Flemming v. South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Appellant's Reply Brief

    Ifmteii States ( to r t  of Appeals
For the Fourth Circuit

No. 6995

SARAH MAE FLEMMING,

vs.
Appellant,

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC AND GAS 
COMPANY, a corporation,

Appellee.

A ppeal, prom the U nited States D istrict Court for the 
E astern D istrict op South Carolina

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

P hilip W ittenberg,
306-308 Barringer Building, 

Columbia, South Carolina,
R obert L. Carter,
T hurgood Marshall,

107 West 43rd Street,
New York, New York,

Attorneys for Appellant.

Spottswood W. R obinson, III,
of Counsel.

Supreme P rinting Co., I nc., 114 W orth Street, N. Y. 13, BEekman 3-2320



I N D E X

Table of Cases
PAGE

Brown v. Baskin, 174 F. 2d 391 (CA 4th 1949).........  7
Culver v. City of Warren, 84 Ohio App. 373, 83 N. E.

2d 82 (1948) .......................................................... 7
DuPont Rayon Co. v. Henson, 162 Tenn. 394, 36 S. W.

2d 879 (1931) ........................................................  3n
Enoch Pratt Free Public Library v. Kerr, 149 F. 2d 

212 (CA 4th 1945), cert, denied, 326 U. S. 723........ 7
Houston v. Minneapolis R. Co., 25 N. D. 469,141 N. W.

995 (1913) .............................................................  3n
Hull v. Boston & Maine R. R., 210 Mass. 159, 95 N. E. 

58(1911).................    3
Illinois Steel Co. v. Novak, 84 111. App. 641 (1899), 

a il’d 184 111. 501 (1900) ........................................ 3
Kent v. Southern Ry. Co., 52 Ga, App. 731, 184 S. E.

481 (1936)...............................................................  3n
Kern v. City Commissioners of Newton, 151 Kan.

565, 100 P. 2d 709 (1940) ......................................  7
King v. Illinois R. R. Co., 69 Miss. 245, 10 So. 42 

(1891) ....................................................................  3,5
Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S. D. W. Va.

1948) ......................................................................  7
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Turner, 100 Tenn. 213, 47 

S. W. 223 (1898) ....................................................  10
Maggi v. Pompa, 105 Cal. App. 496, 287 P. 982

(1930) ....................................................................  3n
McKinney Steel Co. v. Belcher, 205 Ky. 453, 266 S. W.

42 (1924) .....................................    3n
Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Assn., 202 F. 2d 

275 (CA 6th 1953), vacated and remanded, 344 U. S.
971 .......................................................................... 7



11

PAGE

Nash v. Air Terminal Services, 85 F. Supp. 545 (E. D.
Va. 1949) ...............................................................  7

Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Haun, 167 Va. 157, 187 S. E.
481 (1936) ........................................................ 4 ,4n

Redgate v. So. Pacific Co., 24 Cal. App. 573, 141 P.
1191 (1911)....................... ..................................... 4

Renand v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 210 Mass.
553, 97 N. E. 98 (1912) ....................... ................. 10

Rice v. Elmore, 165 F. 2d 387 (CA 4th 1947), cert, 
denied, 333 U. S. 875 ............................................  7

St. Louis & M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Waters, 105 Ark.
619, 152 S. W. 619 (1912) ......................................  3, 5n

St. Louis R. Co. v. Hudson, 95 Ark. 506, 130 S. W.
534 (1910)...............................................................  3n

Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 . ................  12
Spain v. Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co., 78 Ore.

355, 362-363, 153 P. 470 (1915)............................... 2, 3
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U. S.

192 ................................................................    7
Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 ................................. 7
Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 

U. S. 210 ...............................................................  7
Union Traction Co. v. Smith, 70 Ind. App. 40, 123 

N. E. 4 (1919) .....................................................  10
Williams v. United States, 341 U. S. 97 ................  12



Httiteii States Glmtrt af A p p e a ls
For the Fourth Circuit

No. 6995

---------------- 0-----------------

Sabah Mae F lemming,

vs.
Appellant,

South Carolina E lectric and Gas Company, a corporation,
Appellee.

A ppeal from the U nited States District Court for the 
E astern District of South Carolina

---------------------- o----------- ---------- -

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

Appellee, in its brief, has addressed itself to the ques­
tion of whether the court below had jurisdiction to hear 
and determine this cause. In substance, appellee’s conten­
tions are that it is a private corporation and not a state 
instrumentality within the meaning of Title 28, United 
States Code, Section 1343, and that in any event the com­
plaint is against the bus driver for acts for which it cannot 
be held responsible under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior. Since favorable resolution of this question is 
crucial to a consideration of the issues of substance on 
this appeal, the jurisdictional questions raised by appellee 
will be the subject of this reply. Appellee also touches 
upon the merits of appellant ’s claim, but extensive argu­
ment has been devoted to those questions in appellant’s 
main brief and need not be repeated here.



2

I

Section 58-1494 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina, 
1952, makes the bus driver a special policeman, but only 
while employed by appellee and actively engaged in the 
operation of the bus. Thus, the driver is a special police 
officer only while performing his duties as appellee’s agent. 
The complaint is clear. Paragraphs 6 and 7 (3a) allege 
that the driver ordered appellant out of a seat in the front 
of the bus (reserved for white people) and ordered her to 
leave by the rear exit solely because she was a Negro. 
These are the acts of a driver in charge of appellee’s prop­
erty and enforcing its regulations with respect to the seat­
ing and movement of passengers.

An observation by the Oregon Supreme Court in Spain 
v. Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co., 78 Ore. 355, 362-363, 
153 P. 470 (1915), is particularly apt here:

While it is true that the conductor is given by 
the statute the powers of a sheriff, it is not con­
ceived that when executing the duty of preserving 
order on the train he ceases to be a servant of his 
company, or that the statute invests him with any 
other or different power than that already possessed 
by him as conductor, beyond that of calling upon 
the bystanders for assistance in making an arrest, 
which but for the statute he would have no legal 
right to require. It is impossible to separate the 
peace officer from the conductor when the duties of 
both are vested in the same person, and practically 
the same duty is required in each capacity. “ I swear 
as a private person and not as a bishop,” said a 
cleric, when reproved by the King for profanity. 
“ But,” said the King, “ if the private person goes to 
hell for swearing, what becomes of the bishop?”



3

Where a statute requires an employee of a carrier or 
other private corporation to perform certain duties and 
makes such employee a special police officer in the per­
formance of those duties, the carrier or other private cor­
poration is nevertheless liable for acts of its employee 
otherwise within the scope of his employment. King v. 
Illinois R. R. Co., 69 Miss. 245, 10 So. 42 (1891); St. Louis 
d  M. d  8. Ry. Co. v. Waters, 105 Ark. 619, 152 S. W. 619 
(1912); Spain v. Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co., supra. 
The same rule applies where the employer, in accordance 
with the terms of a statute, procures the appointment of 
one of its regular employees, e. g., a conductor, as a special 
policeman to keep order or protect its property. Illinois 
Steel Co. v. Novak, 84 111. App. 641 (1899), aff’d 184 111. 
501 (1900); Hull v. Boston £ Maine R. R., 210 Mass. 159, 
95 N. E. 58 (1911).

Cases and authorities cited by appellee are inapplicable 
to the instant case and in fact distinguish themselves.1 
One basic distinction is that the rules cited by appellee 
apply only to those cases where the act complained of was 
executed by a special police officer appointed by public 
authority who occupied no other relation to the person 
sought to be held liable than that of a special policeman. 
Thus, the general rule cited by appellee at page 11 in its 
brief from 35 A. L, B. 681, is preceded by the statement

1St. Louis R. Co. v. Hudson, 95 Ark. 506, 130 S. W. 534 (1910) ; 
Kent v. Southern Ry. Co., 52 Ga. App. 731, 184 S. E. 481 (1936), 
cited by appellee, do not even purport to be decided on the question 
of respondeat superior, but rather are determinations that no wrong 
was committed either by the agent or the employer. The facts in 
McKinney Steel Co. v. Belcher, 205 Ky. 453, 266 S. W. 42 (1924) ; 
DuPont Rayon Co. v. Henson, 162 Tenn. 394, 36 S. W. 2d 879 
(1931) ; Houston v. Minneapolis R. Co.. 25 N. D. 469, 141 N. W. 
995 (1913); Maggi v. Pompa, 105 Cal. App. 496, 287 P. 982 (1930), 
cited by appellee, clearly distinguish them from this appeal.



4

that “ cases are excluded where the arrest was caused or 
made by a particular servant as, for instance, a con­
ductor . . . ”

In Redgate v. So. Pacific Co., 24 Cal. App. 573, 141 P. 
1191 (1911), cited by appellee at page 12, where the tort was 
committed by one who was solely a special police officer 
in the employ of the defendant, the court, after stating 
the applicable rule of non-liability of the employer, noted 
that in cases where the officer acts in a dual capacity, e. g., 
as a special policeman and foreman or janitor, the em­
ployer is held liable. And in Norfolk <& W. Ry. Co. v. Haun, 
167 Va. 157, 187 S. E. 481 (1936), also cited by appellee at 
page 12, where the tort was committed by a special police­
man appointed by public authority, the court carefully dis­
tinguished its holding from those cases where an employee 
of a carrier is clothed by statute with police authority to 
preserve the peace in the regular course of his duties as 
the carrier’s employee.2

2 Even in cases where the employee is solely a special police 
officer, the courts make a distinction between action for false arrest 
and action for assault. In the former case, an arrest after an act 
is done by the complainant may be said to be for the vindication of 
public justice and thus not within the scope of the employee’s author­
ity, whereas the justification cannot be offered in cases of assault. 
See 35 A. L. R. 645. Moreover, these decisions make a distinction 
between cases where the assault or arrest was against a passenger 
to whom an employer owes a duty of protection and those where the 
assault or arrest was against a trespasser. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. 
Haun, supra.

Finally, even in the cases cited by appellee where the employee 
is solely a policeman, the rule is that it is for the trier of fact to deter­
mine whether the employee was acting for his employer at the time 
he committed the act. 1 Restatement of Agency, 245(f). Thus, 
even if appellee’s cases were applicable here, the question would be 
one for the jury and not properly raised on a motion to dismiss.



5

Even more important perhaps, is the fact that the stat­
ute in the instant case makes it the duty of the carrier to 
maintain a policy of segregation and clothes the bus driver 
with the power of a special police officer to enable the 
carrier to more effectively maintain and enforce this 
policy. Here the case of King v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 
supra, is particularly in point. In that case, the court 
asserted that the purpose of the statute was to make it the 
duty of the carrier to preserve order (there the purpose 
was implicit; here the intent to require the carrier to segre­
gate is explicit, Section 58-1491); and that it was for this 
reason that the statute clothed the station agent with the 
power of a conservator of the pease. Where a statute was 
enacted to place responsibility for the execution of a policy 
on the carrier, the court held, the carrier could hardly 
escape liability because its employee was vested with police 
authority to enforce this policy.3

This question of the carrier’s responsibility was raised 
in the court below on motion to dismiss, and for purposes 
of its determination the allegations of fact in the complaint 
must be taken as true. The complaint alleges (par. 2) that 
appellee is a public utilities corporation created by and 
operating under South Carolina laws as a common carrier 
in the transportation of passengers in the City of Columbia.

3 Appellee seeks to distinguish St. Louis & M. & S. Ry. Co. v. 
Waters, supra, by noting that in that case the statute did not relieve 
the carrier of liability for the special policeman’s act while in the 
instant case, there is such a provision. In fact, the existence of this 
exculpatory clause affords greater evidence that the driver acted for 
the appellee, for it evinces a realization on the part of the legislators 
that, were it not for the exculpatory clause, the carrier would be liable 
for the acts of its employees in carrying out the policy which the stat­
ute requires the carrier to maintain. Of course, the exculpatorj- 
clause, even if applicable to the instant case, will not serve as a defense 
where the statute is unconstitutional.



6

It is obvious that, as a corporation, it could act only through 
agents, whether or not performing a duty imposed upon 
it by statute.

As the complaint sets out, the matters for which 
appellant sued were the activities of the driver of the bus 
in question. The complaint denominates this driver 
“ defendant’s employee and agent” (par. 6; see also 
par. 7), and alleges that he was “ acting within the scope 
of his employment and agency, and acting under color of 
Title 58-1491 through 1496, Code of Laws of South Caro­
lina, 1952 . . . and under color of customs and usages in 
said City, County and State . . . which prevail and 
pertain to the segregation of races on public transporta­
tion by motor vehicle carriers . . . ” (par. 6). It refers 
to the bus in question as having been “ operated by Defend­
ant” (par. 4), and to the driver’s conduct as “ actions on 
the part of the Defendant acting under color of the law, 
customs and usages, as hereinbefore set out . . . ” (par. 8; 
see also par. 9).

Clearly, then, appellee is forced to concede, as the com­
plaint alleges, that the driver in question was, and acted 
as, appellee’s agent with respect to all that gave rise to this 
complaint. Thus, a defense that the bus driver was not 
acting within the scope of his employment is not available 
to appellee in the present posture of this proceeding.

II

That in the circumstances of this case jurisdiction 
attaches only where complaint arises under color of state 
law or pursuant to state action, we readily concede. It is 
now too late to argue that the 14th Amendment binds 
individual rather than governmental activity. That appel­
lee is a private corporation, however, is not ipso facto deter­



7

minative. Rather the decisive question is whether the cor­
poration is acting for the state or its activities are gov­
erned and controlled by the state to such an extent that 
its private character has disappeared or been merged with 
that of the state. Under either circumstance there is state 
action within the meaning of Section 1343. See Terry v. 
Adams, 345 U. S. 461; Enoch Pratt Free Public Library v. 
Kerr, 149 F. 2d 212 (CA 4th 1945), cert, denied, 326 U. S. 
721; Rice v. Elmore, 165 F. 2d 387 (CA 4th 1947), cert, 
denied, 333 U. S. 875; Brown v. Baskin, 174 F. 2d 391 (CA 
4th 1949); Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S. D. 
W. Va. 1948); Nash v. Air Terminal Services, 85 F. Supp. 
545 (E. D. Ya. 1949); cf. Steele v. Louisville <& Nashville 
iR. Co., 323 U. S. 192; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomo­
tive Firemen, 323 U. S. 210. See also Kern v. City Com­
missioners of Newton, 151 Kan. 565, 100 P. 2d 709 (1940); 
Culver v. City of Warren, 84 Ohio App. 373, 83 N. E. 2d 
82 (1948).

Of particular interest is Muir v. Louisville Park The­
atrical Assn., 202 Fed. 2d 275 (CA 6th 1953), vacated and 
remanded, 344 U. S. 971, in which the Supreme Court 
ordered the Court of Appeals to reconsider its decision 
which had affirmed the judgment of the district court hold­
ing that a private corporation, which operated summer 
theatrical performances in a city-owned amphitheater, was 
free from the restraints of the 14th Amendment with 
respect to a racially-discriminatory admission policy, since 
its action was not state action within the meaning of the 
federal Constitution. It should be further noted that the 
Supreme Court action was with respect to a decision on the 
merits by the court below as to the private character of 
the corporation’s activity.

The statutory scheme here, Sections 58-1491 through 
58-1496, is clear. Appellee, as a passenger motor vehicle 
carrier, is specifically delegated with the obligation and



8

duty, subject to penalty, of maintaining and enforcing on 
its motor vehicle buses the state’s policy of racial segrega­
tion. By Section 58-1491, all passenger motor vehicle car­
riers are specifically required, upon pain of a maximum fine 
of $250, to “ separate the white and colored passengers in 
their motor buses” and to “ set apart and designate in eacli 
bus or other vehicle a portion thereof, or certain seats 
therein, to be occupied by white passengers and a portion 
thereof, or certain seats therein, to be occupied by colored 
passengers.” By Section 58-1492, such carriers are com­
manded to “ make no difference or discrimination in the 
quality or convenience of the accommodations provided for 
the two races”.

Obviously, the corporate carrier can act only through 
its agents in the execution of the functions enjoined upon 
it as a carrier. It is equally obvious that, in enforcing the 
statutory mandate of racial separation upon all its motor 
vehicles, its instrumentality must be the driver of that 
vehicle in the absence of a reserved seat system, for it is the 
driver who must assign to passengers the seats or other 
space they are to take or occupy. Further, Section 58- 
1493 specifically authorizes and requires the driver, “ at any 
time when it may be necessary or proper for the comfort 
or convenience of passengers so to do”, to “ change the 
designation so as to increase or decrease the amount of 
space or seats set apart for either race” and to “ require 
any passenger to change his seat as it may be necessary 
or proper.” The driver, of course, is the only agent of 
the carrier who could be in a position to determine the 
necessity or propriety of changing the space designations 
or requiring passengers to change their seats.

The statutory scheme clearly delegates to the carrier 
the authority, duty and responsibility of making rules and 
regulations in order to maintain and enforce the state’s 
segregation policy on its buses. Indeed, the policy could



9

not be effectuated without the necessary exercise of the 
carrier’s rule-making power. Hence, we submit it is clear 
that the state’s primary effective instrumentality for the 
enforcement of its policy of racial segregation is the car­
rier and not the driver. The great carrier of today can 
regulate the numerous details of its operation only through 
rules and regulations operating uniformly upon its numer­
ous servants in control of its numerous vehicles.

Such rules are further necessitated by certain of the 
features of the statutory provision themselves. As the law 
is silent as to what the pattern of segregation shall be, ex­
cept that 1493 requires that “ no contiguous seats on the 
same bench shall be occupied by white and colored persons 
at the same time”, regulations establishing a uniform sys­
tem must be adopted. Indeed Section 1495 clearly contem­
plates the adoption of such regulations. The necessity there­
for is accentuated by the need for extreme care in devising 
the segregation scheme in order to observe the prohibition 
of Section 58-1492, that “ no difference or discrimination in 
the quality or convenience of the accommodations provided 
for the two races.” The scheme must be uniform, for other­
wise the plans and patterns of passenger racial distribu­
tion, in existence on different vehicles of the same carrier, 
might be as diverse and as numerous as the vehicles them­
selves.

The orderly conduct of the carrier’s business further 
necessitates such regulations in order that its agents and 
servants could act uniformly in effecting the segregation 
and in making the designation required. As the statutes 
impose the requirement upon every motor vehicle carrier, 
and as the segregation schemes of the several might vary 
each from the other, the legal requirement would arise that 
each give reasonable notice to the public as to the scheme in 
force upon its line—a requirement that can be satisfied only 
through rules and regulations concerning which the public 
may be advised.



10

Here the segregation practices which the driver was 
enforcing were clearly the result of the carrier’s rules and 
regulations. It cannot segregate in the abstract. The law 
requires that Negro and white passengers be assigned to 
particular seats or portions of the bus. The carrier has 
to make rules and regulations to indicate which portion of 
the bus or which seats are to be assigned to the members 
of each race, and such rules and regulations must be made 
known to the public so as to leave no doubt that it reaches 
all to be affected by it. Union Traction Co. v. Smith, 70 Ind. 
App. 40, 123 N. E. 4 (1919); Renaud v. New York, N. H. (§ 
II. R. Co., 210 Mass. 553, 97 N. E. 98 (1912); Louisville 
N. R. Co. v. Turner, 100 Tenn. 213, 47 S. W. 223 (1898). 
Otherwise passengers could not be bound, and the corpoi'a- 
tion could be liable to the State for a violation of its 
statutory mandate and to the passenger for damages.

Nor could the duties imposed upon the carrier be per­
formed without the promulgation of segregation regulations. 
The carrier must have available sanctions that might be 
invoked against the passenger refusing to be segregated. 
The only sanctions feasible are the privileges of ejection, 
arrest and prosecution for violation of Section 58-1495. 
The statutory right to eject the passenger, whether by the 
carrier’s agent, or by a police officer or other conservator 
of the peace, is limited by Section 58-1496 to passengers vio­
lating Section 58-1495, that is, those refusing to “ take and 
occupy” the seat or other space assigned, or to “ change” 
seats from time to time as occasions require, “ pursu­
ant to any lawful rule, regulation or custom in force by 
such lines as to assigning separate seats or other space 
to white and colored persons, respectively, having been 
first advised of the fact of such regulations and requested 
to conform thereto.” Likewise, if a privilege of ejection 
is asserted by the carrier under common law principles as 
respects a passenger who merely refuses to be segregated,



11

a rule or regulation requiring segregation must be shown, 
since without such rule the invalidity of the ejection 
would be apparent. Under Section 58-1494, the police 
powers conferred upon the driver or other servant in 
charge of the vehicle are likewise confined in their 
exercise, where the passenger is not disorderly, to cases 
of passengers who violate Section 58-1495; such agents 
of the carrier are given the powers of special police­
men and conservators of the peace only for the “ en­
forcement of the provisions of this article’’ and “ while in 
the pursuit of persons . . . for violating the provisions 
of this article.” Rules and regulations prescribing a sepa­
ration of the races are thus essential, for otherwise there 
can be no violation of Section 58-1495.

The conclusion is unavoidable that the carrier rather 
than the driver, is the primary effective agency of the state 
in the enforcement of racial segregation on buses. And, 
in view of the severe penalties it faces for failure so to do, 
it is not surprising that the statutes would, as does 
Section 58-1494, confer upon the driver sufficient powers to 
enable enforcement of the segregation provisions. By 
Section 58-1406, it faces criminal prosecution if it “ wil­
fully violates or fails to comply with” certain statutes, 
including the segregation laws, and by Section 58-1422, it 
also faces possible loss of its franchise by operation of the 
provisions therefor where the carrier has “ wilfully vio­
lated or refused to observe the laws of this State touching 
motor vehicle carriers. . . ”

We submit that there can be no doubt that the statu­
tory scheme in question, pursuant to which appellee de­
prived appellant of her right to freedom in the use of 
public transportation facilities without discrimination 
based upon race, made appellee the state’s agency and as 
such, its activities are subject to redress in the federal 
courts.



12

I I I

Acceptance of the view that the carrier is a state instru­
mentality for enforcement by the state of its segregation 
policy, of course, would render the absence of the driver, 
as a party-defendant, immaterial. Even appellee appar­
ently concedes jurisdiction had both the driver and it been 
joined as defendants. Yet, even if it be assumed arguendo 
that the driver is the state’s sole enforcement agency, we 
submit that federal jurisdiction nonetheless attaches.

There could be no real question but that the driver’s 
actions, as a special police officer under the segregation 
statute, was action “ under color of . . . State law” within 
the purview of Section 1343(3). Williams v. United States, 
341 U. S. 97. See also Screws v. United States, 325 
U. S. 91. By the allegations of the complaint that 
action impaired appellant’s rights to freedom from state- 
imposed distinctions secured by the due process and equal 
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the 
rights secured by 42 U. S. C. Sections 1981 and 1983. For 
that deprivation, Section 1343(3) affords District Courts 
jurisdiction to adjudicate. That jurisdiction would seem 
here to be complete.

It is, of course, necessary that the complaining party 
have been deprived, under color of state authority, of some 
right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or 
one of the Civil Rights Acts. But Section 1343(3) does 
not immunize a principal whose agent’s conduct caused 
that deprivation. It does not expressly require that such 
agent be a party to the litigation, nor can such a require­
ment be implied from its language.

Here the cause of action and the District Court’s juris­
diction to entertain it were complete when the bus driver 
committed the acts specified in the complaint. The driver 
was nonetheless an agent of appellee; that agency made 
appellee liable to appellant for the driver’s acts. Juris­



13

diction flows simply from what the agent did to the appel­
lant; appellee’s liability flows from the fact of agency. It 
is submitted that jurisdiction exists when the master is 
before the Court even though the action complained of, as 
state action, was that of the agent.

CONCLUSION

Wherefore it is respectfully submitted that the 
judgment of the court below should be reversed.

P hilip W ittenberg,
306-308 Barringer Building, 

Columbia, South Carolina,
R obert L. Carter,
T hurgood Marshall,

107 West 43rd Street,
New York, New York,

Attorneys for Appellant.

Spottswood AY. R obinson, III,
of Counsel.