectfully submitted,
/s / Dennis N. Balske_______
Dennis N. Balske 
P.O. Box 2087
Montgomery, AL 36102-2087 
Attorney for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing have been 
served upon Ed Hardin, Rick Meadows, Cynthia Drabek, 
James S. Ward and John Bell, by U.S. First Class Mail, 
this 29th day of June, 1984.

/ s /  D e n n i s  N. B a l s k e ___________

Attorney for Plaintiffs



157

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3561-N 
P hillip Paradise, Jr., etc., et al., plaintiffs 

U nited States of A merica, plaintiff and amicus curiae

v.

Byron P rescott, etc., et al ., defendants 
V. E. McClellan, et al ., defendant-intervenors

RESPONSE TO ORDER

Comes now the defendant Personnel Board of the State 
of Alabama and does hereby respond to this Court’s order 
of June 21, 1984.

The above-styled defendant has no objection to the use 
of the promotional procedure and believes that the pro­
cedure does not discriminate against any persons eligible 
for promotion to the rank of corporal within the Depart­
ment of Public Safety.

Respectfully submitted,
Charles A. Graddick
Attorney General
By / s /  Richard N. Meadows
Assistant Attorney General

Address of Counsel:
Office of the Attorney General 
250 Administrative Building 
64 North Union Street 
Montgomery, Alabama 36130 
(205) 834-5150



158

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have served a copy of the forego­
ing on the following:

Hon. Dennis N. Balske 
1001 South Hull Street 
Post Office Box 2087 
Montgomery, Alabama 36103
Hon. Cynthia Drabek 
Department of Justice 
Post Office Box 23991 
L’Enfant Plaza 
Washington, D.C. 20026
Hon. James S. Ward 
Ward & McKnight 
2100 16th Avenue, South 
Suite 302
Birmingham, Alabama 35205

by placing said copies in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid.

DONE this the 27th day of June, 1984.
/s / Richard N. Meadows

Richard N. Meadows 
Assistant Attorney General

Address of Counsel:
Office of the Attorney General 
250 Administrative Building 
64 North Union Street 
Montgomery, Alabama 36130 
(205) 834-5150



159

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE UNITED
STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 
NORTHERN DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3561-N 
P hillip Paradise, Jr., etc., et al., plaintiffs 

U nited States of A merica, plaintiff

v.

Byron P rescott, etc., et al., defendants

RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES 
TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

APPROVE SELECTION PROCEDURE

By its order of June 21, 1984, this Court directed the 
United States to respond to the defendants’ motion seek­
ing approval of their selection procedure for promotions 
to State Trooper Corporal positions. The United States 
response as follows:

1. Counsel for the United States first learned of defend­
ants’ selection procedure for corporal promotions on June 
22, 1983, when she learned of the scheduled hearing on 
defendants’ motion.

2. In a telephone conversation with defendants’ counsel, 
Mr. Hardin, the undersigned counsel for the United States 
was advised generally of the selection procedure and its 
results, including the following facts:

a. The selection procedure included a written exam 
that, together with trooper performance ratings, was 
used as a screening device;

b. Troopers who passed the screening device were inter­
viewed by a 3-member panel;



160

c. On the basis of the oral interviews, candidates were 
ranked in the following categories: best qualified, 
highly qualified, qualified, and unqualified;

d. Of the 256 troopers who applied and took the written 
test for State Trooper Corporal, 77 (30.1%) were 
black;

e. Of the thirteen troopers who were rated “best 
qualified”, three (23.1%) are black;

f. All of the troopers rated “best qualified” are deemed 
equally qualified;

g. The Department of Public Safety believes it is unlike­
ly that it will make promotions from this list beyond 
the “best qualified” group.

3. Based upon the above representations of counsel, it 
appears that the selection procedure, up to the point of 
identifying the thirteen “best qualified” candidates does 
not have an unlawful adverse impact. See, Uniform 
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 43 Fed. 
Reg. 38290, 28 C.F.R. 50.14 (1978), § 4D; Questions and 
Answers to Clarify and Provide a Common Interpretation 
o f the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Pro­
cedures, 44 Fed. Reg. 11996, March 2, 1979, Q & A #21. 
Accordingly, the United States does not oppose the de­
fendants’ motion to allow corporals to be promoted from 
their list of “best qualified” candidates.

4. The racial impact of the total selection process cannot 
be known until actual promotions are made from among 
the thirteen “best qualified” candidates. According to de­
fendants’ representations, the Director of the Department 
of Public Safety, under this procedure, has discretion to 
appoint any of the “best qualified” troopers for corporal 
vacancies that arise. The United States does not believe it 
is necessary to circumscribe the Director’s discretion at this 
time. However, the actual selections of troopers to be pro­
moted should be monitored closely to prevent any promo­
tions that would result in unlawful adverse impact which 
would violate federal law or the orders of this Court.



161

Accordingly, the United States proposes that the de­
fendants be required to identify to plaintiffs, including 
plaintiff United States, and the Court each trooper who is 
to be promoted to corporal no less than one week before 
the promotion is to take effect. If plaintiffs object to the 
proposed promotion, or if the Court so orders, the promo­
tion should not take effect until the matter is resolved by 
the Court.

5. The United-States has no information about the com­
position of the group of candidates rated “highly 
qualified” or • “qualified.” Therefore, it has no opinion 
whether promotions from those groups would comply 
with this Court’s orders.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the representations of counsel, the United 
States believes that the procedure for identifying the thir­
teen “best qualified” candidates for State Trooper Cor­
poral positions does not have an adverse impact and com­
plies with the orders of this Court. The United States does 
not oppose the defendants’ proposal to select corporals 
from the list of “best qualified” candidates. The United 
States submits that actual promotions of individuals 
selected from that list should not become of effective 
unless or until (1) one week has elapsed after notification 
to the Court and to plaintiffs of the individuals to be pro­
moted and no objection has been filed, or (2) any objec­
tion having been raised, the Court has resolved the matter 
pursuant to such proceedings as it deems proper.

John C. Bell

United States Attorney

By: ________________
Kenneth E. Vines 

Assistant United States 
Attorney

Respectfully submitted,
/ s /  Cynthia D rabek 
Cynthia Drabek 

A ttorney
Post Office Box 23991 
L’Enfant Plaza 
Wash., D.C. 20026-3991 
(202) 633-3415



162

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have served the foregoing 
Response of the United States to Defendants’ Motion to 
Approve Selection Procedure by mailing a copy, postage 

, prepaid, to counsel listed below:
Mr. Dennis N. Balske 
P.O. Box 2087
Montgomery, Alabama 36102-2087 
Mr. Edward L. Hardin, Jr.
Post Office Box 1214 
Birmingham, Alabama 35201
Mr. Richard N. Meadows 
Ms. Rosa H. Davis 
Assistant Attorneys General 
250 Administrative Building 
Montgomery, Alabama 36130 
Mr. James S. Ward 
1933 Montgomery Highway 
Birmingham, Alabama 35209

This the 26th day of June, 1984.
/s / Cynthia D rabek________
Cynthia Drabek 

Attorney
Post Office Box 23991 
L’Enfant Plaza 
Washington, D.C.

20026-3991 
(202) 633-3415



163

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE UNITED
STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF

ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3561-N 
P hillip Paradise, Jr ., etc., et al., plaintiffs 

U nited States of A merica, plaintiff

v.

Byron P rescott, etc., et al., defendants 

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on defendants’ June 19, 
1984 Motion to Approve Selection Procedure for Promo­
tion to Corporal. The Court has received written responses 
of counsel, it received documentary evidence presented by 
the Department of Public Safety and heard the arguments 
of counsel for all parties at a hearing on July 3, 1984. The 
Court having considered the evidence and arguments pre­
sented, it is now hereby ORDERED:

1. Subject to the limitations set forth in this Order, de­
fendants Prescott, et al., are permitted to make promo­
tions to State Trooper Corporal from the group of persons 
designated “best qualified” pursuant to the selection pro­
cedure described in defendants’ June 19, 1984 motion.

2. Defendants Prescott, et al., shall select corporals 
from the “best qualified” group in a non-discriminatory 
manner. Defendants shall provide actual notice of such 
promotions to counsel for the parties not less than five 
working days prior to the effective date of such promo­
tions. Such notice shall include the name and race of each 
person to be promoted and may include any other infor­
mation defendants deem relevant. If no party files a timely



164

objection, the promotions designated by defendants shall 
take effect without further order of this Court. If a party 
files an objection at least two days prior to the proposed 
promotions, the promotions in question shall not become 
effective until the Court so orders, before or after resolu­
tion of the objection.

3. The one-for-one quota for corporal promotions, 
ordered December 15, 1983, shall not apply to the use of 
this selection procedure as described in paragraphs 1 and 2 
of this Order.

4. The parties may proceed with discovery on the issue 
whether the selection procedure described in the defend­
ants’ June 19 motion can be validated as job-related pur­
suant to The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection 
Procedures, 28 C.F.R. 50.14, 29 C.F.R. 51.53, and thus 
shown to be in compliance with the 1979 and 1981 consent 
decrees, other orders in this case, and federal law.

5. The Court shall conduct further proceedings to deter­
mine whether the results of future administrations of the 
selection procedure presented by defendants Prescott, et 
al., or a similar procedure, may be used to select State 
Trooper Corporals without further review. Until further 
order of this Court, defendants shall make no promotions 
to State Trooper Corporal positions other than from the 
group they have identified as the 13 “best qualified” can­
didates.

DONE this 27th day of July, 1984.
[SIGNATURE]________
United States District Judge



165

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

CASE NUMBER 3561-N 
P hillip P aradise, Jr., et al., plaintiffs 

U nited States of A merica, plaintiff and amicus curiae

v .

Byron P rescott, et al., defendants 

V. E. McClellan, et al., intervenors-defendants

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Notice is hereby given that Defendants-Intervenors, V. 
E. McClellan, William M. Bailey, D. B. Mansell and Dan 
Davenport hereby appeal to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, from the Order entered 
in this cause on the 27th day of July, 1984, ordering de­
fendant, Byron Prescott to make promotions to State 
Trooper Corporal. Defendant-intervenors further give 
Notice of Appeal of that portion of the Order which 
designates promotional procedures as set forth in the 
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Order.

Respectfully submitted,
Corley, Moncus, Bynum, &
D eBuys, P.C.
/s / James S. W ard_________
James S. Ward 

Attorney for Defendants- 
Intervenors

2100 16th Avenue, South 
Birmingham, Alabama 

35205



166

CERTIFICATE OF FILING

I hereby certify that I have this date filed with the Clerk 
of the District Court of the United States for the Middle 
District of Alabama, Northern Division the original and 
seven copies of the foregoing Notice of Appeal, together 
with Seventy dollars ($70.00) for the filing and docket 
fees, and such other instruments as have been completed 
and included herein for service by the Clerk of a true copy 
thereof on each of the following:

1. Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit together with the appropriate docket fee,

2. Counsel of record:
Ms. Cynthia Drabek 
Attorney At Law 
Room 5515 Main Building 
Civil Rights Division 
Department of Justice 
Washington, D.C. 20530 
Mr. Richard N. Meadows 
Assistant Attorney General 
250 Administrative Building 
Montgomery, Alabama 36130 
Mr. Dennis N. Balske 
Attorney At Law 
1001 South Hull Street 
Montgomery, Alabama 36101 
Mr. Edward L. Hardin, Jr.
Attorney At Law 
Post Office Box 1214 
Birmingham, Alabama 35201 
Mr. Kenneth E. Vines 
United States Attorney 
Post Office Box 197 
Montgomery, Alabama 36101



167

Dated this the 24th day of August, 1984.
/s /  James S. Ward_________
Of Counsel

Corley, Moncus, Bynum, & 
DeBuys, P.C.

Ash Place, Suite 300 
2100 16th Avenue, South 
Birmingham, Alabama 

35205
(205) 939-0811



168

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE UNITED
STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF

ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 3561-N 
P hillip P aradise, Jr., et al., plaintiffs 

U nited States of A merica, plaintiff and amicus curiae

v .

Byron P rescott, et al., defendants

V. E. McClellan, et al., defendants-intervenors

INTERVENORS OBJECTION TO 
OPPOSED CORPORAL PROMOTIONS

Come now the Intervenors in the above styled cause and 
hereby object to the proposed corporal promotions as 
outlined in the September 5, 1984 letter sent to counsel and 
the Court by the attorney for the Department of Public 
Safety. The Intervenors’ objections are as follows:

(1) Intervenors adopt and incorporate herein by 
reference their Response to Defendant Prescott’s Motion 
to Approve Selection Procedure for Promotion to Cor­
poral heretofore filed in this cause on June 28, 1984.

(2) For that Intervenors herein adopt and incorporate by 
reference the grounds asserted in their Motion to Stay 
heretofore filed in this cause on or about January 6, 1984 
and -their Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment of 
December 15, 1983 and to Stay its Reinforcement as 
Amended.

(3) For that Intervenors have filed a Notice of Appeal 
with the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals challenging this 
Court’s Order of July 27, 1984. Under the circumstances 
this Court should abstain from approving any promotions



169

to Corporal until this Appeal can be heard. This Appeal 
will involve important and substantial questions of con­
stitutional law and statutory construction concerning the 
recent U.S. Supreme Court case of Memphis Fire Depart­
ment, et al. v. Stotts 52 U.S.L.W. 4767 (June 12, 1984). 
The importance of this case has not escaped the other par­
ties to this litigation as there is presently pending before 
the 11th Circuit a request for the filing of an Amici Curiae 
brief concerning the applicability of the Stotts issue to the 
appeal by the parties of this Court’s December 15, 1983 
Order.

Respectfully submitted,
Corley, Moncus, Bynum, & 
D eBuys, P.C.
/s / James S. Ward_________
James S. Ward 

Attorney for Intervenors 
Suite 300, Ash Place 
2100 16th Avenue, South 
Birmingham, Alabama 

35205



170

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify this the 10th day of September, 1984, I 
served a copy of the foregoin Intervenors Objection to Op­
posed Corporal Promotions upon the following attorneys 
by placing a copy of the same in the United States Mail, 
postage prepaid and properly addressed:

Dennis N. Balske, Esquire 
Post Office Box 2087 
Montgomery, Alabama 36102 
Richard N. Meadows, Esquire 
Rosa H. Davis, Esquire 
Assistant Attorney General 
64 North Union Street 
Montgomery, Alabama 36130 
Mr. Edward L. Hardin, Jr.
Post Office Box 11328 
Birmingham, Alabama 35202
Cynthia Drabek, Esquire 
Department of Justice 
Post Office Box 23991 
L’Enfant Plaza
Washington, D.C. 20026-3991

/s / James S. Ward

Of Counsel



171

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 3561-N 
P hillip Paradise, Jr., et al., plaintiffs 

U nited States of A merica, plaintiff and amicus curiae

v .

Byron P rescott, et al., defendants 

V. E. McClellan, et al, defendant-intervenors

MOTION FOR STAY

Come now the Defendants-Intervenors in the above- 
styled cause, by and through their attorney of record, and 
respectfully move this Court to enter an Order staying the 
application of its Order of July 27, 1984 wherein Defend­
ant Prescott is entitled to make promotions to State 
Trooper Corporal from the group of persons determined 
“best qualified” pursuant to the selection procedure 
described in Defendants’ June 19, 1984 motion. As 
grounds for this motion, the Defendants-Intervenors set 
down and assign the following, separately and severally:

1. To allow promotions would effectively deny and in­
fringe upon the Defendants-Intervenors’ right of appeal in 
that other persons would be promoted and would be 
receiving the benefits of that promotion and not the 
Defendants-Intervenors.

2. The recent United States Supreme Court case of 
Memphis Fire Department, et al. v. Stotts prohibits quota 
promotion and expressly disallows schemes of promotion 
whereby blacks are promoted ahead of whites without any 
showing that the black was a victim of unlawful discrimi­



172

nation in employment. Since the previously entered Con­
sent Decrees provide for quota promotion and blacks to be 
promoted ahead of whites without a showing that the 
black is or was a victim of unlawful discrimination in 
employment, any promotional scheme pursuant to those 
Consent Decrees is unconstitutional, in violation of Title 
VII, and the Stotts decision.

3. For that there is presently pending in the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals an appeal from this Court’s 
Order of December 15, 1983 and from this Court’s Order 
of July 27, 1984, that Order being the subject of this mo­
tion for stay. (The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals re­
quested the parties to address the issue of whether this 
Court’s Order of July 27, 1984 was final and therefore ap­
pealable. The parties have responded and as of this date 
the Eleventh Circuit has not indicated whether they will 
accept the appeal.) Both appeals will involve the interpre­
tation, affect and applicability of the Stotts decision 
generally and to the facts of this case specifically. This 
Court should await direction and guidance from the 
Eleventh Circuit on these issues before allowing promo­
tions to Corporal.

4. Presently at issue is whether the Corporal examina­
tion had content validity. If it is determined that the ex­
amination had content validity the allowing of promotions 
would mean that a quota based promotional scheme 
would be allowed when under any other circumstances an 
employer could promote on rank order rating based upon 
a content valid examination.

5. To allow quota promotion pursuant to an examina­
tion which has content validity, without any showing that 
blacks who would be preferentially treated by those quotas 
were victims of an unlawful discrimination, is in violation 
of the Constitution of the United States, Title VII and the 
Stotts decision.

6. To allow promotion based upon a promotional 
scheme accomplished pursuant to Consent Decrees en­



173

tered when the Defendants-Intervenors were not parties to 
this litigation, yet where those Decrees subsequently affect 
their rights to employment and career advancement, is un­
just and severely encroaches upon their rights. Memphis 
Fire Department, et al. v. Stotts.

7. To allow promotion pursuant to a promotional 
scheme based upon the previously entered Consent 
Decrees in this case would be illegal, unreasonable, un­
constitutional and contrary to public policy.

8. For that the Department promoted sixteen troopers 
to the position of corporal approximately six months ago 
and the Department has not promoted any other troopers 
to the position of corporal since the Order of July 27, 
1984, that being almost three months. Under the circum­
stances, it would seem that further delay so that the 
Eleventh Circuit can decide the important and substantial 
issues raised on appeal would not unduly affect the ad­
ministration of the Department of Public Safety.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the De- 
fendant-Intervenors pray that this Court enter an Order 
staying the operation of its July 27, 1984 Order.

Respectfully submitted,
Corley, Moncus, Bynum, & 
DeBuys, P.C.
/ s /  James S. Ward_________

James S. Ward 
Attorney for Intervenors 
Suite 300, Ash Place 
2100 16th Avenue, South 
Birmingham, Alabama 35205



174

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify this the 25th day of October, 1984, I 
served a copy of the foregoing Motion for Stay upon the 
following attorneys by placing a copy of the same in the 
United States Mail, postage prepaid and properly ad­
dressed:

Dennis N. Balske 
Post Office Box 2087 
Montgomery, Alabama 36102 
Richard N. Meadows 
Rosa H. Davis,
Assistant Attorneys General 
64 North Union Street 
Montgomery, Alabama 36130 
John C. Bell 
U.S. Attorney 
U.S. Courthouse 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
Edward L. Hardin, Jr.
Post Office Box 11328 
Birmingham, Alabama 35202
Cynthia Drabek 
Department of Justice 
Post Office Box 23991 
L’Enfant Plaza 
Washington, D.C. 20026-3991

/s / James S. Ward

Of Counsel



175

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA,

NORTHERN DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3561-N 
Phillip Paradise, Jr., individually and on behalf of

THE CLASS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS

U nited States of A merica, plaintiff and amicus curiae

v.

Byron P rescott, as director of the Alabama
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, ETC., ET AL„ DEFENDANTS

V. E. McClellan, et al., defendant-intervenors

ORDER

For good cause, it is ORDERED that the defendant- 
intervenors’ October 25, 1984, motion to stay this court’s 
July 27, 1984, order be and it is hereby denied.

DONE, this the 25th day of October, 1984.
[SIGNATURE]___________
United States District Judge



176

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA,

NORTHERN DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3561-N 
P hillip P aradise, Jr., et al., plaintiffs 

U nited States of A merica, plaintiff

v.

Byron P rescott, et al., defendants 

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on defendants’ August 
16, 1984 Motion to Approve Selection Procedure for Pro­
motion to Sergeant. The Court has received written 
responses of counsel, it received documentary evidence 
presented by the Department of Public Safety and heard 
the arguments of counsel for all parties at a hearing on Oc­
tober 25, 1984. The Court having considered the evidence 
and arguments presented, it is now hereby ORDERED:

1. Subject to the limitations set forth in this Order, de­
fendants Prescott, et al., are permitted to make promo­
tions to State Trooper Sergeant from the group of 13 per­
sons designated “most qualified” pursuant to the selection 
procedure described in defendants’ September 10, 1984, 
submission.

2. Defendants Prescott, et al., shall select sergeants 
from the “most qualified” group in a non-discriminatory 
manner. Defendants shall provide actual notice of such 
promotions to counsel for the parties not less than five 
working days prior to the effective date of such promo­
tions. Such notice shall include the name and race of each 
person to be promoted and may include any other infor­



177

mation defendants deem relevant. If no party files a timely 
objection, the promotions designated by defendants shall 
take effect without further order of this Court. If a party 
files an objection at least two days prior to the proposed 
promotions, the promotions in question shall not become 
effective until the Court so orders, before or after resolu­
tion of the objection.

3. The one-for-one quota for sergeant promotions, 
ordered December 15, 1983, shall not apply to the use of 
this selection procedure as described in paragraphs 1 and 2 
of this Order.

4. The Court shall conduct further proceedings upon 
motion of a party to determine whether the results of 
future administrations of the selection procedure present­
ed by defendants Prescott, et al., or a similar procedure, 
may be used to select State Trooper Sergeants without fur­
ther review. Until further order of this Court, defendants 
shall make no promotions to State Trooper Sergeant posi­
tions other than from the group they have identified as the 
13 “most qualified” candidates.

DONE, this 25th day of October, 1984.
[SIGNATURE]___________
United States District Judge



178

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 85-999

U nited States, petitioner

v.

P hillip P aradise, Jr., et al.

ORDER ALLOWING CERTIORARI. Filed July 7, 
1986.

The petition herein for a writ of certiorari to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is 
granted, limited to Question 3 presented by the petition.

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