Brown v. Board of Education Transcript of Record
Public Court Documents
November 19, 1951
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Brown v. Board of Education Transcript of Record, 1951. 65d4ddd5-b69a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/69c57503-d5dc-4526-a4ad-e851c6b9699d/brown-v-board-of-education-transcript-of-record. Accessed December 04, 2025.
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TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1952
No. 8
OLIVER BROWN, MRS. RICHARD LAWTON, MRS.
SADIE EMMANUEL, ET AL., APPELLANTS,
vs.
BOARD OP EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, SHAWNEE
COUNTY, KANSAS, ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF KANSAS
FILED NOVEMBER 19, 1951
Probable jurisdiction noted June 9, 1952
JAM ES M. H
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1952
No. 8
OLIVER BROWN, MRS. RICHARD LAWTON, MRS.
SADIE EMMANUEL, ET AL., APPELLANTS,
vs.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, SHAWNEE
COUNTY, KANSAS, ET AL.
APPEAL, FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT1 COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF KANSAS
INDEX
Record from U.S.D.C. for the District of Kansas..............
Caption .................................... (omitted in printing) . .
Amended complaint .......................... ..............................
Motion for a more definite statement and to strike. . . .
Docket entry— Motion denied, except as to paragraph
8, which is to be amended............................................
Amendment to paragraph 8 of amended complaint. . . .
Answer to amended complaint as amended in para
graph 8 thereof...............................................................
Separate answer of the State of Kansas........................
Transcript o f procedings of pre-trial conference........
Appearances .............................................................
Colloquy between court and counsel......................
Reporter’s certificate.............. (omitted in printing) . .
Original Print
1 i
a
1 1
8 8
11 10
12 10
13 11
17 14
19 15
19 15
21 16
98
J udd & Defwbiler ( I nc.) , P rintees, W ashington, D. C., J udy 8, 1952.
— 2734
11 INDEX
Record from U.S.D.C. for the District of Kansas— Con
tinued Original Print
Order correcting transcript of record.............. -............. 99 62
Transcript of proceedings, June 25, 1951...................... 105 63
Caption ....................................................................... 106 63
Colloquy between Court and counsel...................... 107 63
Offers in evidence ..................................................... 108 64
Testimony of Arthur H. Saville . . . ........................ 115 68
Kenneth McFarland ............................ 121 72
Lena Mae C arper.................................. 136 81
Katherine Carper ................................ 141 85
Oliver L. Brown .................................... 145 88
Darlene Watson .................................... 155 94
Alma Jean Galloway ............................ 158 96
Sadie Emanuel ...................................... 160 97
Shirley Mae H odison ............................ 164 100
James Y. Richardson............................ 167 102
Lucinda Todd ........................................ 169 103
Marguerite Emmerson ........................ 171 104
Zelma H enderson.................................. 173 105
Silas Hardwick F lem ing...................... 176 107
Hugh W. Speer.................................. 182 111
James H. Buchanan.......................... 233 143
R. S. B. English.................................... 248 153
Wilbur B. Brookover............................ 263 162
Louisa H o l t ................................... 272 168
John J. Kane ........................................ 283 175
Bettie Belk ............................................ 291 180
Dorothy Crawford ............................ 303 187
Clarence G. Grimes .......................... 309 191
Thelma Mifflin ...................................... 317 196
Kenneth McFarland (Recalled) . . . . 331 205
Ernest M anheim................................ 342 213
Colloquy between court on counsel.......................... 347 216
Opening argument on behalf of plaintiff.............. 349 217
Argument on behalf of defendants........................ 363 225
Closing argument on behalf of plaintiff................ 372 231
Colloquy between Court and counsel.......................... 377 233
Reporter’s certificate.............. (omitted in printing). . 384
Clerk’s certificate...................... (omitted in printing) . . 385
Opinion, Huxman, J .......................................................... 386 238
Findings of fact and conclusions of law............................ 393 244
Deeree ................................................................................. 397 247
Petition for a p p ea l........................................................... 398 248
Assignment of errors and prayer for reversal.............. 400 249
Order allowing appeal ..................................................... 403 251
Citation on appeal.................. (omitted in printing) . . 405
Note re cost bond............................................................... 406 252
Statement required by paragraph 2 rule 12 o f the rules
of the Supreme Court (omitted in printing)............ 407
INDEX 111
Record from U.S.D.C. for the District of Kansas— Con
tinued Original
Praecipe for transcript.......... (omitted in printing) . . 412
Order extending time to file and docket record on ap
peal ................................................................................. 414
Clerk’s certificate.................... (omitted in printing) . . 415
Statement of points to be relied upon and designation of
parts of record to be printed................................................ 416
Order noting probable jurisdiction......................................... 418
Print
253
254
1
[fol. a]
IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF KANSAS
[Caption omitted]
O liver B r o w n , Mrs. R ichard L a w to n , Mrs. S a m e E m m a n
u e l , Mrs. Lucinda Todd, Mrs. Iona Richardson, Mrs.
Lena Carper, Mrs. Shirley Hodison, Mrs. Alma Lewis,
Mrs. Darlene Brown, Mrs. Shirla Fleming, Mrs. Andrew
Henderson, Mrs. Vivian Scales, Mrs. Marguerite Fmmer-
son, and
L inda Carol B r o w n , an infant, by Oliver Brown, her father
and next friend,
V ictoria J ean L aw ton and Carol K ay L a w to n , infants, by
Mrs. Richard Lawton, their mother and next friend,
J am es M eldon E m m a n u e l , an infant, b y Mrs. Sadie Em
manuel, his mother and next friend,
N an c y J an e T odd, an infant, by Mrs. Lucinda Todd, her
mother and next friend,
R onald D ouglas R ichardson , an infant, b y Mrs. Iona
Richardson, his mother and next friend,
K ath er in e L ouise Carper, an infant, by Mrs. Lena Carper,
her mother and next friend,
C harles H odison, an infant, by Mrs. Shirley Hodison, his
mother and next friend,
[ fo l . b ] T heron L ew is , M arth a J ean L ew is , A r th u r L ew is
and Frances Lewis, infants, by Mrs. Alma Lewis, their
mother and next friend,
S aundria D orstella B r o w n , an infant, b y Mrs. Darlene
Brown, her mother and next friend,
D uane D ean F lem in g and S ilas H abdrick F lem in g , infants,
by Mrs. Shirla Fleming, their mother and next friend,
D onald A ndrew H enderson and V ic k i A n n H enderson ,
infants, by Mrs. Andrew Henderson, their mother and
next friend,
1—8
2
R u t h A n n S cales, an infant, by Mrs. Vivian Scales, her
mother and next friend,
Claude A r t h u r E m m erson and G eorge R obert E m m erso n ,
infants, by Mrs. Marguerite Emmerson, their mother and
next friend, Plaintiffs,
vs.
B oard op E ducation op T opeka , S h a w n e e C o u n t y , K ansas ;
Kenneth McFarland, Superintendent of Schools of
Topeka, Kansas; and Frank Wilson, Principal of Sumner
Elementary School, Defendants,
and
T h e S tate op K ansas, Intervening Defendant
No. T-316 Civil
[fol. 1] A mended C o m plain t— Filed March 22,1951
1. (a) The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under
Title 28, United States Code, section 1331. This action
arises under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States, section 1, and the Act of May 31, 1870,
Chapter 114, section 16, 16 Stat. 144 (Title 8, United States
Code, section 41), as hereinafter more fully appears. The
matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and
costs, the sum or value of Three Thousand Dollars
($3000.00).
(b) The jurisdiction of this Court is also invoked under
Title 28, United States Code, section 1343. This action is
authorized by the Act of April 20, 1871, Chapter 22, section
1, 17 Stat. 13 (Title 8, United States Code, section 43), to be
commenced by any citizen of the United States or other
persons within the jurisdiction thereof to redress the depri
vation, under color of a state law, statute, ordinance, regu
lation, custom or usage, or rights, privileges and immunities
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, section 1, and by the Act of May 31,
1870, Chapter 114, section 16, 16 Stat. 144 (Title 8, United
States Code, section 41), providing for the equal rights of
citizens and of all other persons within the jurisdiction of
the United States, as hereinafter more fully appears.
3
(c) The jurisdiction of this Court is also invoked under
Title 28, United States Code, section 2281. This is an action
for an interlocutory injunction and a permanent injunction
restraining the enforcement, operation and execution of
statutes of the State of Kansas by restraining the action of
defendants, officers of such state, in the enforcement and
execution of such statutes.
2. This is a proceeding for a declaratory judgment and
injunction under Title 28, United States Code, section 2201,
for the purpose of determining questions in actual eontro-
[fol. 2] versy between the parties to wit:
(a) The question of whether the state statute, ch. 72-1724
of the General Statutes of Kansas 1935, is unconstitutional
in that it gives to defendants the power to organize and
maintain separate schools for the education of white and
colored children in the City of Topeka, Kansas.
(b) The question of whether the customs and practices of
the defendants operating under Ch. 72-1724 of the General
Statutes of Kansas, 1935, are unconstitutional in that they
deny infant plaintiffs the rights and privileges of enrolling
in, attending and receiving instruction in public schools of
the district within which they live while such rights and
privileges are granted to white children similarly situated;
where the basis of this refusal and grant is the race and
color of the children, and that alone.
(c) The question of whether the denial to infant plaintiffs,
solely because of race, of educational opportunities equal to
those afforded white children is in contravention of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
as being a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
3. (a) Infant plaintiffs are citizens of the United States,
the State of Kansas, and Shawnee County, the City of
Topeka, Kansas. They are among those classified as
Negroes. They reside within various school districts in the
City of Topeka, satisfy all requirements for admission to
schools within the districts within which they live, have
presented themselves for enrollment and registration at the
proper times and places, and were denied the right to enroll
therein, on account of their race and color. Instead, they
4
are required, solely because of race, to attend schools where
they do not and cannot receive educational advantages, op
portunities and facilities equal to those furnished white
ffol. 3] children.
(b) Adult plaintiffs are citizens of the United States and
the State of Kansas, are residents of and domiciled in
Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas, are taxpayers of said
county, of the State of Kansas, and of the United States.
They are the parents and natural guardians of infant
plaintiffs named herein. By being compelled to send their
children to schools outside the districts wherein they live
rather than to schools within said districts, they must bear
certain burdens and forego certain advantages, neither of
which is suffered by parents of white children situated simi
larly to children of plaintiffs.
(c) Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and
also on behalf of all citizens similarly situated and affected,
pursuant to Rule 23A of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce
dure, there being common questions of law and fact affecting
the rights of all Negro citizens of the United States simi
larly situated who reside in cities in the State of Kansas in
which separate public schools are maintained for white and
Negro children of public school age, and who are so numer
ous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the
Court.
4. The State of Kansas has declared public education a
state function in the Constitution of the State of Kansas,
Article 6, Sections 1 and 2. Pursuant to this mandate, the
Legislature of Kansas has established a system of free
public schools in the State of Kansas, according to a plan
set out in Chapter 72 of the General Statutes of Kansas,
1935, and supplements thereto. The establishment, mainte
nance, and administration of the public school system of
Kansas is vested in a Superintendent of Public Instruction,
County Superintendent of Schools, and City School Boards.
(Constitution of Kansas, Article 6, section 1.)
[fol. 4] 5. The public schools of Topeka, Shawnee County,
Kansas are under the control and supervision of the de
fendants.
5
(a) Defendant, Board of Education, is under a duty to
enforce the school laws of the State of Kansas
6/22/51 ̂ 1949
amended at (General Statutes of Kansas, 1935, [and sup-
Pre-Trial 72-1724
A.J.M. plements thereto,] # section 72-1809) ; to
maintain an efficient system of public schools
in Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas; to determine the
studies pursued, the methods of teaching, and to establish
such schools as may be necessary to the completeness and
efficiency of the school system. It is an administrative de
partment of the State of Kansas, which discharges govern
mental functions pursuant to the Constitution and the laws
of the State of Kansas. (Constitution of Kansas, Article 6,
sections 1 and 2, General Statutes, 1935, and supplements
thereto of Kansas, section 72-1601). It is declared by law
to be a body corporate and is sued in its governmental
capacity.
(b) Defendant Kenneth McFarland is Superintendent of
Schools, and holds office pursuant to the Constitution and
the laws of the State of Kansas, as an administrative officer
of the free public school system of the State of Kansas. He
has immediate control of the operation of public schools in
Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas. He is sued in his official
capacity.
6. Defendant, Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee
County, Kansas, has established and at the present time
maintains in the City of Topeka, State of Kansas, elemen
tary schools for the education of the school children of the
City of Topeka. They are located within different districts
of the City of Topeka, whose boundaries are designated by
the defendant, Board of Education.
7. White Children of elementary school age go to the
school within the designated boundaries of the district in
which they live.
[fol. 5] Infant plaintiffs live within the boundaries of these
districts, but they are required to leave the districts within
which they live and travel from one and one-half miles to
* Struck out in copy.
6
two miles to separate all-Negro schools, solely because of
their race and color and in violation of their rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.
8. The educational opportunities provided by defendants
for infant plaintiffs in the separate all-Negro schools are
inferior to those provided for white school children simi
larly situated in violation of the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.
9. Adult plaintiffs are required to send their children
outside the school districts in which they reside to separate
all-Negro schools, whereas parents of white children are
permitted to send their children to schools close at hand
within the district in which they live, solely because of race
and color. Thus adult plaintiffs are being denied the equal
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amend
ment to the Constitution of the United States.
10. Infant plaintiffs and adult plaintiffs are thereby
being wilfully and unlawfully discriminated against by the
defendants on account of their race and color, in that infant
plaintiffs are compelled to attend schools outside the school
districts in which they live, while white children similarly
situated are not so compelled; infant plaintiffs and adult
plaintiffs are being deprived of their rights guaranteed by
the Constitution and laws of the United States.
11. Plaintiffs are suffering irreparable injury and face
irreparable injury in the future by reason of the acts herein
complained of. They have no plain, adequate or complete
remedy to redress the wrongs and illegal acts herein com
plained of, other than this suit for a declaration of rights
[fol. 6] and an injunction. Any other remedy to which
plaintiffs might be remitted would be attended by such
uncertainties and delays as to deny substantial relief;
would involve a multiplicity of suits; and would cause fur
ther irreparable injury not only to plaintiffs, but to defend
ants as governmental agencies.
Wherefore, plaintiffs respectfully pray that:
1. The Honorable Court, upon filing of this complaint,
notify the Chief Judge of this Circuit as required by 28
U. 8. C. A., section 2284, so that the Chief Judge may desig
7
nate two other judges to serve as members of a three-judge
court as required by Title 28, U. S. C. A., section 2281, to
hear and determine this action.
2. The Honorable Court enter a judgment or decree
declaring that. the General Statutes of Kansas, 1935,
72-1724, is unconstitutional insofar as it empowers defend
ants to set up separate schools for Negro and white school
children.
3. The Honorable Court enter a judgment or decree de
claring that the policy, custom, usage and practice of de
fendants in operating under Ch. 72-1724, General Statutes
of Kansas, 1935, in denying plaintiffs and other Negro
children residing in Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas,
solely because of race or color, the right and privilege of
enrolling in, attending and receiving instruction in schools
within the district within which they reside as is provided
for white children of like qualifications, are denials of the
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution
and are therefore unconstitutional and void.
4. The Honorable Court issue a permanent injunction
forever restraining and enjoining the defendants from
executing so much of Ch. 72-1724, General Statutes of
Kansas, 1935, as empowers them to set up separate schools
for Negro and white school children.
[fol. 7] 5. The Honorable Court issue a permanent in
junction forever restraining defendants from denying the
Negro school children of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas,
on account of their race or color, the right and privilege of
attending public schools within the district wherein they
live, and from making any distinction based upon race or
color in the opportunities which the defendants provide for
public education.
6. The Honorable Court will allow plaintiffs their costs
herein, reasonable fees for attorneys, and such other and
further relief as may appear to the Court to be equitable
and just.
7. The Honorable Court retain jurisdiction of this cause
after judgment to render such relief as may become neces
sary in the future.
Bledsoe, Scott, Scott & Scott, by Chas. E. Bledsoe,
Charles S. Scott, John J. Scott, Attorneys for
Plaintiffs.
8
Duly sworn to by Charles E. Bledsoe. Jurat omitted in
printing.
[ fo l . 8 ] 1st U nited S tates D istrict C ourt
D efen d an ts ’ M otion for a M ore D e fin ite S tatem en t and
to S trik e :— Filed May 15, 1951
Defendants move the court for an order, as follows:
1. Requiring plaintiffs to amend their amended com
plaint, paragraph 3 (a), last sentence thereof, which reads
as follows: “ Instead, they are required, solely because of
race, to attend schools where they do not and cannot receive
educational advantages, opportunities and facilities equal
to those furnished white children. ’ ’ by making a more defi
nite statement therein setting forth the facts upon which
plaintiffs base their conclusion as to unequal advantages,
opportunities and facilities, for the reason that the present
statement is so vague or ambiguous that defendants cannot
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading
thereto.
2. Requiring plaintiffs to amend their amended com
plaint, paragraph 3 (b), last sentence thereof, which reads
as follows:
“ By being compelled to send their children to schools
outside the districts wherein they live rather than to
schools within said districts, they must bear certain
burdens and forego certain advantages, neither of
which is suffered by parents of white children situated
similarly to children of plaintiffs.”
by making a more definite statement therein setting forth
the facts upon which plaintiffs base their conclusion that
adult plaintiffs must bear certain burdens and forego cer
tain benefits; for the reason that the present statement is
so vague and ambiguous that defendants cannot reasonably
be required to frame a responsive pleading thereto.
3. Requiring plaintiffs to strike from their amended com
plaint the following language in paragraph 7 thereof:
“ and in violation of their rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”
9
[fol. 9] for the reason that the same is a conclusion and is
redundant.
4. Requiring plaintiffs to amend the eighth paragraph
of their amended complaint, which reads as follows:
“ The educational opportunities provided by defend
ants for infant plaintiffs in the separate all-Negro
schools are inferior to those provided for white school
children similarly situated in violation of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.”
by making a more definite statement therein setting forth
the facts upon which plaintiffs base their conclusion that
educational opportunities claimed therein are inferior to
those provided for white children; for the reason that the
present statement is so vague and ambiguous that defend
ants cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive
pleading thereto, and further requiring plaintiffs to strike
from said paragraph 8, the following language:
“ in violation of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.”
for the reason that the same is a conclusion and is re
dundant.
5. Requiring plaintiffs to strike from paragraph 9 of
the amended complaint the last sentence thereof which
reads as follows:
“ Thus adult plaintiffs are being denied the equal pro
tection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”
for the reason that the same is a conclusion and is re
dundant.
6. By requiring plaintiffs to amend their amended com
plaint by striking all of paragraph 10 thereof, which reads
as follows:
“ Infant plaintiffs and adult plaintiffs are thereby
being wilfully and unlawfully discriminated against by
the defendants on account of their race and color, in
10
that infant plaintiffs are compelled to attend schools
outside the school districts in which they live, while
white children similarly situated are not so compelled;
infant plaintiffs and adult plaintiffs are being deprived
[fol. 10] of their rights guaranteed by the Constitution
and laws of the United States.”
for the reason that the same is a conclusion and is re
dundant.
Lester M. Goodell, George M. Brewster, 401 Colum
bian Building, Topeka, Kansas, Attorneys for
Defendants.
[fol. 11] I n U nited States D istrict Court
D ocket E n try
“ May 25, 1951. At Topeka, before Huxman, Mellott, and
Hill, J J .: Defendants’ Motion for more definite statement
and to Strike denied except as to paragraph 8 which is to
be amended; plaintiffs given five days to amend paragraph
8 and defendants to have five days to plead or ten days to
answer. ’ ’
[ fo l . 12] I n U nited S tates D istrict C ourt
A m e n d m en t to P aragraph E ig h t of t h e A mended
C o m plain t— Filed May 29, 1951
8. The educational opportunities provided by defendants
for infant plaintiffs in the separate all-Negro schools are
inferior to those provided for white school children simi
larly situated in violation of the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. The respects in which these opportunities
are inferior include the physical facilities, curricula, teach
ing, resources, student personnel services, access and all
other educational factors, tangible and intangible, offered
to school children in Topeka. Apart from all other factors,
the racial segregation herein practiced in and of itself con
stitutes an inferiority in educational opportunity offered
11
to Negroes, when compared to educational opportunity
offered to whites.
Bledsoe, Scott, Scott & Scott, by Chas. E. Bledsoe.
Duly sworn to by Charles E. Bledsoe. Jurat omitted in
printing.
[ fo l . 13] I n U nited S tates D istrict C ourt
A nsw er of D efendants to A mended C o m plain t as
A mended in P aragraph 8 T hereof—Filed June 7, 1951
1. Defendants admit the allegations stated in paragraphs
4 and 6 of the Amended Complaint, except that defendants
allege that the City of Topeka is one school district, as
hereinafter set forth. Defendants deny all the allegations
stated in Amendments to paragraph 8 of the Amended
Complaint, and further deny all the allegations stated in
paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the Amended Complaint.
2. Defendants admit the allegations stated in paragraph
1 (a) of the Amended Complaint, except defendants deny
that the amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and
costs, exceeds $3,000.00.
3. Defendants admit the allegations stated in paragraph
2, except defendants deny that infant plaintiffs are denied
rights and privileges of enrolling in, attending and receiv
ing instruction in public schools within the district in which
they live; and deny that they have denied infant plaintiffs
educational opportunities equal to those afforded white
children.
4. Defendants allege that the City of Topeka, Kansas,
is in and of itself one school district; that acting pursuant
to authority vested in it, defendants have designated and
defined 22 separate territories within the City of Topeka
and in each of said territories have established and main
tain a public elementary school, and white children are
required to attend the elementary school located in the
territory in which they live; that defendants have also
established and maintain four separate elementary schools
for colored children within said district, and only colored
children in the City of Topeka may attend said four schools,
[fol. 14] Defendants further allege that the colored school
12
children, including infant plaintiffs, may attend any one of
these four schools.
5. Defendants allege that said separate schools are estab
lished and maintained pursuant to the laws of the State of
Kansas, G. S. 1949, 72-1724, and separate schools are pro
vided only for elementary school children, to-wit, the first
six grades.
6. Defendants allege that they have established and main
tain junior high schools throughout the City of Topeka and
have designated and defined territories for each of said
schools; that both colored and white children may attend
these schools and are required to attend the jiinior high
school located within the territory in which they live.
7. Defendants allege that transportation facilities are
provided for colored school children attending the four
colored schools mentioned in paragraph 4 hereof, and said
transportation facilities are furnished any colored school
child attending elementary schools, upon request; that no
transportation is furnished white children by the defend
ants.
8. Defendants admit the allegations stated in paragraph
3 (b) that adult plaintiffs are citizens of the United States,
the State of Kansas, Shawnee County and the City of
Topeka, Kansas, and deny the remainder of said paragraph.
Defendants further deny that adult plaintiffs are compelled
to send their children to schools outside the district wherein
they live.
9. Defendants admit the allegations stated in paragraph
3 (a) that infant plaintiffs are citizens of the United States,
State of Kansas, Shawnee County and the City of Topeka,
Kansas, and that they are among those classified as negroes,
[fol. 15] Defendants allege that infant plaintiffs have pre
sented themselves for enrollment and registration in ele
mentary schools for white children but were denied the
right to enroll therein. Defendants allege that infant plain
tiffs, because of race and color, do not satisfy the require
ments for admission to schools for white children and by
reason thereof they were denied admission. Defendants
deny the remainder of paragraph 3 (a).
10. Defendants allege that they are without knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
the allegations stated in paragraph 3 (c) of the Amended
13
Complaint, or that adult plaintiffs are taxpayers of
Shawnee County, the State of Kansas, and the United
States, as stated in paragraph 3 (b).
11. Defendants admit the allegations stated in para
graph 5 of the Amended Complaint, but deny that they are
governed by General Statutes 1935, and supplements
thereto, section 72-1809, for the reason that said statute
applies to public schools in cities of the second class and not
to public schools in cities of the first class to which class
the City of Topeka belongs.
12. Defendants deny the allegations stated in paragraph
7 of the Amended Complaint, and allege that white school
children of elementary school age in the City of Topeka are
required to go to the elementary schools within the desig
nated boundaries of the territory in which they live, and
that these schools are within the school district of the City
of Topeka; that infant plaintiffs go to elementary schools
within the district in which they live, namely, the school dis
trict of the City of Topeka, Kansas, and they may attend
any of the colored elementary schools within the City of
Topeka, as set forth in paragraph 4 hereof. Defendants
further allege that the distance traveled by colored children
[fol. 16] in reaching the schools they attend is not on the
average greater than the distance white children are re
quired to travel.
Wherefore, Defendants pray that plaintiffs take naught;
and that defendants have judgment and costs.
Lester M. Goodell, George M. Brewster, Topeka,
Kansas, Attorneys for Defendants.
Duly sworn to by Lester M. Goodell. Jural omitted in
printing.
[fol. 17] [File endorsement omitted]
In U nited S tates D istrict C ourt
[Title omitted]
S eparate A n sw er of t h e S tate of K ansas— Filed June
15, 1951
Comes now the State of Kansas, an intervening defend
ant, by Edward F. Arn, Governor of said State, and Har
old E. Fatzer, the Attorney General thereof, and for its
answer to the amended complaint herein alleges as follows:
I
That the amended complaint in said cause fails to state
a claim or cause of action against this intervening defend
ant upon which relief may be granted to the plaintiffs.
II
This intervening defendant admits the allegations con
tained in paragraph 1 of the amended complaint except
that it denies the amount in controversy exceeds, exclu
sive of interest and costs, the sum or value of $3,000.00.
III
This intervening defendant admits the allegations con
tained in paragraph 2 (a) of the amended complaint ex
cept that it expressly denies Chapter 72-1724 of the Gen
eral Statutes of Kansas, 1935 (1949), is unconstitutional.
This defendant is without knowledge or information to
either admit or deny the truth or the allegations contained
in paragraph 2 (b), (c), and paragraph 3 (a), (b) of the
amended complaint.
[fol. 18] IV
This defendant admits the allegations contained in para
graphs 4 and 5 of the amended complaint, but denies that
the defendant, Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee
County, Kansas, is governed by the General Statutes of
Kansas, 1935, and supplements thereto, Section 72-1809,
for the reason that said statute has no application to pub-
14
15
lie schools in cities of the first class to which class the
city of Topeka belongs.
V
For further answer herein this intervening defendant
states it is without knowledge or information to either
admit or deny the truth of the allegations contained in
paragraphs 6, 7, 8 as amended, 9 or 10 of the amended com
plaint. All other allegations contained in the amended
complaint which are not hereinbefore admitted or ex
plained are hereby expressly denied.
Wherefore this intervening defendant prays that plain
tiffs take naught by this action and that defendants have
judgment for all costs herein expended.
Harold R, Fatzer, Attorney General for the State
of Kansas; Willis H. McQueary, Assistant Attor
ney General for the State of Kansas; C. Harold
Hughes, Assistant Attorney General of the State
of Kansas.
[Verified by Willis H. McQueary.]
[ fo l . 19] In U niTEo S tates D istrict C ourt
[Title omitted]
Transcript of Proceedings of Pre-Trial Conference—Filed
October 30,1951
APPEARANCES :
Hon. Walter A. Huxman, Judge, United States Court
of Appeals, Tenth Circuit,
Hon. Arthur J. Mellott, Judge, United States District
Court, District of Kansas.
Charles S. Scott, Topeka, Kansas; John Scott, Topeka,
Kansas; Charles Bledsoe, Topeka, Kansas; Robert L. Car
ter, New York, New York, and Jack Greenberg, New York,
New York. Appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs.
Lester M. Goodell, Topeka, Kansas, and George M.
Brewster, Topeka, Kansas. Appeared on behalf of De
16
fendants, Board of Education, Topeka, Shawnee County,
Kansas, et al.
Harold R. Fatzer, Attorney General, State of Kansas,
by Willis H. McQueary and Charles H. Hobart, Assistant
Attorneys General, State of Kansas, Topeka, Kansas. Ap
peared on behalf of State of Kansas.
Harold Pittell, Official Reporter.
[fol. 20] Be it remembered, on this 22nd day of June,
A.D. 1951, the above matter coming on for hearing before
Honorable Walter A. Huxman, .Judge, United States Court
of Appeals, Tenth Circuit and Honorable Arthur J. Mellott,
Judge, United States District Court, District of Kansas,
and the parties appearing in person and/or by counsel, as
hereinabove set forth, the following proceedings were had:
̂ ̂ ̂ ̂ •if*
[ fo l . 21] C olloquy B etw een C ourt and C ounsel
Judge Mellott: Do you have the appearances, Mr. Re
porter?
The Reporter : Yes, Your Honor.
Judge Huxman: Gentlemen, the purpose of this session
this morning is to hold a pre-trial conference to see whether
we can simplify the matters and what can be agreed to
before we go to trial next Monday.
Judge Mellott has called my attention to Rule 16. It
provides for conference to simplify the issues, whether
there is any necessity for amendments to the pleadings
and to inquire into the possibility of obtaining admissions
of fact concerning which there can be no dispute, limita
tion of the number of expert witnesses, the advisability
of a preliminary reference of the issues to a master for
findings and any such other matters as may simplify the
issues at the time of the trial.
All the parties have entered—are in court and have
filed pleadings; that is true of the State of Kansas, is it
not?
Mr. McQueary: It is, Your Honor.
Judge Huxman: Is there a desire on the part of any
body to amend the pleadings in any manner; any necessity
for amendment of pleadings?
Mr. Charles Scott: Yes, if the Court please. We have
one amendment we desire to make.
[fol. 22] Judge Mellott: To what paragraph?
Mr. Charles Scott: Paragraph 5, sub-paragraph (a)
of the plaintiffs’ amended complaint.
Mr. Goodell: What was that again?
Mr. Charles Scott: Paragraph 5, sub-paragraph (a).
Judge Huxman: Paragraph 5 what?
Mr. Charles Scott: Paragraph 5(a).
Judge Mellott: Let me orient myself and Judge Hux
man. Did you file a complete amended complaint?
Mr. Charles Scott: No, sir.
Judge Mellott: You filed an original complaint.
Mr. Charles Scott: And an amended complaint and------
Judge Mellott : And then in the amended complaint—
there was an amendment to the amended complaint.
Mr. Goodell: I interpret that they did file——
Judge Mellott: You did file an amended complaint on
March 22nd, didn’t you?
Mr. Charles Scott: Yes.
Judge Mellott: The motion to make more definite was
addressed to that amended complaint.
[fol. 23] Mr. Charles Scott: That is correct.
Judge Mellott: And then you filed an amendment to
the amended complaint, under date of May 29th, did you
not?
Mr. Charles Scott: That is correct, sir.
Judge Huxman: What do you desire presently?
Mr. Charles Scott: We desire to correct the statute of
72-1809 of the General Statutes of 1935 and the supple
ments thereto.
Judge Mellott: Let me get this in the pleading here.
You are now talking about your original amended com
plaint, aren’t you?
Mr. Charles Scott: The original amended complaint.
Judge Mellott: And you say you want to refer to para
graph 5 of that.
Mr. Charles Scott: 5(a).
Judge Mellott: 5(a). Your amendment is what; you
want to make reference to the General Statutes of ’49 in
stead of 1935, is that what you are saying?
2—8
17
18
Mr. Charles Scott: We also want to make reference to
the General Statutes of 1949 and also strike therefrom Sec
tion 72-1809 and insert therein 72-1724.
Judge Mellott: 72-1724.
Mr. Charles Scott: That is correct.
[fol. 24] Judge Mellott: And does that read, then, that
that is the General Statutes of Kansas for 1949?
Mr. Charles Scott: That is correct.
Judge Mellott: You wish to leave out the words, “ and
supplements thereto.”
Mr. Charles Scott: Yes, we can take that out, that’s true.
Judge Mellott: Let me see if I understand what you are
doing. Paragraph 5(a), as amended, now reads: “ De
fendant, Board of Education, is under a duty to enforce
the school laws of the State of Kansas (General Statutes
of Kansas, 1949, Section 72-1724) ” , is that the amendment
you are making ?
Mr. Charles Scott: That is correct, sir.
Judge Mellott: Any other amendments!
Mr. Charles Scott: That is all we have.
Judge Huxman: Any objections to that? No objections;
the amendment will be------
Mr. Goodell: If I understand his point, he cited in his
amended complaint, which he now desires to correct, a
statute which applies to cities of second class, erroneously
when he intended to use—so we have no objection.
Judge Huxman: All right; the amendment will be ordered.
Judge Mellott: The Court will make the amendment by
[fol. 25] interlineation.
Judge Huxman: Any other amendment to the pleadings?
Mr. Goodell: We have none, Your Honor.
Judge Huxman: No further amendments to any of the
pleadings.
Mr. Bledsoe: If the Court please, at this time I would
like to inform the Court we have two attorneys who are
interested in this case with the plaintiffs, and they are
here now, and I would like to present them to the Court
at this time.
Judge Huxman: I will ask Judge Mellott to handle that
because he knows how that matter is handled.
Judge Mellott: Very well. You may introduce them, if
you will, and tell me who they are.
19
Mr. Bledsoe: They would like to be admitted for the
purpose of this case only.
Judge Mellott: Present them.
Mr. Bledsoe: If the Court please, this gentleman! here is
Robert Carter, from New York. This, gentlemen, is Judge
Huxman of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals; the gentle
man over here is Jack Greenberg, of New York, and this is
Judge Mellott of the District of Kansas Federal Court.
Judge Mellott: Are these gentlemen members of the bar?
[fob 26] Mr. Bledsoe: They are.
Judge Mellott: In what state!
Mr. Bledsoe: New York.
Judge Mellott: In good standing?
Mr. Bledsoe: They are.
Judge Mellott: And are they admitted to practice in
federal courts and courts such as this in their home jurisdic
tion ?
Mr. Bledsoe: They are.
Judge Mellott: Never been disbarred. You vouch for
them.
Mr. Bledsoe: I do.
Judge Mellott: Without further formality, then, they
will be permitted to appear as counsel, along with the other
gentlemen who presently appear as counsel in this case.
Thank you, gentlemen; you may be seated.
Judge Huxman: Unless there is something else pre
liminary, we might------
Mr. Carter: Your Honor, if I may, I would like to raise
one point. I don’t think an amendment would be necessary
to our pleadings, but we erroneously refer to school dis
tricts in Topeka, where it should be “ territories” , and, we
were going to make a stipulation with the defendants that
they are territories rather than districts—and there is one
school district.
[fol. 27] Judge Huxman: I think that is covered.
Mr. Carter: I just want to be sure.
Judge Mellott: I suppose, if necessary, for all proper
purposes in this case, the Court can consider that where
you use the word “ district” in your pleading, that really
what you are referring to is “ territories.” I believe I sug
gested that at an earlier proceeding here. It -was my under
2 0
standing Topeka was one school district, so you were re
ferring to territories.
Judge Hnxman: There is one other matter that might
come up during the trial—at least I think the Court might
want to make inquiry—will either or any of the parties to
this litigation want to use expert witnesses?
Mr. Carter: Well, Your Honor------
Judge Huxman: For what purpose?
Mr. Carter: We want to use expert witnesses for the
general purpose of showing that the segregation, which is
the- issue in the case, the segregation of the plaintiffs and
of the class they represent in the negro schools is in fact a
denial to them of their right to equal educational oppor
tunities, that they are not getting equal educational
opportunities by virtue of that. That is the purpose of
our expert testimony.
Judge Huxman: Will there be any opposition to expert
witnesses?
[fol. 28] Mr. Goodeh: The------
Judge Huxman: —the use of expert witnesses by the
plaintiffs?
Mr. Groodell: The way the question was stated, we will
certainly object to that. We think that is a question of law.
I, of course, don’t know what turn it will take.
Judge Huxman: Well, the question of whether such testi
mony is competent, does not need to be decided at this time.
The purpose of this inquiry is to ascertain how many such
witnesses you will request and whether there shall be a
limit. How many witnesses do you gentlemen desire on
that question, assuming that the Court rules it is competent.
Mr. Carter: Well, Your Honor, I think that we were not
certain of the exact number but approximately nine. We
have approximately nine or ten people who we want to call
who have made studies of this.
Judge Huxman: Well, the Court feels that nine witnesses
on that one issue is too: many witnesses. In other words,
the issue is whether segregation itself, I presume, is not a
denial of due process, irrespective of whether everything
else is equal, to that furnished in. the white schools, is that
not your general contention?
Mr. Carter: Yes, sir.
Judge Huxman: Because of the effect it has upon the
21
[fol. 29] mind, upon the student, upon his outlook; I pre
sume that would be your position.
Mr. Carter: That is absolutely correct, Your Honor.
Judge Huxman: Could nine witnesses give different testi
mony, or would their testimony be largely the same?
Mr. Carter: I doubt that, Your Honor. Our testimony
will not be cumulative. Our purpose of getting these people
was in order to give a rounded picture with respect to the
subject that we have just raised. Now, we will have some
witnesses who will testify as to tangible and physical
inequalities also among those people, so that I think that
it would be a great hardship to us if wTe were limited.
We have no intention of merely bringing on witnesses to
be cumulative.
Judge Mellott: That is the thing the Court thinks it should
avoid. We shouldn’t hear nine witnesses testify cumula
tively even as experts, it seems to me, on the same thing.
Mr. Carter: I agree, but, Your Honor, we have no—we
are not going to have duplication. Each of the people that
we are asking to come here to testify will handle a different
phase of this.
Judge Mellott: Then we should not limit you if that is
what you expect to do.
[fol. 30] Judge Huxman: The Court feels this way, that
it ’s difficult for it at this time to see where nine witnesses
could testify on this one subject, to nine different sets of
facts, unrelated facts, but you may be right; we do not
intend to deny you the right to fully present your ease. The
Court, however, feels that after it has heard five witnesses,
expert witnesses, if the Court then feels that the witnesses
that you are offering thereafter are merely duplicating what
has been said, an objection to their testimony on that ground
will be sustained. If, on the other hand, the testimony is
clearly different from what has been given, why you then
should have the right to present your nine witnesses. But
at the end of five, the Court will certainly scrutinize the
testimony of the other four quite carefully to see whether
it is duplication or additional testimony.
Mr. Carter: All right, sir.
Judge Huxman: Do you gentlemen then stipulate that,
in any event, the expert witnesses which you request will be
limited in number to nine.
22
Mr. Carter: Your Honor, frankly, our difficulty in making
any stipulation like that is that Mr. Greenberg and I have
just gotten here from New York this morning about------
Judge Huxman: This isn’t the first case of this kind you
were in. You were in the South Carolina case, weren’t
[fol. 31] you?
Mr. Carter: Yes, sir; but the thing is we haven’t really
had an opportunity to go over this.. I would not want to
make that stipulation. What I will say and what Your
Honor has ruled is that after five, you will scrutinize what
ever testimony we present for duplication, and we will
certainly attempt to avoid that, but I wouldn’t want to say
that we would only have nine.
Judge Huxman: That was your statement in response.
_ Mr. Carter: I said approximately; I didn’t want to be
tied down to that number at all.
Judge Mellott: How much leeway do you want ?
Mr. Carter: Well, I frankly think that we won’t have
more than nine, but I just would prefer not to be tied down.
I am not going to, believe me, Your Honor, we are not going
to parade a lot of witnesses here merely to keep you tied
down.
Mr. Goodell: It would be under ninety, wouldn’t it?
Mr. Carter: It will be under fifteen.
Mr. Goodell: Nine to ninety.
Judge Huxman: It would be the order of the Court that
expert witnesses on behalf of the plaintiff, in the first
[fol. 32] instance, will be limited to five, but if at that
point the plaintiffs have additional witnesses which they
feel have testimony to offer which has not been covered by
these five, they will not be denied the right to present that
testimony, is that correct, judge?
Judge Mellott : Yes, at this time, I think.
Judge Huxman: But that after five have been heard,
the Court will reserve the right to reject any further evi
dence if it should feel that the evidence that is being offered
is cumulative and not additional to what the first five have
testified, is that fair to you boys ?
In view of the fact that there has been a statement that
plaintiffs will offer expert witnesses on this subject,
assuming that the testimony will be received, will the de
23
fendants, or any of them, want to on their part offer expert
testimony along this same line!
Mr. Goodell: Well, I am a little at a handicap of know
ing exactly what their line is. They mention there is to be
testimony from experts, as I understood it, on some physical
facts which, of course, I don’t know what they are referring*
to except I take it to mean that inferiority to—as to some
—something relating to the school system and, of course,
if that comes up, we will probably want to rebut that, not
with experts, I don’t think.
[fob 33J Judge Huxman: Judge Mellott-----
Mr. Goodell: As to the other phase which I understand
is the psychological aspect and sociological, until I have
heard their testimony, I am at a loss to know whether we
will want to rebut it or attempt to rebut it.
Judge Mellott: Well, would it not be proper if the Court
thought in terms of the same basic premise that in the event
you do decide to offer experts rebutting the testimony of
the plaintiffs’ experts, that a limitation somewhat along the
line suggested by Judge Huxman to the plaintiff should,
likewise, apply to you.
Mr. Goodell: I certainly think so.
Judge Huxman: All right; that will be the order of the
Court at this time.
Now, is there anything else, gentlemen, as to preliminary
matters that we want to discuss before we go into these
requests for admissions. Anything else that might be help
ful in shaping the issues, shortening this trial.
I may state for myself, as a member of this court, that it
would certainly be my purpose to afford the parties a full
and complete hearing and an opportunity to present the
issues fully and completely but, on the other hand, I would
be very loathe to just permit the introduction of a great
mass of testimony for any purpose whatever that has no
bearing upon the issues; it merely prolongs and drags out
[fol. 34] this trial.
Anything else preliminary? Do you care to say anything
more?
Judge Mellott: I am quite sure Judge Hill and I concur
entirely as to what you have just said, though my authority,
of course, to speak is only to speak for myself.
Judge Huxman: In a preliminary conference, Judge
24
Mellott, to bring yon np to date, purely informal, with attor
neys for the plaintiffs and the defendants, I suggested that,
as a preliminary to this pre-trial conference, each side pre
pare requested admissions of fact and serve them on the
other side.
Judge Mellott: I am sure that was quite helpful.
Judge Huxman: We have that here this morning and,
if there is nothing further, suppose, gentlemen, we proceed
to see how many of these requests we can agree upon.
We will take up the defendants’ requests for stipulations
first.
No. 1 is a request for an agreement that the City of
Topeka, Kansas, constitutes one school district.
Mr. Carter: We agree.
Judge Huxman: That is agreed to.
Judge Mellott: Thank you, gentlemen.
[fol. 35] Judge Huxman: Request No. 2:
“ That defendants have designated within the City of
Topeka, Kansas, eighteen territories and in each of these
territories have established and maintain a public elemen
tary school for white children only; in addition thereto
defendants have established and maintain in the City of
Topeka, Kansas, four separate elementary schools for
colored children and attendance at these four schools is
restricted to colored children. Exhibit A, which is made
a part hereof by reference, is a map of the City of Topeka
and adjacent territories attached to Topeka School District
for school purposes only. Said Exhibit A correctly desig
nates the school territory for white schools for the City
of Topeka, Kansas. Said map also designates the four
colored schools, which are Buchanan, McKinley, Monroe
and Washington. Colored school children in the City of
Topeka, Kansas, may attend any one of these four colored
schools, and the choice of schools is made by the colored
school children or their parents. The territory colored blue
on Exhibit A represents areas not within the City of Topeka
except for school purposes, and children residing in said
areas attend schools in the City of Topeka, Kansas.”
Now, before you make any request, Judge Mellott has
not seen Exhibit “ A ” . As a preliminary question, may
I ask, Mr. Goodell, who prepared that exhibit!
25
[fol. 36] Mr. Goodell: The clerk of the Topeka Board of
Education.
Judge Huxman: Do you vouch for its territorial correct
ness and integrity?
Mr. Goodell: Absolutely.
Judge Huxman: All right. With that preliminary state
ment, is there any objection to the admission requested in
request No. 2?
Mr. Carter: Well, Your Honor, this is the first—I think
we have no objection on Exhibit “ A ” , but going over on to
page 2—about the fifth line from the top------
Judge Huxman: Fifth line from the top on page 2.
Mr. Carter: ‘ ‘ and the choice of schools is made by the
colored school children or their parents.” I should think
we have to get more information on that before we could
agree. With that exception, we will agree.
Mr. Goodell: For clarity, what is meant there, of course,
is choice of which of the four colored schools. It doesn’t
mean to say------
Mr. Carter: It is a question in our minds as to whether
that is true.
Judge Huxman: Do you have testimony to the effect
that that is not true?
Mr. Carter: We may.
[fol. 37] Judge Huxman: You may.
Mr. Carter: Yes, sir.
Judge Huxman: Well, do you have reasons to believe
that it is not true?
Mr. Carter: Well, the only thing I can say at this time,
Your Honor, is that up to—as far as this is concerned, we
have to know—we would have to make a little further in
vestigation on this ourselves. We might stipulate, agree,
that this is true by Monday, but I don’t think we can do it
today.
Judge Huxman: All right, I just feel this way, that
there ought to be a perfect willingness on the part of both
parties to freely and frankly agree to facts concerning
which there just can’t be any dispute. Now, if there is a
question about a fact, that should not be agreed to, of
course, but you have local colored counsel here who no
doubt went to schools here, these segregated schools.
26
Mr. Carter: That is------
Judge Huxman: Do you agree to the request with the
exception of that portion starting—with this exception:
“ Colored school children in the City of Topeka, Kansas,
may attend any one of these four colored schools, and the
choice of schools is made by the colored school children or
their parents.”
Mr. Carter: All we reject is of the choice.
[fol. 38] Judge Huxman: Do you agree to everything
but that!
Mr. Carter: We agree with the first part of the state
ment. All we don’t know about is the choice.
Judge Huxman: I am just taking the one sentence. I
don’t like to divide a sentence. You want to reserve the
agreement to that until Monday.
Mr. Carter: Yes, sir.
Judge Huxman: And, in the meantime, you will make
an investigation and if you find that that is a fact------
Mr. Carter: We will agree to it.
Judge Huxman: Mr. Scott, you have been a resident of
Topeka all your life.
Mr. Charles Scott: Yes, sir.
Judge Huxman: Are you able to say whether that is or
is not a fact as the schools are administered.
Mr. Charles Scott: Qualified, Your Honor. We are al
lowed to go to the schools that are closest to our home.
Now*, whether or not the school board has any control over
that or not, I don’t know, but, as a practical matter, natu
rally, the colored students go to the school closest to their
home.
Judge Huxman: I tell you what I wish you would do with
your New York counsel. I wish you would have a confer-
[fol. 39] ence with the members of the school board between
now and Monday and ask them if a colored student wants
to attend any one of these four schools whether there is
any restriction upon his right to do so.
Mr. Charles Scott: I will do that, Your Honor.
Judge Huxman: And then come in Monday morning------
Mr. Coodell: Of course, my information came from the
board and the administrative officers on all these matters.
Judge Huxman: They should have the right to get that
information themselves.
27
It is agreed, then, that request for admission No. 2 is
argeed to with the exception of that portion which has just
been read by the Court and, as to that portion, inquiry will
be made by Monday and a statement by counsel for plain
tiffs will be made then as to whether they agree to that por
tion which is presently eliminated.
We will take up No. 3:
“ That the same curriculum is used in the elementary
colored schools in the City of Topeka, Kansas, as is used
in the elementary white schools in said city. ’ ’
Mr. Carter: After conference, Your Honor, we cannot
stipulate to that.
[fol. 40] Judge Huxman: Do you claim that that is not so?
Mr. Carter: We would change in the first sentence where
it reads, “ That the same curricula is used” , we would
change that to “ prescribed” as long as curricula is under
stood to mean courses of study.
Judge Huxman: That is what the curricula means, isn’t
it, courses of study.
Mr. Gfoodell: That is what I intended by it.
Mr. Carter: I am not sure.
Judge Huxman: Do you have a different meaning of
curricula ?
Mr. Carter: Yes, sir.
Judge Huxman: Is there any objection to the elimination
of the word “ curricula” and the substitution of the
“ studies are used” ?
Mr. Carter: “ Prescribed” is what we want to use.
Judge Huxman: That wouldn’t be any admission. The
question is, is it actually used, that is the test.
Mr. Carter: We are advised that that is not true, Your
Honor.
Judg*e Huxman: How?
[fol. 41] Mr. Carter: We at this table don’t feel that we
can stipulate to that at this time.
Judge Huxman: Well, do you intend to offer evidence
to show that that is not so?
Mr. Carter: Yes, sir.
Judge Huxman: In what respect do you contend that
there is a difference?
Mr. Carter: Well, there are several things that I have
28
right now at my fingertips that I can indicate. One is that
there is a difference in terms of the special teachers and
the special—there are special teachers that are used at the
White schools. No special teachers or special courses for
certain classes of the student body are at the Negro School.
Judge Huxman: The teachers have nothing to do with
the courses of study?
Mr. Carter: Yes, sir. They have set up, as we under
stand it, Your Honor, set up at the White school a special
course of study for children who are somewhat retarded
who are not able to come up to the part of their class. Now,
no such course is available at the Negro school. We also
have a question right now as to whether even though the
same courses of study are prescribed, and we think that
we have evidence to show that it is not used, that this is
not followed out at the Negro school generally.
[fol. 42] Judge Huxman: Mr. Goodell, what do you say
with regard to the statement that special courses prescribed
in white schools for sub-normal children are not in colored
schools?
Mr. Goodell: I don’t think that is curricula that is special
—that comes under a heading later in our brief about spe
cial services which they cover in paragraph 8, which I don’t
think is embraced in the question of curricula.
Judge Mellott: I am wondering if you gentlemen perhaps
are in dispute primarily about the definition of the word
‘ ‘ curricula. ’ ’ I wonder if that is your difficulty.
Mr. Goodell: I think—my interpretation of it and the
use I intended is the—as meaning the subjects taught, pro
grams used in the school and the subjects taught, courses
of study.
Judge Mellott : Well, do you wish to rephrase it so that
it does limit it to those particular terms? Maybe your
adversary will agree if you rephrase it.
Mr. Goodell: I am willing to change it, Your Honor, by
striking out the word “ curricula” and substituting there
for “ that the same course of study” —“ courses of study” .
Judge Mellott: I suggest that counsel for the plaintiff
give attention to what is being said.
[fol. 43] Mr. Carter: Yes, sir.
Judge Huxman: He is suggesting that perhaps a change
in the word “ curricula” might make this understandable
29
so you do agree upon its meaning and perhaps get closer
to a stipulation.
Mr. Goodell: “ That the same course of study is used
in the elementary colored schools in the City of Topeka as
is used in the elementary white schools.” It will read,
Your Honor, my suggested amendment.
Judge Huy man: Also keep in mind, gentlemen, that
under Mr. Goodell’s explanation this special matter which
you mentioned for abnormal children is not meant to be
included in here, and the agreement to this stipulation
would not bar you from showing that some special services
are rendered to white children that are not rendered to
colored children. With that statement, are you willing to
agree with this ?
Mr. Charles Scott: At this time, Your Honor, I don’t
think we are inclined to accept it.
Judge Mellott: Your associates think they are. They
say if you limit it to simply saying that the same course
of study is used, that they don’t have any objection.
Mr. Charles Scott: Well, this is the reason, Your Honor:
We have examined a greater portion of the curricula, as
prescribed by the school board, and we have found that
[fob 44] there are some differences, certain course of
studies are offered in some schools and are not offered in
some of the colored schools, and so I don’t think we are in
clined to accept it on those basis.
Judge Huxman: Can you name a specific instance?
Mr. Charles Scott: Yes, sir.
Judge Huxman: All right, let’s have it.
Mr. Charles Scott: They have a course entitled “ Litera
ture Appreciation” that is offered in the fifth and sixth
grades in several of the white schools, and it is not offered
in one or two of the colored schools. Then you have------
Judge Huxman: Is that shown by the exhibits ?
Mr. Charles Scott: Yes, sir.
Judge Huxman: All right. What would you say to this:
Would you agree that the courses of study as outlined in
these exhibits—what are the exhibits?
Mr. Charles Scott: If the Court please, now they
label------
Judge Huxman: Are the courses of studies that are used.
30
Mr. Charles Scott: They call it the school program, but it
appears to be the course of study.
[fol. 45] Judge Huxman: That is quibbling about words,
isn’t it?
Mr. Charles Scott: Well------
Mr. Goodell: I am willing to limit that again. I am not
familiar with that matter he points out—to have it read,
“ That the same course of study required by the Kansas” —
by law—“ by the Kansas statute is given.” I think what
he is talking about is some extra-curricular subject that
some teachers of their own volition give, like outside read
ing, reference texts, and so forth, rather than a prescribed
course of study.
Mr. Charles Scott: No, I beg to differ with counsel. This
is prescribed by the school board and sent down.
Mr. Goodell: I am talking about what the state law re
quires to be taught in our Kansas elementary public school
system.
(Colloquy was here had between counsel off the record.)
Mr. Goodell: If we are going to have a lawsuit here and
pursue factual inquiry as to—as to school by school, of
which there are twenty-two, we will be chasing down each
textbook for outside reading that Miss Jones may pre
scribe at Randolph which Miss Baker at another school
doesn’t like, and she prescribes another text for outside
[fol. 46] reading. Suppose they are taking history; one
likes this for outside reading and another teacher likes
another. That will frequently occur.
Judge Mellott: Do you have a printed course of study?
Mr. Goodell: Absolutely.
Judge Mellott: Do you have one?
Mr. Goodell: I have it attached as an exhibit here. And
what I meant to convey and what I mean by this stipula
tion and will reframe it------
Judge Mellott: Where is it attached?
Mr. Brewster: Exhibit “ F ” .
Mr. Goodell: That the course of study required by our
Kansas statute is followed in all of the schools without any
distinction between the white and colored elementary
schools.
31
(Colloquy was here had between counsel off the record.)
Judge Huxman: Shall we then eliminate request No. 3?
Mr. Goodell: Let’s pass that, Your Honor.
Judge Huxman: We will pass request No. 3 and take up
No. 4:
“ That the same school hooks are used in the elementary
colored schools in the City of Topeka, Kansas, as are used in
[fol. 47] the elementary white schools in said city.”
Is that not related to 3 and also covered by your exhibits ?
Mr. Goodell: Yes.
Judge Huxman: Shall we pass it?
Mr. Goodell: Yes, that is satisfactory.
Mr. Carter: Your Honor, we are having one of our
expert witnesses, that is going to be a librarian, who is at
the present time checking the holdings of all the schools.
Judge Huxman: Is what?
Mr. Carter: The holdings, the library holdings of all of
the schools, and we therefore are not—we can’t------
Judge Huxman: We passed 4.
Mr. Goodell: I would like to amend, in view of his re
marks, I would like to amend that to read, ‘ ‘ The same text
books” —“ school textbooks” —so that it doesn’t------
Judge Huxman: All right, that will be permitted.
Judge Mellott: Do you agree that the same textbooks are
used ?
Mr. Carter: I think we will agree.
Judge Mellott: Very well.
Judge Huxman: Did you, Mr. Reporter, get request No.
[fol. 48] 4, as amended?
The Reporter: Yes, Your Honor.
Judge Huxman: We will take No. 5:
“ That each of the four colored elementary schools in the
City of Topeka, Kansas, is situated in neighborhoods where
the population is predominantly colored. ”
Mr. John Scott: That is agreeable, Your Honor.
Judge Huxman: That is agreed to.
Judge Huxman: No. 6:
“ That transportation to and from school is furnished
colored children in the elementary schools of the City of
32
Topeka, Kansas, without cost to said children or their
parents. No such transportation is furnished white chil
dren in the elementary schools of the City of Topeka.”
It would seem to me that is either a fact or isn’t a fact.
Mr. Charles Scott: We will agree to that.
Judge Huxman: All right. No. 6 is agreed to.
No. 7:
“ That the same services are offered to colored and white
elementary schools by the school authorities of the City of
Topeka, Kansas, except in the case of transportation, as
[fol. 49] set out in the preceding paragraph hereof.”
Now, before you speak on that, I would like to ask a pre
liminary question: I am not sure that I understand, Mr.
Goodell, what you mean by the “ same services.”
Mr. Goddell: I mean services like supervised play of the
children at recess and noon period; I mean services of pub
lic health, nursing, which is furnished the elementary
schools, both white and colored alike; I mean services that
are entailed in departmental heads calling on the ele
mentary school system, such as music department, and giv
ing supervision and advice to the teachers. That is what I
mean.
Judge Huxman: Is there anything else that you include
in services ?
Mr. Goodell: No, that is what I mean.
Judge Huxman: All right. And your request, requested
admission, that these services which you have mentioned
are furnished both in the colored schools and in the white
schools.
Mr. Goodell: That is correct.
Mr. John Scott: We don’t accept that, if Your Honor
please. I think that is a little too indefinite; we need a lit
tle more definite and certain------
Judge Huxman: That is the reason I asked you to state
[fol. 50] specifically the kind of services he had in mind.
Mr. John Scott: Yes, Your Honor, I understand that, but,
as it stands in the stipulation at the present time, we
wouldn’t have a way of knowing.
Judge Huxman: The stipulation as it reads in the
printed record isn’t going to be the record. The record
33
that is made is as modified by the statements of Mr. Goodell.
They are the ones that go into the record.
All right; is that agreed to, then?
Mr. Carter: That is agreeable, Your Honor.
Judge Huxman: That is agreeable.
Judge Mellott: Well, are there any other services that
either side thinks should be incorporated. Now, I have in
my mind some three or four services. Now, in order to
make that complete, do you wish to give us a more detailed
or do you wish to add anything to the services which Mr.
Goodell has referred to?
Mr. Carter: No, sir. We have one item that I think I
spoke of before. I think that Mr. Goodell indicated that it
was a service, but he doesn’t include that in his special
statements. The statement is satisfactory to us.
Judge Mellott: The word “ services” is rather big and
broad and all-inclusive.
Judge Huxman: Of course, it—all right, that is agreed
[fol. 51] to, then, as modified by the explanation; the fur
nishing of services as stated is agreed to.
We will take up No. 8:
“ That the distance traveled by colored children in reach
ing the schools they attend is not on the average greater
than the distance wdiite children are required to travel to
reach the schools they attend.”
Mr. Carter: Well, Your Honor, I don’t think we want to
stipulate on this. I don’t think it has anything to do with
the case. I think it ’s irrelevant.
Mr. Goodell: If the Court please, on that point, it is
merely a mathematical proposition. That map, Exhibit
“ A ” , shows the whole City of Topeka and territory out
side of the city is in blue, which is in Topeka for school
purposes. We have marked on the map, Exhibit “ A ” , each
school territory. It shows, of course, the physical facts
of distances which appear on this city map and can be com
puted. Children, in other words, living, for example—tak
ing Exhibit “ A ” —in the blue territory over here in the
corner (indicating) their school that they would have to go
to, white children, would be Randolph, and all of that. Of
course the matter of various school distances are written in
3— 8
34
on the map—are identified. Of course to get at it any more
accurately, which would be almost an intolerable job, Would
be to get each child that went to the city schools and get the
[fob 52] actual distance travelled divided by the number of
children, and then you would get the average, and then
get each colored child and get the actual distance divided by
number of children, and then you would have the average.
Judge Huxman: Mr. Goodell, I doubt whether the Court
would want that kind of a stipulation agreed to. That
might be mathematically correct when you take an outlying
territory. Now, to reach that result, you take territory that
is not in the city limits and that------
Mr. Goodell: I have done some computing with a ruler,
and I have taken the school population of the various
schools, and I have taken distances in various different
territories, and I know that as a matter of fact, it’s a con
servative statement, it ’s on the conservative side.
Judge Huxman: Well, now you may be right, but I
wouldn’t want this, as far as I am concerned; I wouldn’t be
content to have it established by stipulation that you can
have four schools in the City of Topeka for one group of
people and eighteen for another in that same territorial
limit and yet those in the four schools would not be required
to travel greater distances than the children that have
eighteen schools. Now maybe it ’s a fact, I don’t know.
Mr. Goodell: Keep in mind, Your Honor, that the colored
schools have been, and that is covered by prior stipulation
which is admitted, are located in neighborhoods in each case
[fol. 53] which are predominantly colored neighborhoods;
consequently, you don’t have a situation in the case of
where four colored schools have children living blocks—
thirty some blocks—away from the nearest school which
we—which does obtain in the case of many of our white
schools—several of them—because of the population trends
in the southwest part of our city in the last few years, par
ticularly since the war. We have had great population
trends out toward the west and southwest which has caused
the territory to be taken in for school purposes and, in some
cases, annexed territory, and has brought about that situa
tion.
Furthermore, I—except for paragraph 8, when they make
that as one of their grounds for inequality, is the matter
35
of distance travelled or inaccessibility of their schools. I
can’t see where that is too important because we do trans
port them in every case where they ask to be transported.
Judge Huxman: Now that is a conclusion which flows
from what is done, and you might be right on that, but the
fact is a different thing, and Judge Mellott and I are in
agreement that the Court does not Want the stipulation as
an admitted fact in this case.
Mr. Goodell: Would it add anything to it for me to have
some witness get on the stand and testify as to just what
the map shows and testify that the children do come from
[fol. 54] the territories as shown by the map, to the various
schools. Now, to make anything——
Judge Huxman: Speaking for myself alone, Mr. Goodell,
as I get—if I understand the effect of what you are trying
to say, is that the average distances travelled by the white
children are as great as the average distance travelled by
the colored children.
Mr. Goodell: That’s right.
Judge Huxman: I wouldn’t be impressed with that in the
case at all. If the fact remained that a colored child over
here had to travel two miles and a number of colored chil
dren had to travel two miles by virtue of the fact that there
Weren’t so many of them and you had an outlying district
of white children which, brought their average travelled
distance to as great as the colored children had to travel, I
still think it might be an imposition upon a colored child if
it had to travel two miles whereas a white child did not
have to travel two miles.
Mr. Goodell: We will have an isolated case. When I talk
about travel, I say again, in the stipulations, have already
been admitted on that; that they are furnished transporta
tion so that travel doesn’t seem to me as a very significant
issue.
Judge Huxman: That is a different matter.
Mr. Goodell: But, be that as it may, you still have iso-
[fol. 55] lated cases where a colored child may go twenty-
four blocks by bus.
Judge Huxman: The Court is of the view that the request
for stipulation No. 8 might be eliminated, so we might as
Well pass it for the time being.
Mr. Goodell: As I understand the Court, I have to prove
the distance all the white children go to school and the
distance the colored children go to school, is that my under
standing, is that correct? We would he here for days and
days on that.
Judge Mellott: You have your map here, and I think you
can demonstrate—you already have indicated what you
think your demonstration would consist of. What Judge
Huxman, as I understand, is suggesting, and I am in ac
cord with his view's, is a mere mathematical calculation out
of which flows an average allocated in one instance to the
colored pupils and in another instance to the white pupils,
wouldn’t be particularly helpful.
Mr. Goodell: Of course there is inequality within the
white structure. You have some white kids living next
door and half a block away from the schoolhouse and others
living thirty-six blocks away. To cure that we would have
to have a schoolhouse on every corner. There always has
to be that disparity.
Judge Huxman: But, as Judge Mellott has just stated,
[fol. 56] an average distance travelled arrived upon the
composite of a great number, has very little weight with me.
Mr. Goodell: I admit that fallacies in it, of course. I
have to prove that because they have injected that as an
issue.
Judge Huxman: They might be willing to concede that
you having arrived at this by average, that the total dis
tance travelled by all the white children and the total dis
tance travelled by the colored children would produce this
result ; that is a different matter. But, anyhow, it wouldn’t
take you very long to prove that, how this computation was
arrived at.
Mr. Goodell: Your Honor, I am not trying to say that I
proved that on a school attendance record. I took—arbi
trarily—distances and assume there would be children
going to school in some of their territory. Now, that was an
assumption. To get at that on a factual basis, I would have
to get the school attendance from each and every one of
these schools, look up the records where each kid lives, put
those altogether, those children and distances, divided by
the number of children to get at the average distance, and
I would be all summer doing that.
37
Judge Mellott: I don’t think we would ever ask you to do
that or permit you to do it.
Judge Huxman: Bequest No. 8 is omitted.
[fol. 57] Mr. Brewster: One statement, judge. Plaintiffs’
objection to this stipulation was the fact that distance
travelled was immaterial. If that is what he meant, are
you willing to stipulate, then, that the distance the stu
dents are required to travel is not an issue in the lawsuit.
Mr. Carter: No; I didn’t say that. I said that the stipu
lation was immaterial.
Judge Huxman: No use or purpose would be served by
pursuing the inquiry further because the Court itself has
eliminated request No. 8.
Mr. Brewster: The point was------
Judge Huxman: We will come to No. 9:
“ That Exhibits B-l to B-22, inclusive, attached hereto
and made a part hereof, are correct compilations for each
of the elementary public schools in the City of Topeka,
Kansas, and correctly state for the 1950-1951 school pe
riod the following as to each school designated:
“ 1. Name of elementary school.
“ 2. Name of principal.
“ 3. Class-room units.
“ 4. Enrollment.
“ 5. Kindergarten units.
“ 6. Kindergarten enrollment.
“ 7. Names of teachers, grades taught, enrollment for
each grade, and average daily attendance.”
[fol. 58] Now, before we go to that, I think I would like
to clear up in my mind a matter that is somewhat cloudy.
I want to be sure that I understand these designations.
“ SP” means what?
Mr. Groodell: Special.
Judge Huxman: Special teacher. What does “ K ”
mean ?
Mr. Goodell: Kindergarten.
Judge Huxman: And the figures appearing after “ K ”
is the number of kindergarten students, or what is that?
For instance, in Buchanan, you have this: “ Teacher, SP
K 1 1-2 2 2-3” .
Judge Mellott: I suppose those are first grades.
38
(Colloquy was here had between Court and Counsel off
the record.)
Judge Mellott: Do you stipulate, gentlemen, that these
exhibits are correct and reflect those various matters?
Mr. Charles Scott: If the Court please, we agree to
everything. I think there is a typographical error in the
name of Mildred Starnes, as appears on Exhibit “ B -l.”
The name should be changed to Myrtle. It isn’t material.
Judge Mellott: Any correction such as that is not very
material, but if you want them corrected—
[fol. 59] Judge Huxman: Do plaintiffs agree to request
for admissions as contained in No. 9, then.
Mr. Carter: Yes, sir.
Judge Huxman: No. 9 is agreed to.
No. 10:
“ That Exhibits C-l to C-22 inclusive, attached hereto
and made a part hereof, are correct compilations for each
of the elementary public schools in the City of Topeka,
Kansas, and correctly state for the 1950-1951 school pe
riod the following as to each school designated:
“ 1. Name of teacher or principal.
“ 2. Total service.
“ 3. Degree or hours credit.
“ 4. 1950-1951 salary.
“ 5. 1951-1952 salary.”
Is there any objection to agreeing to that?
Mr. Charles Scott: No, sir.
Judge Huxman: All right. Request No. 10 is agreed to
in toto.
No. 11:
“ That in arriving at the salary to be paid teachers in
the elementary public schools of Topeka, Kansas, the de
termining factors are the same for colored teachers as for
white teachers, and the application of these factors is the
[fol. 60] same. ”
Mr. Carter: Well, Your Honor, we can’t say that this is
a fact. We don’t think it ’s important.
Judge Huxman: That’s rather a conclusion, isn’t it?
Mr. Goodell: Maybe it is, except what is meant by it, the
39
clear implication of it, wliat I meant to say, if it can he
made plainer, I will amend it to say it. No distinction
is made in the matter of payment of salaries between
white and colored teachers.
Judge Huxman: Well, Mr. Goodell------
Mr. Goodell: ------because of color.
Judge Huxman: The Court is of the view that No. 11
perhaps would serve no useful purpose if agreed to, and
it is of such a nature that the plaintiffs perhaps shouldn’t
be required to agree to it. I doubt if they make an issue of
that.
Mr. Goodell: If the Court please------
Judge Mellott: They have covered it in the preceding
paragraph admitting what the salaries are, haven’t they?
Mr. Goodell: That admits salaries, yes. That shows the
physical facts of what the salaries being paid are, yes.
(Colloquy was here had off the record.)
[fol. 61] Judge Huxman: What is it you state?
Mr. Goodell: The amendment to the amended complaint
which is amending paragraph 8 of the amended complaint
filed in this case makes blanket allegations. They don’t go
into particularity, but they make blanket allegations of
disparities that exist between the white and the colored ele
mentary schools. Now one of the disparities covered by
that pleading in amendment to paragraph 8 of the original
—of the amended complaint, is teaching. Now I take it
that under that allegation it would be fair—it would be
a fair line of proof for them to admit—to introduce evi
dence that we are treating the teacher differently with
respect to their contracts and their salary and so forth.
So of course you don’t get as good work and their children
are suffering because they are not getting the benefit of a
well-paid teacher.
Judge Huxman: Speaking for myself, Mr. Goodell, I am
still of the opinion that even if that is so, if that is their
position, it ’s a matter that you can’t very well reduce to
an absolute agreement. They may not------
Mr. Goodell: I see the Court’s point about that.
Judge Huxman:------they may not contend that. If they
do, it ’s their burden to establish. If they fail to establish
40
it, it ’s out of the case. If they make the contention it ’s a
very simple matter for you to prove that it isn’t so.
[fol. 62] Mr. Goodell: Of course they know that whether
it ’s a fact or not. I say that it ’s a fact, but I agree with
you that they may not care to admit it and perhaps
shouldn’t be required to.
Judge Huxman: No. 11 is out. All right. No. 12:
“ That Exhibit D, attached hereto and made a part hereof,
is a correct compilation of statistics of the transportation
costs for the colored elementary schools in the City of
Topeka for the 1950-1951 school period.”
Mr. Goodell: That is shown by our records, the treasur
er’s office.
Judge Mellott: Do you contend that that is not an ac
curate compilation, gentlemen?
Mr. Charles Scott: We agree to it.
Mr. John Scott: That is admitted.
Judge Huxman: No. 13 :
“ That Exhibits E-l to E-5 inclusive, attached hereto
and made a part hereof, are correct compilations of statis
tics relating to public school nurses in the City of Topeka,
Kansas, and correctly set forth statistics relating to pub
lic health nurses in the City of Topeka for the 1950-1951
school period.”
Mr. Goodell: Now all that exhibit is is to show the num-
[fol. 63] her of persons or children served by the various
public school nurses over the city as reflecting on the ques
tion of whether there are enough nurses to give adequate
service to the colored schools. In other words, it shows
the load per pupil for the nurses.
Mr. Carter: Tour Honor, there again is one of the things
that we don’t know. We are not going to controvert it.
Mr. Goodell. Our records show it.
Judge Huxman: If the records show it, could you not
agree to the exhibit without agreeing to the matter which
they intend to establish by it. You don’t have to agree to
that. You could agree that this is a fact or the facts
shown by this exhibit are correct. You don’t have to
agree to the conclusion that flows from that.
41
Mr. Carter: All right.
Judge Huxman: All right. It is then agreed that Ex
hibits “ E -l” to “ E-5” , as attached to the request for stipu
lations, are correct.
Mr. Carter: Yes, sir.
Mr. G-oodell: The record is correct.
Judge Huxman: And the facts therein reflected are the
facts.
Mr. Carter: All right.
Judge Huxman: All right.
[fol. 64] No, No. 14:
“ That Exhibits F -l to F-22 inclusive, attached hereto
and made a part hereof, are correct compilations of the
elementary public school program for each of the desig
nated elementary schools in the City of Topeka, Kansas,
for the 1950-1951 school period.”
Any objections to that?
Mr. Carter: No, sir. We agree to that.
Judge Huxman: You agree.
Mr. Carter: Yes, sir.
Judge Huxman: AH right. Request for admission No.
14, as read, is agreed.
Judge Mellott: Let me be on the record for just a mo
ment.
I believe that if I have understood correctly what Judge
Huxman has accomplished so far in the pre-trial, it has re
sulted in the receipt in evidence of all of these exhibits here,
is not that correct, gentlemen?
Mr. Charles Scott: That is correct.
Judge Mellott: I am wondering if we shouldn’t just turn
these exhibits over to the clerk and let him mark them as
exhibits admitted in evidence for all purposes, and then
they constitute a part of the formal record.
Mr. Brewster: We have additional ones, supplemental
requests.
[fol. 65] Judge Huxman: I think that is a good sugges
tion, Judge Mellott, and the parties have agreed to it,
Mr. Goodell: If Your Honor please, we were going back
to the preceding paragraphs which were passed for the
moment in the light of this last exhibit.
4 2
I am willing to amend paragraph 3 by substituting for
“ curricula” the words, “ course of study.”
Judge H um an : Mr. Goodell, let me ask you, for my in
formation, these exhibits, I forget what the numbers of
them are, set out the courses of study.
Mr. Goodell: “ F -l.”
Judge Huxman: The “ F ” series of exhibits sets out
the actual courses of study that are taught in all of these
schools.
Mr. Goodell: That’s right.
Judge Huxman: What does your request for admission
No. 3 add to what those exhibits actually show?
Mr. Brewster: How would it be if on 14 we just added,
“ And said program includes all courses of study pre
scribed by the law of the State of Kansas.” Is that what
you are getting at?
Mr. Goodell: I wanted to make that plan that we were
following the prescribed course of study.
Judge Huxman: You have actually set out the courses of
study that you say are taught.
[fol. 66] Mr. Goodell: All it takes to pick it up and make
it complete------
Judge Huxman: There is no contention made that they
don’t conform to the state requirements. If they want to
claim it, let them prove it. You say those are the courses
of study.
Mr. Goodell: I don’t care to belabor the point.
Judge Huxman: What would 3 add?
Mr. Goodell: Three supplements 14 only in respect, that
it ties up and shows that it ’s a legal course of study being
followed or taught.
Judge Mellott: May I suggest that the reporter read
what Mr. Brewster interpolated and see if, perhaps, his
interpolation may not be added as a part of your admis
sion with reference to Exhibit “ F ” .
(Portion referred to by Judge Mellott read aloud by the
reporter.)
Judge Mellott: Is there any reason why you couldn’t
supplement No.-----
43
Mr. Carter: I think, if I may, Your Honor------
Judge Mellott: Any reason why you couldn’t supple
ment No. XI which you have agreed to, by the addition of
what Mr. Brewster just said.
[fol. 67] Mr. Carter: I frankly am unable to see where it
adds anything. We have admitted the facts.
Judge Mellott: I don’t think it adds much. You are not
contending that Topeka in the operation of its school sys
tem is refusing to abide by the statutes of Kansas and the
orders of the state superintendent of public instruction with
reference to courses of study, are you; you are not making
that contention.
Mr. Carter: I would prefer, however, Your Honor, if
the exhibit which sets out the courses and they are ad
mitted in the record, I think they speak for themselves.
Judge-Mellott: You haven’t answered my question. I
think you should answer it. Do you contend that the board
of education of the City of Topeka, Kansas, is not comply
ing with the state law and the regulations and the orders
of the state superintendent of public instruction1?
Mr. Carter: That is not our contention, no.
Judge Mellott: All right.
Judge Huxman: Then why do you object to this addi
tion? The only reason you could object to it is that you
claim they aren’t complying.
Mr. Carter: Well, Your Honor, the point is that we have
admitted the courses of study. These are facts which
[fol. 68] they have set forth in the record; these are the
courses of study which are taught.
Judge Mellott: Well, I think we would take his statement
as an admission that of course he is not contending that
the Board of Education of Topeka is doing other than com
plying with the Kansas statutes so far as course of study
is concerned. I would certainly spell that out of counsel’s
statement.
Judge Huxman: With that statement by counsel perhaps
the addition isn’t necessary.
Judge Mellott: I don’t think so.
Judge Huxman: Let’s take up the supplemental requests
for stipulations which have been filed by the defendants.
4 4
“ That Exhibit G, attached hereto and made a part hereof,
is a correct statement taken from the records of the Board
of Education of the City of Topeka, Kansas, pertaining to
bus schedules for colored elementary school children for
transportation furnished said children by the said Board
of Education for the 1950-1951 school year.”
Is there any objection to agreeing to that stipulation?
Mr. Carter: We agree to that, Your Honor, with the
exception of line 9.
[fol. 69] Judge Human : Line 9?
Mr. Carter: Line 2 under “ Monroe” ; that is on the
exhibit itself.
Judge Mellott: That is on the exhibit.
Mr. Carter: Line 2 under “ Monroe.”
Judge Huxman: Which says, ‘ ‘ 8 :10—First and Kansas. ’ ’
You don’t agree to that.
Mr. Goodell: You mean that is erroneous? What should
it be?
Mr. Charles Scott: Should be First and Quincy.
Mr. Goodell: Is that correct, First and Quincy?
Judge Mellott: Let’s change it to First and Quincy, then.
Mr. Goodell: I am writing that in as an amendment then.
Judge Huxman: And, as amended, plaintiffs agree to
request 15 for admissions.
Mr. Carter: Your Honor, Mr. Scott brought something to
our attention. This addendum down here, “ Bus picks up
students also anywhere along route.”
Judge Mellott : You haven’t gotten to that yet, have you?
Mr. Carter: That is on the same exhibit—on the exhibit,
[fol. 70] Judge Huxman: “ Bus picks up students also
anywhere along route.” You don’t agree to that?
Mr. Carter: I understand that they picked them up at
these various stops.
Mr. Goodell: They do and, in addition, along the way at
not designated stops they will pick them up. That is what
they tell me; I don’t know. That is what the clerk’s office
tells me has been the practice for years.
Judge Mellott: Well, do you Topeka lawyers especially,
do you know whether that is a fact or not ?
No. 15:
45
Mr, Charles Scott: No, sir.
Judge Mellott: Suppose we admit the exhibit, then,
eliminating from it the parenthetical clause and let that
remain as an item requiring proof, if that is required.
Judge Huxman: If requested. As so modified, do you
agree to the admission?
Mr. Charles Scott: Yes, sir.
Judge Huxman: All right.
No. 16:
‘ ‘ That Exhibit H attached hereto and made a part hereof,
is a correct statement of facts from the records of the Board
of Education of the City of Topeka pertaining to teacher
load in the kindergartens of the Topeka public schools for
[fol. 71] the 1950-1951 school year.”
Any objection to agreeing to that?
Mr. Carter: Our witness informs us that this is not
correct.
Judge Mellott: Who is your witness?
Mr. Carter : Dr. Speer.
Judge Mellott: What does he know about it; has he
checked the records ?
Mr. Carter: Yes, sir.
Judge Mellott: Is he here now?
Mr. Carter: No, he isn’t.
Judge Mellott: How much of that is covered here in
exhibits which are already in evidence.
Mr. Carter: I don’t know.
Judge Mellott: You have stipulated with refere, I believe
it was “ E ” or “ F ” , has already been covered. Let me refer
back here.
Mr. Brewster: Series “ B ” , I imagine.
Judge Mellott: You have shown here what the number of
kindergarten children were in each of the schools, and you
have shown what the average daily attendance of the kinder
garten was. I don’t know what is shown by “ H ” .
Mr. Carter: Isn’t this the teacher load? These are facts
taken from that other report, isn’t it, Mr. Groodell?
[fol. 72] Mr. Goodell: Sure. It ’s a breakdown of each
school in the City of Topeka showing the teaching load per
teacher. In other words, children each teacher has under
her for particular grades starting with kindergarten.
46
Judge Mellott: What I am asking is simply this: Isn’t
Exhibit “ H ” a mere assembling of the data which is already
in Exhibit “ B ” ?
Mr. Goodell: I t ’s calculations drawn therefrom from
that other data; it ’s a mathematical, in other words, reduc
tion of what the other exhibits show. I can prove that; I
don’t care to argue it.
Judge Huxman: Now, gentlemen, the Court is of this
view, that this exhibit is just a compilation of the other
exhibits already in there.
Mr. Carter: But, Your Honor, Mr. Goodell himself says
it ’s a calculation based upon it which is entirely different.
Judge Huxman: That is what I mean, a compilation made
from data already in. It ’s a simple calculation, and it ’s
either right or it ’s wrong.
Mr. Goodell: Calculation—it’s a reduction of the figures
used down to teaching load.
Judge Huxman: The Court is of this view, that we will
not ask for an admission at this time, and we will give both
parties an opportunity to check this exhibit again, against
[fol. 73] the basic data which is contained in these other
exhibits, and then, before we start into the trial Monday
morning, we will again ask Mr. Goodell whether he is satis
fied with the correctness, and we will also ask plaintiff- then
if they still contend that this computation is not correct, to
have for the benefit of the Court your computation in which
you point out the manner and respect in which this is not
correct. Now if it is not correct, it shouldn’t go in. If it is
correct, I know both parties want to agree to it.
Now, that is 16, isn’t it?
Mr. Goodell: Yes.
Judge Huxman: That will be passed until Monday morn-
ing.
Both parties here have shown a spirit of fairness and
cooperation and I see no reason in the world why you
shouldn’t get together on the question of whether this ex
hibit is or is not correct.
No. 17:
“ That Exhibit I attached hereto and made a part hereof
is a correct statement of facts from the records of the
Board of Education of the City of Topeka pertaining to
47
teacher load in the first six grades of the elementary schools
of the Topeka public school system for the 1950-1951 school
year,”
[fol. 74] Mr. Carter: We could shorten this, Tour Honor,
if we might have the same ruling as you made on the last
one apply to this one.
Judge Huxman: All right. We pass No. 17 to Monday.
Mr. Brewster: As I understand it, their claim is, using
the first series of exhibits, we haven’t computed correctly,
is that what they mean ?
Mr. Goodell: No, they are challenging the reductions we
made there.
Judge Huxman: No. 18:
“ That Exhibit J attached hereto and made a part hereof
is a correct statement of facts from the records of the Board
of Education of the City of Topeka pertaining to audi
toriums and gymnasiums in the elementary schools of the
City of Topeka, Kansas.”
Mr. Goodell: I think there is a typographical error in that
which I would like to correct.
Judge Huxman: All right. Where is that,
Mr. Goodell: Exhibit “ J ” . On the Monroe School where
I have in my exhibit ‘ ‘ combination ’ ’, meaning that they have
combination auditorium and gymnasium, that is erroneous,
according to my later information, that they do not have a
gymnasium, only an auditorium.
Judge Huxman: Only an auditorium.
[fol. 75] Judge Mellott: What do you want to do, strike
out the word “ combination” and put in the word “ yes”
under “ Auditorium.”
Mr. Goodell: That’s right and “ no” under “ Gym
nasium.”
Judge Huxman: And “ no” under “ Gymnasium” , all
right. That correction will be made.
Mr. Carter: Your Honor, we don’t feel that we can accept
this at this time. We are today, as of today, our experts are
now checking these items, and we cannot say whether they
are true or not, so we are not willing to accept them as of
now.
48
Judge Huxman: We will pass that as we have some of
these others until Monday morning.
Judge Mellott: May I inquire if counsel understand that
we are expecting you to tell us Monday morning whether
these are correct and, if they are not, you will give us what
you say the correct data is.
Mr. Carter: I understand that completely.
Judge Huxman: No. 19:
‘ ‘ That no distinction is shown by the Board of Education
of the City of Topeka in school plant facilities and equip
ment, because of race or color. Instead, the same factors
are considered and applied by said Board of Education as
to plant facilities and equipment in both white and colored
ffol. 76] elementary schools.”
Mr. Carter: We can’t agree to that.
Judge Huxman: All right, plaintiffs will not be re
quired to agree to No. 19.
No. 20:
‘ ‘ That Exhibit K attached hereto and made a part hereof,
is a correct statement of facts from the records of the Board
of Education of the City of Topeka pertaining to original
cost of school buildings in the City of Topeka, Kansas, and
correctly states the following:
“ 1. Name of building or school.
“ 2. Year of construction.
“ 3. Structural cost.
“ 4. Land cost.
“ 5. Equipment cost.”
Mr. Carter: We agree.
Judge Huxman: 20 is agreed to.
No. 21:
“ That Exhibit L attached hereto and made a part hereof,
is a correct statement from the records of the Board of Edu
cation of the City of Topeka pertaining to the present
appraised value of the school buildings and equipment, for
both white and colored elementary schools; that said ap
praised value is the appraised value furnished by the ap
praisers for the insurance underwriters for the purpose of
49
[fol. 77] fixing values of said buildings and equipment for
issuing insurance thereon. ’ ’
Mr. Carter: We agree to that.
Judge Huxman: No. 21 is agreed to.
Now, that completes the defendants’ request for agree
ment.
Judge Mellott: In the light of what has just been gone
through, the Exhibits “ G” and “ K ” and “ L ” seem now
to be ready for admission formally, is not that correct,
gentlemen ?
Mr. Charles Scott: That is correct.
Judge Mellott: The clerk, then, will mark them as ad
mitted in evidence. The others just covered, namely, the
others, “ H ” , “ I ” and “ J ” may be handed to the clerk and
marked for identification only.
How has the map been marked, if at all.
Mr. Goodell: Exhibit “ A ” , Your Honor.
Judge Mellott: Exhibit “ A ” . It may be marked and
admitted in evidence, subject to any corrections that counsel
may desire to call to the Court’s attention based upon the
draftsmanship of the map.
Mr. Goodell: I do think this, Your Honor, I want to re
check it. I think since this map was prepared, the copy
prepared which came from the map that the Board of Edu
cation clerk’s office keeps, that there is a segment of that
southwest territory that may have been annexed so it
wouldn’t be correctly outside of the city now.
[fol. 78] Judge Huxman: Yes.
Judge Mellott: Well, I believe we all know and can take
judicial notice of the fact that under the statutes of Kansas
pertaining to cities of the first class, schools within and
adjoining cities of the first class, that the statutes contem
plate, and most of the cities of Kansas do, attach to the cities
for school purposes territory which is outside of the city,
and that is what you refer to as property attached to the
city for school purposes.
Mr. Goodell: Yes.
Judge Mellott: Now since your map indicates that certain
of that territory has been attached for school purposes but
that there may be some inaccuracies in that, you have not
4— 8
50
checked to see if subsequently some of the territory has
actually been annexed to and brought into the city for all
purposes.
Mr. Goodell: I will reconcile that with all the later annexa
tions.
Judge Huxman: Let me ask you this, Mr. Goodell, is it
your understanding that this map is accurate and correct as
to the close of the school year ?
Mr. Goodell: Yes.
Judge Huxman: Then it would seem to me, that is, on
the questions which we have, that what has taken place in
the last three or four months or as to the annexation of
[fol. 79] additional territory, would not be a'ny factor in
determining the constitutionality — the questions before us
in this case, do you gentlemen agree with that?
Mr. Charles Scott: Yes.
Judge Huxman: And if this map is correct as drawn, any
changes since would not need to be shown.
(A brief recess was here had at the conclusion of which
the following further proceedings were had:)
Judge Huxman: Let me address this remark to attorneys
for plaintiffs: Has your request for admission No. 1 not
already been met by defendants’ request for admission 1.
There is no difference in them, is there?
Mr. John Scott: Except for the latter part, Your Honor,
“ That Negro children of elementary school age are com
pelled to attend one of the four Negro schools afore
mentioned because of their race and color, pursuant to the
custom and usage provided in General Statutes 1949, 72-
1724.”
Judge Huxman: That is a fact, isn’t it?
Mr. John Scott: Yes, sir.
Judge Huxman: I am asking Mr. Goodell now. That
latter part is a fact now, isn’t it?
Mr. Goodell: I think it’s embraced in our stipulation.
Judge Huxman: You do not have that—you do not have
[fol. 80] in your request the statement, “ Negro children of
elementary school age are compelled to attend one of the
four negro schools because of their race and color pursuant
to the custom and usage provided in G. S. 1949, 72-1724.”
You do not have that in your------
Mr. Goodell: We don’t use the statute; we say they are
required to attend instead of compelled.
Judge Huxman: That is a fact that it is because of
their------
Mr. Goodell: That’s right.
Judge Huxman: All right, then—is it then agreed, gentle
men, that it is a fact and so stipulated for the purpose of this
trial that negro children of elementary school age are com
pelled to attend one of the four negro schools provided for
in Topeka because of their race and color pursuant to the
custom and usage provided in 6. S. 1949, 72-1724.
Mr. Goodell: Well, that is a fact. I don’t think the
‘ ‘ custom and usage ’ ’ is provided by the statute. I t ’s simply
an authorization, but we won’t quibble about that.
Judge Huxman: Suppose we eliminate “ custom and
usage” as authorized.
Mr. Goodell: That is all right.
Judge Mellott: I understand there isn’t any dispute.
[fol. 81] Mr. Goodell: We will admit it.
Judge Mellott: —that they are, you say, required—-the
word “ required” connotes about the same thing as com
pelled.
Judge Huxman: He objected to the words “ custom and
usage” provided by the statute. The statute doesn’t per
haps provide a custom.
Mr. Goodell: I would say pursuant to the statute.
Judge Huxman: All right. We will put in the word
“ pursuant” , is that agreed to?
Mr. Goodell: Yes.
Judge Huxman: All right.
Now, we will take up No. 2:
“ 2. That the distance be computed based on city blocks
from given points of residence of infant plaintiffs and other
Negro children similarly situated, to the designated Negro
schools where they must attend as outlined on the official
map of the City of Topeka.”
Judge Mellott: Since we did not require you to go into
that average one, it seems to me that you wouldn’t want to
insist upon this, would you, Mr. Scott?
Mr. John Scott: Well, if Your Honor please------
51
52
Judge Huxman: In other words, do you want to go back
[fol. 82] now to the defendants’ request No. 8 and add to it
what you now have, is that what you want to do ?
Mr. John Scott: No, sir. We will withdraw that.
Judge Huxman: You will withdraw request No. 2.
Mr. Carter: No, sir. We are talking about an entirely
different point there, Your Honor.
Judge Mellott: I don’t understand what you are talking
about.
Mr. Carter: I will try to explain it for a moment. When
the defendants are talking about averages, insofar as we
are concerned, we feel that that is irrelevant because it has
nothing to do with the individual disadvantage. When
we speak here of a distance which is travelled by individual
plaintiffs we are attempting to show an individual dis
advantage which these plaintiffs have in making the trip.
We are not talking about general averages; we are talking
about what affects the individual plaintiff, and I think that
is entirely a different point.
Judge Huxman: Mr. Counsel, we didn’t permit the de
fendants to commit you to a yardstick of measuring dis
tances and why should we------
Mr. Carter: We will put on proof to that effect.
[fol. 83] Judge Huxman: Let me just finish my sentence
for the record so it doesn’t stand up there in the air. Why
should we permit you to commit them to a yardstick of
measurement?
Request for admission No. 2 is withdrawn.
Request No. 3:
“ Infant plaintiffs and other Negro children similarly
situated are transported by buses to the Negro schools
where they attend and are picked up by said buses at desig
nated points along prescribed routes in accordance with
schedules and designated pick-up points outlined by the
School Board or its agents. A copy of the schedule of
routes is hereto attached marked Exhibit ‘ A ’ and made a
part hereof.”
That schedule has already been agreed to, hasn’t it, and
request No. 3 will therefore, I presume, be withdrawn.
Judge Mellott: That is Exhibit “ Gr” which has been ad
53
mitted in evidence with the parenthetical clause, “ Bus
picks up students also anywhere along the route.” elimi
nated.
Now you gentlemen did tell us, did you not, that you
would make inquiry and find out, if you can, by Monday
morning whether the parenthetical clause is or is not appli
cable, can you not do that?
[fob 84] Mr. John Scott: Yes, sir.
Judge Huxrnan: That’s right.
Judge Mellott: Then that probably covers everything
that you have. Now you have a copy of the schedule of
routes.
Mr. John Scott: Yes, sir.
Judge Huxman: Is it any different from Exhibit “ G” ?
Mr. Charles Scott: No.
Mr. John Scott: No, it ’s exactly the same.
Judge Mellott: Do you propose to offer it in evidence
as an additional exhibit?
Mr. John Scott: No, sir. The one that the defendants
offered-------
Judge Huxman: The entire request No. 3 is withdrawn
in view of the admissions already made.
Mr. John Scott: That’s right, sir.
Judge Huxman: Request for admission No. 4:
“ That no provision made for shelter or protection
against inclement weather conditions or safety regulations
at designated pick-up points for infant plaintiffs and other
Negro children similarly situated while waiting for the
arrival of their respective buses.”
[fol. 85] What do the attorneys for the defendant say
as to that request?
Mr. Goodell: We don’t have shelter-houses, so I would
say we do admit that. “ Safety regulations” is pretty
broad. I don’t know what they mean by that.
Judge Huxman: Well, what would you say to this:
Safety regulations other than those provided for traffic
generally.
Mr. Brewster: The board of education doesn’t provide
the lights anyway.
Mr. Goodell: In Topeka the Police Department and the
54
traffic control division have jurisdiction over those matters.
Judge Huxman: Don’t you gentlemen feel that the ques
tion of safety regulations could be deleted? What value
is there to------
Mr. John Scott: Well, if Your Honor please----- -
Judge Huxman: Now you can show, if you want to, that
there are no added regulations or precautions. Of course
the Court will take knowledge, in the absence of anything
else, that the usual conditions with respect to traffic and
travel in the city obtains, and no other, unless it ’s shown.
Mr. John Scott: Yes, I think that is sufficient, don’t
[fol. 86] you?
Mr. Carter: Yes.
Mr. John Scott: I think that is sufficient.
Judge Huxman: Then is it agreed that request for ad
mission No. 4, as follows, is agreed to :
“ That no provision made for shelter or protection
against inclement weather” —“ That no provision is made
for shelter or protection against inclement weather con
ditions.”
Do the defendants agree to that?
Mr. Goodell: That is correct.
Judge Huxman: And we will omit from your request the
reference to any additional safety regulations.
Mr. John Scott: Yes, sir.
Judge Huxman: I didn’t go quite far enough, Mr. Re
porter. The admission should read as follows:
“ That no provision is made for shelter or protection
against inclement weather conditions at designated pick-up
points for infant plaintiffs and other Negro children simi
larly situated while waiting for the arrival of their respec
tive buses.”
That is the admission as it is agreed to.
Judge Mellott: The affirmative answer was made by
counsel for the School Board.
Mr. Goodell: Yes.
[fol. 87] Judge Huxman: No. 5:
“ That said buses make only two trips a day to and fro
to the respective all Negro schools in the morning as pre
scribed” ——■
55
Judge Mellott: We don’t have the exhibit, so I sup
pose—
Judge Huxman: Would you object if we substituted for
your Exhibit “ A ” the number of their exhibit to which------
Judge Mellott: Exhibit “ G-
Mr. John Scott: That will be perfectly all right.
Judge Huxman: “ in the morning as prescribed in De
fendants’ Exhibit ‘ G’ admitted in the record and in the
evening at the close of school.”
Judge Mellott: I understand that is admitted.
Mr. John Scott: Yes, sir.
Judge Mellott: Correct, Mr. Goodell?
Mr. Goodell: Yes.
Judge Huxman: I wanted to stop there purposely; so
far you admit that much of the request of No. 5.
Mr. Goodell: The schedule shows that they are taken to
the school in the morning and returned at night.
[fol. 88] Judge Huxman: Now, we will take up the rest
of the request because we might run into trouble there.
The further request is made for an admission, “ A sa result,
infant plaintiffs and other Negro children similarly situated
are required to spend the entire day at their respective
school without the opportunity and benefit of seeing their
parents during the noon hour and are required to eat cold
lunches which are prepared by their parents before leaving-
home in the morning. ’ ’
Mr. Goodell: We are not prepared to admit. It ’s a con
clusion.
Judge Huxman: That is a conclusion, isn’t it, that flows
from the admission.
Mr. John Scott: We can prove that, Your Honor.
Judge Huxman: That portion of the request will be
denied.
Mr. Goodell: I don’t think it ’s a proper issue in the case
because they are treated no differently than white children.
If they want to go home for lunch, they go, and if they
don’t, they stay and eat lunch.
Judge Huxman: That is argumentative, in any event.
Request No. 6:
“ That the respective buses are without any supervisor
other than the driver to exercise disciplinary measures
[fol. 89] and control of said children.”
5 6
Is that agreed to?
Mr. Goodell: I don’t think we send a guard along; I
believe that is accurate; we just have a driver.
Judge Huxman: You agree to that, then.
Mr. Goodell: I would like to check it. I think it ’s correct.
Judge Huxman: Let’s put it this way, you agree to that,
subject to your right to check and withdraw your agreement
if your further investigation shows otherwise.
Mr. Goodell: Yes.
Judge Huxman: No. 7:
‘ 1 That Buchanan School does not have an auditorium or
gymnasium; such facilities are available at Sumner,” —
before we go further, gentlemen, we have already covered
the question of auditoriums and gymnasiums in the series
of exhibits designated “ J ” .
Mr. John Scott: Yes, sir.
Judge Mellott: We have not yet admitted “ J ” , but you
were to——
Mr. John Scott: —check it .'
Judge Mellott: —check it and give us any corrections on
Monday morning.
Mr. John Scott: That’s right.
Judge Huxman: Then we should not agree to request
[fol. 90] No. 7 here and that can be ironed out on your in
vestigation as to Exhibit “ J ” , as proffered by the defend
ant.
Mr. John Scott: Yes. We will withdraw that.
Judge Huxman: Bequest for admission No. 7 is with
drawn because of these other matters in the record.
No. 8:
“ That Monroe School’s playground or a portion thereof
is separated by a public thoroughfare adjacent to the build
ing and located on the easterly side of said playground is
the A. T. S. F. Railroad right-of-wTay and track.”
Is that a fact, Mr. Goodell?
Mr. Goodell: I believe that is accurate, yes.
Judge Huxman: Then you admit request No. 8 as read.
Mr. Goodell: Yes.
Judge Huxman: All right.
57
No. 9 :
“ That no provisions are made for electrically operated
school stop signs and safety signals at any of the Negro
schools and no safety measures are provided for Infant
Plaintiffs and other Negro children similarly situated who
are required to cross the intersection of First and Kansas
[fol. 91] Avenue at a time when the vehicular traffic is
dense, while they are enroute to the designated bus pick-up
points and at other busy intersections throughout the City
of Topeka where Infant Plaintiffs and other Negro children
similarly situated are required to cross enroute to desig
nated bus pick-up points. ’ ’
Mr. Goodell: We can’t admit that because it isn’t an
accurate statement. Furthermore, we have no control over
traffic lights, electric devices. The City of Topeka Police
Department takes traffic counts at various points in town
and, from their determination, decide that a designated
point should have school blinker signs, and we have several
cases, the evidence will show if we get in that point,—in
several cases requested signs which they on the traffic count
didn’t think it was justified and wouldn’t put them in. We
don’t have any control over it.
Mr. John Scott: If Your Honor please?— -
Judge Huxman: Didn’t we, when we had up defendants’
request for agreement, agree that there were no extra
safety or traffic regulations provided at these places.
Mr. Goodell: I don’t think so. There are some------
Judge Mellott: Let me ask this question: You agree, do
you not, Mr. Scott and counsel for the plaintiffs, that Mr.
[fol. 91a] Goodell is correct in his statement that the Board
of Education has nothing whatever to do with putting in
blinker lights and safety devices for school children and
others to cross the public streets, but at best, can only
request that the traffic department of the state and the city
police department take care of those matters; do you not
agree that that is a fact?
Mr. John Scott: We agree that that is a fact and also, to
extend that, Your Honor, I think the first part of that re
quest is a fact, that there are no------
Judge Mellott: Well, I suppose that if you divide the
58
request, there may be some merit, ‘ 4 That no provisions are
made for electrically operated school stop signs and safety
signals at any of the Negro schools.” Now, I suppose------
Mr. Goodell: If the Court please, that is not accurate.
Judge Mellott: Then you should not agree upon it.
Mr. John Scott: It is accurate.
Mr. Goodell: No, it isn’t accurate.
Mr. John Scott: We can prove it, Your Honor.
Judge Huxman: The Court feels that that is a very
minor matter, whatever the electrical arrangements are
or aren’t, and, if you can’t agree on it, it will take only fif-
[fol. 92] teen minutes of evidence to establish what the
fact is.
Mr. Goodell: They make a broad statement, as I under
stand it, no safety devices in any of the areas traversed by
the colored children to go to their schools------
Judge Huxman: They don’t say that at all.
(Colloquy was here had off the record.)
Mr. Goodell: For example, on 10th Street, you have
Parkdale School and Washington School in very close
proximity. The negro children who have to cross 10th
Street to get to AYashington School that walk and don’t
ride, they use that traffic sign—I mean there is a designated
crossing for school children where they cross over 10th
there for Parkdale. Now it ’s splitting hairs to say that is
solely for Parkdale and no benefit to Washington.
Judge Huxman: Well, the Court feels that is a minor
matter.
Mr. Goodell: We have got that situation in other parts
of town.
Judge Huxman: I t ’s a simple matter, and we will not
require the parties to agree on that—request No. 9.
Mr. John Scott: We can prove it very easily, Your
Honor.
[fol. 93] Judge Huxman: I believe the attorneys for the
plaintiffs will agree that this case, the outcome, doesn’t
hinge upon that one little factor; I doubt whether it ’s going
to be determinative too much.
Now, does that conclude plaintiffs’ requests for admis
sions?
59
Mr. John Scott: Yes, sir.
Judge Huxman: We want to ask at this point counsel for
the State of Kansas whether they have at this time any
requests for admissions of fact in addition to what has been
agreed to and, if not, whether they go along with, and agree
to, these admissions which have been made by the respec
tive parties to this litigation.
Mr. McQueary: If Your Honor please, the position of
the State of Kansas, insofar as this lawsuit or this con
troversy is concerned, is going to be to endeavor to uphold
the constitutionality of the statute in question, and our par
ticipation will be limited to that field, and so far as equal
facilities or the conditions provided by the Board of Edu
cation of the City of Topeka or the facilities enjoyed by the
negro, by the plaintiffs, we are not going to make that a
matter of issue insofar as we are concerned. We have no
knowledge as to that; we haven’t investigated it. That will
be left solely to the other parties in this matter.
Judge Huxman: Then I understand your position is that
you have no request for admissions of fact.
[fol. 94] Mr. McQueary: We have none, Your Honor.
Judge Huxman: And that the state has no interest in
these admissions which have been made by the parties, the
plaintiff and defendant, other than the state, because you
do not think that they touch the state’s phase of this case.
Mr. McQueary: That is a correct statement.
Judge Huxman: All right.
Mr. Goodell: I have one more matter. I would like to
request a stipulation that the—as an exhibit, that seventeen
cites, first and second class cities of the State of Kansas,
operate separate colored and white schools in the elemen
tary grades, and I have an exhibit.
Judge Huxman: I am not sure that I understand that,
Mr. Goodell.
Mr. Goodell: I have an exhibit with the names of the-
cities showing that seventeen cities in the State of Kansas
are operating their elementary school systems similar to
Topeka—strike that—operating separate white and colored
schools in the elementary grades pursuant to the same
statute.
Judge Huxman: Is there any objection to that admis
sion?
60
Mr. Greenberg: Yes, Yonr Honor. We object on the
[fol. 95] ground that what may happen in any other city
in the State of Kansas is not relevant to the rights of our
particular plaintiffs who operate in this school system here
and now.
Judge Hu m an : Since there is one member of the Court
not here, in any event we will—and since this is the trial
court, we will receive it. You have no objection to the cor
rectness of the statement.
Mr. Greenberg: We don’t know, as a matter fact; we
haven’t------
Judge Huxman: You have no reason to doubt the correct
ness of the statement.
Mr. Greenberg: We have had no occasion to investigate
it because we haven’t thought it pertinent.
Judge Huxman: The exhibit will be received subject to
its materiality.
Judge Mellott: It will be marked as Exhibit “ M ” , De
fendants ’ Exhibit ‘ ‘ M ” .
Judge Huxman: Also subject to the right of counsel
before trial, if he so desires, to attack it as to its correctness.
Mr. Greenberg: That is agreeable.
Judge Huxman: Is there anything else?
Judge Mellott: That may be taken up Monday also.
[fol. 96] Judge Huxman: Is there anything else now,
gentlemen ?
Judge Mellott has a matter that he would like to in
quire about. Go ahead, judge.
Judge Mellott: I was only going to suggest to my asso
ciates on the bench that we may not have covered cate
gorically sub-division (6) of Ride 16 which says that it ’s
proper for us at a pre-trial to give consideration to such
other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
That is, of course, only a general statement. Does either
side care to suggest, in line with that sub-section, any other
matters which you think might be taken up with the Court
at this time which would aid in the disposition of the action.
Mr. Goodell: I think of none, Your Honor.
Judge Mellott: Very well. The concluding sentences of
the rule under which we are now functioning provides that,
“ The court shall make an order which recites the action
taken at the conference, the amendments allowed to the
61
pleadings, and the- agreements made by the parties as to
any of the matters considered, and which limits the issues
for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agree
ments of counsel;” .
Now, where a pre-trial is handled as intelligently and
as expeditiously as this has been handled by reason of the
[fob 97] preliminary requests for admissions having been
made and secured to some extent, it seems to me that per-
haps it is wholly unnecessary for this tribunal to make any
order because your record itself shows just what disposi
tion has been made.
Counsel may desire to secure from the reporter copies
of what has been accomplished, but I believe that the way
in which this has been handled that everybody has it pretty
well in mind, and I am suggesting that perhaps it would
be mere supererogation and wholly unnecessary for the
Court in this particular instance to dictate into the record
a lengthy order inasmuch as Judge Huxman has pretty
well covered that as we have proceeded.
Do you think this Court should make a separate order or
not?
Mr. G-oodell: No, I think not.
Judge Huxman: All right. Anything else that anyone
has to suggest which might tend to expedite this hearing
before we recess. If not, the pre-trial conference will be
recessed until 10:00 o ’clock Monday morning when we will
take up for final disposition the matters that we have left
here in abeyance and which you gentlemen on your respec
tive parts will investigate and see if you can satisfy your
selves, and we will then make final disposition of that and
immediately go into the trial of this case at the conclusion
—final conclusion of the pre-trial conference.
* # # # # * *
[fol. 98] (Reporter’s Note:) The further proceedings in
the pre-trial conference had on June 25, 1951, are contained
in the transcript of proceedings of the hearing proper.
# * # # # # *
Reporter’s Certificate (omitted in printing).
6 2
[fol. 99] [File endorsement omitted]
I n U n ited S tates D istrict C ourt
[Title omitted]
O rder C orrecting T ranscript oe R ecord—Filed August
27, 1951
It Fas been called to the attention of the Court that cer
tain minor typographical errors exist in the certified rec
ord filed in the Court in the above entitled cause. The
Court Reporter has checked the record and confirms the
existence of these minor typographical errors.
So that the record may speak the truth, it is considered,
ordered and adjudged that it be corrected in the follow
ing respects :
That on Page 10, Line 4, the name “ Dr. Spee” be cor
rected to read “ Dr. Speer” ; that on Page 56, Line 2, the
phrase “ Hold are they” be corrected to read “ How old
are they?” ; that on Page 115 in the last two lines the word
“ depredations” be changed to read “ deprevations” ; that
on Page 119, Line 2, the sentence there should be made
[fols. 100-103] to read “ . . . United States there are
. . . ” ; that the index record be corrected to correctly re
flect the name of Horace B. English as it appears on Page
145_of the record; that at Page 162, Line 4, the phrase
“ minor groups” be changed to read “ minority groups” ;
that on Page 164 in Line 7 from the bottom the word
“ roll” be changed to “ role” ; that at Page 169 the record
be corrected to show- “ direct examination wxas by Mr. Car
ter” ; that at Page 173 in the third line of the paragraph
marked “ Q” the last word “ them” be deleted; that at
Page 212 in Line 9 from the bottom the word “ minitors” be
changed to “ monitors” ; that at Page 219, 11 Lines from
the top, the sentence should read “ of the entire school
system?” ; that at Page 248, 6 Lines from the bottom, the
semi-colon after the word “ individual” be changed to a
comma; that at Page 249, 12 Lines from the top the word
“ disadvantages” be changed to “ disadvantaged” ; that at
Page 251 and 255 where the case name McLawrin appears
the record be changed to show the name of the case to be
“ McLaurin” .
It is by the Court further considered, ordered and ad
judged that a filing of this order constitute the correction
of the record and that copies of this order be furnished to
the parties requesting or now having a copy of the record.
(S.) Walter A. Huxman, United States Circuit Judge.
[fob 104] In U nited S tates D istrict Court
[Title omitted]
[fol. 105] T ranscript op P roceedings— Filed October 16,
1951
[fob 106] Be it remembered, on this 25th day of June,
A.D. 1951, the above matter coming on for hearing before
Honorable Walter A. Huxman, Judge, United States Court
of Appeals, Tenth Circuit; Honorable Arthur J. Mellott,
Judge, United States District Court, District of Kansas,
and Honorable Delmas C. Hill, Judge, United States Dis
trict Court, District of Kansas, duly constituted as a Three-
Judge Court under Chap. 155, Title 28, U.S.C., and the
parties appearing in person and/or by counsel, as herein
above set forth, the following proceedings were had:
[fol. 107] C olloquy B etw een . C ourt and C ounsel
Judge Pluxman: I take it there are no additional parties
to be entered of record. All of that was done the other
day, was it? Anyone else to be entered as an attorney of
record?
Mr. Goodell: If the Court please, this is Mr. Bannon,
attorney for the Board of Education of Leavenworth,
Kansas.
Judge Huxman: Do you desire to have your name en
tered as------
Mr. Bannon: As appearing, Your Honor, but I do not
know whether or not, the Board might ask for authority
to file a brief at some later stage of the proceeding.
Judge Huxman: All right.
Mr. Goodell: The attorney for the Board of Education
at Coffeyville.
6 4
Judge Mellott: 1 suppose he should be admitted only as
amicus curiae at this time since he filed no pleading.
Mr. Goodell: I suppose so.
Mr. Dallas Knapp, attorney for the Board of Educa
tion at Coffeyville called me and asked to have his name
entered and wanted to be allowed to participate for filing
a brief.
Judge Huxman: Well, we will have his name entered at
this time, and wTe will determine------
[fol. 108] Mr. Goodell: The same is true of Mr. Hal
Harlan, of Manhattan, Kansas, who is attorney for the
Board of Education there.
Judge Huxman: What do they desire!
Mr. Goodell: To have his name entered and be permitted
to file a. brief.
Judge Huxman: His name will be entered, and the ques
tion of filing of briefs amicus curiae will be determined at
the conclusion of the hearing.
Mr. Goodell: Surely.
Judge Huxman: Now, at the conclusion of our pre-trial
conference Friday there were certain matters that were
passed for final determination this morning. The first one
I have noted is Stipulation 16, which reads as follows:
“ That Exhibit “ H ” , attached hereto and made a part
hereof, is a correct statement of facts from the records of
the Board of Education of the City of Topeka, pertaining
to teacher load in the kindergarten of the Topeka public
schools for the 1950 and 1951 school years.” Attorneys
for plaintiff wanted opportunity to check into that. What
do you say this morning!
Mr. Carter: We are willing to accept that.
Offers in E vidence
Judge Mellott: Let the record show Exhibit “ H ” is
formally admitted then in evidence.
Defendants’ Exhibit “ I I ” , having been offered and
[fol. 109] received in evidence, is contained in the case file.
Judge Huxman: All right. Request 17; “ That Ex
hibit ‘ I ’, attached hereto and made a part hereof, is a
correct statement of facts from the Board of Education of
the City of Topeka, pertaining to teacher load in the first
6 5
six grades of the elementary schools of the Topeka public
school system for the school years 1950 and 1951.”
Mr. Carter: We will accept that, too.
Judge Huxman: The record may show that their request
No. 17 is agreed to, stipulated, and that Exhibit “ I ” is
admitted.
Defendants’ Exhibit “ I ” , having been offered and re
ceived in evidence, is contained in the case file.
Judge Huxman: Request No. 18, “ That Exhibit £J ’,
attached hereto and made a part hereof, is a correct state
ment of facts from the records of the Board of Education
of the City of Topeka pertaining to auditoriums and gym
nasiums in the elementary schools of the City of Topeka,
Kansas.”
Mr. Carter: On that we have a question, Your Honor;
definition, I suppose. Our investigation reveals------
Judge Huxman: I didn’t understand.
Mr. Carter: We have a question. I suppose it ’s one of
definition and------
Judge Huxman: Let’s look at Exhibit “ J ” . Is that in
[fol. 110] the original exhibits?
Mr. Carter: That is in the supplement attached to the
supplement that you were reading; pertains to auditoriums
and gymnasiums.
Mr. Goodell: Which one are you talking about now?
Mr. Carter: Exhibit “ J ” .
Mr. Goodell: Any particular part of Exhibit “ J ” ?
Judge Huxman: All right. Now what is it?
Mr. Carter: We are unable to accept the definition under
“ Buchanan” “ Yes” , as having an auditorium because our
investigation shows that there are two rooms, makeshift
rooms, that have been thrown together in which there are
chairs. Now we think that is totally different from the
feeling of an auditorium which has been built in the school.
With that reservation, we will accept that part.
Judge Huxman: If we eliminated “ Buchanan” do you
accept the statements in Exhibit “ J ” as to the auditorium
and gymnasium in Central Park, Clay—what are the three
colored schools?
Mr. Goodell: Monroe.
5—8
66
Judge Huxman: Do you accept the rest of the exhibit
with the exception of that pertaining to Buchanan?
Mr. Carter: Well, just three items, Your Honor. If you
[fol. I l l ] read down there to Lafayette------
Judge Huxman: Is that a colored school?
Mr. Carter: No, sir; that is not. It is shown here “ yes”
an auditorium, “ no” gymnasium. We have found that
there is a playroom in the school building which is ample,
and we think that that should be entered on the record.
Mr. Goodell: We say “ yes” it has an auditorium.
Judge Huxman: Suppose we change the “ no” to “ play
room” , what do you say, Mr. Goodell?
Mr. Goodell: I don’t think it ’s accurate; neither is Ms
statement accurate about Buchanan. We will offer evi
dence on it.
Judge Huxman: All right. If you can’t agree, we will
eliminate Lafayette from the exhibit.
Mr. Carter: And we have the same------
Judge Huxman: Just a minute. How about Buchanan?
You won’t agree to Buchanan as stated in the exhibit?
Mr. Carter: No, sir.
Judge Huxman: We will eliminate Buchanan.
Mr. Carter: We agree with everything else on the exhibit
with the exception of Polk and Potwin and in both of those
schools there are playrooms, even though there is no
gymnasiums.
Judge Huxman: Polk and Potwin. All right. We will
[fol. 112] eliminate Polk and Potwin. With Buchanan,
Lafayette, Polk and Potwin eliminated, do you agree to
Exhibit “ J ” as it now remains?
Mr. Carter : Yes, sir.
Judge Huxman: The record will then shown that it is
agreed that Exhibit “ J ” , with Buchanan, Lafayette, Polk
and Potwin eliminated therefrom, will be admitted and
received in the record as evidence.
Defendants’ Exhibit “ J ” , as agreed to above, having
been offered and received in evidence, is contained in the
case file.
Judge Huxman: Now, that is all that I have marked
that was left for consideration today. Have I omitted
anything ?
67
Mr. Carter: No, sir, not that I know of.
Judge H um an: Any other stipulations that the parties
wish or can agree to as to evidence?
Mr. John Scott: If the Court please, we have prepared
a map of the City of Topeka for the purpose of showing
valuations of the buildings that are located within the
City of Topeka school district.
Judge Huxman: That is a- evaluation of the school
buildings ?
Mr. John Scott: The school buildings; that is correct,
sir, and we would like to enter this as a stipulation in this
[fol. 113] particular case.
Mr. G-oodell: I couldn’t agree to that without knowing
something about it. Who appraised it?
Mr. John Scott: Dr. Speer.
Mr. G-oodell: I wouldn’t agree to such a thing as that.
I t ’s some school teacher that gave an expert opinion
about------
Mr. John Scott: I t ’s no such a thing.
Judge Huxman: Now, gentlemen, don’t get to quarreling
with each other before the real trial starts.
Mr. John Scott: This was taken from your exhibits.
Judg*e Huxman: Now, just a minute; you address your
remarks to the Court, please. If you can’t agree to it,
why you can offer it in the due course of time, and we will
then rule on it at that time.
Judge Mellott makes this suggestion, and I agree with
him: This case to the Court is just another burden that
we have in a trial to be decided by us and approached by
us just as any other case that comes before the Court.
It will be the endeavor of the Court to decide this case
according to the law and the evidence. We realize that,
of course, there is considerable sentiment in this case that
you can’t get away from. We trust that, first, there will
be no quarreling or bickering among counsel; it ’s not
[fol. 114] called for; it isn’t necessary; doesn’t add any-
ing to the value of the case. We trust that counsel will
keep that in mind. Also, there will be no demonstration
on the part of the audience or spectators in any way.
This, of course, is a public trial. We want all those who
are interested to be here; but the decorum that is main
68
tained in federal courts must be maintained throughout
the trial.
Is there anything else before we proceed to the trial of
the case! If not, the Court is ready to proceed with the
trial of case No. T-316, Orville Brown and others vs. Board
of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas.
Mr. Carter: If Your Honor please, plaintiffs would like
to invoke Rule 43(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro
cedure and call as the first witness the president of the
Board of Education, Mr. Kelsey Petry.
Judge Mellott: That is what, calling your adversary as
a hostile witness'?
Mr. Carter: Yes, sir.
Judge Mellott: “ A party may interrogate any unwilling
or hostile witness by leading questions. A party may call
an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent”
and so forth. Proceed.
Judge Huxman: You may proceed.
Judge Mellott: The witness that was called come
forward; Mr. Speer, was that his name?
[fol. 115] Mr. Groodell: It is my understanding that this
witness was out of the city.
Judge Huxman: Who is the witness?
Mr. Groodell: Mr. Petry, who is president of the board.
Judge Huxman: Is he here? Is Mr. Petry here?
Mr. Goodell: He was out of the city, I think, when the
subpoena was issued, in Colorado.
Mr. Carter: Then we will call Mr. Saville.
Judge Huxman: Mr. Saville present? Come forward and
be sworn.
A rt h u r H. S aville , h av in g been first du ly sw orn , assum ed
the stand and testified as f o l lo w s :
Direct examination.
By Mr. Carter:
Q. Mr. Saville, how long have you been a member of the
Board of Education of Topeka?
A. About twelve years.
Judge Mellott: May I have the witness’ name1?
The Witness: Arthur H. Saville.
By Mr. Carter:
Q. What are your duties and responsibilities as a member
of the Board of Education?
[fol. 116] A. To adopt policies that are carried out by the
school administration, build a budget and various things of
that sort.
Q. Does the Board of Education promulgate rules and
regulations governing the entire school system of Topeka?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You maintain, do you not, eighteen schools, elementary
schools, in Topeka that are located in eighteen territories, is
that correct?
A. Elementary schools ? I think there are twenty-two.
Judge Huxman: Isn’t that all stipulated to, the number
of schools that are maintained.
Mr. Carter: Yes, sir; it ’s stipulated to, but I am leading
up to a question.
Judge Huxman: All right.
By Mr. Carter:
Q. Well, you maintain a total of twenty-two.
A. I believe so, yes, that is correct.
Q. Eighteen are for white children and four for negro
children.
A. That’s right.
Q. Now, why is it that the Board of Education requires
negro children to attend the four separate schools in
Topeka?
Mr. Goodell: Object to that as incompetent, irrelevant
and immaterial and invading the province of the Court. The
pleadings show the issues are joined, that they are doing it,
[fol. 117] and they are doing it under a permissive statute,
72-1724. The personal feelings of a board member has
nothing to do------
Judge Huxman: I think the objection will be sustained.
Mr. Carter: I think, if I may------
6 9
70
Judge Huxman: I t ’s agreed they are doing it under stat
ute and the ordinance of the City of Topeka.
Mr. Carter: I know that, Your Honor, hut I think that I
would be entitled to inquire as to whether there are any
rules and regulations that the board adopted.
Judge Huxman: You did inquire that and you ask him
now why they maintain them. The objection is sustained.
By Mr. Carter:
Q. In your opinion, as a member of the Board of Educa
tion, would the board—wouldn’t the board have a much
simpler problem, since it must maintain the high schools on
an unsegregated basis, to integrate negro and white chil
dren at the elementary school level?
Mr. Groodell: Object to that as incompetent, irrelevant
and immaterial, not having any probative force on the issues
in this case.
Judge Huxman: The objection will be sustained.
By Mr. Carter:
Q. Mr. Saville, are you familiar with the document known
[fol. 118] as the comprehensive plan of the City of Topeka
and Shawnee County, Kansas. I might add that, this was—
this document was sponsored jointly by the Board of City
Commissioners, the Board of County Commissioners and
the Board of Education of Topeka and, at the time of the
sponsorship, your name, A. H. Saville, is listed as being on
the board.
A. Yes.
Q. You are familiar with this.
A. Is that the Bartholomew plan?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. I believe I remember it.
Q. Can you tell me whether or not this plan has been
adopted, is being followed at the present time by the Board
of Education.
Mr. Goodell: Object to that as incompetent, irrelevant
and immaterial; has to do with a long-range view building
plan; outside the issues of the case.
Judge Huxman: The objection will be overruled. He may
answer.
The Witness: Frankly, I don’t remember. What was the
date of that?
By Mr. Carter:
Q. The document was published May, 1945.
A. I couldn’t tell you; I couldn’t answer that yes or no.
Q. You can’t say whether before this document was
[fol. 119] published you looked at it as a member of the
Board of Education and approved it.
A. Yes, I looked at it—I am familiar to some extent with
the contents of the document, but I have no recollection at
this time what’s contained in it.
Q. Well, if I may, I would like to address your attention to
several extracts from the document and find whether this is
the policy of the board or whether you approved of it. The
document reads as follows, under Schools, Chapter 7.
‘ (Schools and Recreational Facilities. No city affords satis
factory living facilities unless adequate parks and schools
are available to all persons living therein. Just as the
economic welfare of the community is largely dependent
upon the extent and diversity of its commerce and industry,
the mental and physical wellbeing of the population are
largely dependent upon the educational and recreational
facilities available. The vital role which public education
plays in democracy has long been recognized.” Would you
subscribe to that statement?
Mr. Goodell: We object to that as pursuit here of an
academic matter of a report prepared by Bartholomew
which this witness didn’t prepare.
Judge Huxman: What’s the purpose of this line of
questioning ?
Mr. Carter: This is a document, Your Honor, which was
[fol. 120] sponsored by the Board of Education. It is true
that it sets up a long-range plan. The document was pre
pared by Harlan Bartholomew, but it is indicated in the
document that changns were made in it, and so forth, at the
suggestion of the various people here listed, the members of
the Board of Education. I think that I am entitled to at
tempt to find out whether or not this witness, as a member
of the Board of Education, either had anything to do with
the preparation of the document, whether he agrees with the
71
72
statements, some of the statements which are listed here and
whether they are being followed. Now, Mr. Saville indicates
he does not know whether this plan is now being followed by
the Board of Education.
Judge Huxman: Mr. Counsel, the question before the
Court in this case is not what the viewpoint of anyone is or
might be as to the future, the present or the past; but it
seems to me the question in this case turns upon what the
City of Topeka has and is doing, and what they may think
about it is immaterial, if they are furnishing adequate
facilities. If they are doing that, then what they are think
ing about is immaterial. The objection to this line of ques
tioning is sustained.
Mr. Carter: Your Honor, I don’t want to press this point
too much, but I think the Court is being unduly severe,
[fob 121] There are statements in here which have to do
with a question of the adequacy of facilities.
Judge Huxman: That is a long-range program laid down
by a man, Bartholomew, who is not even a member of the
Board of Education. It has nothing to do with what the
City of Topeka is doing or is not doing with regard to its
school system. No, the objection will be sustained. That
line of questioning will not be pursued.
Mr. Carter: All right, Your Honor. I think that is all.
Judge Huxman: Any questions?
Mr. Groodell: No questions.
Judge Huxman: Any need for this witness remaining
longer or may he be excused from attendance?
Mr. Carter: We have no further need for him.
Judge Huxman: You are not required to attend further
upon the Court.
(Witness excused.)
K e n n e t h M cF arland , having been first duly sworn, as
sumed the stand and testified as follows:
Direct examination.
By Mr. Carter:
Q. Mr. McFarland, you are at present the superintendent
[fol. 122] of schools of Topeka, Kansas?
73
A. Correct.
Q. How long have you been superintendent?
A. Nine years.
Q. Are there any rules and regulations that you know of
that are in force with regard to the choice of schools by
negro pupils in the school system, among the four that are
set aside for them?
A. Well, we have administered the schools as they were
organized at the time this administration took over in 1942.
The four negro districts were established at that time.
Q. What I am driving at is what determines, in terms of
the place in the city where a negro child lives, what deter
mines what school that child will attend?
A. Those districts were drawn prior to 1942 and adopted
by the Board of Education, and we have administered them
in essentially the same form.
Q. Well, may I have what they are?
A. Well, you have a map.
Judge Huxman: Doctor, what he asks is what determines
the location, if you know. Is that what you want?
Mr. Carter: I am trying to ask—there are four negro
schools—the white schools—the school system is divided
into territories. That apparently is not true of the negro
[fol. 123] schools. Now a negro who lives—out let’s say—
let’s say the Randolph area, what determines what school,
what colored school, he or she will attend? That is what
I am trying to find out. Are there any rules about that?
ered by the admitted state of facts.
Mr. G-oodell: Object to this as already having been
covered by the admitted state of facts.
Judge Huxman: I am sorry; repeat that question.
(The last preceding question was here read by the re
porter.)
Mr. Goodell: The objection is that this is in conflict with
the admitted statement of facts.
Judge Mellott: Was it admitted? I have overlooked it,
and that is what I was asking Judge Huxman, is the reason
he didn’t hear you. In paragraph 2, I believe, of your
original stipulation------
7 4
Mr. Goodell: On Page 2, Your Honor, there was that—
that portion was not agreed to.
Judge Mellott: That is what I thought.
Mr. Goodell: I withdraw my objection.
Mr. Carter: That is what I am trying* to find out.
Mr. Goodell: Our pleadings allege that a colored child
may attend any one of the four colored schools based upon
[fob 124] the selection of his parents.
Judge Mellott: As I recollect it, counsel did not agree
upon that Friday, so I think he should pursue it.
Judge Huxman: The witness may answer.
The Witness: Theoretically, the plan would be to give the
best coverage possible with four buildings in relationship to
where children live and with relationship to bus routes, and
so forth.
By Mr. Carter:
Q. Now, Mr. McFarland, the defendants have introduced
a series of exhibits relating to school program, teacher
salaries, bus schedules and transportation costs. Are you
familiar with those exhibits?
A. Not in detail. I am familiar with the fact that the
exhibits were prepared and delivered to the counsel.
Q. They were prepared in your office.
A. By my office, yes.
Mr. Carter: If I may get the exhibit “ F ” (l) to “ F ” (22).
Mr. Goodell: You have copies of that.
Mr. Carter: All right.
By Mr. Carter:
Q. I want to direct your attention—these are the exhibits.
Now, those exhibits “ F ” (l) to (22) relate to the school
schedule program for the school year in each of the schools,
[fol. 125] Judge Mellott: You said “ F ” (22).
Mr. Carter: “ F ” (l) to (22) covering the twenty-two
schools.
By Mr. Carter:
Q. That is the school program for each of the schools.
What I want to know, we do not have any information as
7 5
to the hours that school is in session. Would you have
that at your fingertips ?
A. Well, 9:00 o ’clock until 4:00 o ’clock is the general
hour for elementary schools.
Q. Is there any difference with respect to—does that
apply from the first grade through the sixth grade?
A. No, first grades convene a little later, adjourn a lit
tle earlier, so do kindergartens. They also have different
schedules for the first few weeks of school than they do
later.
Q. Without regard for the first few weeks of school, I
would like to get the accurate figures on that, if available.
When does kindergarten convene and when does it let out?
A. Well, we have let the kindergartens out at 11:30.
Q. They convene at 9:00?
A. And convene at 9 :00.
Q. Do you have any in the afternoons?
A. 1 :30 and 3 :30.
Q. 1 :30 and 3 :30.
A. I think most of those------
[fol. 126] Q. What about the first year, the first grade?
A. We usually, during warm weather, when the schools
first start, we are more lenient on those; we will start about
fifteen minutes later.
Q. That would be 9 :15.
A. 9 :15. We will let them out at 11:30 and sometimes
11:45.
Q. 11:30, 11:45. They reconvene at what time?
A. 1:30, 1:15.
Q. Until 4:00. What about the second through sixth?
A. 1:15 to 4:00.
Q. What about the morning schedule ?
A. 9:00 to 12:00.
Q. 9 :00 to 12:00. An hour for lunch.
A. Right; an hour or a half or an hour and fifteen min
utes, depending.
Q. In order that I may be absolutely correct on this, you
have half session of kindergarten, half day of kindergarten
from 9 :00 to 11:30 or from 1 :30 to 3 :30.
Judge Huxman: Answer, doctor.
The Witness: Yes.
76
By Mr. Carter:
Q. You have in the first grade, you convene at approxi
mately 9 :00 or 9 :15; you let out at approximately 11:30,
11:45.
A. Right.
Q. And reconvene at 1 :15 to 4 :00.
[fol. 127] A. That’s right; those are approximately right.
There are some variations in that. We have a schedule
here, if you want it, admitted in evidence.
Q. If you have the schedule.
A. We have a complete schedule of that and will he glad
to get it.
Q. Well, I think it would he—if it ’s here I would like to
see it because I am going to ask some questions.
Mr. Goodell: If the Court please, we introduced, and it ’s
admitted, the program. I don’t understand—do you claim
they don’t get as many hours of instruction?
Mr. Carter: What I am trying to find out is the hours of
the classes. You have introduced the program hut not the
hours of the school.
Mr. Goodell: If the Court please, we submit it would be
immaterial unless he claims there is disparity between the
two schools as to hours of instruction.
Judge Huxman: I don’t see much probative value to that
unless there is discrimination, if you will not pursue it
too far------
Mr. Carter: I am going to ask some questions on it, Your
Honor, and I think the questions will be germane. I wanted
[fol. 128] to be certain that Mr. McFarland is certain of his
hours. I don’t want to have an approximation, and I am
not trying to lead you or trap you. I merely want to get the
facts. I think it ’s important for us to know the school
schedule.
The Witness: We should prepare a schedule and hand it
to you for every school, in that case.
By Mr. Carter:
Q. You mean there are differences?
A. And differences in season, difference in time.
77
Judge Huxman: Does counsel contend there is a dis
crimination in those hours between colored schools and
white schools?
Mr. Carter: We are trying to find out something which
we think is—affects the school program with regard to a
particular school in terms of—that would—it would be im
portant for us to kno'w what hours the classes are in session,
and it is for that reason I am particularly anxious to find
that out.
Judge Huxman: Do you contend there is any discrimi
nation between the hours in the colored schools and in the
white schools 1
Mr. Carter: That is not what we are directing it to, Your
Honor. We would contend there is discrimination if cer
tain facts occur with regard -to the hours that the school
operates. For example, I would be interested chiefly in
[fol. 129] Washington School. I am chiefly interested in
what the schedule is in Washington School, particularly the
first grade, kindergarten and the second to sixth grade.
Judge Huxman: Mr. Counsel, the Court feels that this is
purely a fishing expedition at this time. You don’t make
an allegation that there is discrimination in the hours of
school in colored schools as against the white schools. You
are just, by your frank admission, you are stating that you
are trying to see whether there is or not. The Court is
going to sustain this objection; going to sustain an objec
tion to this line of questioning at this time. You have an
opportunity at recess to get this schedule and go over it.
If yon can find anything material in it, why you may then
pursue this line of examination and Dr. McFarland will be
available. But just to go into a fishing expedition in all of
this line of testimony, the Court doesn’t think it ’s proper.
The objection will be sustained at this time.
Doctor, you will make available to counsel those schedules
for their examination, if you have them.
The Witness: We have them.
Judge Huxman: Then if you want to renew your request
for this examination later on, you may pursue it, but at this
time the objection is sustained.
[fol. 130] Mr. Carter: The thing I wrant to find out, I
think I can find out.
78
By Mr. Carter:
Q. Now, I would like to direct your attention to Exhibit
“ G” , which is the morning schedule, bus schedule, to take
the negro children to school, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Judge Mellott: What is your------
Mr. Carter: Exhibit “ G” .
Judge Mellott: Exhibit “ G” .
By Mr. Carter:
Q. I understand that from—from Mr. Goodell that there
was not submitted a schedule for taking the children home,
but he has advised me that that would be available. Now,
I would also like to address your attention to Exhibit “ D ”
and then we can take “ D ’ ’ and “ G ” together.
Mr. Goodell: Exhibit what ?
Mr. Carter: “ D ” .
Judge Huxman: “ D ” like in dog.
Mr. Carter: “ D ” like in dog.
By Mr. Carter:
Q. Now, I am directing your attention to both of those
schedules, both of those exhibits. I note that you—the
Board of Education paid a Miss Washington for transpor
tation of negro pupils in 1950-1951. Can you tell me what
part of the schedule on Exhibit “ G” Miss Washington
[fol. 131] handled?
Judge Huxman: What is the materiality of that?
Mr. Carter: I want to find out, Your Honor—I want to
find out the bus schedule for each—who is handling each
of the bus schedules because we think it ’s material.
Mr. Goodell: We object to this as being outside——
Judge Huxman: Will you state in what respect it ’s ma
terial.
Mr. Carter: Well, for example, I want to find out whether
Mr. Grimes handles both the schedule which is listed at
the top to Washington and the one listed at Monroe;
whether Mr. Grimes handles the 8:00 o ’clock pick-up to
79
8 :29 and then—I think I want to find out how that operates.
I want to find out what bus—which of these people handles
the taking of the children to McKinley and which handles
the taking of the children to Buchanan.
Mr. Goodell: I object to this as incompetent, irrelevant
and immaterial, and outside the scope of the issues made up
by the pleadings and the admitted stipulation of facts. The
two exhibits that he’s asked to compare with, one of them is
[fob 132] a regularly maintained bus; the other he has
called attention to are some teachers, an isolated case of a
teacher or two in the kindergarten who has taken her
private car and taken children home, which ordinarily would
be done by taxi cabs or by the bus, but to let the teacher
make a little extra money, at their request voluntarily,
she has taken them home and has been paid by the Board
of Education.
Judge Huxman: Mr. Counsel, the Court fails to see any
materiality in the question as to who drove the bus. The
Court can’t see how it makes any difference.
Mr. Carter: Let me pursue it for a moment; I won’t take
up your time, Your Honor.
By Mr. Carter:
Q. The bus schedule, as listed here, indicates that with
regard to Monroe School, children are taken to Monroe;
they begin at 8 :00 o ’clock; they are let off at Monroe School
at 8 :29. Now, it ’s my understanding—I would like to have
it cleared up—that this same bus driver and this same bus
then has a pick-up at 6th and Brannan at 8:30. Now I—
t he only way I can find that out-----
Judge Huxman: Ask the witness if he knows whether
that is a fact or not.
Mr. Carter: That is what I asked, Your Honor, whether
Mr. Grimes handled both of these schedules. Mr. Grimes is
the one who is involved in this.
[fol. 133] Mr. Goodell: Do I understand it that you chal
lenge the accurateness of that exhibit now? You want to
inquire into its accuracy, is that what you are getting at?
Mr. Carter: I would like to find out whether Mr. Grimes
handles both of these and, therefore, I have a right to, of
course, inquire into that.
8 0
Mr. Goodell: If the Court please, we renew our objection.
They have admitted the bus schedule as being accurate ex
cepting only that they stop at additional places other than
the scheduled bus stops.
Judge Huxman: The doctor may answer, if he knows.
I fail to see the materiality of it.
The Witness: I don’t know.
Mr. Carter: All right, that’s okay.
By Mr. Carter:
Q. Now, Mr. McFarland, in your schools are there any
thing that you call special rooms that you have set aside for
white children in your public school system?
A. Yes.
Q. Are there any such special rooms for negro children
in the public schools?
A. We have no special rooms for negro children. We
have health rooms for both, but not special rooms.
Q. What is the nature of these special rooms?
A. Special rooms are for groups that are, for one reason
[fol. 134] or another, unable to fit into regular classroom,
do regular work and still we would consider as public school
people.
Q. If you know, can you tell us why there are no special
rooms for negro children?
A. We haven’t had the need. We haven’t had, we felt,
sufficient numbers of them who were far enough out of line
from the regular group to warrant special rooms.
Q. Are any provisions made in the school system for hot
lunches, aside from the health rooms? I understand the
health rooms are for undernourished children.
A. That’s right.
Q. Aside from that, are any provisions made for hot
lunches?
A. Not in elementary schools.
Q. I see. Now that would apply to the negro children
regardless of the fact that whether they were too far to go
home to lunch, you make no provisions for hot lunches for
them, is that right?
A. Outside the health rooms, no provision. You under
stand we have two health rooms for four colored schools,
where we have only two health rooms for eighteen white
schools.
Q. I understand. Can you tell me, in terms of the trans
portation of pupils to school, if you know, can you tell me
what is the number of children that are transported, negro
children that are transported to school, total number.
[fol. 135J A. I couldn’t give you that figure. I don’t have
it at hand.
Q. Is that figure available!
A. We can get that for yon.
Q. Would I be able to get that from you?
A. Yes.
Mr. Carter: That’s all. . .
Judge Huxman: Any questions by defendants?
Mr. Groodell: We have no questions.
Judge Huxman: Anyone request the presence of Dr.
McFarland any further, or may he be excused?
Mr. Carter: Well, I would like for Dr. McFarland to be
able to get from him the school schedule and the number
of pupils transported, and I think-------
Dr. McFarland: You mean class schedule or hours? You
want hours?
Mr. Carter: Hours that the school is in session, that
is, including- the afternoon recess.
Judge Huxman: Can you furnish that, doctor?
Dr. McFarland: Yes.
Judge Huxman: Will you furnish that to counsel on each
side and also copies for the Court!
Dr. McFarland: Yes, sir.
(Witness excused.)
81
[ fo l. 136] L en a M ae Carper, h av in g been first duly sw orn,
assum ed the stand and testified as f o l lo w s :
Direct examination.
By Mr. John Scott:
Q. State your name to the Court please.
A. Lena Mae Carper.
Q. Are you one of the plaintiffs in this action?
6—8
82
A. Yes.
Q. Where do you live, Mrs. Carper?
A. 1217 Hillsdale.
Q. 1217.
A. Yes.
Mr. Goodell: Twelve what?
The Witness: 1217 Hillsdale.
By Mr. John Scott:
Q. Is that in the City of Topeka?
A. Yes.
Q. Are you married, Mrs. Carper?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you have children or a child of school age?
A. I have one.
Q. What is her name?
A. Katherine Louise Carper.
Q. How old is she?
A. She’s ten years old.
[fol. 137] Q. Will you state to the Court what school she
attends?
A. She attends the Buchanan School.
Q. The Buchanan School. What grade is she in?
A. Fifth grade.
Q. Fifth grade.
Mr. John Scott: For the purpose of the record, the resi
dence the plaintiff, Mrs. Carper, has testified to appears
to be in the district Gage and Randolph indicated on the
official map of Topeka, the same being Exhibit—Defend
ants’ Exhibit “ A ” .
Mr. Goodell: No, that is our exhibit “ A ” . Oh, pardon
me. Did you say was in both of those school districts?
Mr. John Scott: Yes, and it ’s also indicated on the map
in the color of red and blue.
Mr. Goodell: Do you mean it ’s in Gage and Randolph?
Mr. John Scott: Gage-Randolph.
Mr. Goodell: There are two different territories.
Mr. John Scott: She lives in the same district.
By Mr. John Scott:
Q. Now, Mrs. Carper, how does your child go to school?
A. She has to walk about four blocks on Huntoon and then
[fol. 138] has to cross the highway at Huntoon and Gage
and catch a school bus.
Q. What time does she catch the school bus!
A. The school bus is supposed to he there at 8 :40. How
ever, I go to work, and I go with her each morning she goes
to school, and sometimes it has been as high as five minutes
to nine before the bus showed up.
Q. Can you state to the Court the approximate distance
from the school—strike that—the approximate distance of
the pick-up point to the Buchanan School.
A. Oh, in the neighborhood of about—oh, I say about
twenty-four blocks, anyhow.
Q. And can you state to the Court what schools that you
live near!
A. She—we live near the Gage Park or the Randolph
School.
Q. Randolph School. And is there also a school now
under construction located at 17th and Stone!
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know the name of that school now under con
struction !
A. No, I don’t.
Q. Are you also located near that particular site?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, Mrs. Carper, do you prepare a lunch for your
child?
A. Yes.
[fol. 139] Q. Every day that she attends school?
A. Yes.
Q. Does she come home for dinner?
A. No.
Q. What time does she return home?
A. She usually gets home around 4 :30.
Q. Around 4:30. HaWe you ever had an occasion to ob
serve the number of people riding the bus that your child
rides?
A. When the bus comes for my child it ’s nearly loaded.
Q. When you say “ nearly loaded” be more explicit about
that, Mrs. Carper.
A. Sometimes it is really overloaded.
Mr. Goodell: Move to strike that answer as a conclusion
of the witness.
Judge H um an: Overruled.
By Mr. John Scott:
Q. And I believe you stated, Mrs. Carper, that there
have been times that the bus has been late, is that correct?
A. Many times.
Q. Would that he during the cold winter months?
A. Yes.
Q. And what would your child and other children be doing
at that time?
A. They would usually stand in the cold waiting for
the bus until they couldn’t stand it any longer, and then
we would take them to a small grocery store on Gage and
[fol. 140] take them in there and try to get them warm
until the bus come. When the bus come, I would get out
and hail the bus in front of the store to pick them up.
Q. Are there any shelters or any means of protection
against wmather conditions there on the corner where the
bus stops?
A. None.
Q. Is there a stop signal there at Huntoon and Gage ?
A. Absolutely none.
Q. Can you tell the Court what the traffic conditions are
where your little girl catches the bus?
Mr. Goodell: Object to this as outside the scope of the
issues and the pleadings. There is no evidence that the
Board of Education has any control over safety devices,
the installation or operation of them.
Mr. John Scott: If the Court please-------
Judge Huxman: Just a minute. The objection will be
overruled.
By Mr. John Scott:
Q, Did you understand the question?
(The last preceding question was here read by the re
porter.)
A. At that time of the morning the cars are really con
gested going along that highway. It ’s really congested
85
traffic along there at that time. In the morning most peo
ple are going to work at that time.
[fol. 141] Mr. John Scott: I believe that is all. You may
cross examine.
Mr. Goodell: No questions.
Judge Huxman: You may step down; call your next wit
ness.
(Witness excused.)
K ath er in e C arper, h av in g been first du ly sw orn , as
sum ed the stand and testified as fo llo w s :
Direct examination.
By Mr. John Scott:
Q. Katherine, don’t be nervous; these gentlemen up here
are your friends. Now, what is your name?
A. Katherine Carper.
Q. Katherine, how old are you?
A. Ten.
Q. When is your birthday?
A. February 24th.
Q. February 24th.
A. Yes.
Q. Where do you live, Katherine ?
A. 1217 Hillsdale.
Q. What—was that your mother that was just on the
stand?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know the difference between right and wrong,
[fol. 142] Katherine?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you know what it means to tell the truth, don’t
you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, Katherine, you attend Buchanan School, is that
correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you also ride the bus.
A. Yes, sir.
86
Q. I want you to tell these three gentlemen up here—
strike that. Just tell the Court how many people, the con
ditions of the bus that you ride when you catch it in the
morning,
A. It is loaded, and there is no place hardly to sit.
Q. There is no place hardly to sit, is that right!
A. No, sir.
Q. People are standing up.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you have stood on the corner when it was cold,
is that right!
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And did your hands get cold!
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now what grade are you in, Katherine!
A. Fifth.
[fol. 143] Q. Fifth grade.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know what time you arrive at school in the
morning!
A. Quarter to nine.
Q. And what time does school—what time does school
start!
A. Nine o ’clock.
Q. Nine o ’clock. And what time do you get out at noon!
A. Quarter to twelve.
Q. Quarter to twelve.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know what time the first grade gets out!
A. Eleven thirty.
Q. And do you know Mrs. Crawford!
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What grade does she teach!
A. The first and half the second.
Q. Is that at Buchanan School!
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And does she do anything else other than teach school!
A. Takes the kindergarten home.
Q. The kindergarten children home.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What time does she take the kindergarten children
home?
8 7
A. Eleven thirty.
Q. Eleven thirty. And what does she do with her class ?
[fol. 144] A. Let’s them go into Miss McBrier’s room.
Q. Mrs. McBrier?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What grade does she teach?
A. The third and half the second.
Q. The third and half the second. Is her class out at the
time that Mrs. Crawford’s children go in there?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. They are out. Katherine, I want you to tell these
three gentlemen what the conditions of the bus in the
evening are when you go home.
A. Sometimes when I get on the bus it is loaded, and
there is no place to sit.
Q. And are the children sitting on top of each other?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Goodell: We object to this whole line of leading ques
tions of counsel testifying rather than the child.
Judge Huxman: They are slightly leading, but try not to
lead the witness. The objection is overruled.
By Mr. John Scott:
Q. In your neighborhood, Katherine, do you live in a
neighborhood with white children ?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you play with them?
[fol. 145] A. Yes, sir.
Q. What schools do they go to?
A. Bandolph.
Mr. Goodell: I object to that as incompetent, irrelevant
and immaterial, outside the issue.
Judge Huxman: Objection to this line of questioning
will be sustained.
Mr. John Scott: I believe that is all.
Judge Huxman: Any questions? You may be excused.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. Goodell: If the Court please, if they will tell me
where these children live, what the distance is to the pick-up
point, we will agree to all of this and shorten this up.
88
Judge Huxman: They are entitled to make their case.
We will proceed this way, at least presently.
O liver L. B r o w n , h a v in g been first du ly sw orn , assum ed
the stand and testified as f o l lo w s :
Direct examination.
By Mr. Bledsoe:
Q. You may state your name to the Court, please.
A. Oliver Leon Brown.
Q. And where do you live, Mr. Brown?
[fol. 146] A. 511 West First Street.
Q. Are you a citizen of the United States?
A. I am.
Q. And you are a plaintiff in this lawsuit?
A. I am.
Judge Huxman: Talk a little louder, Mr. Brown.
Judge Mellott: He didn’t answer yet.
The Witness: Yes.
By Mr. Bledsoe:
Q. What is your business or occupation?
A. Carman welder.
Mr. Bledsoe: Speak a little louder.
The Witness: A carman welder.
Judge Huxman: Mr. Brown, it ’s difficult to hear you.
I wish you would make an effort to speak so we can hear you
distinctly; we want to hear what you say.
By Mr. Bledsoe:
Q. Are you married?
A. Yes.
Q. And, if so, who constitutes the members of your
family
A. I do.
Q. What I mean by that, who constitute the members of
your family?
A. I have a wife and three children.
89
Q. What are the ages of your children?
[fol. 147] A. My oldest daughter is eight years old; I
have one four and another one five months.
Q. What is the name of your daughter, oldest daughter?
A. Linda Carol Brown.
Q. In what school district or territory do you live,
Mr. Brown?
A. I live in the Sumner District.
Q. Sumner School District.
A. Yes.
Mr. Bledsoe: For the purpose of the record, if the
Court please, let it be shown that the witness resides in
Sumner School District. I think it ’s this district here
marked (indicating on exhibit)—that is colored red.
Judge Mellott: Well, I am afraid your testimony stand
ing alone isn’t too intelligent; it isn’t to me. Now, as I
understand it, Topeko is one school district, you agreed at
the pre-trial, but you said that there were certain terri
tories.
Mr. Bledsoe: Well, I may susbstitute territory for—
if I may—territory for district.
Judge Huxman: Wouldn’t it be more helpful to the
Court if you just had these witnesses locate their resi
dence with reference to the colored school that they attend,
rather than having it defined by the various territories,
[fol. 148] That is the important factor, how far they are
from school.
By Mr. Bledsoe:
Q. Now, Mr. Brown, where do you live with reference to
Monroe School?
A. Well, — stated that I live at 511 West First Street
which is fifteen blocks, approximately, from. Monroe School.
Mr. Groodell: I didn’t get that.
Judge Mellott: Fifteen blocks from Monroe School.
The Witness: Twenty-one blocks, pardon me; approxi
mately twenty-one blocks.
By Mr. Bledsoe:
Q. You are talking about now the way your daughter
has to travel to go to Monroe School, is that correct?
90
A. That is true.
Q. Does your daughter ride the school bus ?
A. Yes,
Q. All right. Now, Mr. Brown, what time does your
daughter leave home in the morning to walk to First and
Quincy, the bus pick-up point, to go to school; what time
does she leave home?
A. She leaves at twenty minutes ’till eight o ’clock.
Q. Twenty minutes of eight.
A. Every school morning.
Q. What time, or thereabouts, does she board the bus
[fol. 149] at First and Quincy?
A. Well, she is supposed to be there at eight o ’clock and
which she has been, in many instances, but many times she
has had to wait through the cold, the rain and the snow
until the bus got there, not knowing definitely what time
it gets there all the time.
Q. All right. Now, Mr. Brown, she boards that bus
about eight o ’clock. What time does she arrive at the
school?
A. She’s supposed to arrive at the school around 8:30.
Q. Eight thirty. And, as I understand it, what time does
the classes begin at school?
A. Nine o ’clock.
Q. What does your daughter do between the time the
bus arrives at the school at 8:30 and 9 :00 o ’clock?
A. Well, there is sometimes she has had to wait outside
the school until someone came to let them in, through the
winter season and likewise, many times.
Q. What else does she do, if anything?
A. Well, there is nothing she can do except stand out
and clap her hands to keep them warm or jump up and
down. They have no provisions at all to shelter them.
Q. And what you want the Court to understand is that
your daughter is conveyed to the school, she gets there
by 8 :30 in the morning, and that she has nothing to do
until school starts at 9:00 o ’clock, is that right?
[fol. 150] A. That is correct.
Q. Now, Mr. Brown, you don’t—withdraw that, please.
WThat provisions are made by the school board for your
daughter to have warm lunch, if any.
A. There are no provisions made at all.
91
Judge Huxman: Mr. Bledsoe, hasn’t it been agreed and
testified to by Dr. McFarland that no provision is made
for warm lunches!
Mr. Bledsoe: I beg your pardon; I believe you are cor
rect, if the Court please.
Judge Huxman: That stands admitted, doesn’t it!
Mr. Bledsoe: That’s right; that is all right. Let me
withdraw that, please.
By Mr. Bledsoe:
Q. Now, then, your child—you don’t get to see your child
during the daytime until she returns home in the evening,
is that right?
A. That is correct, sir.
Q. Would you, Mr. Brown, would you like to have your
daughter home, have the same opportunity of giving her
parental guidance as the white fathers and mothers might
do their child.
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Groodell: We object to the form of that question as
assuming a state of facts not in evidence and, in fact, con-
[fol. 151] trary to some of the admitted stipulation of facts.
Judge Huxman: The objection will he sustained.
By Mr. Bledsoe:
Q. But you do not see your daughter from the time she
leaves in the morning until she returns in the evening, is
that correct ?
A. I do not.
Q. What time is that?
A. She gets home around fifteen minutes to five.
Q. Fifteen minutes to five. Do you know whether or not
there is any provisions made to shelter or protect your
daughter while she is standing on the street or the desig
nated bus pick-up------
Judge Huxman: Mr. Bledsoe, that has been testified
to, and I think it ’s conceded no shelter is provided in any
of these points where colored children are picked up, is
that not so, Mr. Groodell?
Mr. Groodell: That’s right.
92
By Mr. Bledsoe:
Q. Now, Mr. Brown, what is the condition of the area
there between your residence and First and Quincy where
your daughter boards the bus?
A. Well, there are a considerable amount of railroad
tracks there; they do a vast amount of switching from
the Rock Island yards and from the time that she leaves
[fol. 152] home until she gets to Quincy, First and
Quincy, to board the bus, she has to pass all of these
switch tracks and she—also including the main thorough
fare, Kansas Avenue and First; there is a vast amount of
traffic there morning and evening when she goes and re
turns. There is no provisions at all made for safety pre
cautions to protect those children passing these thorough
fares at all.
Q. Now, Mr. Brown, if your daughter were permitted
to attend Sumner School would there be any such obstruc
tions or any such conditions as she will meet on her way to
First and Quincy?
A. Not hardly as I know of.
Q. How far is it from your residence to Sumner School?
A. Seven blocks.
-Q . Seven blocks. Mr. Brown, are you assessed a tax
for the support and maintenance of the public schools of
the City of Topeka?
A. I am.
Mr. Goodell: We object to that, if the Court please; it ’s
wholly outside the scope------
Judge- Huxman: He may answer.
The Witness: I am, sir.
By Mr. Bledsoe:
Q. Mr. Brown, do you consider it an advantage to have
a school in the neighborhood in which you live near your
home ? Do you consider that an advantage ?
[fob 153] Mr. Goodell: We object to that as incompetent,
irrelevant and immaterial what he considers.
Judge Huxman: Objection sustained.
Mr. Bledsoe: If the Court please, I believe that is really
a part of our case.
Mr. G-oodell: If the Court please, every parent would
like to have a school next door, but that is impossible.
Judge Iluxman: I think it flows naturally it ’s an ad
vantage to live closer to a school than to have one far
away. I don’t think we need to spend much time to estab
lish that fact. I think the Court will take judicial knowl
edge of the fact that if it had children of school age it
would rather have them go to a close school than one far
away.
By Mr. Bledsoe:
Q. Mr. Brown, is there a more direct route from your
residence, 511 West First Street, to the bus pick-up point
at First and Quincy; is there any more direct route than
there ?
A. Than just my family do you mean!
Q. No, for your daughter going down to the bus pick-up
point, is there a more direct route for her to travel?
A. No, there isn’t.
Q. There is not.
Judge Iluxman: Any questions?
[fol. 154] Cross-examination.
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. Mr. Brown, you see that map there, Defendants’ Ex
hibit “ A ” ?
A. I do.
Q. You understand that the portions colored there form
the school territory for the whole city of Topeka.
A. I do.
Q. And, directing your attention to the corner here or all
the area in blue, you understand that that is territory
outside of the city limits of Topeka, but in Topeka for
school purposes alone.
A. I understand.
Q. "What?
A. I understand that..
Q. You say your child goes four blocks to the bus pick-up
point.
A. She goes six blocks to the pick-up point.
93
9 4
Q. Six blocks, pardon me. Don’t you know as a matter
of fact that in many, many instances there are children
that go to the white schools in this town that go thirty and
thirty-five blocks and walk to get there.
Mr. Carter: I object to that.
The Witness: Where at?
Mr. Carter: I see no materiality to this question.
[fol. 155] Judge Huxman: Objection will be sustained.
That is not proper cross-examination of this witness.
Mr. Goodell: No further questions.
Judge Huxman: The Court will take a short recess of '
approximately ten minutes.
(The Court then, at 11:15 o ’clock a.m., stood at recess
until 11:25 o ’clock a.m., at which time the following further
proceedings were had:)
Judge Huxman: You may proceed:
D a r l e n e W a t so n , having been first duly sworn, assumed
the stand and testified as follows:
Direct examination.
By Mr. Bledsoe:
Q. State your name to the Court, please.
A. Darlene Watson.
Q. Where do you live?
A. I live at 508 West First.
Q. Do you have children of school age?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And what school do your children attend?
A. They go to Sumner.
Q. Sumner School. Are you acquainted with Oliver
Brown and his family, the Oliver Brown who just left
the stand.
A. Yes; we are neighbors.
[fol. 156] Q. You are neighbors. Now, Mrs. Watson, are
you able to tell the Court what time Linda Brown leaves
in the morning to go to school?
9 5 :
Mr. Groodell: We object to this as repetition; simply
cumulative; already been testified to.
Judge H um an: Yes, this evidence is cumulative but
plaintiff is entitled to reasonable latitude.
Mr. Groodell: We will admit the time you say is right;
we will admit that.
Judge Huxman: You may answer.
The Witness : I have watched her leave at 7 :40.
By Mr. Bledsoe:
Q. Now, do you have a son who attends Sumner School?
A. Yes.
Q. What time does you son leave; you live directly across
the street from Mr. Brown.
A. That’s right.
Q. Now, what time does your son leave to go to Sumner
School!
Mr. Groodell: We object to this as incompetent, irrelevant
and immaterial, and not tending to prove any burden within
the scope of the 14th Amendment which is what this law
suit involves, for the reason that if this is a proper in
quiry, then we have got to subpoena all of the parents
of the white children and show in some cases they live
[fol. 157] thirty-six blocks away, and they have to leave
maybe at 7:15. It ’s pure accident where families may live
close to schoolhouses. We can’t have schoolliouses next
door to everybody.
Judge Huxman: The objection will be overruled.
The Witness: My boy leaves at 8 :40, twenty minutes of
nine.
Q. Twenty minutes of nine.
A. Yes.
Q. How far is it from your home to the Sumner School?
A. I t ’s seven blocks.
Q. Seven blocks. And you just testified that Linda leaves
home at 7 :40 in the morning.
A. That’s right.
Mr. Goodell: We object to this as repetition.
Mr. Bledsoe: That is all.
Judge Huxman: Mr. Bledsoe, speaking for myself alone,
for your future guidance, I will take judicial knowledge of
96
the fact that where there are only four colored schools in
a town of this size, against eighteen white schools, that
there are innumerable instances of this kind where colored
children will go by a white school and go much farther to
[fob 158] a colored school than they would be required to
go if they had the privilege of attending the white school.
That is what you are trying to establish, isn’t it !
Mr. Bledsoe: That is, if the Court please.
Judge Huxman: I think we can take judicial knowledge
of the fact that that is inevitable where you have only four
colored schools as against eighteen white schools.
Mr. Bledsoe: That is. You may take the witness.
Mr. Goodell: No questions.
A lm a J ean G allow ay , having been first duly sworn, as
sumed the stand and testified as follows :
Direct examination.
By Mr. John Scott:
Q. State your name to the Court, please.
A. Alma Jean Galloway.
Q. Mrs. Galloway, please speak right out enough so the
Court and the reporter may hear you, please. Where do you
live, Mrs. Galloway?
A. 428 North Lake.
Q. 428 North Lake.
A. Yes.
Q. Do you have a child or children of school age?
[fol. 159] A. Yes; I have two.
Q. Have two. How old are they?
A. One is six and one is five.
Q. And do they attend any of the public schools in the
City of Topeka?
A. Washington School.
Q. Washington School. Do you know the approximate
distance Washington School is from your residence?
A. I think it ’s sixteen blocks.
Q. How do they go to school?
A. Well, they take the school bus.
97
Q. Where does the school bus pick them up!
A. On the corner of Chandler and Greeley.
Q. How far is the bus pick-up point from your residence?
A. Well, it ’s two and a half blocks.
Q. Two and a half blocks. Are you located near any
school that might be within close proximity of your home?
A. Yes, State Street School.
Q. State Street School. Have you ever had an oppor
tunity to observe the conditions of the buses that take
your children to school ?
A. Well, no, I haven’t.
Q. Are you required to fix a lunch in the morning?
A. Yes.
Q. And your children do not come home at noon, is that
[fol. 160] correct?
A. No.
Q. What time do they arrive home in the evening?
A. Well, about five or ten minutes past four.
Q. I see. And what time do they leave in the morning?
A. About between 8 :20 and 8 :25.
Mr. John Scott: That will be all. You may cross-examine.
Judge Huxman: Any cross-examination?
Mr. Goodell: No.
Judge Huxman: You may step down.
(Witness excused.)
S adie E m a n u e l , h av in g been first du ly sw orn, assum ed
the stand and testified as fo l lo w s :
Direct examination.
By Mr. John Scott:
Q. State your name to the Court, please.
A. Mrs. Sadie Emanuel.
Q. Are you one of the plaintiffs in this actions, Mrs.
Emanuel?
A. I am.
Q. Where do you live?
A. I live at 1606 East Third.
Q. 1606 East Third Street.
7—8
[fol. 161] A. Yes.
Q. Are you a parent of children of school age!
A. I have one boy in school.
Q. How old is he!
A. He is nine years old.
Q. And what school does he attend!
A. He attends Washington School.
Q. Washington School.
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know the approximate distance Washington
is from your home!
A. Well, I don’t know just exactly, but I imagine it
would be from our place to Washington around about
fifteen or sixteen blocks, I just imagine; I don’t know.
Q. How does your child travel to school?
A. I send him to school on the city bus.
Q. State to the Court why you send your child to school
on the city bus.
A. Well, when he was in kindergarten, the kindergarten
teacher she picked him up at our home, and then he would
return on the school bus in the evenings, and I would
meet the school bus which he had about five blocks to come
from the bus line when he was in kindergarten, and
the reason why that I stopped him—after he got out of
kindergarten and started in the first grade when I would
[fol. 162] meet the school bus the children would be hang
ing out of the bus and when they would get so far the other
larger children would push the smaller children on the
ground, and I bought him a cap and when he came home he
said some of the children pulled his cap off and threw
it out of the bus, so we were only just one block from the
city bus, and he has been riding on the city bus ever since,
and I just didn’t like it because it seemed that there wasn’t
any order on the school bus, and I just didn’t like the con
dition; it was so crowded and congested until I just didn’t
like the idea so I send him to school on the city bus.
Q. And you pay his fare each and every day.
A. I sure do.
Q. Approximately how long have you been doing that,
Mrs. Emanuel?
A. Ever since he has been in the first grade.
Q. What grade is he in now?
99
A. He is going into the fourth.
Q. Do you prepare a lunch for him in the morning!
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Therefore he stays at school and eats his lunch, is that
right!
A. Yes.
Judge Huxman: Mr. Counsel, can’t we stipulate and
[fol. 163] agree that in all instances lunches are prepared,
and the colored students stay from the time they come
there in the morning until they go home at night.
Mr. Goodell: That would be true as to the children trans
ported, but it is not an accurate statement as to------
Judge Huxman: That is what I mean, as to those who are
transported. Can we stipulate that into the record that
all colored school children who are transported stay at the
school from the morning; they take their lunch with them
and leave the school building only when school is com
pleted in the afternoon.
Mr. John Scott: Yes, sir.
Mr. Goodell: The stipulation ought to be that they are
not required to stay.
Judge Huxman: They are not required but, of necessity,
they do that.
Mr. John Scott: Convenience.
Judge Huxman: They have no place else to go.
Mr. Goodell: Which is precisely like it is in the white
schools where children live far away.
Judge Huxman: We will not add that on to it.
Mr. John Scott: That is your case.
[fol. 164] Judge Huxman: Nothing gained by asking each
witness whether they prepare the lunch and whether their
children stay there and don’t come home until evening
because that seems to be the pattern.
By Mr. John Scott:
Q. Is there a school located near your home!
A. Two blocks.
Q. Two blocks. What’s the name of that school!
A. Lafayette School.
Q. Lafayette School.
Mr. John Scott: I believe that is all.
100
Judge Huxman: Any questions; cross-examination!
Mr. Goodell: No.
S h irley M ae H odisox, having been first duly sworn,
assumed the stand and testified as follows:
Direct Examination.
By Mr. John Scott:
Q. State your name to the Court, please.
A. Shirley Mae Hodison.
Q. Are you one of the plaintiffs in this action!
A. Yes.
Q. Where do you live!
A. 734 Garfield.
[fol. 165] Q. Do you have a child or children of school
age!
A. I have one of school age.
Q. What is his name!
A. Charles Hodison, Jr.
Q. How old is he!
A. He is nine.
Q. Do you know what grade he is in!
A. He is in the fifth.
Q. What school does he attend.
A. Buchanan.
Judge Mellott: What school!
The Witness: Buchanan.
By Mr. John Scott:
Q. Does he ride the school bus!
A. Yes, he does.
Q. What time does he—do you prepare him to catch the
school bus in the morning!
A. Well, I have him to leave about ten after eight.
Mr. Goodell: If the Court please, we don’t' want to be
obstreperous. We object to this whole line of questioning
on the basis that it could not furnish the basis of recovery,
distance travelled, and a long line of decisions by the federal
101
courts have held that that is not such a situation that would
invoke the 14th Amendment. I have a long line of decisions
on that.
Mr. John Scott: We have------
[fol. 166] Mr. Goodell: That is, those are disparities that
are bound up here in any school system, and it occurs
within the white districts and that that is not a ground for
invoking the equal protection of the laws.
Judge Huxman: The objection will be overruled and,
if a study of the authorities should convince the Court that
this testimony is incompetent, of course, it would be dis
regarded in reaching our conclusion. We can’t stop to
analyze all the cases at this stage.
By Mr. John Scott:
Q. What time did you say he left for school?
A. Ten after eight.
Q. Is that the time the bus arrives!
A. It ’s supposed to be there about a quarter after.
Q. And where do you catch the bus?
A. On 7th and Garfield.
Q. On 7th and Garfield. That is a block from your home.
A. Just about; I live the second house from the corner
of 8th and Garfield.
Q. Do you know the approximate distance Buchanan
School is from your home ?
A. I am not sure; I believe it ’s about eight blocks, I
imagine.
Q. Would you say twelve?
A. I am not sure.
Q. Do you know what time your child arrives at school?
[fol. 167] A. No, I don’t.
Q. Is there a school located near your home?
A. Yes.
Q. What’s the name of that school?
A. Clay.
Q. Clay School.
Mr. John Scott: It has already been stipulated about the
lunches so we don’t have to go into that.
Judge Huxman: Any questions?
Mr. Goodell: No questions.
102
J ames V . R ichardson , h av in g been first du ly sw orn, as
sum ed the stand and testified as f o l lo w s :
Direct examination.
By Mr. Bledsoe:
Q. State your name to the Court, please.
A. James V. Richardson.
Q. Where do you live, Mr. Richardson?
A. 1035 Jewell.
Q. 1035 Jewell. Do you have a—children of school age?
A. One boy.
Q. What is his name?
A. Ronald.
Q. Did you tell me how old he was?
A. Seven years old.
ffol. 168] Q. Seven years old. What school does he now
attend ?
A. Holy Name School.
Q. The Holy Name. That is a parochial school?
A. That’s right, sir.
Q. Why do you send your child to a parochial school,
M r.------
A. Simply because I do not believe in segregation.
Mr. Goodell: Move to strike out that testimony as in
competent, irrelevant and immaterial.
Judge Huxman: The objection will be overruled.
By Mr. Bledsoe:
Q. Now, did your child ever attend Buchanan School?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How far is Buchanan School from you?
A. Oh, approximately ten or eleven blocks.
Q. How far is Lowman School from------
A. Two or three blocks.
Q. Two or three blocks.
Mr. Bledsoe: I believe that’s all.
Judge Huxman: Any questions?
Mr. Goodell: No questions. You may step down.
(Witness excused.)
103
[fol. 169] L ucinda T odd, having been first duly sworn,
assumed the stand and testified as follows:
Direct examination.
By Mr. Bledsoe:
Q. State your name to the Court, please.
A. Lucinda Todd.
Q. Where do you live, Mrs. Todd?
A. At 1007 Jewell.
Q. Do you have a daughter of school age?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Now what school does your daughter attend?
A. Buchanan.
Q. Buchanan School. How far is Buchanan School from
your residence?
A. About ten blocks.
Q. About ten blocks. Is there a school nearer your home
than------
A. Yes, there is.
Q. What school is that?
A. Lowman Hill.
Q. How far is that school from your residence?
A. About three blocks.
Q. Does your child ride the bus?
A. Yes, she does.
Q. What time does she leave in the morning?
[fol. 170] A. About twenty minutes of nine.
Q. About twenty minutes of nine. And of course she
doesn’t return for the noontime.
A. No.
Q. She does not, What time does your daughter get
home in the evening?
A. About four fifteen, four twenty.
Q. And she rides—comes home on the bus, does she?
A. Yes, she does.
Q. Have you noticed the condition of that bus as to how
many rides it?
A. Yes, I have; it ’s very crowded.
Q. Mrs. Todd, do you know of any instances where your
daughter suffered from waiting for the school bus?
104
A. Oh, many instances; she has been stranded on the
corner waiting for the bus from a half-hour to forty-five
minutes many times.
Mr. Bledsoe: I believe that is all.
Judge Huxman: Any questions!
Mr. Gfoodell: No questions.
Judge Huxman: You may step down, please.
(Witness excused.)
[fol. 171] M arguerite E m m erso x , having been first du ly
sworn, assumed the stand and testified as follows:
Direct examination.
By Mr. John Scott:
Q. State your name to the Court, please.
A. Marguerite Emmerson.
Q. Are you one of the plaintiffs in this action?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. Where do you live ?
A. 1029 Grand.
Q. Are you a parent of a child or children of school age?
A. Yes, I have two.
Q. What are their names?
A. Claude Arthur and George Robert.
Q. How old are they?
A. They are nine and eight—nine and seven.
Q. Do you know what grades they are in?
A. They are in the second and fourth grades.
Q. What school do they attend?
A. Buchanan.
Q. How do they get to school?
A. On the school bus.
Q. What time does the school bus pick up your children?
A. Around a quarter to nine and ten minutes to nine,
[fol. 172] Q. Where do they catch the bus?
A. On 11th and Woodward.
Q. Has there ever been any instances that your children
have missed the bus ?
A. Yes, there has been.
105
Q. You can state to the Court what you did, if anything.
A. Well, they have missed the bus, and I have called the
school, and they have sent the bus back after them.
Q. They sent the bus back after them.
A. Yes.
Q. Have there been any instances that they missed the
bus and your child didn’t go to school at all?
A. No, because when he has missed the bus before that
I have sent him on the city bus.
Q. On the city bus, I see. Is there a school located near
your residence?
A. Yes, there is.
Q. What’s the name of that school?
A. Lowman Hill.
Q. How far is it from your residence?
A. About five blocks.
Q. About five blocks.
Mr. John Scott: That is all. You may cross examine.
Mr. Goodell: No questions.
[fob 173] Judge Huxman: Step down, please.
(Witness excused.)
Z elm a H enderson , having been first duly sworn, assumed
the stand and testified as follows:
Direct examination.
By Mr. Bledsoe:
Q. State your name to the Court, please.
A. Zelma Henderson.
Q. Where do you live, Mrs. Henderson?
A. 1307 North Jefferson.
Q. Now, Mrs. Henderson, do you have children of school
age?
A. Yes, I do; I have two.
Q. What school does your children attend?
A. McKinley.
Q. How old are your children?
106
A. Seven and five.
Q. Seven and five. Do you have a child in the kinder
garten now?
A. Yes, she just completed the kindergarten.
Q. In what grade—the other?
A. In the first grade.
Q. Is there a school nearer your residence than McKinley
School ?
A. Yes, there is.
[fol. 174] Q. How far is that school from------
A. I would say approximately five blocks.
Q. What is the name of that school?
A. Quincy.
Q. What time does your children leave home in the
morning?
A. All the way from 8 :15 to 8 :30.
Q. Do they ride the bus?
A. Yes, they do.
Q. And, of course, they don’t come back for lunch.
A. No; the little girl did at noon, of course, but the little
boy stayed all day.
Q. What time would they return home in the evening?
A. About 4:15.
Q. Now, tell the Court whether or not you prepare
lunches for your son.
A. Yes, I prepare lunch but------
Mr. G-oodell: Object to this as having already been
stipulated to.
Mr. Bledsoe: If the Court please, I have something else
I want to------
Judge Huxman: All right, you may ask.
By Mr. Bledsoe:
Q. Do you prepare lunch for your son?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Tell the Court whether or not your son is able to eat
his lunches.
[fol. 175] A. My son------
Mr. Goodell: We object to that; that might depend on a
lot of things rather than that the school board------
Judge Huxman: I think the objection will be sustained.
107
By Mr. Bledsoe:
Q. Have you noticed any physical difference in your
son due to his eating the lunch?
A. Yes.
Mr. Goodell: Wait a minute. We object to this as this
witness is not qualified to give an opinion of that character.
Judge Huxman: Objection sustained.
By Mr. Bledsoe:
Q. Have you observed your son; what was his condition?
A. One month after starting to first grade he was ill.
Mr. Goodell: Just a minute, we object to that unless—we
are not trying the physical elements of these children unless
it ’s connected up with discrimination and violation of the
14th Amendment.
Judge Huxman: I think the answer would be immaterial.
Furthermore, the question is so vague; you couldn’t tell
what condition was referred to. What effect the eating of a
lunch would have upon one individual wouldn’t throw any
light on the constitutional question involved. The objection
[fol. 176] is sustained.
Mr. Bledsoe: That will be all. Thank you.
Mr. Goodell: No questions.
(Witness excused.)
S ilas H ardrick F lem in g , having been first duly sworn,
assumed the stand and testified as follows:
Direct examination.
By Mr. John Scott:
Q. State your name to the Court, please.
A. Silas Hardrick Fleming.
Q. Where do you live, Mr. Fleming?
A. 522 Liberty.
Q. Are you a parent of a child or children of school age?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What are there—how many?
A. Two,
108
Q. What are their names?
A. Silas Hardrick Fleming, Jr., and Duane Dean Fleming.
Q. And state to the Court their ages?
A. Well, ten and seven.
Mr. Goodell: What was that again, please?
The Witness: Ten and seven.
By Mr. John Scott:
Q. What school do they attend?
A. Washington School.
[fol. 177] Q. Do you know the approximate distance Wash
ington is from your school—I mean from your home.
A. Oh, between ten, twelve blocks, I would say; I don’t
know the exact distance.
Q. How do they get to school?
A. They ride the East Tenth Street bus.
Q. They don’t ride the school bus.
A. No.
Q. You state to the Court why they don’t ride the school
bus.
A. Well, the school bus is about six or eight blocks away.
It comes across Brannan Street ; that is about six or seven
blocks away from Sixth and Liberty.
Q. You mean that is the pick-up point?
A. That’s right.
Q. I see. Go ahead. Well, how far do you have—the
children have to walk to catch the regular city bus ?
A. Half a block going to school and about a block starting
home.
Q. Do you pay their fare?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Each and every day?
A. That’s right.
Q. Is there a school located near your home?
A. Yes, there is one two blocks away from me, and there
[fol. 178] is one about four or five blocks. They pass two
schools going to their school.
Q. They pass two schools.
A. Two white schools, yes.
Q. What’s the name of those schools, if you know?
A. Lafayette is one and Parkdale the other.
109
Q. Which of the two schools is closer to your home?
A. How’s that?
Q. Which of the two schools that you just mention are
closer to your home?
A. I guess it ’s Parkdale; it ’s two blocks away, Parkdale.
Q. You are mistaken------
A. It ’s Lafayette.
Q. That’s right. Is there any other reason you don’t
permit your children to ride the school bus ?
A. How’s that?
Q. Is there any other reason that you don’t permit your
children to ride the regular school bus?
A. N o; my only reason is that it ’s just about as far away
from the bus as they wmuld be from the school. They are
only a few blocks away from the school to pick up the bus.
I will ask the Court, Your Honor------
Judge Mellott: I can’t hear the witness.
The Witness: I would ask this for a few minutes to ex
plain why I got into the suit whole soul and body.
[fol. 179] Mr. Gloodell: We object to the voluntary state
ment.
Judge Huxman: I can’t hear what you say.
Mr. G-oodell: He wants to explain why he got in with the
other plaintiffs to bring this lawsuit.
Mr. John Scott: He has a right to do that.
Judge Huxman: Didn’t you consent to be a plaintiff in
this case?
The Witness: That’s right.
Judge Huxman: You did not?
Judge Mellott: He said he did, but he wants to tell the
reason why.
The Witness: I want to tell the cause.
Judge Huxman: You want to tell the Court why you
joined this lawsuit?
The Witness: That’s right.
Judge Huxman: All right, go ahead and tell it.
The Witness: Well, it wasn’t for the sake of hot dogs;
it wasn’t to cast any insinuations that our teachers are not
capable of teaching our children because they are supreme,
extremely intelligent and are capable of teaching* my kids or
white or black kids. But my point was that not only I and
1 1 0
my children are craving light, the entire colored race is
[fol. 180] craving light, and the only way to reach the light
is to start our children together in their infancy and they
come up together.
Judge Huxman: All right, now you have answered and
given us your reason.
The Witness: That was my reason.
Mr. John Scott: Thank you.
By Mr. John Scott:
Q. Just one more question, Mr. Fleming. What time do
your children leave in the morning to go to school?
A. About 8 :20.
Q. What time do they get home in the evening?
A. Oh, about 4 :10 or 4 :15; sometimes the bus is a little
early and sometimes late.
Judge Huxman: The Court is going to adjourn presently
at 12:00 o ’clock. Before we adjourn, we would like to re
quest that counsel on both sides meet with the Court in the
district courtroom chambers.
We will adjourn to 1 :30. We would like to have counsel
meet us at 1 :15 in the district courtroom chambers.
You may announce a recess of the court until 1 :30.
(The court then, at 12:00 o ’clock noon, stood at recess
until 1 :30 o ’clock p.m., at which time court was reconvened
[fol. 181] and the following further proceedings were had:)
Judge Huxman: You may proceed.
Mr. G-oodell: If the Court please, we do have one of the
records that was asked for on the schedule, the hourly
schedule, of the elementary schools. I have that record.
Judge Huxman: Is that what they promised to furnish?
Mr. G-oodell: Yes.
Judge Huxman: I don’t think we have that in the record
here. One of those should be marked.
Mr. Goodell: Dr. McFarland said he would furnish it.
It was what the witness, McFarland, Dr. McFarland said he
would furnish.
Judge Huxman: And that has been prepared.
Mr. Goodell: This is it.
Judge Huxman: Is this offered as an exhibit in the case?
I l l
Mr. Groodell: Yes.
Judge Mellott: What is the next exhibit number, Mr.
Clerk?
The Clerk: “ N ” .
Judge Mellott: “ N ” . Let it be admitted as Defendants’
Exhibit “ N ” .
[fol. 182] Defendants’ Exhibit “ N ” , having* been offered
and received in evidence, is contained in the case file.
H ugh W. S peer, h av in g been first duly sworn, assum ed
the stand and testified as follows:
Direct examination.
By Mr. Greenberg:
Q. Will you please tell the Court your name.
A. Hugh W. Speer.,
Q. And what is your occupation ?
A. I am chairman of the Department of Education at the
University of Kansas City.
Q. Have you ever been in public school work, Mr. Speer?
A. Yes, I was in public school work in Kansas for about
twelve years.
Q. You mentioned the Department of Education, Uni
versity of Kansas City, what is the function of the Depart
ment of Education?
A. Our chief function at the present time is the training
of elementary school teachers.
Q. Do you train teachers eligible to teach in Kansas ?
A. Yes, and a number of them. do.
Q. How many members are on the teaching staff of your
Education Department under your supervision?
[fol. 183] A. At the present about twenty.
Q. Do you have any other responsibilities at your uni
versity ?
A. Well, I am a member of the President’s Advisory
Committee; I am chairman of the Curriculum Committee
of the university.
Q. Do you regularly come into contact with elementary
schools ?
112
A. Yes, we conduct an elementary school of our own.
We call it the demonstration school in the summer. We do
practice teaching in the public schools in our locality,
which means we are in and out of the schools constantly.
Q. Would you tell us something of your educational back
ground, Dr. Speer; where did you attend public school!
A. Attended public schools at Olathe, Kansas.
Q. And what universities did you attend and what de
grees do you hold?
A. I hold a Bachelor’s Degree from American Univer
sity in Washington, D. C., a Master’s Degree from George
Washington University, and a PhD. Degree from the Uni
versity of Chicago.
Q. What was your major field in your doctorate?
A. Evaluation.
Q. Would you please explain to the Court what evalua
tion means.
A. Evaluation is a rather general term. We sometimes
evaluate educational programs or buildings or the behavior
changes that are produced in children as a result of educa-
[fol. 184] tional programs.
Q. Do you belong to any professional organizations, Dr.
Speer?
A. I am a key member of the National Education Associ
ation, a member of the Missouri State Teachers Association,
a member of the National Vocational Guidance Association;
that is about it.
Q. Do you hold any honors or scholarships?
A. I have recently been granted a Fullbright scholarship
by the United States Department of State to lecture on
education in Iran.
Q. What will be the purpose of your visit in Iran?
A. I will work through the University of Tehran to help
improve the school system of Iran.
Q. Dr. Speer, have you ever made an examination of the
elementary schools of Topeka?
A. Yes.
Q. When?
A. During the last month.
Q. Why did you make this examination, Dr. Speer?
A. At the request of counsel for plaintiffs.
113
Q. What aspects of the schools did you examine during
your examination?
A. We examined the more important aspects that we
thought had a bearing on the major issues in this case. We
[fol. 185] have examined the buildings, the curriculum, the
equipment, the library, the preparation and experience of
the teaching staff and the salaries, the class loads, the size
of classes and a few other minor points.
Q. Now, I am going to ask you some questions about
your findings. What did you find concerning the compari
son of teachers in the colored schools with those of the
white schools?
A. I fourfd only minor differences between the two
groups, and these differences tend to balance each other.
For example, in preparation, all the colored teachers have
Bachelor’s degree and all but 15% of the white teachers
have Bachelor’s degrees. On the other hand, in terms of
Master’s degrees, 12% of the colored teachers have Mas
ter’s degree and 15% of the white teachers hold Master’s
degrees. The colored teachers average twenty years of
experience, and the white teachers nineteen years.
Q. Dr. Speer, what did you find concerning class size and
teaching load; would you explain to the Court what teach
ing load is?
A. Teaching load is the number of pupils which the
teacher has each clay and, again, here I found not much
difference. There is some difference at the kindergarten
level where the colored kindergartens are somewhat
smaller. I think the white average is 42; the colored aver-
[fol. 186] age about 25. But, in grades 1 to 6, the average
is very close together; 34 in the white schools and 32 in the
colored schools. Again, I would say, I found no significant
difference in teacher load or teacher preparation.
Q. In examining the two sets of schools, negro and white,
did you find any provisions for special rooms in any of
these ?
A. I found provision for two special rooms for white
children; I found no provision for special rooms for any
colored children.
Q. Now, did you study all of the school buildings in
Topeka, Dr. Speer?
8—8
A. Yes, we examined data in the Board of Education files
on all school buildings, and we personally visited, Dr.
Buchanan and I and some of my other assistants, we visited
about two-thirds of the schools in the city.
Judge Hill: If counsel will let me interrupt, what do you
mean by special rooms?
Mr. Greenberg: Well, if I may explain, in the white
schools there are rooms for specially retarded or handi
capped children, whereas in the negro schools there are
none.
Judge Hill: Very well.
By Mr. Greenberg:
Q. Did you examine these schools with regard to their age
and their insured value?
A. Yes. We------
[f'ol. 187] Judge Huxman: With regard to what?
Mr. Greenberg: Regard to their age and insured value.
The Witness: On the revised list furnished by the Board
of Education we secured the ages of the buildings and also
from the insured values of buildings, as provided by the
Board of Education, in the exhibits, we made a study of the
current values in terms of the insured values.
By Mr. Greenberg:
Q. Why did you use insurance value rather than con
struction cost, Dr. Speer?
A. Construction cost back over the sixty-year period
dates these buildings would vary a great deal which is
obvious. Therefore, we could not make comparisons on
construction cost; but we assumed that the Board of Educa
tion and their insurance companies have arrived accurately
at the current value of buildings, and that those values are
reflected in the insurance figures furnished by the board.
Q. Is the total insurance value—does the total insurance
value of the building reflect accurately the value of the
building as broken down into instructional units?
Mr. Goodell: We object to this testimony from this wit
ness. There is no foundation laid for his expert knowledge
about evaluating of physical property. The testimony
114
115
[fol. 188] shows lie is an educator, that is true. That is in
the field of engineering and architects.
Judge Huxman: The question presupposes a knowledge
he might not have because sometimes you only insure a
building for three-fourths of its value and others may be
insured for 100%.
Mr. Gloodell: Plus the additional reason for the objection
is that it stands admitted the physical value of the physical
plants on two exhibits.
Judge Huxman: We will let the witness answer.
Mr. Greenberg: May I ask him whether or not, as an
educational expert he has been trained in evaluating the
physical plants of buildings?
Judge Huxman: On the basis of insurance ?
Mr. Greenberg: On the basis of insurance.
Judge Huxman: Mr. Counsel, here’s the difficulty with
that question: Suppose it is the policy of the board to insure
Buildings for 25% of their—75%------
Mr. Greenberg: I intend to bring out an explanation of
that particular factor.
Judge Huxman: You don’t know the basic of the insur
ance.
Mr. Greenberg: They insure on the basis of 80%, Your
Honor, and I intend to bring that out.
[fol. 189] Judge Hill: That would be hearsay from this
witness, wouldn’t it?
Mr. Greenberg: It has been admitted in evidence by
stipulation.
Judge Hill: All right.
Judge Huxman: They are insured at 80% of their value,
is that in the stipulation?
Mr. Greenberg: Your printed sheet of insurance values
of each building; the one you have right there.
Mr. Goodell: No, that doesn’t mean that. We have got
an insurance clause that 80% on total loss is paid; that is
the type of insurance, but that doesn’t mean that their in
surability of the buildings is limited to 80%.
Judge Huxman: I think the objection to the question will
be sustained.
116
By Mr. Greenberg:
Q. Dr. Speer, in making your evaluation, did you take into
account the fact that some buildings might have had some
unused classrooms?
A. Yes.
Q. What significance did you ascribe to that fact?
A. Well, an unused classroom is very limited value to
the school. We assume that as most schools operate one
class with one teacher, can profitably use one classroom,
[fol. 190] Q. Now, did you conduct a visual inspection
of any of the buildings in Topeka as well as inspecting the
records which you have indicated?
A. Yes, we did.
Q. How many schools did you inspect visually?
A. We inspected I think it was fourteen directly.
Q. And what criteria did you use to determine which
schools you would evaluate merely on the basis of the
records and which schools you would evaluate by a personal
visit ?
A. We first examined the records on all of them, and
then, in order to substantiate our findings, we thought we
should visit at least a representative sample and we visited
in all two-thirds of them, making sure we got the older
buildings and the newer buildings and some of the medium-
aged buildings so that we would have a representation of
the complete range.
Q. What criteria did you use in your visit?
A. We used the usual criteria that are recognized in
this area, such as sight, the nature of the structure, the
plan of the building, the classrooms, the service rooms, the
kindergartens, library books, the supplies, the safety fea
tures, the maintenance features. I might add these are the
kind of features that are included by such authorities as
Holly and Arnold in their scorecard for elementary school
[fol. 191] buildings. Dr. Holly is from the Ohio State Uni
versity and Dr. Arnold is from the University of Pennsyl
vania.
Mr. Goodell: We object to this as hearsay, about what
some book says about evaluation.
Judge Huxman: He is testifying as to the basis of his
117
knowledge of works on this. I think it ’s competent. This
is an expert witness. He may testify.
Judge Mellott: There seems to be no unanswered ques
tion.
By Mr. Greenberg:
Q. In order to save the time of the Court, Dr. Speer, did
you make any general observations that seemed to apply
to all of the buildings you visited?
A. Yes, I think I can. First of all, in regard to gymna
siums and auditoriums, the facilities, all in all, seemed to
be about equal between the colored schools and the white
schools. Three-fourths of the colored schools have a com
bined gymnasium-auditorium, and we would say approxi
mately that proportion of the white schools have similar
facilities. However, I should add that none of the colored
schools have anything like the luxurious facilities that we
would find in the Oakland building or the State Street build
ing or the Gage Building, for example.
Q. How do the various------
A. I might, if I may------
Q. Go ahead.
[fol. 192] A. —add one or two other general observations
to save time. The buildings are all well kept, well preserved,
and I think well maintained. Dr. Buchanan and I felt that
that was equal throughout the system.
Q. How do the buildings compare as to their ages, Dr.
Speer?
A. The ages of the white buildings average twenty-seven
years, according- to the figures furnished by the board, and
the ages of the colored buildings thirty-three years. In
other words, the white buildings average six years newer.
However, I think we should add another feature here. Inas
much as the newer buildings tend to be larger, we found this
to be the case, that according to last year’s enrollment
figures, 45% of the white children attend schools that were
newer than the newest colored building's, whereas 14% of
the white children attended schools that were older than the
oldest colored building. To state another kind of a compari
son, 66%, or two-thirds, of all white children attend schools
that are newer than the average age of the colored buildings.
Q. Dr. Speer, how do the colored schools compare to the
118
white schools in regard to the insured value per available
classroom?
A. The average for the white schools is $10,517, and the
average for the colored schools is $6,317. Or, stated another
way, the insured value per available classroom is 66%
[fol. 193] higher in the white schools.
Q. Dr. Speer, did you examine the curriculum in the
schools in the City of Topeka?
A. Yes.
Q. Tell the Court what you mean by “ curriculum” , also.
A. By “ curriculum” we mean something more than the
course of study. As commonly defined and accepted now,
“ curriculum” means the total school experience of the
child. Now, when it comes to the mere prescription of the
course of study, we found no significant difference. But,
when it comes to the total school experience of the child,
there are some differences. In other words, we consider
that education is more than just remembering something.
It is concerned with a child’s total development, his person
ality, his personal and social adjustment. Therefore it be
comes the obligation of the school to provide the kind of an
environment in which the child can learn knowledge and
skills such as the three “ B ’s ” and also social skills and
social attitudes and appreciations and interests, and these
considerations are all now part of the curriculum.
Q. I see, Dr. Speer. Do you have anything further to say?
A. Yes. And we might add the more heterogeneous the
group in which the children participate, the better than can
function in our multi-cultural and multi-group society. For
example, if the colored children are denied the experience
[fol. 194] in school of associating with white children, who
represent 90'% of our national society in which these colored
children must live, then the colored child’s curriculum is
being greatly curtailed. The Topeka curriculum or any
school curriculum cannot be equal under segregation.
Q. Dr. Speer, I would like to go through these—through
the school system rather rapidly now school by school and
have you point out key characteristics you found as to each
school.
What did you find concerning the Buchanan School in
regard to these?
A. The Buchanan School is thirty years old; the insurance
119
value per available classroom is $5,623. It bas five rooms,
all of which are in use, including a double room divided with
sliding doors that is used for an auditorium and also for a
playroom. The furniture is quite old, reflecting the age of
the building. The site and playground is only fairly ade
quate. The books in the building are generally old and in
poor condition. Many titles date back to the 1920’s and
even some before 1920.
Q. What did you find concerning Gage School, Dr. Speer ?
A. The Gage School, a white school, is twenty-three years
old and has an insured value per classroom of a little more
—of $9,136. It has fifteen classrooms all in use. The build
ing is more crowded than most, although the classes run
[fob 195] about average for the system. It has a good
auditorium with—it’s combination—it has a kitchenette that
adjoins the auditorium and has an attractive kindergarten
room with murals, toilet facilities and a fireplace; and also
it has some old titles among the books, but a fair proportion
of the books in this building are of a newer and better —
than we found elsewhere. It has a very excellent and
spacious playground.
Q. Concerning Lafayette School, Dr. Speer.
A. Lafayette is forty-eight years old, has an insurance
value per classroom of $3,373.
Mr. Goodell: While he is making his testimony, would it
be better if he designates which are the white schools.
Mr. Greenberg : Dr. Speer, when you describe a school,
tell us also whether it ’s a negro school or white school.
The Witness: Thus far------
By Mr. Greenberg:
Q. Buchanan is what?
A. Colored.
Q. What about Gage?
A. White.
Q. What about Lafayette?
A. Is white. The Lafayette building is forty-eight years
old, insured for $3,373. Although not the oldest, this is
[fob 196] certainly one of the poorest buildings in Topeka.
The comprehensive plan suggested in 1942 by the planning
commission recommended that it be abandoned but it still
120
houses 300 pupils. Small, the auditorium is small, and the
playground is small. The kindergarten is fair; hooks are
only fair. There are two fire escapes, but the safety factor
is somewhat questionable partly due to the number of
children who are housed in the building.
Q. Tell us your findings concerning the McKinley School,
Dr. Speer.
A. McKinley is a colored school; it ’s forty-four years
old. It ’s insured value per available classroom is $2,477.
The building was well constructed. It has wooden floors and
stairs, which make it something of a fire hazard. It has one
fire escape. Approximately three-fourths of the books were
too old to be suitable for school use. The comprehensive
plan for the City of Topeka, prepared by the City Commis
sioner—
Mr. Goodell: If the Court please, we object to this witness
telling about some book comprehensive plan. It ’s outside
the scope of the issues in this case; secondly, it ’s not the best
evidence; it ’s hearsay as far as this witness is concerned.
Mr. Greenberg: If the Court please, may I ask Dr. Speer
whether such city plans and city surveys are things which
[fob 197] an educator customarily studies in making an
evaluation.
Judge Huxman: What comprehensive plan are you re
ferring to, Doctor?
The Witness: I am referring, Your Honor------
Judge Huxman: Bartholomew plan?
The Witness : I am referring, Your Honor, to the one that
was mentioned in court this morning that was prepared
jointly by the Board of Education, the City Commissioners,
and, I think------
Mr. Goodell: Now, if the Court please, that is this wit
ness’ idea that it was prepared jointly.
Judge Huxman: That plan was ruled out. We haven’t
received or permitted any evidence concerning that plan.
I think the witness should refrain from reference to this
comprehensive plan.
The Witness: This—the site of the McKinley building is
not at all attractive and hardly adequate for school pur
poses. In other words, we might say it has very poor
aesthetic value.
121
By Mr. Greenberg:
Q. Would you tell us what you found concerning Monroe
School f
A. Monroe. Colored building, is twenty-four years old;
it ’s valued at $9,760. This is, in our judgment, the best of
the colored buildings. I t ’s well constructed, has tile floors,
[fol. 198] Again, however, many of the books are too old for
good school use. The site is rather small, and the building
and site are not very attractive.
Q. And tell us about what you found concerning Oakland
School, Dr. Speer.
A. The Oakland School is white; it ’s only one year old.
I t ’s insured value per available classroom is $23,906. It ’s
a beautiful structure. It ’s about the last word in school
buildings; has modern furniture, asphalt tile floors, acousti
cal ceilings, good lighting, good heating, darkroom for
audio-visual aids, office vault, public address system for use
of radio programs, music programs, has a beautiful, large
combination auditorium-gymnasium very suitable for com
munity gatherings and parent meetings, large dining and
social room with a kitchen adjoining; well adapted for com
munity meetings; has a beautiful kindergarten room with
new equipment; the books still not ideal but they are very
good. All in all, it ’s an excellent building that should pro
vide for one of the best educational opportunities.
Q. And tell the Court what you found concerning the
Parkdale School.
A. The Parkdale, white, is age twenty-seven, value $8,016.
The building appears to have been rather poorly con
structed. It has a stucco exterior for the most part. It is
[fol. 199] in rather an attractive location with ample play
ground area. The kindergarten room is quite dull; the books
are just fairly good.
Q. And would you do the same concerning* the Polk
School.
A. The Polk School, for white children, is sixty-four years
old; it ’s the oldest building in Topeka. It ’s insured value
per room is $2,547. It is the oldest building in Topeka, but
it is not, in my judgment, the worst building. It is sur
prisingly substantial, surprisingly attractive on the inside.
Has a nice auditorium, two playrooms in the basement, built
122
of native stone; has two fire escapes; the books in the build
ing are very good.
Q. And what did you find concerning the Potwin School!
A. The Potwin School is white, age two years, value per
room, $18,100. It ’s a beautiful building with very modern
features. It has a spacious playground which is surfaced
with asphalt. It has a beautiful auditorium, also double
playrooms. The books are mostly good, at least dating from
the 1930’s on, mostly. It has a kitchen, a visual aids room.
This building seems to be filled to capacity already although
only two years old. It is, all in all, one that should provide
an excellent educational opportunity.
Q. And what about the Randolph School, Dr. Speer.
A. The Randolph School, a large school, age twenty-four,
[fol. 200] value $6,947. I t ’s a large building which is
reasonably good. The desks are old, but the books are fairly
good, the majority of them dating in the 1940’s. It has a
very attractive kindergarten with a fireplace and good
decorations. It has an excellent, spacious playground. It
has a beautiful row of trees which highlight the landscaping.
Although it ’s a little old, this building is still capable of pro
viding a very good educational opportunity. It has a small
combination auditorium-gymnasium which is not adequate
for the entire enrollment.
Q. Would you please tell the Court what you found con
cerning State Street School.
A. State Street is a white school, age eleven years, in
sured value per classroom, $13,880. I t ’s an excellent build
ing, beautifully located, well landscaped; most of the new
features, such as a public address system, beautiful audi
torium, adequate gymnasium, excellent playground, has a
kitchen, library room; the books are fairly good but not in
keeping with the building. All in all, the facilities are avail
able to provide a very good educational opportunity, one of
the best.
Q. Would you tell the Court what you found concerning
Sumner School.
A. The Sumner School is white, age fifteen years, value
$15,936 per room. It ’s another excellent building; beautiful
[fol. 201] auditorium, a large good gymnasium, has its
public address system; the books are good; very attractive
123
kindergarten. Again, the facilities are available for an
excellent educational opportunity.
Q. Would you do the same concerning the Van Buren
School.
A. Van Buren is a white school, age forty-one years,
value $6,030 per classroom. Although it ’s an old building,
it has steel stairways which eliminates some fire hazard.
It has an auditorium and a playroom; has good pictures and
good books. The one fire escape, however, is approached
through a window on the second floor which might be locked
or hard for children to reach in an emergency. However,
the building can still provide a fair educational opportunity.
Q, Would you tell the Court what you found concerning
the Washington School.
A. Washington is a colored school, thirty-six years old,
valued at $6,284. It ’s a fairly good building in a rather
unattractive setting. One room seemed to be set aside for
books. The books were fair; better than in most of the
colored buildings. The faculty here—there was evidence to
lead us to believe that the faculty here were doing the best
to make the most of their facilities.
Q. Are there other buildings that you did not visit, Dr.
Speer, but concerning which you have data.
[fol. 202] A. Yes, there are, I think, eight other build
ings that I have this data on.
Q. Could you rapidly go down that list and tell the
Court what data you found.
A. Yes, I will very quickly read age first and value sec
ond, if I may.
Central Park, white, thirty-nine years old, $5,160.
Clay, White, twenty-five years old, $12,750.
Grant, thirteen years old, $15,336. Grant is a white
school.
Lincoln, a white school, thirty-five years old, $4,610.
Lowman Hill, a white school, forty-eight years old
$5,220.
Quincy, white building, forty-seven years old, $4,040.
Quinton Heights, thirty-eight years old, $3,024.
I m igh t m ention here that there is a new bu ild in g now
u n der con stru ction to be ca lled the S ou th w est bu ild ing
w hich, I presum e, w ill be available som etim e d u rin g the
124
coming year and, by our formula, the insured value per
classroom should be about $26,660.
Q. Now, Dr. Speer, you have gone through all the schools
[fol. 203] in the City of Topeka, and I would like to ask
you some hypothetical questions which I would like you
to answer on the basis of your study of the schools in the
City of Topeka and on the basis of your knowledge and
experience and study as an educator.
I want you to assume the following set of facts, Dr.
Speer: That a negro child who lives in Topeka, where
there are racially segregated schools, attends the Bu
chanan School, although if there were not racial segrega
tion in the City of Topeka, because of where he lives, he
would otherwise attend the Randolph School, would you
say that on the basis of the evidence you have given above
and. the other factors which I mentioned, that he obtains
the same educational opportunity at Buchanan that he
would obtain if he attended Randolph?
Mr. Goodell: To which we object as the hypothetical
question assumes a fact not proven, and the fact assumes
another fact that is contrary to some evidence. The fact
it assumes that if the child lived at Randolph and there
wasn’t racial segregation he would attend Randolph. It
assumes that fact. It isn’t necessarily so. The child, even
if you didn’t have segregation, might not prefer to go to
Randolph. He might prefer to go to some school where
he wasn’t outnumbered by fifty to one. Object to the
question in the present form because it assumes a hypothe-
[fol. 204] tical fact unsupported by any evidence.
Judge Huxman: You may answer, Doctor.
The Witness: The question, as I understand it------
Mr. Greenberg: (To reporter) Would you read it back,
please.
(The last preceding question was read by the reporter.)
By Mr. Greenberg:
Q. What is your answer to that question, Dr. Speer?
A. No, I would say he would not get the same educational
opportunity for some of the following reasons: First of
1 2 5
all, the Buchanan building is an older building; it ’s thirty-
years old; Randolph is twenty-four years old. The insured
value per classroom for Buchanan is $5,623; for Randolph
it ’s $6,947. To look at some of the details of the buildings,
Buchanan has no combined gymnasium-auditorium; Ran
dolph has one that is not completely adequate but it will
hold several grades at one time. The furniture------
Mr. Goodell: Pardon me, I want to interpose another ob
jection, that this has no probative force to show denial of
equal protection of the law on this sort of a comparison
because he is now demonstrating that because—that an
inequality exists because some physical plants are newer
[fol. 205] and bigger and better than other physical plants.
He is comparing, it ’s true, with a colored plant, but he
is also in the other part of his testimony—he has shown
that the same disparity exists between many white schools
as to the newer school where we have very old schools, very
low cost per capita per room, classroom, and also the tes
timony very obviously shows no school system in the world
could have buildings equal because newer buildings neces
sarily incorporate modern facilities not known when they
were built twenty or thirty years ago.
Mr. Greenberg: May I answer that, Your Honor?
Mr. Goodell: I address that to the Court, not you.
Mr. Greenberg: I didn’t ask you whether I could an
swer it.
Judge Huxman: The witness may answer.
The Witness: Proceeding, on the other hand, we might
say that the Randolph building has these features, a much
more attractive kindergarten room, more spacious play
ground, much more attractive surroundings which adds
to its aesthetic educational value, and I would add, if I
may consult my notes a moment here------
Mr. Greenberg: Go ahead.
The Witness: That the books in the Randolph School
are better than the books in the Buchanan building, in
[fol. 206] my judgment. There are better heating and
lighting in the Randolph building, and I think I would add,
Your Honor, that most important of all the curriculum in
the Randolph building provides a much better educational
opportunity than the one in the Buchanan building, be
126
cause, in the Randolph building, the colored child would
have opportunity to learn to live with, to work with, to
cooperate with, white children who are representative of
approximately 90% of the population of the society in
which he is to live.
By Mr. Greenberg:
Q. Now, Dr. Speer, rather than asking you the same ques
tion again, I would like you to answer the same question,
comparing the Gage and the Buchanan Schools.
Judge Huxman: Would your answers be substantially
the same, based upon substantially the same reasons!
The Witness: Some of the reasons would be the same,
Your Honor. However, I believe this particular compari
son the difference is greater.
Judge Huxman: Well, would be a difference of degree,
otherwise your answer would be the same.
The Witness: Some of the specific details might be dif
ferent.
Judge Huxman: Does that satisfy you, Mr.------
[fol. 207] Mr. Greenberg: That is all right; that satisfies
us, yes.
By Mr. Greenberg:
Q. I would like to ask you the same question concern
ing a comparison of Sumner and Monroe Schools, Dr.
Speer.
A. Sumner and Monroe. Again I would say for some of
the same kinds of reasons that the Sumner building would
provide a better educational opportunity.
Judge Huxman: May I ask the doctor a question?
Mr. Greenberg: Yes.
Judge Huxman: To be sure I understand his answer, is
one of the reasons which is common to all three of these,
your reason that they are by segregation denied in all
three of these schools the opportunity to mingle and live
with the white children, which they would otherwise have
and that, to you, is an important factor, is that part of your
answer?
The Witness: Yes, Your Honor, that would enter into all
of them.
Judge Huxman: I was quite sure that was it, but I wanted
to be clear in my own mind that that was a part of your
answer in all of these schools.
By Mr. Greenberg:
Q. Dr. Speer, I would like you to make a similar com
parison between State and Washington Schools.
[fol. 208] A. The same curriculum reasons, of course,
apply and, in addition, we find, as I stated in earlier testi
mony, that the State Street School is one of the better
schools, and it has many features such as the P. A. system
and a beautiful auditorium, an excellent playground, a
library room, a kitchen that can be used to provide a con
siderably better educational opportunity than could be pro
vided in the Washington School.
Mr. Greenberg: Your witness.
Judge Huxman: You may cross examine.
Cross-examination.
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. Dr. Speer, if I understand your testimony correctly,
boiled down to—as to the physical facts on the comparison
of buildings and facilities feature of it, eliminating the
racial feature, is it your opinion that any school, white
school, that is considerably older and inferior and a wide
disparity as to modern facilities, that that child going to
such a white school is likewise being denied an equal
opportunity of education?
A. It is unequal in another sense, I would say, if I under
stand your question correctly. Would you mind repeating
the crux of it; I am not sure that I understand you.
Q. What I am trying to say is, eliminating the racial
feature and restricting your opinion entirely to com
parison of plants, facilities and accessories, will you still
[fol. 209] say that a child, a white child, who goes to one |
of these other schools, such as Lafayette, Quinton Heights,
Polk and some of these old schools, and Lowman, are
127
128
denied equal educational opportunities as against children
—as compared to children who live in a territory such as
Oakland and Randolph and Potwin and get to go to those
new schools.
A. A child might be—might have an inferior educational
opportunity in some respects, but he would not have the
stigma of segregation, nor be denied the opportunity to
mix with the majority group of the population. Also------
Q. I said eliminating that feature of it. Other than that,
do you consider that it ’s an inferior opportunity as far
as the white child is concerned so that he is denied an
equal opportunity of education, eliminating the racial thing.
A. It might be if all other facilities are equal, but that
is an accident of geography.
Q. Well, you made comparisons between some of the
best white schools we have here in town to the colored
schools, haven’t you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, while we are on that subject, I will ask you to
turn to Exhibit “ K ” , vdiich is the Board of Education’s
record pertaining to the original cost of these buildings
[fol. 210] and also, in the same connection------
A. I don’t have a copy of that here, sir.
Q. I will step over here and let you see it. What I have
marked on my copy here in red are the negro schools;
what I have marked in blue pencil are the white schools;
you understand?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, I will direct your attention, if the schools that
were built about the same time, the white schools, as the
colored schools, if this exhibit doesn’t show the same'—
practically—outlay of cost and, in some instances, more
money spent for structural, or the school, and land acquisi
tion than there were for white schools that were built at
that same period of time.
A. I think that may be possible.
Q. Doesn’t the exhibit show that, the records of the
Board of Education.
A. Which two buildings do you mean?
Q. Well, compare Quinton Heights, which was built in
1913, at a cost of $12,640.
129
A. With what?
Q. We will get that in a minute, and McKinley, which was
built six years earlier at a cost of $51,000 for the structure.
A. I would say that between 1907 and 1913 building costs
might have fluctuated a great deal, and I don’t think—
[fol. 211] I would not base a comparison on building—on
construction cost with that many years intervening. That
is why we used insurance costs which are supposed to be
current and accurate as prepared by the Board of Educa
tion.
Q. Let’s compare Lowman Hill, which is a white school
built, according to the exhibit, in 1906, with McKinley.
A. May I correct you? It was built in 1901 and an ad
dition in 1906.
Q. All right. Compare that to McKinley School.
A. McKinley School was built in 1907, six years later;
again there may have been considerable difference in con
struction costs over a six-year period. They sometimes
change very rapidly to the best cycle and other things.
Q. Let’s look at the exhibit on the insurance values;
don’t you see disparity between the old white schools and
the new white schools?
A. That is possible.
Q. On the present insurance table------
Judge Mellott: What is the exhibit on the insurance?
Mr. Goodell: “ L ” .
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. I call your attention specifically to some schools
shown on this exhibit and their present insurance values
as shown by this exhibit. Quinton Heights has a total
[fol. 212] structure insured value of $14,000, doesn’t it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Van Buren has an insured value of $46,800, doesn’t
it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. That is a white school. Washington has an insured
value of $64,800, doesn’t it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Monroe has an insured value of $112,000, doesn’t it?
9— 8
130
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So there you have got three white schools, all of
which are lower present value than the colored, schools,
isn’t that right?
A. If I may express my view, my basis, you cannot com
pare building by building on—even on insured cost because
some buildings are larger than others. Therefore, the
only, basis I was able to arrive at was an insured value
per available classroom. You have to have some kind of
a common yardstick to use on all buildings. For instance,
some of those buildings are twice as big as others and,
therefore, their value would naturally be proportionately
greater.
■Q. Do you know of any school system in the United
States—not just Topeka—in the United States, that has
buildings that are equal, that there isn’t great differences
based upon when they were built and the needs of the com-
[fol. 213] munity at the time they were built?
A. That has not—doesn’t have great differences as to
their value and commodious quarters and characters that
are recognized now in modern education and that are
applied in modern buildings, that doesn’t have great dis
parities, those types of buildings, in any school system
in the United States with buildings built twenty, thirty
or forty years ago.
A. I believe there is very likely to be some disparity,
may not be great, and may not be great as compared to
this group and this group, but between individual build
ings, I am sure you would find some disparity if there is
more than one building.
Q. You realize that school buildings are built as a com
munity grows up and population trends—where the town
grows and which way it grows determines whether build
ings are located and newer buildings are added.
A. That is one factor.
Q. Do you know of any way way on earth to keep those
facilities adequate and at the same time equal in any school
system?
A. There are ways that it can be approached.
Q. Well, just tell me how you would approach it.
A. By forming a good cooperative city planning with
the Board of Education and the City Commissioners on
[fol. 214] a long-term scale and then following it.
Q. Would you recommend that if we had a building like,
say in Topeka, that cost $112,000 and is now a sound and
structural safe colored building, that you tear that down
because we happen to have a new building built a year ago
that cost a half million dollars; would you recommend
that?
A. Not merely for that reason, no.
Q. What other reasons would you have for tearing it
down ?
A. If I found that throughout the community the colored
children’s buildings were decidedly inferior to the build
ings of the white schools, then I would consider that to be
an unequal educational opportunity between the groups.
Q. Well, now, let’s talk about that subject. Let’s talk
about Quinton Heights and Polk Street and Lafayette
School and Lowman School, all of which have a physical
plant value at the time they were built and at the present
time, an insurance value less than any of the four colored
schools. Do you think that makes the white children get
inferior education than to the colored children going to
those schools?
A. The colored children are getting an inferior educa
tion, I think, for this reason: That, as I cited in my original
testimony, 45% of the white children can go to schools that
are newer than the newest colored building; only 14%
[fol. 215] of the white children have to go to schools that
are older than the oldest colored building, so it ’s a com
parison of 14% against 45%.
lQ. Let’s get back on the track. I asked you whether or
not, using an illustration of four white schools, if they
are inferior as to value, both at the time they were built
and now, to the colored schools, do you consider that alone
makes the white child that is attending those schools, Quin
ton Heights, Polk, Lowman and Lafayette, receive in and
of itself, receive an inferior education.
A. Not necessarily.
Q. Well, then, why do you say that when you talk about
that element as causing the colored child——
A. Because------
131
132
Q. Wait just a minute until I ask my question, will you
please? Why do you say that when you are talking about
a colored child who goes to one of the four colored schools
and you compare the plant and facilities to some of the
modern buildings—school buildings—in the last two or
three years.
A. Because, in the first instance, we are assuming------
Judge Mellott: The witness must wait until the question
is completely asked. The reporter can’t get it down when
you both talk at the same time.
(The last preceding question was read by the re-
[fol. 216] porter.)
Judge Mellott: Strike out the answer as partially given.
By Mr. Goodell :
Q. Why do you say in such a situation in making the com
parison in the case of a negro child going to one of the
four negro schools, comparing it to some of the schools built
in the Topeka area, in the Topeka school system in the last
two or three or four years, such as Randolph, Potwin and
Oakland, that that fact alone gives the negro child an in
ferior educational opportunity, that would not apply in
the case of the children going to the white schools that I
have previously mentioned in my other question.
A. In the first instance, if I understand you correctly,
I was assuming that other things were equal because of the
—as we admitted, the faculty preparation is approximately
equal, the class size equal, and so forth. But, in the latter
instance, other things are not equal primarily because of
the difference in the curriculum which is a very important
factor.
Q. All right, now, what is present in the case of the
Quinton Heights white school, in the curriculum you talk
about, that is not present for comparison purposes in any
of the four colored schools?
A. Because in Quinton Heights the child has the oppor
tunity to learn his personal adjustments, his social adjust-
(fol. 217] ments and his citizenship skills in the presence
of a cross-section of the population.
133
Q. I asked you to eliminate the racial feature entirely and
restrict it to physical things alone; that is what I asked
you.
The Witness: If the Court will permit, I don’t think that
we can answer an educational opportunity purely on phys
ical features. There are too many other elements that are
also involved.
Q. Mr. Speer, Professor Speer, I probably misunder
stood you. I thought—I understood your testimony to be
that because of these physical things that in and of itself,
ignoring the racial thing, that that constituted an unequal
educational opportunity to the negro child because of these
modern buildings that he wasn’t allowed to go to; is that
correct, or not?
A. It is certainly one of the very important things and,
if the other factors are equal, and this one is unequal, then
there may be an inequality in the total educational oppor
tunity.
Q. Maybe I am so stupid I can’t understand you. Did
you not say, is it your opinion, that because of physical
factors, and I mean by physical factors differences in plant
facilities, of some of the white schools and the four negro
[fol. 218] schools, that alone, in and of itself, causes you
to give an opinion, and it is your opinion that that child,
the negro child, because of that alone, doesn’t have equal
educational opportunity.
A. That is a contributing factor, but I do not consider
that of—that alone.
Q. Then you didn’t say that alone caused him to have
an unequal opportunity.
A. No, but that coupled with other factors did cause him
to have an unequal opportunity.
Q. What are the other factors rather than racial fac
tors.
A. Curriculum factor; there is faculty; there is size of
classrooms; there is books— —
Q. Let’s compare some white schools—let’s take Quinton
Heights, Lowman, Polk and Lafayette again. What is
present as to the faculty, comparing that to the faculty of
the four negro schools, that is inferior or that is there
is a disparity.
134
Mr. Carter: I would like—I think that we have listened
to this line of questioning—it seems to us that it is now
objectionable. What I apparently gather from the line of
examination that is being made is that the—Mr. Goodell
is attempting to establish that because there are depriva
tions of white children that he call off the deprivations of
the negro child in segregation. We don’t think that is
[fol. 219] the issue in the case.
Judge Huxman: This is cross-examination of your expert
witness where the latitude is a little greater. You may
proceed.
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. Restricting now for this question, I will ask you to
compare and point out dissimilarities or disparities between
the faculty—one thing alone now—the faculty, that is, the
teaching in the four white schools, that is, Quinton, Polk—-
Quinton Heights, Polk Street, Lowman Hill and Lafayette,
to the four negro schools that are in issue in this lawsuit.
A. I can’t answer that at the moment, sir. I would have
to add up the preparation of the faculties of those four
particular schools. I do not have that at hand. I added
them up for the entire system and took the entire averages,
but I do not have them for those four particular schools.
Q. As far as you know, they are perfectly equal then,
is that right?
A. I don’t think they could be perfectly equal; that would
be impossible.
Judge Huxman: Well, now, that is rather quibbling, of
course. Perfect equality you can’t find in two teachers
any place.
Mr. Goodell: I think so.
The Witness: Yes.
[fol. 220] By Mr. Goodell:
Q. What—is the faculty, then, comparing it to the other
factor which you mentioned, curriculum, on the four white
schools covered by the illustration and the four negro
schools------
A. How does the curriculum compare?
135
Q. Yes.
A. Between the two schools. As far as course of study
is concerned, as far as I know, it is probably about equal
but as far as the total curriculum is concerned, and that
is the only basis on which I can discuss it, it is not equal.
Q. What do you mean by total curriculum!
A. I mean the total school experience of the school child,
what the instructions, what the books are, what the sur
roundings of the buildings are, what his associations with
the other children are.
Q. Well, eliminating that feature, the associations with i
the other children, which is the racial feature, what are
the other part of the curriculum which is any dissimilarity !
or inferior factors present in the case of the negro schools j
and the white schools that I have used for illustration.
A. In professional circles we have a term called the
great ‘ ‘ gestalt’ ’ which means the sum is greater—the whole .
is greater than the sum of the parts and, when we start
taking into account only the parts one by one, we destroy I
[fol. 221] our “ gestalt” , and we cannot make a wise com
parison.
Judge Mellott: What was that word!
The Witness: (Spelling) G-e-s-t-a-l-t.
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. Now you come from Missouri, don’t you!
A. I at present live in Missouri, yes, sir.
Q. You have segregated schools there, don’t you!
A. We have some segregated schools. On the univer
sity campus we have a mixed school.
Q. I am talking about the public school system in the
State of Missouri.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And it is mandatory, isn’t that right!
A. I presume in some cases it is.
Q. Have you studied any of the various state statutes
over the country which we have had for a half century
concerning this segregation of students!
Mr. Carter: Your Honor, I can’t see how this------
Mr. Goodell. This is preliminary for another question.
136
Judge Huxman: I think that is an improper question.
Well, as long as it is preliminary, you may answer whether
you have or have not studied these various statutes.
Mr. G-oodell: I will withdraw the question.
[fol.222] By Mr. Goodell:
Q. You know in a great many cities and communities
of the United States there are statutes similar to the
statutes here in Kansas which we have had for a half
century or three-fourt-s of a century, isn’t that right?
A. I presume so.
Q. You know, as a practical man, laws get passed by
legislators coming from the various parts of their com
munities over the state, don’t you ?
A. Yes, sir.
Judge Huxman: Mr. Goodell, what is the purpose of that
question? What value does that have to our problem how
laws are passed?
Mr. Goodell: I am getting to that. I can’t ask it all at
once. I am trying to get from this witness the feature as
to whether he thinks elimination of racial segregation, if
it’s unwanted by the community and is out of step with the
thinking of the community which the mere existence of
the laws have some indication------
Judge Huxman: I think Dr. Speer has made it quite
clear from his evidence—he has to me at least, if I under
stand it—that segregation, racial segregation, is the prime
and controlling factor ot the equality of the whole curricu
lum, and that these physical factors are secondary, and that
his testimony, as it registered with me, is that aside from
[fol. 223] racial segregation he perhaps would not testify
that there was any such inequality in the physical properties
as would deny anybody an equal educational opportunity.
Do I understand your testimony correctly ?
The Witness: If I may say, Your Honor, I think I would
sum up this way: That there is, in my opinion, some in
equality in physical facilities between the groups in Topeka,
but, in addition to that, there is also the difference of
segregation itself which affects the school curriculum.
Judge Huxman: Let’s see if I can get myself straightened
137
out. Do you not also agree with what Mr. Goodell is trying
to bring out here—you haven’t gotten together—that if
you put it on that fact, that there is inequality in physical
facilities as between the white schools and the colored
schools, sometimes the greater facilities are with the colored
schools against the older white schools.
The Witness: Yes, Your Honor, but they are not as many
in that direction as there are in the other direction in this
case.
Judge Huxman: It seems to me we are spending a lot
of time on that when that is rather, it seems to me, it
would be obvious if you have an older white building
[fol. 224] than a colored building that perhaps the physi
cal facilities in the older white building would be poorer
than the colored building.
The Witness: Yes, I will agree.
Mr. Goodell: I will try to shorten this up.
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. If I understand you correctly, the basis of your
opinion on saying that the mere separation—strike that.
I t ’s your opinion, then, that you can’t have separate schools
in any public school system and have equality, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And that is predicated on the—on your philosophy or
your theory that merely because the two races are kept |
apart in the educational process, isn’t that right, mere j
separation causes inequality.
A. That is one of the things which causes inequality, \
yes, sir.
Q. Yes. Now, assuming, Doctor, that we didn’t have
separate schools and they were altogether, and you still
had a social situation in this community which didn’t
recoignize co-mingling of the races, didn’t admit them on
free equality, that child would run against those—run up
against those things in his practical every-day world,
wouldn’t he?
[fol. 225] A. I presume so.
Q. Sir?
A. I would think so.
138
Q. Wouldn’t that tend to cause more of a tempest and
emotional strain or psychological impact if he got used
to going to school with white children than when he went
downtown and couldn’t eat in a white restaurant, couldn’t
go to a white hotel and couldn’t do this and that, wouldn’t
that make the impact greater and accentuate that very
thing,
Mr. Greenberg: This witness is qualified as an expert in
the field of education, and I don’t believe has testified or is
qualified to testify concerning segregation all over the
State of Kansas or elsewhere.
Mr. Goodell: Well, I restrict it to Topeka.
Judge Huxman: I think the Court will sustain the
objection. That is purely argumentative. I doubt whether
the doctor has qualified himself.
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. Assuming, Doctor, we will restrict this to the educa
tional process, assuming that—that we didn’t have segre
gation, for the purpose of this question, and assuming
further we had a negro child going to Potwin or Oakland
or Randolph and assuming that the population trend ap
pears in the schoolroom as it does in our city, so that he
would be outnumbered from twenty to fifty to one, assuming
all that, for the purpose of this question as being true,
[fol. 226] wouldn’t that cause some inferiority feeling
on the part of the colored child when he went to such
a school where he was outnumbered twenty to fifty to one
and caused some sort of mental disturbance and upset.
A. On which basis would you rather for me to—on theory
or on personal observation or experience?
Q. I am talking about theory here.
A. And personal observation and experience.
Q. Yes.
A. Let me first mention the latter one; we have adjoining
our campus a demonstration school of 210 students in the
elementary grades and mixed in with them are about ten
negro children, so they are outnumbered in that proportion,
and my observation is, and the reports I receive from my
assistants are, that those children are very happy, very
139
well adjusted, and they are there voluntarily. They don’t
have to attend.
Mr. Elisha Scott: I object to that.
Judge Huxman: Mr. Scott, are you entered here as an
attorney of record?
Mr. Elisha Scott: I am supposed to be.
Judge Huxman: Go ahead.
Mr. Elisha Scott: I object to that because he is invading
the rights, and he is answering a question not based upon
[fol. 227] the evidence adduced or could be adduced.
Mr. Goodell: You just got here; you wouldn’t know.
Mr. Elisha Scott: Yes I do know.
Judge Huxman: Objection will be overruled. You may
answer.
The Witness: Shall I repeat the answer?
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. Have you finished ?
A. I think, also, on the basis of our knowledge of child
behavior that we can say on a short-range basis there may
be occasionally, the first time we jump into water we may
be a little bit frightened, but, on a long-range basis, we
generally are able to work out our adjustments and make
a good situation out of it.
Q. Segregation occurs, doesn’t it, Doctor, in any school
system among the races. I mean by that, children that
come from wealthy families co-mingle with children from
poor families; they go off into different cliques; that occurs,
doesn’t it?
A. It occurs sometimes.
Q. Occurs frequently, doesn’t it?
A. Well, it all depends on your definition.
Q. And the child that is left out of the swim, so to speak,
he feels inferior or second-class, doesn’t he?
A. Yes, and I think we should prevent that in all cases
[fol. 228] possible.
Q. You wouldn’t make a new social order to prevent
social strata of society, would you?
Judge Huxman: Just a minute. The Court will sustain
an objection to that question.
1 4 0
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. Have you made a survey of any of the students that
have gone to our segregated schools, the negro students,
and picked them up to see what effect to their education
that you call attention to as being inferior, how it ’s worked
out in every-day life.
A. I have talked to a few of them, but I have not made
a survey of them.
Q. Have you heard of anybody getting hired or a pro
fessional man having a plant or a businessman having a
customer based upon what elementary school he went to in
the first grade or the second grade or the sixth grade for
that matter?
A. Oh, probably not, but probably there are cases where
a person is hired or not hired on the basis of the kind of
education he received in the first six grades.
Q. You don’t know a thing about our community and how
the negro child, when he goes through our school system,
how he is received in the business world at all, do you?
A. Oh, I have known Topeka for some years. I may have
a little knowledge.
[fol. 229] Q. Do you know anything about that?
A. A little, not too much.
Q. What?
A. I don’t know too much about it.
Q. Do you know that in the case of the junior high grades
and in the senior high grades that they are not segregated ?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you think, getting back to the school system and
the illustration of where the negro child would go to a
school where he would be outnumbered twenty to fifty to
one, and he wasn’t recognized because of pure majority rule
and wasn’t elected head of his class or class officers or
recognized in the various school activities, that that would
have any impact on such a child.
A. Not as much impact as having been denied even to
get into the running.
Q. You think if you got in the school and left out entirely
he would feel happy about it, would he?
A. What’s that again?
lQ. You think if the negro child was simply by edict of
141
law forced into the white school, whether the white school
was ready to receive him or not, and however much he was
in the minority and however much he would be left out of
things, he would . still be happy merely because he had
found his way into the white school, is that right?
[fol. 230] A. I think on a long-range plan he would be
happier than on the other way.
Mr. Goodell: That’s all.
Mr. Carter: Your Honor, may we have a five-minute re
cess?
Judge Huxman: Yes. The court will take a ten-minute
recess.
(The court then, at 2 :40 o ’clock p. m., stood at recess until
2:50 o ’clock p. m., at which time court was reconvened and
the following further proceedings were had:)
Mr. Goodell: I would like to recall Dr. Speer for two
short questions.
Judge Huxman: Dr. Speer, take the witness stand for a
question or two further.
H u gh W. S peer, h av in g been p re v io u s ly sw orn, reas
sum ed the stand and testified fu rth er as fo l lo w s :
Cross-examination (continued).
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. Dr. Speer, in giving your opinion here a moment ago
as to the comparison based upon library books—library or
books in certain of the negro—in the negro schools to cer
tain of the white schools covered by your testimony, did
you consider, in forming that opinion, the fact that the Par-
[fol. 231] ent Teachers Association in the various school
territories contribute personally and raise the money to
buy those books, and they are not furnished by the Board
of Education.
A. Yes, I have been informed that that is sometimes the
case.
Q. Well, how did you segregate which books have been
bought by Parent Teachers Association and the books that
have been furnished by the Board of Education?
142
A. I didn’t make that separation. I felt that by neglect
the Board of Education permitted an inequality to exist.
Q. Now, did you also—strike that. State whether or not
any of the books in any of the libraries or rooms in the
schools that you made the investigation concerning books,
that at the end of the term the books, some of them, were
gone, that is, packed up in boxes.
A. Yes, we understood that, and we also understood that
some of the books are regularly kept in the central office of
the Board of Education, and we took that into account,
knowing that the same—those books are taken out of all
the schools and kept in the Board of Education, so that
what remained are really the comparable—form the basis
for comparison.
Q. So if some of the books were missing, either being
packed up or gone, and you didn’t know what they were,
you are just basing your testimony, your considered opin-
[fol. 232] ion, on what you found, is that right?
A. Sir, the books that were gone are the books that circu
late among all the buildings in the course of the year, so
we assume that those are equal. It ’s the books that are
left in the building that really belong to that building, and
it is on that basis that we made our differential.
Q. Were some of them packed up?
A. Some of them packed up, and we looked into the
boxes.
Q. Did you take them all out volume by volume and ex
amine them?
A. We did not examine every book in the Topeka school
system, but we sampled it in an unbiased way. We sampled
a large number of rooms and a large number of buildings
and a large number of boxes, but we did not examine every
book.
Q. You mean you took a book out here and there from a
box and, from that, made up your mind that they were all
alike and, consequently, that is the way you got at your
opinion.
A. No, sir. We took sampling in a scientific way.
Q. What do you mean scientific way?
143
A. We took a sample that was representative and large
enough to where we could feel confident in it.
Judge Huxman: Is that all?
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. Which books were bought in the various schools that
you gave your opinion about—were bought by the Parent
[fob 233] Teachers Association?
A. I don’t know just which books. Some, no doubt, were
but not a great many. It is not enough to affect the per
centage very much.
Q. If you don’t know what books they were, some of the
books you didn’t even examine, you don’t know what quan
tity they are, how do you get at an opinion as to book
facilities at the various schools?
A. On this basis, sir, that it is the books in the school that
are responsible for the education of the child, and we ex
amined the books in the school and, on that basis, we made
our opinion.
Q. So what you are saying, if I understand you right,
the books you found and examined showred less books or
inferior quality as to date and so forth in the colored
schools than the books you found in the white schools, is
that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Goodell: All right.
Judge Huxman: Step down.
J am es H. B u c h a n a n , h av in g been first d u ly sw orn, as
sum ed the stand and testified as fo l lo w s :
D ire ct exam ination.
By Mr. Greenberg:
[fol. 234] Q. Dr. Buchanan, will you tell the Court your
full name, please.
A. James H. Buchanan.
144
Q. Please tell the Court something of your educational
background.
A. At the present time I am Director of the Graduate
Division, Kansas State Teachers College, and acting head
of the Department of Education. The year preceding this
year I was associate professor of education at the Kansas
State Teachers College. Six years preceding that time,
from 1943 to 1949, I was superintendent of schools at Boul
der, Colorado. From 1933 to 1943 superintendent of schools
in Lamar, Colorado, and, from 1930 to ’33, superintendent
of schools at La Jara, Colorado, and, from 1928 to 1930,
superintendent of schools in Boyero, Colorado.
Q. Dr. Buchanan, what degrees do you hold and where
were they earned?
A. I hold an A.B. Degree from Denver University, 1928;
Master of Arts Degree, University of Colorado, 1932; I
have had three years—three summers of graduate study
at Harvard University, 1936, 1938, 1939, and a Doctor
of Education Degree from the University of Colorado,
1949.
Q. Have you visited any of the schools in the City of
Topeka?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you visit the Buchanan School?
[fol. 235] A. Yes, I did.
Q. Gage, Lafayette ?
A. Yes.
Q. McKinley?
A. Yes.
Q. Monroe?
A. Yes.
Q. Parkdale?
A. Yes.
Q. Polk?
A. Yes.
Q. Potwin?
A. Yes.
Q. Kandolph?
A. Yes.
Q. State Street?
A. Yes.
145
Q. Sumner?
A. Yes.
Q. Yan Buren?
A. Yes.
Q. Washington?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you observe the general appearance of the in
terior, exterior and the surrounding areas about the school?
[fol. 236] A. I did.
Q. Would you describe what you noticed with regard to
these factors in the Randolph School.
A. Well, I would say that the Randolph School was situ
ated in a very average residential section; perhaps above
average. I think the school is a well-constructed building;
it show's good signs of being in a very good state of repair,
I should say, and the maintenance in it has been excellent.
The facilities in it, such as auditorium, the classrooms and
so on, are adequate to a good educational program. I would
say the grounds are ample for proper play and recreation
for the pupils.
Q. Would you tell us what you found concerning these
factors at the Buchanan School, Dr. Buchanan.
A. I would say that the Buchanan School is an older
school. It has been well constructed. The vralls are in
a good state of preservation; redecoration seems to have
been done within a reasonable time and the maintenance is
equally good. I think in the maintenance you have to take
into consideration the age of the building, but I would say
it was very good at the Buchanan School. The playground,
it would seem to me, was ample for recreational facilities.
I think there was no auditorium in the Buchanan School,
but it was my impression that adequate precautions have
been made for prevention of fire or escape from the building
[fol. 237] in case of fire.
Q. I don’t recall, Dr. Buchanan, did you say anything
concerning the surrounding areas of the Buchanan School?
A. Yes, I 'would say the surrounding area, as I observed
it, being a stranger to the city, practically so, was not
quite as substantial; certainly not as substantial a resi
dential area as I would say around the Randolph School.
10—8
146
In other words, I would say it would reflect the general
community in which it was associated, perhaps both in age
and state of preservation of the building.
Q. Would you tell us what you found concerning the
Gage School, Dr. Buchanan.
A. Well, the Gage School is a very fine school. I would
say, speaking from memory, I would say it ’s within a few
years of the age of the Randolph School. I have the im
pression it ’s somewhat larger. It had some very good pic
tures on the wall; the walls were in a good state of preserva
tion; there was some repair work going on. There were
some rooms in which they needed some repair work and
were planning on doing it immediately because there were
materials placed outside the doors and, in some places,
the floors were up. I would say that the playground and
the landscaping is quite attractive and quite beautiful; a
very nice piece of work.
Q. Would you tell us, now, what you found concerning
[fol. 238] the Sumner School.
A. The Sumner School is a newer school than Gage. I
think it ’s perhaps about ten or eleven years old. It has
quite ample—very spacious suitable classroom facilities
and a nice auditorium. I think the landscaping would be
nothing that anyone could take particular objection to.
The general appearance of the building, I should say, was
in keeping with a good school situation.
Q. Will you now tell us what you found concerning the
Monroe School, Dr. Buchanan.
A. I would say the Monroe School would compare fairly
well in construction, in appearance, with the Randolph
School, I would rather carry them in mind. I think the
Monroe School, I woud say, is about twenty-four, twenty-
five years of age. It has fireproof stairways. It shows
sign of good care and good maintenance and quite service
able, I should say, for a number of years. The playground
and the landscaping in front of the building is about in
keeping with the community in which it is located, I should
say. In other words, I would say it is a credit to the com
munity.
Q. And would you tell the Court about the State Street
School?
147
A. Yes. I saw the State Street School. It is a very
good school, I should say; it ’s more or less in a class with
the Sumner School, perhaps a little more modernistic, a
[fol. 239] little more in keeping with modern design and
the demands of modern education. The playground or the
grounds that were vacant, which I assume were available
for the children, I thought were quite adequate and quite
spacious for a large enrollment. It had auditorium facili
ties and other features of that kind that make for a good
educational situation.
Q. Would you tell us something about the area surround
ing the State Street School.
A. I would say that it was quite a creditable residential
section.
Mr. Groodell: I didn’t hear that.
The Witness: I say it was quite a creditable residential
section; very good residential section.
By Mr. Greenberg:
Q. Would you tell us what you found concerning the
Washington School, Dr. Buchanan?
A. Well, the Washington School is an older school; I
think it is not so old as the Buchanan School; at least that
is my impression of it. It has been well cared for. It has
an auditorium which, I would assume, for an enrollment
of 150, 160 children, would be adequate for them. The
maintenance there is quite a creditable thing. I would
say that was characteristic of the Topeka schools. There
were fourteen 1 visited; I would say the maintenance and
repairs were quite good.
[fol. 240] Q. In your visit to the fourteen schools, Dr.
Buchanan, did you make any general observations con
cerning the areas in which they exist?
A. I think I have already implied that in the answers
that I have given. My observation would be that the
schools visited, the fourteen of the twenty-two schools,
reflect the communities in which they are located, that is,
if they are like, well, Polk, perhaps Buchanan, Gage; the
varying degrees of the quality of the school is somewhat
dependent upon the age of the residential region or section
148
of the city in which they are located. That is, you would
find the better schools in the places that are comparatively
newer and better developed; that would be my general
observation. The poorer schools were perhaps in a region,
we might say, have longer been a residential region or
area of the city, which is tending, perhaps, to slide down
just a bit in quality.
Q. Can you make any general statement concerning the
negro schools which you saw and the areas in which they
live, Dr. Buchanan.
A. My general statement would be merely to say that
they reflect the situation which I have outlined. I think
they show a very good care. I think, for instance, the
Monroe School, is a school that definitely looks the way
you would expect; I think anyone who has had experience
[fol. 241] in examining or visiting schools would say that
it looks about the way you would expect it to look when
you see it from the outside and when you go in. It has been
well cared for. All of the schools in Topeka I was im
pressed by the fact that there was a minimum amount of
marking on the walls or disfiguring of the walls or furni
ture in any way, either in the white schools or the colored
schools.
Q. Did you make any general observation concerning the
areas in which these colored schools existed, Doctor?
A. I would say, in general, they probably are in the areas
which were not the best residential section of the city. I
don’t know that they would be the poorest, but they were
not in the best residential section, and I think there was
some variation there. I thought I observed some variation
in the quality of the residential section.
Q. Dr. Buchanan, in evaluating the quality of education
which a student obtains when attending school, does an
educator consider the physical characteristics of the school;
I mean their appearance and the appearance which they
present to the child, along with the appearance of the area
in which the school exists. Is there a direct correlation
between that and educational opportunity?
A. Yes, I think that is true. I think the educator—
educators do recognize the relationship between the quality
[fol. 242] of the building, landscaping of the grounds, the
149
area in which it is placed as an important factor in educa
tion.
Q. Now, bearing that criterion in mind, I)r. Buchanan, I
would like you to make several comparisons. I want you to
assume in the City of Topeka a negro child would attend
Randolph School, if there were not racial segregation in
the city, but is compelled to attend Buchanan because of
racial segregation. Would you say that if all other factors
in the City of Topeka and in the schools were equal, except
these factors concerning appearance, residential area, and
so forth which you have just described in answer to a
previous question, if all factors were equal except those
factors, would the child attending Buchanan obtain the
same educational opportunities that he would obtain if he
attended Randolph?
A. I believe no; my answer would be that he would not
receive the same educational opportunity.
Q. Well, bearing in mind the correlation which you stated
between educational opportunity and physical appearance
and area, would you explain the reason for your answer ?
A. I believe that education is best facilitated when it is
in a beautiful environment, where there is a building which
pupils can take pride in and where they have beautiful
landscaping and the interior of the building is a place
where there are the maximum number of modern facilities
[fol. 243] to facilitate a good curriculum.
Q. And to the estent that these are different, you would
say that the opportunity to learn is different.
A. Beg pardon; would you------
Q. Would you say that to the extent that these are
different, the opportunity to learn is different?
A. Yes, I think it has a relationship to the opportunity,
yes.
Q. Is this supported by the authorities in the field of
education, Dr. Buchanan?
A. I am certain it is, yes, sir.
Q. Did you say yes?
A. I am certain that it is, yes.
Q. Could you state any authorities who support this view?
A. Well, I think that my number of authorities, for in
stance, Dr. Reeder of Ohio State University in his recent
150
publication on administration, “ Public Education of the
United States” which came from the press in 1951, just
a few months ago, a revision of his book, makes that very
clear. He makes that statement that the quality of a build
ing, its setting, is an important factor in the education of
a child. Strayer and Englehart, of Columbia University,
who are recognized as the leading authorities in school-
house construction, hold that view and numerous others.
Judge Mellott: You drop your voice, and I usually get
[fol. 244] most excepting the last two or three words. You
drop your voice, and I can’t hear you.
The Witness: I am sorry; I thought I had a very strong
voice.
Judge Mellott: You do, but you don’t keep it up.
By Mr. Greenberg:
Q. Dr. Buchanan, I am going to ask you to make three
more comparisons without going into as much detail, if
you believe the detail you stated concerning the first com
parison applies to the following schools: I would like you
to compare Gage against Buchanan with regard to these
criteria.
A. I would say that Gage very obviously is a better
school than Buchanan.
Q. On the basis of the criterion vou stated?
A. Yes.
Q. I would like you to compare Sumner against Monroe.
A. Obviously Sumner is a better school than Monroe; a
more up-to-date school, a newer school, as I have indicated.
Q. I would like you to compare State Street School
against Washington Street School with regard to these
criteria.
A. State Street is a better school than Washington School
in terms of age, in the terms of these things we have
talked about.
Mr. Greenberg: Your witness.
1 5 1
[fol. 245] Cross-examination.
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. Dr. Buchanan, if I understand you correctly, you are
stating that the plant or the building is a very important
factor in the educational opportunity.
A. Yes.
Q. The building a child goes to.
A. Yes, indeed.
Q. And, therefore, where you have one building with
shrubbery around it and landscaping, which is pretty, and
another building built earlier many years ago which isn’t
as pretty, even however strong and commodious and suffi
cient, if it isn’t as pretty and big and new and as modern,
that educational opportunity is minimized in the child that
goes to that building, is that right?
A. That would be—other factors being equal, I would
say the better one------
Q. I am restricting it to that factor if I understood your
testimony.
A. That’s right; I would say that that would be detract
ing from it.
Q. The only way children in any community could have
an equal educational opportunity would be to have build
ings all beautiful, built about the same time, all modern, all
beautifully landscaped and everything just about alike,
[fol. 246] isn’t that right?
A. As far as that factor is concerned, that is correct.
Q. As a practical matter, don’t you realize that we live
in a practical world?
A. I have lived in it for nearly fifty years.
Q. How do you think any Board of Education could have
all of their buildings built at the same time, same land
scaping—
Judge Huxman: You need not answer that question; that
is argumentative, has no probative value.
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. Well, according to your theory, if I understand it
right, if I went to a little country schoolhouse, even though
I had good teaching and good texts and all other facilities,
1 5 2
but not a building as good as Randolph, I was in a bad way,
or anybody would be in a bad way, to get an education, is
that right?
A. No, that isn’t my theory. My theory would be you
would get a better education if you had better equipment,
but you would not—I wouldn’t say you would have a poor
education because you went to a poorer building. You
might have a very superior teacher or you might have
very superior ability yourself.
Q. Buildings don’t make the educated child, does it?
A. I wouldn’t say entirely, no; they are a contributing
factor, but not the entire thing.
[fol. 247] Q. You compared the negro schools to Gage
and Randolph and Sumner, I believe those three.
A. I think so.
Q. Now, would you please compare those same schools,
I mean those white schools; they are all white schools,
aren’t they?
A. Yes.
Q. —with the schools of Lafayette and Quinton Heights
and Polk and Lowman and Quincy.
A. Well, I didn’t visit all you have named, but------
Q. Which did you visit ?
A. Lafayette. I visited------
Q. Didn’t you know we had those others?
A. Yes, but------
Q. You didn’t get around to them.
A. We didn’t get around to them. I would say that
Lafayette compared with Gage or Randolph or Sumner
would be far inferior.
Q. Far inferior.
A. Far inferior to it.
Q. We are discriminating then against a child that
lives in that territory if he goes to Lafayette as against a
child that lives—goes to Gage.
Judge Huxman: That is immaterial and need not be
answered.
[fol. 248] Mr. Goodell: No further questions.
Judge Huxman: Anything else of this witness? Doctor,
you may stand aside.
(Witness excused.)
153
R . 8 . B. E n g lish , h av in g been first d u ly sw orn , assum ed
the stand and testified as fo l lo w s :
Direct examination.
By Mr. Greenberg:
Q. Will you please tell the Court your full name, Mr.
English.
A. Horace B. English.
Q. What is your occupation, Mr. English ?
A. I am professor of psychology at the Ohio State Uni
versity.
Q. Would you tell the Court something about your back
ground and the degrees you hold.
A. I took my Bachelor’s Degree at Oxford University,
and there I also took a certificate in cultural anthropology.
Later I took the Ph.D. Degree at Yale. As for my experi
ence, I have been teaching and doing research work since
1916. I have been a full professor since 1921. During the
war I was—during the first war I was psychological ex
aminer and then chief of the re-education service in one of
the hospitals. In the second world war I was a consultant
on personnel problems part time for the Adjutant General’s
Office of the Army and then immediately after the surrender
[fol. 249] I was a morale analyst in Japan. I then—
I have had a number of part-time positions; I was consult
ant for the Forest Service on human relations. I wras con
sultant to the West Virginia Department of Education on
the curriculum in their state teachers colleges. I was chair
man of the counsel on human relations appointed by the
American Association for the Advancement of Science,
for work with the Conservation Departments of the gov
ernment, and I spent some six months in the study and re
search in the field of child development under the auspices
of the American Council on Education.
Q. Have you ever held office in, or been a member of, any
learned societies?
A. Yes, in the American Psychological Association I am
a Fellow; I have been a member of the Council of Directors,
and I have been chairman of the Committee on Professional
Ethics of that association. At the moment I am president
1 5 4
of the Division of Educational Psychology of that associa
tion. In 1940 I was president of the American Association
for the Advancement of Science—for the American Asso
ciation for Applied Psychology, and I have been president
of the Ohio State Psychologists and the Midwestern
Psychological Association. And I am a Fellow of the
British Psychological Society and member of the Executive
Committee of the Psychology Section of the American As-
[fol. 250] sociation for the Advancement of Science.
Q. Have you ever published any books or articles in the
field of education and psychology, Dr. English!
A. Published with Victor Ramey, of the University of
Colorado, a book on studying the individual school child.
Just this year brought out a textbook on child psychology,
and I have published something around 150 articles in pro
fessional journals.
Q. Have you ever made any studies bearing on the ca
pacities of different groups to profit by education!
A. Yes. As a matter of fact my first research, which was
begun in 1912, was addressed to this very thing; the results
were published in 1918. Then I was also on the team which
brought out the celebrated alpha test of intelligence in the
United States Army, as I helped with the experimental work
which lead to that; and I have been continuously occupied
in the field of individual differences and of group differ
ences, and I teach that subject at the Ohjp State University.
Then I also supervise somewhere between 75 and 100 stu
dents a year who make case studies of individual children
and I may add some of these are always negro children. I
have done some research studies in the field of attitudes,
including two of them concerning the attitudes of negroes
and, finally, in this list I have done a rather prolonged
[fol. 251] series of experiments in the field of learning
with special reference to how children learn in school, rather
than mere laboratory learning.
Q. Dr. English, have you told me all the courses that you
now teach at Ohio State University?
A. No; I teach chiefly individual differences, child
psychology and the more practical aspects of learning,
rather than theoretical, and I also teach the theory of per
sonality. Those are the main courses.
1 5 5
Q. Dr. English, at this point I want to ask you a hypo
thetical question. I want you to assume that in the City of
Topeka there is a body of white school children and a body
of negro school children, and that there is also racially en
forced segregation in the schools. Would you say that on
the basis of your learning, experience and study that on
the basis of color alone there is a difference in their ability
to learn?
A. No, there certainly is not.
Q. Would you tell me, the support for your statement.
A. Well, in the first place, we don’t have racial groups
learning; we have individuals learning and in both groups,
white and negro, we have some persons who are very good
learners; we have some persons who are very poor learners,
and we have some medium learners. You can break that
down to as fine a point as you like; the range is exactly
[fol. 252] the same. Well, I say that, as a matter of fact,
with regard to school children in respect to the I. Q. which
is the best single measure of a child’s ability to learn. The
best I. Q. on record is that of a negro girl who has no white
blood as far as that can be told at all, but right after this
child there are four white children, so, you see, it’s—at the
top it ’s quite equal and at the bottom it ’s quite equal and
in the middle it ’s quite equal. It ’s a matter of individuals
and not a matter of groups. So knowing only the color you
can’t predict at all how well a child can learn. If a child
is white you can’t tell from that fact alone how well that
child will learn in comparison with a group of negro chil
dren and, of course, vice versa from the fact that a child
is a negro you can’t tell how well he will learn with respect
to a group of white children. From color alone there is
no telling. We know that the negro child, moreover, learns
in the same way, that he uses the same process in learning
and learns the same things, but I do want to make one
exception; it ’s a notable exception: If we din it into a per
son that it is unnatural for him to learn certain things, if
we din it into a person that he is incapable of learning, then
he is less likely to be able to learn.
Q. That difference is not based upon any inherent quality.
A. Not at all. It ’s a parallel exactly the way it is with
[fol. 253] women learning mathematics. There is sort of
156
a superstition that women are naturally incapable of learn
ing mathematics, and so they don’t, most of them, learn it.
They can, if they will, and some of them do, but there is a
tendency for us to live up to, or perhaps I should say to live
down to the social expectation and to learn what we think
people say we can learn, and legal segregation definitely
depresses the negroes expectancy, and is therefore preju
dicial to his learning. If you get a child in the attitude that
he is somehow inferior, and he thinks to himself, “ Well, I
can’t learn this very well.” , then he is unlikely to learn
it very well.
Q. Dr. English, is there any other scientific evidence to
support this conclusion which you have stated other than
what you have said.
A. Yes, there is a good deal. For example, in the last
war we took the people who were illiterates. These, of
course—a good many more of them were colored than
white, but we put them into schools to teach them fourth-
grade literacy and, as a matter of fact, 87 % of the negroes
and 84% of the whites successfully completed the work of
these schools. Now I don’t make anything of the difference
of 3% in favor of the negroes as compared with the white.
That is, of course, within the range of accidental error, but
I say these results do show that under favorable conditions
[fol. 254] and under conditions of motivation where these
men wanted to learn, the negro men proved that they could
learn as well as the whites. Most of the scientific evidence
concerns intelligence testing, which, as I said a moment
ago, is the best single measure of the ability to learn, and
the scientific question that we would ask is, “ Are there
differences in intelligence which we find? Are these differ
ences due to race or are they due to unequal opportunities?”
and the whole trend of the evidence, beginning with the work
in 1912, but especially beginning after the first world war
when we analyzed the scores of the recruits in the first
world war, the whole trend of the evidence is this, and
there are no real exceptions to this trend, that wherever we
try to equalize the opportunities, we minimize or extinguish
the differences in learning ability as between the two racial
groups. Perhaps the best study of this is Dr. Klineberg’s
study showing the results of the migration to New York
157
City of children from the deep south. He found—of course
we all know that the schools in the south, and particularly
the negro schools in the south, are by and large inferior.
There are some cities in the south where the schools are
very good, but the general tendency, and especially in the
rural regions, is for the educational opportunities in the
south to be very bad and particularly bad for negroes,
[fob 255] These things are well known in educational cir
cles. So the negroes then coming out of these very poor
school situations had very low ability to learn. They
seemed stupid and their intelligence test scores were low.
But each year that they were in the more favorable learning
opportunities in the north, their intelligence quotient was
rising, and the longer they were in that favorable region
the more their intelligence rose, so that the conclusion is
unavoidable that their previous condition was due to the
unfavorable opportunities.
Q. Dr. English, is there any scientific evidence to the
contrary?
A. Very little indeed and such little evidence as there is
doesn’t stand up. Now, for example, there was a study
by a man named Tanzer, worked with Canadian negroes in
a place in Ontario. They went to the same school with the
whites, and the whites were, as a group, somewhat better
than the negroes. But in this study when we reanalyze
the data we found that the negroes were of lower economic
status, and we know that lower economic status affects these
things, and we found that the negro children went to school
less often. In the white group the attendance was 93
and in the colored group it was 84% of the time. With a
loss of schooling like that and coming from an inferior
group, the tendency is to think that the difference found was
[fob 256] attributable to these unfavorable factors, rather
than the race itself. Certainly these factors that I men
tion were a contributing cause, and I don’t say they are
the whole thing; they themselves reflect the whole tissue
of social circumstances which somewhat discouraged negro
learning, and this is a rather typical sample of the few,
the relatively few, studies which even seem to point in the
opposite direction. The overwhelming tendency is all in
the direction of my first statement. May I summarize that?
158
It seems to me that what we have here is that the segrega
tion tends to create—first of all, segregation seemingly is
based upon a fallacy of a difference and then by the mere
fact of segregation it turns around and creates the very
difference which if assumes to have been present to begin
with, and we get into a vicious circle.
Q. Dr. English, I would like to ask you another hypothe
tical question now, and I would like you to answer on the
basis of your experience and learning as an educational
psychologist. I want you to assume that a negro child
lives within a few blocks of a school; that he lives a much
greater distance from another school, which is a negro
school which he is compelled to attend on the basis of race;
that he spends perhaps a half hour, perhaps more, perhaps
an hour or two a day travelling to and from school, where
as if he were not compelled to attend this negro school he
[fob 257] would spend a few minutes, perhaps fifteen or
twenty minutes, a day going to and from school. Would
you say that if all other factors were equal that he would
receive the same benefits from attending the negro school
as he would from attending the white school?
A. Definitely not.
'Q. Give us the reasons.
A. May I say—perhaps your question is, you say from
attending the negro school. May I broaden it, from his
education, if the Court will permit that extension because
it ’s the whole education of the child which is being damaged
here. The education of the child is not wholly in the class
room. The education of the child goes on on the play
ground, in playing with his equals and his fellows, around
home. This is one of the most important things for the
wholesome development of the child and, when you take
an hour a day from a child, you are taking away something
very precious to his total education. I have had this in
my own home because one of my children had to go to
quite a distant school because of a physical handicap, and
we could see the results upon his development of this
deprivation. It was one of those things we couldn’t help.
I gather that what you are talking about is something
that we could help if it were not for the presence of the
law.
159
[fol. 258] Q. Is there any scientific data supporting this
opinion which you have just given, Dr. English?
A. It would be very hard to find it, for me to recall it.
I t ’s one of those things which has such universal consent
that I can’t recall it ever being challenged. I am sure we
see in our clinics all the time, as we examine children
who are disadvantaged and who are maladjusted, we see all
the time the evidence of the children who do not get out
and play with others. As a matter of fact, I don’t think
there is any—I am sure there is no psychologist, no child
psychologist in the country who would challenge the state
ment that there is—that the child’s play is of the utmost
importance and should not be unnecessarily diminished.
Mr. Greenberg: That is all.
Cross-examination.
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. Dr. English, this opinion you have rendered is some
what founded upon theory, is it not?
A. No, sir, it is based upon literally thousands of experi
mental studies.
Q. How many cases have you taken, for example, of
children that have gone to segregated schools and followed
them through—-you yourself—and examined their situation
in adult life.
A. Well, now to what answer of mine is that addressed. I
[fol. 259] thought you were asking me about the question
of individual differences.
Q. No.
A. What are you asking them about.
Q. Have you personally conducted a survey or super
vised a survey wthere you took cases of children that had
gone through, negro children, that had gone through segre
gated schools and examined them in their adult life to
determine whether or not the fact that they had gone to
segregated schools had any bearing or relation to their
success or achievement record.
A. I don’t believe that I testified on that point, did I?
Q. I didn’t say you did. I am asking you if you have
ever done such a thing.
160
A. I have not done such a thing. I am not sure that it ’s
relevant at all to my testimony.
Q. Well, is it possible that you could be in error in some
of your conclusions here? Could you be mistaken about
some of them?
A. Every man can be mistaken; certainly I can.
Q. You could be mistaken, couldn’t you?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Have you given this expert testimony around the
country in cases such as this?
A. No, sir, never before; I teach it.
[fol. 260] Q. Now, Doctor, the ideal state, if I understand
your testimony, that you testified in your opinion to, would
be where you had no segregation as far as educational
process.
A. I don’t think I said anything about the ideal state.
Q. Well, it would be better, in other words, is that right?
A. I certainly believe that things would be better if we
had no segregation, but that is not an expert opinion; that
is my personal opinion. I didn’t testify to that.
Q. Well, I mean restricting it to the educational process
is what I meant.
A. Yes, without any doubt.
Q. Would you—would it change your opinion any if the
facts present in this community were that the child, the
negro child, that we are dealing with, if he went to a white
school he would be outnumbered ten to one or fifty to one.
A. Not at all. I have seen that happen. I have grown
up in schools where that happened myself. I have seen it
happen repeatedly. We have it in our own city.
Q. Don’t you think there is a general tendency, for
getting the racial thing, for the majority to rule and operate
the thing that they belong to.
A. In what sense “ majority” ?
Q. Well------
A. Racial majority?
[fol. 261] Q. Assuming you had 500 white children going
to Randolph School and ten negro children. What would be
the natural tendency, taking into account the human ele
ment and human equations of whether the negro children
1 6 1
would run that school or participate actively in the student
activities or whether it would be run by the white students?
A. Well, of course, the majority would generally have
a preponderant voice if they divided along racial lines
which they tend to do, but which they do not invariably do.
I have seen many cases where the colored child receives
in a mixed school from the majority group considerable
amount of status and honor. You may recall just recently
a man was elected captain of the football team in a pre
dominantly white school. I think it was Williams or Am
herst, I am not quite sure which, and this is reproduced
all the way through our school systems where we do have
mixed schools.
Q. And there are some outstanding negroes in different
fields of professions and—who have received their—part
of their education—in the deep south in segregated schools.
A. That is true.
Q. And yet have achieved great places of importance,
isn’t that right?
A. Education isn’t the whole answer to ability; it is
merely one factor. There are men who are big enough,
[fol. 262] white or black, to rise above unfavorable cir
cumstances.
Q. Surely. You are familiar, of course, as an educator,
with the experience that was had back in the reconstruc
tion days, sometimes referred to as the carpet-bagger days
in the south.
A. Very definitely.
Q. You realize that a certain element, radical element
I would call it, of the Republican party, perhaps to gain
some political advantage, decided to go down in the various
states and abolish certain segregation; you realize that
was done.
A. Well, there wasn’t exactly segregation at that time,
but they did go down there and set up some laws of one
sort or another, yes.
Q. Which attempted, in one swoop, to eliminate all of
their custom and usages of those communities in the south,
didn’t it?
11—8
162
A. I am not here as an expert on history, bnt I read
history that way, yes.
Q. Surely. Don’t you realize that the experience of that
period was that they had a tremendous amount of trouble,
tremendous amount of emotional outburst and that it caused
a great deal of strife between the races and didn’t work
at all.
[fol. 263] A. Well, if the Court wants a layman’s opinion
on history, I will answer that question to the best of my
knowledge as a layman on history; I am not here as a
historian.
Judge Huxman: It seems to me the question is going far
afield.
Mr. Goodell: That is all.
Judge Huxman: Any further questions of the doctor?
If not, you may step down, doctor.
(Witness excused.)
W ilbu r B. B rookoyer, h av in g been first du ly sw orn, as
sum ed the stand and testified as fo l lo w s :
Direct Examination.
By Mr. Greenberg:
Q. Mr. Brookover, will you please state your full name.
A. Wilbur B. Brookover.
Q. What is your occupation?
A. I am a social psychologist by profession. The position
I now hold is professor of social science, sociology, at Michi
gan State College.
Q. What degrees do you hold, Mr. Brookover?
A. I hold an A.B. Degree from Manchester College, a
Master of Arts Degree and a Doctor of Philosophy Degree
in sociology and psychology from the University of Wis
consin.
Q. Are you a member of any learned societies, Doctor?
[fol. 264] A. I am a member of the American Sociological
Society, Society for Applied Anthropology, Society for the
Psychological study of Social Issues, the High Valley
Sociological Society, Michigan Academy of Science, the
American Association for the Advancement of Science.
Q. What is your field of special interest, Dr. Brookover?
A. I am particularly concerned in my teaching and re
search in the field of social psychology with particular
reference to the human relations in the school society, or
the school as a social institution and in relations between
minority groups and majority groups in society.
Q. Are you the author of any books or publications?
A. I am the author of several articles on various topics
concerned with social relations between teachers and pupils
and other aspects of social factors in education. I am also
the author of articles concerned with relation of these social
factors to teaching—to pupil achievement. I have pub
lished articles on the impact of social stratafication on
education, one that is in press at the present time to appear
in the Journal of Educational Theory. I am also the author
of articles concerning social factors in relation to citizen
ship education, an article to appear in the 1951 yearbook
of the National Council of Social Studies, now in press. I
have in preparation a book to be published by the American
Book company that will be entitled “ The Sociology of
[fol. 265] Education.” I am a joint author of a book now
in preparation; it’s a monograph which will report research
which—committee of which I was chairman conducted on
minority groups in Maple County, which is a midwestern
community.
Q. Other than what you have stated, have you devoted any
special study to the problem of the effect of racial segre
gation on the individual?
A. Well, the monograph which I last mentioned grows
out of a rather extended project still in process on the
analysis of minority group relations in midwestern society.
I have inaugurated at the present time, designed a study
to analyze the dynamics of prejudices among youth.
Mr. Goodell: I didn’t get that.
The Witness: The dynamics of prejudices among youth
in a midwestern school community.
Q. Now, Dr. Brookover, I am going to ask you a hypo
thetical question which I would like to have you answer
163
164
on the basis of your learning*. Assume that in the City of
Topeka there is maintained a racially segregated school
system. Would you say that the negro child who attends
the racially segregated school receives the same benefits
as he would receive from attending a racial integrated
school, if all other factors were equal?
A. No, I would not.
[fol. 266] Q. On what do you base your opinion?
A. Well, I would say, first of all, that I would want to
emphasize the nature of the educational process in this
respect: Education is a process of teaching youth to behave
in those ways that society thinks is essential. In our
society it has long been held that this is a necessary func
tion, to prepare democratic citizens. Now, the child acquires
these essential behavior patterns in association with other
people. In other words, they are not fixed; they are not
inherent in the behavior of the child, but they are acquired
in a social situation. Now, in order to acquire the types
of behavior that any society may expect and to learn how
to behave in various situations, the child must be provided
an opportunity to interact with and understand what kinds
of behavior are desired, expected, in all kinds of situations.
This is achieved only if the child has presented to him
clearly defined models.
Q. What do you mean by models, Professor?
A. Examples, illustrations of behavior; persons behaving
in the ways that are—that the child is expected to behave
and also consistent behavior of this sort. In other words,
of an example, one kind of a model, and another time he is
expected to behave if at one time he is presented one kind
of an example, one kind of model, and another time he is
[fol. 267] presented another kind of a model, and there
is a constant confusion. Now that, I think, leads us
immediately to the situation with regard to segregated
schools. In American society we consistently present to the
child a model of democratic equality of opportunity. We
teach him the principles of equality; we teach him what
kind of ideals we have in American society and set this
model of behavior before him and expect him to internalize,
to take on, this model, to believe it, to understand it. At
the same time, in a segregated school situation he is pre
165
sented a contradictory or inharmonious model. He is pre
sented a school situation in which it is obvious that he is
a subordinate, inferior kind of a citizen. He is not presented
a model of equality and equal opportunity and basis of
operating in terms of his own individual rights and privh
leges. Now, this conflict of models always creates con
fusion, insecurity, and difficulty for the child who can not
internalize a clearly defined and clearly accepted definition
of his role, so he is faced with situations which he doesn’t—
he has two or three, at least two in this situation, definitions
of how he is expected to behave. This frustration that
results may result in a delinquent behavior or otherwise
criminal or socially abnormal behavior. Now the negro
child is constantly presented with this dual definition of
his role as a citizen and the segregated schools perpet-
[fol. 268] uates this conflict in expectancies, condemns the
negro child to an ineffective role as a citizen and member
of society.
Q. Dr. Brookover, this opinion and the reasons you have
just given, are they supported by scientific authority ?
A. Yes, there is extensive work been done by psychol
ogists, social psychologists, on the whole theory of role-
taking and the question of eternization of patterns of ex
pectancy, such people as George Herbert Meade, Charles
Horton Cooley and numerous other people have done ex
tensive work, extensive research in the processes of per
sonality development and learning a situation through-social
interaction.
Mr. Greenberg: That is all.
Cross-examination.
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. Doctor, I will just ask you one question: Have you
ever heard of these people, all negroes: Mary McLeod
Bethune of Sumter, South Carolina, who is president of the
college there, Bethune-Cookman College, Daytona Beach,
Florida.
A. I have heard of someone by the name of Bethune. I
am not sure that I know.
166
Q. Richard Wright, Greenwood, Mississippi and Jackson,
, Mississippi, author of Native Son, negro.
A. I have.
[fol. 269] Q. Charles Johnson of Bristol, Virginia.
A. Charles Johnson, that I know.
Q. Sociologist and president of Fisk University.
A. I think that is in Tennessee.
Q. Perhaps so. Walter White, of Atlanta, Georgia, Ex-,
ecutive Secretary of National Association for the Advance
ment of Colored People.
A. I have heard of him; don’t know him.
Q. George Washington Carver, Neosho, Missouri, resi
dence.
A. I have heard of him.
Q. Langston Hughes, poet and author; I believe from
Kansas.
A. I have heard of him; don’t know him.
Q. W. E. B. DuBois who was an author, I believe con
nected with Fisk University at Nashville.
A. I know a DuBois who is an anthropologist. I don’t
know if this is the one.
Q. Mordecai Johnson, Paris, Tennessee, president of
Howard University, Washington, D. C., negro university.
A. I know the name; I don’t know him at all.
Q. William Grant Still, a composer of Little Rock, Ar
kansas.
A. Don’t know him.
Q. Negro. A. Philip Randolph, Florida, president of the
Sleeping—strike that. Charles Wesley of Baltimore, Mary
land, president of the university in Ohio; I don’t have the
town.
[fol. 270] A. I don’t know him.
Q. Frederick Patterson, president of Tuskegee Institute,
Washington, D. C.
A. I don’t know him.
Q. Some of these men you know. Assuming they were
all educated—got their preliminary education in segregated
schools, a large part of them in the south, would you—did
you consider that in arriving at your opinion here?
A. Certainly did. The fact that occasionally a person is
able to overcome, through various readjustments and other
167
experiences, the conflict of roles, the conflict of models, does
not disturb the generalization which I make, in the least.
Certainly there are individual cases which either through
psychotherapy or other experiences, the individual is able
to overcome such difficulties. But this is not the general
case at all.
Q. Well, there are many illustrations of emotional stress
and strain among the white children who go to school
and don’t get—get sort of left out, don’t make the foot
ball team or the basketball team or don’t get invited to
the parties, isn’t that right?
A. Sure, there are differences in ability to adjust and
there are emotional disturbances. The differences which
you cite are not enforced differences. They are not inevi
table in terms of the situation in which they come—in which
[fol. 271] they operate. The child is not by fiat or legali
zation required to have presented to him this conflict.
Q. That is your opinion about what the law ought to be,
in other words, is that it?
A. I would say on the basis of my testimony that the
segregation of schools presents a conflicting set of models
inevitably.
Q. This opinion you have given here is largely your own
personal view based upon your study.
A. No, I wouldn’t say it ’s my own personal view at all.
I would say it ’s the result of a tremendous amount of
research and evidence.
Q. I said study.
A. That is accumulated by social psychologists over a
period of years and as I have studied and analyzed this
research, I would come to this conclusion.
Q. You think you could be wrong?
A. Of course any scientist always presents the possibility
or recognizes the possibility that new evidence and new
research may modify to some extent the conclusions of a
particular time.
Mr. Goodell: That is all.
(Witness excused.)
168
[ fo l . 272] L ouisa H olt, h av in g been first du ly sw orn , as
sum ed the stand and testified as fo l lo w s :
Direct examination.
By Mr. Carter:
Q. Mrs. Holt, what is yon occupation?
A. I am a social psychologist.
Q. Would you indicate to the Court what your educa
tional background is.
A. I received the Bachelor’s Degree, Master’s Degree and
Ph.D. all from Radcliffe College, which is the feminine
adjunct of Harvard University. This was in the field of
sociology in the Department of Social Relations there, which
includes cultural anthropology, clinical psychology, social
psychology, as well as sociology.
Q. Mrs. Holt, would you also describe your various job
experiences.
A. Well, I started under an arrangement which gave me
a kind of internship in public administration where I
worked in the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
Q. Where was this?
A. For six months in Alderson, West Virginia; for about
nine months in Washington. Following that, I had a year
of graduate study concurrent with work in a settlement
house in Boston, South End House, and then was appointed
an instructor in sociology at Skidmore College and also
[fol. 273] director of a college community center in Sara
toga Springs. I was then returned to Radcliffe College
where I was appointed a teaching fellow and tutor in
sociology. Concurrently with that, I held a Sigmund Freud
Memorial Fellowship at the Boston Psychoanalytic Institute
in 1944 and 1945. Following these other jobs, I participated
in some research work for the Family Society of Boston in
connection with their vocational counseling service. I was
then an educational counselor for the National Institute of
Public Affairs in Washington. From 1947 to 1949 I held
a part-time appointment in the Menninger Foundation
School of Psychiatry and for part of that time in their
school of clinical psychology affiliated with the University
of Kansas.
169
Q. That is located in this city.
A. What’s that?
A. Is that in Topeka?
A. Yes. In the interim, there was a post-doctorate research
fellowship of the National Institute of Mental Health. This
past year I have been on the faculty of the University of
Kansas in the Psychology Department, teaching courses
in social psychology and personality and some of their
inter-relations. At the same time I also prepared a long
paper for a United States Public Health Service project
in connection with the Mid-Century Whitehouse Conference
[fol. 274] on Children and Youth dealing with the problems,
the methodology of evaluating mental health programs.
Q. What is your major field of interests, Mrs. Holt?
A. It ’s probably clear that I am interested in the relations
between social process and social conditions and person
ality functioning behavior.
Q. Are you a member of any professional societies?
A. The American Sociological Society, the Society for
Applied Anthropology, Society for the Psychological Study
of Social Issues, the American Society for Group Psycho
therapy and Psychodrama, and I am an associate member
of the Topeka Psychoanalytic Society.
Q. Mrs. Holt, are you at all familiar with the school
system in Topeka?
A. Yes; I have one child who entered that system this
last year and another who enters next September.
Q. You are then aware of the fact that the schools are
operated on a segregated basis.
A. I am.
Q. Based upon your experience and your knowledge, tak
ing the segregated factor alone in the school system in
Topeka, in your opinion does enforced legal separation
have any adverse effect upon the personality development
of the negro child?
[fol. 275] A. The fact that it is enforced, that it is legal,
I think, has more importance than the mere fact of segre
gation by itself does because this gives legal and official
sanction to a policy which inevitably is interpreted both
by white people and by negroes as denoting the inferiority
of the negro group. Were it not for the sense that one group
170
is inferior to the other, there would be no basis, and I am-
not granting that this is a rational basis, for such segre
gation.
Q. Well, does this interference have any effect, in your
opinion, on the learning process f
A. A sense of inferiority must always affect one’s moti
vation for learning since it affects the feeling one has of
one’s self as a person, as a personality or a self or an ego
identity, as Eric Erickson has recently expressed it. That
sense of ego identity is built up on the basis of attitudes
that are expressed toward a person by others who are
important. First the parents and then teachers, other
people in the community, whether they are older or one’s
own peers. It is other peoples reactions to one’s self which
most basically affects the conception of one’s self that one
has. If these attitudes that are reflected back and then
internalized or projected, are unfavorable ones, then one
develops a sense of one’s self as an inferior being. That
may not be deleterious necessarily from the standpoint of
[fol. 276] educational motivation. I believe in some cases
it can lead to stronger motivation to achieve well in aca
demic pursuits, to strive to disprove to the world that one
is inferior since the world feels that one is inferior. In
other cases, of course, the reaction may be the opposite and
apathetic acceptance, fatalistic submission to the feeling-
others have expressed that one is inferior and therefore
any efforts to prove otherwise would be doomed to failure.
Q. Now these difficulties that you have described, whether
they give a feeling of inferiority which you were motivated
to attempt to disprove to the world by doing more or
whether they give you a feeling of inferiority and therefore
cause you to do less, would you say that the difficulties
which segregation causes in the public school system inter
fere with a well—development of a well-rounded person
ality ? -
A. I think the maximum or maximal development of any
personality can only be based on the potentialities which
that individual himself possesses. Of course they are
affected for good or ill by the attitudes, opinions, feelings,
which are expressed by others and which may be fossilized
into laws. On the other hand, these can be overcome in
171
exceptional cases. The instances I cited of those whose
motivation to succeed in academic competition is heightened
[fol. 277] may very well not be fulfilling their own most
basic, most appropriate potentialities but seeking, rather, to
tilt against windmills, to disprove something which there
was no valid reason, in my opinion, to think was so anyhow,
namely, the feeling of their inferiority. So even when
educational success is achieved that still may not denote
the most self-realization of the person. I feel, if I may
add another word, I feel that when segregation exists, it ’s
not something—although it may seem to be such—that is
directed against people for what they are. It is directed
against them on the basis of who their parents are, since
that is the definition which, according to sociologists and
social psychologists analysis of the matter, that is used in
determining who shall go to a segregated school, a negro
school or a white school; it is not simply skin color. In the
case of Walter White, for example, and sociologist Allison
Davis, his brother, John Davis, who are negroes, their skin
color is lighter than mine; of course, I have been out in
the sun—the definition does depend upon who a person’s
parents were. That appears also if a dark-skinned person
had parents who were high potentates in India he is not
defined as a negro; therefore he is not required to use segre
gated facilities. It is not the skin color; it is who the
parents were, and my understanding and various soeiolo-
[fol. 278] gists and psychologists analysis of the American
tradition, religious tradition as well as set of values and
ethos, determining much of our most valued and significant
behavior, hinges upon a belief in treating people upon their
own merits and we are inclined to oppose a view which
states that we should respect people or reject them on the
basis of who their parents were.
Q. Now, Mrs. Holt, you are aware of the fact that segre
gation is practiced in Topeka only for the first six grades.
Thereafter, the child goes to high school and junior high
school apparently without regard to race or color. You
have described difficulties and interferences with the person
ality development which occurs by virtue of segregation at
the first six grades. Is the integration of the child at the
172
junior high school level, does that correct these difficulties
which you have just spoken of, in your opinion?
A. I think it’s a theory that would be accepted by virtual
ly all students of personality development that the earlier
a significant event occurs in the life of an individual the
more lasting, the more far-reaching and deeper the effects
of that incident, that trauma, will be; th,e more—the
earlier an event occurs, the more difficult it is later on to
eradicate those effects.
[fob 279] Q. Your opinion would be that it would be more
difficult to eradicate those effects at the junior high school
level, is that it ; merely because you integrate them at the
junior high school level------
A. Well, once a trauma has occurred, and I do believe
that attending a segregated school, perhaps after the pre
school years of free play with others of different skin
color, is a trauma to the negro child; that occurs early.
There is also evidence emerging from a study now going
on at Harvard University that the later achievement of
individuals in their adult occupational careers can be pre
dicted at the first grade. If that is true, it means that the
important effects of schooling in relation to later achieve
ment are set down at that early age, and I therefore don’t
think that simply removing segregation at a somewhat
later grade could possibly undue those effects.
Cross-examination:
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. You mean, Mrs. Holt, there is a serious study being
made now to project in the future whether a child in the
first grade is going to be a flop or a success?
A. I do.
Q. You have confidence in that, do you?
A. That study is being directed by Professor Tawkett
[fob 280] Parsons, the head of the Department of Social
Relations.
Q. You have a good deal of confidence in that?
A. I certainly do.
Q. You made a comment in your testimony I would like
173
to call your attention to again; this segregation in some
cases would spur, act as a whiplash, on the child to spur
him on and make him achieve, and that would he a bad
thing.
A. Yes.
Q. You mean it ’s a bad thing, for example, for a poor
boy, because he is poor, the whiplash of poverty makes
him work harder to rise hig*her; that is a bad thing!
A. I mean that that can be at the expense of healthy
personality development, self-actualization, self-realiza
tion of the most basic fundamental and appropriate kind
for that person, and we have plenty of evidence of people
who burn themselves out with various emotional or per
haps psychosomatic diseases in whose cases that can be
attributed to this overweening striving for competitive suc
cess to overcome feelings of inferiority.
Q. Mrs. Holt, more or less educational process has in it
competitive features, that is, the children are given tests
and examinations and gradecards and the ones that don’t
make good grades, they get poor grades; at least the
teacher gives them their merit grade. You don’t believe
[fob 281] in that, do you!
A. I believe in the children being appraised on the basis
of their own objective achievement.
Q. You don’t believe, then, in any sort of competition
in the public school system, do you!
A. I believe competition has its values.
'Q. Do you believe in that in the way it ’s carried on and
have competitive examinations and gradecarding and things
of that kind!
A. I don’t know how else one can operate a society in
which individuals are judged primarily on their own merits
rather than through connections of who their parents were
or who they know which are the alternatives to that sys
tem.
Q. Progressive education, that is one of the elements
that they believe which has been set up in California and
other areas, to abolish all grading, abolish all examina
tions, let every child go to school and never have to worry
about what his grades are; never know what they are,
isn’t that right?
174
A. I think a child needs' some definiteness in the expecta
tions -which the authorities over him, the teachers, have
in order to stimulate him to his own maximal productive
ness. I think also competition with his peers,,if not carried
to excessive limits, if not if not undue emphasis is placed
on it, can also have very beneficial effects.
[fol. 282] Q. These are your personal views you have
been giving here largely.
A. They are based on a fair amount of acquaintance
with scientific work in this field.
Mr. Goodell: That is all.
If the Court please, at the outset the Court mentioned—
I don’t care to be objecting about it, but the Court, I
thought, suggested a limit on this line of testimony.
Judge Mellott: That is about nine now that we have
had on this phase. How many more are there?
Mr. Greenberg: Pardon me, sir, I didn’t hear you.
Judge Mellott: You have had several now of the so-
called expert testimony; how many will there be?
Mr. Greenberg: We have three or four more, Your Honor,
and they are all different.
Judge Huxman: Well, now, we are not disposed to be
critical, but it ’s my opinion from having listened to this
testimony, the last four witnesses—that it ’s all cumulative.
I can see no difference, substantial difference, between any
of the testimony of the last three or four witnesses. It ’s
fifteen minutes until adjournment time. AYe are going to
have to adjourn this evening at 4:30 on account of a com-
[fol. 283] mitment I have. AVe can, perhaps, finish one
more wdtness in that time. Then I suggest that you gentle
men tonight really appraise your witnesses and appraise
this evidence, see whether my statement is warranted that
this evidence we are now receiving is all substantially the
same and, unless there is more difference in the testimony
that you have, we might well have the qualifications of the
remaining witnesses read into the record and have a stipu
lation that their testimony as to the effect of segregation
itself upon the mental attitude upon the outlook and life
of the student is substantially as testified to by these wit
nesses. I am just simply suggesting that, saying not that
175
we will enforce that rule in the morning, but it was under
stood that about five witnesses would be allowed, and then
we would examine the subject, and we are reaching that
point, so suppose you call your next witness; that will take
us to adjournment time.
J o h n J . K an e , h av in g been first du ly sw orn, assum ed the
stand and testified as f o l lo w s :
Direct examination.
By Mr. Greenberg:
Q. What is your full name?
A. John J. Kane. n
[fol. 284] Q. What is your occupation?
A. I am an instructor in Sociology at the University of
Notre Dame.
Q. What is your educational background?
A. I have a Bachelor of Arts Degree from St. Joseph’s
College, a Master of Arts Degree in sociology from Tem
ple University, a Doctor of Philosophy Degree in Soci
ology from the University of Pennsylvania.
Q. What positions have you held?
A. I was an instructor in sociology at St. Joseph’s Col
lege about two and a half or three years. I have been in
structor in Sociology at the University of Notre Dame for
three years.
Q. Have you devoted yourself for any of your profes
sional attention to the field of the impact of racial segre
gation on the individual?
A. I have done two studies in the general field of preju
dices, racial—my major interest in the graduate school
was in the field of race relations and ethnic relations.
Q. Mr. Kane, on the basis of your educational experience
and your studies, I want you to answer the following hy
pothetical question: Assume that in the City of Topeka
there is maintained a racially segregated school system
and that a negro child is compelled to attend a racially
segregated school because of his race alone; that if this
[fol. 285] system did not exist, he would attend a racially
176
integrated school, would you say that if all other factors
are equal, that he obtains the same educational opportuni
ties at the former school as at the latter?
A. No, I would not.
Q. Now, would you give us the basis for your opinion,
Mr. Kane.
A. I would begin with two points: The first one is that
the school, with the exception of the home, is the institution
that makes the greatest impact on American youth. You
see, the school gets the child early in life, keeps him for a
number of years, so that day after day, year after year it is
transferring attitudes for him. Now, we have some scien
tific evidence about the effectiveness of the accumulation
of materials in this area. For instance, Professor Thurs
ton’s work on changing attitudes through motion pictures
shows that when one picture was shown to a group of
youngsters it had relatively little influence in changing at
titudes ; two had a little more, but if he worked in series of
three, he discovered cumulative evidence was very power
ful in changing attitudes. What I am mentioning this for
is the fact that the influence of the segregated school, when
a negro child day after day, year after year, does have this
cumulative effect. Secondly, I would like to point out that
one of the things children get out of education besides cer-
[fol. 286] tain manual skills, spelling, arithmetic and sci
ence, is above all, the formation of attitudes. This is what
lasts; this is what continues after the school years, and
therefore the attitude they g*et in the particular schools
is of great significance. Now, in a school system in which
racial segregation is practiced, you have a day after day
accumulation of attitudes that the negro child is inferior
because segregation is differentiation and distinction. It
means, as Professor Newcomb has pointed out, that one
group denies to another group, status, privilege and power
and so it is borne in upon a negro boy and girl that they
are being differentiated not merely because of skin color
or physical characteristics, but because there is something
inately inferior or subordinate about them and so most
of them begin to learn that certain avenues of vertical mo
bility are closed to them.
Q. What do you mean by vertical mobility?
177
A. I mean the opportunity of advancing in the world,
moving ahead, having a better job than your father had,
more social position, and I would point out to you that this
concept is fundamental to the American system of values.
This is one of the things that we Americans believe in very
intensively, and it is something which is denied to negro
children. Furthermore, the philosophy of racial segrega-
[fol. 287] gation is supported by rationalizations on the
racial myth of inferiority for which we have no adequate
scientific evidence. Secondly, segregation cuts down on
the communication among people. It erects a barrier. Now,
certain barriers will exist whether you have a segregation
enforced by law or not, but here’s a case where barriers are
created and upheld by law. The total effect is to make
most of your negro children feel inferior, and I would like
to refer to a study that was made by Preston with regard
to projected scores on tests. A number of white boys were
asked to put down the score they expected to get on a cer
tain test and, when they put down the score, they were told
that negro youths had made a higher score. The white
boys were allowed to change, and they immediately changed
their scores above the negro score. Negro youths were
told they were about to take a test and were asked to put
down the expected score and, when they put it down, they
were told this was higher than the white boys made, and
they were asked if they wanted to change it, and they
lowered their scores below that of the white group. This
is indicative of the expectation of behavior which is en
gendered in a segregated school among most of your colored
students.
Q. Dr. Kane, you mentioned a study that vou made.
A. Well------
[fol. 288] Q. —in this field. Could you tell us whether
or not that study supports the conclusion which you just
stated and describe the study.
A. I studied groups of negro boys, gangs, in West Phila
delphia. I think it could be used.
Q. Will you describe what you did in this study.
A. We discovered in this particular area there was a
system of social stratafication among negroes. The area
12—8
was roughly split into two sections, one in which the negroes
called the “ Tops” and the other which they called the
“ Bottoms.” In the “ Tops” you had a high degree of
homeownership, negro males there, the fathers had better
occupations, larger income and a fairly stable family. The
“ Bottoms” area you never had any area in which as many
as 6% of the negroes owned their homes. You had a rela
tively unstable family; for the most part they were em
ployed in menial jobs. Now you would think that the 11 Bot
toms” area, as a group, represented the lowest level of
negro society, but these negroes themselves made a dis
tinction, and they would point out that there was still a
lower group than this, and that was the negro from the
south and, if you asked them, they said because of segre
gated education. Now, I want to point out, whether or not
that was true, is quite beside the point because, as W. I.
Thomas indicated long ago, if men define situations as
[fol. 289] real, they are real in their consequences and
this is the attitude the negro group itself held, and, of
course, this is the way we form attitudes about ourselves;
not only what we think, but what we know or believe other
people think about us. So, here again, you have an indi
cation of the inferiority that was engendered because of
the segregated school system amongst the immigrants from
the south.
Mr. Greenberg: That is all.
Cross-examination.
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. Professor, don’t you believe a home which has the
child, say the first five years without any—where the school
doesn’t have him at all, in any case whether he is negro
or white, don’t you think the child has a great deal to do
with attitudes, it’s race and towards another race and ac
ceptance, and so forth.
A. You are perfectly correct. As a matter of fact, the
home is much more important than the school, if it’s an
adequate home. Now, I should like to point out, if I
may------
Q. That answers my question.
179'
Judge Huxman: You luay go ahead and give your ex
planation, This is an expert witness.
The Witness: I should like to point out that when the
home facilities are inadequate, as they are in so many
[fol. 290] cases of your poor negro family, then the school
becomes increasingly important and, in those cases prob
ably, more important than the home since it is exercising
little influence.
Mr. Gfoodell: I have no further questions.
Judge Huxman: It is now five minutes of adjournment
time, and we perhaps could not finish another witness, and
I just have an appointment I must keep. So we will sus
pend at this time.
The court will be in recess until tomorrow morning
promptly at 9 :30.
(The court then, at 4:25 o ’clock p. m., adjourned until
9:30 o ’clock a. m., the following day, Tuesday, June 26,
1951.)
[fol. 291] Tuesday, June 26, 1951
(Pursuant to adjournment as aforesaid, the court met,
present and presiding as before, and the following pro
ceedings were had:)
Judge Huxman: You may proceed, gentlemen.
Let me inquire of the attorney for plaintiff, how many
more of these expert witnesses do you have?
Mr. Carter: Your Honor, we at the present time—we
only have one more expert witness to put on.
Judge Huxman: Just one more expert witness.
Do you have any testimony after that or will that con
clude your case?
Mr. Carter: We have subpoenaed a number of witnesses,
Your Honor, and we are contemplating calling only one
other witness to establish one point.
Judge Huxman: All right, you may put on this other
witness, expert witness.
180
B ettie B e l k , h av in g been first d u ly sw orn, assum ed the
stand and testified as fo l lo w s :
Direct examination.
By Mr. Carter:
Q. Miss Belk, what is your occupation?
A. At the present time I am on the staff of the Workshop
in Human Relations at the University of Kansas City,
Missouri.
[fol. 292] Q. What is your educational background?
A. I have my Bachelor’s Degree from State Teachers
College in Worcester, Massachusetts, my Master’s Degree
from Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts, and, at
the present time, I am working on my Ph.D. in Human
Development at the University of Chicago.
Q. Miss Belk, what other than your present employment
at the University, of Kansas City—what other job experi
ence have you had?
A. I have taught junior and senior high school in Indiana
for two years; for ten years I was employed by the
T. W. C. A., first as director of the teen age program in
Trenton, New Jersey, and for five years as a member of
the national staff as a consultant on the teen age program.
In that capacity I did work in the midwest; Kansas .was
one of the twelve states in the area that I served, and I
have worked with the local organization here on their prob
lems of teen age program. At the university I have been
employed as a research assistant in the study of develop
mental tasks of adolescents and, during the past year, I
have been on the staff of the Center for Inter-Group Edu
cation.
Q. Have you published any books or articles on the prob
lems of adolescents?
A. Yes, for the Y. W. C. A. I published several articles
on teen age problems and a pamphlet designed for train-
[fol. 293] ing adult leaders to work with teen agers.
Q. Do you belong to any professional societies?
A. Yes. I am a member of the National Association of
Group Workers.
Q. What is your field of major interests ?
181
A. Well, my recent experience lias been in training adults
to work with groups, and I am particularly interested in this
aspect of human development. My work at the present
time is in the training of adult leadership for this kind of
job.
Q. That is the training of an adult—of adults to work
with adolescents and so forth?
A. Yes.
jQ. Now, assume, Miss Belk, that the City of Topeka has
organized its public school system so that a child enters the
first grade at approximately the age of six; goes through
the elementary schools, six grades; he would be entering a
junior high school at approximately the age of twelve. As
sume that for the first six grades the schools in Topeka are
maintained on a segregated basis. Thereafter, the junior
high schools and high schools, the schools are integrated.
Based upon your experience and your knowledge, would you
give an opinion as to whether or not it would be harmful—it
would have any adverse effect on the child at that stage
of his development to move from a segregated educational
ffol. 294] pattern into an integrated pattern?
A. I would say that by bringing children together for the
first time at this age, the Board of Education is working
a real hardship on both the negro and white children, and
I would like to explain why, if I may.
Q. Please do so.
A. I think that it is a well established fact that the years
just preceding age 12, the years 10 to 12, roughly, for girls
and 11 to 13 for boys, are the years during which the im
portant physical and physiological changes take place. The
child at age 12 is trying to integrate two to five inches of
standing height that he had acquired very rapidly. He is
also trying to integrate very important physiological
changes. In our society, girls reach puberty at about twelve
and a half and boys at about thirteen and a half, and they
are adjusting to really a new kind of body for them because
of the changes which have taken place. There are social
changes that take place also at this age; changes take place
within the school system itself. Up until this point the
child has been accustomed to a school situation in which
he has related to one adult. Now he moves into what we
1 8 2
call a departmentalized pattern. He has several teachers;
he moves from one classroom to another. In other words,
he has a pattern of relationship with many important adults
in the school system. Also, at this age the child moves
[fol. 295] from a peer society which has been largely
made up of members of the same sex, into a heterosexual
society. The seventh grade is a crucial one for girls, par
ticularly, because they become interested in boys before
boys become interested in them, and this is a very difficult
time for them to live through. All in all, these are the
years when children are making some of their most im
portant life adjustments., and I would say that having been
brought up in a separate system where they can only learn
that negroes and white are different, they must at this
age then make an adjustment to living with someone that
they have learned is different, and I think that this puts
an additional adjustment on them at an age when it is very
difficult for them to make it.
Cross-examination.
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. Is it Miss or Mrs. Belk?
A. I t ’s Miss Belk.
Q. Are you familiar with the City of Topeka and the
customs and usages with respect to inter-racial matters ?
A. I have visited the City of Topeka as a consultant for
the Y. W. C. A., yes.
Q. Bo you realize that for half a century, to some de
gree, there has been segregation practiced in the business
world and in the social strata of this community?
A. I believe that I have heard that there is segregation in
[fol. 296] in the community, yes.
Q. Without regard to the merits, if that is a fact, as
suming—strike that—that there is segregation practiced
in the ordinary workday life of the community in the busi
ness world and in the social strata as of our two races here,
negro and the white, and assuming further for the purpose
of this question that there were no segregation in the first
six grades of our public school system, and the negro chil
dren were absorbed in the present existing white schools,
183
where they were outnumbered twenty-five to fifty to one
and, in some cases, more than that, would you reform your
opinion any, taking that into account?
A. No, I would not,
Q. Do you know what the natural tendencies are in a
practical world? Would it be customary, where children
come from homes—living in a community where segrega
tion is practiced other than in the schools, for those same
white children to carry on that same custom and usage in
their relations with the race—with the opposite race—the
negro.
A. I don’t understand your question.
Q. Well, assuming that segregation, as I have just stated,
as practiced in this community in Topeka, in the citjq out
side of the school, and that is a fact, children coming from
homes in this community, isn’t it very natural that they
[fol. 297] would simply carry on that custom and usage
in their relations with other negro students of the opposite
race?
A. Well, I think our recent studies have shown that
children, adolescents particularly, take most of their so
cial pattern from their peers rather than their parents; in
fact, it ’s one of the real problems in our American society
today that this is true.
Q. Who are the children, what do you mean by that,
that the negro children they would look upon as their
peers and therefore they would follow them; what do you
mean?
A. I mean that all adolescent children take most of their
social patterns from people their own age; they tend to
see each other as authorities. It ’s an age at which they
break away completely from parental authority, in fact
to the extent that it becomes a difficult problem in home-
life, so it is not always the patterns of the parents that they
are repeating; in fact, during this time they are forming
their own values.
Q. I don’t know as I understand it. You consider another
child, that a child will look upon another wdiite child as
his peer, is that what you are getting at?
A. Yes.
1 8 4
Q. What is there about another child of the same age
that would make him a peer as to another child?
A. This is one of the phenomena of development. The
child must, in his growing up process, ultimately break
[fol. 298] away from the home. Now adolescents in our
society are treated at one moment as though they were
children and the parents are very authoritarian with them
and at another moment they are expected to behave like
adults and, consequently, most of them are in some state
of confusion as to what their status really is. But they
are moving always toward adulthood, toward establishing
their own values and, for this reason, they take more of
their pattern—you can see it even in their dress. I don’t
know if you have any adolescent children of your own, but
if you do you know they dress alike, they act alike, they
talk alike. They get their values largely from each other
at this age.
Q. Assuming for the purpose of this question, though,
that segregation was abolished and the negro child was
absorbed in the white school system and, for illustration, he
was outnumbered in the particular school system on the
average of thirty to one or twenty to one or any figure of
that proportion; taking into account the natural factors of
every-day life and the practicabilities of the situation,
wouldn’t that result in and of itself of him being a very
small minority group and being left out of activities and
the run of things, the negro child.
A. I do not think that that is necessarily true. In fact,
in my own experience I have seen it not to be true.
[fol. 299] Q. Well, isn’t that true within the white struc
ture, that some children run things and others tag along;
some are leaders and others aren’t?
A. This is an individual matter. It is quite true.
Q. And to that extent where you have children that do
run things, elected class officers and in all activities, make
the teams and so forth, and in their own group, and in
the other children that doesn’t—aren’t given recognition
in that sense, that child—this philosophy of yours, this
theory of yours, is made to feel second-class and left out
of things, isn’t that right, of his own group.
A. Of his own group, yes, and most of us who work in
185
inter-group relations nowadays see this as a total thing.
There is no longer any stress on negro-white relations; it ’s
on inter-group relations.
Q. I mean without regard to the racial factor, you have
that situation in any organized society, don’t you; some
people get along better than others, run things, are leaders;
others tagging along and are not leaders.
A. This is true and our problem is to work so that
everybody has a niche into which he fits.
Q. How would you eliminate that aspect of life in a
school system where some children are not the leaders
and don’t run the show and are sort of left out, so they
don’t have an inferiority feeling that they are second-
[fol. 300] class? How would you get rid of that?
A. As a matter of fact we have been doing some work
on that at the center for inter-group education. Our work
deals with schools. Well, for example, in one school chil
dren said you are separated here according to whether or
not you belong to the cashmere sweater set, so this became
the problem that we worked on. The way that we usually
do it is sitting down with young people themselves and
talking about why people do exclude other people and why
this is important to them and what are the values in learn
ing to live with people who are different from you and
being able to accept them.
Q. Well, without regard to your—adoption of your
theories and your opinion here in the school system, you
are still going to have that problem considering the prac
ticalities of the situation.
A. The problem of rejection and acceptance is one that
will be with all of us all through life.
Q. Surely. Isn’t it awfully difficult for you to have the
experience of a negro child so that you could expertly say
what he feels, a first grader and a third grader, and so
forth, how he feels about anything.
A. Is it difficult for me ?
Q. Certainly, to put your mind—I mean to—for you to
assume the feelings of a negro child that is in these elemen-
[fol. 301] tary grades? How do you do that?
A. It is difficult for me really to understand the experi
ences of anyone else, but this is'part of my job.
186
Q. Well, I grant all that, but how do you do it; how can
you tell what I feel and react and my reactions, and so
forth, to a set of facts or my social relations.
A. How do I actually do it?
Q. Iiow do you tell it, yes.
A. Well, I try to put myself in the other person’s place.
Q. Well, I know that, but I mean is it like a mathematical
problem that we have got in algebra so that you can add
it up and prove it.
A. We do have techniques for doing this sort of thing and
the technique is known as role-playing, and I would be glad
to describe it to you.
Q. If some of your assumptions are wrong, then your
whole conclusions you reach are wrong too, aren’t they;
isn’t that right ? That’s all.
A. Well------
(Witness excused.)
Mr. Carter: We were going to call our next witness, Mrs.
Dorothy Crawford, but I don’t believe she is here, and so
we will rest.
Judge Huxman: You will rest.
Mr. Carter : Yes, sir.
[fol. 302] Judge Huxman: Plaintiff rests.
Mr. Goodell: If the Court please, I would like to be given
about ten minutes. There were some members of the school
system I couldn’t reach last night and, because you started
at 9:30, I couldn’t get hold of them in time. I won’t take
over ten minutes.
Judge Huxman: That was too early for the school mem
bers to be out?
Mr. Goodell: No, I couldn’t get in touch with them.
Judge Huxman: You want a ten-minute recess?
Mr. Goodell: If it isn’t imposing, yes.
Judge Huxman: Court will be in recess.
(The court then, at 9:45 o ’clock a. m., stood at recess
until 9:55 o ’clock a. m., at which time the following pro
ceedings were had:)
Mr. Goodell: Does the Court want all my witnesses sworn
at one time?
187
Judge Huxman: We will follow the same procedure.
Mr. John Scott: If the Court please, we have a witness
that just arrived, and we would like to put her on; just a
short witness.
Judge Huxman: All right.
Mr. John Scott: And we would also like to invoke Rule
ffol. 303] 43(b), that is, on hostile witnesses. This witness
will testify pertaining to transportation, and she also has
a financial interest in it and, therefore, we would like to
invoke that rule.
Mr. G-oodell: Who is the witness?
Mr. John Scott: Mrs. Dorothy Crawford.
Judge Huxman: The hostile witness rule is rather a
flexible rule, and it depends upon whether the witness shows
any hostility, so suppose you proceed in the regular way
of examination, and we will th§n be guided by what follows.
Mr. John Scott: All right.
D orothy Crawford , h av in g been first du ly sw orn, as
sum ed the stand and testified as fo llo w s :
Direct Examination.
By Mr. John Scott:
Q. State your name to the Court, please.
A. Mrs. Dorothy Crawford.
Q. Where do you live?
A. 835 Clay.
Q. Here in the City of Topeka?
A. Topeka.
Q. Defendants’ Exhibit “ B ” (l) that has been admitted
into evidence indicates that you are engaged in the pro-
[fol. 304] fession of teaching, is that correct? ,
A. That’s right.
Q. And you also teach at Buchanan School.
A. That’s right.
Q. And you also teach the first and part of the second
grade, is that right?
A. That’s right.
188
Q. And also Defendants’ Exhibit “ D ” states that you
receive $272.19 for transportation, is that correct?
A. I don’t remember the exact amount.
Q. I want you to explain to the Court, if anybody, that
you transport, what persons and of what grades that you
transport.
Mr. Goodell: We object to that as incompetent, irrelevant
and immaterial; don’t see the purpose of it.
Judge Hill: What is the purpose of it?
Mr. John Scott: The purpose of this testimony is to
show that she transports kindergarten children and she
dismisses her grade for the purpose of transporting chil
dren, and those children are sent to another classroom dur
ing the time that she is conveying these children.
Judge Huxman: You may answer.
(The last preceding question was here read by the re-
[fol. 305] porter.)
By Mr. John Scott:
Q. —if any.
A. I do transport kindergarten children after dismissing
the first grade at 11:30 and the second grade at 11:45.
Q. Now, when you dismiss your class at 11:30, where
does—where do the second-grade children go?
A. I stay in the building and teach the second-grade chil
dren until 11:45. I do not dismiss the second grade until
11:45.
Q. Now, Mrs. Crawford, you say you transport the chil
dren at 11:30, is that correct?
A. No, I did not say that. I said that I transport the
children after dismissing the first grade at 11:30 and the
second grade at 11:45. I do not leave the building until
after I dismiss the second grade at 11:45.
Q. Isn’t it a matter of fact that you take the kinder
garten children home at 11:30, and you send the second-
grade class into another classroom?
A. No, I do not.
'Q. During the time that you have undertaken these duties
189
of transporting the kindergarten children, haven’t you done
that?
A. I have not.
Judge Mellott: Didn’t your witness testify it was 11:45
that this transportation began?
[fol. 306] Mr. John Scott: No, 11:30.
Judge Mellott: I don’t agree.
Mr. John Scott: I think the testimony yesterday indi
cated it was 11:30.
Judge Mellott: No, the testimony yesterday was as she
has given, after the dismissal of the second class at 11:45
that she transported the children.
Mr. John Scott: I don’t think the record shows that,
Your Honor.
Judge Mellott: I think it does, but you may proceed.
By Mr. John Scott:
Q. Well, during the year of 1950 and ’51 can you state
to the Court the approximate number of children that you
transported, that is, each day.
A. The number varied according to the attendance, daily
attendance, and also according to the transfer of children
from one district to another and according to some chil
dren going out, of town and some coming in town and
also some parents on some days elected to come for their
children; so it ’s hard to tell the exact number each day.
Q. Well, use your best judgment, Mrs. Crawford.
Judge Huxman: What’s the purpose of this? What are
you trying------
Mr. John Scott: It ’s to ascertain the number of children
she transports daily, and I am going to ask her the type
[fol. 307] of vehicle she is driving, Your Honor.
Mr. Goodell: If the Court please, this isn’t an accounting
procedure. Do they claim she’s overpaid or what is it?
Mr. John Scott: We are not claiming anything such.
Judge Huxman: You are trying to establish the buses are
overcrowded, is that it?
Mr. John Scott: Trying to establish the number of chil
dren she’s transporting daily and the type of vehicle.
190
Judge Huxman: What is the purpose of that when you
establish it?
Mr. John Scott: The fact that these children are trans
ported under crowded conditions.
Judge Huxman: Well-------
By Mr. John Scott:
Q. What type of vehicle do you drive, Mrs. Crawford?
A. I drive a Ford two-door.
Q. What model?
A. A two-door.
Q. Well, I mean------
Mr. G-oode.ll: Year model he means.
By Mr. John Scott:
Q. Year model.
A. 1938.
[fol. 308] Q. Just give your best judgment the number
of children that you take in that car each day; is it six,
eight, nine, ten or twelve?
A. Well, I take no more than five at a time. When there
are more than five children I make two trips.
Q. You make two trips.
A. Yes.
Q. I see. Do you have any special coverage for liability
of these children that you carry?
Mr. Goodell: Now, we submit, if the Court please, we
object to that as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial,
has no probative force in this case.
Judge Huxman: The objection will be sustained. It is
collateral and can’t go to any due process, has no bearing
on this matter.
Mr. John Scott: I believe that is all.
Cross-examination.
By Mr. Goodell:
_ Q- Are you neglecting your teaching job by hauling some
kids wholly during the noon hour?
A. I am not.
191
Mr. Goodell: That is all.
Judge Huxman: Are you through now? Plaintiff rests?
Mr. Carter: Yes.
[fol. 309] Judge Huxman: You may proceed with the
defense.
Clarence G. G rimes, h av in g been first du ly sw orn, as
sum ed the stand and testified as fo l lo w s :
Direct examination.
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. State your name for the record and for the Court.
A. Clarence G. Grimes.
'Q. You are commonly known around town here as “ Cap’ ’
Grimes.
A. That’s right.
Q. Were you an officer in World War I?
A. I was.
Q. Have you had for many years the contract with the
Topeka Board of Education for the transporting of pupils
to the negro schools?
A. Thirty-five years.
Q. Are you familiar then with all the details of the ac
tual carrying out of that mission or the transportation
of------
A. I am.
Q. There has been some testimony here offered in the
plaintiffs’ case to the effect that they had to wait long
periods of time at scheduled bus stops. State what the
facts are about these buses running on schedule, and so
forth.
A. I plan my schedule on clock time to reach the corners
at a certain time and, if they are waiting much longer
[fol. 310] than what they say here, they are there before
the bus is supposed to get there.
Judge Hill: I can’t hear the witness.
Judge Mellott: It ’s difficult to hear you, Mr. Grimes; if
you will talk a little louder.
192
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. Repeat that.
A. I say I run my bus on the scheduled time by the clock
and, if there is children at the corners that have to wait any
length of time, they are there long before the bus should
be able to get there. They know what time the bus is
supposed to get to the corner.
Q. There is some testimony here in the case given yes
terday relating to scheduled stop where a child or parent,
perhaps both, testified they had to go seven blocks down
here to get to the bus at First and Quincy. Are you familiar
with that?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. Is that correct?
A. No.
Q. What are the facts about it?
A. This child lives four blocks and three houses west of
First and Kansas Avenue and the bus sets seventy-five feet
east of First and Kansas Avenue.
Q. Were you present in court when the testimony was
given about the time of the morning that they left in
[fol. 311] order to get to the bus stop?
A. I was.
Q. So that would be thirty minutes to go four blocks.
A. That’s right.
Q. Do you have, as a practical matter, do you have in
stances of colored children, negro children, going farther
from their home than a scheduled bus stop in order to get
to ride longer ?
A. I used to have, but I don’t have that anymore.
Q. What—do you know the proximity—some of the
children have you pick them up—how far away?
A. I think the long*est distance is five blocks.
Q. And the closest?
A. The closest distance, some of them are right by their
houses.
Q. How far from school?
A. Oh, some of the Washington children are eight or nine
blocks from school when I pick them up.
Q. What are some of the closest you pick up and take?
A. From the school?
193
Q. From many of the schools, yes.
A. That is about the distance—Sixth and Chandler is
the closest.
Q. Yes. Now there was some testimony given yesterday
[fol. 312] to the effect by one parent—I don’t have his
name—lives out here in the east part of town, around
Chandler in that neighborhood—he had his child ride on
the city bus because he had observed children leaning out
the windows and their arms out the windows, and so forth.
How are these buses built?
A. According to the state regulations on buses, school
buses, you have to have half windows in your buses and my
windows let down from the top, not any farther than that
distance, and they can’t get their heads out.
Q. It ’s impossible.
Judge Mellott: Indicating what, six inches?
The Witness: About six inches.
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. Now, do you try to maintain some decorum in those
buses so that it’s orderly and the children------
A. —the principal to put a patrol on each one of these
buses.
Q. You mean the principal- of the schools have a school
patrol on each bus.
A. That’s right.
'Q. And they ride the buses, do they?
A. They do.
Mr. Goodell: I believe that is all.
Judge Huxman: You may cross-examine.
[fol. 313] Cross-examination.
By Mr. Carter:
Q. Mr. Grimes, how many buses do you operate?
A. Just one.
Q. And to how many schools do you take children?
A. Two.
Q. I show you this exhibit, would you indicate to me what
13—8
194
the bus schedule you follow on that exhibit—the exhibit is
marked “ G” ------
Judge Mellott: “ G” ?
Mr. Carter: “ G” .
The Witness: I follow the Washington and Monroe sched
ules.
By Mr. Carter:
Q. Now you have looked at this schedule and this is cor
rect?
A. That is the time the bus arrives at certain places.
Q. I note on this schedule which you have indicated is
correct that at 8:29 you unload the rest of the group at
the Monroe School; that is, your first load is taken to the
Monroe School, and you get there 8:29, is that correct?
A. That varies on account of traffic sometimes; some
times it’s after that and sometimes a little before that.
Q. The schedules—the schedule indicates—I think your
testimony indicated that you arrived at a certain time
per day and that there was no waiting because of the sched-
[fol. 314] ule. Now you tell me that here when it says
you are supposed to get to the Monroe School at 8 :29 you
cannot say that is correct because it varies due to the
traffic. Now is this or is this not a correct time schedule
for your buses?
A. I didn’t say I got to the Monroe School at 8:29.
Q. Your schedule says it does.
A. I know, but that is not my schedule.
Judge Huxman: It seems to me—I don’t want to restrict
the opportunity to present this evidence—but this goes to
a very minor matter. In the first place, there is a schedule
and, in the second place, I think I would take judicial knowl
edge that maybe buses sometimes are a little bit late and
sometimes children get there a little ahead of time. I
doubt if there ever was a bus that ran exactly on the sec
ond. I don’t want to restrict you in your cross-examina
tion, but I wouldn’t pursue that, too far.
Mr. Carter: Well, the only reason that I raised it is that
the testimony which has been established, attempted to be
established by the defendants, is that the schedule is fol
lowed and that the bus arrives on time.
195
Judge Huxman: Suppose you established that the sched
ule varied or the bus wasn’t always there on time, do you
think that would have a weighty bearing on the question
[fol. 315] of whether the due process clause of the Four
teenth Amendment was thereby violated. It might be an
insignificant------
Mr. Carter: I don’t believe it would be crucial.
Judge Huxman: Let’s not pursue it, too far. This ease
isn’t going to turn on whether this schedule is strictly
adhered to or whether there is a variance in it.
Mr. Carter: All right, sir, I will follow your suggestion.
Judge Huxman: In the first place, I think the buses are
late. I have never seen a bus yet that wasn’t late.
By Mr. Carter:
Q. What is the maximum capacity on your buses?
A. My bus has a seating capacity of thirty-six.
Q. And you indicated that there are monitors on the
bus.
A. Yes.
Q. Who are they?
A. I don’t know them by name. I don’t know hardly any
of the children by last names; some of the first names, I
believe, the older boys and girls of the different schools.
Q. Is this only on your return from school?
A. No, going to and coming.
Q. Going to and coming.
[fol. 316] A. Yes, sir.
Q. Every day there is a different person.
A. No, it isn’t a different person; it ’s the same child.
Q. You don’t know who it is.
A. I know who they are by looking at them. I can’t tell
you their names because I am not familiar with all their
names.
Redirect examination.
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. Mr. Grimes, you mentioned that only Monroe and
Washington were the only ones you personally transported.
196
Do you know how the other schools are handled, who
transports them?
A. The Topeka Transportation Company.
Q. The city bus system.
A. The city bus system.
Q. They use their own ordinary equipment.
A. That’s right.
Q. They contract that with the Board of Education.
A. That’s right.
Mr. Goodell: That’s all.
Judge Huxman: Step down.
(Witness excused.)
[ fo l . 317] T h e lm a M if f l in , h av in g been first du ly sw orn,
assum ed the stand and testified as fo llo w s :
Direct examination.
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. State your name to the Court and for the record.
A. Thelma Mifflin.
Q. What official position do you hold in the city schools ?
A. I am the clerk of the Board of Education.
Judge Huxman: I didn’t get the answer.
The Witness: I am the clerk of the Board of Education.
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. How long have you been in such administrative ca
pacity ?
A. I have been in Topeka in that capacity for nine years;
twenty-seven years total in other school systems.
Q. Are the records then that have been furnished the
Court here that are exhibits in this case, were they made
under your supervision and direction?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. They are true and accurate records?
A. They are.
Q. And reflect correctly the matters which are covered
by them?
197
A. That’s right.
ffol. 318] Q. Did you bring with you this morning at
my direction an exhibit or list of the number of colored,
negro, students transported?
A. Yes, sir, four copies.
Q. I will hand you what has been marked Defendants’
Exhibit “ 0 ” and is that a list of the—broken down by
schools—of the negro students that are transported in the
City of Topeka to the negro schools ?
A. That’s right.
Q. And it ’s true and correct?
A. It is.
Mr. Groodell: We offer the same in evidence.
Judge Huxman: What is the exhibit number?
Judge Mellott: “ 0 ” .
Judge Huxman: Exhibit “ 0 ” will be received.
Defendants’ Exhibit “ 0 ” , having been offered and re
ceived in evidence, is contained in the case file.
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. Mrs. Mifflin, do you attend all board meetings in your
capacity as clerk for the Board of Education?
A. Yes, sir, I do.
Q. You are present then when discussions of policy and
administrative policy and the running of the schools comes
up for discussion by the board and Dr. McFarland,
ffol. 319] A. Yes, sir.
_Q- You are familiar, then, and have been all these years,
with that policy.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are you familiar then with the actual policy with re
spect to the operation of the entire school system which
includes the eighteen elementary schools and the four negro
schools?
A. Yes, sir, I am.
Q. State whether or not you know the policy that has
been adopted and carried out by the Board of Education
with respect to the negro schools concerning the right of a
child, if he so elects or his parents, to attend any one of
the four negro schools of his own selection; do you know
the policy about that?
198
A. Yes, it is the policy of the board to allow the child
to attend the school which he wishes to attend in the colored
division.
Q. Do you recall of any instances when that election was
made which wasn’t acceded to ?
A. No.
Q. Are you likewise familiar with the course of study
that is prescribed by state law and whether or not it ’s been
adopted and used in the city schools, elementary schools,
both negro and white schools.
A. The same course of study is used in all schools.
[fol. 320] Q. That would mean then, of course, the same
textbooks.
A. That’s right.
Q. There was some testimony given here yesterday by
Dr. Speer concerning his examination of books and com
parisons that he made from books found in negro schools,
comparing the books found in certain of the white schools,
that he made such a similar examination. Do you know
whether or not, as far as the Board of Education is con
cerned, there is any distinction or differences in the fur
nishing of books to the different schools on the basis of their
color, whether negro or white schools.
A. There is no distinction made. The number of books
isn’t—the number of books sent is determined by the num
ber of children in the school.
Q. Well, I mean do you have any policy to send old-
style books down to the negro schools and new books to the
white schools?
A. No, there is no policy like that. I am sorry that Dr.
Speer didn’t see the schools when they were in operation.
He saw them after they were closed. If a principal had
“ put his school to bed” as we say correctly, the good books
would have been packed in boxes and packed away. The
books that are left out on the shelf are books that could
be eliminated, really.
Q. Obsolete books.
A. That’s right.
[fol. 321] Q. But the modern up-to-date books that are
actually used in the operation of the schools, your policy
199
has been as soon as school is ont to box them up and put
them away.
A. Put them away very carefully so they won’t be dusty
when school starts.
Q. Now, Miss Mifflin, state, if you know, whether or not
additional books, not furnished by the Board of Education,
are sometimes furnished by the Parent Teachers Associa
tion made up of parents of children living in the various
territories in the city?
A. Yes. P. T. A .’s very frequently have money to spend,
and they do buy books for various schools.
Q. Buy it with their own money, not public funds.
A. That’s right.
Q. And put it in that particular school where the P. T. A.
decides to make that purchase, is that correct?
A. That’s right.
Q. And that is no different, whether it ’s negro or white,
is that right?
A. That’s right.
Q. The board doesn’t spend its money or have any con
trol over that.
A. No.
Q. Other than that dissimilarity wherein the Parent
Teachers Association in some territory might buy more—
might have more money to spend, is there any dissimilarity
[fol. 322] by reference books or books furnished by the
board in any of the schools in the elementary system?
A. There is no difference.
Q. Now, I want to direct your attention, Miss Mifflin, to
what has been introduced in evidence as Exhibit “ A ” and
which I want—first, I will ask you if all of the territories
are named and designated on this Exhibit “ A ” , both white
and negro?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Of the entire school system?
A. That’s right,
Q. Are school territories also shown on Exhibit “ A ”
wfflich are outside the city limits of Topeka?
A. Yes; the school district is on that map.
Q. In other words, you have some areas shown on Ex-
200
Mbit “ A ” which are in the City of Topeka for school pur
poses alone, is that right?
A. That’s right.
Q. Does that appear colored in blue?
A. That’s right.
Q. I will ask you whether or not in each, if you know,
according to the records of the Board of Education, if you
have children attending from all of these areas shown in
the territory, school territory, or put it another way, from
[fol. 323] the blue, what is marked blue.
A. Yes, we do have.
Q. Is any transportation furnished to any of the white
children from any part of town?
A. None at all.
Q. Do some of them live as much as thirty blocks away?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Well, in those cases, if they ride a bus, do they ride
a city bus ?
A. Yes, they would have to furnish their own transpor
tation.
Q. Now, do you furnish a convoy with any of these chil
dren, people to go with them to get them across the streets,
and so forth.
A. No, sir.
Q. White children.
A. No.
Q. Do you have any control—state, if you know, whether
you have any control—I mean by you, the Board of Edu
cation, over selection of traffic lights or blinker lights at
any territory in the City of Topeka?
A. No; that is the business of the city.
‘Q. And how—and do you know how they make that
decision?
A. I think they------
Judge Huxman: Mr. Goodell, that would have to be
hearsay on her part.
[fol. 324] Mr. Goodell: Yes, it would be.
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. Miss Mifflin, Exhibit “ E ” and “ J ” that have been
introduced in evidence have to do or set out in a portion
201
of the exhibits the facilities of each school in the whole
City of Topeka and, particularly, it shows on that exhibit
—those exhibits—whether they have a gymnasium or audi
torium and, in some cases, where they are combined, is
that accurate, true and correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Those exhibits.
A. That’s right.
Q. Do you have some white schools where you have that
combination where you turn one room into one, using
it------
Judge Huxman: Mr. Goodell, haven’t those exhibits been
agreed to?
Mr. Goddell: I believe so. I have a note that it wasn’t
entirely agreed to as to that particular feature.
Judge Huxman: There were only two questions -bout
it at all. The exhibits were admitted.
Mr. Goodell: Except it was held up because they claim
inaccuracies in the case of one school. I have a note to
that effect.
Judge Huxman: You might ask her about that one in
accuracy.
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. I believe Dr. Speer was the witness who testified
[fol. 325] pertaining to four schools which I will direct
your attention to, as being Buchanan, Lafayette, Polk and
Potwin—in other words the data contained in this data
as being true with respect to auditoriums and gymnasiums,
will you examine now particularly those schools I have in
dicated. I will take it one by one and ask you a question:
Potwin, for example, you have the record shows that it
has an auditorium but no gymnasium, is that correct?
A. That’s right, it has a playroom but all schools have
playrooms.
Q. Is that true of the negro schools?
A. They all have rooms that they do not use; any room
that is not used can be called a playroom.
Q. I notice Polk Street now, the next one that Dr. Speer
mentioned in his testimony, it ’s marked auditorium room
202
used for auditorium purposes but no gymnasium, is that
correct?
A, That’s right; there is no gymnasium there.
Q. I notice the same before Lafayette, that your rec
ords show it has an auditorium room, facilities for an audi
torium, but no gymnasium, is that right?
A. That’s right.
Q. And I direct your attention to the same matter on
Buchanan; your record shows it has an auditorium but
[fol. 326] no gymnasium, is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Judge Mellott: Is the difference of opinion, take, for
instance, Buchanan School, purely one of terminology?
Now she refers to it as having an auditorium. As I under
stood it, counsel’s statement was that there were two rooms
capable of being thrown together for an assembly room, but
they object to calling it an auditorium, is that the point of
difference?
Mr. Goodell: That perhaps is the point of difference.
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. That is correct in some of these older schools, white
schools, for example, like Lafayette and Polk and some of
the others.
A. We have made auditoriums by remodeling in a num
ber of schools. Now the auditorium, what we call audi
torium at Buchanan, has a stage; it has seating. The only
difference, if they do not wish to have the whole room
included in the auditorium, they may pull a sliding door
closed and not use the entire auditorium.
Q. Now, are you familiar and is it part of your job and
are you familiar with the ordinary maintenance and opera
tion of the school system with respect to furnishing of sup-
plies upon requisition, accessories and needed supplies to
properly make the school function?
[fol. 327] A. Yes, sir; I am the business manager of the
schools; purchase all the supplies.
Q. You are familiar, then, with the practice and policy
that actually has been adopted and used by the board in
that respect in the furnishing of supplies.
203
A. Yes, sir.
!Q. State, if you know, as a matter of policy, whether
there has ever been any distinction shown between furnish
ing supplies when requested to negro schools as compared
to white schools in the elementary system!
A. There is no distinction made between colored and
white schools.
Q. They are operated, in other words, the whole thing
is operated as a school system, is it?
A. That’s right; it ’s a school system, and we operate
entirely on the need of the school.
Q. And do you know what factors—strike that. Are
you familiar with the factors, by reason of board policy
and administrative practice, that Dr. McFarland and the
board uses actually in fixing teachers’ salaries in the en
tire school system, inclusive of these elementary schools.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What are those factors?
A. Salaries—you mean the salaries?
Q. How are they arrived at?
[fol. 328] A. Salaries are determined by education, by
experience and how well the job is being done.
Q. Teaching experience, educational attainments?
A. That’s right.
Q. And actual manner in which the teacher has per
formed his duties, is that right?
A. That’s right.
Q. If I understand you correctly, then, you might have a
teacher with the same number of years experience and the
same educational attainments, but one that didn’t have as
good performance record; in the ease of one that had a good
performance record might get more money than another
one having all the other qualities except that one.
A. He might; he also might have extra duties.
Q. Extra duties.
A. That’s right.
Q. State whether or not the Board, as a matter of policy
by Dr. McFarland and the board, in fixing these salaries
there has ever been any other factors applied to the negro
school teachers not applied to the white teachers in fixing
those salaries?
204
Mr. Carter: Your Honor, all the things brought out, I
think, so far have been stipulated to, particularly the
salaries.
Mr. Groodell: They wouldn’t stipulate on that, and I
[fob 329] have it in my stipulation and I have it marked
they wouldn’t stipulate.
Judge Huxman: She may answer. I didn’t think there
was any issue made on it. There is no evidence whatever
to show anything to the contrary, but she may answer.
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. Are the same factors used, in other words, in fixing
salaries in teachers contracts—I mean the same factors ob
served and actually followed in fixing salaries for both
negro and white teachers!
A. Yes, sir, exactly the same.
Mr. Goodell: I believe that is all.
Cross-examination.
By Mr. Carter:
Q. Miss Mifflin, you said you were the clerk of the Board
of Education!
A. That’s right.
Q. I think you testified that—as to an exhibit with re
gard to the school program that this program was carried
out throughout the school system, is that correct?
A. That’s right.
Q. Among your duties as clerk of the board, are you
the person who goes and visits the schools and examines
them and inspects them; are those—is that included in your
duties?
A. Yes, it is; I call on all schools.
[fol. 330] Q. I see. Now, with regard to the books that
are held, if there is any difference between the books that
are held by the white schools and those that are held by the
negroes, if I understand your testimony correctly, you
would attribute that to donations by the P. T. A. organi
zation, is that right?
A. That’s right.
205
Q. Is it or is it not a fact that if these books do—if they
are donated by the P. T. A. they belong to the school or
the Board of Education or what happens?
Mr. Gloodell: We object to that as calling for a conclu
sion, legal conclusion, of this witness, where title is in the
books.
Judge Huxman: She said she’s in charge of the school
system for that purpose. She may answer.
The Witness: They are usually gifts to the school. If
they are a gift, then they become the property of the school.
By Mr. Carter:
Q. They become the property of the school to which they
are given.
A. However, we wouldn’t feel that we could go—if a
gift would go to a certain school, we wouldn’t feel that we
should go in and remove it to another school.
Q. I understand that. They become the property of
the school to which it ’s given, and they remain there, is
that correct?
[fol. 331] A. That’s right.
Judge Huxman: You may step aside, please.
(Witness excused.)
K e n n e t h M cF arland , h av in g been p re v io u s ly sw orn, as
sum ed the stand and testified as fo l lo w s :
Direct examination.
By Mr. Goodell:
Q. State your name again for the record.
A. Kenneth McFarland.
Q. And you are the superintendent of schools of the City
of Topeka.
A. Yes.
Q. How long have you held that post?
A. Nine years; since 1942.
Q. How long have you been in educational work?
2 0 6 '
Judge Huxman: Wasn’t all of that gone into yesterday.
I thought the doctor was asked his qualifications.
The Witness: No.
Mr. Goodell: I don’t recall it.
Judge Huxman: Proceed.
Mr. Goodell: I will dismiss it, though, if the Court doesn’t
want to hear it. I will make this very brief.
[fol. 332] By Mr. Goodell:
Q. What is your educational background?
A. Bachelor’s Degree from Pittsburgh Teachers College
here in Kansas and a Master’s Degree from Columbia
University and doctorate degree from Stanford University.
Q. How long have you been in education work, Doctor?
A. Twenty-four years.
Q. When you came to Topeka, state whether or not the
elementary schools were being operated, separated as to
negro and whites in the first six grades.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You understand, do you, that the statute of Kansas
is a permissive one, that the Board of Education may—
it ’s up to their discretion—according to statute.
A. Yes.
Q. —to so operate the elementary schools.
A. Yes, I understand that.
Q. Has it ever been your policy that you recommended
to the board to change that operation actually?
A. We have—no; we have never recommended that we
change the fundamental structure of the elementary schools.
Q. Why not.
Judge Huxman: Mr. Goodell, what would that establish
in this lawsuit?
Mr. Goodell: Well, I think he, as an administrator—I am
leading to something. I can’t ask more than one question
[fol. 333] at a time.
Judge Huxman: I know, but what’s the purpose? If the
statute gives the city permission to operate the schools, and
he testified they are operating separate schools, what dif
ference would it make whether they had or had not con
sidered changing?
207
Mr. Goodell: It might make some difference. We had a
lot of expert testimony here on a hypothetical community
or hypothetical situation, and I want to show the human
factor in the custom and usage in this community, whether
he knows it and whether or not it had something to do
with the operation of the schools, why they operated------
Judge Huxman: Whether the city authorities had con
sidered discarding what they had a right under the stat
ute to do or hadn’t considered, wouldn’t prove any issue
in this case.
By Mr. Goodell: -
Q. Have you ever, as an administrator of schools, con
sidered it part of your business to formulate custom and—•
social customs and usage in the community!
A. Mr. Goodell, I think that point is extremely signifi
cant; in fact, it ’s probably the major factor in why the
Board of Education is defending this lawsuit, and that is
that we have never considered it, and there is nothing in
the record historically, that it’s the place of the public
school system to dictate the social customs of the people
[fol. 334] who support the public school system.
Q. Do you say that the separation of the schools that
we have is in harmony with the public opinion, weight of
public opinion, in this community!
A. We have no objective evidence that the majority
sentiment of the public would desire a change in the funda
mental structure.
Q. Now, we will get on to the actual operation. Have
there been any distinction in the question of fixing salaries,
furnishing accessories or supplies to the negro schools as
opposed to the white schools?
A. No. I think we found what we thought were some
discrepancies when we first came here in salaries. Those
were corrected; we adopted a minimum salary of $2400
for inexperienced teachers with degrees; that was the basis
where we started and, from that point on, there has been
no discrepancy of any kind.
Q. Do you take into account, as head of the schools, as
recommending to the Board of Education the matter of the
208
color of the teacher at all in fixing that teacher’s contract
salary?
A. No.
Q. You have heard Mrs. Mifflin testify to the factors that
are considered, is that correct?
A. The three factors plus the total responsibilities in-
[fol. 335] volved in the job.
Q. Some teachers have more responsibilities than others.
A. That’s right.
Q. Of course a principal, that would be naturally true.
Now, in respect to furnishing, honoring requisitions and
furnishing all supplies, are the same factors considered by
you and the Board of Education in respect to that, without
regard to whether the school is white or negro school!
A. Oh, yes, no difference.
Q. There has been some testimony here about curricu
lum. Is the same curriculum followed in both the negro
and white schools, elementary schools.
A. Yes, they are all under the same director of elemen
tary schools, same supervisor of elementary schools and
same special supervisors, no difference.
Q. Your administrative set-up is entirely one for the
operation of the entire school system, is it not?
A. Yes, it ’s considered twenty-two elementary schools.
Q. Yes. In any particular, whether I have asked you
or not, is there the slightest difference in the actual op
eration and maintenance of the school system between the
negro and the white schools the way it ’s carried on?
A. Nothing done on the basis of color. They are merely
treated as individuals.
Q. Do you know whether or not this operation has been
[fol. 336] well received in this community?
A. Well, I feel that it has, in the main, been well re
ceived.
Q. State whether or not the school system has been com
mented on by national authorities, educational authori
ties.
Judge Huxman: Doctor, you need not answer that ques
tion. Mr. Goodell, that is not an issue in this case, has
nothing to do with the problems concerning the Court.
209
Mr. Goodell: I thought they were trying to show we had
some poor schools. Maybe not. That is all.
Judge Huxman: You may cross-examine.
Cross examination.
By Mr. Carter:
Q. Mr. McFarland, I think you said that you didn’t con
sider it the function of the Board of Education to go against
the prevailing opinion with regard to the maintenance of
public schools.
A. I said the social customs of the people. I didn’t think
it was the purpose of the school system to dictate the social
customs of the people who support the schools. That has
been our policy.
Q. Now, how do you know that social customs of Topeka
require the maintenance of separate schools at the elemen
tary school level?
A. I said we had no objective evidence that the majority
[fol. 337] of the people wishes to change in the fundamen
tal structure which we don’t have.
Q. Would you say that there is a difference in the social
or public opinion or social customs with regard to the
maintenance of segregated schools above the elementary
school level?
A. I didn’t say that.
Q. Would you say, I am asking you a question.
A. I don’t know; I wouldn’t pass on that. You see, we
are operating the schools under essentially the same struc
ture that we took them over in 1942.
Q. But you are operating schools that have a mixed
characteristic, mixed characteristics, rather, do you not?
You are operating schools that are segregated at the ele
mentary school level, integrated beyond. Now why does
the Board of Education feel that they are maintaining their
—they are in accord with public opinion by maintaining
that type of operation?
A. Well, we have——
Mr. Goodell: Just a minute. Object to this question be
cause it assumes as a part of the question—assumes that
14—8
210
part of this integration is caused by public policy of the
board. The Supreme Court decision in the case of Graham
vs. Board of Education, decided that there couldn’t be a
separation in the seventh and eighth grade where we had
[fol. 338] a junior and senior set up. There is a policy
set up on it of cities of the first class, all except Kansas
City, which is controlled by another statute, so it isn’t a
matter of policy of the board.
Judge Huxman: I doubt if there is very much value to
this whole line of questions.
Mr. Goodell: My point is that the law compels them to
have integrated system as to junior high and high school.
Judge Huxman: The witness may answer the question.
(The last preceding question was read by the reporter.)
Mr. Goodell: If the Court please, I insist again my ob
jection is proper. He is asking the doctor to distinguish
the board forming a policy, saying in the elementary grades
they will be separate and in the others it won’t; it isn’t
a matter of choice with them as to junior high and high
school. It ’s fixed by law.
Judge Huxman: The objection will be overruled.
The Witness: The answer is essentially that given by
the attorney. The board has had no vote upon whether or
not they would segregate the schools above the sixth grade
[fol. 339] nor have the people—the public that they rep
resent.
By Mr. Carter:
Q. I see. So, actually, you are not maintaining—you
can’t really say you are maintaining the schools in accord
with social custom. You merely have kept consant the
status quo as you found it when you came here. You are
maintaining segregated schools merely because they were
here when you arrived; that’s all you can say, isn’t that
true ?
A. We have, as I stated, no objective evidence that there
is any substantial desire for a change among the people
that the board represents.
Judge Huxman: May I ask counsel on both sides, assum
ing that is true, assuming the schools are maintained in
211
accordance with social customs and the wishes of the people,
or that they are not, what bearing does that have on the
right to so maintain them under the Fourteenth Amend
ment?
Mr. Goodell: Judge Parker in his opinion that was
handed down by that court of South Carolina, goes into
that very, very carefully.
Judge Huxman: Presently we are not interested in that.
I am asking—this is------
Mr. Goodell: Our theory of the equal protection of the
laws------
Judge Huxman: Mr. Goodell, the question is what the
[fol. 340] Fourteenth Amendment warrants and what it
doesn’t. We don’t care what social customs provide. That
is the reason I can’t see any use in pursuing this line of
argument unduly—this line of questioning.
Mr. Carter: I agree with that, Your Honor, but------
Judge Huxman: Then let’s not pursue it too far. I don’t
want to cut you off because Mr. Goodell opened it up, but
don’t pursue it unnecessarily.
Mr. Carter: I am not going to pursue it any further,
but I thought I shouldn’t allow it to remain in the record
unchallenged. That is the only reason I have asked the
question.
By Mr. Carter:
Q. Now, I have just a few more questions, Mr. McFarland.
Are you familiar with J. Murray Lee, who is the dean of
the School of Education of the State of Washington; are
you familiar with him; do you know him?
A. No, I don’t know him.
Q. Ho you know his wife, Doris Mae Lee, who is the co
author of “ Learning to Read Through Experience” ?
A. Do I know her?
Q. Are you familiar------
A. I just know there is such a person.
Q. In a book which both of them collaborated on------
[fol. 341] Mr. Goodell: What did you say? I didn’t hear
you.
Mr. Carter: Collaborated in writing.
212
By Mr. Carter:
Q. This statement appears, and I would like to get your
views on this: “ No longer is the curriculum to be con
sidered a fixed body of subject matter to be learned. We
realize only too well that the curriculum for each child is
the sum total of all of his experiences which are in any
way affected by the school. However rich or valuable any
printed course of study may seem to be, the child benefits
not at all if he does not have those experiences in class
room.”
Now, would you agree or disagree with that statement?
A. Well, you lift one statement like that out of its con
text in an educational philosophy—it’s a little difficult to
say whether you would agree with the single statement or
not. We would have to know the background of that, what
lead up to it.
Q. The statement is—follows a philosophy that the sum
total of a child’s experience throughout the school—is the
curriculum, not merely the subjects in the school. Now,
do you or do you not agree with that?
A. I would agree with that in principle, but, of course, you
understand when you go to that theory of education that
the child is in the public schools a small percentage of
[fol. 342] his total living hours. That puts the curriculum
over into a field that is largely out of control of the schools.
Q. It puts the curriculum certainly out of control of the
school but insofar as the school provides the atmosphere
and everything that is part of the curriculum, not only the
books but everything else that goes into the—into his
experience in the schools, is that right?
A. Anything that would have to do with motivation of
learning.
Mr. Carter: That is all.
Judge Huxman: Is that all.
Mr. Carter: That is all.
Judge Huxman: You may step down.
Mr. Goodell: The defendant rests.
Judge Huxman: The defendant rests. Any rebuttal testi
mony ?
Mr. Greenberg: Yes, Your Honor.
213
E rnest M a n h e im , h av in g been first du ly sw orn, testified
on beh a lf o f the p la in tiffs in rebuttal as fo l lo w s :
Direct examination.
By Mr. Greenberg:
Q. Would you please state your full name to the Court.
A. Ernest Manheim.
Q. What is your occupation, Mr. Manheim!
A. Professor of Sociology at the University of Kansas
City.
[fol. 343] Q. What degrees do you hold and where were
they earned!
A. A Ph.D. in sociology at the University of Leipzig, a
Ph.D. in anthropology from the University of London.
Q. What is your field of special interest, Professor Man
heim !
A. Social organization, juvenile delinquency and social
theory.
'Q. Have you published any articles in this particular
field! Or any books!
Mr. Goodell: We don’t want to interfere but we object
to this if this is a repetition, simply cumulative of more
expert opinion.
Mr. Greenberg: It is not, Your Honor.
Judge Huxman: What do you propose to rebut by the
testimony of this witness! I take it you are qualifying him
as an expert. Now just what testimony offered by the
defendants are you proposing to rebut!
Mr. Greenberg: The clerk of the School Board stated that
to the extent that there was a difference of library holdings
between the colored and white schools, it was attributable
to P. T. A. donations to the white schools. We intend to
show that the maintenance of a segregated school system
in Topeka has caused this difference in P. T. A. and com
munity support of the colored as against the white schools.
Mr. Goodell: We object to that.
[fol. 344] Mr. Greenberg: Directly rebuts------
Judge Huxman: Just a minute. The doctor isn’t a resi-
det of this community, is he!
214
Mr. Greenberg: The doctor is not a resident of this com
munity.
Judge Huxman: How could he know whether that is what
caused this condition in Topeka f
Mr. Greenberg: Well, the doctor is a man who has studied
social forces in nearby communities and, in qualifying as
an expert, we believe that, he will be competent to generalize
from his studies and his experience.
Judge Huxman: How would that qualify him to testify
that segregated schools in Topeka is what caused certain
voluntary and independent groups to make donations of
books to certain schools'?
Mr. Greenberg: I don’t want to give the doctor’s testi
mony, but------
Judge Huxman: How could it tend to establish that?
Mr. Greenberg: I believe the doctor is going to testify
that studies have shown that the distance which community
support—the distance that community support is from a
particular school determines the force of the community
effectiveness of the community support.
Judge Huxman: How long is this testimony going to
[fol. 345] take?
Mr. Greenberg: Perhaps five or ten minutes.
Judge Huxman: Frankly, the Court doubts if it is re
buttal testimony. If it ’s brief, we will give you the benefit
of the doubt and let you go ahead. I don’t think it rebuts
anything.
(The last question was here read by the reporter.)
The Witness: Yes, I have published in my field in so
ciology six books; one of them deals with juvenile delin
quency in Kansas City.
By Mr. Greenberg:
Q. Have you ever made any studies which would enable
you to form a conclusion concerning the community support
which a community gives to a school?
Mr. Goodell: We object to this as calling not for any
fact, pure conjecture and guesswork and conclusion on the
part of the witness.
215
Judge Huxman: He may answer.
The Witness: Inasmuch as I can generalize from ex
perience in Kansas City, I would tend to say that a school
which is far from the clientele’s residence, from their
parents, is weakened in its position to supervise the conduct
of the children, and is—and it is the cooperation between
the teachers and the parents tend to be weaker.
[fol. 346] Mr. Goodell: We object to this for the further
reason it ’s not rebuttal. If anything, it ’s part of their
case in chief and, for the further reason, that is opinion------
Judge Huxman: The objection to that question will be
sustained. It isn’t responsive; it doesn’t rebut anything
that has been offered in the case.
Mr. Greenberg: Well, Your Honor, I believe that the
clerk of the Board of Education did testify that the dis
crepancy between the white and colored schools was attribu
table to discrepancies in P. T. A. support. We are trying to
show that------
Judge Huxman: Didn’t so testify. She testified that these
additional books or extra books were the result of donations
by P. T. A. organizations; that is what she testified to
and------
Mr. Greenberg: I hope to establish by this witness that a
weakened P. T. A. is caused by having children and parents
great distance from the school which the children attend.
Mr. Goodell: Object to it for the further reason it’s out
side the scope of the pleadings; it ’s not an issue raised by
the pleadings as being one or any of the grounds of in
equality, so it ’s outside the scope of the issues.
[fol. 347] Judge Huxman: The majority of the Court
feels that this testimony is not proper rebuttal testimony
from the very nature of the explanation that you have given.
The doctor could not testify that the discrimination^ if
you want to so refer to it, which results in the donation
of books in Topeka to one school and not to another is
caused by segregation. He could only give that as his
theory that that will flow and result from segregation
generally. But he knows nothing about Topeka. The
objection will be sustained. We will receive no further
evidence along this line.
Anything further?
216
Mr. Carter: We have nothing further.
Judge Huxman: Both parties rest!
Mr. G-oodell: Yes, Your Honor.
Mr. Carter: Yes.
Colloquy B etw een C ourt and C ounsel
Judge Huxman: We perhaps should take a short recess.
We would like to ask counsel, is there a desire to argue
this case orally?
Mr. Goodell: I would personally, my notion about it, I
believe the Court has heard all the testimony, that we could
perhaps aid the Court more in a written brief. I would
like to submit a written brief, and I can have it ready
inside of a week.
Judge Huxman: Does plaintiff desire to argue the case
[fol. 348] to the Court?
Mr. Carter : Yes, we do, Your Honor.
Judge Huxman: You shall be afforded that opportunity.
Will the defendant then want to argue the case?
Mr. Goodell: We will make a short argument.
Judge Huxman: How much time do you feel you would
want to argue this case?
Mr. Carter: We would think, Your Honor, just about a
half hour on opening, and we would like to have time for
rebuttal.
Judge Huxman: How much time for rebuttal?
Mr. Carter : I should think approximately fifteen minutes.
Judgtf Huxman: Forty-five minutes, of which you take
thirty minutes in the opening argument and fifteen in the
closing; and how much does the defendant want?
Mr. Goodell: Twenty or thirty minutes, I think, will be
sufficient.
Judge Huxman: We will take a five or ten-minute recess
before we start into that phase.
(The court then, at 11:05 o ’clock a. m., stood at recess
until 11:15 o ’clock a. m., at which time the following further
proceedings were had:)
[fol. 349] Judge Huxman: Do you gentlemen desire the
Court to keep a record of your time or will you do that
yourselves?
217
Mr. Carter: I will do that, Your Honor.
Judge Huxman: All right, forty-five minutes, thirty for
opening, fifteen for closing and, of course, the defendant,
while they have only asked for twenty, if they should want
not to exceed that, they will be given the same amount.
You may proceed.
O pen in g A rg u m en t on B eh alf of P lain tiff
Mr. Carter: Involved in this case is a question of the
constitutionality of the state statute, Section 72-1724, of
the General Statutes of the State of Kansas which purports
to give to the Boards of Education of cities of certain class
the power to organize and maintain separate schools for the
education of white and colored children, and I think that
the reading of the wordage of the statute is very interest
ing. The statute says that such power as “ to organize and
maintain separate schools for the education of white and
colored children, including the high schools in Kansas City,
Kansas; no discrimination on account of color shall be
made in high schools, except as provided herein; #
Now, I think, that that is very interesting* verbiage be
cause, I think, there is a recognition, certainly the lan-
[fol. 350] guage is a recognition by the framers of the
statute, that the separation at the elementary school level
was discrimination and is discrimination.
Now we rest our case on the question of the power of the
state. We feel, one, that the state has no authority and no
power to make any distinction or any classification among
its citizenry based upon race and color alone. We think
that this has been settled by the Supreme Court of the
United States in a long line of cases which hold that in
order for a classification to be constitutional it must be
based on a real difference, a real and substantial difference
which has pertinence to the legislative objective. The
Supreme Court has also held in a series of cases that race
and ancestry and color are irrelevant differences and can
not form the basis for any legislative action. The only
exception to this provision has been in the cases involving
the Japanese war cases which included—involved rights
under the Fifth Amendment and the exception has been
repeated by the Supreme Court of the United States after
218
Hirabayashi vs. U. S. and other cases that were decided,
Korematsu vs. United States, and the Supreme Court has
repeated again and again when it has struck down a legis
lative or governmental action because it said it was based
on race and race alone, the Supreme Court has said that
there is absence of compelling necessity to support the
[fol. 351] constitutionality of this statute and the only
compelling necessity that we have found in the cases is a
national emergency which, in the Hirabayashi case, the
court decided even though it questioned the constitutionality
of the Exclusion Act of the Japanese because of their
ancestry; the Supreme Court felt that national interests
were of such a nature that they could not interfere with the
judgment of the War Department. But that is the only
exception to this general theory which I think the Court is
familiar with and the principle of law established by the
Supreme Court that there can be no distinction, no classifi
cation, unless it is based upon a real and substantial dif
ference, and race is not a real and substantial difference.
The other trend of the law is that the rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment are individual rights. You cannot
take away the individual’s rights by classifying him or
putting him in a group and therefore saying that we, on the
average, treat the group well, therefore the individual, if
he suffers he has to suffer because he is a member of the
group. The Supreme Court of the United States has taken
care of that in a series of cases which I think I need not
mention but one particularly is Missouri ex rel Gaines vs.
Canada; the other is the recent Sweatt vs. Painter, in
volving the admission of a negro to the University of Texas,
[fol. 352] Another is the Henderson vs. U. S. which in
volved the right of negroes to eat any place on a dining
car without the curtains or signs or distinctions based on
race and color.
Now, in all of those cases the argument raised was that
we are providing for negroes as a group about as much
as we can. We are meeting the demand. It just happens
that this individual—if this individual wants to eat in the
dining car and the space we have reserved for him is
filled, then even though there are vacant seats in the outer
part of the dining car, the fact that he has to wait, he is no
219
more disadvantaged than a white person who comes into the
dining car and the place is filled, and he has to wait. The
Supreme Court said in those cases that the Fourteenth
Amendment granted individual rights, rights to the indi
vidual, and it was no answer to say that because the person
was a member of a group or because of his number, because
of the numbers of the group, that therefore he should not
be accorded this right which the Fourteenth Amendment
gives.
Now, I think that those two trends of the law—those are
the two trends of the law which presently exist, and those
two trends, I think, make it clear that no other conclusion
can be reached in this case other than that this statute is
unconstitutional.
[fol. 353] I realize that there is a body of law which is
classified under the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy
vs. Ferguson which would seem to give authority to a state
to maintain segregation, but it is our contention, and 1
will attempt to show—I will attempt to demonstrate to
the Court that whatever potency that doctrine may have
had that by virtue of the present classification doctrine
which has been established by the Supreme Court of the
United States by the emphasis and reemphasis of the in
dividual right under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Plessy
vs. Ferguson doctrine of separate but equal has been
whittled away.
Now, it is interesting, in examining the cases under this
doctrine, in the field of education to find that in none of
the Supreme Court cases has this doctrine been applied.
It was mentioned—the nearest case in which it came to
being applied, rather, was a case which was decided some
time ago, I think about 1925, Gong Lum vs. Rice. In that
case Mr. Chief Justice Taft assumed that the Supreme
Court of the United States had followed and had made as
to law the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy vs. Fer
guson, but the real problem in that case was not the appli
cation of the separate but equal doctrine; the real problem
in Gong Lum vs. Rice is whether a person of Chinese
extraction who was classified by the state as a negro had
[fol. 354] a right to being so classified. The petitioner, the
Chinese child, did not question the power of the state to
220
make a classification; it questioned the use of the power
in putting her, as a Chinese, being classified as a negro
for purposes of education, so that the problem which we
here present as to whether or not the state has the power
to classify on the basis of race, was not presented in Gong
Lum vs. Rice and certainly was not passed upon. The
Gaines case, the Sipuel case, Sweatt case, the McLaurin
case, the MeKissick vs. Carmichael, and I will merely men
tion it because it is a more recent case and it may well
be that the Court hasn’t read it; I am sure that you are
familiar with the other cases that I will not have to go into,
but in MeKissick vs. Carmichael involves the right of a
negro to attend the University of North Carolina School
of Law. The state maintained a separate and segregated
school at the North Carolina College for Negroes. The case
was lost in the lower court on the grounds that it would
be better for negroes to go to a segregated school than it
would be for them to go to the university—to the University
of North Carolina. On appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit the judgment of the court
below was reversed on authority of the U. S. Supreme Court
in Sweatt vs. Painter, and the Supreme Court, on June
4, 1951, refused to review the case. Now, the interesting
[fol. 355] thing about that case, if the Court please, is that
here in North Carolina one of the oldest negro law schools
in the country had been operated. It had been established
and had been operating since 1939—the oldest school. It
was conceded that the state was making an effort to main
tain a school for the education of negroes but, because of
the segregation, because that school was segregated, the
Court of Appeals held, consistent with the case of Sweatt
vs. Painter, the state had no power to make any such dis
tinctions.
Now I think that, if anything, the only argument that can
be made with regard to this problem is not whether the
law, as it now stands, is for the proposition that the main
tenance of separate schools can be maintained by the state.
I think that the law, as it now stands with the classification
cases, with the individual right under the Fourteenth
Amendment, I think that the inevitable conclusion must be
221
that segregation, the maintenance by the state of segregated
facilities on the basis of race, is unconstitutional.
The question sometimes may arise with regard to whether
or not even though this is the law, it is expedient for the
Court to reach a decision at this time, and I think that
that seems to me to probably be apparently the trend of
[fol. 356] the present cases. The United States Supreme
Court recently also handled a case involving interstate
travel and, in this case, in which it denied to review on May
28, 1951, the Fourth Circuit held that Jim Crow coaches—
the separate coaches for negroes and whites on a north-
south journey was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
refused to review this. Now I see no distinction between
Jim Crow coaches on a north-south journey than between
Jim Crow coaches on a south-north journey. The Court
made the distinction, and the law as I understand it at the
present time, applies only to north-south journies. I think
that the distinction was made because the Court felt that
it could and should strike down illegal regulations involv
ing racial distinctions of a person who comes from an area
in which, they do not have to submit to that, going into an
area in which they do, even though they pass the imaginary
Mason-Dixon Line.
Now, however, I think the facts show that here in Topeka
the time is now ripe for decision and for this court to use its
power to strike down this statute. The system in Topeka
is operated with eighteen schools for white children and four
schools for negroes. The white children attend the schools
in the territories in which they live. Negroes attend four
schools that are located in I think for the most part in the
center of town, with one in an area which I believe is called
North Topeka. A number of negro children have to be
[fol. 357] transported to these schools in buses. We have
submitted testimony to show that insofar as the time spent
on the bus takes awTay from the child the opportunity to
play and to learn, to play rather, that he is being deprived
of something of value to his education, and he is being-
deprived of this in this instance because the state says that
the City of Topeka can, and the City of Topeka has decided
to maintain separate schools at the elementary school level.
222
Now also in the City of Topeka there is a school system
which is different from that at the elementary school level.
At the junior high school level and the high school level
we have mixed schools. Now, defendants have indicated,
and I realize that this is because the statute says that there
can be no discrimination at the high school level; however,
in this type of mixed situation where on one hand you have
for only six grades of the same public school system you
maintain segregation, with the other six grades you do not
maintain segregation, then certainly the interest, whatever
interest the state may have in the maintenance of segrega
tion, if it could be argued that it has such an interest, and
therefore a court should withhold its authority to strike
down that power, whatever interest it has, it seems that the
picture of it maintaining in one end of the system for
most of the system and not maintaining it in another, in-
[fol. 358] dicates that if there is such an interest, it is of
minor importance and should be disregarded.
We maintain, of course, that the state has no power in this
area. But this case, I think, is as close to McLaurin vs. The
Board of Regents of Oklahoma as any other case that we
have been familiar with. If the Court will remember, in
that case a negro, or a, group of negroes, were admitted to
the University of Oklahoma. They were given the same
teachers, the same textbooks; they apparently got the same
education, that is, in terms of subject matter. But, because
they were negroes, they were forced in the classroom to
sit at separate seats; they were forced to sit at separate
benches in the library; they were forced to eat at separate
tables in the cafeteria. In reviewing this case, the United
States Supreme Court felt that here was an area in which
it was apparent that this type of segregation was ridiculous
and meaningless. If McLaurin could be admitted into the
classroom, necessarily he should be able to be permitted
into the classroom without distinction or difference based
upon race and color. The Court found that these arbitrary
distinctions, putting him aside, stigmatized him and inter
fered with his ability to learn and with the learning process.
Now we contend the same thing here. We contend that
[fol. 359] this statute, one, that the state has no power to
enforce the statute in the first place, and, two, that if it has
223
such power, that by making a difference at the high school
level and the junior high level, whatever interest it may
have, that interest is not now of any importance because
it is clear that there is no distinction between maintaining
a power to maintain segregation in the first six grades of
school and the power to maintain segregation at the junior
high and the high school level. So that with this mixed
situation we think that it ’s even more important that the
power of this Court should be exercised in striking down
this statute.
We have introduced testimony to show that there are
differences, substantial differences, between various of the
white schools as contrasted to the negro schools. We have
shown that on the average in terms of teacher preparation,
subject matter taught, buildings, and so forth, that on the
average the school system here, as between the negro and
the white schools, there is not too much difference except
for this factor: We have shown that 45% of the white chil
dren attend schools newer than the newest colored schools
and that 66% of them attend in buildings newer than the
average age of the negro school, and that on the average the
insured value per classroom of the negro school is approxi
mately $4,000 below that of the white school. We have also
[fol. 360'] shown that in terms of books which are held by
the various schools that the white schools maintain a newer
supply of books; that the white schools have better books
and that therefore the book holdings of the schools, as
between negro and white, is substantially different.
Now., the defendants attempt to defend this on the grounds
that the P. T. A. is the cause of this difference. It is our
contention that in spite of where the books come from and
it has been testified that when they get into the school they
belong to that particular school; that without regard to
where they come from, the fact that they belong to the
school and are held by the school is really the factor which
makes for the difference and that has to be considered.
We have submitted testimony also to show that the
separation of negroes and whites in the elementary school
of the school grades of Topeka is harmful to the develop
ment of the child, although it has been conceded that the
subject-matters taught are the same, and in our definition
224
of what is a school curriculum we have attempted to point
out in the record that the school curriculum is the sum
total of the child’s experience from the time he leaves
home to go to school until the time that he returns, and
therefore the fact that negroes have to ride buses, those
[fol. 361] who do, and cannot go to the school which is
within walking distance of them, therefore they cannot
come home for hot lunches, that they are required to travel
across the town merely because they are negroes and attend
a segregated school and makes it impossible for us to say
that the curriculum at the segregated negro schools are
equal to those at the white schools.
We have also attempted to establish that, if anything,
the maintenance of the segregated system at the first six
grades and then integration at the high school, junior
high school level, places an added burden upon the child
because that is the time that he is meeting the problems
of adolescence and attempting to develop into a man or
into a woman and that with those additional burdens upon
him, we think this is an additional hardship which makes
this statute, in our view, unreasonable.
Now, with that in mind we feel that we have sufficiently
established that the separation of negroes and whites in
the public schools of Topeka is a denial of equal protection
because of the Fourteenth Amendment, that this statute
which the city or Board of Education under which it pur
ports to operate, is unconstitutional and should be so de
clared by this Court, and we also contend that by virtue
of the facts which we have set in the record with regard
to the stigma on the negro child because of race and color
[fol. 362] at what is considered the most crucial age of
his development, that the injuries which are established
here, we have put on evidence to show that these injuries
are likely permanent and that they cannot be corrected
merely by introducing them into the junior high school
at a later age. In fact, we show that it probably by making
this introduction to the junior high school on an integrated
basis at the adolescent age, probably compounds the injury
which has been suffered at the elementary school level and,
for these reasons, we think we have established the rights
of the plaintiffs for the issuance of the injunction for which
225
we have prayed and we submit that this Court should declare
this statute to be unconstitutional and order the Board of
Education of Topeka to admit all persons into its schools
without regard to race or color.
Judge Huxman: In assigning time for argument, we
overlooked the State of Kansas represented by the attorney
general. That was unintentional. How much time, Mr.
McQueary, if any, do you desire to argue in behalf of the
constitutionality of the state statute which you are defend
ing here.
Mr. McQueary: If the Court please, I think we can
explain our position very fully and amply well in a brief
[fol. 363] on the matter of the constitutionality of the
statute.
Judge Huxman: All right. You may proceed with the
argument.
Do you desire the Court to keep track of your time, or are
you going to keep track of your time?
Mr. Brewster: Perhaps you better keep track, Your
Honor.
Judge Huxman: How much time do you desire to take
in the opening argument, Mr. Brewster?
Mr. Brewster: I would say twenty, twenty-five minutes.
Judge Huxman: Well, now, you say which? I can’t
keep------
Mr. Brewster: Twenty-five minutes.
A rg u m en t on B eh alf of D efendants
Your Honor, I would like to touch on one point mentioned
by counsel for the plaintiffs, and that is attempting to lay
some stress on the fact that the distance traveled by a pupil
in attending school has some bearing upon the question
before this Court.
There are a number of cases to the effect that the mere
fact that certain colored school children must travel farther
to reach a colored school than any white child is required
to travel to reach the white school, is not necessarily a
deprivation of equal advantages. There are a lot of eases
on that. They are collected in an annotation in A. L. R.
[fol. 364] Then, going to a United States Supreme Court
15—8
226
decision of Gong* Lum vs. Rice, in there the Court pointed
out that there was no colored school within the district in
which this—school for other than whites; that involved a
Chinese girl being declared as ineligible to attend a white
school; but they did point out in that case that there was
a school in the county in which this particular school district
was located where she could attend and therefore there
could be no objection made on constitutional ground. The
distance you travel is immaterial, and I would say that that
is especially true in our situation where the entire city of
Topeka constitutes a school district and where the evidence,
testimony, shows that there are a number of white students
who are required to walk to school a greater distance than
these colored children who are furnished transportation,
and we have the Kansas case in which this question was
raised, Reynolds vs. The Board of Education—well, I believe
it ’s the Wright case, and there the Supreme Court pointed
out that the question was raised that they had to attend
Buchanan School which was twenty blocks farther than a
white school they could attend, and our court pointed out
the fact that transportation was furnished and therefore
the question of distance traveled would have no bearing
on the proposition. Now that is all I want to say right
[fob 365] now on distance traveled.
The plaintiffs in this case, of course, are by these cases
attempting to have the courts abandon the separate but
equal doctrine which was enunciated in the case of Plessy
vs. Ferguson, which appears in 163 U. S. 537. It has been
mentioned by counsel for the plaintiff, and they mention or
contend that the more recent descisions have whittled away
the effect of that decision and, of course, in that connection,
they rely upon the case of Sweatt vs. Painter, which is the
most recent case on this point. I will come to that in just
a minute. First, I would like to call attention to the fact
that there have been a number of decisions to the effect
that establishing separate schools for white and colored
children does not violate the constitutional right to equal
privileges and immunities if equal advantages are afforded
for each class.
Now, defendants admit that there has been engrafted
upon this separate but equal doctrine the requirement that
227
you must afford equal opportunity, and it’s our position
that under the facts stipulated to here and the evidence, that
there is no real question but what we do afford equal educa
tional opportunities to the colored folks, and we finally get
down to there one point and that is that segregation in and
[fol. 366] of itself constitutes a. discrimination.
School segregation statutes have been before the United
States Supreme Court in a number of cases and at no
time have they held that these state statutes are uncon
stitutional.
Now, getting down to the case of Sweatt vs. Painter, we
have here the opinion of the District Court of the United
States for the Eastern District of South Carolina. This is
the opinion of the court and, while it is not published, it is,
of course, authority—Harry Briggs, Jr., et al, Plaintiff,
vs. R. W. Elliott, et al.
Judge Mellott: You mean that is the last case that came
down a year or two ago.
Mr. Brewster: That is correct. This is the opinion of the
court, and it was decided June 23, 1951. I would like to
first call attention to this Sweatt case. In the opening para
graph of the opinion of that case the Court said this:
“ This case and McLaurin vs. Oklahoma State Regents”
and cites “ present different aspects of this general ques
tion: To what extent does the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment limit the power of a state to
distinguish between students of different races in profes
sional and graduate education in a state university?”
[fol. 367] In other words, the Court specifically restricted
that to professional and graduate education in a state uni
versity. Then the Court pointed out that broader issues
had been urged for their consideration, but adhering to
the rule that constitutional questions are made as narrow
as possible, and the Court says that was—is not necessary
to consider, and the point I am making is that the Sweatt
and the McLaurin cases do not in anyway detract from the
effect of Plessy vs. Ferguson which is still the law.
Now, reviewing Plessy vs. Ferguson, that is the case which
involved the state statute providing for separate railway
carriages for white and colored races, and it was a Lou
isiana statute, and it provided that the passengers be
228
assigned to the coaches according to their race by the con
ductor, and the Court held that it did not violate—deprive
a colored person of any rights under the Fourteenth Amend
ment to the federal constitution. That is the case from
which stems this separate but equal doctrine which the
defendants think is still applicable and which the plain
tiffs, of course, are seeking to overturn.
Here’s one thing the Court said:
“ So far, then, as a conflict with the Fourteenth Amend
ment is concerned, the case reduces itself to the question
[fol. 368] whether the statute of Louisiana is a reasonable
regulation, and with respect to this there must necessarily
be a large discretion on the part of the legislature. In
determining the question of reasonableness it is at liberty
to act with reference to the established usages, customs and
traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of
their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace
and good order. Gauged by this standard, we cannot say
that a law which authorizes or even requires the separation
of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable, or
more obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment than the
acts of Congress requiring separate schools for colored
children in the District of Columbia, the constitutionality
of which does not seem to have been questioned, or the
corresponding acts of state legislatures.
“ We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s
argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with
a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason
of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored
race chooses to put that construction upon it. The argument
necessarily assumes that if, as has been more than once
the case, and is not unlikely to be so again, the colored race
should become the dominant power in the state legislature,
[fol. 369] and should enact a law in precisely similar terms,
it would thereby relegate the white race to an inferior posi
tion. We imagine that the white race, at least, would not
acquiesce in this assumption. The argument also assumes
that social prejudices may be overcome by legislation, and
that equal rights cannot be secured to the negro except by an
229
enforced commingling of the two races. We cannot accept
this proposition. If the two races are to meet upon terms
of social equality, it must he the result of natural affinities,
a mutual appreciation of each other’s merits and a volun
tary consent of individuals.”
Judge Huxman: Mr. Brewster, I don’t know------
Mr. Brewster : I am about through with that.
Judge Huxman: I was going to say that on the Circuit
Court we do not care to have reading from an opinion.
Mr. Brewster: I want to point out that Plessy vs. Fer
guson, which establishes the separate but equal doctrine
and the basis upon which they go, and that is that this
regulation that this is a part of the police power of the
state. Now, it has been repeatedly held, and that is part—
that is the basis of the decision in the South Carolina case,
that each state determines for itself, subject to the observ-
[fol. 370] ance of fundamental rights and liberties guar
anteed by the federal constitution, how it shall exercise
the police power and that the power to legislate with respect
to safety, morals, health and general welfare and that in no
field—in no field is this right of the several states more
clearly recognized than in that of public education.
Well, now, the case—the South Carolina case—bases
their decision, and I won’t quote a great deal from it on
the proposition that it ’s within the police power of the
state to segregate these schools if they want to, but they
must provide equal educational facilities.
Now, speaking of the Sweatt vs. Painter case which, of
course, it will be found the plaintiffs rely on that to a great
extent; that dealt with a professional or graduate school.
We are here dealing with an elementary school system which,
assuming that the student goes through high school and
college, this segregation exists in less than one-half of the
normal educational, formal educational, period. “ At this
level” I would like to quote just briefly from this opinion,
“ At this level as good education can be afforded in negro
schools as in white schools and the thought of establishing
professional contacts does not enter into the picture. More
over, education at this level is not a matter of voluntary
choice on the part of the student, but of compulsion by the
[fol. 371] state.”
230
Now, I would like to also call attention to the fact that
in Sweatt vs. Painter the Supreme Court of the United
States specifically refused to overrule Plessy vs. Ferguson
and, in that respect, I think it strengthens the opinion and
shows that the present segregation and separation and
equality is still recognized.
Now, there has been testimony to the effect that mixed
schools would give a better education. But, on the other
hand, it ’s been indicated that mixed schools might result
in additional racial friction due to the fact that the colored
student would be greatly outnumbered and you’d still have
that inferior feeling.
I would like to, with the Court’s permission, quote just
a little more from this South Carolina opinion; I just got
it this morning or I would have tried to give it without
quoting it :
“ The federal courts would he going far outside their
constitutional function were they to attempt to prescribe
educational policies for the state in such matters, however
desirable such policies might be in the opinion of some
sociologists or educators. For the federal courts to do so,
would result not only in interference with local affairs by
an agency of the federal government, hut also in the sub
stitution of the judicial for the legislative process in what
[fol. 372] is essentially a legislative matter.” In other
words continuing the theory that this is a matter of the
police power, and the state has the right to make this
regulation.
We submit that- under the facts which are stipulated,
there is established—it is established that there is no in
equality of educational facilities and, furthermore, that it is
within the province of the state to determine what regula
tions necessary under its police power which, of course,
is to promote the peace and the welfare of the people of
that state, and, as far as the opinions of some sociologists
or educators are concerned, we are in agreement with what
the Court decided in South Carolina that it would not be
within the province of a federal court or any federal agency
to adopt those views regardless of what the state might
consider to be the proper regulation under the police powers.
Judge Huxman: You may proceed, Mr. Goodell.
231
Mr. Groodell: I prefer to—if we are given authority to
file briefs, I will waive argument.
Judge Huxman: You will waive your argument. All
right, the plaintiff may close the argument, then.
Closing A rgum ent1 on B eh alf of P lain tiff
Mr. Carter: Your Honor, I just have a few comments to
make.
[fol. 373] I remember the last point that counsel for the
defendants made about the statements of sociologists and
educators. I would like to point the Court’s attention
again to the decision in McLaurin vs. The Board of Regents
where what was considered in that case to be crucial to the
decision was the mental attitude of the negro and the
impact of segregation upon him mentally, and therefore
it was held that he was deprived of the equal protection
of the laws in the segregated educational system.
Now, I have to congratulate the attorneys for the Board
of Education on being much more efficient than, at least, I
am, because I had hoped that we could have the South
Carolina opinion ourselves and that we could quote from
the dissent, but we were unable to get it.
Judge Mellott: We have a copy of it.
Mr. Carter: No, thank you. But, at any rate, if the
Court please, I think that although these two decisions
certainly, McLaurin and Sweatt, were limited, as counsel
indicated, to the graduate and professional schools, it
was not necessary for the Court to have made any such
limitation because that would have been obvious because
they applied to graduate and professional schools anyway,
but the United States Supreme Court, in a recent case,
Rice vs. Arnold, which I don’t remember the exact date of
the decision, I think it was about October 16, 1950; I don’t
[fol. 374] believe it’s yet reported—that case involved a
question of the separate days for the use of a golf course in
Miami; negroes were given certain days of the week and
whites were given the rest of the time. The matter was
appealed through the Florida Supreme Court to the U. S.
Supreme Court, and the question raised was whether or not
the separation and giving of this separate time to negroes
and not permitting them to use the golf course without dis
232
crimination based on race or color was a denial of the
equal protection clause, the golf course being municipally
owned. The Supreme Court took the case, granted cer
tiorari, reversed and remanded in the light of the McLaurin
and Sweatt opinions.
Now, I think that that is clear evidence at least that the
Supreme Court realized and certainly feels that the deci
sions and the principles which it enunciated in Sweatt and
McLaurin have wide application and cannot be limited in
the narrow scope of a professional school or a law school.
I believe that what the Supreme Court, of course, in Plessy
vs. Ferguson—the Supreme Court refused to overrule
Plessy vs. Ferguson, refused to apply it or refused to re
examine it, but I don’t believe that counsel for the de
fendants can take too much hope in that in view of the
decision which was reached. The two decisions reached
were to the effect that segregation, at least at the level at
[fol. 375] which the decision was handed down, were un
constitutional in the law school and in the graduate schools
and I might also add that Plessy vs. Ferguson applied to
railroads and not to education and, although it has some
how been taken over into the educational field, it is really
a railroad case. However, I think that actually what—with
the trend of the law, I think that the trend of the law is
to such an extent that it is impossible to reach any other
decision except that the State of Kansas has no power to
order segregation. I think also that here this is no situa
tion—this is not applicable to South Carolina; the two
states are entirely different. There is not the vested in
terest in the maintenance of segregation in Kansas as there
is in South Carolina or in Georgia. This is clear, by virtue
of the fact that the state forbids it at one level even though
it permits it at another, and I think that what should be
applied in this case is the rule that at least if the segrega
tion is unconstitutional, and I think that the Supreme Court
cases inevitably point to that end, that a declaration of
uneonstitutionality should be made in an area in which
it is ripe. The time is ripe for such a decision to be
reached, and I think that certainly in Kansas, with the
situation as it is, that the time is now ripe for this Court
to strike down the statute here in issue and to declare
233
[fol. 376] that the State of Kansas has no power to main
tain segregation in its public school system.
Judge Huxman: Before the Court adjourns, the Court
wants to compliment the parties on both sides for their
fairness in the presentation of this case, the spirit of co
operation exhibited by all, to have a speedy determination
of the issues in the trial of the case. I think this case was
tried within less than ten days after the issues were made
up and concluded, and we feel that we want to have as
speedy a determination by the Court as can be handed
down, giving counsel an opportunity to file briefs because,
if this laAv is declared unconstitutional, certainly the City
of Topeka is—wants to have it done as soon as possible
before the beginning of the fall school term and all those
matters. So we are all interested in having the matter
determined just as expeditiously as it can be done, afford
ing everybody an opportunity to prepare and file their
briefs.
Now, the questions are comparatively simple to state and
quite difficult to answer. There are only two questions in
the case; one is, are the facilities, as I see them, are the
facilities which are afforded by Topeka in its separate
schools, comparable; that is one question, and the other is,
granting that they are, is segregation unconstitutional not
withstanding, in light of the Fourteenth Amendment, As
[fol. 377] I get it, those are the two points in the case, is
that right?
Mr. Carter: Yes, sir.
C olloquy B etw een Court and C ounsel .
Judge Huxman: There is nothing else.
Now, ordinarily, of course, the plaintiffs prepare and
file their briefs and the defendants have a certain time to
reply thereafter, which, of course, would take additional
time. I am wondering if you want to invoke that rule or
whether, in view of the fact that these two issues are so
clear, and the testimony is clear in the minds of all of us,
whether you would be willing or feel that you would prefer
to proceed without waiting to receive the briefs on the
part of the plaintiff. What do you say, Mr. Goodell ?
Mr. Goodell: Subject only to this, Your Honor: If coun
234
sel chooses to argue points of evidence, I would be a little
handicapped to answer them when I didn’t know what he
was going to argue.
Judge Huxman: You would be given the right for reply
brief.
Mr. Goodell: With that exception, I would be perfectly
willing to hand mine in at the same time.
Judge Huxman: How much time do you think you need
to prepare and file your brief?
[fol. 378] Mr. Goodell: I think a week we can do it in.
Judge Huxman: Well, no need of rushing you to that
extent.
Mr. Goodell: Ten days.
Judge Huxman: What do plaintiffs—of course, you have
done a lot of work; you have practically got your material
assembled on the law, naturally. How long does plain
tiff feel that you need to prepare and file your brief?
Mr. Carter: Well, Your Honor, we could, of course, do it
within a week, but we would like to have, say, a week from
next Monday, which would give us about ten days.
Judge Huxman: Well, let’s give the parties—do you
want to wait in the preparation of your brief until you
receive the record? Of course it will take approximately
ten days to get the record. I presume each side will want
a record, because, irrespective of the outcome of this litiga
tion, it ’s headed for the Supreme Court anyway. Do you
prefer to wait with your brief until you have a copy of the
record? What do you say?
Mr. Goodell: That depends on the turn it takes. As I
understand counsel, you are relying now entirely on the
question of segregation in itself is discriminatory,
ffol. 379] Mr. Carter: WTe are relying—of course we are
relying on that. I think, Your Honor, that we would not
need the record. I think we have our testimony in mind that
has been presented.
Mr. Goodell: If that is your point, of course, then------•
Judge Huxman: Mr. Goodell, I do not understand the
attorneys for plaintiff waive the one point and rely on
the other alone.
Mr. Goodell: I------
Judge Huxman: I understand from what they have said
235
they practically indicate they do not lean too heavily on
this discrimination in the facilities which are furnished.
How much time from today does plaintiff want to file
their brief, assuming the record will be ready for you in
ten days. We will put it that way. How much time do you
want from today!
Mr. Carter: We would like to have ten days, Your Honor.
Judge Huxman: We will give you fifteen days. You
understand what I asked was assuming that it will take
ten days from now to get the record, how much time from
now do you want to file your brief! If you want ten days
after the record is furnished, you may take twenty days, of
[fol. 380] course, from now.
Mr. Goodell: The time, Your Honor, while I am on that
subject;------
Mr. Carter: Fifteen days will be ample.
Mr. Goodell: If it ’s going to be appealed, and I think it
will be perhaps, either way this decision goes, the time lag
would be such that we couldn’t have a determination, I
don’t believe, by September in the appellate court.
Judge Huxman: Of course there are these factors: Judge
Mellott and Judge Hill, both, have heavy schedules left
and myself, my schedule isn’t as heavy as theirs is for the
remaining portion of the summer, but if we defer this
matter too long, it runs into the fall when our new terms
of court take place, and then it would be difficult for any
of us to devote our time to it. We don’t want to cut the
parties short, but, on the other hand, there is no need of
granting more time than you need for the preparation.
Mr. Goodell: It seems to me if he is going to go into
evidence, it ’s pretty awkward to write a brief about evi
dentiary matters without having a transcript, and it ’s not
satisfactory.
Judge Huxman: We will give you twenty days from today
for the filing of your brief, and the reporter has told us
[fol. 381] it would be about a week for the preparation of
the record so, in any event, if you wanted the record, you
will have ten or twelve days, and I will say this: If your
briefs don’t get in on the twentieth day, you will not be
out of court.
Mr. Goodell: That will be satisfactory.
236
Judge Huxman: Are the parties going to order a copy
of the record, each of you; I presume that is your intention.
Mr. (xoodell: Yes, we will.
Mr. Carter: Yes, sir.
Judge Huxman: All right.
Mr. Groodell: Your Honor, do I understand we are given
the privilege of a reply brief if we desire.
Judge Hill: Certainly.
Judge Huxman: Now, there is one other suggestion that
the Court has in mind that you could be very helpful to
the Court, and that may take a little additional time; that
when you file your brief, to go with it each side file suggested
findings or requested findings of fact, on the theory that
you are going to prevail in the lawsuit, and conclusions
of law.
Judge Mellott: We are required to make them under
Rule 52.
Judge Huxman: Yes. We must make them, of course, and
[fol. 382] it will be helpful to the Court if we had in mind
when we come to consider this case, the idea and the theories
of both sides as to the findings of fact; if we have both of
them, then we will make our own findings, of course.
You also understand that there are three of us, that we
all live in separate cities and if you would file your briefs
in triplicate so that each judge can have a copy of the brief,
it will expedite matters.
One thing I would like to inquire of my two associates
of the district bench, what is your practice with regard
to requiring printed or typewritten briefs in cases such as
these! Of course in the Circuit Court, as you know, briefs
must be printed, but my associates tell me that typewritten
briefs are the practice here so that will be the practice in
this case.
Judge Mellott: Use some good carbon paper because car
bons are hard to read.
Mr. Goodell: We will do that.
Judge Huxman: Judge Hill makes this suggestion, which
I have found valuable in my work on the appellate bench:
If, when you prepare and submit a requested finding of
fact, if you will alongside of it have the page of the record
that you claim sustains that request, it will save us a
237
tremendous amount of work; otherwise we have to go
[fol. 383] through the whole record to see whether there
is any warrant in the record for that request. So, if you
will do that, that will help the Court.
Judge Mellott: I would like to have you get copies of
the court’s rules of practice, which are printed, and that
will call your attention to the way we want the brief pre
pared; give us a table of cases and your citations.
Judge Huxman: My associates are more familiar with
those rules than I am. It ’s their court, and they know
what the practice is.
Now, I suppose Judge Mellott and Judge Hill, that we
should make the same order with respect to all of these
requests for brief amicus curiae, that they be filed within
the same length of time, within twenty days from today;
anybody that has appeared here that wants to file a brief
as amicus curiae.
Mr. Goodell: Our notion, if it doesn’t interfere with the
rules of the court, would be to have the other lawyers join
with us in a certain section of the brief.
Judge Huxman: Well, I would certainly prefer—frankly,
I have never been very much impressed with this amicus
curiae theory of the law. There just isn’t such a thing
anyhow because an amicus curiae has an active interest on
[fol. 384] one side or the other of the litigation and if you
could get—that is, however, for you defendants to arrange
—if you could get all the parties who have entered an
appearance amicus curiae to join with you in the brief, it
would save a lot of duplication.
Mr. Goodell: That is what I thought.
Judge Huxman: These issues are sharply drawn. There
is a certain line of cases, and it’s just a question of analyz
ing and distinguishing those cases, but, however, I doubt
whether we could order that—wdiether we can order amicus
curiae to join with you in a brief.
Mr. Goodell: If it ’s satisfactory, I meant, I think that is
what we will do.
Judge Huxman: That would be much simpler. Any
thing that the parties have to request! The court will be
adjourned subject to further call.
238
(The court then, at 12:15 o ’clock p. m., stood adjourned
until further call.)
# # #
R eporter ’s Certificate (om itted in p rin tin g )
[fol. 385] Clerk’s Certificate to foregoing transcript omit
ted in printing.
[ fo l . 386] I n U nited S tates D istrict C ourt
Opin io n of t h e C ourt1—Entered August 3, 1951.
H u x m a n , Circuit Judge, delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Chapter 72-1724 of the General Statutes of Kansas, 1949,
relating to public schools in cities of the first class, so far
as material, authorizes such cities to organize and maintain
separate schools for the education of white and colored
children in the grades below the high school grades. Pur
suant to this authority, the City of Topeka, Kansas, a city
of the first class, has established and maintains a segregated
system of schools for the first six grades. It has estab
lished and maintains in the Topeka School District eighteen
schools for white students and four schools for colored
students.
The adult plaintiffs instituted this action for themselves,
their minor children plaintiffs, and all other persons simi
larly situated for an interlocutory injunction, a permanent
injunction, restraining the enforcement, operation and ex
ecution of the state statute and the segregation instituted
thereunder by the school authorities of the City of Topeka
and for a declaratory judgment declaring unconstitutional
the state statute and the segregation set up thereunder by
the school authorities of the City of Topeka.
As against the school district of Topeka they contend
that the opportunities provided for the infant plaintiffs
in the separate all negro schools are inferior to those pro
239
vided white children in the all white schools; that the
respects in which these opportunities are inferior include
the physical facilities, curricula, teaching resources, student
personnel services as well as all other services. As against
both the state and the school district, they contend that
apart from all other factors segregation in itself constitutes
[fol. 387] an inferiority in educational opportunities
offered to negroes and that all of this is in violation of due
process guaranteed them by the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. In their answer both the
state and the school district defend the constitutionality
of the state law and in addition the school district defends
the segregation in its schools instituted thereunder.
We have found as a fact that the physical facilities, the
curricula, courses of study, qualification of and quality of
teachers, as well as other educational facilities in the two
sets of schools are comparable. It is obvious that absolute
equality of physical facilities is impossible of attainment
in buildings that are erected at different times: So also
absolute equality of subjects taught is impossible of main
tenance when teachers are permitted to select books of
their own choosing to use in teaching in addition to the
prescribed courses of study. It is without dispute that
the prescribed courses of study are identical in all of the
Topeka Schools and that there is no discrimination in this
respect. It is also clear in the record that the educational
qualifications of the teachers in the colored schools are
equal to those in the white schools and that in all other
respects the educational facilities and services are com
parable. It is obvious from the fact that there are only
four colored schools as against eighteen white schools in
the Topeka School District, that, colored children in many
instances are required to travel much greater distances
than they would be required to travel could they attend a
white school, and are required to travel much greater dis
tances than white children are required to travel. The
evidence, however, establishes that the school district
transports colored children to and from school free of
charge. No such service is furnished to white children.
We conclude that in the maintenance and operation of the
[fol. 388] schools there is no willful, intentional or sub
240
stantial discrimination in the matters referred to above
between the colored and white schools. In fact, while plain
tiffs ’ attorneys have not abandoned this contention, they
did not give it great emphasis in their presentation before
the court. They relied primarily upon the contention that
segregation in and of itself without more violates their
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
This contention poses a question not free from difficulty.
As a subordinate court in the federal judicial system, we
seek the answer to this constitutional question in the deci
sions of the Supreme Court when it has spoken on the
subject and do not substitute our own views for the declared
law by the Supreme Court. The difficult question as always
is to analyze the decisions and seek to ascertain the trend
as revealed by the later decisions.
There are a great number of cases, both federal and
state, that have dealt with the many phases of segregation.
Since the question involves a construction and interpreta
tion of the federal Constitution and the pronouncements
of the Supreme Court, we will consider only those cases by
the Supreme Court with respect to segregation in the
schools. In the early case of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 II. S.
537, the Supreme Court said:
“ The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to
enforce the absolute equality of the two races before
the law, but in the nature of things it could not have
been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color,
or to encorce social, as distinguished from political
equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms
unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and even
requiring, their separation in places where they are
liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily
[fol. 389] imply the inferiority of either race to the
other, and have been generally, if not universally,
recognized as within the competency of the state legis
latures in the exercise of their police power. The most
common instance of this is connected with the estab
lishment of separate schools for white and colored
children, which has been held to be a valid exercise
of the legislative power even by courts of States where
241
the political rights of the colored race have been
longest and most earnestly enforced.”
It is true as contended by plaintiffs that the Plessy case
involved transportation and that the above quoted state
ment relating to schools was not essential to the decision
of the question before the court and was therefore some
what in the nature of dicta. But that the statement is con
sidered more than dicta is evidenced by the treatment
accorded it by those seeking to strike down segregation as
well as by statements in subsequent decisions of the Su
preme Court. On numerous occasions the Supreme Court
has been asked to overrule the Plessy case. This the
Supreme Court has refused to do, on the sole ground that
a decision of the question was not necessary to a disposal
of the controversy presented. In the late case of Sweatt
v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629, the Supreme Court again refused
to review the Plessy case. The Court said:
“ Nor need we reach petitioner’s contention that
Plessy v. Ferguson should be reexamined in the light
of contemporary knowledge respecting the purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the effects of racial
segregation.”
Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78, was a grade school segre
gation case. It involved the segregation law of Mississippi.
Gong Lum was a Chinese child and, because of color, was
required to attend the separate schools provided for colored
children. The opinion of the court assumes that the educa
tional facilities in the colored schools were adequate and
equal to those of the white schools. Thus the court said:
“ The question here is whether a Chinese citizen of the
[fol. 390] United States is denied equal protection of the
laws when he is classed among the colored races and fur
nished facilities for education equal to that offered to all,
whether white, brown, yellow or black.” In addition to
numerous state decisions on the subject, the Supreme Court
in support of its conclusions cited Plessy v. Ferguson,
supra. The Court also pointed out that the question was
the same no matter what the color of the class that was
16—8
242
required to attend separate schools. Thus the Court said:
“ Most of the cases cited arose, it is true, over the estab
lishment of separate schools as between white pupils and
black pupils, but we cannot think that the question is any
different or that any different result can be reached, as
suming the cases above cited to be rightly decided, where
the issue is as between white pupils and the pupils of the
yellow race.” The court held that the question of segre
gation was within the discretion of the state in regulating
its public schools and did not conflict with the Fourteenth
Amendment.
It is vigorously argued and not without some basis
therefor that the later decisions of the Supreme Court in
McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U. S. 637, and Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U. S. 629, show a trend away from the Plessy and Lum
cases. McLaurin v. Oklahoma arose under the segrega
tion laws of Oklahoma. McLaurin, a colored student,
applied for admission to the University of Oklahoma in
order to pursue studies leading to a doctorate degree in
education. He was denied admission solely because he was
a negro. After litigation in the courts, which need not be
reviewed herein, the legislature amended the statute per
mitting- the admission of colored students to institutions of
higher learning attended by white students, but providing
that such instruction should be given on a segregated basis;
that the instruction be given in separate class rooms or at
separate times. In compliance with this statute McLaurin
[fol. 391] was admitted to the university but was required
to sit at a separate desk in the ante room adjoining the class
room; to sit at a designated desk on the mezzanine floor of
the library; and to sit at a designated table and eat at a
different time from the other students in the school cafe
teria. These restrictions were held to violate his rights
under the federal Constitution. The Supreme Court held
that such treatment handicapped the student in his pursuit
of effective graduate instruction.1
1 The court said: ‘ ‘ Our society grows increasingly com
plex, and our need for trained leaders increases cor
respondingly. Appellant’s case represents, perhaps, the
epitome of that need, for he is attempting to obtain an
In Sweatt v. Painter, 339 TJ. S. 629, petitioner, a colored
student, filed an application for admission to the University
of Texas Law School. His application was rejected solely
on the ground that he was a negro. In its opinion the
Supreme Court stressed the educational benefits from, com
mingling with white students. The court concluded by
stating: “ We cannot conclude that the education offered
petitioner in a separate school is substantially equal to
that which he would receive if admitted to the University
of Texas Law School.” If segregation within a school as
in the McLaurin case is a denial of due process, it is difficult
to see why segregation in separate schools would not result
[fol. 392] in the same denial. Or if the denial of the right
to commingle with the majority group in higher institutions
of learning as in the Sweatt case and gain the educational
advantages resulting therefrom, is lack of due process, it
is difficult to see why such denial would not result in the
same lack of due process if practiced in the lower grades.
It must however be remembered that in both of these
cases the Supreme Court made it clear that it was con
fining itself to answering the one specific question, namely:
“ To what extent does the equal protection clause limit the
advanced degree in education, to become, by definition, a
leader and trainer of others. Those who will come under
this guidance and influence must be directly affected by
the education he received. Their own education and de
velopment will necessarily suffer to the extent that his
training is unequal to that of his classmates. State im
posed restrictions which produce such inequalities cannot
be sustained.”
“ It may be argued that appellant will be in no better
position when these restrictions are removed, for he may
still be set apart by his fellow students. This we think
irrelevant. There is a vast difference—a Constitutional
difference—between restrictions imposed by the state
which prohibit the intellectual commingling of. students,
and the refusal of individuals to commingle where the state
presents no such bar. * * * having been admitted to a
state supported graduate school, [he] must receive the
same treatment at the hands of the state as students of
other races.”
244
power of a state to distinguish, between students of different
races in professional and graduate education in a state
university?” , and that the Supreme Court refused to review
the Plessy ease because that question was not essential to
a decision of the controversy in the case.
We are accordingly of the view that the Plessy and Lum
cases, supra, have not been overruled and that they still
presently are authority for the maintenance of a segre
gated school system in the lower grades.
The prayer for relief will be denied and judgment will be
entered for defendants for costs.
[ fo l . 393] I n U n ited S tates D istrict C ourt
F in din gs of F act and C onclusions of L aw — Entered
August 3, 1951.
F in din gs of F act
I
This is a class action in which plaintiffs seek a decree,
declaring Section 72-1724 of the General Statutes of Kan
sas 1949 to be unconstitutional, insofar as it empowers the
Board of Education of the City of Topeka “ to organize
and maintain separate schools for the education of white
and colored children” and an injunction restraining the
enforcement, operation and execution of that portion of the
statute and of the segregation instituted thereunder by the
School Board.
II
This suit arises under the Constitution of the United
States and involves more than $3,000 exclusive of interest
and costs. It is also a civil action to redress an alleged
deprivation, under color of State law, of a right, privilege
or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United
States providing for an equal rights of citizens and to
have the court declare the rights and other legal relations
of the interested parties. The Court has jurisdiction of
the subject matter and of the parties to the action.
2 4 5
III
Pursuant to statutory authority contained in Section
72-1724 of the General Statutes of Kansas 1949, the City
of Topeka, Kansas, a city of the first class, has established
and maintains a segregated system of schools for the first
six grades. It has established and maintains in the Topeka
School District, eighteen schools for white children and four
[fol. 394] for colored children, the latter being located in
neighborhoods where the population is predominantly
colored. The City of Topeka is one school district. The
colored children may attend any one of the four schools
established for them, the choice being made either by the
children or by their parents.
IV
There is no material difference in the physical facilities
in the colored schools and in the white schools and such
facilities in the colored schools are not inferior in any
material respects to those in the white schools.
V
The educational qualifications of the teachers and the
quality of instruction in the colored schools are not inferior
to and are comparable to those of the white schools.
VI
The courses of study prescribed by the State law are
taught in both the colored schools and in the white schools.
The prescribed courses of study are identical in both
classes of schools.
VII
Transportation to and from school is furnished colored
children in the segregated schools without cost to the
children or to their parents. No such transportation is
furnished to the white children in the segregated schools.
[fol. 395] VIII
Segregation of white and colored children in public
schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children.
246
The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law;
for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted
as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense
of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a
tendency to retain the educational and mental development
of negro children and to deprive them of some of the bene
fits they would receive in a racial integrated school system.
IX
The court finds as facts the stipulated facts and those
agreed upon by counsel at the pre-trial and during the
course of the trial.
Conclusions of L aw
I
This court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of
the parties to the action.1
II
We conclude that no discrimination is practiced against
plaintiffs in the colored schools set apart for them because
of the nature of the physical characteristics of the buildings,
the equipment, the curricula, quality of instructors and
[fol. 396] instruction or school services furnished and that
they are denied no constitutional rights or privileges by
reason of any of these matters.
III
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. 8. 537, and Gong Lum v. Rice,
275 U. S. 78 upholds the constitutionality of a legally
segregated school system in the lower grades and no denial
of due process results from the maintenance of such a
segregated system of schools absent discrimination in the
maintenance of the segregated schools. We conclude that
the above cited cases have not been overruled by the later
cases of McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U. 8. 637, and Sweatt
v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629.
1 Title 28 U.S.C. §1331; idem § 1343; idem Ch. 151.
Title 8 U.S.C. Ch. 3. Title 28 U.S.C. Ch. 155.
247
IY
The only question in the case under the record is whether
legal segregation in and of itself without more constitutes
denial of due process. We are of the view that under the
above decisions of the Supreme Court the answer must be
in the negative. We accordingly conclude that plaintiffs
have suffered no denial of due process by virtue of the
manner in which the segregated school system of Topeka,
Kansas, is being operated. The relief sought is there
fore denied. Judgment will be entered for defendants
for costs.
Walter A. Huxman, Circuit Judge, Arthur J. Mellott,
Chief District Judge, Delmas C. Hill, District
Judge.
[fol. 397] In U n ited S tates. D istrict Court
D egree.— Entered August 3, 1951.
Now on this 3rd day of August, 1951 this cause comes
regularly on for hearing before the undersigned Judges,
constituting a three-judge court, duly convened pursuant
to the provisions of Title 28 TJ. S. C. 2281 and 2284.
The Court has heretofore filed its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law together with an opinion and has held
as a matter of law that the plaintiffs have failed to prove
they are entitled to the relief demanded.
Now, therefore, it is by the court, considered, ordered,
adjudged and decreed that judgment be and it hereby is
entered in favor of the defendants.
Walter A. Huxman, Circuit Judge, Arthur J. Mellott,
Chief District Judge, Delmas C. Hill, District
Judge.
248
[fol. 398] I n U n ited S tates D istrict C ourt
[Title omitted]
P etition for A ppeal—Piled October 1, 1951
Considering themselves aggrieved by the final decree and
judgment of this court entered on August 3, 1951, Oliver:
Brown, Mrs. Richard Lawton, Mrs. Sadie Emanuel, Mrs.
Lucinda Todd, Mrs. Iona Richardson, Mrs. Lena Carper,
Mrs. Shirley Hodison, Mrs. Alma Lewis, Mrs. Darlene
Brown, Mrs. Shirla Fleming, Mrs. Andrew Henderson,
Mrs. Vivian Scales, Mrs. Marguerite Emmerson, and Linda
Carol Brown, an infant by Oliver Brown, her father and
next friend; Victoria Jean Lawton and Carol Kay Lawton,
infants, by Mrs. Richard Lawton, their mother and next
friend; James Meldon Emanuel, an infant, by Mrs. Sadie
Emanuel, his mother and next friend; Nancy Jane Todd,
an infant, by Mrs. Lucinda Todd, her mother and next
friend; Ronald Douglas Richardson, an infant, by Mrs.
Iona Richardson, his mother and next friend; Katherine
Louise Carper, an infant, by Mrs. Lena Carper, her mother
and next friend; Charles Hodison, an infant, by Mrs. Shir
ley Hodison, his mother and next friend; Theron Lewis,
Martha Jean Lewis, Arthur Lewis and Frances Lewis,
infants, by Mrs. Alma Lewis, their mother and next friend;
Saundria Dorstella Brown, an infant, by Mrs. Darlene
Brown, her mother and next friend; Duane Dean Fleming
and Silas Hardrick Fleming, infants, by Mrs. Shirla Flem-
[fol. 399] ing, their mother and next friend; Donald Andrew
Henderson and Vicki Ann Henderson, infants, by Mrs.
Andrew Henderson, their mother and next friend; Ruth
Ann Scales, an infant, by Mrs. Vivian Scales, her mother
and next friend; Claude Arthur Emmerson and George
Robert Emmerson, infants, by Mrs. Marguerite Emmerson,
their mother and next friend, plaintiffs herein, do hereby
pray that an appeal be allowed to the Supreme Court of the
United States from said final decree and judgment and
from each and every part thereof; that citation be issued
in accordance with law; that an order be made with respect
to the appeal bond to be given by said plaintiffs, and that
the amount of security be fixed by the order allowing the
249
appeal, and that the material parts of the record, pro
ceedings and papers upon which said final judgment and
decree was based duly authenticated be sent to the Supreme
Court of the United States in accordance with the rules in
such cases made and provided.
Respectfully submitted, Charles E. Bledsoe, 330
Kansas Avenue, Topeka, Kansas, John J. Scott,
Charles S. Scott, 410 Kansas Avenue, Topeka,
Kansas, Robert L. Carter, Jack Greenberg, Thur-
good Marshall, 20 West 40th Street, New York 18,
New York, Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
[fob 400] I n U nited- S tates- D istrict C ourt
[Title omitted]
A ssign m en t op E rrors and P rayer por R eversal—
filed October 1, 1951.
Oliver Brown, Mrs. Richard Lawton, Mrs. Sadie Emanuel,
Mrs. Lucinda Todd, Mrs. Iona Richardson, Mrs. Lena Car
per, Mrs. Shirley Hodison, Mrs. Alma Lewis, Mrs. Darlene
Brown, Mrs. Shirla Fleming, Mrs. Andrew Henderson,
Mrs. Vivian Scales, Mrs. Marguerite Emmerson, and Linda
Carol Brown, an infant by Oliver Brown, her father and
next friend; Victoria Jean Lawton and Carol Kay Lawton,
infants, by Mrs. Richard Lawton, their mother and next
friend; James Meldon Emanuel, an infant, by Mrs. Sadie
Emanuel, his mother and next friend; Nancy Jane Todd, an
infant, by Mrs. Lucinda Todd, her mother and next friend;
Ronald Douglas Richardson, an infant, by Mrs. Iona
Richardson, his mother and next friend; Katherine Louise
Carper, an infant, by Mrs. Lena Carper, her mother and
next friend; Charles Hodison, an infant, by Mrs. Shirley
Hodison, his mother and next friend; Theron Lewis, Martha
Jean Lewis, Arthur Lewis and Frances Lewis, infants, by
Mrs. Alma Lewis, their mother and next friend; Saundria
Dorstella Brown, an infant, by Mrs. Darlene Brown, her
mother and next friend; Duane Dean Fleming and Silas
Hardrick Fleming, infants, by Mrs. Shirla Fleming, their
[fol. 401] mother and next friend; Donald Andrew Hen
250
derson and Vicki Ann Henderson, infants, by Mrs. Andrew
Henderson, their mother and next friend; Ruth Ann Scales,
an infant, by Mrs. Vivian Scales, her mother and next
friend; Claude Arthur Emmerson and George Robert Em-
merson, infants, by Mrs. Marguerite Emmerson, their
mother and next friend, plaintiffs in the above-entitled
cause, in connection with their appeal to the Supreme Court
of the United States, hereby file the following assignment
of errors upon which they will rely in their prosecution of
said appeal from the final judgment of the District Court
entered on August 3, 1951.
The District Court erred:
1. In refusing to grant plaintiffs ’ application for a tem
porary and permanent injunction restraining the defend
ants from acting pursuant to Chapter 72-1724 of the Gen
eral Statutes of Kansas under which they are maintaining
separate public elementary schools through the first six
grades for Negro children solely because of their race and
color.
2. In refusing to hold that the State of Kansas is with
out authority to promulgate Chapter 72-1724 of the General
Statutes of Kansas in that such statute constitutes a clas
sification based upon race and color which is violative of
the Constitution of the United States.
3. In refusing to enter judgment in favor of plaintiffs,
after the court found that plaintiffs suffered serious harm
and detriment in being required to attend segregated ele
mentary schools in the City of Topeka, and were deprived
thereby of benefits they would have received in a racially
integrated school system.
Wherefore, plaintiffs pray that the final decree of the
[fol. 402] District Court be reversed, and for such other
relief as the Court may deem fit and proper.
Charles E. Bledsoe, 330 Kansas Avenue, Topeka,
Kansas, Charles S. Scott, John Scott, 410 Kansas
Avenue, Topeka, Kansas, Robert L. Carter, Jack
Greenberg, Thurgood Marshall, Counsel for Plain-
tiffs-Appellants.
Dated: September 28, 1951.
251
[fol. 403] I n U n ited S tates D istrict C ourt
[Title omitted]
Order A llo w in g A ppeal— Entered October 1, 1951.
Oliver Brown, Mrs. Richard Lawton, Mrs. Sadie Emanuel,
Mrs. Lucinda Todd, Mrs. Iona Richardson, Mrs. Lena Car
per, Mrs. Shirley Hodison, Mrs. Alma Lewis, Mrs. Darlene
Brown, Mrs. Shirla Fleming, Mrs. Andrew Henderson, Mrs.
Vivian Scales, Mrs. Marguerite Emmerson, and Linda Carol
Brown, an infant by Oliver Brown, her father and next
friend; Victoria Jean Lawton and Carol Kay Lawton, in
fants, by Mrs. Richard Lawton, their mother and next
friend; James Meldon Emanuel, an infant, by Mrs. Sadie
Emanuel, his mother and next friend; Nancy Jane Todd,
an infant, by Mrs. Lucinda Todd, her mother and next
friend; Ronald Douglas Richardson, an infant, by Mrs. Iona
Richardson, his mother and next friend; Katherine Louise
Carper, an infant, by Mrs. Lena Carper, her mother and
next friend; Charles Hodison, an infant, by Mrs. Shirley
Hodison, his mother and next friend; Theron Lewis, Martha
Jean Lewis, Arthur Lewis and Frances Lewis, infants,
by Mrs. Alma Lewis, their mother and next friend; Saun-
dria Dorstella Brown, an infant, by Mrs. Darlene Brown,
her mother and next friend; Duane Dean Fleming and Silas
Hardrick Fleming, infants, by Mrs. Shirla Fleming, their
mother and next friend; Donald Andrew Henderson and
[fol. 404] Vicki Ann Henderson, infants, by Mrs. Andrew
Henderson, their mother and next friend; Ruth Ann Scales,
an infant, by Mrs. Vivian Scales, her mother and next
friend; Claude Arthur Emmerson and George Robert Em
merson, infants, by Mrs. Marguerite Emmerson, their
mother and next friend, having made and filed their peti
tion praying for an appeal to the Supreme Court of the
United States from the final judgment and decree of this
court in this cause entered on August 3, 1951, and from
each and every part thereof, and having presented their
assignment of errors and prayer for reversal and their
statements as to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
the United States on appeal pursuant to the statutes and
252
rules of the Supreme Court of the United States in such
cases made and provided,
Now, therefore, it is hereby ordered that said appeal
be and the same is hereby allowed as prayed for.
It is further ordered that the amount of the appeal
bond be and the same is hereby fixed in the sum of $500
with good and sufficient surety, and shall be conditioned
as may be required by law.
It is further ordered that citation shall issue in accord
ance with law.
Walter A. Huxman, U. S. Circuit Judge.
Dated: October 1, 1951.
[fol. 405] Citation in usual form showing service on Les
ter M. Goodell and George Brewster omitted in printing.
[ fo l . 406] N ote ke Cost B ond
Cost bond in the sum of $500.00, with Fidelity & Deposit
Company of Maryland, as surety, was approved by the
Clerk and Filed October 1, 1951.
[fols. 407-408] Statement required by Paragraph 2, Rule
12 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States
(omitted in printing).
[fols. 409-411] Acknowledgment of service (omitted in
printing).
[fols. 412-413] P kaecipe— Filed October 5, 1951 (omitted
in printing).
253
[ fo l . 414] I n U n ited S tates. D istrict ' C ourt
Order E xten din g T im e to F ile an d D ocket R ecord on
A ppeal in t h e S uprem e C ourt op t h e U n ited S tates—
Entered November 5, 1951
Now, on this 5 day of November, 1951, upon the applica
tion of Charles S. Scott, one of the attorneys for the plain
tiffs., and for good cause shown,
It is hereby ordered that the time within which to file and
docket the record on appeal in above action in the Supreme
Court of the United States be and it is hereby extended
twenty days from November 9, 1951.
Walter A. Huxman, United States Circuit Judge.
[fol. 415] Clerk’s Certificate to foregoing transcript
omitted in printing.
[fols. 416-417] I n th e S uprem e C ourt oe t h e U nited
S tates, O ctober T erm , 1951, No. 436
[Title omitted]
S tatem en t op P oints to B e R elied U pon an d D esignation
op P arts of R ecord to B e P rinted-— Filed November
27, 1951
A. Appellants adopt for their statement of points upon
which they intend to rely in their appeal to this Court the
points contained in their Assignment of Errors heretofore
filed.
B. Appellants designate the entire record, as filed in
the above-entitled case, for printing by the Clerk of this
Court.
Robert L. Carter, Counsel for Appellants.
[File endorsement omitted.]
[fol. 418] S uprem e , C ourt oe th e . U n ited S tates
No. 436, O ctober T erm , 1951
O rder N oting P robable. J urisdiction—June 9, 1952
The statement of jurisdiction in this case having been
submitted and considered by the Court, probable jurisdic
tion is noted.
(2734)
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