Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education Reply Brief of Appellants Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education
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May 11, 2000

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education Reply Brief of Appellants Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 2000. 36387b90-c69a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/6a872e89-dcf6-4684-8a82-2859f8b39f42/belk-v-charlotte-mecklenburg-board-of-education-reply-brief-of-appellants-charlotte-mecklenburg-board-of-education. Accessed June 13, 2025.
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT Nos. 9 9 -2 3 8 9 , 9 9 -2 3 9 1 , 0 0 -1 0 9 8 and 0 0 -1 4 3 2 TERRY BELK, e t ah , Plaintiffs-A ppellants, and WILLIAM CAPACCHIONE, MICHAEL P. GRANT, e t ah , Plaintiff-Intervenors-A ppellees, v. THE CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION, e t ah , De fe ndants-A ppellants. WILLIAM CAPACCHIONE, MICHAEL GRANT, e t ah , Plaintiff-Intervenors-A ppellees, and TERRY BELK, e t ah , Plaintiffs-A ppellants, v. THE CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION, e t ah , D efendants-A ppellants. Appeal From the U nited S ta te s D istrict Court for th e W estern D istrict o f North Carolina REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION, E T AL. Allen R. Snyder Maree Sneed John W. Borkowski HOGAN 8& HARTSON L.L.P. 555 Thirteenth Street, N.W. W ashington, DC 20004 (202) 637-5741 Dated: May 11, 2000 Jam es G. Middlebrooks Irving M. Brenner Amy Rickner Langdon SMITH HELMS MULLISS 86 MOORE, L.L.P. 201 N. Tryon Street Charlotte, NC 28202 (704) 343-2051 Leslie W inner General Counsel Charlotte-M ecklenburg Board of Education Post Office Box 30035 Charlotte, NC 28230-0035 (704) 343-6275 Counsel for Appellants Charlotte-M ecklenburg Board of Education, et al. 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................................. i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES....................................................................................................... ii ARGUMENT.................................................................................................................................1 I. APPELLEES’ BRIEF CONTAINS NUMEROUS MISREPRESENTATIONS ..................................................................................................................................................................2 II. CMS IS NOT UNITARY........................................................................................... 9 III. WHILE CMS WAS STILL OPERATING PURSUANT TO A DESEGREGATION DECREE, ITS MAGNET PLAN WAS LAWFUL..... 10 IV. THE INJUNCTION WAS UNNECESSARY BECAUSE CMS DID NOT PROPOSE TO CONTINUE ITS MAGNET PLAN...........................................19 V. THE INJUNCTION IS OVERBROAD............................................................... 22 VI. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HARSHLY SANCTIONING THE SCHOOL DISTRICT.....................................................27 VII. APPELLEES ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS’ F E E S .................... 28 CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................................... 32 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE r TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES: Arthur v. Nyquist, 473 F.Supp. 830 (W.D.N.Y. 1979)......................................... 4 Associated Gen. Contractors o f Cal. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 616 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1061 (1980)..................... 12,25 Brock u. R.J. Auto Parts and Service, Inc., 864 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1988).................................................................................................................... 27 Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Sch., 57 F. Supp. 2d 228 (W.D.N.C. 1999).................................................................................................. passim Coalition for Econ. Equity v. NAACP, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997).................. 12,25 Columbus Bd. ofEduc. u. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).................................................. 25,26 Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999), cert, denied, 120 S,Ct. 1420 (2000).................................................. 11,24 Estes u. Metropolitan Branches o f Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437 (1980)......... 26 Hampton u. Jefferson County Bd. ofEduc., 72 F.Supp. 2d 753 (W.D. Ky. 1999)............................................................................................................. 11,17,19 Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 1998).............. 11 Hunter v. Regents ofUniv. o f Cal., 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999).................... 27 Jackson v. Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, 49 F.R.D. 134 (N.D. W.Va. 1970).................................................................................................................... 27 Jenkins v. Missouri, 942 F.2d 487, 493 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 967 (1991)................................................................................................... 15 Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 659 F.Supp. 363 (E.D.Ark. 1987)............................................................................ 16 Martin v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 475 F.Supp. 1318 (W.D.N.C. 1979), affid, 626 F.2d 1165 (4* Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981)......................................................................................... 4,17,18 Martin u. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 626 F.2d 1165 (4th Cir. 1980).................................................................................................................... 24 Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood ofR.R. Signalmen, 164 F.3d 847 (4th Cir. 1998)...................................................................................................... 19,21 ii Paradise v. United States, 480 U.S. 149 (1986).................................................. 10 Regents ofUniv. o f Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) .................................... 26 S-l and S-2 v. State Bd. ofEduc., 21 F.3d 49 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 876 (1994)........................................................................................... 31 Shaw v. Hunt, 154 F.3d 161 (4* Cir. 1998)........................................................ 30 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 311 F.Supp 265 (W.D.N.C. 1970).................................................................................................. 3,13,17 Swann u . Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)....................... passim Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 379 F.Supp. 1102 (W.D.N.C. 1974).................................................................................................. 14,16,18 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 501 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1974)..................................................................................................................... 14 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 67 F.R.D. 648 (W.D.N.C. 1975).................................................................................................. 7 Texas u. Lesage, 120 S.Ct. 467 (1999)................................................................................... 29,30 Tuttle u. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1552 (2000)........................................................................... 7,23,26 United States v. Hunter, 459 F. 2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972) ........................................................................................................... 22 United States u. Pittman, 808 F.2d 385 (5* Cir. 1987) ............................................. 4 United States u. State of Miss., 622 F.Supp. 622 (S.D.Miss. 1985), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. United States u. Pittman, 808 F.2d 385 (5‘h Cir. 1987).............................................................................................. 4 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) ...................................................... 22 Vaughns v. Board ofEduc. of Prince George’s County, 980 F.Supp. 834 (D.Md. 1997)........................................................................................................ 15 Vaughns v. Board ofEduc. of Prince George’s County, 758 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1985)...................................................................................................... 18 Washington u. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982)............................ 24,25,26 Wessman u. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998).............................................. 11 Wilson u. Office o f Civilian Health, 65 F.3d 361 (4th Cir. 1995) ............................ 7 Wilson v. Volkswagen o f Am., Inc., 561 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1997)..................... 27 Wirtz u. B.A.C. Steel Prods. Inc., 312 F.2d 14 (4th Cir. 1963)............................ 27 IV ARGUMENT The C harlotte-M ecklenburg Board of E ducation (“CMS” or the “School D istrict”) is no t yet un ita ry because it h a s ne ither fully com plied w ith the desegregation orders nor rem edied the vestiges of segregation to the ex ten t practicable. If CMS were un itary , full local control shou ld be re tu rn e d to the elected School Board, and Judge Potter’s in junction im properly im pinges on th a t au thority . Try as they might, Appellees can n o t tw ist th is case into a story of the collusive u se of d iscrim inatory racial q u o tas in the face of increasing residential segregation caused by dem ographic change. Therefore, to defend the erroneous decision below, they d isregard and d isto rt the record an d controlling au thority . The h e a rt of the ac tual d ispu te ab o u t u n ita ry s ta tu s in th is case is w hether the perpetuation of racial inequities, m any con trary to explicit cou rt orders, is allowed. As the Sw ann A ppellants m ake clear, viewed u n d e r the proper legal s tan d ard , the h istorical racial u n fa irn ess in a re a s su c h as s tu d en t assignm ent, the construction of new facilities, and the allocation of educational opportun ities prevents the School D istrict from yet being un ita ry . See Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants (filed April 15, 2000) (“Sw ann Reply B rief’) The o ther m ajor issue in th is case is the im propriety of the lower c o u rt’s sweeping in junction, which is not only baseless, b u t also u n n ecessa ry and overbroad: CMS did not violate the C onstitu tion; it did no t propose to continue 1 the m agnet adm issions procedures rejected by the d istric t court; an d it should no t be prohibited from considering any conceivable, narrow ly tailored, race conscious m eans of p u rsu ing compelling educational in te res ts in the fu ture. For these reasons and those se t forth in the Brief of A ppellants C harlotte-M ecklenburg Board of E ducation , et al. (filed F eb ruary 22, 2000) (“CMS B rief’), the Brief of Plaintiffs-A ppellants (filed F ebruary 1, 2000) (“Sw ann B rief’), and the Sw ann Reply Brief, the decision below shou ld be reversed. I. APPELLEES’ BRIEF CONTAINS NUMEROUS MISREPRESENTATIONS Appellees repeatedly m isrep resen t the record below, relevan t cou rt decisions, and even CMS’ plainly a rticu la ted positions. While space co n stra in ts m ake it im possible to correct all of the d isto rtions in A ppellees’ 136-page brief, some of the m ost obvious an d ou trageous are noted here. F irst, Appellees m ake false factual rep resen ta tions th a t are no t supported by the record, and often they provide no record c ita tions a t all. On the first page of their brief, Appellees incorrectly claim th a t “several CMS experts and its form er su p erin ten d en t effectively concluded the school system w as u n ita ry m any years before th is litigation e n su ed .” A ppellees’ Brief a t 3. The only “CMS expert” to whom Appellees d irect the C ourt is Dr. M ichael Stolee. Stolee, however, issued a report in 1992 th a t noted su b s ta n tia l racial inequities in CMS’ s tu d en t assignm en t p rac tices a t th a t tim e. See DX 108 a t 3- - 2 - 9. \ / Moreover, Dr. Stolee testified w ithout con trad iction th a t he never conducted a un ita ry s ta tu s analysis in CMS. Tr. 5 /2 5 :8 4 -8 6 (Stolee). As the d istric t co u rt found, Stolee also recognized th a t CMS w as still u n d e r court order an d recom m ended th a t the School D istrict seek jud ic ia l approval of any changes to its s tu d en t assignm en t plan. 57 F. Supp. 2d 228, 239 (W.D.N.C. 1999) (citing DX 108 a t 9). U ndisputed evidence show ed th a t Stolee also inform ed th en -S uperin tenden t Jo h n M urphy th a t CMS had racially identifiable faculties, DX 71; Tr. 5 /2 5 :8 6 -8 8 (Stolee), con trary to explicit co u rt orders. Sw ann, 311 F.Supp. 265, 268-69 (W.D.N.C. 1970). In addition , Appellees rely on the ir w itness Dr. M urphy’s testim ony th a t he believed CMS to be un itary , b u t it is u n d isp u ted th a t M urphy never even asked Dr. Stolee or anyone else to do a u n ita ry s ta tu s analysis. Tr. 4 /2 6 :2 2 7 (Murphy); Post-Trial Brief a t 7 6 n .4 1 . He never p resen ted the u n ita ry s ta tu s issue to the Board. Tr. 4 /2 6 :3 1 , 227 (Murphy). He w as shocked by racial inequities in CMS, id. a t 92- 94, and conceded th a t more could be done to correct the rem ain ing racial d isparities. Tr. 4 /2 6 :2 2 8 (Murphy). See also Tr. 5 /3 :1 8 3 (Schiller). One of the principal concerns noted in Dr. Stolee’s repo rt w as the inequitable tran spo rta tion bu rden on b lack s tu d en ts . DX 108 a t 3-6. Appellees sim ply m isrepresen t the facts in a ttem pting to suggest th a t th is problem never existed. See Appellees’ Brief a t 21. Despite the d istric t c o u rt’s 1 / C itations to exhibits, hearing tran scrip ts , and pleadings follow the sam e form at u sed in CMS’ opening brief. See CMS Brief a t 5-7 n. 1-3. -3- findings to the contrary in 1979, 2 / an d S tolee’s observations in 1992, see DX 108 a t 3-6, Appellees brazenly claim th a t the tran sp o rta tio n b u rd en on black an d w hite s tu d e n ts “from 1974 to 1992” w as “substan tia lly equal.” Appellees’ Brief a t 21. The only alleged suppo rt for th is p a te n t falsehood is the vague asse rtio n by a single w itness th a t “white an d black s tu d e n ts did sh a re th a t b u rd en .” Tr. 4 /2 2 :3 6 (Bynum). However, m any w itnesses testified w ithout contrad iction th a t the bu rden w as no t sh a red a t all fairly. See Proposed F indings a t 29-34, 40-51. Appellees’ trea tm en t of con tem porary tran sp o rta tio n sta tis tics is even more d isingenuous. They claim th a t “w hites generally travel . . . in higher num bers th a n b lack s tu d e n ts for desegregation.” A ppellees’ Brief a t 59. Rem arkably, they cite in su p p o rt of th is claim the c o u rt’s findings th a t 58% of s tu d en ts tran sp o rted for desegregation pu rposes in 1998-99 were black. 57 F. Supp. 2d a t 253. The m agnitude of Appellees’ d isto rtion of the record here is amplified by the fact th a t even the d istric t c o u rt’s 58% figure vastly u n d e rs ta te s the d isproportionate b u rd en on black s tu d en ts . T hat percentage im properly includes voluntary tran sfe rs u n d er the m agnet program (which are d isproportionately white). 3 / More th a n 80% of 2 / Martin v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board o f Education, 475 F .Supp. 1318, 1338-40 (W.D.N.C. 1979), a ff’d, 626 F.2d 1165 (4th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981) 3 / See United S ta tes v. State o f M ississippi, 622 F .Supp. 622, 627 (S.D.Miss. 1985) (voluntary transfers “canno t be considered a b u rd en ”), reu’d on other grounds su b nom. United S ta tes v. Pittman, 808 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1987); Arthur v. Nyquist, 473 F.Supp. 830, 840 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (burdens are inequitable w hen the busing was genuinely voluntary for w hites b u t no t for blacks). -4- CMS s tu d e n ts mandatorily tran sp o rted in p a rt for desegregation pu rposes in 1998-99 were black. See Post-Trial Brief a t 15-16. W ithout any record support, Appellees also claim th a t CMS h as “reflied] increasingly on stric t racial q u o tas ,” p u rsu e d a “perm anen t, ever-accelerating racial quo ta system ” and “continually ex p an d ed ] [the] role race played in s tu d e n t assignm en t.” Appellees’ Brief a t 9. To the con trary , the expansion of the m agnet p lan in 1992 moved CMS away from m andato ry a ssignm en ts for desegregation an d tow ard a m ore volun tary approach . Moreover, as d iscussed below, the m an n e r in w hich race w as considered in m aking assignm en ts to m agnet schools w as the sam e in the expanded program as in 1970s and 1980s. See infra Section IV. U nfortunately, because key com ponen ts of the p lan developed u n d e r Dr. M urphy were never im plem ented, see, e.g., Post-Trial Brief a t 17-19 (failure to co n stru c t m idpoint schools), CMS actually operated a growing n u m b er of racially identifiable schools in the 1990s. Id. a t 12-13. B ecause the Sw ann Plaintiffs foresaw su ch adverse consequences, they actively opposed the expanded m agnet plan. See Sw ann Reply Brief a t 26-28. Therefore, it is ironic th a t Appellees g roundlessly claim th a t there w as “collusion” betw een CMS and the S w a n n Plaintiffs. See A ppellees’ Brief a t 3. Appellees also m ake the false asse rtion th a t “the only cau se for any school’s racial im balance w as dem ographic change .” A ppellees’ Brief a t 11. To the contrary , the dem ographic changes in C harlo tte have m ade its residential population more racially integrated, 57 F .Supp. 2d a t 237, an d ind ispu tab ly m ade desegregation easier. Post-Trial Brief a t 26-30; Tr. 6 / 11:5 (Lord); Tr. -5- 4 /1 9 :1 3 7 -3 8 , 226 (Clark). Moreover, the record show s th a t CMS’ actions and inactions were m ajor con tribu to rs to the growing n u m b er of racially identifiable schools in the early 1990s. See, e.g., Post-Trial Brief a t 28-30; Proposed Findings a t UK 91-104; Sw ann Reply Brief a t 17-20. The racial im balances in m any schools were caused in p a rt by s tu d e n t a ssignm en t changes su ch a s (1) assigning additional predom inantly b lack satellites to schools th a t were already racially balanced, causing them to becom e im balanced; (2) estab lish ing “feeder” p a tte rn s for m iddle and high schools th a t grouped together racially im balanced elem entary schools, creating racially im balanced secondary schools; and (3) depairing schools w ithout im plem enting any alternative stra tegy to prevent their resegregation. Tr. 6 /9 :1 1 1 -1 3 , 135-39 (Foster); Tr. 6 /1 1 :4 9 -5 2 , 131-32 (Lord). As a resu lt, a s Appellees’ dem ographer adm itted , som e schools becam e predom inantly “black w hen the neighborhoods were still b a lan ced .” Tr. 4 /1 9 :2 1 8 (Clark). In addition, o ther schools th a t have alw ays been located in relatively segregated neighborhoods (areas w hich did no t experience significant change in the ir racial dem ographics) h ad racially balanced s tu d e n t enrollm ents in the 1970s an d 1980s b u t were allowed to becom e racially identifiable in the 1990s. See, e.g., Tr. 6 /9 :1 0 6 , 135-39 (Foster); Tr. 6 /1 1 :8 5 -8 6 (Lord); Proposed Findings 92-93, 103. Second, Appellees are willing no t only to d isto rt the record below b u t also to m isrep resen t controlling legal au tho rities. For exam ple, Appellees claim th a t the “1970 order w as the only desegregation decree ever issued in the Sw ann case .” Appellees’ Brief a t 7. B ut the co u rt issued n u m ero u s o th er o rders and - 6 - em phasized in 1975 th a t there were “m any o rders of con tinu ing effect.” 67 F.R.D. 648, 649 (W.D.N.C. 1975). See also infra Section III. Appellees also a ttem p t to confuse the s ta n d a rd of review to be applied in analyzing the d istric t c o u rt’s in junction , suggesting th a t th e “abuse-of- d iscretion” s tan d ard som ehow lessens de novo review of legal issu e s an d differs in pe rm an en t an d tem porary in junction contexts. See A ppellees’ Brief a t 40- 41. In fact, th is C ourt h as clearly explained th a t “[w]hat we m ean w hen we say th a t a co u rt abused its discretion, is m erely th a t we th in k th a t [it] m ade a m istake. In m aking th a t assessm en t, we review the d is tric t c o u rt’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” Wilson v. Office o f Civilian Health, 65 F.3d 361, 363-64 (4th Cir. 1995) (in ternal c ita tions omitted). Moreover, while Appellees m istakenly claim th is C ourt ab an d o n ed th is s tan d ard in Tuttle v. Arlington County School Board, 195 F .3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999), cert, denied, 120 S.Ct. 1552 (2000), see Appellees’ Brief a t 41, the C ourt in fact se t aside the in junction issued there. Third, Appellees not only tw ist the facts and the law, b u t also m isrep resen t the School D istrict’s position on key issues. Appellees, for exam ple, a sse r t th a t CMS “repeatedly acknow ledged a t trial th a t [its] schools are racially balanced to the fullest ex ten t p rac ticab le ,” A ppellees’ Brief a t 49-50, b u t the only citation offered in suppo rt of th is rid iculous proposition is a single docum ent offered by Appellees indicating th a t CMS’ 1998-99 s tu d e n t assignm en t p lan balanced four competing considerations (diversity, stability, utilization, and proximity) “to the ex ten t p rac ticab le ,” P laintiff-Intervenors’ -7- Index a t 124-25 (filed Ju ly 20, 1999) (“P-I Index”) (citing PIX 17). CMS’ superin tenden t, Board chair, staff and experts all testified w ithou t equivocation th a t m ore could practicably be done to desegregate its schools. See, e.g., CMS Brief a t 13-15; Post-Trial Brief a t 31-33; DX1. Appellees also m ake inconsis ten t an d incorrect c laim s bo th th a t CMS does no t w an t to be un itary , see A ppellees’ Brief a t 3, an d th a t the School D istrict does no t con test u n ita ry s ta tu s on appeal. Id. a t 42. In fact, CMS developed a p lan to achieve u n ita ry s ta tu s in a reasonable tim e, see, e.g., DX 1, and plainly h a s recognized th a t it h a s no t yet e lim inated the vestiges of segregation to the extent practicable. See CMS Brief a t 13-17. Finally, Appellees claim incorrectly th a t “CMS ap p aren tly concedes th a t [the d istric t c o u rt’s] in junction w as proper, a ssu m in g its finding of p a s t equal protection violations w as proper.” Appellees’ Brief a t 98. This rem arkable assertion ignores the School D istrict’s com pelling a rg u m en ts th a t, even if CMS’ m agnet school p ractices had been unco n stitu tio n a l, the in junc tion nevertheless would have been unnecessa ry — because CMS did not propose to con tinue its m agnet p lan — and overbroad — because it p rohib ited any fu tu re narrow ly- tailored, race-conscious actions by the Board. See CMS Brief a t 26-32; Accord infra a t Sections IV-V. In short, like a funhouse m irror, the A ppellees’ Brief c an n o t be relied upon for an accu ra te reflection of the record below, the governing law, or the issues a t stake in th is case. - 8 - II. CMS IS NOT UNITARY As the Sw ann A ppellants ably dem onstra te , Appellees can n o t successfully defend the d istric t c o u rt’s erroneous ruling th a t CMS is unitary . See Sw ann Reply Brief. The principal reaso n s th a t the School D istrict is not un ita ry relate to the persisten t inequities flowing from the failure to comply fully w ith the Sw ann orders. See Post-Trial Brief a t 11-73. For exam ple, m any of the sam e issues noted by the d istric t co u rt in Martin still have no t been dealt with adequately. Id. a t 6-26. The cu rre n t School D istrict leadersh ip , however, is com m itted to addressing these problem s, including the failure to co n stru c t new facilities where they can readily serve bo th races an d the rela ted inequities in tran sp o rta tio n bu rdens and d isparities in facilities quality. Id. a t 31-33, 50. CMS is also reform ing o ther practices, su ch a s tracking, th a t con tribu te to the pe rs is ten t achievem ent gap betw een its b lack an d white s tu d en ts . Id. a t 39, 69-71. Moreover, these issues are integrally in terre la ted w ith s tu d e n t assignm ent, because a re tu rn to racially isolated schools w ould only exacerbate the p ers is ten t racial inequities. Id. a t 71-74. Finally, the dem ographic changes th a t have m ade C harlo tte’s residential population larger an d more racially integrated have nothing a t all to do w ith m ost of these issu es an d ru n counter to the tren d of increasing racial im balance in s tu d e n t enrollm ents. Id. a t 26- 30. Therefore, the d istric t court erred in concluding th a t the School D istrict is un itary . 4 / 4 / Ju d g e Potter’s conclusions w ith respec t to CMS’ experts Dr. William Trent, Dr. Robert Peterkin, Dr. Dwayne G ardner, Dr. Gordon Foster and Dr. Rosylyn Mickelson are clearly erroneous. A fair reading of their reports and -9- III. WHILE CMS WAS STILL OPERATING PURSUANT TO A DESEGREGATION DECREE, ITS MAGNET PLAN WAS LAWFUL The d istric t court erred in applying stric t sc ru tiny to the School D istric t’s good faith effort to comply w ith the Stuann o rders th rough the operation of m agnet schools and in aw arding dam ages an d injunctive relief on th a t basis. Appellees seek to defend the d istric t c o u rt’s analysis of CMS’ m agnet school adm issions p ractices by claim ing on the one h an d th a t s tric t sc ru tin y applies to efforts to im plem ent court-ordered desegregation requ irem en ts , see Appellees’ Brief a t 81-83, 88-89, and on the o ther h an d th a t CMS’ m agnet schools were no t a good faith effort to comply w ith the S w ann o rders. Id. a t 84-88, 89-91. Their first a rgum ent is incorrect as a m atte r of law, an d their second argum en t res ts on m isrep resen ta tions of bo th the S w a n n o rders and the record below. First, Appellees m istakenly claim th a t the Suprem e C ourt in Paradise v. United States, 480 U.S. 149 (1986), overruled decades of school desegregation ju risp ru d en ce , see CMS Brief a t 17-20, and held th a t stric t sc ru tin y applies to court-ordered racial classifications. Appellees’ Brief a t 82, 88. The C ourt did not so hold, expressly reserving th a t issue, 480 U.S. a t 167, a n d it h a s never held th a t stric t scru tiny applies to desegregation rem edies. Indeed, as Ju s tice testim ony does no t suppo rt the d istric t c o u rt’s conclusions, b u t d em onstra tes the lengths to which the court w ent in a ttem pting to escape the weight of the evidence. See DX 10, DX 11, DX 6, DX 7, DX 13, DX 13A, DX 5 an d DX 8. The court also clearly erred in u tterly ignoring the testim ony an d expert report of Dr. D ennis Lord, DX 12, which d ism antles the dem ographic analysis of Dr. William Clark, on which Appellees and the co u rt below erroneously relied. See, e.g., Proposed Findings a t ^ 9 7 -1 0 4 . - 10 - Stevens no ted in his concurring opinion in Paradise, “[t]he cen tra l them e” of the C ourt’s opinion in Sw ann w as “th a t race-conscious rem edies are obviously required to rem edy racially d iscrim inatory actions by the S ta te .” Id. a t 189 (citing Sw ann, 402 U.S. 1 (1971)). Therefore, d istric t co u rts have “broad and flexible au tho rity to rem edy the w rongs resu lting from [such] v io la tion^].” Id. a t 190. Today, the governing s tan d ard in school desegregation cases rem ains clear: W hen a school board ac ts p u rsu a n t to a con tinu ing desegregation decree, it “possesses considerable discretion to enac t s tu d e n t assignm en t policies to m eet its continuing obligations u n d e r the D ecree.” H am pton v. Jefferson County Bd. o fE duc., 72 F .Supp. 2d 753, 777 (W.D. Ky. 1999). See also CMS Brief a t 17-19. Appellees also canno t rely on th is C o u rt’s decisions in Tuttle and Eisenberg to suppo rt the rem arkable proposition th a t stric t sc ru tiny should apply to court-ordered desegregation rem edies. See A ppellees’ Brief a t 82. Neither of those cases involved the im plem entation of desegregation rem edies, because n e ither school system w as u n d e r co u rt order. O ther cases cited by the Appellees, su ch as W essm an v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998), are inapposite for the sam e reason. Even the Ninth C ircuit’s anom alous decision in Ho u. San Francisco Unified School District, 147 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 1998), does no t su p p o rt the application of stric t scru tiny here. In Ho, the school d istric t w as operating p u rsu a n t to a consen t decree ra th e r th a n a rem edial order en tered after findings of liability. Moreover, the panel in Ho ignored the N inth C ircu it’s prior - 11 - teach ing th a t “[u]nlike racial preference program s, [even voluntary] school desegregation program s are not inherently invidious, do no t w ork wholly to the benefit of certain m em bers of one group and correspondingly to the harm of certain m em bers of a n o th e r group, and do no t deprive citizens of righ ts .” Coalition fo r Econ. Equity v. NAACP, 122 F.3d 692, 708 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting A ssociated Gen. Contractors o f Cal. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 616 F.2d 1381, 1387 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1061 (1980)). B ecause of th is fundam en ta l difference betw een school desegregation and o th er racial classifications and because of the longstanding trad ition of local control of public education , the Suprem e C ourt h a s never abandoned its p recedents requiring deference to school au tho rities in im plem enting court-o rdered desegregation rem edies. See CMS Brief a t 17-21. A pparently recognizing the unp receden ted n a tu re of the d istric t c o u rt’s application of stric t scru tiny to the School B oard’s efforts to com ply w ith court- ordered desegregation requirem ents, Appellees now m ake the baseless claim th a t CMS’ m agnet school program “w as no t designed to erad ica te vestiges of segregation.” Appellees’ Brief a t 89. The d istric t cou rt itself, however, found th a t in im plem enting its m agnet p rocedures “the school system w as acting to fu rth er a compelling governm ental in terest, i.e., rem edying th e effects of p a s t racial d iscrim ination .” Capacchione, 57 F .S upp 2d a t 289. Moreover, before the decision below, Appellees them selves adm itted th a t the m agnet p lan w as in tended “to comply with the C ourt’s O rder.” P-I Index a t ^ 98 (citing - 12 - M urphy). 5 / Appellees’ s tu d e n t assignm en t expert also testified on direct exam ination th a t “race is an integral p a rt . . . of m agnet schools, of runn ing lotteries for m agnet schools . . . because th a t ’s the only w a y you can meet the court order.” Tr. 4 /2 9 :2 3 (Armor) (em phasis added). See also Tr. 4 /1 9 :6 8 -6 9 (Clark); CMS Brief a t 20-21. Therefore, the frivolous allegation th a t “no o ther school system in history h as been found to have m an ipu la ted desegregation orders in a s b la tan t a m an n er,” Appellees’ Brief a t 92, is a s d isingenuous as it is incorrect. In th is C ourt, Appellees sim ply ignore the Sw ann o rders upon which their own expert relied a t trial. For exam ple, while Appellees quote the d istric t c o u rt’s 1969 s ta tem en t th a t it did “no t feel like it h a s the pow er” to order every school to have a 70-30 black-w hite ratio, Appellees’ Brief a t 7 n .7 , they fail to acknowledge th a t the cou rt subsequen tly ordered th a t “efforts shou ld be m ade to reach a 71-29 ratio . . . so th a t there will be no basis for con tend ing th a t one school is racially different from the o thers .” 311 F .Supp. a t 267-68. In a later order, the co u rt directed CMS to en su re th a t “pupils of all g rades be assigned in su ch a way th a t as nearly as practicable the various schools at various grade levels have about the sam e proportion o f black and w hite s tu d e n ts .” Id. a t 268 (em phasis added). This order was affirm ed by the Suprem e C ourt, which approved the “use m ade of m athem atical ra tio s” as “a s ta rtin g po in t” for s tu d e n t assignm en ts. 402 U.S. a t 25. This requ irem ent clearly applies to 5 / See also id. a t 107 (citing Schiller testim ony); Tr. 5 /3 :2 1 (Schiller) (new plan “had the sam e objectives as the one it w as going to replace, m ain tain ing -13- m agnet schools: This C ourt itself h a s recognized th a t in sim ilar program s w ith lim ited capacity, such as program s for “exceptionally ta len ted ch ild ren ,” th is directive m ay require adm issions p rocedures th a t “necessarily exclude[ ] some . . . s tu d e n ts .” 501 F.2d 383, 384 (4th Cir. 1974) (affirming in junction aga in st s ta te court action by white p a ren ts challenging adm iss ions procedures). In 1974, the d istric t cou rt reaffirm ed its earlier s tu d e n t a ssig n m en t orders, 379 F.Supp. 1102, 1105, and approved a new p lan th a t included “optional” or m agnet schools. Id. a t 1103. This order expressly required CMS to en su re th a t m agnet schools have “ab o u t or above 20% black s tu d e n ts ,” id. a t 1104, th a t is, no less th an 15 percentage po in ts below 35% black, the districtw ide enrollm ent a t the time. The cou rt also ordered CMS to m onitor and a d ju s t school assignm ents to p revent adverse tren d s in th e ir “racial m ake u p .” Id. a t 1104, 1107. The m anner in w hich CMS adm itted s tu d e n ts to its m agnet schools w as fully con sis ten t with these o rders and not rigid or inflexible. J u s t a s the Sw ann o rders required, the School D istrict u sed the districtw ide w hite-black ratio of 60-40 as “a sta rting poin t,” 402 U.S. a t 25, and th en im plem ented rec ru itm en t and adm issions p rocedures to try to m eet th a t goal. See CMS Brief a t 20. Significant variance from th a t initial goal could an d did occur because, inter alia, different proportions of w hite an d b lack s tu d e n ts reenrolled each year, different num bers of white and b lack s tu d e n ts h ad siblings who the court o rder”). -14- were autom atically adm itted , and different n u m b ers of w hite an d black s tu d e n ts applied. Tr. 4 /2 8 :4 6 -4 8 (Wells). In 1998-99, no t a single m agnet school ended u p w ith an enrollm ent of 6 0 /4 0 : R ather, the b lack percentage varied from 7% to 82%. Id. a t 37-38. This m agnet adm issions process w as co n sis ten t over tim e, an d the court below clearly erred in concluding, w ithout any supporting evidence, th a t “the way th a t CMS’ m agnet program u se s race in its adm issions p rocess is significantly different from any assignm en t policy ordered or approved of in Sw ann.” 57 F.Supp. 2d a t 286. First, the record m akes c lear th a t “optional” schools an d “m agnet” schools are the sam e thing. See CMS Brief a t 21. For exam ple, a CMS letter to the D epartm ent of E ducation , from w hich Appellees repeatedly offer selective quotations, see, e.g., Appellees’ Brief a t 17, 84 n .44 , m akes clear th a t in 1974 the court approved “optional schools (including w hat we now refer to as ‘m agnet schools’).” See PIX 4 a t CM 209603. Indeed, even Appellee G ran t adm itted th a t in 1986 h is son h ad a ttended a m agnet school, and “they called them optional” schools a t the time. Tr. 4 /2 3 :5 2 , 54. The m agnet schools of the 1970s an d 1980s also adm itted s tu d e n ts th rough race-conscious lotteries of the type u sed by CMS. 6 / The court 6 / Moreover, racial guidelines of the kind u sed by CMS are ind ispu tab ly com m onplace for m agnet schools in school system s u n d e r c o u rt order. See CMS Brief a t 20-21. See also Jenk ins v. Missouri, 942 F .2d 487, 493 (8th Cir.) (sum m arily rejecting argum ents aga in st racial quo tas in m agnet school adm issions), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 967 (1991); Vaughns v. Board o f Educ. o f Prince George’s County, 980 F.Supp. 834, 838 (D.Md. 1997) (“G uidelines aim ing a t racial balance have had to be adopted because, in th e ir absence, applications could well be skewed in favor of one race or an o th e r and the -15- approved a p lan th a t would m ake optional schools a t least 20% black, 379 F .Supp. a t 1104, and also would designate the “m axim um num bers o f s tu d en ts th a t m ay be draw n from each o ther school a tten d an ce area , by race. ” Id. a t 1108 (em phasis added). In 1975, CMS reported to the co u rt th a t it was controlling not ju s t adm issions b u t also the ac tu a l en ro llm ents a t optional schools w ithin a p lus-o r-m inus 8% range, u sing a race-conscious lottery. PIX 24 a t CM 072967-75. D uring the 1980s, the School D istric t’s policy for optional schools provided th a t “[a] lottery will be conducted by grade of all b lack and white s tu d e n ts separately u sing the system w ide average racial ra tio .” DX 204 a t 7. Form er S uperin tenden t M urphy, testifying for the Appellees, also confirm ed th a t in 1991 the optional or m agnet p rogram s “were operating on the basis of a lottery with two lists, broken down racially” and u sed “a 6 0 /4 0 white to b lack m ix,” and these “sam e guidelines” were con tinued in the 1992 m agnet plan. Tr. 4 /2 6 :1 4 7 -4 8 (Murphy). T hus the record m akes c lear tha t: (1) the cou rt ordered CMS to consider race in s tu d e n t assignm en t for desegregation purposes; (2) the d istric t court approved m agnet schools in 1974 w ith racial controls on adm issions; (3) the court w as inform ed of the basic lottery procedures in 1975; and (4) th a t process did no t change significantly from 1974 un til 1999. 7 / concept of the m agnet would be defeated."); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 659 F .Supp. 363, 365, 371 (E.D.Ark. 1987) ("[a] 11 m agnet schools shall have a s tu d e n t population w hich is fifty percen t (50%) b lack and fifty percen t (50%) non-black"). 7 / Im m ediately following the decision below, CMS im plem ented race-blind p rocedures for both m agnet school adm issions and s tu d e n t tran sfe rs , and -16- In ad ju sting the adm issions target over tim e so th a t “a s nearly as p racticab le” its m agnets would have “the sam e proportion of b lack and white s tu d e n ts ,” 311 F.Supp. a t 268, and expanding the u se of m agnet schools in the 1990s, CMS did no t exceed the “m axim um leeway” th a t the d is tric t cou rt had given it u n d e r the Sw ann orders. Martin, 475 F .Supp. a t 1341. A nother d istric t co u rt recently found th a t a school d istric t th a t, like CMS, w as no longer u n d e r active judicial supervision b u t w as sub ject to an ongoing desegregation decree h ad acted lawfully p u rsu a n t to th a t decree w hen it changed its desegregation p lan w ithout cou rt approval. Hampton, 72 F .Supp. 2d a t 767, 777. “B ecause the B oard’s S tu d en t A ssignm ent Plan and its racial guidelines . . . served the essen tia l purpose of com plying w ith the . . . Decree, the C ourt concludes th a t the Decree p ro tects these policies from a tta c k .” Id. a t 777. Appellees’ claim on appeal th a t CMS expanded its u se of m agnet schools to respond to dem ographic changes is both incorrect and irrelevant. See Appellees’ Brief a t 84. First, it is ind ispu tab le th a t the increasing residential in tegration in M ecklenburg C ounty found by the d istric t court, 57 F .Supp. 2d a t 237, h a s m ade desegregation easier. Post-Trial Brief a t 26-30; Tr. 4 / 19:137- 38, 226 (Clark); Tr. 6 / 11:5 (Lord). Second, the d istric t co u rt itself found th a t the School D istrict adopted its 1992 m agnet p lan because it “allowed CMS to phase o u t pairing, which had become increasingly u n stab le an d u n p o p u la r” and th a t CMS “w as acting to fu rther a com pelling in te res t.” 57 F .Supp. 2d a t these new procedures rem ain in effect. See M em orandum in S uppo rt of Stay Motion a t 3 (Oct. 14 1999) (citing Affidavit of S u p erin ten d en t Sm ith a t 2). -17- 239, 227-28. Third, the record reveals several o th er reasons, u n re la ted to dem ographic factors, why the School D istrict expanded its u se of m agnets. Appellees falsely claim — w ithout any record c itation — th a t Dr. S tolee’s p lan “clearly s ta ted it w as a p lan designed to balance schools th a t CMS knew were im balanced due to dem ographic change” and th a t fo rm er-superin tenden t M urphy testified th a t the p lan w as im plem ented “to co u n te r-ac t racially im balanced schools caused by dem ographic change .” A ppellees’ Brief a t 85. Both Stolee and M urphy, however, recognized several o ther problem s w ith CMS’ s tu d e n t assignm ent m ethods in 1992. See DX 108 a t 3, 5; Tr. 4 /2 6 :2 5 - 27 (Murphy). For exam ple, a s Appellees conceded below, “CMS im plem ented its m agnet school program in p a rt to reduce the tran sp o rta tio n b u rd en on its m inority s tu d e n ts ,” P-I Index a t f 157 (citing Tr. 4 /2 6 :2 2 2 -2 3 (Murphy)), a s it had been ordered to do in 1974, 379 F .Supp. a t 1106, failed to do a s of 1979, 475 F .Supp. a t 1338-40, and still h ad no t done in 1992. DX 108 a t 3-13. Even if CMS had been responding to dem ographic changes ra th e r th an a ttem pting to comply w ith the c o u rt’s o rders regarding the fa irness of its s tu d e n t assignm ent system , the School D istrict still would no t have been violating any of the co u rt’s s tu d e n t assignm en t orders. As th is C ourt held in Vaughns v. Board o f Education o f Prince George’s County, 758 F .2d 983 (4th Cir. 1985), un til un ita ry s ta tu s is achieved a school d is tr ic t’s “affirm ative du ty to elim inate all vestiges of segregation ‘root an d b ra n c h ”’ can n o t be absolved “by reason of dem ographic changes.” Id. a t 988. While it rem ained sub jec t to the -18- Sw ann orders, CMS retained no t merely the d iscretion to a ttem p t to achieve desegregated s tu d en t enrollm ents b u t the d u ty to do so. “As ano ther court h a s recently noted, the painfu l reality of s ta te sponsored segregation and constitu tionally m an d a ted desegregation requires th a t th is C ourt respectfully consider an d delicately balance existing legal com m ands, ne ither ignoring them nor perpe tuating them u n necessa rily .” Hampton, 72 F.Supp. 2d a t 776. By aw arding dam ages an d injunctive relief based on CMS’ good faith effort to comply w ith the S w ann o rders while they were still in effect, the cou rt below im properly ignored the School D istrict’s obligations u n d e r those orders. IV. THE INJUNCTION WAS UNNECESSARY BECAUSE CMS DID NOT PROPOSE TO CONTINUE ITS MAGNET PLAN Even had there been a constitu tional violation — w hich there w as not — the in junction w as unnecessary : CMS did no t propose to con tinue its m agnet adm issions procedures. As a resu lt, there w as no “im m inen t th re a t” of illegal action. See Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood o f R.R. Signalmen, 164 F.3d 847, 856 (4th Cir. 1998). There w as no evidence a t all th a t CMS would con tinue its m agnet adm issions procedures after being declared un ita ry . Indeed, the only proffered evidence on th is subject suggested th a t, as a u n ita ry school system , CMS would no t employ race-conscious s tu d e n t assignm en t m easu res . See DX 1. While CMS proposed to continue to consider race in s tu d e n t a ssignm en t un til it becam e un itary , its proposed plan would have d iscon tinued the u se of race -19- as a factor in th ree years if the School D istrict w as th en un itary . Id. a t 25, 27. Moreover, the record is clear th a t no decision had been m ade by the School Board ab o u t w hat type of s tu d e n t assignm en t p lan it would im plem ent if the d istric t co u rt found th a t it a lready w as un ita ry . See CMS Brief a t 25. The School D istrict did no t even propose to con tinue its m agnet adm issions p rocedures w ithout m odification if the cou rt found th a t it w as not yet un ita ry . Appellees sim ply m isrep resen t the record, therefore, w hen they claim th a t “[a]t no tim e during or after tria l did CMS advise the co u rt of [its] p lans to term inate its m agnet school” adm issions p rocedures. Appellees’ Brief a t 100. B ecause, a s im plem ented, Dr. M urphy’s m agnet p lan h ad not worked, CMS proposed to the cou rt an entirely different p lan to comply w ith the Sw ann o rders an d becom e un itary . See DX 1. The d istric t cou rt did no t even consider th a t p lan, im properly excluding it a s evidence. See CMS Brief a t 14-15. 8 / CMS also never sough t to defend the m agnet adm issions p rocedures th a t it h ad adopted to comply w ith the Sw ann o rders as a m ethod of prom oting diversity in a post-un ita ry system . Appellees’ suggestions to the con trary are u tterly baseless. See Appellees’ Brief a t 99. As the d istric t co u rt found, CMS’ arg u m en ts (and Appellees’ as well) ab o u t diversity are “irrelevant” to the 8 / Ju d g e Potter’s sta tem en t th a t CMS created th is rem edial p lan as “an eleventh h o u r strategy” is clearly erroneous. In D ecem ber 1998, the School D istrict inform ed the Appellees and the d istric t cou rt th a t it h ad been preparing a “com prehensive rem edial p lan ” to p resen t to the court. See D efendan ts’ Response to Motion to R einstate Reporting R equirem ent a t 2 (filed D ecem ber 1, 1998). Several m on ths before trial, in refusing to g ran t Appellees’ m otion, Ju d g e Potter noted th a t CMS “prom ises th a t it will propose a - 20 - propriety of the m agnet p lan designed to rem edy p a s t d iscrim ination . 57 F. Supp. 2d a t 289. Neither Board C hairm an A rthu r Griffin’s refusal to speculate abou t w hat the Board m ight do in the fu tu re no r h is own personal belief in diversity, see Appellees’ Brief a t 99, provide any evidence th a t the Board contem plated illegal actions. Indeed, he unam biguously testified th a t the Board had no t “d iscussed . . . w hat to do after u n ita ry s ta tu s .” Tr. 6 /2 1 :8 6 (Griffin). The School D istrict offered evidence a b o u t the dangers of resegregation and the educational benefits of diversity solely because Appellees openly sough t the overbroad in junction th a t Ju d g e Potter u ltim ately g ran ted . See C om plaint a t If 43 (filed April 8, 1998) (requesting “injunctive relief barring . . . any race-based policies or p rocedures th a t seek to assign s tu d e n ts or otherw ise to allocate governm ent benefits . . . on the basis of race”) (em phasis added). In the face of th is overreaching request, CMS offered evidence abou t the reaso n s why a un ita ry school system — w hich it does no t believe itself yet to be — m ight in the fu ture w ant to consider narrow ly tailored, race-conscious policies. The fact th a t CMS believes th a t su c h hypothetical fu tu re policies would improve education and could be designed in a lawful m an n er does not constitu te an im m inent th rea t justify ing a p e rm an en t in junction . In Norfolk & W estern Railway, a union indicated in its brief th a t it had no in ten tion to com prehensive rem edial p lan to the C ourt prior to the trial of th is m atte r.” J a n u a ry 8, 1999 O rder a t 2. - 2 1 - strike, an d th is C ourt therefore in terpreted a previous “th re a t” to strike a s legal a rgum en t abou t the c ircum stances in w hich su ch action w ould be lawful. 164 F. 3d a t 856-57. Here, CMS’ s ta tem en ts ab o u t the possible rea so n s for a un ita ry school system to consider race in s tu d e n t assignm en t were expressly identified a s legal a rgum en ts and did no t constitu te a th re a t to adop t any particu la r race-conscious plan or to take any illegal action. Appellees’ m isplaced reliance on United S ta tes v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), see Appellees’ Brief a t 98, only u n d ersco res the im propriety of Judge Potter’s in junction. 9 / In th a t case, after it h ad already been found th a t Virginia M ilitary Institu te (“VMI”) violated the C onstitu tion by excluding women, Virginia m ade a “rem edial p roposal” th a t con tinued th is exclusion. Id. a t 547-48. Here, Judge Potter never gave the elected School B oard an opportun ity to modify its m agnet adm issions p rocedures or to consider w hat s tu d e n t assignm en t m ethods it would adop t if found un ita ry . Instead , the cou rt below im properly preem pted local deliberation on the topic w ith its prohibition of any consideration of race. V. THE INJUNCTION IS OVERBROAD Even if the School D istrict were already un itary , its m agnet practices had been unlaw ful, and CMS proposed to con tinue them — none of w hich is true — 9 / Nor does th is C ourt’s decision in United S ta tes v. Hunter, 459 F. 2d 205 (4th Cir.), sup p o rt Appellees’ argum ent. See Appellees’ Brief a t 98-99. In Hunter, th is C ourt actually affirmed the denial of injunctive relief because there was no “cognizable danger of recu rren t violation.” 459 F .2d a t 219. Appellees quote d ic ta ab o u t the inapposite situa tion in w hich there h a s been “a pa ttern or practice of p as t violations.” Id. a t 220. - 22 - the d istric t c o u rt’s in junction still would be overbroad. The in junction im properly p rohib its narrow ly-tailored, race-conscious m agnet school lotteries, a s well a s any o ther race-conscious s tu d e n t assignm en t m easu res. As w ritten, it also m ay forbid CMS from considering race in selecting school sites and in crafting program s to ad d ress educational deficits am ong m inority s tu d en ts . The in junction goes far beyond enjoining the m agnet adm issions procedures th a t the court below incorrectly found to be unconstitu tiona l. Therefore, it violates the longstanding principle th a t an in junc tion “should not go beyond the extent of the estab lished violation.” Tuttle, 195 F. 3d a t 708. By its term s, Ju d g e Potter’s in junction forbids no t only CMS’ form er m agnet adm issions procedures b u t also race-consciously draw n s tu d e n t a ttendance areas, including those explicitly approved in S w ann and never even d iscussed in the decision below. T hus, if draw ing an a tten d an ce boundary one way would produce a racially isolated school, b u t a slight m odification would provide a racially and ethnically diverse school, th is in junction m ay preclude CMS from choosing the modified boundary. The in junction , however, does no t stop there — a t the d isrup tion of a tten d an ce a reas for literally th o u san d s of ch ild ren th ro u g h o u t the School D istrict — b u t ex tends even fu rther to the “a llo ca tio n of] educational opportun ities an d benefits.” 57 F. Supp. 2d. a t 294. As CMS argued below, th is in junction could be in terpreted to p roh ib it it “from add ress in g the u n d isp u ted physical and educational deficiencies in m any schools — simply because their s tu d e n t population is d isproportionately b lack .” Post-Trial Brief -23- a t 4, 81. This concern is no t idle; Appellees sought, even prio r to the issuance of the in junction , to prohibit su ch plainly lawful activities a s a “facilities renovation program th a t prioritizes facilities” in the in n er city an d incentive pay to “teachers who agree to teach in inner city schools.” See P laintiff-Intervenors’ Motion a t 2 and Brief in S upport a t 3 (filed Ju ly 2, 1999). Appellees’ defense of Ju d g e P o tter’s in junc tion sim ply ignores the Suprem e C o u rt’s s ta tem en ts in th is case th a t “school au th o ritie s have wide discretion in form ulating school policy, and th a t a s a m atte r of educational policy school au thorities m ay well conclude th a t som e kind of rac ia l balance in the schools is desirable.” 402 U.S. a t 45. J u s t a s im portantly , Appellees never acknowledge th a t to uphold the in junction below th is C ourt m u s t overrule its own decision in Martin. 626 F.2d 1165 (4th Cir. 1980). In Martin, th is C ourt held th a t the “School Board is vested w ith broad d iscretionary pow ers over educational policy and zs well w ithin its pow ers w hen it decides th a t a s a m atte r of policy schools should not have a m ajority of m inority s tu d e n ts .” Id. a t 1167 (em phasis added). Ignoring th is b inding precedent, Ju d g e Potter issued an in junction forever prohibiting CMS from m aking th is type of educational policy decision. The Martin decision h as not been overruled. The S uprem e C ourt h as not revisited the issue of school bo ard s’ p lenary au th o rity over educa tiona l policy, including s tu d e n t assignm ent, since its s ta tem en ts in S w ann an d in W ashington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982). The High C ourt’s decisions with respect to affirm ative action in hiring an d governm ent -24- contracting are inapposite. Public education is no t a scarce comm odity: CMS will teach all children. The School D istrict assign ing s tu d e n ts am ong various schools is no t like a governm ent body choosing am ong bids for a single con trac t or selecting am ong applications for a p a rticu la r job. As the N inth C ircuit h a s explained, “‘stacked deck’ program s [such a s race-based ‘affirmative ac tion ’] trench on Fourteen th A m endm ent values in ways th a t ‘reshuffle’ program s [such a s school desegregation] do n o t.”’ Coalition fo r Econ. Equity, 122 F. 3d a t 708 {quoting A ssociated Gen. Contractors o f Cal., 616 F.2d a t 1387). In Seattle School District, the Suprem e C ourt also recognized th a t desegregation does not operate to benefit som e (and as a re su lt to harm others), b u t ra th e r all children “benefit from exposure to ‘e thn ic an d racial diversity in the classroom .”’ 458 U.S. a t 472 (quoting Columbus Bd. o f Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 486 (1979)). The record in th is case leaves no d o u b t th a t CMS h as com pelling educational in te res ts th a t it should be allowed to consider add ress ing th rough narrow ly-tailored, race-conscious m eans in the fu ture. Resegregation would p resen t d au n tin g challenges for CMS schools. The c u rre n t inequities in facilities an d educational opportun ities w ould be exacerbated. See Post-Trial Brief a t 71-74. Appellees now claim th a t som e “race n eu tra l p lan ” m ight prevent th is resegregation, see Appellees’ Brief a t 112, b u t there is no evidence in the record below th a t such a p lan could have th is result. Appellees also ignore the fact th a t the m ajority of the Suprem e C ourt has recognized th a t “the a tta inm en t of a diverse s tu d e n t body . . . clearly is a -25- constitu tionally perm issible goal for an in stitu tio n of h igher educa tion .” R egents ofU niv. o f Cal. v. B akke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-312 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). As th is C ourt recognized in both Tuttle, 195 F.3d a t 704, and Eisenberg, 197 F.3d a t 130, lower courts , therefore, shou ld a ssu m e th a t educational diversity m ay be a com pelling s ta te in terest. The educational benefits of diversity are even more com pelling a t the elem entary and secondary level th an in the h igher education context. First, as the Suprem e C ourt h as recognized, public education provides the cornerstone of o u r p luralistic democracy: “[A]n ethnically diverse school . . . p rep a res ] m inority child ren ‘for citizenship in ou r p luralistic society’ . . . while, we m ay hope, teach ing m em bers of the racial m ajority ‘to live in harm ony an d m u tua l resp ec t’ w ith children of m inority heritage.” Seattle School Dist., 458 U.S. a t 473 (quoting E stes v. Metropolitan B ranches o f Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437, 451 (1980); Penick, 443 U.S. a t 485 n.5). Second, unlike h igher education , public e lem entary and secondary education , a s noted above, is freely available to all children. Therefore, race-conscious m easu res to prom ote diversity a t the e lem entary and secondary level need not exclude anyone from educational opportunity . The d istric t court erred in issu ing an overly broad in junction prem ised on the legally incorrect assum ption th a t preventing the h a rm s of resegregation, - 26 - prom oting the benefits of diversity, an d o th er im p o rtan t educa tiona l in te rests never can be compelling. 10/ VI. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HARSHLY SANCTIONING THE SCHOOL DISTRICT Appellees m istakenly claim th a t th is C ou rt’s decision in Wilson v. Volkswagen o f America, Inc., 561 F.2d 494, 505-506 (4th Cir. 1997), does no t provide the relevant te s t for the im position of discovery san c tio n s u n d e r Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See A ppellees’ Brief a t 132-33. Applying Wilson, however, it is clear tha t: (1) the B oard w as reasonab le in its reliance on the Pretrial O rder and on th is C o u rt’s holding th a t Federal Rule 26 does no t require the disclosure of tria l w itnesses prior to the da te designated in the governing pretrial order, see Wirtz v. B.A.C. Steel Products, Inc., 312 F.2d 14, 16 (4th Cir. 1963); 11 / (2) the Board did no t ac t in bad faith; an d (3) far less d rastic sanctions would have been effective. See CMS Brief a t 33-36. Appellees use aggressive, b u t u ltim ately em pty rhetoric in characterizing CMS’ w itness d isclosure as an “a m b u sh ” an d in “sandbagging” and in suggesting th a t “som ething . . . m ischievous w as afoot.” Appellees’ Brief a t 129, 130. Appellees do not con test the ind ispu tab le fact th a t CMS 10/ See also H unter v. Regents ofUniu. o f Cal., 190 F.3d 1061, 1064 n.6, 1067 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding th a t s ta te h a s com pelling in te res t in u sin g a diverse s tu d e n t population to study effective educational techniques). 11/ Jackson v. Kroblin Refrigerated X press, 49 F.R.D. 134, 135 (N.D.W.Va. 1970)(rule is “well settled”); Brock v. R.J. Auto Parts and Service, Inc., 864 F.2d 677, 679 (10th Cir. 1988)(citing sim ilar Fifth an d E ighth C ircu it decisions). -27- repeatedly informed them m on ths before tria l th a t it believed the Pretrial O rder’s deadlines for disclosure of w itnesses controlled. See CMS Brief a t 34- 35 n.13. Moreover, Dr. Eric Sm ith, CMS’ S uperin tenden t, w as identified prior to the deadline for disclosure of fact w itnesses, see A ppellees’ Brief a t 128, 130, because given his vast educational experience it w as possible th a t he would be called as an expert. The claim th a t Appellees were prejudiced by CMS’ co n d u ct also is plainly false. See Appellees’ Brief a t 134. Ironically, had CMS know n or disclosed all of its possible fact w itnesses du ring the discovery period, Appellees could no t have deposed them because A ppellees h ad convinced the d istric t co u rt th a t th is was no t a com plex case and already h ad exceeded the limit on non-expert depositions. CMS Brief a t 8-9. Moreover, A ppellees’ decision to w ait for over five m onths un til the eve of tria l before raising the w itness d isclosure issue w ith the d istric t co u rt b a rs equitable relief u n d e r Rule 37. Id. a t 35-36. In th is context, Judge Potter a b u sed his d iscretion in harsh ly sanctioning the School D istrict by g ran ting Appellees u n ila te ra l m id-trial discovery, ordering CMS to pay all costs, an d prohibiting certa in CMS w itnesses from testifying. VII. APPELLEES ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS’ FE E S None of the Appellees are en titled to a tto rn ey s’ fees because they should no t have prevailed in the d istric t court. B ut, even if th is C ourt were to affirm on the m erits, Judge Potter erred in aw arding fees to C apacchione. - 2 8 - C apacchione’s claim s for injunctive, declaratory an d com pensatory relief were d ism issed w ith prejudice (both as a plaintiff and as an intervenor), and his dau g h te r would no t have been adm itted to the school of h e r choice even if race had not been considered, precluding liability on h is rem ain ing claim for nom inal dam ages. See CMS Brief a t 38. C apacch ione’s efforts to salvage h is a tto rn ey s’ fees reflect the sam e types of d istortion an d m isrepresen ta tion of the record th a t characterize Appellees’ o ther argum en ts . For exam ple, C apacchione claim s he qualifies a s a “prevailing party” u n d e r Section 1988 because he allegedly h ad "clear stand ing to a tta in prospective injunctive relief w ith respec t to the [m agnet school program 's u se of race" and allegedly recovered “on the m erits of h is claim for prospective injunctive relief.” Appellees’ Brief a t 114-115. To the contrary , the trial cou rt specifically rejected C apacchione's c laim s of stan d in g to seek injunctive relief and dism issed all of h is claim s for prospective in junctive relief with prejudice in the c o u rt’s D ecem ber 22, 1998 Order. M em orandum of Decision an d O rder dated Decem ber 22, 1998 a t 4-5. C apacchione canno t prevail on h is sole surviving dam ages claim u n der Texas v. Lesage, 120 S. Ct. 467 (1999). See CMS Brief a t 37-38. Lesage teaches th a t a school canno t be liable for dam ages if it would have m ade the sam e decision ab sen t the alleged d iscrim ination . 120 S. Ct. a t 468. Only a plaintiff seeking “forward looking relief’ need no t affirmatively estab lish th a t he would have received the benefit in question if race were no t considered. Because C apacch ione’s claim s for “forward looking relief’ were d ism issed long -29- before trial, the B oard’s dem onstra tion th a t it would have m ade the sam e decision if race had not been considered “precludes any finding of liability.” Id. a t 469. 12/ C ontrary to C apacchione’s u n su p p o rted claim th a t s tu d e n ts received “race based lottery n u m b ers ,” Appellees’ Brief a t 124, each s tu d e n t received a random n u m b er regardless of race. Tr. 6 /1 4 :6 8 -7 1 (Purser); Tr. 4 /2 8 :4 5 (Wells). B ecause her random num ber w as h igher th a n the total n u m b er of available seats , C apacchione’s daugh te r would no t have been adm itted even had race no t been considered. Tr. 6 /1 4 :6 8 -7 1 (Purser). Therefore, CMS canno t be liable even for nom inal dam ages, an d C apacchione is no t a “prevailing party .” In the alternative, Capacchione a rgues incorrectly th a t he is entitled to fees based on the G ran t In tervenors’ success in Sw ann. C apacchione m istakenly suggests th a t Shaw v. Hunt, 154 F.3d 161 (4th Cir. 1998) su ppo rts his argum ent, bu t, unlike the in tervenors in Shaw , C apacchione w as no t an intervenor on the claim s on which G ran t prevailed. C appachione w as perm itted to "intervene" in S w ann ; however, C apacchione's declaratory and injunctive claim s were specifically d ism issed in both cases long before trial started . The tria l court concluded, “C apacch ione’s claim s for injunctive relief - as a plaintiff in his own case and as an intervenor in S w ann - m u s t be 12/ C apacchione, like the d istric t court, e rrs in suggesting th a t m erely retain ing stand ing to a sse rt a claim for dam ages can su b s titu te for the actual finding of liability necessary to be prevailing party. Compare Lesage, 120 S. Ct. a t 468-69, w ith 57 F.Supp. a t 288 n.50. -30- d ism issed .” Decem ber 22, 1998 O rder a t 4 (em phasis added). T hus, a t trial, C apacchione w as no longer an in tervenor on the claim s in Sw ann for w hich he is seeking fees; he was only pu rsu in g h is claim s for dam ages. Even if C apacchione’s efforts con tribu ted to the o ther A ppellees’ success, th is C ourt h a s firmly rejected such a “ca ta ly st” theory for the recovery of fees. S -l and S-2 v. S tate Bd. o fE duc., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 876 (1994). Finally, Shaw is d istingu ishab le because of its "special" an d "rather exceptional" c ircum stances, which th is C ourt repeatedly em phasized in its decision. Shaw, 131 F.3d a t 167-168. In Shaw , in tervenors lost stand ing only after tria l an d appeal. In s ta rk con trast, C apacchione moved to California in A ugust 1998 an d h is claim s for declaratory an d injunctive relief were dism issed in D ecem ber 1988, four m on ths before trial. N um erous in tervenors with sim ilar claim s rem ained. Still, C apacchione an d h is counsel voluntarily p u rsu ed h is dam ages claim, assum ing the risk of no t recovering dam ages or a tto rn ey s’ fees. U nder these c ircum stances there is no inequity in holding C apacchione and h is counsel accountab le to the clear requ irem en ts of Section 1988 an d denying Capacchione a tto rneys fees because he is no t a "prevailing party." 31- CONCLUSION The judgm en t of the d istric t cou rt shou ld be reversed a n d its in junction should be vacated. Respectfully subm itted , ^ \ ---------- Allen 111. Snyder M aree Sneed Jo h n W. Borkowski HOGAN & HARTSON L.L.P. 555 T h irteen th S treet, N.W. W ashington, DC 20004 (202) 637-5741 Ja m e s G. M iddlebrooks Irving M. B renner Amy R ickner Langdon SMITH HELMS MULLISS & MOORE, L.L.P. 201 N. Tryon S treet C harlo tte, NC 28202 (704) 343-2051 Leslie W inner G eneral C ounsel C harlotte-M ecklenburg B oard of E ducation Post Office Box 30035 C harlo tte, NC 28230-0035 (704) 343-6275 C ounsel for A ppellants C harlotte-M ecklenburg B oard of E ducation , et al. -32- CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(c), counsel hereby certifies tha t the foregoing brief contains 7,366 words. Counsel has relied on the word- count function of the w ord-processing system used to p repare th is brief. ring l v IrvingVM. Brenner SMITH HELMS MULLISS & MOORE, L.L.P. 201 North Tryon Street Post Office Box 31247 Charlotte, North Carolina 28231 704/343-2075 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify th a t tw o copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of A ppellants Charlotte-M ecklenburg Board of Education, e t al. w as served upon the parties to this action as follows: VIA HAND DELIVERY John O. Pollard Kevin V. Parsons McGuire Woods Battle & Boothe LLP 3700 NationsBank Plaza 101 South Tryon Street Charlotte, North Carolina 28280 Jam es E. Ferguson, II S. Luke Largess Ferguson, Stein, Wallas, Adkins, Gresham & Sumter, P.A. 741 Kenilworth Avenue Suite 300 Post Office Box 36486 Charlotte, North Carolina 28236 Thomas J. Ashcraft 212 South Tryon Street Suite 465 Charlotte, North Carolina 28281 This the 11th day of May, 2000. VIA REGULAR MAIL William S. Helfand M agenheim , Batem an, Robinson, W rotenberry & Helfand P.L.L.C. 3600 One Houston C enter 1221 McKinney Houston, Texas 77010 Gloria J. Browne Elaine Jones Norm an J. Chachkin NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. 99 H udson Street N ew York, New York 10013 A. Lee Parks Kirwan, Parks, C hesin & Miller, P.C. 75 Fourteenth Street 2600 The G rand A tlanta, Georgia 30309 - 4 , mi Irving[1m . B renner