Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University & Agricultural & Mechanical College v Ludley Brief on Behalf of Appellees

    IN  THE

Initeft States (Erntrl n! Appeals
For the Fifth Circuit

No. 16,854
B oard of Supervisors op L ouisiana State University & 

A gricultural & Mechanical College, et al.,
Appellants,

versus
A rnease L udley, Appellee,

A udrey C. R obertson, A lyery L. B arnum,
R uth Mae J ohnson, Intervenors.

No. 16,855
L ouisiana State B oard op E ducation, et al.,

Appellants,
versus

Alma L ark, et al., Appellees.

No. 16,856
L ouisiana State B oard op E ducation, et al.,

Appellants,
versus

J ack Bailey, et al., Appellees.

BRIEF ON BEHALF OF APPELLEES

A. P. Tureaud,
Claver Building,

1821 Orleans Avenue,
New Orleans 16, Louisiana.

T hurgood Marshall,
Jack Greenberg,

107 West 43rd Street,
New York 36, New York.

R obert L. Carter,
20 West 40th Street,

New York 18, New York,
Irma R obbins F eder, Attorneys for Appellees.

Of Counsel.



SUBJECT INDEX

Statement of the C a se ...................................................
Argument:

I. The Court Below Did Not Err in Holding 
La. R. S. 17 =2131-2135 & 17 =443 (Acts 15 & 
249 of 1956) Unconstitutional as Said Laws 
Bar Appellants and Other Negro Students 
Similarly Situated from Attending State In­
stitutions of Higher Education on Account of 
Their Race and Color in Violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution .......................................................
The Court Below Did Not Err in Consider­
ing Evidence of Legislative Intent in Enact­
ing the Statutes Challenged in the Instant 
Cases ..................................................................

II. The Instant Suits Are Not Suits Against the 
State Under the Eleventh Amendment........

III. A  Three-Judge District Court Was Unneces­
sary in the Instant C ases...............................

IV. No Hiving of Security Was Ordered or Re­
quired With Reference to the Temporary Re­
straining Orders and Preliminary Injunc­
tions in the Instant C ases........ .......................

V. The Court Below Did Not Abuse Its Discre­
tion in Permitting the Intervention as Plain­
tiffs of Audrey C. Robertson, Alvery L. 
Barnum and Ruth Mae Johnson in No. 16,854

Conclusion........... ............................................................
Certificate of S ervice .....................................................

PAGE

1

2

4

6

7

9

10
12
12



11

Authorities Cited
PAGE

Adkins v. School Board of City of Newport News,
148 F. Supp. 430 (E. D. Va. 1957), a ff’d 246 F. 2d 
325 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. den. — U. S. —, 1 L. ed.
2d— (1957)..................................................................4,5, 8, 9

Askew v. Benton. Harbor Housing Commission, 24 
Fed. Buies Serv. 23a, 53, Case 1 ...............................  11

Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University 
v. Tureaud, 228 F. 2d 895 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. den.
351 U. S. 924 (1956) ................................................. 8,10

Booker v. Tennessee Board of Education, 240 F. 2d 
689 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. den. 1 L. ed. 2d 915 (1957) 8

Buck Stove & Bange Co. v. Vickers, 226 U. S. 205
(1912) ............................................................................ 6

Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, 138 F. Supp.
337 (E. D. La. 1956), aff’d 242 F. 2d 156 (5th Cir.
1957), cert. den. — U. S. —, 1 L. ed. 2d 1436 (1957) .4, 5, 6

California Water Service Company v. City of Bed­
ding, 304 U. S. 252 (1938) .........................................  7, 8

Cook v. Davis, 178 F. 2d 595 (5th Cir. 1950) ............  11
Davis v. County Board of Prince Edward County,

AGrginia, 142 F. Supp. 616 (E. D. Va. 1956) .......... 9
Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S. D. Ala. 1949), 

a ff’d 336 U. S. 933 (1949) ........................................ 5
Ex parte Ayers, 123 U. S. 443 (1887) ..........................  6
Ex parte Poresky, 290 U. S. 30 (1933) .....................  7, 8
Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908) .....................  6
International Text-Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91 

(1910) ..................................................   6
Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 288 (1939) .........................  4
New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U. S. 76 (1883).. 6
Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270 (1885 ).......... 6



I l l

PAGE
Eice V. Elmore, 165 F. 2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert, 

den. 333 U. S. 875 (1948) .........................................  4
School Board of City of Charlottesville, Virginia v.

Allen, 240 F. 2d 59 (4th Cir. 1956) ........................ 6
School Segregation Cases, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), 349 

U. S. 294 (1955) ......................................................... 8

Statutes and Constitution Cited

28 United States Code, §§2281-2284 ...........................  8
Buie 65(c), Federal Buies of Civil Procedure.......... 9
La. Constitution, Article XIX, § 26 (as amended No­

vember 6, 1956) ........................................................... 6
La. B. S. 17:2131-2135 (Act 15 of 1956)
La. B. S. 17:443 (Act 249 of 1956) . . . .

2, 3, 5, 9,10 
2, 3, 5, 9,10



IN THE

Itutefc States Gkmrt o! Appeals
For the Fifth Circuit

— —----- -——— o----------------------
No. 16,854

B oaed of Supervisors of L ouisiana State U niversity & 
A gricultural & Mechanical College, et al.,

Appellants,
versus

A bnease Ltjdley,
Appellee,

A udrey C. R obertson, A lvery L. B aenum,
R uth Mae J ohnson,

Intervenors.

No. 16,855
L ouisiana State B oard of E ducation, et al.,

Appellants,
versus

A lma L ark, et al.,
Appellees.

No. 16,856
L ouisiana State B oard of E ducation, et al.,

Appellants,
versus

J ack B ailey, et al.,
Appellees.

o-

BRIEF ON BEHALF OF APPELLEES

Statement of the Case
The statement of the facts by appellants is a fair state­

ment of the facts material on these appeals. By order of 
this Court, these three cases were consolidated for pur­
poses of appeal.



2

ARGUMENT

I
The Court Below Did Not Err in Holding La.
R. S. 17:2131-2135 and 17:443 (Acts 15 & 249 
of 1956) Unconstitutional As Said Laws Bar 
Appellants And Other Negro Students Simi­
larly Situated From Attending State Institu­
tions Of Higher Education On Account Of 
Their Race And Color In Violation Of The 

Fourteenth Amendment To The United 
States Constitution.

The two statutes challenged in the instant cases consti­
tute an effective means of preserving segregation in pub­
licly-supported institutions of higher learning in the state 
of Louisiana. La. R. S. 17:2131-2135 requires a certificate 
of eligibility and good moral character signed by the 
appropriate Superintendent and Principal for admission 
and attendance at such institutions, and La. R. S. 17:443 
makes any act “ bringing about integration”  in such insti­
tutions grounds for dismissal of a permanent teacher:

“ No person shall be registered at or admitted to any 
publicly financed institution of higher learning of 
this state unless he or she shall have first filed with 
said institution a certificate addressed to the particu­
lar institution sought to be entered attesting to his 
or her eligibility and good moral character. This 
certificate must be signed by the Superintendent of 
Education of the Parish, County, or Municipality 
wherein said applicant graduated from High School, 
and by the principal of the High School from which 
he graduated.”

(Act No. 15, House Bill No. 437, § 1, approved by 
the Governor on June 20, 1956.)

“ A  permanent teacher shall not be removed from 
office except upon written and signed charges of . . . 
advocating or in any manner performing any act 
toward bringing about integration of the races within



3

the public school system or any public institution of 
higher learning of the State of Louisiana . . . ”

(Act No. 249, House Bill No. 1447, § 1, approved 
by the Governor July 8, 1956.)

As stated by the court below, “ Addressing a certificate 
of good character for a Negro to a . . . white institution 
. . . jeopardizes the job of the principal or superintendent 
addressing the certificate”  (R. No. 16,854 p. 119; No. 16,855 
p. 76; No. 16,856 p. 67). Thus, these statutes on their 
face deprive qualified Negro applicants of their constitu­
tional right to be admitted to public colleges and univer­
sities in Louisiana on the same basis as white applicants.

The evidence offered by appellees at the hearing clearly 
supports the above conclusion. Numerous affidavits attest 
to the fact that appellees were unable to secure the re­
quired signatures for the necessary certificates because the 
principals and superintendents were fearful of losing their 
jobs (R. No. 16,855 pp. 16-26, 60-61; No. 16,856 pp. 14-24, 
51).

Moreover, apart from the constitutional invalidity of 
these statutes on account of their inevitable result in dis­
criminating against Negro students desiring to attend 
public institutions of higher learning, the two laws are 
unconstitutional because they were intended to deprive such 
Negro students of equal protection of laws by continuing 
segregation in direct opposition to decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court. That the court below was justified 
in considering evidence of legislative history and intent is 
discussed elsewhere in this brief. That the legislative 
background set forth in the opinion of the court below 
provided ample grounds for holding the intent of the 
Louisiana Legislature in passing the challenged statutes 
to be the preservation of segregation is obvious. It is 
respectfully submitted that the opinion of the court below 
contains a comprehensive and well-reasoned analysis of 
the unconstitutionality of the “ transparent device”  con­
sisting of La. R. S. 17:2131-2135 and 17:443, and appellees 
feel any further analysis would be superfluous.



4

Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 288 (1939);
Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, 138 F. Supp. 

337 (E. D. La. 1956), aff’d 242 F. 2d 156 (5th 
Cir. 1957), cert. den. — U. S. — , 1 L. ed. 2d 
1436 (1957) ;

Adkins v. School Board of City of Newport News, 
148 F. Supp. 430 (E. D. Ya. 1957), a ff’d 246 
F. 2d 325 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. den. — U. S. — , 
1 L. ed. 2d — (1957).

The Court Below Did Not Err In Consider­
ing Evidence Of Legislative Intent In Enact­

ing The Statutes Challenged In The 
Instant Cases.

Relevant case-law demonstrates that such legislative 
history and background as the court below considered is 
admissible to prove the intent and purpose with which 
the challenged laws were passed, the fact that these laws 
are part of an overall legislative scheme, or, in more 
general terms, the conditions and circumstances out of 
which the cause of action arose.

In Rice v. Elmore, 165 F. 2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert, 
den. 333 U. S. 875 (1948), the Court affirmed an injunction 
enjoining Domocratic party officials from denying Negroes 
the right to vote in party primaries. In holding the “ two 
step election machinery’ ’ unconstitutional, the Court dis­
cussed and relied on peripheral legislative activity.1

1 “ Immediately following this decision [Smith v. Allwright, 321 
U. S. 649], the then Governor of South Carolina convened the state 
legislature and recommended that it repeal all laws with relation to 
primaries with the avowed purpose of preventing voting by Negroes 
in the Democratic primaries of the state. Pursuant to this recom­
mendation, the primary laws of the state were repealed and the 
Democratic primary was conducted thereafter under rules prescribed 
by the Democratic party.”  (A  quote from the District Judge’s opinion 
follows stating that the Democratic State Convention then adopted 
“the repealed statutes” ). Id. at 388-389.



5

Similarly, Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S. D. Ala. 
1949), aff’d. 336 U. S. 933 (1949), relied on the “ history 
of the period immediately preceding the adoption of the 
Boswell Amendment”  in holding this racially-discrimina- 
tory voting amendment invalid (at 878 et seq.).

Nor are examples in the school-segregation field lack­
ing. In Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, 138 F. 
Supp. 337 (E. D. La. 1956), a ff’d. 242 F. 2d 156 (5th Cir. 
1957), cert, denied — U. S. —, 1 L. ed. 2d 1436 (1957), 
the Court held a “ pupil assignment-administrative remedy”  
law unconstitutional as “ part of the legislative plan . . . 
to avoid the effect o f ”  the School Segregation Cases (at 
341). The Court referred to a constitutional “ segrega­
tion”  provision and a compulsory public-school segrega­
tion statute as other parts of the invalid legislative device. 
In Adkins v. School Board of City of Newport News, 
148 F. Supp, 430 (E. D. Va. 1957), aff’d. 246 F. 2d 325 (4th 
Cir. 1957), cert. den. — U. S. —, 1 L. ed. 2d — (1957), 
the Court reviewed “ the forerunners and objectives lead­
ing to the enactment of Chapter 70,”  several of which are 
identical with evidence supporting assertions in paragraph 
seven of the instant complaint, and in the light of “ this 
background,”  held the Pupil Placement Act unconstitu­
tional (at 433-439).

Thus, as in the above-cited cases, the court below 
properly noted legislative history and background in the 
instant cases since it furnished an appropriate background 
or perspective for determining the unconstitutionality of 
La. R. S. 17:2131-2135 and 17:443 under the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.



6

I I
The Instant Suits Are Not Suits Against The 

State Under The Eleventh Amendment.

Appellants now concede that the United States Supreme 
Court has long held that federal courts may entertain suits 
to restrain State officers from acting under invalid stat­
utes: such suits are not suits against the Slate for which 
the State’s consent is required since State officers neither 
represent nor equal “ the State”  when they act pursuant 
to unconstitutional laws. See Bush v. Orleans Parish School 
Board, 138 F. Supp. 337, 310 (E. D. La. 1956), aff’d. 242 
F. 2d 156, 160-161 (5th Cir. 1957), application for writ of 
mandamus requiring 3-judge court denied 351 U. S. 948
(1956) , cert. den. — U. S. —, 1 L. ed. 2d 1436 (1957), and 
School Board of City of Charlottesville, Virginia v. Allen, 
240 F. 2d 59, 60-63 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. den. 353 U. S. 910
(1957) , for cases in which the general rule has been applied 
in suits to restrain public school officials from enforcing 
or acting under racially-discriminatory laws.

Appellants, however, now raise two other points. First, 
they rely on the provision of the Louisiana Constitution 
decreeing all suits against specific state agencies including 
school boards to be suits against the State, whether or not 
the constitutionality of the agencies’ action is challenged. 
See Louisiana Constitution Article XIX, Section 26, as 
amended November 6, 1956. This point is clearly without 
merit. The United States Supreme Court considers it a 
“ settled doctrine”  that the judiciary, and only the judi­
ciary, has the duty as well as the power to determine the 
real parties in a case, Ex parte Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 487, 
492 (1887), citing Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 
287 (1885), New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U. S. 76 
(1883), and no State can limit either federal jurisdiction 
or the constitutional right to sue in the federal courts, 
Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 148 (1908), International 
Text-Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91 (1910), Buck Stove & 
Range Co. v. Vickers, 226 U. S. 205 (1912). Suffice it to



7

say that research has revealed no case in which a State’s 
“ sovereign immunity”  has been permitted to frustrate a 
federal court’s jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of 
invalid State statutes by public officials.

Secondly, appellants now assert that they are not 
charged with enforcing the two statutes involved in the 
instant cases. “ A  careful reading of these laws,”  as sug­
gested by appellants at page 11 of the Lark2 & Bailey 3 
briefs, demonstrates'the fact that the Board of Supervisors, 
President of the University, and Dean of the Graduate 
School (appellants in the Ludley case), and the State Board 
of Education, State Superintendent of Education, Presi­
dents and Registrars of the college involved (appellants in 
the Lark & Bailey cases), are appropriate defendants since 
they have supervisory duties with respect to the pertinent 
educational institutions and therefore are directly con­
cerned with admissions policies—whether embodied in 
statutes, rules and regulations, resolutions, or custom 
and practice. Thus, they are the ‘ ‘ proper parties ’ ’ against 
whom restraining orders give appellees the relief they 
seek.

I l l
A  Three-Judge District Court Was Unnecessary 

In The Instant Cases.

Appellants have cited and quoted from the leading case 
holding a three-judge district court under 28 U. S. C. Sec­
tions 2281-2284 unnecessary in the absence of “  [ t ] he 
existence of a substantial question of constitutionality. 
# # * ”  j£x parfe Boresky, 290 U. S. 30, 32 (1933); cf. Cali­
fornia Water Service Company v. City of Redding, 304 U. S. 
252 (1938). Appellants contend, however, that this is true 
only when “ prior decisions have left no doubt that the 
statute is constitutional * * * ”  (Ludley, Lark, & Bailey 
briefs, p. 18).

2 No. 16,855.
3 No. 16,856.



8

But explicit language in the two above-cited United 
States Supreme Court opinions clearly demonstrates the 
fallacy in appellants’ contention:

“ The question may be plainly unsubstantial, either 
because it is ‘ obviously without merit’ or because 
‘ its unsoundness so clearly results from the previous 
decisions of this court as to foreclose the subject- 
and leave no room for the inference that the ques­
tion sought to be raised can be the subject of con­
troversy.’ ”

Ex parte Poresky, 290 U. 8. 30, 32 (1933); restated 
in California Water Service Company v. City of 
Redding, 304 U. S. 252, 255 (1938).

“ Previous decisions”  can “ leave no room for the in­
ference”  that statutes are constitutional as well as for 
the assertion that they are unconstitutional. Surely if a 
state passed a law that every citizen must register before 
uttering a .single word anywhere the energy, expense, and 
time required for a three-judge court would not be re­
quired for an injunction enjoining the enforcement of such 
a patently unconstitutional statute.

Already many cases have relied on the proposition just 
discussed for having a single judge hear a suit to enjoin 
the enforcement of public school segregation statutes since 
the laws’ unconstitutionality is apparent under the School 
Segregation Cases, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), 349 U. S. 294 
(1955); see e.g., Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State 
University v. Tureaud, 228 P. 2d 895 (5th Cir. 1956), rein­
stating order in 225 P. 2d 434 in the light of the United 
States Supreme Court’s reversal of 207 F. 2d 807 in 347 
U. S. 971, cert. den. 351 U. S. 924 (1956); Booker v. Ten­
nessee Board of Education, 240 F. 2d 689 (6th Cir. 1957), 
motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus pre­
viously denied, 351 U. S. 948 (1956), cert. den. —  U. S. — , 
1 L. Ed. 2d 915 (1957); Adkins v. School Board of City of 
Newport News, 148 F. Supp. 430 (E. D. Ya. 1957), a if’d



9

246 F. 2d 325 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. den. — U. S. —, 1 L. Ed. 
2d — (1957); Davis v. County Board of Prince Edward 
County, Va., 142 F. Supp. 616 (E. D. Va. 1956).

In the instant suits the law as enunciated by the United 
States Supreme Court is clear and leaves no room for doubt 
that La. R. S. 17:2131-2135 and 17:443 are unconstitutional 
as applied to bar Negro plaintiffs from state colleges on 
account of their race. In view of the unequivocal relevant 
decisions prior to this suit, discussed earlier in this brief, 
no substantial question of constitutionality is present and 
a three-judge court was therefore not necessary.

I V
No Giving Of Security Was Ordered Or Required 
With Reference To The Temporary Restraining 

Orders And Preliminary Injunctions In The 
Instant Cases.

Although appellants refer to Rule 65 (c) (F. R. C. P.) 
in their briefs {Dudley brief, p. 32; Lark brief, p. 29; Bailey 
brief, p. 28), they totally neglect the italicized portion of 
the Rule:

“ No restraining order or preliminary injunction 
shall issue except upon the giving of security by the 
applicant, in such sum as the court deems proper, 
for the payment of such costs and damages as may 
he incurred or suffered by any party who is found 
to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.”

Neither the temporary restraining orders, the orders 
continuing temporary restraining orders, nor the tempo­
rary injunction orders in the instant cases mentioned any 
giving of security by appellees. (R. No. 16854, pp. 14, 16, 
100, 105-109, 121; No. 16,855, pp. 26, 28, 62-70, 78-79; No. 
16,856, pp. 24, 26, 53-61, 69-70). It is therefore apparent 
that District Judges J. Shelly Wright and Herbert W. 
Christenberry did not deem any security necessary or 
“ proper”  since costs would be minimal and damages to 
defendants non-existent in suits of this type.



10

Appellee was never “ required to give any security”  in 
the similar case of Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State 
University v. Tureaud, 228 F. 2d 895 (5th Cir. 1956), re­
instating order in 225 F. 2d 434, following the United States 
Supreme Court’s reversal of 207 F. 2d 807 in 347 U. S. 971, 
cert. den. 351 U. S. 924 (1956); quote appears in the dis­
senting opinion of Judge Cameron in 228 F. 2d 895, 901. 
The three cases cited by appellants (at p. 32, Ludley brief 
and p. 29, Lark & Bailey briefs) all involved substantial 
monetary injury to the opposing parties if the injunctive 
relief was improperly granted.

In any event, appellants have waived their objection to 
the lack of security since they did not raise it prior to 
these appeals.

V
The Court Below Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
In Permitting The Intervention As Plaintiffs O f
Audrey C. Robertson, Alvery L. Barnum And 

Ruth Mae Johnson In No. 16,854.

After the hearing on preliminary injunction had been 
held by the court below and before any decision had been 
rendered by that court, three appellees filed a motion to 
intervene as plaintiffs in No. 16,854. These intervenors 
were members of the same class represented by original 
plaintiff Arnease Ludley, i.e., Negro citizens of the United 
States and of the State of Louisiana presently attending 
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical 
College, a publicly supported institution of higher educa­
tion of the State of Louisiana, whose further admission 
and continued attendance in the previously “ all white”  
state institutions of higher learning was being barred by 
La. R. S. 17:2131-2135 and 17:443. The intervenors’ claims 
and those in the main action No. 16,854 (as well as in No. 
16,855 and No. 16,856) had questions of law and fact in 
common. Applicant-intervenors adopted the allegations 
and prayers contained in the original complaint and the



11

motions filed by plaintiff-Arnease Lndley. (R. No. 16,854
pp. 98-100).

The court below granted the motion to intervene, and 
explicitly noted the identity of issues involved in deciding 
that any further hearing was unnecessary:

‘ ‘ Since these intervenors were before the court from 
the inception of this class action because of their 
being members of the class, and in view of the dis­
position by this court in Nos. 1836 and 1837 [No. 
16,856 and No. 16,855 respectively on appeal] of the 
identical issues raised in No. 1833 [No. 16,854 on 
appeal], no useful purpose would be served by a 
second hearing on the application for preliminary 
injunction in No. 1833.”  (R. No. 16,854 p. 115 fn.
3; No. 16,855 p. 72'fn. 3; No. 16,856 p. 63 fn. 3).

It is submitted that the court below was completely 
justified in granting the motion to intervene in the circum­
stances of this case, No. 16,854, and that appellants have 
shown no reason for deeming the court’s action an abuse 
of discretion or error. Askew v. Benton Harbor Housing 
Commission, 24 Fed. Rules Serv. 23a.53, Case 1.

Indeed, appellants’ argument is all but incomprehensible 
to appellees. For example, the statement quoted from 
Cook v. Davis, 178 F. 2d 595 (5th Cir. 1950) appears to 
have no bearing whatsoever upon the instant case, par­
ticularly in view of the fact that no intervention was sought 
or discussed in that case. The Court merely remarked in 
passing on authority to the effect that no decree can be 
entered in a class suit if no case is made out for the only 
named plaintiff. In the instant case, although there was 
a failure to make out a case for plaintiff—Arnease Ludley, 
there was no such failure as to the three named intervenor- 
plaintiffs-appellees, Audrey C. Robertson, Alvery L. 
Barnum and Ruth Mae Johnson.



12

CONCLUSION

In conclusion it is submitted that the court below 
committed no prejudicial errors, that its judgments 
were entirely proper, and that they should therefore 
be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

A. P. T tjreatjd,
Claver Building,

1821 Orleans Avenne,
New Orleans 16, Louisiana.

T hurgood Marshall,
Jack Greenberg,

107 West 43rd Street,
New York 36, New York.

R obert L. Carter,
20 West 40th. Street,

New York 18, New York,
Attorneys for Appellees.

Irma R obbins F eder,
Of Counsel.

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on this day I have served copies 
of the foregoing brief on behalf of appellees on counsel to 
appellants by placing the same in the United States Mail 
with sufficient postage affixed thereto.

Dated this day of November, 1957.

T hurgood Marshall,
107 West 43rd Street,

New York 36, New York, 
Attorney for Appellees.



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