Jones v. Caddo Parish School Board Brief for Appellants

    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

NO. 74-1672

BERYL N. JONES, et a'l.. ,
Plaintiffs,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Intervenor,

vs.
CADDO PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees,
JERRY ADAMS, et al.,

Applicants for Intervention 
Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Louisiana

BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS ADAMS, et al.

HILRY HUCKABY, III 
501 Petroleum Tower 
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101 

JACK GREENBERG 
JAMES M. NABRIT, III 
NORMAN J. CHACHKIN 
MARGRETT FORD 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

Attorneys for Appellants



IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

NO. 74-1672

BERYL N. JONES, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

vs .
Plaintiff-Intervenor,

CADDO PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,

JERRY AD/aMS , et al.,
Applicants for Intervention- 
Appellants .

Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Louisiana

CERTIFICATE REQUIRED BY LOCAL RULE 13(a)

The undersigned, counsel of record for the applicants for 
intervention-appellants, certifies that the following listed 
parties have an interest in the outcome of this case. These 
representations are made in order that Judges of this Court may 
evaluate possible disqualification or recusal pursuant to Local
Rule 13(a) :



1. The original plaintiffs who commenced this action in 
1965 include Rev. E. E. Jones, who sued individually and on 
behalf of his minor children Beryl N. Jones and Ernest E. Jones, 
Jr.; Mrs. Bernice Smith, who sued individually and on behalf of 
her minor children Brenda Braggs and Renee Skannal; and Mrs. 
Dorothy Saxton, who sued individually and on behalf 0 1 her minor 
children Brenda Louise Saxton and Kenneth Saxton. A fourth 
original plaintiff, C.C. McLain, was dismissed as a party plain­
tiff on his own behalf and on behalf of his minor children on 

June 14, 1965.

2. The original plaintiffs above named commenced and 
maintained this action as a class aclion pursuant to F.R. Civ. P. 
23 on behalf of “other Negro children and their parents in CJiddo

Parish.

3. The United States of America, admitted as a plaintiff- 

intervenor in this cause.

4. The defendants are the Caddo Parish School Board, a 
public body corporate responsible for the operation of the 
public schools of Caddo Parish, Louisiana; and the current 
President of the said School Board and Superintendent of the 
Caddo Parish Public Schools.

5. Appellants, unsuccessful applicants for intervention 
as plaintiffs, are Mrs. Fannie Adams, suing individually and 
on behalf of her minor children Jerry Adams, Vicki Adams and

-2-



William Adams; Mrs. Marjorie R. Ford, suing individually and 
on behalf of her minor children Tracy Roderick Ford, Vivian 
Ray Ford, Toni Lynn Ford and Alan Craig Ford; David L. Roberson, 
suing individually and onbehalf of his minor child Kevin Dwayne 
Roberson; Rev. Curtis F. Roberson; and Mr. and Mrs. Eddie Clark, 
suing individually and on behalf of their minor children Jeanette 
Clark, Janet Marie Clark, Azzie Lee Clark and Eddie Clark, Jr.

6. Appellants sought to intervene in this litigation m  

order to represent the interests of a class defined as follows: 
"present and future black public schoolchildren who are or will 
be eligible to attend the public schools of Caddo Parish . . .
[and] parents and guardians of such black public schoolchildren 
with the exception of the subclass of such adults who have 
accepted the presently operative plan of desegregation and who 
do not desire to have its constitutionality determined by this

Court."

({(Ccu/it
NORMAN J. CH^CHKIN 
Attorney of Record for 
Applicants for Intervention- 
Appellants.

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I N D E X
Page

Table of Authorities . ........................... ii
Issues Presented for Review ....................  1
Statement

Background of the C a s e ....................  2
Proceedings for Further Desegregation . . . .  3
Substitution of Counsel and Entry
of Consent Decree  ..................  6
The Attempted Intervention ................  8

ARGUMENT —
I. The District Court Erred in Denying

Intervention.......... ..................10
'A. The interests sought to be represen­

ted by the appellants were not ade­
quately protected by the original 
plaintiffs in the proceedings before
the District C o u r t .................. 10

B. Appellants complied with the require­
ments of Hines v. Rapides Parish 
School Bd. , supra  .................. 13

C. Intervention would have corrected 
the error committed by the District
Court in the substitution of counsel . 14

D. The intervention was timely.......... 16
II. This Case Should Be Remanded To Another 

District Judge With Instructions To 
Disapprove The Biracial Committee Plan . . 20
A. A reversal of the intervention ruling 

alone, or with a remand to the District 
Court to reconsider its approval of 
the biracial committee plan will lead 
only to delay and is unnecessary since 
the holding and principles of Calhoun 
v. Cook, 487 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1973), 
are so clearly controlling.......... 21

l



I N D E X  (continued)

B. This Court should also instruct the
District Court on remand that the 
biracial committee plan is unconsti­
tutionally insufficient on this 
record because it fails to desegre­
gate the Caddo Parish public schools . 26

C. This case should be remanded with 
instructions that it be transferred
to another district judge . . . . . .  28

oqConclusion.............................. ..

Page

Table of Authorities

Cases:
Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S.

19 (1969) . .............................* 19
Allen v. Board of Public Instruction of Broward

County, 432 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1970) . . .  . 27
Ashback v. Kirtley, 289 F.2d 159 (8th Cir. 1961) 22
Atlantis Development Corp. v. United States,

379 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967)..............  12n
Bradley v. Board of Public Instruction of Pinellas

County, 431 F.2d 1377 (5th Cir. 1970) . . . 27
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) . . 23, 24
Calhoun v. Cook, 487 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1973) . . 2, 13, 14,19-20, 21,

Calhoun v. Cook, 469 F.2d 106 7 (5th Cir. 1972) . -an
Cameron v. President & Fellows, 157 F.2d 993

(Ist Cir. 1946) ..........................

16,
22n

xi



Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Bd.,
396 U.S. 290 (1970)........................  3, 19

Carter v. WTest Feliciana Parish School Bd.,
396 U.S. 226 (1969)........................  19

Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas
Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967) ............ .. 12n, 17

Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School
Dist., 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972) . . . . .  27

Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1942) . . .  22
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) ............... 24
Davis v. Board of School Comm1rs of Mobile, 402 .

U.S. 33 (1971) ......................... 27
Dowell v. School Bd. of Oklahoma City, 430 F.2d

865 (10th Cir. 1970; ...................... 12
Ellis v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange

County, 465 F.2d 878 (5th Cir. 1972), cert, 
denied, 410 U.S. 966 (1973)................  18

Flax v. Potts, 313 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1963) . . . 23, 25, 28
Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 417 F.2d 

801 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 396 U.S.
904 (1969) . . . . .  ................  . . .  3

Hatton v. County Bd. of Educ. of Maury County,
422 F.2d 457 (6th Cir. 1970) ..............  11

Henry v. Clarksdale Municipal Separate School
Dist., 433 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1970) . . . . .  27

Hines v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 479 F.2d
762 (5th Cir. 1973)........................  8, 10, 13, 14

Jones v. Caddo Parish School Bd., 421 F.2d
313 (5th Cir. 1970)........................ 3

Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 482 F.2d
1253 (5th Cir. 1973) ......................  13

Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1970) . . 22

Table of Authorities (continued)
Page

iii



Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis, 412
U.S. 427 (1973)............................  30

Pate v. Dade County School Bd., 434 F.2d 1141
(5th Cir. 1970)............................  27

Sertic v. Cuyahoga Lake, etc., Carpenters Dist.
Council, 459 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1972) . . . .  22

Sheffield v. Itawamba County Bd. of Supervisors,
439 F. 2d 35 (5th Cir. 1971)................ 25

Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)...........  25, 28
Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School

Dist., 432 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1970) . . . . .  27
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1968),

rev1 g 44 F.R.D. 18 (D.D.C. 1968) ..........  12
Steele v. Board of Public Instruction of Leon

County, 448 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1971) . . . .  19
Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ.,

333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 379
U.S. 933 (1964)............................ H

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1 (1971).......................... 3, 9n, 27

Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America, 404
U.S. 528 (1972)............................  12

United States v. Hinds County School Bd., No.
28030 (5th Cir., March 20, 1974) ..........  19

United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ.,
372 F.2d 836 (1966), aff'd en banc, 380 F.2d 
385 (5th Cir.), cert, denied sub nom. Caddo 
Parish School Bd. v. United States, 389 U.S.
840 (1967) ................................ 3

United States v. Quattrone, 149 F. Supp. 240
(D.D.C. 1957) ..............................  28

United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d
848 (5th Cir. 1972)........................  27

Table of Authorities (continued)
Page

IV



Table of Authorities (continued)
M i

Walpert v. Bart, 44 F.R.D. 359 (D. Md. 1968) . . .  18
Wright v. Board of Public Instruction of Alachua

County, 431 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1970) . . . .  27
Wright v. Board of Public Instruction of Alachua

County, 445 F.2d 1397 (5th Cir. 1971) . . . .  19
Young v. Katz, 447 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1971) . . . .  22
Youngblood v. Board of Public Instruction of Bay

County, 448 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1971) . . . .  19

Statutes and Rules:
F.R. Civ. P. 23  ................ .. 16, 19, 22.,
F.R. Civ. P. 24  ............ 10
Local Rule 1, U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D. La. . . . . . .  15

Other Authorities:
4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (5th Ed. 1941) . . 24

v



IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

NO. 74-1672

BERYL N. JONES, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Intervenor,

vs.
CADDO PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, et al.,

Defendant s-Appellees,

JERRY ADAMS, et al.,
Applicants for Intervention- 
Appellants „

Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Louisiana

BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS ADAJMSf_jet_a 

Issues Presented for Review

1. Did the District Court err in denying appellants 
motion to intervene in this case where appellants are all 
members of the class on whose behalf this action was commenced 
by the original plaintiffs, and appellants objected to the 
settlement of the lawsuit upon the terms to which the original



plaintiffs had agreed because, appellants alleged, that settle­
ment fails to protect the rights of the class?

2. Did the District Court err in striking from the docket 
the names of plaintiffs' original counsel without their filing 
motions to withdraw, endorsing a motion to substitute other 
counsel for them, before notice of the motion had reached them, 
and without, considering the necessity to insure adequate repre­
sentation of the class on whose beha]f this suit was brought?

3. Did the District Court err in approving a purported 
desegregation plan for the Caddo Parish school system by issu­
ance of a consent decree in this class action, without making 
findings and conclusions as to the constitutional sufficiency 
of the plan? Calhoun v. Cook, 487 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1973) .

Statement
This appeal brings to the Fifth Circuit another unfortunate, 

ugly instance in which a United States Court has become enmeshed *
in a scheme to frustrate the effectuation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.

Background of the Case
This is a classic school desegregation suit which was 

brought May 4, 1965. Its progress through the years is reflected 
in the major decisions of this Court which directly applied to

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it, e.g., United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ.,
372 F.2d 836 (1966), aff'd en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.),
cert, denied sub noin. Caddo Parish School Bd. v. United States,
389 U.S. 840 (1967); Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 417
F.2d 801 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969); see 
Jones v. Caddo Parish School Bd., 421 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 19/0) .

Following this Court's Carter" remand in 1970, the District
Court approved, as modified, a school board geographic zoning

2/
plan of desegregation (R. 12). That plan did not utilize 
pairing (con liguous or non—contiguous) , non-contiguous zoning, 
or pupil transportation to facilitate the elimination of racially 
identifiable schools in Caddo Parish. Minor modifications to the 
zone lines were made on several occasions (R. 12—16).

Proceedings for Further' Desegregation
On March 6, 1972, plaintiffs filed an Amended Motion for 

Further Relief (R. 22-33) seeking comprehensive desegregation 
of the Caddo Parish public schools in accordance with the prin­
ciples enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Swann 
v. Charlotte—Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) and 
companion cases. The school board responded on May 2, 1972 (R.

1/ Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Bd., 396 U.S. 290 (1970).
2/ Citations to the reproduced Record filed with this Brief. The 

record initially transmitted by the District Court Clerk has 
been supplemented in accordance with this Court s Order of April 
1, 1974. The entire Record as supplemented has been consecutively
paginated in the lower left-hand corner of each page.

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16) but there were no further proceedings with respect to
3/school desegregation until March 5, 1973

when the school board moved to modify certain attendance zones 
(R. 17) .

On March 20, 1973, plai.ntiff-intervenor United States of
America filed a "Response" to plaintiffs' year-old Amended
Motion for Further Relief (R. 34-40). The pleading noted, in
pertinent part, that:

ft]he desegregation plan approved by the 
Court on February 9, 1970 projected the 
continued existence of 22 all black or 
predominantly black schools which were 
all black schools under the dual school 
system. . . . Defendants' reports to the
court reflect that these schools, and 4 
other schools, are operated as all black 
or predominantly black schools at the pres­
ent time. The plan also projected that 19 
all white or predominantly white schools 
under the dual school system would continue 
their racial identity under the present 
plan. Defendants' reports to the court 
indicate that the school system presently 
operates 15 all white or predominantly 
white schools.
Moreover, the present desegregation plan 
does not utilize desegregation tools which 
have since specifically been approved . . .
such as rezoning and pairing . . . .  [R. 37]

However, the government suggested the appointment of a bi-racial
committee (whose, specific membership it proposed) to formulate

3/ A separate phase of the case involving the method of elec­
tion to the school board was tried during this period. On 

February 27, 1973 the matter was reassigned to District Judge 
Scott upon Judge Dawkins' recusal for reasons of health.

-4-



alternative desegregation plans for the school system. The 
"Response" appended a suggested Order to this effect (R. 41- 
49), which was signed and issued the same date, March 20, 1973. 
The Order specifically recited the Court's finding that the 
school board had not carried its burden of showing that the one- 
race schools were not the result of past or present discrim­
inatory action (R. 44-45).

4/

The biracial committee commenced a series of meetings in
the spring of 1973, leading ultimately to its submission to
the District Court on June 1, 1973 of its proposed "desegregation
plan" (R. 82-123). On June 11, 1973, plaintiffs filed objections
to the committee's plan (R. 124-26) requesting disapproval of
its student assignment provisions. Subsequently, the United
States commented upon the committee's plan as follows (R. 130-34)

[T]he student desegregation plan also 
proposes the continued operation of 34 
one-race or predominantly one-race 
schools. With regard to these schools, 
the plan does not, as required by the 
March 20, 1973 order, state the facts 
relied upon to justify their continued 
operation, provide options to fully 
desegregate them, or state the feasibility 
of implementing all or parts of deseg­
regation plans for these schools on record 
in this case. . . . we are unable to
respond at this time to the question 
whether the plan in regard to these 
schools conforms with constitutional 
standards. [R. 132-33]

4/ The United States cited Calhoun v. Cook, 469 F.2d 1067 
(5th Cir. 1972) in support of its implied suggestion that 

the biracial committee should seek an agreed settlement of 
the case (R. 38-39).

-5-



The Caddo Parish School Board notified the District Court
that it would accept the biracial committee's plan only if 
it were entered as a consent decree (R. 135-38).

Also during the spring of 1973, plaintiffs retained edu­
cational experts to draw a desegregation proposal for Caddo 
Parish; this plan was presented to the biracial committee during 
its deliberations and thereafter filed with the District Court 
(R. 50-81). Three days after plaintiffs filed objections to 
the committee plan, they sought to add additional adult and 
minor named plaintiffs to the case, noting that many of the 
original minor plaintiffs were no longer attending the Caddo 
Parish schools (R. 127-29).

Substitution of Counsel and Entry of Consent Decree
It was at this juncture in the proceedings, while plain­

tiffs' motion to add additional representative parties, and 
their objections to the biracial committee plan, were both 
pending, that a "Motion to Enroll Substitute Counsel" for the 
plaintiffs was filed. This document was purportedly submitted 
by one of original counsel for the plaintiffs who was then a 
State official and unable to continue in his capacity as attorney 
for the plaintiffs. It was signed by his law partner, who was 
at that time a member of the Caddo Parish School Board. It 
contained neither the signatures of other counsel for the plain­
tiffs nor representations of knowledge or acquiescence in the 
motion. It was unsigned by the attorney sought to be substituted

-6-
i



in place of all of these individuals, to represent the plain­
tiffs and the class on whose behalf suit was brought. It was 
accompanied by an affidavit signed by one of the original 
plaintiffs which indicated that three of the four original 
adult named plaintiffs (including one who had been dismissed 
from the lawsuit in 1965) desired to discharge their attorneys 
and employ new counsel. (R. 139-41).

The day after the "motion" was filed, the Order was signed 
by Judge Scott striking original counsel from the case and 
substituting therefor Murphy W. Bell, Esq. as attorney for the 
plaintiffs and the class (R. 140).

Newly enrolled counsel then filed a motion to strike from
the record, the objections to the biracial committee plan

6/which had been filed previously (R. 154-58); this motion was
granted the same day it was submitted; and on that same day,
without any hearing or notice to the class members, the District

7/Court entered a consent decree approving the biracial committee's 
plan (R. 160-61) .

5/ In the meantime, upon receiving the "motion," several of 
the former attorneys for the original plaintiffs prepared 

and forwarded a response to the District Court (R. 150-52) in 
which they suggested that the original named plaintiffs were 
no longer fairly representative or could adequately protect the 
interests of the class, that the pending motion to add named 
plaintiffs should be granted, that new counsel should be allowed 
to represent the original named plaintiffs, that the merits of 
the plans should first be considered and determination of class 
representation matters postponed until after that determination 
was made. While the response was in the mail, the District Court 
denied the pending motion to add parties plaintiff (R. 144-45) .
6/ and 7/ continued on next page

-7-



The Attempted Intervention
On November 19, 1973, the present appellants filed their 

Motion to Intervene as plaintiffs and proposed complaint (R. 
170-74, 184-95). As elaborated upon in their supporting 
Memorandum (R. 175-83), appellants sought to comply with this 
Court's ruling in Hines v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 479 F.2d 
762 (5th Cir. 1973) by specifying their claims and indicating 
what consideration, if any, had been given them by the District 
Court in the prior proceedings- The Motion for Leave to Inter­
vene asserted:

Specifically, applicants for intervention 
seek to present to the court, for resolution 
on their merits, contentions which were 
abandoned by the original plaintiffs after 
July 13, 1973 and which have never been 
explicitly ruled upon by this Court; i.e., 
that the presently operative plan of 
desegregation in Caddo Parish is consti­
tutionally insufficient. [R. 172]

Applicants for intervention and the class or 
subclass they represent are not adequately 
represented by the original plaintiffs 
herein. Nor are their interests protected 
by the United States of America, which was 
permitted to intervene as a plaintiff 
herein but which acceded to the approval and 
implementation of the current plan of operation 
despite its earlier expressed position that

[continued] •
<3/ Counsel for the present appellants first saw this motion 
when the record on this appeal was withdrawn for purposes 

of reproduction.
7/ The United States did not consent but endorsed entry of the 
Order in the following statement (R. 160):

-8- [continued next page]



such approval, without a showing to justify 
the continued existence of one-race schools, 
was improper. [R. 173]

Present appellants also addressed, in their Motion and the
supporting Memorandum, the question of timeliness:

Intervention will not delay nor unduly 
prejudice the rights of the original parties.
The presently operative plan of desegregation 
was approved by this Court on July 20, 1973, 
on the basis that none of the parties had 
filed objection thereto [the Court having 
permitted new counsel for original plaintiffs 
to withdraw previously filed objections] 
and without a determination that the plan 
meets constitutional standards. Intervening 
decision of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit in Calhoun v. Cook, No.
73-2020 (August 21, 1973) will require an
evidentiary hearing and determination on the 
merits by this Court in any event. . . .
[R. 173]

On February 4, 1974, the District Court denied leave to 
intervene (R. 204—05), finding (a) that the original plaintiffs 
adequately represented the class, and (b) that the application 
was untimely. (R. 205). As a result, the public schools of 
Shreveport remain largely segregated under the District Court's 
Order, and unless appellants are permitted to intervene and 
challenge that plan, the schools will remain segregated unto 
eternity.

[continued]
The present posture of this lawsuit considered, 
the United States of America, intervenor here­
in, interjects no objection to ordering imple­
mentation of this plan, as is more fully set 
out in its response filed herein.

That response, of course, had noted the inadequacy of the plan 
under Swann.

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ARGUMENT

I

The District Court Erred 
In Denying Intervention

Present appellants contend here, as they did before the 
District Court, that their intervention is supported by law and 
justice, and that their moving papers adequately complied not 
only with the technical requirements of F.R. Civ. P. 24(a) and 
(b) [governing both mandatory and permissive intervention], but 
also with the special considerations governing intervention in 
school desegregation actions outlined by this Court in Hines v. 
Rapides Parish School Bd., 479 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1973) . A 
detailed treatment of the Federal Rules issues can be found in 
our Memorandum submitted to the District Court (R. 175-83), and 
we respectfully refer the Court to that portion of the record.
We shall not duplicate that discussion here but rather seek to 
elucidate the most compelling reasons why intervention should 
have been allowed.

A. The interests sought to be represented by the appellants 
were not adequately protected by the original plaintiffs 
in the proceedings before the District Court____________
A classic ground for intervention is to permit the repre­

sentation and protection of interests which would be affected by 
the outcome of a lawsuit but would otherwise go unheard. Such 
a notion forms the basis of F.R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), setting forth

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the requirements for intervention as of right. There can be no
question but that appellants will be affected by the progress of 
this litigation, for minor appellants are public schoolchildren 
of Caddo Parish whose school assignments, and chances for re­
ceiving their constitutional entitlement of an integrated education, 
are entirely dependent upon the orders of the District Court.

Indeed, the lower court's holding is not grounded upon any 
lack of an affected interest in appellants, but rather upon 
the court's belief that appellants' interests were adequately 
represented by the existing parties. That belief is nothing 
less than incredible upon this record, which fairly shrieks of 
the inadequate representation afforded appellants and the class 
they sought to represent.

This case is unlike most of those in which intervention law 
in school desegregation suits has been fashioned. Commonly, 
these have involved attempts by white parents to intervene in

1order to add their voice to that of the school authorities in 
resisting desegregation. E .g., Hatton v. County Dd. of Educ. 
of Maury County, 422 F.2d 457 (6th Cir. 1970) ; Stell v. Savannah- 
Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir.), cert, denied,
379 U.S. 933 (1964). In such cases, traditionally intervention
as of right has been disallowed since it was evident that no 
party could resist integration harder nor more effectively than 
the school boards themselves were already doing. See Hatton, 
supra, 422 F.2d at 461. And although appellants' right to

ri
-11-



intervene stands on a different footing, the more recent 
holdings that white parents in the circumstances outlined above 
should be entitled to intervene cannot but support appellants' 
position here. See, e.g., Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. 
Cir. 1968) , rev1g 44 F.R.D. 18 (D.D.C. 1968) ; Dowell v. School 
Bd■ of Oklahoma City, 430 F.2d 865 (10th Cir. 1970).

In the instant case, however, the situation is the converse 
of that in the cases involving intervention by white parents.
The record clearly establishes that appellants met their "minimal 
burden" of demonstrating that representation of their interests 
by the original plaintiffs "may be inadequate." Trbovich v. 
United Mine Workers of America, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972) .
Here, appellants noted in their moving papers that they joined 
in objections to the biracial committee plan originally filed by 
the plaintiffs (R. 174). Their interest was the approval of a 
constitutional plan of desegregation for Caddo Parish, which 
they asserted was not provided by the biracial committee's sub­
mission. They posited no hypothetical lack of representation, 
for their request to intervene was filed after the original 
plaintiffs withdrew the objections and consented to the entry of
a decree which leaves 34 Caddo Parish schools with one-race

8/student bodies.

8/ We treat the issue of timeliness below, but we pause here 
to emphasize that the request to intervene was not untimely 

simply because it was post-judgment. See Cascade Natural Gas 
Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967); Atlantis 
Development Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967).

-12-
r



The point can be stated almost syllogistically. Appellants 
claim that the biracial committee plan is unconstitutional. At 
the time the District Court approved the plan, no party to the 
lawsuit had expressed this position on the record, previous 
objections having been withdrawn. The District Court made no 
finding as to the constitutionality of the plan when it approved 
it (R. 160-61). Thus, appellants' interests were not only not 
adequately represented before the District Court at the time of 
judgment: their concerns were not even voiced!

Despite these facts, the District Court's order denying 
intervention offers no explanation for its bald conclusion that 
"[c]onsidering the record, the Court finds that the original 
plaintiffs adequately represent the class" (R, 205). Under rhe 
circumstances, therefore, the order must be reversed.

B. Appellants complied with the requirements of Hines v.
Rapides Parish School Bd., supra.____________________
This Circuit has required particular clarity of inter­

vention papers in school desegregation cases, to the ends of 
judicial economy and prompt adjudication. Hines v. Rapides 
Parish School Bd., supra; Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 482 
F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1973). See Calhoun v. Cook, supra, 487 F.2d 
at 683. Appellants were aware of these decisions at the time 
of their attempted intervention, and complied with them.

Hines describes the determinations which must be made by 
district courts passing upon applications to intervene in school

-13-
I



desegregation cases, and which pleadings should facilitate, as
follows (479 F.2d, at 765):

The district court could then determine 
whether these matters had been previously 
raised and resolved and/or whether the 
issues sought to be presented by the new 
group were currently known to the court 
and parties in the initial suit. If the 
court determined that the issues these new 
plaintiffs sought to present had been 
previously determined or if it found that 
the parties in the original action were 
aware of these issues and completely com­
petent to represent the interests of the 
new group, it could deny intervention.
[emphasis supplied]

The pleadings of the appellants state the issues with clarity.

The issues not resolved in the litigation were the 
constitutionality of the biracial committee's plan and the 
adequacy of continuing class representation by the original 
plaintiffs. The application to intervene did not rest upon 
allegations of collusion in the entry of the consent decree, 
as did such requests, in part, in Calhoun v. Cook, supra, see 
487 F.2d, at 683. Under the circumstances of this case, there­
fore, the pleadings need not be reframed, ibid., and this Court 
should return the case to the District Court with directions 
to permit intervention.

C. Intervention would have corrected the error committed by 
the District Court in the substitution of counsel.______

Intervention by appellants was additionally desirable be­
cause it would have dissipated the effects of the District 
Court's failure to protect the interests of the class on whose

-14-



behalf this suit was brought, both at the time the District 
Court permitted substitution of counsel, and at the time it 
allowed withdrawal of objections to the biracial committee plan 
previously filed and simultaneously entered a consent decree 
approving the plan.

This record bears eloquent witness to the unfortunate 
failure of the District Court, to shoulder its responsibility 
under the Constitution and laws of the United States. Indeed, 
it is euphemistic to term the 1970 proceedings in this case as 
"highly irregular." The actions of the District Court provide 
anything but a lesson in due process.

Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Further Relief, for example, 
elicited no judicial response whatsoever for more than a year.
The same day the United States filed its Response thereto, how­
ever, suggesting the novel procedure of placing responsibility 
for the development of a new plan not upon the school authorities 
but upon a "citizens committee," the Court issued an Order to 
this effect. Subsequently, without awaiting or seeking responses 
from all of plaintiffs' counsel in this class action, the Court 
within one day granted a highly unusual motion to strike all 
of plaintiffs' counsel from the case and substitute in their 
stead a newcomer to the litigation, nonresident within the judicial 
district. Compare, e.g., Local Rule 1(H)(1), U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D. 
La •

-15-



Since there was pending before the District Court at that 
time, a motion to add additional representative parties plain­
tiff which specifically noted that many of the minor original 
plaintiffs no longer attended Caddo Parish public schools the 
District Court should have been alerted to the problems of 
class representation which needed to be resolved. The District 
Court only compounded the error when, after receiving a Response 
from some of plaintiffs’ original counsel which expressed doubt 
that original plaintiffs adequately represented the class (R. 
150), it did not reconsider its Order substituting counsel; and 
when it subsequently permitted withdrawal of the objections to 
the biracial committee plan and compromised this class action 
without either notice or hearing. F.R. Civ. P. 23; Calhoun v. 
Cook, supra.

These defects could have been vitiated by the granting of 
intervention to appellants, for the District Court could then 
have entertained the necessary proceedings and held the necessary 
hearings to determine the constitutionality of the committee 
plan. The denial of intervention thus serves to carry other 
District Court errors forward in this cause and makes reversal 
even more critical.

D. The intervention was timely.
The District Court denied intervention on two grounds: that

appellants' interests were adequately represented throughout 
the proceedings (see above) and that, "[a]t any rate, the Motion

-16-



to Intervene comes too late" (R. 205). This second basis for 
decision is no more satisfactory than the first.

If the District Court meant that the intervention would 
have been timely only if filed before entry of its consent judg­
ment, it was requiring virtually a physical impossibility as 
well as a legal irrelevancy. Appellants include many of the 
individuals sought to be added as plaintiffs prior to the 
substitution of counsel on July 13, 1973. Their present coun­
sel were not served with the motion to substitute counsel until 
four days prior to the entry of the consent judgment; they did 
not become aware that the District Ccurt had granted it (without 
allowing them an opportunity to respond) until after- the consent 
decree was issued on July 20, 1973. The District Court's order
denying the motion to add additional plaintiffs was denied just 
two days prior thereto, on July 18, but again counsel for appel­
lants did not receive notice of this action until after the 
consent judgment was entered.

Of course, there is no legal support for the notion that 
post-judgment interventions are per se untimely. Indeed, this 
case bears a striking resemblance to the leading decision in 
the area, Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 
supra. There, as here, the district court was confronted with 
the problems of "dismantling an illegal structure." Also, as 
here, the applicants asserted an interest in how the dismantling

-17-



should be accomplished, pointing out the potential injury 
that would be done if the court proceeded in implementing the 
divestiture plan as proposed by the United States. Significantly, 
after a costly and time-consuming appeal prosecuted by the 
applicants, they were permitted intervention by the Supreme Court 
after entry of a consent decree.

The District Court's conclusion is no more well-founded 
in general terms. Courts have been especially reluctant to 
dispose of applications for intervention on grounds of untime­
liness. E_. cj_., Cameron v. President. & Fellows, 157 F.2d 993 
(1st Cir. 1946) ; Walpert v. Bart, 44 F.R.D. 359, 361 (D. Md.
1968). The most important interests served by time requirements 
for intervention are already satisfied here: finality and
avoidance of prejudice to opposing parties.

As to considerations of finality, it is true that the 
application to intervene came after the plan of the biracial 
committee had been implemented in Shreveport for the 1973-74 
school year. However, unlike other types of litigation, decrees 
in school desegregation cases are subject to repeated modification 
and reopening to insure compliance with current legal standards. 
See Ellis v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, 465 
F.2d 878, 879-80 (5th Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 410 U.S. 966 
(1973). It cannot fairly be maintained that intervention by

-18-

1



appellants was sought after this case had "come to rest," since 
in this Circuit school desegregation suits must be maintained 
on the docket for at least three years following entry of supposedly 
"terminal" decrees, Youngblood v. Board of Public Instruction 
of Bay County, 448 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1971) ; Steele v. Board of
Public_Instruction of Leon County, 448 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1971);
V.'right v. Board of Public Instruction of Alachua County, 445 F.2d 
1397 (5th Cir. 1971), and even thereafter may be reopened upon 
motion. See, e.g., United States v. Hinds County School Bd. 
[Lauderdale County School Dist.], No. 28030 (5th Cir., March 20, 
1974) .

Nor would intervention, if granted when sought or if ordered 
now, prejudice the rights of the other parties. Clearly the 
Caddo Parish school authorities have no right to continue 
operating an unconstitutional school system. Nor have the 
original plaintiffs any right to defeat the constitutional rights 
of the class of minor schoolchildren in the Parish by acquiescing 
in such a plan. Appellants have not sought midyear disruption 
of the biracial committee plan so the parties did not have to 
face possible prejudice of that nature, if prejudice to rights 
it is. Compare Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S.
19 (1969); Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Bd., 396 U.S.
226 (1969), 396 U.S. 290 (1970).

Furthermore, this case is clearly controlled by Rule 23,
F.R. Civ. P. as authoritatively interpreted in Calhoun v. Cook,

-19-
l



supra, to invalidate approval of desegregation plans by entry
of consent decrees. Thus, if the minimal legal requirements 
are to be carried out in this case, there must be further 
hearings and findings about the constitutionality of the biracial 
committee plan by the District Court. Those hearings had not 
been scheduled or held at the time appellants sought to intervene, 
nor have they been scheduled or held since that time. For 
this reason, none of the other parties to this lawsuit would have 
or will suffer the slightest prejudice from the intervention as 
plaintiffs of the appellants at this time.

II.
This Case Should Be Remanded To Another 
District Judge With Instructions To 
Disapprove The Biracial Committee Plan

In the circumstances of this case, we believe the Court 
must go farther than merely reversing the District Court's 
denial of intervention. We respectfully suggest the Court's 
heavy responsibility to insure enforcement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires that it vacate the Order approving the bi­
racial committe's plan and remand the matter for further pro­
ceedings before another district judge, with instructions that 
the committee plan is facially insufficient on this record to 
meet the constitutional mandate.

-20-



A. A reversal of the intervention ruling alone, or with a 
remand to the District Court to reconsider its approval 
of the biracial committee plain will lead only to delay 
and is unnecessary since the holding and principles of 
Calhoun v. Cook, 487 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1973), are so 
clearly controlling._______________________ ___________
A ruling by this Court that appellants should have been 

permitted to intervene but which did not also vacate the 
District Court's consent judgment approving the biracial 
committee plan for Caddo Parish would insure yet another delay 
in the effectuation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the parish's 
school system. We submit that, inasmuch as appellants sought 
to intervene to challenge the plan and even brought this Court's 
disapproval of consent decrees in school desegregation cases to 
the attention of the District Court, and since Calhoun v. Cook, 
supra, is so clearly applicable to the facts of this suit, that 
this Court should vacate the lower court's approval of the plan 
and obviate unnecessary delay which would result from remanding 
to the District Court for consideration in light of Calhoun and 
with the participation of appellants as intervenors.

As this Court said in Calhoun:
At least some of the attorneys representing 
the original plaintiffs assert no such 
compromise was made. The attempted inter­
venors sought to demonstrate that still other 
parties whom they assert are class members 
would object. In these circumstances the 
advisability of approval and the viability 
of the plan submitted could not properly be 
adjudicated on the basis oil Rule 23(e) [, F.R.
Civ. P.] . (487 F. 2d, at 682)

Calhoun is but the logical extension of the settled principle 
that the judgment of a court approving a settlement of a class

21-



action under Rule 23(e) must be founded on facts. Cohen v.
Young, 127 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1942); Sertic v. Cuyahoga Lake, 
etc., Carpenters Dist. Council, 459 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1972); 
cf. Ashback v. Kirtley, 289 F.2d 159 (8th Cir. 1961) . Here, of 
course, there was no factual presentation by opponents of the 
plan nor did the District Court make factual findings about the 
proposals before it, nor draw conclusions as to the legal and

9/constitutional sufficiency of the plan embodied in the decree.

The acquiescence of counsel for the United States, the 
defendants, and the named representative plaintiffs did not 
relieve the District Court of its obligation to hear evidence 
and make findings. Cohen v. Young, sip ra. Accord, Young v.
Katz, 447 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1971).

When presented with the consent decree and the acquiescence 
of the existing parties, it was the District Court's obligation 
—  even apart from the peculiar circumstances of withdrawal of 
previous objections, etc. —  to examine the proposal as the 
"guardian" of the rights of the absent class members affected 
by the judgment. Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 
1970). For a number of reasons, this role is particularly crit-

9/ The District Court refers to the proceedings of the biracial 
committee as if to suggest that the presentation of appellants' 

objections and proposed plan to that body was a sufficient sub­
stitute for judicial consideration (R. 204-05). But the judicial 
power, and judicial responsibility, is non—delegable. Cf.
Calhoun v. Cook, supra, 487 F.2d, at 683.

-22-



ical in school desegregation cases.

The first reason stems from the very nature of class 
actions to enforce Fourteenth Amendment rights under Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). This Court's illuminating
decision in Flax v. Potts, 313 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1963), shows 
that by the vary nature of the controversy, litigation attacking 
a school system's practice of racial discrimination cannot be 
limited in its operative effect to individual plaintiffs. Decrees 
in cases challenging entrenched dual systems of segregation 
touch upon and determine whether or not discriminatory practices 
will continue or be eliminated for each pupil i.n the system.

In some types of class action litigation non-participating 
members of the class may exercise an option not to be bound by 
the litigation and "opt out" of a case. No such choice is avail— 
â-)le to students attending a public school system operated as 
a dual system. Either the system is transformed into a unitary 
system where all vestiges of discrimination are eliminated or 
it continues as an unconstitutional system for all the pupils.

Another reason the court must function as a guardian for 
absent parties in considering compromise of a school case is 
the fact that the case involves the precious constitutional 
rights of persons who are children unable to protect their own 
rights. The right of a student not to be segregated on racial 
^f^c^^ds in schools so maintained is indeed so fundamental and

-23-



pervasive that it is embraced in the concept of due process
of law." Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958). Minors, 
unable to protect their own rights in court, must be the subject 
of the special solicitude and protection of courts of equity.
The tradition of equity is that infants are "wards of the court."
4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence 871 (5th Ed. 1941).

Still another reason proposed settlements of school 
segregation litigation must be scrutinized with great care is 
that resistance to implementation of the Brown decision has been 
so widespread that the courts must constantly guard against 
schemes to avoid and evade the law of school desegregation. The 
Court is familiar with the history of interposition resolutions, 
massive resistance laws, school closing, pupil placement laws, 
tuition grants, and other overt and covert plans to evade and 
avoid compliance with Brown. Currently there is widespread 
political activity against "busing" to promote school desegre­
gation. Some black people, as well as white people, have 
advocated continuing segregation —  particularly those who, 
as have some of the actors in the instant case, have attained 
positions within the political apparatus still dominated by whites. 
In this situation the courts' task of enforcing the Constitution 
requires a difficult vigilance to ensure that court-approved 
compromises of school cases do not accomplish indirectly that 
which the interposition resolutions failed to achieve by direct 
defiance of Brown.

-24-



Yet such is clearly the result of the proceedings below, 
in which the District Court, which had every reason to doubt 
the validity of the consent judgment, ignored its responsibilities 
to the absent class members. This action by the lower court 
amounts to plain error which is subject to correction on this 
appeal. As this Court said in 1971, affirming a district court's 
order refusing to permit plaintiffs to dismiss a class action 
voting rights suit,

. . . having instituted a public lawsuit to
secure rectification for a constitutional 
wrong of wide dimension, [plaintiffs] cannot 
privately determine its destiny.

Sheffield v. Itawamba County Bd. of Supervisors, 43 9 F.2d 3 5,
36 (5th Cir. 1971). The discretionary powers of the District 
Court in determining whether to approve a proposed settlement 
are necessarily limited by the Court's duty to avoid approval 
of a decree which affirmatively authorizes continued discrimin­
ation (Flax v. Potts, supra; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 
(1948)) .

In sum, the District Court's action in approving the 
biracial committee's plan because it had the "consent" of the 
parties, cannot be reconciled with the Court's obligations under 
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Judicial Code. ’That order must 
be vacated and the cause remanded with instructions to permit 
intervention, to hold hearings and to make findings in support 
of the ultimate decree of the court.

25-



i-

B. This Court should also instruct the District Court on remand 
that the biracial committee plan is unconstitutionally 
insufficient on this record because it fails to desegregate 
the Caddo Parish public schools.____________________________

We further submit that this Court's decision should also 
eliminate the necessity for the District Court to delay the 
implementation of a comprehensive desegregation plan for Caddo 
Parish by holding hearings or taking additional time to deter­
mine whether the biracial committee plan could be constitutional. 
The fatal deficiencies of the settlement proposal to eliminate 
racial segregation of pupils attending the schools of the Caddo 
Parish system are evident and apparent on the face of the plan.
Some objections to the plan would require factual inquiry; however, 
looking at the face of the plan and at the documents in this 
record, it is clear that the plan's major defects preclude any 
approval under this Court's governing precedents.

The plan reveals it will leave 34 one-race schools in 
Caddo Parish; it does not employ any assignment technique 
except contiguous geographic zoning (often misnamed the "neigh­
borhood school" method of assignment). It was characterized 
by the Response of the United States, a signatory to the consent 
decree, as constitutionally inadequate for its f&ilure to explain 
why alternate desegregation proposals for these schools, contained 
in the plaintiffs' plan (filed prior to removal of plaintiffs' 
counsel) of even the 1969 IIEW plan, were not feasible. No further 
explanation was ever offered or accepted.

-26-



Anyone familiar with the course of the development of 
school desegregation law in this Circuit would recognize that 
more than four years ago —  a year before the Swann decision —  

this Court required school districts at a minimum to pair 
contiguous segregated schools. Caddo Parish has not yet met 
the standards applied in such cases as Allen v. Board of 
Public Instruction of Broward County, 432 F.2d 362, 367 (5th 
Cir. 1970); Pate v. Dade County School Bd., 434 F.2d 1141 (5th 
Cir. 1970); Bradley v. Board of Public Instruction of Pinellas 
County, 431 F.2d 1377 (5th Cir. 1970); Wright v. Board of 
puklic _Jjnstruction of Alachua County, 431 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 
19,70) ; Henry v. Clarksdale Municipal Separate School Dist., 433. 
F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1.970); Singleton v. Jackson Municipal 
Sepa rate S choo1 D i s t., 432 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1970). Now, under 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklcnburq Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)
and Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile, 402 U.S. 33 
(1971), the law requires the use of such remedial techniques as 
busing, non—contiguous zones, grouping of schools and the like 
if necessary to desegregate. See Cisneros v. Corpus Cnristi 
Independent School Dist., 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 19/2) ; United. 
States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1972).
The Caddo Parish settlement plan approved by the District Court 
does not even remotely approach compliance with this standard. 
The plan is unconstitutional on its face as a matter of law.

-27-



Each of the black children attending the schools of Caddo 
Parish has a "personal and present" constitutional right to 
equal protection of the laws. Each of these children has a 
right to require that the defendants operate the public schools 
in accordance with the Constitution. No one has a right to 
demand otherwise. "The Constitution confers upon no individual 
the right to demand action by the State which results in the 
denial of equal protection of the laws to other individuals." 
Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, 334 U.S., at 22. The District Court 
had no power to decree otherwise, by "consent" of anyone. Flak 
v. Potts, supra. Recently, this Court opined that in this case, 
"[e]ight years of litigation between the original parties has 
final],y come to an end" (R. 164) . Unfortunately that statement 
is wrong. There is but one way to brxng the case to a lawful 
end and that is to desegregate the Caddo Parish public schools 
as required by the Constitution.

C. This case should be remanded with instructions that it 
be transferred to another district judge._____________

It has often been remarked that courts should avoid the 
appearance of impropriety as well as impropriety itself. Cf., 
e.g., United States v. Quattrone, 149 F. Supp. 240 (D.D.C. 1957) . 
It is in accord with this spirit that appellants reluctantly 
and respectfully advise this Court that here, the appearance 
of impropriety is great; and we respectfully suggest that it

-28-



would be appropriate for further proceedings on remand in this 
matter to be conducted before another district judge, upon 
the direction of this Court in the exercise of its supervisory- 
jurisdiction and responsibility.

We do not believe that the strange history of these proceed­
ings, nor the apparent disregard by the District Court of its 
obligations toward the class, need be repeated. We submit, 
however, that the events are subject to interpretation which 
does not reflect well upon the Courts of the United States. We 
allege no impropriety nor do we possess extralegal evidence of 
any; yet we cannot brand such an interpretation of the events 
as irrational. But the question can best be removed from these 
proceedings, we submit, by transferring them to another district 
judge or by this Court retaining jurisdiction to approve a 
constitutional plan of operation for the Caddo Parish schools.

CONCLUSION
WI-IEREFOP.E, for the foregoing reasons, appellants respec- 

fully pray that the Order of the District Court denying intervention 
be reversed, that the Order of the District Court approving the 
desegregation plan of the biracial committee be vacated, that 
either jurisdiction of the cause be retained by this Court or 
the cause be remanded to another district judge with instructions 
to consider the plaintiffs' plan and any new plan to be submitted 

by either the United States or the school board, to make findings

-29



thereon, and to approve and supervise the implementation of a
plan which removes all vestiges of the dual system from Caddo
Parish, as required by the Fourteenth Amendment, the decisions
of the United States Supreme Court and of this Court.

Appellants further respectfully pray that this Court grant
them reasonable attorneys' fees in connection with this appeal
Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis, 412 U.S. 427 (1973),
as well as their costs.

Respectfully submitted.

HILRY HUCKABY, III 
501 Petroleum Tower 
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101 

JACK GREENBERG 
JAMES M. NABRIT, III 
NORMAN J. CHACHKIN 
MARGRETT FORD 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

Attorneys for Appellants 
ADAMS, et al.

-30-



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

i.

I hereby certify that on this 15th day of April, 1974,
I served two copies of the Brief for Appellants Adams, et al. 
upon counsel for the appellees herein, by depositing same in 
the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed 
to each as follows:

Murphy W. Bell, Esq.
617 North Boulevard 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
John R. Pleasant, Esq.
1004 Mid South Towers 
P. O. Drawer 1092 
Shreveport, Louisiana 71163
Hon. Donald E. Walter, Esq. 
United States Attorney 
Federal Building 
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
Brian Landsberg, Esq.
Civil Rights Division 
Department of Justice 
Washington, D.C. 20530

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