Supplemental Joint Appendix

    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
October Term 1971 

No. 71-1463

WILLIAM J. MILLIKEN, Governor of the State of Michigan and ex-officio 
member of the Michigan State Board of Education; FRANK J. KELLEY, 
Attorney General of the State of Michigan; MICHIGAN STATE BOARD 
OF EDUCATION, a constitutional body corporate, and JOHN W. 
PORTER, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Department of Educa­
tion of the State of Michigan,

Petitioners,
-vs-

RONALD BRADLEY and RICHARD BRADLEY, by their Mother and
(Continued on Inside Front Cover)

SUPPLEMENTAL JOINT APPENDIX

BUTZEL, LONG, GUST, KLEIN & 
VAN ZILE 

John B. Weaver 
Robert M. Vercruysse,

Of Counsel

HILL, LEWIS, ADAMS, 
GOODRICH &TAIT 

Robert B. Webster,
Of Counsel

CONDIT AND MC GARRY, P.C. 
Richard P. Condit,

Of Counsel
HARTMAN, BEIER, HOWLETT.

MC CONNELL & GOOGASIAN 
Kenneth B. McConnell,

Of Counsel

FRANK J. KELLEY 
Attorney General
ROBERT A. DERENGOSKI 
Solicitor General
EUGENE KRASICKY 
Assistant Attorney General
STEWART H. FREEMAN
Assistant Solicitor General
Counsel for Petitioners 
525 W. Ottawa Street 
Lansing, Michigan 48913
WILLIAM M. SAXTON 
1881 First National Building 
Detroit, Michigan 48226

Counsel for Respondents Allen 
Park Public Schools, et al, Southfield 
Public Schools and School District 
of the City of Royal Oak

DOUGLAS H. WEST 
3700 Penobscot Building 
Detroit, Michigan 48226
Counsel for Respondent Grosse 
Pointe Public Schools



Next Friend, VERDA BRADLEY; JEANNE GOINGS, by her Mother 
and Next Friend, BLANCH GOINGS; BEVERLY LOVE, JIMMY LOVE 
and DARRELL LOVE, by their Mother and Next Friend, CLARISSA 
LOVE; CAMILLE BURDEN, PIERRE BURDEN, AVA BURDEN, 
MYRA BURDEN, MARC BURDEN and STEVEN BURDEN, by their 
Father and Next Friend, MARCUS BURDEN; KAREN WILLIAMS 
and KRISTY WILLIAMS, by their Father and Next Friend, C. WIL­
LIAMS; RAY LITT and MRS. WILBUR BLAKE, parents; all parents 
haying children attending the public schools of the City of Detroit, 
Michigan, on their own behalf and on behalf of their minor children, 
all on behalf of any person similarly situated; and NATIONAL ASSO­
CIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, DE­
TROIT BRANCH; DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 
231, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO; BOARD 
OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF DETROIT, a  school district of 
the first class; PATRICK McDONALD, JAMES HATHAWAY and 
CORNELIUS GOLIGHTLY, members of the Board of Education of 
the City of Detroit; and NORMAN DRACHLER, Superintendent of 
the Detroit Public Schools; ALLEN PARK PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF BERKLEY, BRANDON 
SCHOOLS, CENTERLINE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, CHERRY HILL 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, CHIPPEWA VALLEY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF CLAWSON, CRESTWOOD 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, DEARBORN PUBLIC SCHOOLS, DEARBORN 
HEIGHTS SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 7, EAST DETROIT PUB­
LIC SCHOOLS, SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF FERNDALE, 
FLAT ROCK COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, GARDEN CITY PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS, GIBRALTAR SCHOOL DISTRICT, SCHOOL DISTRICT 
OF THE CITY OF HARPER WOODS, SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE 
CITY OF HAZEL PARK, INTERMEDIATE SCHOOL DISTRICT OF 
THE COUNTY OF MACOMB, LAKE SHORE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 
LAKE VIEW PUBLIC SCHOOLS, THE LAMPHERE SCHOOLS, LIN­
COLN PARK PUBLIC SCHOOLS, MADISON DISTRICT PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS, MELVINDALE-NORTH ALLEN PARK SCHOOL DIS­
TRICT, SCHOOL DISTRICT OF NORTH DEARBORN HEIGHTS, 
NOVI COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, OAK PARK SCHOOL DIS­
TRICT, OXFORD AREA COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, REDFORD UNION 
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, RICHMOND COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, 
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF RIVER ROUGE, RIVER- 
VIEW COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, ROSEVILLE PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS, SOUTH LAKE SCHOOLS, TAYLOR SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
WARREN CONSOLIDATED SCHOOLS, WARREN WOODS PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS, WAYNE-WESTLAND COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, WOOD- 
HAVEN SCHOOL DISTRICT and WYANDOTTE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 
KERRY and COLLEEN GREEN, by their Father and Next Friend, 
DONALD G. GREEN, JAMES, JACK and KATHLEEN ROSEMARY, 
by their Mother and Next Friend, EVELYN G. ROSEMARY, TERRI 
DORAN, by her Mother and Next Friend, BEVERLY DORAN, SHER­
RILL, KEITH. JEFFREY and GREGORY COULS, by their Mother 
and Next Friend, SHARON COULS, EDWARD and MICHAEL ROMES- 
BURG, by their Father and Next Friend, EDWARD M. ROMESBURG, 
JR., TRACEY and GREGORY ARLEDGE, by their Mother and Next 
Friend, AILEEN ARLEDGE, SHERYL and RUSSELL PAUL, by their 
Mother and Next Friend, MARY LOU PAUL, TRACY QUIGLEY, by 
her Mother and Next Friend, JANICE QUIGLEY, IAN, STEPHANIE, 
KARL and JAAKO SUNI, by their Mother and Next Friend, SHIRLEY 
SUNI, and TRI-COUNTY CITIZENS FOR INTERVENTION IN FED­
ERAL SCHOOL ACTION NO. 35257; DENISE MAGDOWSKI and 
DAVID MAGDOWSKI, by their Mother and Next Friend, JOYCE 
MAGDOWSKI; DAVID VIETTI by his Mother and Next Friend, 
VIOLET VIETTI, and the CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR BETTER 
EDUCATION OF THE DETROIT METROPOLITAN AREA, a Mich­
igan non-Proflt Corporation, SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY 
OF ROYAL OAK, SOUTHFIELD PUBLIC SCHOOLS, GROSSE 
POINTE PUBLIC SCHOOLS,

Respondents.



INDEX

Findings o f Fact and C onclusions o f  Law in Support o f 
Ruling on Desegregation Area and Developm ent 
o f  P la n ..................................................................................  laa

Ruling on Desegregation Area and Code for D evelop­
m ent o f Plan o f D eseg rega tion .................................... 39aa

E xhib it P.M. 1 2 ............................................................................. 48aa



laa

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT O F MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RONALD BRADLEY, et al„
Plaintiffs

WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al„
Defendants

and
DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
LOCAL 231, AMERICAN FEDERA­
TION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO,

Defendant-
Intervenor

and
DENISE MAGDOWSKI, et al„

Defendants-
Intervenor

et al.

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CIVIL ACTION NO: 
35257

FINDINGS O F FA C T AND CONCLUSIONS O F  LAW 
IN SUPPORT O F RULING

ON DESEGREGATION AREA AND DEVELOPM ENT O F PLANS

On the basis of the entire record in this action, including 
particularly the evidence heard by the court from March 28 
through April 14. 1972. the court now makes the following 
Supplementary Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. It

\



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should be noted that the court has taken no proofs with respect 
to the establishment of the boundaries of the 86 public school 
districts in the counties of Wayne, Oakland and Macomb, nor 
on the issue of whether, with the exclusion of the city of 
Detroit school district, such school districts have commited acts 
of de jure segregation.

INTRODUCTION

1. On September 27, 1971, this court issued its Ruling on 
Issue of Segregation. On October 4, 1971, this court issued 
from the bench guidelines to bind the parties in the submission 
of plans to remedy the constitutional violation found, i.e., 
school segregation; and in particular this court noted that the 
primary objective before us was to deveop and implement a 
plan which attempts to “achieve the greatest possible degree of 
actual desegregation, taking into account the practicalities of 
the situation.” The same day this court reiterated these require­
ments by orders “ that the Detroit Board of Education submit a 
plan for the desegregation of its schools within 60 days” and 
“ that the State defendants submit a metropolitan plan of de­
segregation within 120 days.” In response to these orders hear­
ings were held, and thereafter rulings issued, on Detroit-only 
plans (see Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Detroit- 
Only Plans of Desegregation) and on the propriety of con­
sidering remedies which extend beyond the corporate 
geographic limits of the City of Detroit. (See Ruling on Pro­
priety of Considering a Metropolitan Remedy to Accomplish 
Desegregation of the Public Schools of the City of Detroit.) 
Between March 28, 1972 and April 14, 1972, hearings were 
held on metropolitan proposals for desegregation of the Detroit 
public schools.

2. From the initial ruling on September 27, 1971, to this 
day, the basis of the proceedings has been and remains the 
violation: de jure school segregation. Since Brown v. Board o f 
Education the Supreme Court has consistently held that the 
remedy for such illegal segregation is desegregation. The racial 
history of this country is writ large by constitutional adjudica­
tion from Dred Scott v. Sanford to Plessy v. Ferguson to



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Brown. The message in Brown was simple: The Fourteenth 
Amendment was to be applied full force in public schooling. 
The Court held that “state-imposed” school segregation 
immeasurably taints the education received by all children in 
the public schools; perpetuates racial discrimination and a his­
tory of public action attaching a badge of inferiority to the 
black race in a public forum which importantly shapes the 
minds and hearts of succeeding generations of our young 
people; and amounts to an invidious racial classification. Since 
Brown the Supreme Court has consistently, and with increasing 
force, held that the remedy upon finding de jure segregation is 
prompt and maximum actual desegregation of the public 
schools by all reasonable, feasible, and practicable means avail­
able. This court finds that there is nothing in the law, wisdom, 
or facts, and the particular circumstances and arguments, 
presented in this case which suggest anything except the affir­
mance of these principles in both fact and law.

3. The task before this court, therefore, is now, and, since 
September 27, 1971, has always been, how to desegregate the 
Detroit public schools. The issue, despite efforts of the inter- 
venors to suggest a new rationale for a return to the discredited 
“separate but equal” policy, 1 is not whether to desegregate. 
That question has been foreclosed by the prior and settled com­
mands of the Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit. Our duty 
now is to “grapple with the flinty, intractable realities” - of 
implementing the constitutional commands.

4. In the most recent set of hearings, several issues were 
addressed generally, including appropriate methods of pupils 
reassignment to desegregate schools; quality and capacity of 
school facilities; transportation needs incident to school de­
segregation; the effects of new school construction, and 
judicially established controls thereon, on any plan of de­
segregation; the reassignment of faculty and restructuring of 
facilities incident to pupil reassignment to accomplish school 
desegregation; appropriate and necessary interim and final 
administrative and financial arrangements; appropriate com­
munity, parental, staff, and pupil involvement in the deseg­
regation process; and attention to individual, cultural, and



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ethnic values, respect, dignity and identity. But the primary 
question addressed by these hearings, in the absence of submis­
sion of a complete desegregation plan by the state, remains the 
determination of the area necessary and practicable effectively 
to eliminate “root and branch” the effects of state-imposed and 
supported segregation and to desegregate the Detroit public 
schools.

SUPPLEMENTARY FINDINGS OF FACT

A. The Desegregation Area

5. The State Board of Education filed six (6) “plans” 
without recommendation or preference; intervening defendants 
Magdowski, et al., filed a proposal for metropolitan desegrega­
tion which included most of the tri-county area; the defendant 
Detroit Board of Education filed a proposal for metropolitan 
desegregation which included the entire tri-county area. 3 At 
the hearing plaintiffs presented a modification of the three pro­
posals which actually described areas within which pupil deseg­
regation was to be accomplished.

6. In the consideration of metropolitan plans of deseg­
regation of the Detroit public schools, the State defendants 
stand as the primary defendants. They bear the initial burden of 
coming forward with a proposal that promises to work. In the 
context of this case, they represent the “school authorities ” 4 
to whom equity courts traditionally have shown deference in 
these matters. 5 Yet in its submission without recommendation 
of six (6) “plans” the State Board of Education has failed to 
meet, or even attempt to meet, that burden and none of the 
other State defendants has filled the void.

7. The State Board refused to make any recommenda­
tions to the court about the appropriate area for desegregation. 
In State Defendant Porter’s words, the State Board “didn’t 
make a decision, period.” Defendants Milliken and Kelley 
merely filed objections to all six (6) plans.

8. Three of the State “plans” merely proposed concepts 
alternative to maximum actual desegregation. The Racial 
Proportion Plan described a statistical method of determining the



5aa

number of transfers involved in achieving a particular racial 
ratio in each school once an area of desegregation had been 
chosen. The Equal Educational Opportunity and Quality 
Integration Plan was admitted to be a non-plan and described 
criteria for education which, in whole or part, might, or might 
not, be applicable to any school system.

9. Only one State “plan,” the Metropolitan District Re­
organization Plan, attempted to describe an area within which 
desegregation should occur, called the “ initial operating zone” 
(sometimes referred to hereafter as the “State Proposal”). That 
“plan,” however, was primarily concerned with discussing a new 
governance structure for the desegregation area. Pupil reassign­
ment was mentioned only in passing and no foundation was laid 
by State defendants for the particular area of desegregation 
described. Further, it suffered from the default of the State 
defendants by their stubborn insistence that under their self­
serving, and therefore self-limiting, view of their powers they 
were free to ignore the clear order of this court and abdicate 
their responsibility vested in them by both the Michigan and 
Federal Constitution for supervision of public education and 
equal protection for all citizens.

10. From the very limited evidence in the record in sup­
port of the area in that state proposal, the primary foundation 
appears to be the particular racial ratio attained in that plan, 
approximately 65% black, 35% white, with the provision that 
the area could be expanded if “white flight” ensued. In the 
absence of any other persuasive foundation, such area is not 
based on any definable or legally sustainable criteria for either 
inclusion or exclusion of particular areas; and the concept of an 
“ initial operating zone” raises serious practical questions, which 
should be avoided if a more permanent solution is now possible. 
In short, the area described by the “ initial operating zone” does 
not appear to be based primarily on relevant factors, like elim­
inating racially identifiable schools; accomplishing maximum 
actual desegregation of the Detroit public schools; or avoiding, 
where possible, maintaining a pattern of schools substantially 
disproportionate to the relevant school community’s racial com­
position by force of deliberate action by public authority. Nor,



6aa

on the evidence in this record, is the “ initial operating zone” 
based on any practical limitation of reasonable times and dis­
tances for transportation of pupils. These factors seem to have 
played little part in the creation of the “ initial operating zone” 
and are reflected less in its result.

11. At the hearings, moreover, the State defendants did 
not purport to present evidence in support, or even in opposi­
tion, to the State Proposal. The State, despite prodding by the 
court, presented only one witness, who merely explained what 
appeared on the face of the various State “Plans” submitted. 
The State’s cross examination of witnesses was of no assistance 
to the court in ascertaining any preference, legal or educational. 
Put bluntly, State defendants in this hearing deliberately chose 
not to assist the court in choosing an appropriate area for effec­
tive desegregation of the Detroit public schools. Their resistance 
and abdication of responsibility throughout has been consistent 
with the other failures to meet their obligations noted in the 
court’s earlier rulings. Indeed, some of the submissions spoke as 
clearly in opposition to desegregation as did the legislature in 
Sec. 1 2 of Act 48 ruled unconstitutional by the Sixth Circuit.

1 2. In such circumstances little weight or deference can be 
given to the unsupported submission of the State Board of 
Education. In light of the available alternatives and the facts 
produced at the hearing bearing on the issue, the court finds 
that State defendants offered no basis for ruling that the “ initial 
operating zone” is the appropriate area within which to effec­
tively desegregate the Detroit public schools.

13. Similarly, the newly intervening, defendant school dis­
tricts did not attempt at the hearing to assist the court in 
determining which area was appropriate to accomplish effective 
desegregation. They were given the opportunity, by express 
written order and several admonitions during the course of the 
hearings, to assist the court in the task at hand but chose in 
their best judgment instead, in the main, to suggest their view 
that separate schools were preferable. The failure of the group 
of 40 districts to even comment that the court should exclude 
certain districts under any number of available rationales may in



7aa

part be explained by the awkward position chosen by them and 
their counsel of having single representation for districts on 
different sides of the various suggested perimeters.

14. The plans of intervening defendants Magdowski, et ah, 
and the defendant Detroit Board of Education are similar. With 
slight variations they include the entire tri-county, metropolitan 
Detroit area, with that area divided into several regions or 
clusters to make the planning for accomplishing desegregation 
more manageable. Although both have as their main objective 
desegregation, their larger area arises primarily from a heavy 
emphasis on such factors as white flight and an appropriate 
socio-economic balance in each cluster and school. 6

15. The authors of the Detroit Board and Magdowski 
plans readily admit that the regions or clusters for pupil reas­
signment which involve Mt. Clemens and Pontiac are not direct­
ly related to desegregation of the Detroit public schools and 
may be disregarded without any substantial adverse effect on 
accomplishing our objective. No other party has expressed any 
disagreement with that view. And the court finds that these two 
regions or clusters, for purposes of pupil reassignment, need not 
be included at this time in the desegregation area.

16. With the elimination of these two clusters there are, 
then, three basic proposals to be considered for the desegrega­
tion area: the State Proposal; the Detroit Board Proposal, and 
the proposal of defendant-intervenors Magdowski, et al. In 
addition, as noted, plaintiffs filed a modification of these three 
proposals.

17. Each of these proposals starts from the same two 
premises: (1) the tri-county area  ̂ constitutes the relevant 
school community which can serve as an initial benchmark in 
beginning the evaluation of how to effectively eliminate the 
racial segregation of Detroit schools; (2) but in some instances 
reasonable time and distance limitations for pupil transporta­
tion, and in other instances the actual area required to eliminate 
the pattern of racially identifable schools, limit the area within 
which pupil reassignment should occur. In terms of proof, put­
ting aside arguments of impotence by the State defendants,



8aa

there was absolutely no contradictory evidence on these two 
criteria. The entire tri-county area includes areas, pupils, and 
schools in 86 school districts; it includes approximately one 
million students, of whom approximately 20% are black. Based 
on the evidence concerning school and non-school factors, 8 
and reasonable time and distance limitations for pupil transpor­
tation, the court finds that both premises are accurate.^

18. The State Proposal includes the areas, pupils and 
school in 36 school districts, approximately 550,000 students 
are included of whom 36% are black. The Detroit Board Pro­
posal (excluding clusters 8 and 12) includes the areas, pupils, 
and schools in 69 school districts; approximately 850,000 stu­
dents are included, of whom 25% are minority. 10 The CCBE 
Proposal includes the areas, pupils, and schools in some 62 
school districts; approximately 777,000 students are included 
of whom 197,000 (25.4%) are black. Plaintiffs’ Proposal 
includes the areas, pupils, and schools in 54 school districts; 
approximately 780,000 students are included, of whom 
197,000 (25.3%) are black.

19. The State Proposal approaches what may be con­
sidered a substantial disproportion in the context of this case. It 
is to be remembered that within any desegregation area, the 
racial composition of desegregated schools will vary from the 
area’s racial mix. Given the variations in school plant, demo­
graphic and geographic factors, limiting the desegregation area 
to the State Proposal would result in some schools being sub­
stantially disproportionate in their racial composition to the 
tri-county area, and other schools racially identifable, all with­
out any justification in law or fact. This finding is supported by 
the lack of any apparent justification for the desegregation area 
described by the State Proposal except a desire to achieve an 
arbitrary racial ratio.

20. Transportation of children by school bus is a common 
practice throughout the nation, in the state of Michigan, and in 
the tri-county area. Within appropriate time limits it is a con­
siderably safer, more reliable, healthful and efficient means of 
getting children to school than either car pools or walking, and 
this is especially true for younger children.



9aa

21. In Michigan and the tri-county area, pupils often 
spend upwards of one hour, and up to one and one half hours, 
one-way on the bus ride to school each day. Consistent with its 
interest in the health, welfare and safety of children and in 
avoiding impingement on the educational process, state educa­
tional authorities routinely fund such transportation for school 
children. Such transportation of school children is a long­
standing, sound practice in elementary and secondary education 
in this state and throughout the country. And the court finds 
such transportation times, used by the state and recommended 
here, are reasonable in the circumstances here presented and 
will not endanger the health or safety of the child nor impinge 
on the educational process. For school authorities or private 
citizens to now object to such transportation practices raises the 
inference not of hostility to pupil transportation but rather 
racially motivated hostility to the desegregated school at the 
end of the ride.

22. The Plaintiffs’ Proposal made reference to P.M.8, 
based on the TALUS regional transportation and travel times 
study. Although there was dispute over the meaning of the 
study, such studies are deemed sufficiently reliable that major 
governmental agencies customarily rely on their projection for a 
variety of planning functions. When used by the plaintiffs, P.M. 
8, in conjunction with the Detroit Board’s survey of maximum 
school to school travel times, served as a rough guideline within 
which the plaintiffs’ modification of other proposals attempted 
to stay in an effort to provide maximum desegregation without 
any more transportation time than is required to desegregate. 
This court finds that the utilization of these two factors, and 
the lower travel time estimates which should result, is a reason­
able basis for the modification in the circumstances of this case. 
The court’s duty and objective is not to maximize transporta­
tion but to maximize desegregation and within that standard it 
will always be reasonable to minimize transportation. To that 
end the court has accepted the more conservative perimeter for 
the desegregation area suggested as a modification by plaintiffs 
because it provides no less effective desegregation.

23. Based on these criteria, the State Proposal is too nar­
rowly drawn.



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24. Based on these criteria, parts of the Detroit Board 
Proposal are too sweeping.

25. Based on these criteria, the CCBE Proposal and the 
Plaintiffs’ Proposal, roughly approximate the area so de­
scribed 11.

26. There is general agreement among the parties, and the 
court so finds, that on the west the areas, schools, and pupils in 
the Huron, Van Buren, Northville, Plymouth and Novi districts

(1) are beyond the rough 40-minute travel time line; (2) are 
not necessary to effectively desegregate schools involved in the 
regions and clusters abutting those schools; and, (3) at this 
writing, are not otherwise necessary, insofar as pupil assignment 
is concerned, to provide an effective remedy now and hereafter. 
(See Findings 63-69 below.)

27. In the southwest the school districts of Woodhaven, 
Gibralter, Flat Rock, Grosse lie and Trenton are within reason­
able time and distance criteria set forth above. These virtually 
all-white districts are included in the Detroit Board Proposal but 
excluded from the plaintiffs’ modification. The areas, schools 
and pupils in such school districts are similarly not necessary to 
effectively desegregate. (Clusters 13, 14, and 15 in Plaintiffs’ 
Proposal are 20.5%, 24.4% and 22.7% black respectively.) There 
is nothing in the record which suggests that these districts need 
be included in the desegregation area in order to disestablish the 
racial identifiability of the Detroit public schools. From the 
evidence, the primary reason for the Detroit School Board’s 
interest in the inclusion of these school districts is not racial 
desegregation but to increase the average socio-economic 
balance of all the schools in the abutting regions and clusters. In 
terms of what this court views as the primary obligation estab­
lished by the Constitution — racial desegregation — the court 
deems the proper approach is to be more conservative: the 
court finds it appropriate to confine the desegregation area to 
its smallest effective limits. This court weighs more heavily the 
judicially recognized concern for limiting the time and distance 
of pupil transportation as much as possible, consistent with the 
constitutional requirement to eliminate racially identifiable 
schools, than a concern for expanding the desegregation area to



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raise somewhat the average socio-economic balance of a rela­
tively few clusters of schools. 1 ^

28. To the north and northeast, the only major disagree­
m ent among the Detroit Board Proposal and plaintiffs’ 
modification relates to the areas, schools, and pupils in the 
Utica School District. This district is a virtually all-white, long, 
relatively narrow area extending several miles in a north-south 
direction away from the city of Detroit. Only the southern part 
of the district is within the rough, TALUS 40-minute travel 
time line.

29. The Detroit Board argues that Utica should be includ­
ed in order to raise the average socio-economic balance of the 
abutting clusters and schools. In this instance, however, the 
overall racial composition of the cluster, 27.0% black, may tend 
toward disproportionate black relative to the tri-county starting 
point.

30. Mr. Henrickson, the planner for the Board, also sug­
gested that Cluster 3 of Plaintiffs’ Proposal, because of its 
omission of Utica, might present some problems, which he 
admitted could be solved, in designing a plan of pupil reassign­
ment for the desegregation of schools. (See Findings 34-39 
below.)

31. In light of these relevant, and competing, considera­
tions the question presented by the Utica situation is close; 
however, at this writing, the court determines that the areas, 
schools, and pupils in the Utica School District need not be 
included, and therefore, should not be included in the deseg­
regation area.

32. The court finds that the appropriate desegregation 
area is described by plaintiffs’ modification of the three primary 
proposals. Within that area the racial identifiability of schools 
may be disestablished by implementation of an appropriate 
pupil desegregation plan. The area as a whole is substantially 
proportionate to the tri-county starting point. Within the area it 
is practicable, feasible, and sound to effectively desegregate all 
schools without imposing any undue transportation burden on 
the children or on the state’s system of public schooling. The



12aa

time or distance children need be transported to desegregate 
schools in the area will impose no risk to the children’s health 
and will not significantly impinge on the educational process.

B. Ousters

33. The Detroit Board Proposal makes use of 16 regions 
or clusters. These clusters range from 36,000 to 105,000 pupils 
and from 17.5% to 29.7% “minority.” The clusters are arranged 
along major surface arteries and utilize the “skip,” or non­
contiguous zoning, technique to minimize the time and distance 
any child need spend in transit. The use of these clusters basical­
ly subdivides the planning for pupil reassignment within the 
desegregation area into a series of smaller, manageable and 
basically independent plans. Thus, although as the new inter- 
venors suggest devising a desegregation plan for a system with 
some 800,000 pupils has never been attempted, the practical 
and manageable reality is that desegregation plans for systems 
with from 36,000 to 100,000 pupils has been done and such 
plans have been implemented.

34. Plaintiffs’ Proposal uses the same cluster technique 
and the same clusters, modified to fit the desegregation area. 
The 15 clusters range from 27,000 to 93,000 pupils and from 
20.5% to 30.8% black. Only three relevant objections were 
raised by Mr. Henrickson, to the clusters as modified.

35. First, Cluster 4 was challenged as “concealing” a 
“problem,” namely effective desegregation of other schools 
resulting from the omission of Utica from plaintiffs’ modifica­
tion. On cross-examination Mr. Henrickson admitted that the 
“problem” of actual pupil desegregation for these other schools 
could be “solved,” that all schools within Cluster 4 could be 
affectively desegregated, and that Cluster 4 was smaller than the 
Detroit Board Cluster 6. The objection was thus narrowed to 
the possibility that a suburban high school constellation feeder 
pattern might have to be split between two Detroit high school 
constellation feeder patterns in order to desergregate. Several of 
the Detroit Board’s clusters, however, also contain two Detroit 
high school feeder patterns.



13aa

36. This objection, splitting an existing feeder pattern, 
was raised directly in reference to Cluster 12. In neither 
instance, however, did Mr. Henrickson suggest that the time or 
distance of transportation involved was too long or that it would 
present administrative difficulty in devising a pupil assignment 
plan for either cluster. The objection relates solely to a matter 
of administrative convenience, namely the use of existing feeder 
patterns in preparing pupil assignments. For example, Mr. 
Henrickson previously admitted that in drawing a pupil assign­
ment plan, an alternative to use of existing feeder patterns 
would be to “wipe the slate clean,” and disregard existing 
feeder patterns. In fact one of the State plans suggested use of 
census tracts as an alternative. ^  On numerous occasions in the 
past Mr. Henrickson himself has reassigned parts of one feeder 
pattern to another school in order to relieve overcrowding 
and /o r accomplish desegregation. The objection to such 
practice, therefore, is admittedly insubstantial.

37. The third objection relates to the exchange of Detroit 
Northern for Detroit Murray in Clusters 6 and 15 requiring that 
the students transported, if they proceed on their entire journey 
by way of the expressway, encounter an interchange which 
tends to be rather slow-moving. Such transportation time and 
distance, however, is well within the rough criteria for reason­
ableness and is shorter than or comparable to the maximum 
trips required in the Detroit Board’s clusters. In other instances, 
Mr. Henrickson admitted that pupils in the Detroit proposal 
might also have to travel through similar interchanges. More­
over, the objection to this particular increase in travel time must 
be weighed against the apparent general decrease in time which 
would be required in plaintiffs’ modified clusters as compared 
with the Detroit Board’s clusters. In any event the desegregation 
panel, based on its investigation of all aspects of pupil assign­
ment, remains free to suggest a modification of these clusters in 
order to reduce the time and number of children requiring 
transportation.

38. With that caveat, the court finds that plaintiffs’ 
modification of the Detroit Board’s clusters provides a 
workable, practicable, and sound framework for the design of a 
plan to desegregate the Detroit public schools.\



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C. Pupil Assignment and Transportation.

39. Example of various methods of pupil assignment to 
accomplish desegregation have been brought to the attention of 
the court by the parties: pairing, grouping, and clustering of 
schools; various strip, skip, island, and non-contiguous zoning; 
various lotteries based on combinations of present school assign­
ment, geographic location, name, or birthday. Judicious use of 
these techniques — coupled with reasonable staggering of school 
hours and maximizing use of existing transportation facilities — 
can lead to maximum actual desegregation with a minimum of 
additional transportation.

40. Quite apart from desegregation, under any circum­
stances, transportation for secondary pupils living more than IZ2 
miles, and elementary pupils, living more than 1 mile from 
school, is often demanded by parents and should be provided. 
Moreoever, it is essential to the effectiveness of any desegrega­
tion plan that transportation be provided free to all students 
requiring it under that criteria. (Brewer v. Norfolk Board of 
Education,____F. 2d_____ (April 1972) (4th Cir.)

41. In the recent past more than 300,000 pupils in the 
tri-county area regularly rode to school on some type of bus; 
this Figure excludes the countless children who arrive at school 
in car pools, which are many, many times more dangerous than 
riding on the school bus.

42. Throughout the state approximately 35-40% of all stu­
dents arrive at school on a bus. In school districts eligible for 
state reimbursement of transportation costs in the three 
affected counties, the percent of pupils transported in 1969-70 
ranged from 42 to 52%.

43. In comparison approximately 40%, or 310,000, of the 
780,000 children within the desegregation area will require 
transportation in order to accomplish maximum actual deseg­
regation.

44. Hence, any increase in the numbers of pupils to be 
transported upon implementation of a complete desegregation 
plan over the number presently transported, relative to the state



15aa

and the tri-county area, should be minimal. Indeed, any increase 
may only reflect the greater numbers of pupils who would be 
transported in any event but for the state practice, which af­
fected the segregation found in this case, and which denies state 
reimbursement to students and districts wholly within city 
limits regardless of the distance of the child from the school to 
which assigned. (Ruling on Issue of Segregation at 14.) The 
greatest change is the direction of the buses.

45. There is uncontradicted evidence that the actual 
cost of transportation for a two-way plan of desegregation 
should be no greater than 50 to 60 dollars per pupil trans­
ported, comparable to the present costs per pupil through 
the state. Increases in the total costs of pupil transportation in 
the desegregation area, therefore, will result primarily from pro­
viding all children requiring transportation a free ride instead of 
imposing the costs of transportation for many on the families in 
districts which are ineligible for state reimbursement and which 
fail to provide transportation.

46. By multiple use of buses, careful routing, and econo­
mies of scale resulting from a comprehensive system of pupil 
transportation, it may be possible to achieve savings in per pupil 
costs. For example in 1969-1970 many school districts in the 
tri-county area which used the same bus for even two loads per 
day lowered their per pupil costs to $40 or less. In a co­
ordinated, urban pupil transportation system it may be possible 
to raise the bus use factor to three of more. (See “First Report” 
State Survey and Evaluation.)

47. In the tri-county area in the recent past there were 
approximely 1,800 buses (and another 100 smaller vans) used 
for the transportation of pupils. Assuming a rough average of 50 
pupils per bus carrying three loads of students per day, this 
transportation fleet may prove sufficient to carry some 270,000 
pupils.

48. Various public transit authorities now transport an 
additional 60,000 pupils on their regular public runs.

\ 49. The degree to which these plausible bus-use factors



16aa

can be realized to their maximum, and whether these public 
transit facilities may be fully utilized in a plan of desegregation, 
must be answered upon careful investigation by a panel of ex­
perts.

50. There is no disagreement among the parties, and the 
court so finds, that additional transportation facilities, at least 
to the number of 350 buses, will have to be purchased to meet 
the increase in the number of students who should be provided 
transportation for either an interim or final plan of desegrega­
tion.

51. For all the reasons stated heretofore — including time, 
distance, and transportation factors — desegregation within the 
area described in physically easier and more practicable and 
feasible, than desegregation efforts limited to the corporate 
geographic limits of the city of Detroit.

52. The issue of transportation of kindergarten children, 
and their inclusion in part or in full in the desegregation plan, 
may require further study. There was general agreement among 
the experts who testified that kindergarten, but for “political” 
considerations, should be included, if practicable, in the deseg­
regation plan. Kindergarten, however, is generally a half-day 
program. Transportation of kindergarten children for upwards 
of 45 minutes, one-way, does not appear unreasonable, harmful, 
or unsafe in any way. In the absence of some compelling justifi­
cation, which does not yet appear, kindergarten children should 
be included in the final plan of desegregation.

53. Every effort should be made to insure that transporta­
tion and reassignment of students to accomplish desegregation 
is “ two-way” and falls as fairly as possible on both races. 
Although the number of black and white children transported 
and reassigned at the outset will be roughly equal, it is 
inevitable that a larger proportion of black children will be 
transported for a greater proportion of their school years than 
white children, if transportation overall is to be minimized. To 
mitigate this disproportion, every effort should be made at the 
outset to randomize the location of particular grade centers. In 
the short term, full utilization of vastly under-capacity inner-



17aa

city schools may also help to mitigate the disproportion for 
some black children; and in the long term, new school capacity, 
consistent with other constitutional commands and the overall 
needs of the desegregation area and the surrounding area, should 
be added in Detroit, in relative proximity to concentrations of 
black student residence.

D. Restructuring of Facilities and 
Reassignment of Teachers

54. In the reassignment of pupils to accomplish deseg­
regation the court finds that facilities must be substantially 
reallocated and faculty substantially reassigned by reason of the 
clustering, pairing and grouping of schools.

55. In order to make the pupil desegregation process fully 
effective the court finds that it is essential to integrate faculty 
and staff and to insure that black faculty and staff representa­
tion at every school is more than token. The court has pre­
viously found and reaffirms that “a quota or racial balance in 
each school which is equivalent to the system-wide ratio and 
without more” is educationally unsound, and that the desid­
eratum is the balance of staff by qualifications for subject and 
grade level, and then by race, experience and sex. It is obvious, 
given the racial composition of the faculty and staff in the 
schools in the metropolitan plan area, and the adjusted racial 
composition of the students, that vacancies and increases and 
reductions in faculty and staff cannot effectively achieve the 
needed racial balance in this area of the school operation. 
Active steps must be taken to even out the distribution of black 
teachers and staff throughout the system.

56. In the desegration area approximately 16% of the 
faculty and 12% of the principals and assistant principals are 
black. In this context “ token” means roughly less than 10% 
black. Moreover, where there is more than one building adminis­
trator in any school, a bi-racial administrative team is required 
wherever possible.

57. Every effort should be made to hire and promote, and 
to increase such on-going efforts as there may be to hire and



18aa

promote, additional black faculty and staff. Because of the 
system atic  and substantial under-employment of black 
administrators and teachers in the tri-county area, an affirma­
tive program for black employment should be developed and 
implemented.

58. The rated capacity of classrooms in the Detroit public 
schools is 32; in some of the suburban districts the average rated 
capacity is as low as 24 or 25. Utilization should be redeter­
mined on a uniform basis.

59. In respect to faculty and staff, school facilities, and 
the utilization of existing school capacity, normal administra­
tive practice in handling the substantial reallocation and reas­
signment incident to pupil desegregation should produce 
schools substantially alike.

60. In the circumstances of this case, the pairing, grouping 
and clustering of schools to accomplish desegregation with 
minimum transportation often requires use of grade arrange­
ments such as K-4, K-5, or even K-6. In so planning pupil reas­
signments, it is sometimes necessary, and often administratively 
practicable, to include grades K-8 or even K-9 to achieve the 
maximum actual desegregation with the minimum trans­
portation. Grade structures in most elementary schools in the 
desegregation area is a basic K-6; however, almost all other 
combinations are found. They differ within and among various 
districts.

61. In the reassignments of pupils and teachers and the 
reallocation of equipment and facilities required to accomplish 
desegregation, the elementary grades and schools present rela­
tively few administrative difficulties, while the high school 
grades and facilities present the greater difficulties, particularly 
with respect to scheduling and curriculum.

62. For these reasons, if it develops that interim choices 
must be made because of the impossibility of immediate deseg­
regation of all grades, schools, and clusters in the desegregation 
area, the weight of the evidence is, and the court so finds, that 
desegregation should begin first at the earliest grades for entire



19aa

elementary school groupings throughout as many clusters as 
possible.

E. School Construction

63. Relative to suburban districts the Detroit public 
schools, as a whole, are considerably over-capacity. (See also 
Finding 58, supra.) To alleviate this overcrowding equalize rated 
capacity and minimize and equalize transportation burdens 
borne by black pupils in the city, needed new school capacity, 
consistent with other requirements of a desegregation plan, 
should be added on a priority basis in the city of Detroit.

64. Relevant to the court’s choice of a desegregation area 
more limited than the Detroit Board Proposal is the testimony, 
elecited on cross-examination from two of the primary authors 
of that proposal, related to the effects of controlling new school 
construction. The broader area in the Detroit proposal was 
chosen without any real consideration of the impact of control­
ling school construction in an area larger than the desegregation 
area. Upon reflection, both Dr. Flynn and Mr. Henrickson 
admitted that closely scrutinizing and limiting the addition of 
capacity to areas outside the desegregation area might lead them 
to re-evaluate the need, in the context of maintaining now and 
hereafter a unitary system, to include an area as sweeping as 
recommended by the Detroit Board Proposal.

65. In our Ruling on Issue of Segregation, pp. 8-10, this 
court found that the “ residential segregation throughout the 
larger metropolitan area is substantial, pervasive and of long 
standing” and that “governmental actions and inaction at all 
levels, Federal, State and local, have combined with those of 
private organizations, such as loaning institutions and real estate 
associations and brokerage firms, to establish and to maintain 
the pattern of associations and brokerage firms, to establish and 
to maintain the pattern of residential segregation through the 
Detroit metropolitan area.” We also noted that this deliberate 
setting of residential patterns had an important effect not only 
on the racial composition of inner-city schools but the entire 
School District of the City of Detroit. (Ruling on Issue of Seg­
regation at 3-10.) Just as evident is the fact that suburban



20aa

school districts in the main contain virtually all-white schools. 
The white population of the city declined and in the suburbs 
grew; the black population in the city grew, and largely was 
contained therein by force of public and private racial discrim­
ination at all levels.

66. We also noted the important interaction of school and 
residential segregation: “Just as there is an interaction between 
residential patterns and the racial composition of the schools, so 
there is a corresponding effect on the residential pattern by the 
racial composition of schools.” Ruling on Issue of Segregation 
at 10. C f Swann v. Chariotte-Mecklenberg, 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 
(1971); “People gravitate toward school facilities, just as 
schools as located in response to the needs of people. The loca­
tion of schools may thus influence the patterns of residential 
development of a metropolitan area and have important impact 
on composition of inner city neighborhoods.”

67. Within the context of the segregatory housing market, 
it is obvious that the white families who left the city schools 
would not be as likely to leave in the absence of schools, not to 
mention white schools, to attract, or at least serve, their chil­
dren. Immigrating families were affected in their school and 
housing choices in a similar manner. Between 1950 and 1969 in 
the tri-county area, approximately 13,900 “regular classrooms,” 
capable of serving and attracting over 400,000 pupils, were 
added in school districts which were less than 2% black in their 
pupil racial composition in the 1970-71 school year. (P.M. 14; 
P.M. 15).

68. The precise effect of this massive school construction 
on the racial composition of Detroit area public schools cannot 
be measured. It is clear, however, that the effect has been sub­
stantial. “0 Unfortunately, the State, despite its awareness of 
the important impact of school construction and announced 
policy to control it, acted “ in keeping generally, with the 
discriminatory practices which advanced or perpetuated racial 
segregation in these schools.” Ruling on Issue of Segregation at 
15; see also id., at 13.

69. In addition to the interim re-evaluation of new school



21aa

construction required in the order, pursuant to the State 
Board’s own requirements, the final plan will consider other 
appropriate provisions for future construction throughout the 
metropolitan area.

F. Governance, Finance and Administrative Arrangements

70. The plans submitted by the State Board, the Detroit 
Board, and the intervening defendants Magdowski, et al., discuss 
generally possible governance, finance and administrative ar­
rangements which may be appropriate for operation of an 
interim or final plan of desegregation. Without parsing in detail 
the interesting, and sometimes sensible, concepts introduced by 
each plan, it is sufficient to note that each contemplates over­
laying some broad educational authority over the area, creating 
or using some regional arrangement (with continued use or 
eventual redrawing of existing districts), and considerable input 
at the individual school level. The court has made no decision in 
this regard and will consider the matter at a subsequent hearing.

71. Each concept needs to be “ fleshed-out” in the hard 
prospect of implementation of a final plan of desegregation and 
what is necessary and essential, and only that, for the successful 
operation of that plan of school desegregation now on an 
interim basis and hereafter on a permanent footing.

72. There are now some 86 school districts in the tri­
county area of varying size, numbers of pupils, shapes, and 
wealth.

73. In another context, the State Board of Education 
found each related to a “metropolitan core city” (Detroit) as 
“ city,” “ town,” or “urban fringe” districts.

74. The boundaries of these school districts in general 
bear no relationship to other municipal, county, or special dis­
trict governments, needs or services.--

75. Some educational services are already provided to stu­
dents on an interdistrict, county, intercounty, or metropolitan 
basis: and many support services are provided by the inter­
m ediate school districts and the State Department of



22aa

Education. For various reasons many pupils already cross school 
district lines to attend school or receive educational services. 23

76. In many respects — patterns of economic life, work, 
play, population, planning, transportation, health services — the 
tri-county area constitutes a rough series of interrelated com­
munities constituting, in the view of the United States Census 
Bureau, a single standard metropolitan statistical area.

77. Local units of government in the metropolitan area 
have in many instances joined together for the purpose of pro­
viding better solutions to problems confronting them. In such 
instances various units of government have either disregarded 
local boundaries or have concluded that the problems were such 
as to call for a metropolitan solution. In some cases they have 
created overlay organizations. SEMCOG, recreational autho­
rities, a metropolitan sewage system, SEMTA, and the Detroit 
Water System are examples of these metropolitan approaches.

78. Indeed, the State defendants at this very moment are 
attempting in state court to strike down one irrationality, and 
the discriminatory effect, of the existing school district arrange­
ment, i. e., finance, apparently in the hope of moving to a virtual 
state-wide assumption of costs.

79. In such circumstances there has been no showing that 
the existing school district boundaries are rationally related to 
any legitimate purpose; and the court finds that the particular 
welter of existing boundaries for 86 school districts is not 
necessary to the promotion of any compelling state interest.

80. On the basis of the present record, the court is of the 
view that the shifts in faculty, staff, resources and equipment 
and the exchanges of pupils necessary to accomplish maximum 
actual desegregation may be made, at least on an interim basis, 
by contractual agreements or otherwise among and between the 
existing school districts. The court has serious reservations, 
however, whether such procedures will inevitably threaten the 
continuing effectiveness of a plan of desegregation over the 
long-term. On these issues more evidence and further hearings 
will be necessary before reaching a final decision.



23aa

81. The State defendants, and in particular the State 
Board of Education which is charged with the primary respon­
sibility for public education in Michigan, are the primary parties 
to be charged with responsibility to undertake that vital inquiry 
and return with recommendations about those governance, 
financial, and administrative arrangements which are necessary 
and essential to the successful implementation of a plan of de­
segregation on an interim and continuing basis.

G. Involvement of Affected Persons and Communities 
and Protection Against Racial Discrimination 

in the Desegregation Process

82. The court has received uncontroverted evidence in the 
plans filed by every party and in testimony, and advice in 
several briefs amicus curiae, and the court finds, that the follow­
ing additional factors are essential to implementation and 
operation of an effective plan of desegregation in the circum­
stances of this case:

(a) Bi-racial councils made up of the parents and staff, 
and, where appropriate, pupils, should be set up at 
each school; the persons most affected must be 
encouraged and given every opportunity to parti­
cipate in the implementation of desegregation.

(b) Curriculum content, and all curriculum materials and 
student codes, must be re-evaluated and reflect the 
diversity of ethnic and cultural backgrounds of the 
children now in the schools. As far as possible, those 
immediately affected by these decisions at the indi­
vidual school level should participate in that process.

(c) In-service training for faculty and staff for multi­
e thn ic  studies and human relations should be 
required; we must, after all, rely primarily on our 
teachers and children to respect, nurture, and deal 
with the diversity of students present in the deseg­
regated school.

(d) The entire grading, reporting, counselling, and testing 
program should be reviewed in light of desegregated



24aa

schools compared to traditional schools and to avoid 
imposing the effects of past discrimination on the 
children. Tracking, whether so labeled or by any test, 
which has racial effects should not be utilized; within 
schools a pattern of classes which are substantially 
disproportionate in their racial composition from the 
relevant school or grade mix should be closely 
scrutinized and maintained only if necessary to pro­
mote a compelling educational objective.

83. In making the finding above, we remind the parties 
that this court’s task is to enforce constitutional rights not to 
act as a schoolmaster; the court’s task is to protect the con­
stitutional rights here found violated with as little intrusion into 
the education process as possible. The court’s objective is to 
establish the minimum constitutional framework within which 
the system of public schools may operate now and hereafter in 
a racially unified, non-discriminatory fashion. Within that 
framework the body politic, educators, parents, and most par­
ticularly the children must be given the maximum opportunity 
to experiment and secure a high quality, and equal, educational 
opportunity. However, experience has proven that specific 
goals, deadlines and methods of reporting and review must be 
required in all desegregation cases to insure compliance.

H. Timing

84. The burden remains with State defendants to show 
why desegregation for all schools, grades, classrooms, and pupils 
in the desegregation area should not proceed now, i.e., in the 
context of this litigation, for the 1972 fall term. The design and 
implementation of desegregation plans for all grades in 15 
clusters — including pupil assignments, necessary reassignment 
of faculty and restructuring of facilities, planning and acquiring 
the needed transportation facilities — is conceded by all parties 
to be a major undertaking. Yet next fall will already be a full 
year, not just four or six or even eight weeks, Cf. Carter v. West 
Feliciano Parish School Bd., 396 U.S. 290 (1970), after the 
initial ruling by this court of the need for maximum feasible 
desegregation “ now.” In such circumstances the burden to 
prove the infeasibility of implementation of complete relief is 
high.



25aa

85. The desegregation panel, therefore, must make every 
effort to plan to implement as much actual desegregation, for as 
many clusters, schools, grades, classrooms, and students as pos­
sible.

86. At a minimum, there is agreement among, and 
evidence from, the experts that desegregating several grades, and 
more particularly entire elementary schools, within many, if not 
all, clusters may be accomplished in the fall.

87. In view of Findings 60 to 62, supra, if hard choices 
must be made for the fall, any interim plan should attempt to 
desegregate grades K-6, K-8, or K-9 in as many entire clusters as 
possible; and, in the absence of some other showing, there 
appears no reason why a complete plan may not be imple­
mented by fall 1973. 24

88. A heavy burden rests with those who seek delay in 
any way, shape, kind, degree or extent to convince the court 
that maximum actual desegregation cannot proceed effectively 
forthwith.

89. In view of the time constraints, the need to discharge 
this burden forthwith, the State defendants’ default in assisting 
this court to determine the appropriate desegregation area, and 
the State defendants’ asserted and evident lack of available plan­
ning capacity suited to the task, the court finds that some addi­
tional entity must be charged with the task of preparing a pupil 
assignment plan to accomplish maximum actual desegregation 
and a transportation plan within the framework this day 
established. To that end a panel of skilled experts, broadly re­
presentative of the parties and their interests, appointed by the 
court and assigned that task, is required to discharge effectively 
and promptly these two tasks.

90. State defendants remain charged with the duty, how­
ever, of coming forward with other necessary reports and plans 
concerning those governance, administrative, and financial ar­
rangements necessary and essential to the implementation of an 
effective plan of desegregation on an interim and on-going basis.

\



26aa

I. The Plan

91. Based on the entire evidence amassed in this case, the 
court finds that an educationally sound, administratively fea­
sible, constitutionally adequate, practicable and effective plan 
of desegregation may be developed, implemented, and operated 
hereafter for the desegregation area as set forth in findings 1-90 
above.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The court has continuing jurisdiction of this action for 
all purposes, including the granting of effective relief. Bradley v. 
Milliken, Ruling on Issue of Segregation, September 27, 1971; 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Detroit-Only Plans 
of Desegregation, March 28, 1972.

2. A de jure segregation violation having been found, the 
minimum remedy is maximum actual desegregation, taking into 
account the practicalities of the situation. 25 Bradley v. Mil­
liken, Oral Order, October 4, 1971; Findings of Fact and Con­
clusions of Law on Detroit-Only Plans of Desegregation, March 
28, 1972; Brown v. Board o f Education, 347 U.S. 383 (1954), 
349 U.S. 294 (1954); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 
430 (1968); Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. o f Ed., 396 U.S. 
19 (1969); Carter v. West Feliciano School Bd., 396 U.S. 290
(1970) ; Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenberg Bd. o f Ed.. 402 U.S. 1
(1971) ; Davis v. Board o f School Commissioners o f  Mobile, 402 
U.S. 33 (1971); Davis v. School District o f City o f Pontiac, 443 
F. 2d 513, cert, denied, 925 U.S. 233 (1971).

3. The remedial obligation rests with school authorities, 
but where in any way they fail, or are unable because of the 
circumstances of the case, to fulfill any part of the obligation 
promptly and fully, the court has broad equity power, and the 
duty, to insure that demonstrable progress be made now; that a 
schedule for planning be adopted forthwith; and that necessary 
planning be specifically ordered and immediately undertaken in 
order that a constitutionally adequate plan may be fashioned 
and finally ordered implemented as soon as possible. Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board o f Education, 3 1 1 F. Supp. 265 
(W.D.N.C. 1970), a ff’d, 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Carter v. West



27aa

Feliciano School Bd., 396 U.S. 226, 227-228 (1969), 396 U.S. 
290 (1970); Acres v. County Board o f Education, No. 72-1211 
(5th Cir. March 31, 1972); Rule 53. Fed. R. Civ. P., P.A.R.C. v. 
Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1247, 1266-7 (E.D. Pa. 1971). 
Only then will the court in this case be apprised fully of the 
practicalities of the situation, and what is reasonable and fea­
sible, in order that a final order may issue. School authorities, 
of course, will be given an opportunity to (1) raise relevant 
objections, (2) make suggestions for modifications, (3) or pre­
sent an alternative plan of desegregation; and their judgment 
and expertise will be considered and given appropriate weight 
by the court.

4. Funds must either be raised or reallocated, where 
necessary, to remedy the deprivation of plaintiffs’ con­
stitutional rights and to insure that no such unconstitutional 
neglect recurs again. Shapiro v. Thompson, 397 U.S. 254, 
265-266 (1970); Boddie v. Connecticut, 91 S. Ct. 780, 788 
(1971); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374-375 (1971); Mayer v. Chicago, 
404 U.S. 189, 197 (1971); Griffin v. Prince Edward County, 
377 U.S. 218 (1964); Hoosier v. Evans, 314 F. Supp. 316, 
320-321 (D. St. Croix, 1970); United States v. School District 
151, 301 F. Supp. 201, 232 (N.D. 111. 1969), a ff’d as modified, 
432 F. 2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 402 U.S. 943 
(1971); Plaquemines Parish School Board v. U.S., 415 F. 2d 319
(5th Cir. 1970); Bradley v. Richmond_______F. Supp_____
(April I 971); Brewer v. Norfolk, No. 71-1900 (4th Cir., March 
7, 1972) (Slip op. at pp. 7-8). It would be a cruel mockery of 
constitutional law if a different rule were to be applied to 
school desegregation cases. After all schooling is this nation’s 
biggest industry and the most important tast of government left 
to the states by the Constitution. In this case, were a different 
rule to be applied, it would constitute a gigantic hypocrisy: 
After all the money which has been spent over the years 
creating and maintaining the segregated condition, the relatively 
small amounts of money required to undo that segregation can 
be found. The law, surely, requires at least that. And the ap­
plication of the commands of Swann does require that in almost 
every school desegregation case which has been brought to this 
court’s attention.



28aa

5. In the substantial reassignment of faculty and re­
structuring of facilities required by the clustering, pairing, and 
grouping of schools to accomplish pupil desegregation, normal 
administrative practice should lead to schools with substantially 
like facilities, faculty and staff, and equipment. Swann, supra, 
402 U.S. at 18-20. Moreover, special care should be taken in the 
necessary reassignment of faculty to avoid creating or maintain­
ing the racial identification of schools “simply by reference to 
the racial composition of teachers and staff.” Swann, supra, 402 
U.S. at 18. In any event, the equitable discretion of the court is 
broad enough to insure that those aspects of faculty deseg­
regation and equalization of facilities which are essential to the 
effective operation of a desegregation plan are included in the 
planning and final order, Swann, supra, 402 U.S. at 15; U.S. v. 
Montgomery County Board o f  Ed., 395 U.S. 225 (1969); Hecht 
v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 329-330 (1944); and no contract, union 
agreement or otherwise, or Board policy or practice may 
impede these Fourteenth Amendment obligations. U.S. v. 
Greenwood Municipal Separate School District, 406 F. 2d 
1086, 1094 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 395 U.S. 907 (1969)\Berry 
v. Benton Harbor______ F. Supp_____ (W.D. Mich. 1971).

6. The Federal courts have repeatedly rejected plans 
exempting the lower grades from integration, relying less on 
educational data than upon the hard legal fact that segregation 
at any age is a denial of the equal protection of the law. See, 
e.g., United States v. Jefferson County Bd. o f  Educ., 372 F.2d 
836 (9th Cir. 1966), a ff’d on rehearing en banc, 380 F.2d 385 
(5th Cir. 1967). To leave grades K through 3 exempt from a 
desegregation plan is not to eliminate segregation “ root and 
branch.” Green v. County School Board o f New Kent County, 
391 U.S. 430(1968).

7. The consistent application of settled constitutional law 
invests this court with the equitable power, and the duty, to 
order preparation, and thereafter implementation, of a practic­
able and sound plan which embodies the principles set forth in 
these findings and conclusions and the attached memorandum 
and order. See, generally, Ruling on Propriety of Considering a 
Metropolitan Remedy to Accomplish Desegregation of the



29aa

Public Schools of the City of Detroit, March 24, 1972; Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Detroit-Only Plans, March 
24, 1972; oral ruling on offers of proof, April 13, 1972; and the 
cases cited therein.

8. School construction practices throughout the metro­
politan area have added to and reinforced the pattern of seg­
regation referred to. Although there were vacant seats through­
out the city to which students could have been assigned at lesser 
cost and with the achievement of integration, continued sums 
were expended for construction of new schools designed to 
service particular areas of racial concentration, and such schools 
opened as and have continued to be racially identifiable in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Swann v. Charlotte- 
Mecklenberg Bd. o f Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1971); United 
States V. School Dist. 151, 404 F.2d 1125, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 
1968); Davis v. School Dist. o f  Pontiac, 309 F. Supp. 734, 
741-42 (E.D. Mich. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1971); 
Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. o f Educ., 311 F. Supp. 501, 
517-18 (C.D. Calif. 1970); Johnson v. San Francisco Unified 
School Dist., Civ. No. C-70-1331 (N.D. Calif. April 28, 1971); 
Brewer v. School Board o f the City o f Norfolk, 397 F.2d 37, 42 
(4th Cir. 1968); Cf. Sloan v. Tenth School Dist. o f  Wilson
County,______ F.2d______(6th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Board o f Educ. o f  Polk County,____ F. 2d___ 4th Cir. 1968);
Kelley v. Altheimer,____ F.2d_____(8th Cir. 1967); Bradley v.
School Bd.,______ F. Supp_______(E.D. Va. 1971); Clark v.
Board o f  Educ. o f  Little Rock, 401 U.S. 971 (1971).

9. The legal e ffec ts  o f racially  discriminatory 
confinement to a school district are not different from the ef­
fects of such containment within a district. E.g., Lee v. Macon 
County Board o f Education, 558 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1971); 
Haney v. County Board Sevier, 410 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969), 
429 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1970).

10. Where the actions of state defendants and local school 
authorities throughout the metropolitan area have had the 
natural, foreseeable, and actual effect of building upon, taking 
advantage of, and encouraging racially segregated demographic 
patterns deliberately fixed by governmental action at all levels



30aa

with the effect of creating and maintaining racial segregation in 
the public schools, there is a present obligation to eliminate the 
continuing effects of such violation; and the District Court has 
the duty, upon default by school authorities, to intervene to 
secure compliance with the Constitution pursuant to the sound 
exercise of traditional equity powers consistent with the 
practicalities of the local situation. Swann v. Charlotte- 
Mecklenberg, 402 U.S. 1,15-16, 20-21,31-32 (1971). Cf Find­
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Detroit-Only Plans of 
Desegregation, p.5, Conclusion 4. In devising remedies where 
state-imposed segregation has been established, it is the respon­
sibility of school authorities and district courts to see to it that 
future school construction and abandonment is not used and 
does not serve to perpetuate or re-establish the violation. 
Swann, supra, 402 U.S. at 21.

11. Moreoever, where the State, and named defendants, 
are substantially implicated in the segregation violation found 
and are ultimately responsible for public schooling throughout 
the state, the consistent application of constitutional principles 
requires that this court take all steps necessary and essential to 
require them to desegregate the Detroit public schools ef­
fectively and maintain, now and hereafter, a racially unified, 
non-discriminatory system in the absence of a showing that the 
judicial intervention here contemplated will frustrate the pro­
motion of a legitimate and compelling state policy or interest. 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964), Hunter v. City o f 
Pittsburg , 207 U.S. 161,  178-179 (1907); Phoenix v. 
Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 212-213 (1970); Kramer v. Union 
Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 633 (1969); Williams v. 
Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244^15 (1970); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
U.S. 479, 488 (1966); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 
430, 439, 442; Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg, 402 U.S. 1 
(1971); Davis v. Bd. o f School Commissioners, 402 U.S. 33 
(1971); Brown v. Board o f Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 
Brown r. Board o f Education, 349 U.S. 292, 300 (1955); 
Monroe v. Board o f Commissioners, 391 U.S. 450, 459 (1968).



31aa

FOOTNOTES

1. In the main such proof entirely misses the point: the 
violation here found has to do with school segregation caused in 
substantial part by force of public authority and action; yet the 
intervening defendants’ questions and offer of proof speak 
mainly to educational theory and recent and sometimes con­
tradictory research about narrowly measured educational ef­
fects, mostly on achievement test scores, of quite limited begin­
nings of racial, or socio-economic integration of various types 
and as compared with the effects of dollar or other resource 
inputs and continued segregation. This court does not under­
stand, however, that such research, from the Coleman report to 
its many reanalyses, formed the primary bases for the Brown 
decision or any of its progeny. See, e.g., Brunson v. Bd. of 
Trustees, 429 F.2d 820, 826 (4th Cir. 1970) (J. Sobeloff, con­
curring). In the context similar to newly intervening defendants’ 
objections to desegregation, the Supreme Court in Swann specifi­
cally held that such factors constitute an impermissible limit 
upon the duty to desegregate. 402 U.S. at 24, Fn. 8. Citation to 
such research, either in support or rejection of school deseg­
regation, misses the primary point: insofar as pupil assignments 
are concerned, the system of public schooling in every state 
must be operated in a racially non-discriminatory, unified 
fashion; until that objective is met, the very system of public 
schooling constitutes an invidious racial classification. The 
adoption of an education theory having the effect of main­
taining a pattern of de jure segregation is therefore clearly 
impermissible. (Whether such theories, research, or evidence on 
educational quality or inequality form the basis for requiring 
judicial intervention and relief in the absence of a finding of de 
jure segregation is a question this court need not face.)

In any event, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
held, on June 19, 1970, that greater, not less, desegregation is 
the proper manner to alleviate the problem of disparity in 
achievement. Monroe v. Board of Commissioners, Jackson, 
Tenn., 427 F.2d 1005, 1008 (C.A. 6, 1970).

2. Chief Justice Burger in Swann v. Charlotte-Meeklenberg 
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,6.



32aa

3. Defendants Magdowski, et al., originally opposed to de­
segregation, during the course of the taking of proofs on the 
issue of segregation, conceded that the public schools of the 
city of Detroit were in fact segregated, and took the early lead 
in suggesting that the only effective avenue for desegregation 
was a metropolitan plan. The Detroit Board of Education, while 
continuing to deny that it has been guilty of any act of seg­
regation, took the position that if desegregation were to be 
undertaken it could be done only on a metropolitan basis. So 
that now the white parents of the city of Detroit and its Board 
of Education — the parties most directly involved with the lot 
of the students in the Detroit school system — see no alternative 
to, and, for all practical purposes seek a metropolitan solution 
to the basic Detroit school problem.

4. In the context of this hearing, the defendant Detroit 
Board of Education is not in a position to act as the usual 
“school authority” primarily responsible for suggesting an ap­
propriate desegregation area simply because its authority does 
not extend beyond the geographic limits of the city of Detroit. 
The competence, knowledge of local conditions, and expertise 
of those schoolmen who helped prepare the Detroit Board’s 
proposal, however, may be utilized and given appropriate weight.

5. In Oliver v. Kalamazoo Board of Education, #K88-71, 
Judge Fox pointed out the primary responsibility of the state: 
“The State of Michigan is represented by two entities, but the 
entity is an agent of the State . . . [T] he Constitution says 
something about your [the State’s] responsibility.” The court 
went on to order the State to take an active role. Pre-trial order 
and transcript, May 1, 1972.

6. The Detroit Board plan places heavier reliance on white 
flight and socio-economic factors, while the Magdowski pro­
posal in addition places an emphasis on maintaining a minimum 
percentage black in each school. These considerations in no way 
determine the court’s choice of a desegregation area necessary 
to meet constitutional requirements. In fairness, however, it 
also should be noted that the desegregation area, which the 
court deems to best meet constitutional requirements, also 
happens in the main, to meet the other concerns expressed in



33aa

these two proposals. That the Board’s interest in socio­
economic integration is largely met by racial desegregation is 
not surprising. There is uncontroverted evidence in the record, 
and the court so finds, that there is a high correlation between 
blacks and persons of a low socio-economic status, the result, in 
the main, of the cumulative effects of past and present racial 
discrimination including discrimination in education. At some 
point hereafter, of course, school authorities with responsibility 
for implementation and operation of the racially-unified non­
discriminatory school system contemplated, or parts thereof, 
may and should include in its plan other educational goals and 
needs whether or not they are required by the law or any court. 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg, 402 U.S. at 16.

7. If a state is constitutionally forbidden to institute a 
system of racial segregation by the use of artificial boundary 
lines, it is likewise forbidden to perpetuate a system whose 
effect is to maintain segregation. “There is no legally protected 
vested interest in segregation. If there were, then Brown v Board 
of Education and the numerous decisions based on that case 
would be pointless. Courts will not say in one breath that public 
school systems may not practice segregation, and in the next 
that they may do nothing to eliminate it.” Wanner v School Bd. 
of Arlington County, 357 F.2d 452, ( Soboloff, Cir. J.), pp. 454 
and 455. The historic fact is that existing conditions are based 
on a design to segregate the races. To hold that segregation, 
once accomplished, is sacrosanct and beyond constitutional 
reach, is to say that the United States Constitution and its 
Amendments, and their provisions for equality, are mere 
rhetoric.

8. See Findings 70-78, infra.

9. The interplay of these two factors summarizes two 
other guideposts or starting points: maximum feasible deseg­
regation and eliminating racially identifiable schools. Factors 
such as time and distance limitations, together with the rough 
definitions of substantial disproportion with the relevant school 
community’s pupil racial composition, in turn largely determine 
the meaning of “eliminating racially identifiable schools” and 
what constitutes “maximum feasible desegregation,” in the



34aa

particular circumstances here present and in the context of a 
prior finding of segregation.

10. The Detroit Board Proposal contemplates desegrega­
tion on a “minority”-white basis. The proof in this cause, how­
ever, has been aimed at the segregation of black children and 
white children; similarly the remedy has been so defined, 
argued, and in the main presented by parties. The court finds, 
therefore, that the area, and further planning, should, in the 
main, be confined to a black-white breakdown.

11. To the Southwest, Plaintiffs’ Proposal falls on the side 
of less time in transit than the 40-minute guideline because 
inclusion of more area is not required to desegregate, (see Find­
ing 27, infra.)

12. Moreover, in the main, the areas, schools, and pupils 
in these districts are not as fully members of the greater Detroit 
school community: many are less urban; they are the furthest in 
terms of time, distance, and contact from the Detroit area’s 
economic and social acitivities [SIC]; and many are more 
oriented, if anything, to urban areas other than Detroit, for 
example, the Ann Arbor - Ypsilanti area.

13. The court notes, however, that the range of average 
socio-economic status for the various regions or clusters in 
Plaintiffs’ Proposal is similar to that in the Detroit Board Pro­
posal: based on the Michigan Assessment the range in Plaintiffs’ 
Proposal happens to be 44.7 to 53.7, while in the Detroit Board 
Proposal the range is 46.3 to 53; and only three of the 15 
clusters of schools in Plaintiffs’ Proposal fall below 46.3.

14. Because of the closeness of the question, particularly 
as it relates to any problems which may arise hereafter in 
establishing a pupil desegregation plan, the court feels that some 
opportunity should be given to the expert panel to suggest a 
modification of this tentative resolution. See also Findings 
34-38 below.

15. A common practice in other cases is the use of “pupil
locator” maps. See Northcross v. School Board of City of 
Memphis,_____ F. 2d______ (6th Cir. 1971).



35aa

16. For years these city-contained school districts, which 
include some suburban districts in the desegregation area, as 
well as the Detroit Public Schools, have demanded without suc­
cess that this inequitable state practice be changed so that all 
districts could be reimbursed on the same basis for pupil trans­
portation.

17. The figure almost twice that which appears in several 
of the State “plans” was based on the assumption that busing 
would be “one-way” with black children being assigned to sub­
urban schools. Mr. Wagner, the state official in charge of pupil 
transportation, provided the information on which that esti­
mate was based and also informed his superiors that a two-way 
plan of desegregation and transportation would cost much less 
per pupil. The state defendants did not bring this important fact 
to the court’s attention in any of their submissions; it was un­
covered and fully explored in the disposition of Mr. Wagner 
taken by plaintiffs.

18. This phenomenon was noted in Swann, 402 U.S. 1, 
20-21. The principle was long known, and actively, supported 
by the F.H.A. For example, consider that public agency’s early 
understanding in its 1936 manual that white subdivision 
developments require white schools: “ if the children of people 
living in such area are compelled to attend school where the 
majority or a good number of the pupils represent a far lower 
level of society or an incompatible racial element, the neighbor­
hood under consideration will prove far less stable and desirable 
than if the condition did not exist.”

19. This figure assumes 30 children/regular classroom. 
Although rated capacities may be lower, the figure for regular 
classrooms does not include several types of instructional, 
recreational, laboratory, and other rooms which add overall 
pupil capacity to schools.

20. The resulting pattern is unmistakable: “Residential 
segregation within the city and throughout the larger metro­
politan area is substantial, pervasive and of long standing. Black 
citizens are located in separate and distinct areas within the city 
and are not generally found in the suburbs. While the racially



36aa

unrestricted choice of black persons and economic factors may 
have played some part in the development of this pattern of 
residential segregation, it is, in the main, the result of past and 
present practices and customs or racial discrimination, both 
public and private, which have and do restrict the housing op­
portunities of black people. Perhaps the most that can be said is 
that all of them [various governmental units], including school 
quthorities, are, in part, responsible for the segregated condition 
which exists.” Ruling on Issue of Segregation, 8 and 10. More­
over, an examination of PX 181, 192 and 185 shows that black 
children often remain isolated in predominately black schools in 
the few suburban school districts with any numbers of black 
pupils. In the last several weeks the local press has reported that 
the United States Office of Education cut off funds for one 
such district.

21. Included in this set of arrangements are contract rela­
tionships of various types concerning personnel, property and 
debts.

22. The defendant, William G. Milliken, Governor of the 
State of Michigan, in his amicus brief filed in the Supreme 
Court of the United States, No. 71-1332, San Antonio In­
dependent School District v. Demetrio P. Rodriquez, says, page 
II:

“ 1. Amici, whose individual and particular interests 
are set forth in more detail below, are the Governors of the 
above-listed States. As Governors and Chief executive of­
ficers of their respective States, Amici are responsible for 
upholding and carrying out the commands of the Con­
stitutions and laws of their various States, including the 
provisions thereof requiring the establishment of public 
schools and school districts and commanding the children 
of their States to attend school. Amici are responsible for 
financial decisions affecting all State operations, including 
those pertaining to support and financing of the public 
schools.

“Amici are deeply concerned about the ongoing and 
continuing crisis in public education and the difficulties



37aa

facing public educational systems in their States and 
around the nation. Amici recognize that grave inequities 
exist because of variation in local property tax bases upon 
which local school districts must rely in order to support 
their school systems. Amici believe that these inequalities 
in educational resources violate the requirements of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and that these inequalities 
must be eliminated* * * *”

The Governors’ amicus brief, speaking of the State of 
Texas, could as well be said of the State of Michigan, when 
it used these words:

“It is also undisputed that the local school districts 
and their boundaries, and hence the aggregate value of 
the property they contain, are entirely the creation of and 
their maintenance is the responsibility of the State of 
Texas. Furthermore, the detailed regulation of public 
education financing in Texas * * * is a state not a local 
responsibility. Indeed, the school districts have the power 
to raise funds for education only as a result of delegation 
by the State of its own power to tax for the general wel­
fare.” (Page 8 of brief.)

“Since the State could not discriminate directly 
against students residing in poorer localities, it should not 
be permitted to accomplish the same result by dividing its 
responsibility for equal education with local school 
districts and failing to supplement the funds raised by the 
school districts sufficiently to eliminate discrimination.” 
*(Page 11 of brief.)

*Compare Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 
(1964). While a State may delegate certain of its functions to 
smaller subdivisions such as cities or counties, it cannot escape 
accountability for their actions. Such subdivisions are “created 
as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental 
powers of the State as may be entrusted to them * * * * The 
number, nature, and duration of [their] powers * * * and the 
territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute



38aa

discretion of the State.” Hunter v. City of Pittsburg, 207 U.S. 
161, 178 (1907).

23. For years black children in the Carver School District 
were assigned to black schools in the inner city because no 
white suburban district (or white school in the city) would take 
the children.

24. These findings are made on the basis of the present 
record and are subject to modification based on evidence which 
may be developed once the specific problems of actual deseg­
regation are faced in the planning process.

25. See, Kelley, et al. v. Metropolitan Bd. of Educ., CCA 
6, Nos. 71-1778-79, page 22, slip opinion, May 30, 1972:

“Perhaps the primary thing that the Swann case 
decided was that in devising plans to terminate such 
residual effects, it is appropriate for the school system and 
the District Judge to take note of the proportion of white 
and black students within the area* and seek as practical a 
plan as may be for ending white schools and black schools 
and substituting therefor schools which are representative 
of the area in which the students live.”

*The area referred to in this case is all of Davidson 
County, including the City of Nashville, which is in­
cluded in the jurisdiction of defendant Metropolitan 
Board of Education.



39aa

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RONALD BRADLEY, et al„
Plaintiffs

WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al„
Defendants

and
DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
LOCAL 231, AMERICAN FEDERA­
TION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO,

Defendant-
Intervenor

and
DENISE MAGDOWSKI, et al„

Defendants-
Intervenor

et al.

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CIVIL ACTION NO:
35257

RULING ON DESEGREGATION AREA 
AND

ORDER FOR DEVELOPMENT OF 
PLAN OF DESEGREGATION

On September 27, 1971 the court made its Ruling on Issue 
of Segregation, holding that illegal segregation exists in the 
public schools of the City of Detroit as a result of a course of 
conduct on the part of the State of Michigan and the Detroit 
Board of Education. Having found a constitutional violation as 
established, on October 4, 1971 the court directed the school 
board defendants, City and State, to develop and submit plans 
of desegregation, designed to achieve the greatest possible de­
gree of actual desegregation, taking into account the practicali-

\



40aa

ties of the situation. The directive called for the submission of 
both a “Detroit-only” and a “Metropolitan” plan.

Plans for the desegregation of the Detroit schools were 
submitted by the Detroit Board of Education and by the plain­
tiffs. Following five days of hearings the court found that while 
plaintiffs’ plan would accomplish more desegregation than now 
obtains in the system, or which would be achieved under either 
Plan A or C of the Detroit Board of Education submissions, 
none of the plans would result in the desegregation of the pub­
lic schools of the Detroit school district. The court, in its find­
ings of fact and conclusions of law, concluded that “relief of 
segregation in the Detroit public schools cannot be accom­
plished within the corporate geographical limits of the city,” 
and that it had the authority and the duty to look beyond such 
limits for a solution to the illegal segregation in the Detroit 
public schools. Accordingly, the court ruled, it had to consider 
a metropolitan remedy for segregation.

The parties submitted a number of plans for metropolitan 
desegregation. The State Board of Education submitted six - 
wi thout  recommendation, and without indicating any pre­
ference. With the exception of one of these, none could be con­
sidered as designed to accomplish desegregation. On the other 
hand the proposals of intervening defendant Magdowski, et al., 
the Detroit Board of Education and the plaintiffs were all good 
faith efforts to accomplish desegregation in the Detroit metro­
politan area. The three plans submitted by these parties have 
many similarities, and all of them propose to incorporate, geo­
graphically, most—and in one instance, all -of the three-county 
area of Wayne, Oakland and Macomb.

The hearing on the proposals have set the framework, and 
have articulated the criteria and considerations, for developing 
and evaluating an effective plan of metropolitan desegregation. 
None of the submissions represent a complete plan for the 
effective and equitable desegregation of the metropolitan area, 
capable of implementation in its present form. The court will 
therefore draw upon the resources of the parties to devise, pur­
suant to its direction, a constitutional plan of desegregation of 
the Detroit public schools.



41aa

Based on the entire record herein, the previous oral and 
written rulings and orders of this court, and the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law filed herewith, IT IS ORDERED:

I.

A. As a panel charged with the responsibility of pre­
paring and submitting an effective desegregation plan in accor­
dance with the provisions of this order, the court appoints the 
following:

1. A designee of the State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction;*

2. Harold Wagner, Supervisor of the Transportation Unit 
in the Safety and Traffic Education Program of the 
State Department of Education;

3. Merle Henrickson, Detroit Board of Education;

4. Aubrey McCutcheon, Detroit Board of Education;

5. Freeman Flynn, Detroit Board of Education;

6. Gordon Foster, expert for plaintiffs;

7. R i c h a r d  Morshead,  represent ing de fendant  
Magdowski, et al.;

8. A designee of the newly intervening defendants;*

9. Rita Scott, of the Michigan Civil Rights Commission.

Should any designated member of this panel be unable to 
serve, the other members of the panel shall elect any necessary 
replacements, upon notice to the court and the parties. In the

*The designees of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and 
newly intervening defendants shall be communicated to the court within 
seven days of the entry of this order. In the event the newly intervening 
defendants cannot agree upon a designee, they may each submit a nominee 
within seven days from the entry of this order, and the court shall select 
one of the nominees as representative of said defendants.



42aa

absence of objections within five days of the notice, and pend­
ing a final ruling, such designated replacement shall act as a 
member of the panel.

B. As soon a possible, but in no event later than 45 days 
after the issuance of this order, the panel is to develop a plan 
for the assignment of pupils as set forth below in order to pro­
vide the maximum actual desegregation, and shall develop as 
well a plan for the transportation of pupils, for implementation 
for all grades, schools and clusters in the desegregation area. In­
sofar as required by the circumstances, which are to be detailed 
in particular, the panel may recommend immediate implementa­
tion of an interim desegregation plan for grades K-6, K-8 or K-9 
in all or in as many clusters as practicable, with complete and 
final desegregation to proceed in no event later than the fall 
1973 term. In its transportation plan the panel shall, to meet 
the needs of the proposed pupil assignment plan, make recom­
mendations, including the shortest possible timetable, for ac­
quiring sufficient additional transportation facilities for any in­
terim or final plan of desegregation. Such recommendations 
shall be filed forthwith and in no event later than 45 days after 
the entry of this order. Should it develop that some additional 
transportation equipment is needed for an interim plan, the 
panel shall make recommendations for such acquisition within 
20 days of this order.

C. The parties, their agents, employees, successors. 
[SIC] and all others having actual notice of this order shall 
cooperate fully with the panel in their assigned mission, includ­
ing, but not limited to, the provision of data and reasonable full 
and part-time staff assistance as requested by the panel. The 
State defendants shall provide support, accreditation, funds, 
and otherwise take all actions necessary to insure that local 
officials and employees cooperate fully with the panel. All 
reasonable costs incurred by the panel shall be borne by the 
State defendants; provided, however, that staff assistance or 
other services provided by any school district, its employees or 
agents, shall be without charge, and the cost thereof shall be 
borne by such school district.



43aa

II.
A. Pupil reassignment to accomplish desegregation of the 

Detroit public schools is required within the geographical area 
which may be described as encompassing the following school 
districts (see Exhibit P.M. 12), and hereinafter referred to as the 
“desegregation area” :

Lakeshore Birmingham Fairlane
Lakeview Hazel Park Garden City
Roseville Highland Park North Dearborn 

Heights
South Lake Royal Oak Cherry Hill
East Detroit Berkley Inkster
Grosse Pointe Femdale Wayne
Centerline Southfield Westwood
Fitzgerald Bloomfield Hills Ecorse
Van Dyke Oak Park Romulus
Fraser Redford Union Taylor
Harper Woods West Bloomfield River Rouge
Warren Clarenceville Riverview
Warren Woods Farmington Wyandotte
Clawson Livonia Allen Park
Hamtramck South Redford Lincoln Park
Lamphere Crestwood Melvindale
Madison Heights Dearborn Southgate
Troy Dearborn Heights Detroit

Provided, however, that if in the actual assignment of 
pupils it appears necessary and feasible to achieve effective and 
complete racial desegregation to reassign pupils of another dis­
trict or other districts, the desegregation panel may, upon 
notice to the parties, apply to the Court for an appropriate 
modification of this order.

B. Within the limitations of reasonable travel time and 
distance factors, pupil reassignments shall be effected within the 
clusters described in Exhibit P.M. 12 so as to achieve the 
greatest degree of actual desegregation to the end that, upon 
implementation, no school, grade or classroom by substantially



44aa

disproportionate to the overall pupil racial composition. The 
panel may, upon notice to the parties, recommend reorganiza­
tion of clusters within the desegregation area in order to mini­
mize administrative inconvenience, or time and/or numbers of 
pupils requiring transportation.

C. Appropriate and safe transportation arrangements 
shall be made available without cost to all pupils assigned to 
schools deemed by the panel to be other than “walk-in” 
schools.

D. Consistent with the requirements of maximum actual 
desegregation, every effort should be made to minimize the 
numbers of pupils to be reassigned and requiring transportation, 
the time pupils spend in transit, and the number and cost of 
new transportation facilities to be acquired by utilizing such 
techniques as clustering, the “skip” technique, island zoning, 
reasonable staggering of school hours, and maximization of use 
of existing transportation facilities, including buses owned or 
leased by school districts and buses operated by public transit 
authorities and private charter companies. The panel shall de­
velop appropriate recommendations for limiting transfers which 
affect the desegregation of particular schools.

E. Transportation and pupil assignment shall, to the ex­
tent consistent with maximum feasible desegregation, be a two­
way process with both black and white pupils sharing the re­
sponsibility for transportation requirements at all grade levels. 
In the determination of the utilization of existing, and the con­
struction of new, facilities, care shall be taken to randomize the 
location of particular grade levels.

F. Faculty and staff shall be reassigned, in keeping with 
pupil desegregation, so as to prevent the creation or continua­
tion of the identification of schools by reference to past racial 
composition, or the continuation of substantially disproportion­
ate racial composition of the faculty and staffs, of the schools 
in the desegregation area. The faculty and staffs assigned to the 
schools within the desegregation area shall be substantially dese­
gregated, bearing in mind, however, that the desideratum is the



45aa

balance of faculty and staff by qualifications for subject and 
grade level, and then by race, experience and sex. In the context 
of the evidence in this case, it is appropriate to require assign­
ment of no less than 10% black faculty and staff at each school, 
and where there is more than one building administrator, every 
effort should be made to assign a bi-racial administrative team.

G. In the hiring, assignment, promotion, demotion, and 
dismissal of faculty and staff, racially non-discriminatory cri­
teria must be developed and used; provided, however, there 
shall be no reduction in efforts to increase minority group 
representation among faculty and staff in the desegregation 
area. Affirmative action shall be taken to increase minority 
employment in all levels of teaching and administration.

H. The restructuring of school facility utilization neces­
sitated by pupil reassignments should produce schools of sub­
stantially like quality, facilities, extra-curricular activities and 
staffs; and the utilization of existing school capacity through 
the desegregation area shall be made on the basis of uniform 
criteria.

I. The State Board of Education and the State Super­
intendent of Education shall with respect to all school construc­
tion and expansion, “consider the factor of racial balance along 
with other educational considerations in making decisions about 
new school sites, expansion of present facilities * * * and 
shall, within the desegregation area disapprove all proposals for 
new construction or expansion of existing facilities when 
“housing patterns in an area would result in a school largely se­
gregated on racial * * * lines,” all in accordance with the 1966 
directive issued by the State Board of Education to local school 
boards and the State Board’s “School Plant Planning Hand­
book” (see Ruling on Issue of segregation, p. 13.).

J. Pending further orders of the court, existing school 
district and regional boundaries and school governance arrange­
ments will be maintained and continued, except to the extent 
necessary to effect pupil and faculty desegregation as set forth 
herein; provided, however, that existing administrative, finan­



46aa

cial, contractual, property and governance arrangements shall be 
examined, and recommendations for their temporary and per­
manent retention or modification shall be made, in light of the 
need to operate an effectively desegregated system of schools.

K. At each school within the desegregated area provision 
shall be made to insure that the curriculum, activities, and con­
duct standards respect the diversity of students from differing 
ethnic backgrounds and the dignity and safety of each indivi­
dual, students, faculty, staff and parents.

L. The defendants shall, to insure the effective desegre­
gation of the schools in the desegregation area, take immediate 
action including, but not limited to, the establishment or expan­
sion of in-service training of faculty and staff, create bi-racial 
committees, employ black counselors, and require be-racial and 
non-discriminatory extra-curricular activities.

Ill
The State Superintendent of Public Instruction, with the 

assistance of the other state defendants, shall examine, and 
make recommendations, consistent with the principles estab­
lished above, for appropriate interim and final arrangements for 
the (1) financial, (2) administrative and school governance, and 
(3) contractual arrangements for the operation of the schools 
within the desegregation area, including steps for unifying, or 
otherwise making uniform the personnel policies, procedures, 
contracts, and property arrangements of the various school dis­
tricts.

Within 15 days of the entry of this order, the Super­
intendent shall advise the court and the parties of his progress in 
preparing such recommendations by filing a written report with 
the court and serving it on the parties. In not later than 45 days 
after the entry of this order, the Superintendent shall file with 
the court his recommendations for appropriate interim and final 
relief in these respects.

In his examination and recommendations, the Super­
intendent, consistent with the rulings and orders of this court,



47aa

may be guided, but not limited, by existing state law; where 
state law provides a convenient and adequate framework for in­
terim or ultimate relief, it should be followed, where state law 
either is silent or conflicts with what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of this order, the Superintendent shall independently 
recommend what he deems necessary. In particular, the Super­
intendent shall examine and choose one appropriate interim 
arrangement to oversee the immediate implementation of a plan 
of desegregation.

IV.

Each party may file appropriate plans or proposals for 
inclusion in any final order which may issue in this cause. The 
intent of this order is to permit all the parties to proceed apace 
with the task before us: fashioning an effective plan for the de­
segregation of the Detroit public schools.

Fifteen days after the filing of the reports required herein, 
hearings will begin on any proposal to modify any interim plan 
prepared by the panel and all other matters which may be inci­
dent to the adoption and implementation of any interim plan of 
desegregation submitted. The parties are placed on notice that 
they are to be prepared at that time to present their objections, 
alternatives and modifications. At such hearing the court will 
not consider objections to desegregation or proposals offered 
“instead” of desegregation.

Hearings on a final plan of desegregation will be set as cir­
cumstances require.

DATE: JUNE 14, 1972.

/s/
Stephen J. Roth 

United States District Judge



PLAINTIFFS’ PROPOSAL

SOURCE: 19 70-71 State Racial Ethnic Census, 
Tri-County Area: October 1970 
Detroit Racial Census.



49aa

Total
Total
Black

Percent
Black

District Students Students Students

Cluster 1
Lakeshore 9,566 34 .4
Lakeview 7,859 0 .0
Roseville 14,426 205 1.4
South Lake 5,341 0 .0
Detroit Southeastern 15,990 12,725 79.6

53,180 12,964 24.3%

Cluster 2
East Detroit 12,969 4 .0
Grosse Point 13,267 2 .0
Detroit King 10,495 10,107 96.3

36,731 10,1 13 27.5%
Cluster 3

Centerline 6,716 6 .1
Fitzgerald 5,396 0 .0
Van Dyke 7,238 0 .0
Detroit Northeastern 10,496 9,399 89.5
Detroit Osborn 1 1,584 2,645 22.8

41,430 12,050 29.1

Cluster 4
Fraser 7,652 1 .0
Harper Woods 1,932 0 .0
Warren 31,815 50 2
Warren Woods 9,231 1 .0
Detroit Denby 9,631 421 4.4
Detroit Finney 15,350 8,486 55.3
Detroit Kettering 17,866 16,339 91.4

93,477 25,298 27.0

Cluster 5
Clawson 5,088 0 .0
Hamtramck 2,843 816 28.7
Lamphere 5,851 1 .0



50aa

Total
Total
Black

Percent
Black

District Students Students Students

Cluster 5 (con’t)
Madison Heights 4.646 3 .1
Troy 6,435 6 .1
Detroit Pershing 14,690 9,436 64.2

39,553 10,262 26.0
Cluster 6

Birmingham 16,912 7 .0
Hazel Park 7,868 1 .0
Highland Park 7,708 6,556 85.1
Royal Oak 18,583 5 .0
Detroit Murray 9,564 7,042 73.6

60,635 13,61 1 22.4

Cluster 7
Berkley 8,196 9 .1
Ferndale 8,139 770 9.5
Southfield 16,333 8 _2
Detroit Central 13,491 13,448 99.7

46,159 14,235 30.8

Cluster 8
Bloomfield Hills 9,461 41 .4
Oak Park 5,524 553 10.1
Redford Union 9,382 2 .0
West Bloomfield 4,967 1 .0
Detroit Ford 10,661 2,680 25.1
Detroit Mumford 1 1,884 1 1,190 94.2

51,870 14,472 27.8

Cluster 9
Clarenceville 3,832 0 .0
Farmington 16,367 20 .1
Detroit Cooley 19,287 13,907
less: Cadillac JHS &
1/5 Cooley -4,250 -2,526 75.7
Detroit Redford 15,149 503 3.3

50,385 1 1,904 23.6



51aa

Total
Total
Black

Percent
Black

District Students Students Students

Cluster 10
Livonia 38,239 10 .0
South Redford 7,778 0 .0
Detroit Cody 15,534 1,666 10.7
Detroit Mackenzie 21,773 20,272 93.1

83,324 21,948 26.3
Cluster 11

Crestwood 5,436 0 .0
Dearborn 20,856 2 .0
Dearborn Heights 5,604 0 .0
Fairlane 1,121 0 .0
Garden City 13,669 0 .0
North Dearborn
Heights 2,689 0 .0
Detroit Northwestern 14,876 14,771 99.3

64,251 14,773 22.9

Cluster 12
Cherry Hill 4,627 16 .3
Inkster 4,31 1 3,795 88.0
Wayne 23,218 30 .1
Westwood 4,961 1,980 39.9
Detroit Chadsey 5,998 2,053
plus Cadillac JHS &
1/5 Cooley 4,250 2,526 44.7

43,420 10,400 22.0

Cluster 13
Ecorse 4,200 2,135 50.8
Romulus 5,801 958 16.5
Taylor 20,723 301 1.5
Detroit Western 1 1,728 5,337 45.6

42,452 8,731 20.5



52aa

Total
Total
Black

Percent
Black

District Students Students Students

Cluster 14
River Rouge 3,675 1,588 43.2
Riverview 3,790 1 .0
Wyandotte 8,278 2 .0
Detroit Southwestern 11,183 4,981 44.54

26,926 6,572 24.4

Cluster 15
Allen Park 6,324 11 .2
Lincoln Park 11,559 1 .0
Melvindale 5,476 1 .0
Southgate 9,300 1 .0
Detroit Northern 9,704 9,616 99.1

42,363 9,630 22.7

TOTALS 780,090 197,313 25.3



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