Cypress v. Newport News General and Non-Sectarian Hospital Association, Inc. Appellant's Brief
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1966
Cite this item
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Cypress v. Newport News General and Non-Sectarian Hospital Association, Inc. Appellant's Brief, 1966. 83f3d1df-ae9a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/6b83a2f8-907c-468a-9fd2-160b9f4c610c/cypress-v-newport-news-general-and-non-sectarian-hospital-association-inc-appellants-brief. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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■United States (Enurt nf Appeals
F oe the F ourth Circuit
No. 10,672
I n t h e
George C. Cypress, et al.,
-v.-
Appellants,
T he Newport News General and N on-Sectarian
H ospital A ssociation, I ncorporated, et al.,
Appellees.
on appeal from the united states district court for the
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, NEWPORT NEWS DIVISION
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
J ack Greenberg
J ames M. Nabrit, III
Michael Meltsner
10 Columbus Circle
New Yoi'k, New York
P hilip W alker
648 25th Street
Newport News, Virginia
Attorneys for Appellants
Conrad K. H arper
Of Counsel
I N D E X
PAGE
Statement .............................................................................. 1
The Pleadings .................................................... 2
Summary of Pacts .................................................... 4
Recital of Testimony ................................................ 7
District Court Opinion ............................. 22
Questions Presented .......................................................... 27
A rgument—
I. Negro Physicians Are Excluded Prom Staff
Membership at Riverside Hospital in Violation
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments when
(A) Whites Are Readily Placed on the Staff,
(B) the Qualifications of the Negroes Are Un
questioned (C) the Hospital Presents No Evi
dence of Any Non-Racial Ground for Exclusion
and (D) Three-Fourths of an All-White Staff
Must Vote for a Negro’s Admission ................... 28
A. Negro Doctors Are Excluded From Practice
at Riverside Hospital ....................................... 28
B. The Hospital May Not Exclude Qualified
Negroes by Means of a Procedure Which
Burdens Negro, and Not White, Applicants .... 32
II. Appellants Are Entitled to Injunctive Relief
Against the Hospital’s Practice of Assigning
Rooms on the Basis of Race ........................... 36
Conclusion ................................................ ............. ........... 39
11
T able of Cases
page
Anderson v. City of Albany, 321 F.2d 649 (5th Cir.
1963) ......................................................................... . 38
Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 .................................. 32
Chambers v. Hendersonville Board of Education,
F .2 d ------ (4th. Cir. 1966) .................................29,30,33,35
Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964) ....... ....36, 38
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 ....................................... 38
Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 ...................................... 38
Franklin v. Giles County School Board,------ F.2d ——
(4th Cir. 1966) ................................................................ 33
Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 632 ................... 32
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 ........ ....... ........ ........... 33
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 ........................... 38
Hall v. St. Helena Parish, 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La.
1961), aff’d 368 U.S. 515 .............................................. 32
Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Society, 355 F.2d
718 (4th Cir. 1966) .................................................. 29,33,35
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 ................................ 29
Hunt v. Arnold, 172 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ga. 1959) ..... 34
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and
N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88 ................................ ............... 33
James v. Duckworth, 170 F. Supp. 343 (E.D. Va.
1959) ..................................... .......... .................. .......... . 32
Johnson v. Branch,----- - F .2d ------ (4th Cir. 1966) 32
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123 ........................................................ ..... A W -33
Ill
PAGE
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) ........... 34
Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713..... 32
Ludley v. Board of Supervisors Louisiana State Uni
versity, 150 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. La. 1957) aff’d 252
F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1958) cert. den. 358 U.S. 819 ...... 34
Meredith v. Fair, 298 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1962) ........... 33
Morrison v. Davis, 252 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1958) ....... 38
Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 ................................... 35
Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1963) ...............32, 38
Rackley v. Orangeburg Regional Hospital, 310 F.2d
141 (4th Cir. 1962) .......... .......... .................................36, 38
Simkins v. Moses Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F.2d 959
(4th Cir. 1963) cert, denied 376 U.S. 938 .....32, 35, 36, 38
Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 ......... 33
United States v. Logue, 344 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1965) .... 34
United States v. Mississippi, 339 F.2d 679 (5th Cir.
1964) .................................................................................. 34
United States v. Wilbur Ward, 345 F.2d 857 (5th Cir.
1965) .................................................................................. 34
Wieman v ......Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 ........................... 32
Other A uthorities
Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy, 10th Ed.,
1961 ...... 37
Virginia Administrative Agencies Act, Va. Code
§9-6.10 33
I n t h e
Itttfrfc (Emtrt of Appeals
F ob the F ourth C ircuit
No. 10,672
George C. Cypress, et al..
Appellants,
T he N ewport News General and N on-S ectarian
H ospital A ssociation, I ncoporated, et al.,
Appellees.
on appeal from the united states district court for the
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, NEWPORT NEWS DIVISION
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Statement
This is an appeal from an April 21, 1966 order of the
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dis
missing on the merits the claims of Negro physicians and
patients to nondiscriminatory medical staff admission and
use of treatment facilities at a Hill-Burton Act hospital,
the Riverside Hospital of Newport News, Virginia (299a).
The opinion of the district court is reported at 251 F. Supp.
667 (282-296a).
2
The Pleadings
Plaintiffs brought this action October 11, 1963 on behalf
of themselves and others similarly situated to enjoin the
hospital, and its administrator, from continuing to deny
staff membership to Negro physicians and segregating
Negro from white patients in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution (5-16a). The
complaint asserted “federal question” and “ civil rights”
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C., §§1331, 1343(3); 42 U.S.C.,
§§1981, 1983 (5a, 6a) and, in summary alleged that (1)
Negro physicians practicing in Newport News had been
refused medical staff membership pursuant to the River
side’s policy of excluding Negroes; (2) Darnell Jackson
and Sandra Rose Clark, children suffering from sickle cell
anemia, a chronic disease requiring frequent hospitaliza
tion, desire treatment at Riverside but the hospital ex
cludes their physician, Dr. George C. Cypress, and segre
gates patients by race; and (3) Riverside is a tax exempt
and state regulated hospital which has received approxi
mately $2,250,000.00 from the United States pursuant to a
“ state plan” for hospital construction formulated by the
Commonwealth in accordance with the specifications of
the Hill-Burton Act (13a, 14a, 11a).
On December 5, 1963, the hospital moved to dismiss the
action on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction
over the subject matter (17a, 18a). On March 2, 1964, the
hospital answered denying that it refused to admit Ne
groes to its staff or segregated patients on the basis of
race (19a, 20a) and affirmatively alleging that denial of
staff membership to Dr. Cypress “ was for just and good
cause and was not on the basis of race” (20a). It was
also denied that the hospital was subject to the Fourteenth
Amendment, that “ separate but equal” provisions of the
3
Hill-Burton Act and regulations were unconstitutional, and
that the suit was a proper class action (19-21a). Beceipt
of funds from state and federal governments was admitted
(20a).1
At the trial, held July 14-15, 1964, appellants offered the
testimony of Dr. Cypress (72a) and Dr. C. Waldo Scott
(100a) another Negro physician who had been refused
staff membership. Three white physicians, Dr. Allan But
ler (113a), Dr. Samuel Standard (164a) and Dr. Colvin
Salley (183a) testified as to the qualifications of Dr. Cy
press and Dr. Scott. Two Negro physicians, Dr. B. E.
Beid (236a) and Dr. G. P. Carter (237a) testified to their
interest in the class action brought by Dr. Cypress; Dor
othy Wright (188a), mother of Darnell Jackson, testified
to her desire to have her child treated by Dr. Cypress at
the Biverside Hospital.
The hospital called as its sole witness the administrator,
Nelson L. St. Clair, Jr. (194a).
For convenience of presentation, a summary of facts is
followed by a recital of testimony on an individual basis.
1 The present hospital facility was financed in part by a grant of
$3 million from the United States and the Commonwealth of Virginia
under the Hill-Burton hospital construction program (25a). The federal
grant agreement is in evidence as plaintiffs’ exhibit 9 but has not been
printed. The hospital also receives appropriations from the City of New
port News, Virginia and the Commonwealth. During the years 1961-1963
the hospital received the following sums from the City (27a) :
1961 ..................................... $43,842.82
1962 ..................................... $73,133.69
1963 ..................................... $68,295.97
During the period 1961-1963 the hospital received the following ap
propriations from the Commonwealth:
1961 ..........................
1962 ..........................
1963 ..........................
$6,326.31
$7,873.51
$7,792.89
4
Summary of Facts
Riverside Hospital is a modern 323 bed hospital which
supplies the Newport News area with a wide range of
medical services, the best facilities, and its highest stand
ard of patient care (78a, 108-09a, 137a, 224-25a). Approxi
mately 169 whites and 18 Negroes practice medicine in
the community but Negroes have not been granted staff
membership (76a). The medical staff of the hospital con
sists of 117 whites and no Negroes (76a, 108a, 25a, 28-39a).
As no patient may be admitted or treated by a physician
who is not a member of this staff (41a), Negro physicians
are unable to use the hospital although Negroes who are
patients of white physicians may be treated at Riverside.
Six of the seven Newport News pediatricians certified as
specialists by the American Board of Pediatrics are on
the medical staff (33a, 73a, 77a, 78a).2 They are white;
the other pediatrician, Dr. Cypress, a Negro, has been
denied membership on the staff (240a, 242a). There are
19 surgeons in Newport News, eighteen whites and one
Negro, Dr. C. Waldo Scott (Tlla, 112a). Seventeen of
the 18 whites are members of the Riverside surgical staff
(34a, 35a) ;3 the sole Negro, Dr. Scott, has been refused
staff membership (241a). While Dr. Scott is certified as
a specialist in surgery by the American Board of Surgery,
9 of the white physicians on the surgical staff are not (33-
35a). Tables A, B, C, and D reflect these statistics:
2 Specialty boards examine the training and skill of physicians and
certify them as licensed specialists (72a, 102a). Some hospitals will not
consider a physician for staff membership unless he is board certified
in his specialty (173a) for the likelihood of finding an “able” physician
is “ far greater” among certified specialists (173a). It is only proper to
refuse staff membership to board certified physicians “ under appropriate
specific considerations” (139a).
3 Dr. Scott testified he believed the number was 15, but the hospital’s
roster of staff members, appended to answer to interrogatory Number 1,
indicates the correct number of surgical staff members is 17 (33-35a).
5
MEDICAL STAFF MEMBERSHIP AT RIVERSIDE
HOSPITAL, NEWPORT NEWS, VIRGINIA4
TABLE A
Total number Total number
of physicians
in community White Negro
of medical
staff members White Negro
187 169 18 117 117 0
TABLE B
Board certified Board certified
pediatricians
in community White Negro
pediatricians on
hospital staff White Negro
7 6 1 6 6 0
TABLE C
Surgeons in
community White Negro
Surgeons on
hospital staff White Negro
19 18 1 17 17 0
TABLE D
Board certified Board certified
surgeons in
community White Negro
pediatricians on
hospital staff White Negro
9 8 1 8 8 0
Dr. Cypress on two occasions and Dr. Scott once have
applied for and been denied membership on the medical
4 Source: 28-39a; 41a; 76-78a; 108-112a; 219a; 226a.
6
staff (240-242a). Reasons were not assigned for rejections
of their applications, and when Dr. Cypress sought a
conference with hospital officers, the hospital did not reply
to his letter (75a, 107a, 206a, 207a).
An overwhelming body of evidence, including testimony
of eminent expert witnesses and the Health Director of
the City of Newport News, supports the finding of the
district court that both Dr. Cypress and Dr. Scott are
“highly qualified according to this record” (284a). The
education, ability, character, and experience of the two
Negro doctors was not seriously contested by the hospital
at trial although it had alleged previously that Dr. Cypress
was denied membership for “ just and good cause” (20a),
and had indicated, as shown by the pre-trial order, that
white physicians would be called to testify (45a, 46a). No
evidence was adduced that the Negro doctors are unquali
fied or that any professional or ethical disability explained
denial of staff membership. The hospital’s only witness,
administrator St. Clair, conceded that both physicians
qualified under standards set forth by the by-laws of the
staff (221a, 226a, 262a, 254a):
By the Court:
Q. I take it that you have no reason to point out
to me in any respect wherein either Dr. Cypress or
Dr. Scott are lacking in training, experience and dem
onstrated competence? A. No, sir.
The hospital’s evidence consisted of testimony from the
administrator describing the procedures through which an
application passed from credentials committee (which ap
proved both Negro doctors) to specialty staffs (which
transmitted Dr. Cypress’ application without recommen
dation and Dr. Scott’s with recommendation that it be
7
rejected) to the medical staff where a successful appli
cant requires affirmative votes from three fourths of the
117 doctor staff voting by secret ballot (where both ap
plicants failed to receive the necessary votes) to the Board
(which always ratifies the decision of the medical staff)
(195a, 253-55a, 206a, 226a, 67a). The failure of the spe
cialty staff to enter a recommendation with respect to Dr.
Cypress was “the first time that it happened” (206a).
Throughout this process no hearing is held or findings
entered with respect to the qualifications of an applicant
and no reasons are assigned to a denial of membership
(206a, 207a, 210a, 107a). The by-laws of the medical staff
provide that the specialty staff will submit a “ report” to
the medical staff but none was submitted in the cases of
the Negroes (207a, 254a). When questioned about this re
quirement the administrator at first denied its existence
(207a), then testified he had no recollection of written
reports ever being submitted by the specialty staff (207-
210a).
With respect to patient segregation the evidence shows
that: “ Medical floors are integrated to an extent. We do
not put Negro and white patients in the same room” (63a).
Only when parents are consulted and Mr. St. Clair deter
mines there will be no conflict, are Negro and white
pediatric patients placed in the same rooms. The court
found “Riverside concedes that its practice is not to assign
Negro and white patients to the same room” (295a).
Recital of Testimony
George C. Cypress
Dr. Cypress is a licensed, Negro, medical doctor certified
as a pediatric specialist by the American Board of Pedi
atrics (72-73a). He has been Chief of Pediatrics at a
8
United States Army Hospital, a teacher and consultant
at numerous hospitals and government agencies and a
member of the staff of Dixie Hospital in Hampton, Vir
ginia and Whittaker Hospital in Newport News, where he
is Chief of Pediatrics and Medical Director (73a, 74a, 79a,
81a, 244-48a).
In April, 1961, and again in April, 1962, Dr. Cypress
applied for membership on the medical staff at Riverside
(74a). Subsequently, he received letters from the hospital
stating, without elaboration, that his application for staff
membership had been denied (74-75a, 240a, 242a). From
the time he submitted these applications until receipt of
letters of rejection, Dr. Cypress was not asked to appear
before any body of the hospital or otherwise contacted
(75a). After the second application was denied a letter
was written to the hospital requesting a conference to
discuss reasons for denial.6 The hospital did not reply
(75a).
Eighteen other Negroes practice medicine in the Newport
News-Hampton area, but none is a member of the River
side medical staff (76a). Of the seven pediatricians prac
ticing in the area, Dr. Cypress is the only nonwhite (77-
78a), and the only pediatrician in the area who has been
refused staff membership at the hospital (78a).
Dr. Cypress applied for staff membership because “ Riv
erside Hospital is the best-equipped hospital on the penin
6 The second application listed one organization, the Virginia Pediatric
Society, of which Dr. Cypress was not a member (77a, 83a). For six
years he had received notification of meetings from the Society (77a)
and attended its meetings, which were held simultaneously with a medical
society of which he was a member, the American Academy of Pediatrics,
Virginia Section. Dr. Cypress testified that he mistakenly considered
himself a member of the Virginia Pediatric Society (77a, 83a) and the
district court found no evidence that the misrepresentation “was ever
considered in rejecting the application” or even “ discovered prior to the
preparation for the trial” (287a).
9
sula” and “I would like to be at the best hospital in the
area so that I can give the best care to my patients” (78a,
86a). Another factor was the intern and resident staff of
the hospital which relieves “ some of the burden” of car
ing for patients and provides opportunity for consulta
tions about patient care (78a, 93a, 95a). Although he
presently places patients in Dixie and Whittaker hospitals,
Whittaker does not have any interns or residents. Dixie
does not have a full staff, and the few associated with
the hospital are not used in pediatrics (97a). As the only
Negro pediatrician in the Newport News-Hampton area,
Dr. Cypress is a busy doctor but when questioned by the
hospital’s attorney he stated that, he did not believe his
workload would be a valid ground for denial of member
ship. Noting that Riverside may limit or withdraw staff
membership when a physician does not comply with hos
pital obligations, he thought it premature to assume his
workload would interfere with his practice at Riverside
(83a, 85a, 88a).6 He stated that if he were on the staff he
would consider dropping other hospital affiliations but he
wanted the opportunity accorded to white physicians to
make such a decision based on his actual workload after
admission (86-88a). He thought he was entitled to “pick
the best hospital” in order to “give the highest quality of
medical care” (85-86a). Dr. Cypress also testified that he
had received no complaints about his availability; that al
though there is a shortage of physicians, especially pedia
tricians, in Newport News, he had never turned down a
patient; and that whenever unavailable he arranged for
a physician to “ cover” his cases (83a, 84a, 94a).
6 Compare 154a, 219a, 222a, 262a, 263-269a,
10
Dr. Charles W aldo S cott
Dr. Scott is a Negro physician, licensed to practice in
Virginia, and certified as a specialist in surgery by the
American Board of Surgery (100-01 a). A cum laude grad
uate of Howard University and University of Michigan
Medical School, he also holds a M.S. degree in zoology
from Howard University (100-01a), is a fellow of the
American College of Surgeons (102a) and a member of
a number of medical societies (102a). Aside from being
chairman of the surgical staff at Whittaker Hospital, he
is a staff member at two other hospitals, a Veterans Ad
ministration hospital consultant, and a former instructor
in general surgery at the Howard University Medical
School (103-04a, 249a).
In March, 1963, Dr. Scott applied for membership on
the medical staff at Riverside (106a). He sought member
ship because Riverside is a modern hospital, large enough
to have “innovations” for the comfort and care of patients
and specialists with whom he would like to consult (108-
09a). A number of his patients had expressed disappoint
ment at not being able to be placed in Riverside (109a).
In June, 1963, he received a letter from the administrator
stating only that his “application for staff membership
at Riverside hospital has been denied” (107a).
There are a total of 169 white physicians and 18 Negroes
practicing in the area; 117 of these—all white—are mem
bers of the medical staff of the Riverside hospital (108a).
Dr. Scott is the only Negro of the 19 general surgeons
practicing in the community. He believed that approxi
mately 15 of the 18 white surgeons are of the Riverside
surgical staff (lll-12a).
Dr. Scott described his interest in the litigation as fol
lows : “ I am interested not only for my own benefit, but for
11
the benefit of others who are practicing and others who
will be coming to the area who are similarly situated as
are we” (109a).
The hospital declined to cross-examine Dr. Scott (112a).
Dr. A llan B utler
Dr. Butler, Professor Emeritus at the Harvard Medical
School and former Chief of Children’s Services at Mas
sachusetts General Hospital, was qualified by the court as
an expert in appraising the qualifications of pediatricians
for hospital staff membership:
Any man who had had the vast experience that Dr.
Butler has had would, of necessity, know, of course,
how pediatricians must deal with hospitals and, in a
general sense, how hospitals deal with pediatricians
(117-18a).7
Dr. Butler directly observed Dr. Cypress practice medi
cine at office and hospital and surveyed his educational
record before appraising his qualifications (121-24a). He
was impressed by the cleanliness of the office, the caliber
of the equipment and the competence of Dr. Cypress’ nurse
7 Dr. Butler has practiced pediatries in Massachusetts and Michigan
(141-142a) and taught medicine at Harvard Medical School, Infants’
and Children’s Hospitals of Boston, Massachusetts General Hospital,
Eye and Ear Infirmary of Boston, Stanford and Tulane Universities
(114a). He has been a member of the staff at Massachusetts General
Hospital, the Eye and Ear Infirmary, Boston Lying In Hospital, Tux-
bury State Hospital, Boston Psychopathic, Metropolitan Hospital of
Detroit and Stanford University Medical Center (114a). He is a former
President of the New England Pediatric Society and the American
Pediatric Society and has been an official or a member of the Society
for Pediatric Research, Society for Clinical Investigation, the Associa
tion of American Physicians and the American Academy of Pediatrics
(115a). Prom 1929 to 1960, he published over 100 papers on medical
subjects (115a). At Massachusetts General Hospital and Metropolitan
Hospital in Detroit his duties included organizing the medical staff (116a,
143a).
12
and secretary (121a). He was “very impressed” by the
utilization of the nurse in caring for office patients (122a).
Record-keeping was “ excellent” (122a). The choice of
drugs and use of medications shown on records examined
by Hr. Butler was also “ excellent” (“and this is a part of
medical therapy that can either be done very well or very
badly” ) (122a). He observed Dr. Cypress examine and
treat a number of office patients and found examination
and administration of therapy “ good” (122-23a). “ Through
out” he was impressed by Dr. Cypress’ “wise utilization
of consultants” (123a). At Whittaker Hospital, he watched
Dr. Cypress treat seven patients, including three prema
ture infants, and went over their medical records “and
again it was good” (123a).
The opportunity Dr. Butler had to observe Dr. Cypress’
care for his patients “ is probably a more thorough first
hand contact in going over his records and watching him
take care of patients than I have had in the opportunity
to appraise the qualifications of . . . the perhaps fifty physi
cians—maybe more—that I examined as Chief of Clinical
Services at the Metropolitan Hospital in building up the
staff of that hospital” (123a). Based upon observation,
and consideration of Dr. Cypress’ record, Dr. Butler testi
fied that he would recommend him for the staff at hos
pitals at which Dr. Butler had held positions of responsi
bility, including “ one of the outstanding hospitals of the
United States” (116a-124a).
Dr. Butler testified that Dr. Cypress’s large practice
might give him another reason for endorsing Dr. Cypress
(125a)8 for a major consideration in granting staff mem
8 Dr. Butler’s favorable opinion of Dr. Cypress would not be modified
by whether he had correctly listed membership in the Virginia Pediatric
Society, for he himself often confused medical societies (120a, 152-153a).
Dr. Cypress “ justifiably confused” the American Aeademy of Pediatrics,
Virginia Section and the Virginia Pediatric Society (152a).
13
bership is “ How could we help this doctor in his services
to the people he is caring for in the community” 9 (134a).
His recommendation of Dr. Cypress would not be affected
by the number of other staff appoitnments Dr. Cypress
might have for numerous staff appointments are not
grounds for refusing membership (125a, 127a). This is es
pecially true if the added hospital is the best in the com
munity,10 has interns and residents,11 and increases a doc
tor’s access to consultants (127a-29a). The majority of
practicing physicians in the United States are affiliated
with more than one hospital (160a) and the majority of
pediatricians on the staff at the Massachusetts General
Hospital, hold appointments at three or more hospitals,
often at distances of 15 to 25 miles from their offices (125a-
27a). Dr. Butler stated that he would “ not necessarily”
grant staff membership to a doctor on the basis of spe
9 Even if a physician is not entitled to full privileges he should still
be taken on a staff with limited privileges if this would facilitate the
services he is rendering to the community (134a). Dr. Butler had even
recommended persons of whose judgment he did not think too highly
because such a doctor would be in contact with the physicians at the
hospital and thereby improve the service he would render to his patients
(135a).
10 A major consideration in the choice of hospital to admit a child
who is not critically ill is to get the child to a pediatric unit where there
is proficiency in nursing, proper attention to psychological stress, and
entertainment. Such a pediatric unit cannot be provided economically if
smaller than 25 beds. Riverside hospital has a pediatric unit of the size
which ought to make it able to provide these services (162-163a, cf. 225a).
11 The assistance o f interns and residents makes “ all the difference in
terms of the beating the doctor takes” (155a). Responsibilities are
delegated to them (156a) and this is a timesaving procedure for the
doctor (156a). Working in a hospital which does not have interns or
residents is a tremendous burden on a doctor (156-158a). Dr. Butler
conceded that a problem in American medicine is treating seriously ill
patients in more than one hospital when there are no interns and resi
dents in the hospitals but stated this problem is not pertinent to denial
o f staff membership, for it affects a majority o f practicing physicians
in the United States (159-60a) and restricting a physician’s practice to
one hospital is not the way to solve it (158a).
14
cialty certification alone, but denial of membership to a
board certified physician is only proper “under appro
priate specific considerations” (138a-39a).
When asked by counsel for the hospital to comment on
the fact that other pediatricians in the Newport News
area have reduced the number of their staff affiliations,
Dr. Butler testified (160a-61a):
A. Right. And how do you know but what if Dr.
Cypress is on the staff of the Riverside Hospital the
way these other pediatricians are that, he, too, wouldn’t
restrict his care of hospitalized patients more to River
side than he can now do? My guess is he would.
Q. It could well be. A. Right.
Q. The point is, though, that he would be on the
staffs of others and would have to divide his time.
A. No, he might resign from the staffs of others if he
had the privilege—
Q. In other words, you are getting into speculation
now of what he might do? A. Well, this has been
done by other members of the staff of the Riverside
Hospital. After joining the Riverside Hospital, they
have lessened their staff membership in other hos
pitals.
Dr. Samuel Standard
Dr. Standard, a specialist in surgery and Director of
Surgery at Morrisania Hospital in New York City (164a),
was qualified by the court “ in the field of general surgery”
and also “in his capacity as a director of surgery for
various hospitals” (167a).12 Dr. Standard has “unique
12 Before becoming Director o f Surgery, Dr. Standard was in the
private practice of surgery (,164a). Prom 1939 to 1950 he was Director
of Surgery at Monteflore Hospital in New York and from 1950 to 1962
he was Director of Surgery at Sydenham Hospital in New York (164-
15
experience” in appraising the qualifications of “ somewhere
around a hundred” (165a, 167a) surgeons and a number
of hospitals for the Hospital Accreditation Committee
(composed of representatives of the American Medical
Association, American College of Surgery, and the Ameri
can Board of Surgery) and also for organizations such
as the Health Insurance Plan of New York (165a-66a).
Dr. Standard observed Dr. Scott perform surgery at
the Whittaker Hospital, appraised a random selection of
his charts, discussed professional problems, and surveyed
his educational record (168-69a). The time spent ob
serving Dr. Scott was “as much, or perhaps more than”
that given those considered for staff membership at Dr.
Standard’s hospitals (173a). In his opinion Dr. Scott is
a highly qualified surgeon and a graduate of a highly
rated medical school with an unusually good educational
record (168a-70a). He has a “ flawless technique” in the
operating room (166), and is “technically well above the
average” (170a). “ [H ]e has a fine knowledge of both
preclinical medicine and clinical medicine” (169a). “ On
the whole his charts would stand up well in any accredited
hospital” (171a). The times of his operations are those
“any meticulous surgeon would take” (171a). “He has a
sense of confidence and serenity which a young surgeon
must develop . . .” (172a). Based on direct observation
and educational qualifications, Dr. Standard would be very
happy to have a man of Dr. Scott’s caliber on the surgical
staff of his hospital “as an example for a group of resi
dents” (172a).
65a). Dr. Standard is a member of county, state and national medical
associations and a member of the New York Surgical Society and New
York Cancer Society (166a). He is a member o f the American College
of Surgeons and a diplomat of the American Board of Surgery (166a)
and is presently professor of clinical surgery at New York University
and Bellevue Medical Center (165a).
16
Dr. Standard also relied on Dr. Scott’s certification by
the American Board of Surgery, a prerequisite for staff
membership at Dr. Standard’s hospitals (172a-73a). A l
though board certification is not the sole basis on which a
surgeon should be granted membership (180a), “ I think
if we were to take a hundred board certified men and a
hundred non-board certified men, the likelihood of our
finding a group that were less able would be far greater
in the latter group” (173a).
Dr. Standard agreed with Dr. Butler as to the value of
association with a hospital which has interns and resi
dents.13 A house staff of interns and residents “ actually
does the day labor of taking care of patients” (174a).
The “ important” decisions are made by the attending staff
(174a) but the “ details, say, of putting a tube down a
man’s stomach or putting a catheter into his vein or some
thing like that” are done by the interns and residents
(174a). These duties which are part of the education of
the residents and interns “ really [take] the load off the
surgeon” (174a).
D r, Colvin W . Salley
As Health Director of the City of Newport News since
1961, Dr. Salley is responsible for the health of the citizens
of the City (183-84a). A retired colonel in the U. S. Army
Medical Corps, he was commanding officer at the Fort
Eustis, Virginia army hospital until 1961 where he was
Dr. Cypress’ supervisor (184a, 186-87a) when Dr. Cypress
was employed as a civilian pediatrician, first on a full
time, and later on a part-time, basis (186a). Dr. Salley’s
views of Dr. Cypress’ character and ability are as follows:
He never received complaints about Dr. Cypress, “Nothing
13 See note 11 supra.
17
but praise” (185a). Dr. Cypress now runs a weekly clinic
for poor children at the Health Department which he has
never failed to meet (185a). His performance at the clinic
has been “ superior” (185a). Sick children “with not a cent
of money” referred to him by Dr. Salley are always ac
cepted (185a). Dr. Salley had recommended Dr. Cypress
for staff membership at Riverside Hospital because in
29 years of medical practice he has “never been associated
with a better pediatrician than Dr. George C. Cypress”
(186a).
D orothy W right
Dorothy Wright works at a laundry at Fort Eustis
(189a) and is the mother of a thirteen year old Negro
child, Darnell Jackson, who has suffered from sickle cell
anemia since 1953 (189a). The child has been treated at
Riverside and Whittaker hospitals in the past by three
different doctors, but is now a patient of Dr. Cypress
(190a). If the child has to go to the hospital again, she
desires that the child be treated at Riverside because it
is new and closer to home. She also desires to use Dr.
Cypress if the child is hospitalized because his treatment
seems to have helped the child (191-92a).
Dr. R. E. R eid
Dr. Reid is a Negro physician licensed to practice in
Virginia who has practiced in Newport News for 29 years
(236-37a). He is interested in obtaining staff member
ship at Riverside Hospital although he has not applied
for membership (236-37a). He stated his interest in this
litigation as follows (236a) :
A. Well, I am a Negro, as we all know, and I feel
that anything that would go against him would go
18
against me so far as availability to practice in any
hospital in the community, particularly the Eiverside
Hospital.
He. Gregory P. Carter
Hr. Carter is a licensed Negro physician who has prac
ticed in Newport News for approximately 16 years (237-
38a). He would like to become a member of the Eiver
side staff, but he has not applied (238a). In bringing this
suit, Hr. Carter feels that Hr. Cypress represents him
(237a).
Nelsox L. St. Clair, J r.
Administrator St. Clair has served in that capacity or
as acting or assistant administrator since January, 1961
(50a, 63a).14 Hr. Cypress’ first application for member
ship was approved by the Credentials Committee, but was
sent from the pediatric staff to general staff without rec
ommendation, the first time such a procedure had been
used (52-53a, 206a). When Hr. Cypress reapplied in 1962,
the application was not reprocessed because less than a
year had elapsed since the first application but Hr. Cypress
was not notified of this failure to reprocess (53a, 75a). He
knew of no reason for Hr. Cypress’ rejection other than
the fact that he had failed to obtain the necessary three-
fourths votes of the medical staff (54-55a). Hr. Scott’s
application was approved by the Credentials Committee
and the application was then forwarded to the surgical
staff which recommended to the medical staff that member
14 Mr. St. Clair received a Master’s Degree in hospital administration
in 1961 from the Medical College of Virginia. As part of his education
he was administrative resident of Norfolk General Hospital (194a).
19
ship not be granted. Dr. Scott did not obtain the neces
sary three-fourths vote (56a).
Mr. St. Clair did not attend the meetings which consid
ered the applications of the Negro physicians (57a) and
the only contact he has had with Dr. Scott or Dr. Cypress
was a discussion with the former when he picked up the
membership application. Dr. Scott had asked if Negro
physicians were permitted to apply and was told that he
was at liberty to apply (227a, 232a). After the applica
tions were submitted, there was no discussion with either
Negro (207a). The specialty staffs did not submit reports
to the general staff although the by-laws of the hospital
specify that such a report is to be made (207-09a). When
submitted, these reports are never in writing (209-10a).
State license to practice medicine does not automatically
qualify a man to be a member of the staff, nor is board
certification alone sufficient, but Mr. St. Clair had no
information that Dr. Cypress or Dr. Scott are lacking in
training, experience and demonstrated competence as
physicians (221a). The hospital has not, moreover, re
jected the application of a board certified pediatrician
other than Dr. Cypress (205a).
Mr. St. Clair described the procedure employed with
respect to applications for staff membership. Article III
of the By-laws of the staff contains the only provisions
which refer to staff membership (224a, 252-56a). An ap
plication is presented to the Administrator by the physician
and after references have been checked and letters of rec
ommendation received, it is presented to the Executive
Committee of the medical staff, which acts as the Creden
tials Committee (195a). I f the physician’s application is
in order, as were Cypress’ and Scott’s (226a), it is sent
to the staff of the physician’s specialty, which normally
20
recommends whether the application should be approved
by the general staff. From the specialty staff the appli
cation is sent to the 117 doctor general staff, wThich votes
either for or against the application (195a, 206a), three
fourths majority being necessary for approval (206a).
After the vote, the application is presented to the Board
of the hospital for final action (195a).
Mr. St. Clair’s testimony made it clear that physicians
placed on the staff had appointments at other hospitals for
after becoming staff members many physicians have re
signed staff memberships at other hospitals (202a, 205-
06a, 218a). He also described the manner in which the
hospital assures that physicians meet staff obligations.
Hospital committees appraise the work of physicians and
report any deficiencies (219a) and membership privileges
may be limited on the basis of training, experience and
demonstrated competence (220a, 224-25a). In addition,
physicians may be placed on the staff for a probationary
period (223a).
At a deposition taken prior to trial, Mr. St. Clair testified
that since 1961, when he was employed by the hospital, he
believed only three applicants other than Doctor Cypress
and Doctor Scott had been rejected. Under questioning
he could recall two such cases, only one involving a physi
cian. A dentist was rejected because his residence was in
Norfolk. A doctor applied who had been accepted at one
or two other local hospitals but it was felt that he might
not meet Riverside’s standards of practice (63-64a). Dur
ing this period (1961-64) approximately 20 doctors had
been admitted to Riverside’s staff (63-65a). At trial, in
response to inquiry from his attorney, Mr. St. Clair stated
that a total of eleven or twelve white physicians have been
rejected for staff membership at the hospital since 1958
(202-03a).
21
With respect to patient segregation, he testified as fol
lows: “Medical floors are integrated to an extent. We do
not put Negro and white patients in the same room.”
When parents are consulted and he determines there will
be no conflict, Negro and white pediatric patients may be
placed in the same room (63a). As “a regular thing” ,
however, “we do not put Negro and white patients in the
same room” (63a).
Charles K. H utchens
Appellants placed in evidence the deposition of Mr.
Hutchens, Chairman of the hospital Board since 1952 and
before that a member of the Board (65a). He had read
the minutes of the Board meetings which considered the
applications of Dr. Cypress and Dr. Scott but had not
attended these meetings (66a). He stated that in passing
on applications for staff membership, the Board always
abides by the recommendations made by the medical staff
(67a). He had no knowledge of a Board policy of racial
segregation, but when the hospital was located in an older
building, it had a separate entrance for Negroes and pa
tients were assigned space on the basis of race (68-70a).
D r . Stuart E ichenfield
Dr. Eichenfield, a board certified pediatrician practicing
in Baldwin, New York (D. 3),15 16 was Chief of Pediatrics at
the Fort Eustis Army Hospital from 1958 to 1960, a super
visor of Dr. Cypress during that period (D. 5). His depo
sition was admitted as that of a witness more than 100
miles from the place of trial in anticipation of defenses
suggested by the pleadings but never raised at trial by
15 Citations are to Dr. Eiehenfield’s deposition which is not printed
but is contained in the original record transmitted to the court.
22
the hospital. He testified that Dr. Cypress did his work
“very well” (D. 6) and is possibly “ the most competent
pediatrician” in the Newport News area (D. 27). Dr.
Cypress’ character and judgment were “ excellent” . He
never committed any breach of medical ethics (D. 14, 16).
On the question of staff affiliations, Dr. Eichenfield is
currently on the staff of five hospitals, one only “ techni
cally” (D. 4, 5) and “ utilizes” two of these hospitals (D.
19). Until last year he was also on the staff of another
hospital but resigned because the hospitals he now uses
are more convenient (D. 25). He would drop all his affili
ations if he could conveniently practice at a better hospi
tal, such as Mount Sinai in New York City (D. 25, 26).
While it is his practice to restrict staff associations, this
depends on the particular area of the country (D. 19).
In contrast to the situation in Virginia, Dr. Eichenfield
is obliged to make many house calls and, therefore, prefers
to use nearby hospitals (D. 19). He stated that it is easier
to maintain a number of staff memberships when the hos
pitals have interns and residents (D. 28).
District Court Opinion
The district court found that the Negro doctors met all
the objective standards required for membership and
were both “highly qualified” but unentitled to relief be
cause there was no “ affirmative evidence of discrimination”
(284a, 291a). On the other hand, the court concluded that
“ it may well be argued that there is a justifiable inference
of discrimination from denial of the applications from
Doctors Cypress and Scott” (291a), and that Negro doc
tors “ should now be permitted to apply or reapply for
staff membership” (292a). Upon reapplication, the appli
cation might be “ accepted, deferred, or rejected.” A “ re
jected applicant” however, could request a “hearing” or
“ conference” at his own expense before the general staff
of the hospital. This proceeding would not be public and
statements made would not be governed by rules of evi
dence. There “would be no place for attorneys” or cross-
examination, sworn testimony or burden of proof although
a reporter could take notes at the expense of the doctor
(293a, 294a). If the rejected applicant seeks the “ con
ference” he may be required as a condition “ to execute a
general release in favor of the hospital, its employees,
general staff, and any individuals interrogated pursuant
to any investigation, as to any statements made by anyone
in connection with said application or any investigation
made before or after said conference” (ibid.) (Emphasis
supplied). He also may be required “to authorize exam
ination of records in specific cases and if such authoriza
tion is not given the general staff may draw inferences
therefrom” (ibid.). In summary, the court concluded, “If
the applicant seeks to attack the integrity of the general
staff by claiming that its members are rejecting him be
cause of race the applicant’s life and professional compe
tence must become an ‘open book’ ” (294a). There would
be no judicial review “ from the final action taken by the
hospital authorities” (293a). The doctors’ “right” to re-
apply to the hospital under this procedure was limited to
a sixty day period, the court stating it would enter a
final decree in favor of the hospital if the doctors did not
elect to apply.
With respect to segregation of Negro patients, the court
held that plaintiffs did not have any standing to complain
with respect “to the practice of not putting Negro and
white patients in the same room” (Emphasis in original).
The court gave the following reasons for this holding:
(1) “ This is a complex matter which involves the delicate
24
situation of the patient’s feelings as related to his gen
eral health,” (2) The issue is already before the district
court in a case filed by “ certain of the same counsel”
against another hospital, (3) No witness testified that he
ever sought admission to a room occupied by a person of
another race although “Riverside concedes that its prac
tice is not to assign Negro and white patients to the same
room” (295a).
On March 28, 1966, appellants filed a request for entry
of final decree stating that the doctors did not intend to
subject themselves to the proceeding detailed in the dis
trict court’s opinion and setting forth their belief that the
“hearing” or “ conference” , and especially the absence of
judicial review, did not adequately protect their consti
tutional rights and failed to secure them from a long
standing injury. Specific objection was made to denial
of assistance of counsel, right of cross-examination and
confrontation, notice of charges, other procedural safe
guards, while at the same time requiring the doctors to
pay the expense of proceedings and execute a broad re
lease. During the pendency of such proceedings, it was
noted, there would be a continued denial of relief from
admitted segregation of Negro patients. On the basis of
these objections, appellants notified the court that in their
view it would prejudice their rights not to appeal the
court’s ruling that they were unentitled to relief (297a,
298a). The final decree of the district court was filed
April 21, 1966 (299a). Notice of appeal to this Court was
filed April 29, 1966 (300a).
Although the facts in this case are not in dispute—only
the inferences to be drawn from them—there are a number
of statements in the district court opinion which are mis
leading or unsupported by the record. While none is
25
critical to decision, it is believed that clarification will
be helpful to the court.
First, the district court stated that Dr. Cypress prac
tices alone and has no arrangement with any other pedia
trician to “ cover” for him when he is unavailable (283a).
This is a somewhat misleading characterization of Dr.
Cypress’ practice. As the only Negro pediatrician, Dr.
Cypress does not have a pediatrician “ cover” for him
when he leaves the city, but he always has another doctor
“cover” and be responsible for his patients (93-95a, 98a,
231a). He had received no complaints about his avail
ability and his office and hospital is always informed of
his whereabouts (93-95a, 98a). The record, moreover,
supports the conclusion that staff membership at River
side Hospital—with its interns, consultants, equipment
and modern pediatric clinic—would be of assistance to
Dr. Cypress in caring for his patients (93-95a, 98a, 155a,
156a, 218a, 78a, 109a, 160a, 161a, 174a).
Secondly, the court stated that Dr. Eichenfield, whose
deposition was introduced, testified pediatricians are bet
ter able to handle their practice by confining staff member
ship to one hospital (283a). Dr. Eichenfield, however, is
a staff member at five hospitals, and places most of his
patients at two of these (D. 4, 5, 19). He testified that
the number of staff affiliations a physician maintained
depended on the character of his practice, for example, on
the number of house calls he had to make. In Virginia,
the number of house calls is few but in Long Island,
where Dr. Eichenfield practices, the number is great
(D. 19). Significantly, he stated that he would give up
all his affiliations if he could practice at a superior hos
pital (something he could not do for geographic, not pro
fessional, reasons) (D. 25, 26). Dr. Butler corroboi’ated
that physicians normally maintain numerous staff affilia
26
tions (125-27a, 144a, 145a, 159a) and administrator St.
Clair admitted that many Newport News physicians
limited other staff affiliations after being placed on the
Riverside staff (202a, 205a, 206a).
Thirdly, the district court found that 15 of the 18 white
surgeons in the community are on the surgical staff at
Riverside (284a n. 1). This finding reflects Dr. Scott’s
statement that he understood the number to be 15 (112a).
The actual number of white surgeons on the surgical
staff, however, is 17 as clearly shown by the best avail
able evidence, the listing of staff members supplied by the
hospital in answer to appellants’ interrogatories (33a-35a).
Fourth. After describing the procedure by which an
application for membership at Riverside is considered, the
district court found that the procedure “is substantially
similar to that followed by other hospitals throughout the
nation” (286a). This finding is not supported by the
record. Dr. Butler testified that procedures used at
Riverside for handling staff applications are employed
at other hospitals, but he was not referring to the pro
cedure whereby three-fourths of the staff must approve
of an applicant (131-33a, 149a, 150a). Indeed, the record
demonstrates that at hospitals with which he was affiliated,
and others at which Dr. Standard practiced, there is no
election for medical staff membership (150a, 151a, 178a,
179a). Dr. Butler stated that (150a):
It would be very difficult to have a meeting of 250
practicing physicians of the Massachusetts General
Hospital to pass on the credentials of every applicant
for staff membership.
27
Questions Presented
1. Whether the rights of Negro physicians and patients
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are violated
when a hospital which has received substantial state and
federal funds denies the applications for staff member
ship of Negro physicians in the following circumstances:
(a) The hospital has freely placed white physicians on
its staff;
(b) Three-fourths of an all-white medical staff must
approve a Negro’s admission;
(c) Two Negro physicians with unquestioned qualifica
tions are rejected by secret vote of the white staff;
(d) The hospital presents no evidence of any non-
racial ground for exclusion.
2. Whether Negro physicians entitled to staff member
ship and Negro patients who have been treated in the
hospital and desire to be treated there in the future are
entitled to injunctive relief against the hospital’s admitted
policy of segregating Negro and white patients.
28
ARGUMENT
I
Negro Physicians Are Excluded From Staff Mem
bership at Riverside Hospital in Violation of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments when (A ) Whites Are
Readily Placed on the Staff, (B ) the Qualifications of
the Negroes Are Unquestioned, (C) the Hospital Pre
sents No Evidence of Any Non-Racial Ground for
Exclusion and (D ) Three-Fourths of an All-White
Staff Must Vote for a Negro’ s Admission.
A. Negro Doctors Are Excluded From Practice
at Riverside Hospital.
The record clearly demonstrates that Riverside staff
membership is easily obtained by white physicians and
that Negro doctors are excluded although they meet not
only the standards set forth by the hospital but those of
the nation’s leading hospitals. In addition, the record
shows that certified specialists in surgery or pediatries
have never been denied membership unless they were
Negro. Dr. Cypress is the only pediatrician in the com
munity (all of whom are certified by the American Board
of Pediatrics) who has been denied Riverside staff member
ship. (When Dr. Cypress sought to discuss this extraordi
nary result with the hospital, his letter requesting a con
ference was not answered.) Dr. C. Waldo Scott’s treatment
is even more striking. Seventeen of 18 white surgeons are
on the Riverside staff. Nine of these are not even certified
by the American Board of Surgeons, although certifica
tion is a prerequisite for staff membership at many hos
pitals and a significant index of ability (173a). Dr. Scott,
the only Negro surgeon in the area, is Board certified,
29
but he has been denied staff membership. It taxes the
imagination to contend that exclusion of these Negro
physicians reflects other than the desire of the hospital
staff to maintain its all-white character absent proof of
some factor other than race which distinguishes the
Negroes from their peers, Hawkins v. North Carolina
Dental Society, 355 F.2d 718, 723 (4th Cir. 1966). I f they
stood alone, these statistics would at the very least require
from the hospital “ evidence . . . to rebut the logical in
ference of racial exclusion” , Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S.
475, 480; see Chambers v. Hendersonville Board of Ed
ucation, ------ F.2d ------ (4th Cir. 1966) and eases cited.
The Negro doctors, moreover, did not rest merely on
the hospital’s concession that they meet standards of “ex
perience, training and demonstrated competence” (221a).
This record also establishes the inescapable conclusion
that Negro physicians are arbitrarily excluded from the
Riverside staff, for it affirmatively shows that the two
Negro applicants denied membership are, in character
and ability, exceptional physicians who would be entitled
to membership on the medical staffs of any hospital.
This is revealed not only by their educational and other
“ objective” qualifications but by the testimony of two
eminent witnesses who subjected both doctors to examina
tion, observation, and appraisal far greater than that
usually given persons being considered for staff member
ship. The distinguished qualifications of these two physi
cians were acknowledged by the district court and defense
counsel. Their conclusion that the training and skill of
the Negro physicians was excellent was not contradicted
and the court entered findings in accordance with their
testimony. If corroboration were required it need only
be noted, inter alia, that the Health Director of the City
of Newport News called Dr. Cypress the best pediatrician
30
he had encountered in 29 years of practice; a former
supervisor characterized him as the best pediatrician in
Newport News. Both Dr. Cypress and Dr. Scott have
taught medicine, hold responsible hospital positions and
are considered sufficiently qualified to practice at United
States government hospitals.
Although Riverside affirmatively alleged in its answer
that staff membership was denied for “ just and good
cause,” no evidence of any such “ cause” was adduced.
Absent from this record—despite the contrary allegation
—is any evidence of a legitimate basis on which the ap
plications of the Negro physicians could have been validly
denied. I f such facts exist, the hospital had the power
“to produce the facts” but it has failed to do so. See
Chambers v. Hendersonville Board of Education, supra,
where the court stated:
Innumerable cases have clearly established the princi
ple that under circumstances such as this where a
history of racial discrimination exists, the burden of
proof has been thrown upon the party having the
power to produce the facts.
On the other hand, the record abounds with instances
which establish both physicians as men of high professional
and moral stature. Indeed, in order to satisfy everyone
that Riverside has no legitimate professional or moral
ground for denying membership to Dr. Cypress and Dr.
Scott, they have even shown that certain grounds, none
of which the hospital has contended are the grounds,
could not adequately explain rejection of Negro physicians.
Any suggestion, for example, that Dr. Cypress’ staff
affiliations at two other hospitals could have justified
denial of his application is totally unconvincing. Such
an argument has no relevance to Dr. Scott about whose
31
practice no point was made and it does not offer an ex
planation of the denial of membership to Dr. Cypress.
Dr. Butler testified that it was common for American
physicians to have numerous staff affiliations and the ad
ministrator confirmed this by testifying that many physi
cians decided to decrease their other staff associations
only after having obtained membership at Riverside (the
best hospital in the community) (202a, 218a). Likewise,
Cypress testified he would consider decreasing other
affiliations after admission to the staff if warranted by
hospital responsibilities. Riverside cannot deny to a Negro
doctor the privilege, freely accorded white physicians, to
limit their other affiliations, as may be necessary, after
admission to the staff. The hospital, it should be noted,
has ample means to protect itself from any irresponsible
physician who refuses to meet staff duties. The bylaws
provide for limitation and extension of privileges after
placement on the staff (Art. VI) and continued scrutiny
of a staff physician’s fulfillment of his responsibilities
(Art. VII) (262a, 265-70a, 155a, 219a). The artificiality
of any suggestion that Dr. Cypress could legitimately be
denied staff membership for this reason is also amply
demonstrated by the failure of the hospital, even when
requested to explain the denial of staff membership, to
inform him (if such were the case) that he could become
a member of the staff if he would drop other affiliations.
Finally, the hospital failed to introduce evidence to show
that Dr. Cypress’ use of other hospitals played any part
in denial of membership by Riverside. In short, the
Negro doctors have demonstrated on this record that
they qualify for membership under any conceivable set
of non-racial standards.
32
B. The Hospital May Nol Exclude Qualified Negroes
by Means of a Procedure Which Burdens Negro,
and Not White, Applicants.
Riverside hospital has maintained in the past and main
tains at present policies of racial assignment of patients.
The present policy of refusing to assign patients to rooms
without regard to race was defended in the district court
and continues despite the hospital’s having given assurance
at the time it received an approximately 3 million dollar
federal grant that it would not discriminate on the basis
of race. Thus, the procedure by which the hospital
denied membership to Negro physicians operates in
a context where race has been and continues to be a con
sideration. Negro physicians were denied staff member
ship by their failure to obtain the secret ballot votes of
more than three-fourths of the all-white medical staff of
the hospital, a method which provides an easy opportunity
for the exercise of racial prejudice, and seems more suit
able to a fraternity than to a facility subject to the Con
stitution, Simkins v. Moses Cone Memorial Hospital, 323
F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963). This voting procedure, applied
without consideration of evidence, itself violates due
process of law.16 The Negro physicians here, however,
16 To put to a vote the doctors’ rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to obtain staff membership without racial exclusion is to
argue they may be denied their constitutional rights if more than one-
quarter of the white physicians on the hospital staff desire to exclude
Negroes or act in an other-wise “ patently arbitrary and discriminatory'”
manner, Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192; Johnson v. Branch,
------ F.2d ------ (4th Cir. 1966) and cases cited. The Supreme Court
rejected a similar argument in Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377
U.S. 713, 736, 737, a recent reapportionment case. See also Goss v.
Board of Education, 373 U.S. 632, 655; Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S.
339; Hall v. St. Helena Parish, 197 F. Supp. 649, 658, 659 (E.D. La.
1961) aff’d 368 U.S. 515; Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1963),
290; James v. Duckworth, 170 F. Supp. 343, 347 (E.D. Va. 1959). Due
process also requires some opportunity to introduce evidence and explain
adverse charges. The record clearly demonstrates that Dr. Cypress and
Dr. Scott were denied membership without any such opportunity, per-
33
are entitled to admission to the staff not just a hearing,
for they have demonstrated qualifications far superior to
those required for membership. The voting rule supports
this conclusion for applied by an all-white staff, it ob
viously places a heavy burden on qualified Negro physi
cians because of their race, provides undue opportunity
for racial exclusion, and explains the otherwise inex
plicable rejection of Dr. Cypress and Dr. Scott.
When applied by the all-white medical staff, this proce
dure obviously discriminates against qualified Negro physi
cians. Staff members voting by secret ballot need give no
reasons for denial of membership and are, therefore,
“ immune from outward responsibility in depriving others
of their rights.” Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring,
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 161, 162. On the other hand, the procedure places
no burden on qualified white physicians. Cf. Franklin v.
Giles County School Board,------ - F .2d------ (4th Cir. 1966);
Chambers v. Hendersonville Board of Education, supra.
This court rejected less burdensome admission proce
dures as unconstitutional in Hawkins v. North Carolina
Dental Society, 355 F.2d 718, 723 (4th Cir. 1966) where
only a recommendation from two of 1,214 white dentists
was required for admission. In Meredith v. Fair, 298 F.2d
696, 701-702 (5th Cir. 1962), a state university sought to
mitting denial of membership to completely qualified physicians on the
basis of any charges, no matter how unfounded, arbitrary or irrelevant,
and permitting such charges to remain unrevealed. This is just the kind
of mischief which procedural due process requirements were framed to
prevent. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496, 497; Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 161, 162; Slochower V. Board
of Education, 350 U.S. 551 (summary dismissal without any inquiry when
the self-incrimination claimed denial of due process) ; Interstate Com
merce Commission v. Louisville and N.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 91. Signifi
cantly under Virginia’s Administrative Agencies Act, Va. Code §9-6.10,
the Negroes would have been entitled to a hearing, if denied membership
by a State “Agency” .
34
justify rejection of a Negro applicant on the ground that
he had not furnished required certificates of good char
acter from five alumni. As only whites were alumni, the
court held that such a certificate requirement was a denial
of the equal protection of the laws when applied against
Negroes because it imposed “a heavy burden on qualified
Negro students, because of their race.” Somewhat simi
lar requirements were invalidated in Ludley v. Board of
Supervisors Louisiana State University, 150 F. Supp. 900
(E.D. La. 1957), affirmed 252 F.2d 372 (5th. Cir. 1958),
cert. den. 358 U.S. 819, and Hunt v. Arnold, 172 F. Supp.
847, 849 (N.D. Ga. 1959). See also United States v. Logue,
344 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1965), holding invalid a require
ment that registered voters “vouch” for applicants in reg
istration in a county where no Negroes had been regis
tered. The court said that the voucher requirement “ in
evitably imposes a greater burden on Negroes than whites
under existing dominant social patterns,” and that, “ im
posing as it does a heavier burden on Negro than white
applicants, is inherently discriminatory as applied” (344
F.2d at 292). The court did not inquire into the purpose
of the voucher rule although the rule had been badly
administered; rather it focused on the rule’s effect and
found that it fell more heavily upon Negroes than upon
whites. Indeed, the principle that a marked discrimina
tory effect is the true measure of unconstitutional action
has been long established. United States v. Wilbur Ward,
345 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Mississippi,
339 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1964); Louisiana v. United States,
380 U.S. 145 (1965).
In summary, it is difficult, absent confession of a policy
of racial exclusion, to conceive of additional evidence of
discrimination which the Negroes could have adduced.
While only required to prevail by a preponderance of evi
dence, they have shown beyond a reasonable doubt that
35
they are highly qualified and respected physicians who
meet standards applied in the leading hospitals in the
nation and that whites—especially with their specialty
qualifications—are always granted membership. In the
face of such evidence, and this Court’s condemnation of a
less burdensome procedure than employed here in Haw
kins, supra, the hospital must come forward with some
evidence of a valid ground for denial, especially when it
alleged exclusion for “ just and good cause.” The hospital,
however, has not come forward with any evidence. Its
only witness was not present and did not participate in
the staff meetings at which the votes were taken and con
ceded that as far as he knew, both physicians were fully
qualified.
To hold, in these circumstances, that appellants have
not established exclusion of Negro physicians would be to
permit Hill-Burton hospitals unfettered discretion in with
holding staff membership, for, aside from the outright
admission of discrimination, the proof submitted in this
case is the only kind available to Negro physicians to
establish their exclusion. If qualifications such as Dr.
Scott’s and Dr. Cypress’ are inadequate, no Negro will
ever obtain admission to the Riverside staff, although
“Racial discrimination by hospitals visits severe conse
quences upon Negro physicians and their patients” Sim-
Jcins v. Moses N. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F.2d 959,
970 (4th Cir. 1963). The hospital has failed to offer a
valid explanation for rejection of the Negro physicians
although, if such explanation existed, it was within the
hospital’s power to produce it. See Pierre v. Louisiana,
306 U.S. 354, 361 ;17 Chambers v. Hendersonville Board of
Education, supra.
17 “Had there been evidence obtainable to contradict and disprove the
testimony offered by petitioner, it cannot be assumed that the state would
have refrained from introducing it.”
36
II
Appellants Are Entitled to Injunctive Relief Against
the Hospital’s Practice of Assigning Rooms on the
Basis of Race.
Uncontradicted testimony of Administrator Nelson L.
St. Clair, Jr., establishes segregation of patients at River
side Hospital. Negro patients at Riverside Hospital are
not assigned to rooms with white patients. Pediatrics is
an exception only when parents are consulted and Mr.
St. Clair determines that no “ conflict” will result.
Appellants are entitled to an order enjoining racial as
signment practices at the Hospital. That such assignment
is unlawful is demonstrated by Simkins v. Moses II. Cone
Memorial Hospital, 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert,
denied 376 U.S. 938, and Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710
(4th Cir. 1964). See also Rackley v. Orangeburg Regional
Hospital, 310 F.2d 141, 143 (4th Cir. 1962). In Simkins,
both hospitals excluded Negroes before the Court of Ap
peals decision, but the district judge on remand entered
an order enjoining the hospitals “ from denying plaintiff-
patients and the class they represent, admission to, or
conditioning or abridging the admission to, or use of the
facilities and services of the defendant hospitals on the
basis of race.” Order entered in No. C-57-G--62 (M.D. N.C.
April 16, 1964). In Eaton, supra, where Negro physicians
and patients complained of segregation in room and ward
facilities rather than exclusion, a similar order was en
tered (No. 932, E.D. N.C.). Appellants do not contend
that the hospital cannot assign rooms on the basis of any
legitimate medical or administrative reason; only that the
practice of always assigning Negroes to rooms with other
Negroes or assuming that nonracial placement would cause
conflict is unlawful.
37
In its opinion, the district court concluded that appellants
lacked standing to complain of the hosptial’s admitted pol
icy of not putting Negro and white patients in the same
room. The district court was concerned that, “ This is a
complex matter which involves the delicate situation of
the patient’s feelings as related to his general health.” The
district court also noted that the patient segregation issue
was before it in another case. But minor appellants Jack-
son and Clark certainly are entitled to obtain relief against
segregation of patients. The children, who suffer from a
chronic disease, sickle-cell anemia,18 have been treated at
Riverside in the past on numerous occasions (27a), and a
parent of the Jackson child desires to use its modern
facilities to obtain treatment from Dr. Cypress should
future hospitalization be necessary.
The district court stressed the fact that, “No witness
has testified that he ever sought admission to a room
occupied by a person of another race.” The court noted,
however, that “ Riverside concedes that its practice is not
to assign Negro and white patients to the same room,”
and it was admitted that both Negro minors had been
treated at Riverside (27a). Thus, the court concluded that
Riverside’s admitted policy of patient segregation should
not be enjoined because appellants did not explicitly testify
that they requested relief. The court’s position on this
issue is clearly shown in its extensive colloquy with coun
sel (211-18a). The court asked counsel whether courts are
designed “for social reform;” whether the hospital’s policy
equals “discrimination per se;” whether plaintiff’s lawyer,
or Dr. Cypress, or Dr. Scott, or Mrs. Wright was “com
plaining” of the practice.
It is submitted that the hospital’s confessed policy of
racial segregation and the likelihood of injury to appel
18 The anemia is a result of excessive red cell destruction. Prognosis
is poor. Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy, 10th Ed., 1961.
38
lants makes such testimony a needless formality. First,
it may be fairly inferred from the record as a whole and
especially the subscribed complaint that appellants object
to segregation of patients. Second, it is plain in light of
hospital policy, that both minor appellants were subjected
to racial segregation when treated at Riverside (27a, 190a),
and have standing Rackley v. Orangeburg Regional Hos
pital, 310 F.2d 141, 143 (4th Cir. 1962). Third, it is clear
that the children are likely to be segregated should they
return to Riverside. Fourth, Negroes may sue as a class
to enjoin threatened class discrimination even though no
Negro specifically alleges that he was a victim of such
discrimination, Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966),
(The Evans record reveals that no Negro in that case
alleged that he or any other Negro had been the victim
of racial discrimination. See Record, pp. 37-42, 62-63),
Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202, 204; Morrison v. Davis, 252
F.2d 102, 103 (5th Cir. 1958), Anderson v. City of Albany,
321 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1963). Fifth, this Court has held
in cases not materially different from the instant case
that appellants are entitled to injunctive relief. Simkins
v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, supra; Eaton, supra;
Rackley, supra. Sixth, Negro doctors, entitled to staff
admission, clearly need not subject their patients to seg
regation, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481.
An instructive decision is Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284,
288-290 (5th Cir. 1963), where it was held that desegrega
tion suits are “directed at the systemwide policy of racial
segregation,” and that direct proof of intention to obtain
particular relief is unnecessary, it being implicit in the
circumstances of the litigation. There, two adults suing
on behalf of their children brought suit to desegregate
the Forth Worth, Texas public schools. One testified that
he was bringing the suit for his own children and not for
39
other Negro children and the testimony of the other parent
was silent on the question. The district court and the
court of appeals both found class relief proper. “By the
very nature of the controversy, the attack is on the un
constitutional practice of racial discrimination. Once that
is found to exist, the Court must order that it be discon
tinued. Such a decree, of course, might name the suc
cessful plaintiff as the party not to be discriminated
against. But that decree may not—either expressly or
impliedly—affirmatively authorize continued discrimina
tion by reason of race against others.” In light of the
admitted policy of segregation and the obvious desires of
Negro physicians and patients to end all discrimination
to which they may be subject at the hospital, injunctive
relief against compulsory segregation of patients is clearly
appropriate.
CONCLUSION
W herefore, fo r the foregoin g reasons, plaintiffs pray
that the judgm ent below be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
J ack Greenberg
J ames M. Nabrit, III
M ichael Meltsner
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York
P hilip W alker
648 25th Street
Newport News, Virginia
Attorneys for Appellants
Conrad K. H arper
Of Counsel
MEILEN PRESS INC. ~ N. Y.