Rachel v. Georgia Reply Brief for Appellants

    Ix  TI1K

‘{ t u i U ^  r - f 'tatm ( f m i r t  n f  A y p r a l i i

Foi! THE Fll'TM C ircuit

Xn. 2 1 :1 0 4

T h o m a s  L 'a c i i e l , el a!.,

-v-

T i i e  State of Georgia,

A ppcllants,

Appclh

o x  ARREAE FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COT TIT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

f ' t  ^

KF.PI.Y HKIFF FOK APPE LLAN TS

Donald L. 3 Toi.lowell 
H oward Moore, Jr.

PoiHA Hunter Street, XAY. 
Atlanta, Georgia 30314

Jack Greenhero

10 ColmnVms Circle
New York, New York 10010

A nthony G. A msterdam 
3400 Chestnut Street 
Philadelphia, Pa. 10104

O f  C o u n s e l

A t t o r n e y s  f o r  A p p e l l a n t s

-M J I.VVN Z arr 
A nn Coheir 
.loll N Ql ARI.ES, .In.

- v i» W 'n r n » « » r * y »



I N D E X

PAGE

I. This Court may properly consider Die ease before 
it as on petition in the nature of mandamus or 
habeas corpus........................................................  j

II. Should the Court decline to entertain this case as 
on mandamus, no doctrinal obstacle^ precludujfits
treatment as on habeas corpus...............................  4

III .  The Judicial Code of Ifni, relied upon by appellee
as changing prior law, did not do so ................... 8

IV. Appellee improperly draws from the Civil Rights 
Act of 19(14 the inference that remand orders were
not reviewablc prior to its effective date .............  8

V. JJaincs v. Danville should not be followed here...  9



2 P r o o f s D-l f i -b l

I n t h e

l l m t i ' i i  g l a i r s  CCmtrt n f  A ^ r a l o

For the F ifth Cine lit 

Xo. 2inr. f

T homas Rachel, ct al.,
Appellants,

T he State ok Georgia,
Appellee.

OXA1TEAU FROM T1IK UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

KOIt THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

r e p l y  b r i e f  f o r  a p p e l l a n t s

The purpose of this: reply brief is 1o present such author­
ities, pertinent to the points made in appellee’s brief (here­
after Ur.), as cannot conveniently be put before the Court 
on oral argument. Appellee's points v.hicli miss the sub­
stance of appellants’ or which do not suggest the need for 
consideration of additional authorities are not addressed 

lie re.

I.

This Court ’May Properly Consider the Case Before It 
as on Petition in the Nature of .Mandamus or Habeas 

Corpus.

Appellants have urged that this Court hold their motion 
of March 12, lbbl (Appellants’ Br., App. 71-7.’!) and its at­
tachments jurisdictionally sufficient to put the case before 
it ns on an application for an order in the nature of man-



damns or for habeas corpus. (Appellants’ Br. 30-32, 43.) 
A Pi •(•lice objects that the motion looks like none of tlieso 
things and cannot therefore be so treated. (Hr. 13-18, 19- 
20.) Appellee correctly points out that the authorities cited 
at Appellants’ Hr. 33, supporting tin* extreme liberality of 
the federal courts in const riling-papers to seek whatever 
relief is available consistent with their substance, are all 
cases involving imprisoned criminal convicts without 
lawyers; and appellee asserts that such liberality is imper­
missible except in the case of “ unlettered, incarcerated de­
fendants without counsel and without funds.” (Hr. 10.) 
However, the cases cited by appellants were only exem­
plary, In many others, lawyer-filed documents have been 
accorded the same liberal treatment. K.g., Georgia Hard­
wood Lumber Go. v. Campania de Xuvegacion Transmar, 
S.A., 333 lb S. 334 (1943) (notice of appeal treated as ap­
plication for allowance of appeal in admiralty in order to 
save appeal); Crump v. Jlill, KM F.*2d 30 (3th Cir. 1939) 
(tiling in Court of Appeals of acknowledgment of service 
of notice of appeal and designation of record treated as fil­
ing of notice of appeal in order to save appeal); Den Isles 
v. Kraus, 233 F. 2d 233 (3th Cir. 1933) (application for 
leave to appeal in forma puu/uris treated as notice of ap­
peal in order to save appeal); Hath v. Bird, 239 F. 2d 237 
(3th Cir. 1930) (same); O'Xeal v. Knifed Slates, 272 F. 2d 
412 (3th Cir. 1939) (appeal bond treated as notice of ap­
peal in order to save appeal); Carter v. ('ampheU, 283 F. 
2d OS (3th Cir. 1900) (securing of District Court order 
transmitting exhibits to Court of Appeals, and tiling in 
Court of Appends a motion for leave to prosecute appeal on 
typed record treated as filing notice of appeal in order to 
save appeal); and for an extreme instance see I/adjipa- 
h ras v. J’ad/iea, S.A., 290 F. 2d 097 (3th Cir. 1901) (motion 
in District Court for allowance* of appeal in admiralty and 
motion in Court of Appeals for expedited hearing treated



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I

3

ns ]n'titinii' to tin- respective courts for allowance of inter­
locutory appeal) (alternative ground).‘ Tliese eases make 
apparent that whenever a paper is tiled elearly evincing a 
desire to seek appellate review, the jurisdictional require­
ment is satisfied irrespective of the form of the paper.* In 
the present ease, at least as early .as March 12, liHil it was 
apparent to appellee and to till courts concerned that ap­
pellants were seeking review of the District Court’s remand 
order by any available mode.

1 The clear weight of federal authority supports the Fifth Circuit 
decisions cited. /.*.</.. I ii i'i /.< o/h, 139 j*. ltd .Isiti ( 1). C. Cir. 1013) 
(petition to Court of Appeals for special appeal treated as notice of 
appeal in order to save appeal) ; Soci i t i  I nh  r n a tw n a h  Pour Pur- 
t ic i /Hi 1 ions Industri i  lies i t  ('oinnii relates, S.  *i. v. McGrath,  ISO 
F. od .((it; ( 1), ( ’ . Cir. 1930) (same; ; The Asturian,  f>7 F. 2d 8f> ( 9th 
Cir. 1032) (petition for lihel of review treated ns petition for re­
hearing in order to extend appeal time and save appeal) ; Dickey v. 
Pnit i i l  S t a h s ,  332 1'. 2d 77tt ( 9th Cir. 19ti4 ) (notice of motion for 
new trial treated as motion tor lew trial m order to extend appeal 
(inn* and save appeal). Itv contrast, tin* Seventh Circuit tends to 
insist on technical perfection. Unison v. Atchison,  Topeka <(• Santa  
/■’. liy. Co., 2s0 1'. 2d 72ti ( 7111 Cir. 10(11 ), a r t .  t lcniul, 3(58 U. S. 
s:;,') (lotil i. tint this Court has previously taken “ the more liberal 
rule" in such matters. P nih i l  S t u b s  v. Stromhi  ry, 227 F. 2d 1*03, 
tint Cith Cir. to:.:.) i notice of appeal from denial of post-trial 
motion* treated as addressed to underlying judgment as Well), and 
tin Supreme Court has suhsetpiently agreed. Ponton v. Davis, 371 
t S .  tvs (1 fi('.2 ) ( same).

" Appellants' counsel would he worse than disingenuous not to 
concede that 111 * * i r papers were b.nlh styled and that they are now 
in tin* era eel *ss posture, as appellee puts it, of “ scrambling” (Hr. 8 ) 
to preserve their clients' rights of review. In February and March, 
l!m I do* manlier of obtaining r< \ iew of a district court remand 
order was far from clear and. while this do**s not excuse counsel’s 
ii-ititiii-.il :.*ii 1 uto s, it does suggest do* harshness of visiting irrepara­
ble eon vi|iii*nei*s on appellants, t ' t .  IS construct ion Finance t'or)i, 
v. Prinh n c  St curitii s Advisory  Group,  311 C. S. f)7!t ( 1911) 
(notiec of appeal treal'-d as petition to Court of Appeals for leave 
to appeal where method ot' appeal was unsettled); Pn l t in y  v. Hill- 
h id ie k .  17s K. 2(1 771 i!Mh Cir. ICC* i notice of motion for n stay 
of exeention pending posting of a supersedeas bond treated as 
notice of appeal where manic r of a notice of appeal was unsettled).



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•1

II.

Should the Court Decline to F.ntertuin This Case up 
on '.!; iitl.iiiiti'. No Doctrinal Uli'-taclcs Frccude Its 
I reatioeitl as on Habeas Corpus.

Appellants’ principal reliance is upon the availability of 
mandamus in this Court to review the District Court’s er­
roneous construction of the civil rights removal statute. 
(See Appellant-‘ Hr. 30-42.) If mandamus is unavailable, 
appellants have urged (1) that the question of the validity 
of the order below is cognizable within the jurisdiction of 
the judges of this Court to issue writs of habeas corpus 
(Appellants' Hr. -Id U). or (2) that under 2S U. S. C. §2253 
(1!»5S), this Court has jurisdiction on appeal to determine 
whether the allegations of the removal petition did not 
state a sufficient case for anticipatory federal habeas cor­
pus. so that the District Court might have entertained the 
petition under 2K C. S. C. '2211(e)(3) (IdoS). Appellee 
relies principally that appellants neither were alleged to 
he, nor were in fact, in custody for habeas corpus purposes. 
(Hr. 20 24.)

Hoth the removal petition (K. 0) and the motion for re­
lief in this Court (Appellants* Hr., App. 72) clearly allege 
that appellants are on bail, and the motion additionally 
alleges that they are in imminent danger of reincarceration 
hv reason of raised bond ( ilml.). Appellee takes the posi­
tion that bail status is insufficient eii-tody to support habeas 
corpus under the concept o| custody authoritatively ad­
vanced in ,lnn'.. \. ( '  mi a i n (fleiiii, 571 1 . S. 250 (1!l(i5), be­
cause a defendant on bond. "i.~io tar as the State is con­
cerned. . . . can go where he ph ases and do as lie pleases, 
provided lie appear- to au-wer the charges against him. 
(Hr. 22.) This assertion is dally belied by (h-orgia statute, 
On. Cod.- Ann.. 105.3, 27 HOI, Appendix, infra, which an-



thorizes a surety to urro.d at 
any tilin' <>a tin- surety s iti'T 
llic Georgia c o u r t w  hose 
threatened hero— to increase 
defendant and so cati'-e liis r 
stances, appellants wen* in ]>i 
held in custody, for they tve 
shared by the public goner: 
supra, ."71 1 . fv ut 2 Ml, and 
time . . . and . . . thrown hack 
the procedural safeguards t! 
provided to those charged w 
apjieilants’ circumstances in 
carious than those of the |>ar 
rearrest a hailed defendant 
than the jiowcr to retake a ]>i 
nest that appellants arc frv 
do as they please so long a 
ti 1 ile of incurring the dhp! 
empoweretl to reincarcerate

h1 surrender his principal at 
I- whim, and by the jiowcr of 

exercise was immediately 
the bond required of a bailed 
earrest. 1’nder these circum- 
actical tact as well as theory 
re subject to “ restraints not 
illy," Joins v. Cinniiiii/hani, 
could he “ rearrested at any 

in jail . . . with lew’, if any, of 
lint normally must be and aro 
ith crime," id. at 2-12. Indeed, 
these regards were more pro- 
(,!ee in J o i n s ,  for the power to 
in Georgia is itiore arbitrary 

moled. It blinks reality to sug- 
c to go where they please and 
s their every action is suscep- 
casure of courts and sureties 
them at will.4

Aj i j ie l lee  twi ts  appellants for their suggestion (alterna­
tive (2) supm) that their removal petition is cognizable as 
a petition for habeas corjius in the District Court. Antici-

S ’1 1 1,, entire raison </V/r« of lh<- hail oh! i cut ion, o f course, is to 
i m I a im* eoie.lniiiils on the hailed defendant. See Stack v. Hoyle, 312 
|- s. 1. ,'i in.'il). Hi torieally. a liaih'd defendant is deemed to 
remain in . nstody. 2 H a m :. I ' m  as or Tin. ( nows 124 (1st Ameri- 
i'im i d.. I ’ liila 1 s ]7 t ; •_> poi.i oi k x M aitt.anh, H istohv or  K nouish 
l,\\V .'|S?l CM III. p lug) ;  l l|tl III l>, 1'HIMINAI 1 'KOI I HU II I'. ITiOM A !!- 

r mu A m u .  123 MOIT-. ami win re- as in Georgia— this eon- 
ptinn is at tend i-d liy an arbitrary power of narrest, the hailed 

di' limtant is tni lv “ *on a string.’ ’ tuylor  v. l am to r ,  10 "NN all. .100, 
I'.', 1-2,72 1''7 2 ).

1 The alms.- of hail to |iunisli un)io|mlar defendants in civil rights 
i liv.-s ha h ■■ n d"i-ui:nnl>-d by lie' I'.'iiorl.'l's n! lt.\ll. IN THU 1 NITKl)
S i a ii .s: 100 1. A l(i i'-.ut io n i l :  X ai ionai ( 'unit .him i; on Hail, and 
( ’him in ai, .1 i s  hi i: (May 27-23, 130 1), at a3



___ »>«».. ■uiw 2K*U 1- fcn

6

jiatorv habeas corpus is designated a ‘‘new legal notion.” 
( lir. 25.) Quite apart from tIn* fart that habeas corpus is 
<»! im memo rial Fn " 1 is li u - a: ■ e ( nine! i mes accompanied by a 
writ of privilege) for tie precise purpose of removing 
cases from one court to another in anticipation of trial, see 
8 I!i.ackston!'. CoM.MF.xTAiiir.K 1‘J:t (fit!) rib, Dublin 177a) ; 
.Teaks, '1 he Story of the Habeas Corpus, IS H. Q. ItKV. G4 
(1902), anticipatory federal habeas corpus for state pris­
oners has had long and considerable usage. A cable's case, 
oiled in Appellants’ Hr. ft! n. 49, discusses this use of the 
writ ii, detail; and, in addition to the cases cited in that 
foonote. see, »•.//.. Hunter v. I f W ,  200 I T. S. 207) (1908); 
Amlermn, v. Illlintl, 101 Fed. 009 ( Ith Cir. 1900), dism’d, 22 
S. Ct. 9.80 (1902); IIV.s7 I 'irnhtin v. Lamp. 133 Fed. 887 
(4th Cir. 1901); Had  v. Mnilthn. 87 F. 2d 810 (8th Cir. 
1937); finite Cninraif, -18 Cod. 77 (C. C. I). S. C. 1891); 
/•;./• parte li 'inner, 21 F. 2d 542 (X. D. Okla. 1927); lirawn 
v. ('niit. 50 1’. Supp. 50 ( F. I'. Pa. 19-1 I) ; Lima v. Lanier, 03 
F. Ktipp. 110 ( F. 1). Va. 19-15). As appellants stated at Ap­
pellants’ Mr. 15-17, la p  v. Sain, 372 F. S. 391, -110 (1903), 
suggests that the conditions justifying anticipatory fed­
eral habeas corpus are very similar to those justifying re­
moval under 28 l . S. ('. II 18 ( 19.>S), and thus that the al­
legations of this removal petition appropriately stated a 
case for habeas corpus rebel.'

A|> p- 11-  at 1Hr. 21 :M I/O‘s on ;i | r.is- age from tli e r emova l  pe t i t ion
" lii, li. il ,nys. <1 i- * • 1 a ir-I > n ny i l  ^\r. for 1l.lht .'In (•orjms n •li-f. The
: a - of  r e a r lie i• 1 y S , l \ S 1ft at the i'Niianrc of l i ft In i is m r j m s

( 1)1 )■■ .It | pi I p- •> 1\  S o'. II lie 1 ■ ; u.v, i i> uiinci* - - a r y ;  it
•In.-, n sp- ak to til I'stion a f i-siia •me of I m U m s  r o r f i n s  m l

u b  l i c i t  m i n  m  iflite r 2 - I '. S. ( ’. ; 22 11 '<•1(8) i 19 5 s | to secure
. • 1 iciprat«»ry feeit-ra) a • !.iu» beat  ion o f a pi • l latUs’ ! e«!eral (h’felises.
Sie-li a at icip:ii<ri•y f -.! r;il iinl jmlie itiou i. eV.'O't ly what  tli <• r emoval
pet i t ion seeks.



-----AsStfe

III.

Tho Judicial Cod.- of l ‘>l I. Relied Upon by Appellee 

„« Changing Prior 1-nw, I>i<* ^ ot 1)0  So-

At I’li*. 2ft ::0 n]»|><• 11 *•<* concedes that appellants’ argument 
supporting non-applieahility ol termer 1 14 < ( tl) (l.t.)S) to 
criminal removal eases •‘might seem sound" under the origi­
nal 1887 legislation hut for the effort of the codifications of 
1 -j The 1919 legislative history refuting any
contention that Congress then meant to change prior law 
is set forth at Appellants’ Hr. 2f.-27. As for the Judicial 
Code of 1911 (and wholly apart from the eilect of v~9' of 
the Code, see Appellants’ P.r. 21, 89-40), appellee’s argu­
ment is foreclosed hv express declaration of Congress. Ju­
dicial Code of 1911. §291, 80 Stat. 1««7. 1107;" General In­
vest im,it Co. v. Luke Shove <f Miehif/mi Southern Ihj. Co., 
200 It. S. 201, 278 (1922).

IV.

Appellee Improperly Draws From the Civil Rights 
Net of 100 1 the Inference That Remand Orders Were  
Not Review aide Prior to Its Khedive Date.

Appellee argues (Hr. 81 88) that enactment of '901 of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1901, 78 Stat. 211, 200, expressly con­
firming appellate jurisdiction to review remand orders in 
civil rights eases establishes lhat. prior to the effective date 
of the 1901 act, such orders were not revicwable. “ That

*' *’Sre ‘.I’M. The provisions of this Act. so fur as the\ are suh- 
stantwillv the same as existing statutes, shall lie construed as con­
tinuations thermf. and not is  new enactments, and there shall tie
no implieation of a char:..... . intent l>y r  a-oii of a ehange of words
in sijeh statute, unless sueli e h a n g e  u| intent shall he elearly mani­
fest."

' " I T . -  • “ ■ •vr-»r



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8

type of argument is always unsatisfactory. At times, legis­
lation expressly fixing rights and obligations may serve as 
a make-weight in interpreting earlier legislation as not in- 
tended to include any such rights or obligations; but such 
a canon of interpretation should always bo cautiously em­
ployed.” J,ou(jhm<tu v. Town of Pellioni, 139 F. 2d 989, 994 
(2d Cir. 1918), cert, denied, 322 U. S. 727 (1944), per Cir­
cuit .Judge Frank. The Supreme Court has otton enough 
rejected this proposed canon of interpretation, e.cj., Ttoin- 
walcf v. United Stoles, 3.>f> 1 . S. .>90. .>9.> (19.>8); [jiiitcd 
Stoles v. Price, 3(11 V. S. 304, 313 (1900); United States v. 
H'/sc, 870 V. S. 40.">, 414 (1902), and exposed the absurdity 
of looking to congressional understanding in 1901 for the 
interpretation of legislation enacted three-quarters of a cen­
tury earlier, cf. United Stoles v. Phitodrl])hio National 
n 874 V. s. 321, 848-349 (1903). As Professor Lusky 
suggested in the November 1903 issue of the Columbia Law 
Review, notwithstanding the respectability of ihe argument 
that former 28 V. K. C. $1417(d) (1988) did not apply to 
civil rights cases, it was “ preferable for Congress to take 
the initiative and establish clearly the appealability of re­
mand orders in eases removed under Section 1443.” Lusky, 
Racial Discrimination and the 1‘ edernl Law: A 1 roblem
in Nullification, 0.8 Coi.r.M. L. Ri.v. 1103, 1189-1190 (1903). 
Section 901 is not the only provision of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1901 which affirms prior law. See, eg/., the “ State action” 
provisions of \201(a), (h), (d), 78 Stat. 243. It is poorly to 
esteem contemporary congressional solicitude tor ci\ il 
Debts to twist the 1904 act, by devious reasoning, into a 
ground for refusing these appellants a judicial remedy 
which Congress has always allowed and which it now sa\s 
in so many words shall he allowed.



V.

Haines \. Danville Should Not He Followed Here.

It is in order to advert at this point to Unities v. Danville 
and cnni]>anion caso, till < ‘ir., Nos. OdSO-OOSl, 01 40-01 at), 
O'JI2, derided Augu-t 111. lOtil, relied u]><>n by appellee at 
Hr. (in 07. Unities indeed dismisses appeals and refuses pre­
rogative writs to review remand orders in criminal civil 
rights cases pending on appeal on duly 2, 1001. With till 
deference to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 
its decision is only binding on ihis Court insofar ns its rea­
soning is persuasive. Inspection of the Unities opinion dis­
closes ( ! )  that the court does not discuss at all the applica­
bility to the cases of the Civil Wights Act of 1004, under the 
doctrine relied on by appellants here (see Appellants’ Hr. 
27-2H); (2) that appellants' argument that former 28 
C. S. C. { 1147(d) (1 ‘.la's) did not apply to criminal cases 
was not put hoi ore the fourth Circuit or considered by it 
(see Appellants' Hr. S 27, .’52 .’S) ; and (.">) that, with re­
spect to tlie contention that former i 117(d) did not apply 
to civil rights cases, the Fourth Circuit (which writes at 
S.<). OS; “ The .Judicial ( ’ode [of 1011] contained nothing 
comparable to a of the Act of 1SS7") was not alerted to 
the existence of ,207 of the Judicial ('ode, relied on by ap­
pellants here (see Appellants' Hr. 21, .‘50-40). Appellants’ 
arguments were not presented in the briefs in Haines, but 
were presented to the Supreme Court of the I ’nited States 
in the brie! sueeessfully resisting (Jeorgia's application for 
prerogative writs to upset this Court’s stay order in the 
present case. Hrief for Wespondents llnehel i f  al., in Op­
position, tiled in drurt/i'i v. Tuttle | ( l.T. Hid.'!, Mise. Xo. 
Idol). St S. ( 't. 1010 ( 1001). In view of the Supreme 
Court’s traditional willingness to i--ue prerogative writs 
tit the instance of ti State to review the lower federal

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ilritfHtfaSffiiMMfe ■ —■ ynjttn, v. <— A<fai

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<•<»u11̂  im|*»•<»jm r :i sumption ot jurisdiction in criminal ro- 
nioval ciim's, l'n*/h/i'i v. /w'r, ,, Kin I'. S. Mid (1S79); I'ir- 

V. /’"id. 1 IS r .  S. in: (ls<i::) . /{, „/„, !,■;/ v. rol l  ers. 201 
j r. s. 1 ( 1900); Mnriflatif/ v. Soper (Xo. 1), 270 IT. S.-9

( l0-(»), the stimmary denial ol prohibition here, prior to on- 
nctrneiit of the Civil Rights Art of 1904, clearly suggests 
that tlie ( ourt found considerable force in tin* arguments 
made l»v the present appellants. There is at least enough 
in the Supreme Court’s action to justify this Court's con­
sideration of those arguments free of the baneful constraint 
of the Fourth Circuit’s decision.

Respect fully submitted,

OoN.W.n ],. 1 f01.1,0wi.u,
11nWAim Mi >o|:K, a.

.‘-atlC. Hunter Street, XAV.
Atlanta, (leorgia OOdM

Jack (iiii:KNisr.nr;
10 ( 'olumlms Circle
New York, Xew York 10019

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.i/Ionia/ for Appellants



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