Jackson v. Rawdon Appellees' Brief

    IN  T H E

U n it e d  S tates  C o u r t  of A p p e a l s
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

NO. 15,927

NATHANIEL JACKSON, a Minor, by his Father 
and Next Friend, W. D. JACKSON, ET AL,

Appellants,
VS.

0. C. RAWDON, as President of the Board of
Trustees, Mansfield Independent School District, 
et al, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

APPELLEES’ BRIEF

J. A. Gooch
1500 Sinclair Building
Fort Worth, Texas 
Attorney for Appellees.

COMMERCIAL RECORDER. PORT WORTH, TEXAS—5-14-56—30.



U n i t e d  States C o u r t  of  A p p e a l s
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

IN  T H E

NO. 15,927

NATHANIEL JACKSON, a Minor, by his Father 
and Next Friend, W. D. JACKSON, ET AL,

Appellants,
VS.

0. C. RAWDON, as President of the Board of
Trustees, Mansfield Independent School District, 
et al, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

APPELLEES’ BRIEF



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TO THE HONORABLE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS:

Appellees are the administrative officers of a rural 
independent school district in a farming community 
in Tarrant County, Texas, and have, to the best of 
their ability, administered the affairs of such school 
district in complete obedience to all laws of the land 
for many years.

Through the medium of the press and other modern 
means of communication, appellees were informed of 
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States 
in the Brown case (Brown et al v. Board of Education 
et al, 347 U.S. 483; 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954), 349 U.S. 
294, 75 S.Ct. 753 (1955)), and upon later receiving 
a copy of such opinion, read, digested and as best they 
could, understood the meaning of such a decision. 
Accordingly they set about forthwith to obey the de­
mands and teachings as were present in such ruling. 
It was, however, quite a shock to such persons, be­
cause the opinion in the Brown case completely re­
versed the former decision of the Supreme Court which 
had stood as the law of the land for approximately fifty 
years. At the same time, appellees were cognizant 
of the laws of the State of Texas which, in unmistak­
able words made it a crime for a school board such as 
that of the Mansfield. Independent School District, to 
integrate the clases of people spoken of in the Supreme 
Court ruling.



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Appellees, upon reading the decision and being in­
formed that they must take steps to comply, began a 
serious study of local problems and a serious study 
of the means of solving such problems, to the end that 
the least possible friction* could be averted and to the 
end that violence and tempers would be curbed. As 
we view the language of the Brown case, supra, we 
perceive from it the same meaning as did the school 
board, to-wit, that it was up to the local school boards, 
with as much haste as possible, to seek out the prob­
lems involved in integration, sooth as best they could 
the ruffled tempers of the more irate, and to allow 
the matter to work itself out gradually, rather than 
to split a community wide open and thereby damage 
the relationships that had formerly existed between 
friends and neighbors.

The Brown case contains, to both the trained and 
the untrained mind, clear and unequivocal mandates, 
particularly that part reading as follows:

“Full implementation of these constitutional 
principles may require solution of varied local 
school problems. School authorities have the pri­
mary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, 
and solving these problems; courts will have to 
consider whether the action of school authorities 
constitutes good faith implementation of the gov­
erning constitutional principles. Because of their 
proximity to local conditions and the possible 
need for further hearings, the courts which orig­
inally heard these cases can best perform this



4

judicial appraisal. Accordingly, we believe it 
appropriate to remand the cases to those courts.

“In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, 
the courts will be guided by equitable principles. 
Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a 
practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and 
by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public 
and private needs. These cases call for the exer­
cise of these traditional attributes of equity 
power. * * *”

This language was read and understood by these 
appellees, and forthwith they did find themselves con­
fronted with problems, the solution of which was not 
an easy one. They began a system of conversations, 
talks, meetings and education of the people affected 
in their community. The appointed a committee to 
act as a clearing house. The School Board, in its own 
meetings, received the problems and began a serious 
effort to obey the mandate of the Supreme Court, and 
found that in their honest opinion, with this decision 
coming down in May 1955, that the time was too short 
to integrate at the next term of school, beginning in 
September 1955. The understandable language of the 
Supreme Court in its mandate to them was in simple 
terms:

1. That they, as the local administrators of 
the Mansfield Independent School District, were 
to determine their own local problems.



2. They were told that as the Governing Body 
of the School District, they had the primary re­
sponsibility for finding out their problems, evalu­
ating and solving them.

3. They were told that their actions in deter­
mining and solving their problems would be sub­
ject to scrutiny of their local Federal District 
Court upon demand by either group.

4. They were told that their local court, be­
cause of proximity and judicial knowledge of 
local problems, would be the judge as to whether 
or not their actions toward integration were in 
the nature of procrastination or were in good 
faith, and were further told that their local court 
would be the final arbiter on the question of good 
faith.

These appellees, knowing the thoughts and ideas of 
their friends and neighbors by virtue of having lived 
in the small community for substantially their life­
times, and having had expressed to them these thoughts 
and ideas, set about, by talks, meetings and thought­
ful purpose, to bring to their community the know­
ledge that the Brown case was the law of the land 
and that same had to be obeyed as long as it remained 
the law of the land, and appellees found in their tribu­
lation's extremists on both sides of the case, which is 
the cause in all instances of the disruption of the af­
fairs of any community.

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This Honorable Court judicially knows, and the 
lower court at the time of the proceeding there, ju­
dicially knew that an established social law of more 
than fifty years standing could not be abruptly over­
turned without upsetting a great majority of the 
people in' this country, and particularly in the South. 
The Supreme Court must have realized this situation, 
for there was over a year’s difference between the time 
of the original opinion of the Supreme Court and the 
final order with respect thereto. Had the Supreme 
Court not taken cognizance of the problems that would 
arise by a forced integration, it had the power to and 
could have abruptly ended segregation by the stroke 
of a pen and could have fixed a time within which all 
persons must comply with the rule. The Supreme 
Court did neither of these things, in the 1954 or the 
1955 decisions, but, as stated in its opinion, advised 
that the rules of equity must apply in obeying its man­
date, and prescribed certain rules which they them­
selves called flexible in admonishing compliance with 
its order.

This court, as did the court below, knows of vio­
lence and regretable incidents occurring by reason of 
the action of pressure groups on both sides of the ques­
tion where hasty action has been taken or suggested.

Appellants in their brief make light of the prayers 
of appellees, wherein Divine guidance was sought in
the solution of their problems (Appellants’ brief, page 
1.0). Certainly, the seeking of Divine guidance is a



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manifestation of good faith, as it is from that source 
that all good originates.

The local trial court, under the mandate of the Su­
preme Court, has on substantial and uncontradicted 
evidence held that appellees have acted and are act­
ing in good faith to comply with the edict of the Su­
preme Court. Had the Supreme Court wished to 
place n'on-segregation in immediate effect, it could, 
as above set forth, have done so by establishing a dead­
line. Therefore, the Supreme Court itself recognized 
that there would be many and varied problems and 
many and varied jurisdictions and therefore decreed 
that the enforcement of its rule be accomplished on 
a sane, sensible and thoughtful basis, and by its very 
pronouncement left the issue of good faith working 
toward the ultimate end to the local trial courts in 
each community.

Since the trial court in its wisdom and upon the 
record in the case has determined that appellees have 
complied and are complying with both the letter and 
the spirit of the law, the judgment in this case should 
not be disturbed.

Appellants seem to have ample talent, time and fi­
nances for the advancement of their cause, and, with­
out any cause whatsoever, seem to be impatient, dom­
ineering and demanding, so it goes without saying 
that they can and will express themselves again by 
the refiling of their suit if perchance they think the



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acts of appellees have changed from good faith to 
procrastination.

It is without dispute that the individual plaintilfs 
in the case below had little or no interest in integra­
tion for themselves alone. It does not take either 
testimony or imagination to reveal that the pressure 
in this and similar cases comes from a highly organ­
ized minority who find fault with the equity principles 
prescribed by the Supreme Court leading toward 
compliance.

We respectfully submit that the decision of the trial 
court was correct.

Respectfully submitted,

J. A. Gooch
1500 Sinclair Building 
Fort Worth, Texas 
Attorney for Appellees.



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Certificate of Service

I, J. A. Gooch, hereby certify that I have this the
-------- day of May, 1956, placed copies of appellees’
brief in the United States Mail, postage paid, ad­
dressed to the following attorneys for appellants:

L. Clifford Davis,
401% East 9th Street 
Fort Worth, Texas

U. Simpson Tate 
2600 Flora Street 
Dallas, Texas

Robert L. Carter 
Thurgood Marshall 
107 West 43rd Street 
New York, New York

J. A. Gooch