Northcross v. Memphis City Schools Board of Education Brief in Opposition to Certiorari

    In the

Bupumt ©mart nf %  8>UUb
October Teem, 1979 

No. 79-1629
Board op Education op the Memphis 

City  Schools, et al.,
Petitioners,

Deborah A. Northcross, et al. 

No. 79-1680
Cit y  op Memphis, et al., 

v.

Deborah A. Northcross, et al.

Petitioners,

ON PETITION FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI

W illiam  E. Caldwell 
Ratner & Sugarmon 
525 Commerce Title Bldg. 
Memphis, Tennessee 38103 
(901) 525-8601

N orman J. Chaohkin 
520 Woodward Bldg.
733 15th Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
(202) 628-7446

Jack Greenberg 
James M. Nabrit, I I I  
Bill  Lann  L ee 

Suite 2030 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, N. Y. 10019 
(212) 586-8397

Attorneys for Respondents



TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

Counterstatement of Questions
Presented ....................................................  2

Statement ..............................................................  4

Reasons fo r  Denying the Writs ......................  10

Conclusion ............................................................  19

Ap p en d ix ..............................................   la



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

Albemarle Paper Co. v .  Moody, 422 U.S.
405 (1975) ____. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Arenson v. Board of  Trade, 372 F. Supp. 
1349 (N.D. 111. 1974) 14

Bradley v.  School Bd. o f  Richmond,
416 U.S. 696 (1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,16

Brotherhood o f  Locomotive Firemen and
Enginemen v. Bangor Aroostook R. Co., 
389 U.S. 327 (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . _____ 12

Brown v. Bathke, 588 F.2d 634 (8th
Cir.  1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Brown v. Board o f  Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Brown v.  Board o f  Educ., 349 U.S.
294 (1955) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Christiansburg Garment Co. v .  EEOC, 434
U.S. 412 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

City  o f  Detro i t  v. Grinnel Corp. , 495
F .2d 448 (2d Cir .  1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

City  o f  Detro i t  v. Grinnel Corp. , 560
F .2d 1093 (2d Cir.  1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

City o f  Philadelphia  v. Chas. P f i z e r  
Co., 345 F. Supp. 454 (S.D. N.Y. 
1972) 14

Colson v. H il ton Hotels Corp.,  59 F.R.D.
324 (N.D. 111. 1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

- 11 -



Page

Davis v. County o f  Los Angeles, 8 EPD
f 9444 (C.D. C a l i f .  1974) ....................  14

Donaldson v. O'Connor, 454 F. Supp.
311 (N.D. Fla. 1978) .................. ..........  16

Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel ,  503 F.2d
177 (D.C. Cir.  1974) ..............................  10

Farmington Dowel Products Co. v .  Forster 
Mfg. Co., 421 F .2d 61 (1st Cir.
1970) ........................   15

Frankenstein v.  McCrory, 425 F. Supp.
762 (S.D. N.Y. 1977) ..............................  14

Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers
& Co., 240 U.S. 251 (1916) ..................  12

Hew Corp. v .  Tandy Corp. , 480 F. Supp.
758 (D. Mass. 1979) ................................  14

Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) ........  17

Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc . ,
488 F .2d 714 (5th Cir .  1974) ..............  12

King v. Greenbla tt , 560 F.2d 1024 (1st 
Cir.  1977), ce r t ,  denied, 438 U.S.
916 (1978) .......................................    12

Lamphere v. Brown U n iv . , 610 F.2d 46
(1st Cir .  1979)  ...................................  16

Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v .  American 
Rad. & Stand. Sanitary Corp., 487 
F .2d 161 (3d Cir.  1973) ........................  12

Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v .  American 
Rad. & Stand. Sanitary Corp., 540 
F .2d 102 (3d Cir .  1976) ................ .. 12

- iii -



Page

Locklin v. Day-Glo Color Corp.,  429 
F .2d 873 (7th Cir.  1970), c e r t . 
denied, 400 U.S. 1020 (1971) . . . . . . . .  15

McGowan v. King, In c . ,  569 F.2d 845
(5th Cir.  1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

Nedeau v.  Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275 (1st
Cir.  1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15,16

Northcross v. Board of  Education, 302 
F .2d 818 (6th C i r . ) ,  c e r t ,  denied,
370 U.S. 944 (1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5

Northcross v. Board o f  Education, 333 F .2d
661 (6th C ir .  1964) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5

Northcross v. Board o f  Education, 397
U.S. 232 (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5

Northcross v. Board o f  Education, 412
U.S. 427 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .5,7

Northcross v. Board o f  Education, 489 
F.2d 15 (6th Cir .  1973), ce r t .  
denied, 416 U.S. 962 (1974TT. . . . . . .  . 5

Oppenlander v. Standard O i l  Co.,  64 F.R.D.
597 (D. Colo. 1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

Palmer v. Rogers, 10 EPD 1 10,499 (D. D.C.
1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

Pitchford  S c i e n t i f i c  Inst .  Corp. v,
Pepi,  In c . ,  440 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D.
Pa. 1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . _____. . . . . . . . . . .  17

Quirke v.  Chessie Corp.,  368 F. Supp.
558 (S.D. N.Y. 1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

- iv -



Page

Raney v. Board o f  Education, 391 U.S.
443 (1968) ...............    6

Schaeffer v. San Diego Yel low Cabs, Inc . ,
462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir .  1972) ............  15

Shapiro v. Consolidated Edison C o . , CCH 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 196 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) ...................................................    14

Stanford Daily  v.  Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680
(N.D. C a l i f .  1974) ..................................  14

TWA v.  Hughes, 312 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.
N.Y. 1970) ..................................................  14

United States v. M i tche l l ,  580 F.2d
789 (5th Cir.  1978) ................................  15

Walker v.  Ralston Purina Co., 409 F. Supp.
101 (M.D. Ga. 1976) ................................  15

Wheeler v. Durham City Bd. o f  Educ.,
585 F . 2d 618 (4th Cir .  1978) ..............  17

Statutes :

20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976) ..................................  7,8

42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) ..................................  8

v -



Page

Other Author i t ies

122 CONG. REC. S16451, S16457 (d a i l y  ed.', 29
Sept. 1976) ...............................................  13

122 CONG. REC. 
1976) . . .

H12159 (d a i l y  ed. Oct.
13

H.R. No. 94-1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
4 (15 Sept. 1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

S. REP No.94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
6 (29 June 1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

-  v i



IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

October Term, 1979 

No. 79-1629

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE MEMPHIS 
CITY SCHOOLS, et a l . ,

P e t i t i o n e r s ,

v.

DEBORAH A. NORTHCROSS, et a l .

No. 79-1630

CITY OF MEMPHIS, et a l .

P e t i t i o n e r s , 

v.

DEBORAH A. NORTHCROSS, et a l . ,

On Pe t i t ions  fo r  Writs o f  C e r t io ra r i  to the 
United States Court of  Appeals for  the Sixth C ircuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI

Deborah A. N o r th c ross ,  e t  a l . ,  p l a i n t i f f s  

below, r espec t fu l l y  request that the Court deny



2

the p e t i t ion s  f o r  wr i ts  o f  c e r t i o r a r i  f i l e d  by the 

Board of  Education o f  the Memphis C i ty  Schools, et 

a l . [ " B o a r d " ] ,  No. 79-1629 , and the C i t y  o f  

Memphis, et a l .  [ " C i t y " ] ,  No. 79-1630, seeking 

review o f  the Sixth C i r c u i t ' s  judgment and opinion 

reported at 611 F .2d 624 (23 Nov. 1979), Pet.  App. 

1-A to 35-A.-/

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The judgment below disposed o f  consol idated 

appeals from two separate orders o f  the d i s t r i c t  

court  r u l i n g  on a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  p l a i n t i f f s  in 

t h i s  l on gs ta n d in g  schoo l  d e s e g r e g a t i o n  a c t i o n  

f o r  awards o f  costs ,  including reasonable a t t o r ­

n ey s '  f e e s  and o u t - o f - p o c k e t  expenses.  The 

p r i n c i p a l  appea l  be low,  concerns the d i s t r i c t  

cour t 's  4 November 1977 "Award on App l icat ion  o f  

the P l a i n t i f f s  fo r  Attorneys Fees" (Pe t .  App. 53-A 

[here ina f te r ,  " f i r s t  award"],  granting in part and 

denying in part the request f o r  fees and expenses 

from both the Board and the C i t y  c o v e r in g  the 

period from the commencement o f  the l i t i g a t i o n  

through October 1976. The second appeal below,

1J "Pe t .  App." r e f e rs  to  the separate ly -pre­
sented appendix f i l e d  by the Board in No. 79-1629.



3

concerned the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  7 July  1978 

"R u l in g  on A p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  A t t o rn ey s  Fees and 

Expenses fo r  May 1977 Hearing" (Pet .  App. 63-A) 

[here ina f te r ,  "second award"],  granting in part 

and denying in part  the request  f o r  f e e s  and 

expenses from the Board a lone r e l a t e d  to  a 

f iv e -day  hearing held in May 1977. On appeal from 

the f i r s t  award, the court o f  appeals remanded the 

case fo r  further considerat ion in accordance with 

i t s  op in io n .  Pe t .  App. 28A, 34-A. On appeal 

from the second award, the court  o f  appeals  

remanded with instructions to  enter fo r  p l a i n t i f f s  

in an amount spec i f i ed .  Pet. App. 34-A.

The two sets o f  pe t i t ion e rs  seek to present a 

wide va r i e t y  o f  issues,  numbering twelve in a l l ,  

to  th is  Court fo r  decis ion.  Many o f  the lega l  

" q u e s t i o n s "  which they  p o s i t  a r i s e  on ly  as a 

result  o f  p e t i t i o n e r s '  strained reading o f  the 

court o f  appeals '  ru l ing :  f o r  example, the claim 

that the decis ion below withdraws a l l  d iscre t ion  

from the d i s t r i c t  court on remand. F a i r l y  con­

strued, the ru l ing  below presents two unexception­

able questions.



1. Whether the court  o f  appeals  e r red  in 

remanding the major part o f  the case (the f i r s t  

award) f o r  entry o f  f indings and conclusions which 

would enab le  i n t e l l i g e n t  r e v i e w  o f  any award?

2. Whether the court o f  appeals abused i t s  

d iscre t ion  in determining the amount o f  fees on a 

small part of the case (the second award) pre­

sented for  review on a complete and fu l l y  l i t i ­

gated record?

- 4 -

Statement

A de ta i l ed  descr ip t ion  of  the proceedings in 

the d i s t r i c t  cour t  and the court  o f  appeals  

leading to entry o f  the judgments o f  which review 

is sought appears as an appendix to  th is  B r i e f  at 

pp. la-20a i n f r a . The e s sen t ia l  elements o f  th is  

case are as fo l lows:

From i t s  commencement in  1960 u n t i l  the 

present day, th is  suit has involved but a s ingle  

claim fo r  r e l i e f :  the e f f e c t i v e  dismantling o f  

the state-imposed dual school system in Memphis, 

Tennessee. A f t e r  Brown v. Board o f  Educ. , 347 

U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955), the board 

o f  education refused to plan fo r  the education



of  i t s  black and white chi ldren together  un t i l  

forced to do so by court orders issued in this  

l i t i g a t i o n .  See, e . g . , Northcross v. Board o f  

Educ. ,  302 F .2d 818 (6th C i r . ) ,  c e r t . denied, 370 

U.S. 944 (1962 ) ;  i d . ,  333 F.2d 661 (6 th  C i r .  

1964).

A decade ago th is  Court summarily reversed a 

court o f  appeals decis ion and d irec ted  that prompt 

action be taken to complete the conversion o f  the 

Memphis p u b l i c  schoo ls  to  a u n i t a r y  system. 

Northcross v. Board o f  Educ. ,  397 U.S. 232 (1970). 

Subsequently, the case was again brought to this 

Court by the p l a i n t i f f s  a f t e r  the court o f  appeals 

denied a request for  an award o f  a t to rneys1 fees 

covering one appellate  proceeding without " s t a t -  

[ ing ]  reasons fo r  the denial [making i t ]  . . .  not 

poss ib le  fo r  th is  Court to determine whether the 

Court o f  Appeals applied the proper standard in 

reaching th is  r e s u l t . "  Northcross v. Board o f  

Educ. ,  412 U.S. 427, 427-28 (1973) ( per curiam).

T h e r e a f t e r ,  the d i s t r i c t  cou r t  approved a 

" f i n a l "  p lan o f  d e s e g r e g a t i o n  f o r  the system 

("P lan Z " ) ,  the Sixth C ircu it  af f i rmed, and this  

Court den ied  r e v i e w .  Nor thcross  v .  Board o f

- 5 -

Educ. ,  489 F .2d 15 (6th Cir.  1973), c e r t . denied,



416 U. S. 962 (1974). At th is  f i r s t  r esp i te  in 

what the court below c o r r e c t l y  described as th is  

continuous course o f  l i t i g a t i o n ,  see Pet. App. 

3-A, p l a i n t i f f s  sought to obtain agreement on an 

appropriate award o f  a ttorneys '  f e es ;  and when 

negot ia t ions  proved unavail ing,  f i l e d  th e i r  motion 

f o r  an award o f  costs including reasonable counsel 

fees —- which led u l t im ate ly  to the judgments now 

under consideration.

The main subject o f  th is  l i t i g a t i o n  was far  

from quiescent, however. Mindful o f  th is  Court's 

admonition, Raney v. Board o f  Educ. ,  391 U.S. 443 

(1968), the d i s t r i c t  court had retained ju r i s d i c ­

t ion  over the case to insure that i t s  decree was 

implemented and proved ac tua l ly  e f f e c t i v e .  Each 

year a f t e r  i t  had approved a " f i n a l "  desegrega­

t i o n  p lan ,  the d i s t r i c t  cou r t  was con fron ted  

with a request from the Board of  Education to make 

a ser ies  o f  modif ications to that plan. In the 

spring o f  the fourth year of  Plan Z 's  operation, 

the d i s t r i c t  court concluded in an opinion issued 

24 May 1977 that the Board had f a i l e d  to  establ ish 

a unitary school system and, in f a c t ,  had engaged 

in f r e s h ,  post- judgment ac ts  o f  purpose fu l  

r a c i a l  d i s c r im in a t i o n  in the o p e r a t i o n  o f  the

- 6 -



7

public schools o f  Memphis. This determination was 

not appealed.

The curren t  c o n t r o v e r s y  stems from the 

d i s t r i c t  cour t 's  subsequent award o f  attorneys '  

fees  to counsel fo r  p l a i n t i f f s ,  who were "pre­

v a i l i n g  pa r t i e s "  with respect both to the main 

part o f  the case resu l t ing  in entry o f  the " f i n a l "  

plan o f  desegregation and also with respect to 

the post-judgment proceedings in 1977.

As set fo r th  in greater  d e ta i l  in  the appen­

d i x  h e r e t o ,  at  pp. 5a-9a i n f r a , the d i s t r i c t  

court u t t e r l y  f a i l e d  —  despite  the lesson o f  th is  

Court 's holding in Northcross v. Board o f  Educ. , 

412 U.S. 427 (1973) —  to explain the process by 

which i t  determined upon the serv ices fo r  which 

counsel would be compensated by an award o f  fees 

pursuant to § 718 o f  the Education Amendments o f  

1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976), except that the 

serv ices  of  ce r ta in  counsel fo r  the p l a i n t i f f s  

were regarded as completely unnecessary and not 

subject to  any compensation. Nor did the t r i a l  

court c l a r i f y  the basis fo r  the determination of  

the hourly rates at which time expended by coun­

s e l  f o r  the p l a i n t i f f s  was to  be compensated.



8

P l a i n t i f f s  appealed the adequacy o f  both fee 

awards made by the d i s t r i c t  court. A f t e r  b r i e f in g  

and ora l  argument, the Sixth C ircu it  "conclude[d ] 

tha t  both orders  g ra n t in g  a t t o r n e y s '  f e e s  and 

expenses provide inadequate compensation, contain 

l e ga l  e r ro rs ,  and reach factual conclusions not 

supported by the r eco rd . "  Pet.  App. 10-A. Since 

the record on the f i r s t  award was not in a posture 

f o r  f i n a l  d ispos i t ion  ( see note 4a i n f r a ) , the 

court remanded the p r inc ipa l  part o f  the case " f o r  

further proceedings in accordance with the stan­

dards set out in th is  op in ion . "  I d . The record 

on the second award for  the 1977 post-judgment 

proceedings was "adequate . . . f o r  us to  indepen­

dently  assess an appropriate award, . . .  and we do 

so to demonstrate the f indings and conclusions 

which we hold the d i s t r i c t  courts must enter  in 

the record in making fee  awards." Id.

The b a s i c  l e g a l  p r i n c i p l e s  a p p l i e d  by the 

court below are as fo l lows:  (1 )  In accordance with 

t h i s  C o u r t ' s  r u l in g  in Brad ley  v .  School Bd. 

o f  Richmond, 416 U.S.696 (1974), both the Educa­

t ion Amendments o f  1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976) 

and the C i v i l  Rights A t to rneys ’ Fees Awards Act of  

1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) authorize an award



- 9 -

of  fees  in th is  l i t i g a t i o n  f o r  serv ices  rendered 

p r io r  to th e i r  enactment to pending cases such as 

the in s ta n t  a c t i o n .  ( 2 )  Under the 1976 A c t ,  

p l a i n t i f f s  who preva i led  in th is  l i t i g a t i o n  are 

e n t i t l e d  to counsel fees covering a l l  necessary 

serv ices  "as is  t r a d i t i on a l  with attorneys com­

pensated by a f e e - p a y in g  c l i e n t ,  f o r  a l l  t ime 

reasonably expended on a matter , "  Pet App. 19-A, 

in re l iance  on express l e g i s l a t i v e  h is to ry .  S. 

REP No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (29 June

1976). Further, "the hours claimed need not be 

automatically accepted by the d i s t r i c t  court, but 

to the extent that hours are r e jec ted ,  the court 

must i n d i c a t e  some reason f o r  i t s  a c t i o n .  . . .  

Hours may be cut f o r  d u p l i c a t i o n ,  padding or  

f r i vo lous  c la im s. "  Pet. App. 20-A. Since in i t s  

f i r s t  award, the d i s t r i c t  court  had "s im ply  

el iminated,  without comment, hundreds o f  hours o f  

documented s e r v i c e , "  the court remanded that part 

o f  the case " f o r  entry o f  f indings o f  fact and 

conclusions o f  law adequate to permit our review 

o f  the award." Pet.  App. 19-A to 21-A. (3 )  In 

determining the appropriate ra te  o f  compensation, 

the " f a i r  market value o f  the serv ices provided" 

(Pet.  App. 23-A) is  the appropriate standard to 

implement the intent of Congress.



10

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRITS

The court o f  appeals has wr i t t en  an eminently
. . 2/

s e n s ib l e  op in ion — when con f r o n ted  w i th  a d i s ­

t r i c t  court d ispos i t ion  that kept the appel la te
3/body "completely in the dark"— as to the bases

fo r  decis ion,  but which on i t s  face was contrary
4/

to the w i l l  o f  Congress.™ The court o f  appeals 

d id  no more than e s t a b l i s h  a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  

framework f o r  determining awards o f  fees based 

i n i t i a l l y  on hours claimed and normal hourly rate

2/ The pe t i t ion s  be fore  the Court are devoid o f  
c i ta t io n s  to the opinions o f  the lower courts. 
P e t i t i o n e r s '  sweeping character izat ions o f  the 
actions o f  the courts below are not supported by 
an examination o f  what those courts actua l ly  did 
and said.

3/ Evans v. Sheraton Park H o te l , 503 F . 2d 177, 
188 (D.C, C ir .  1974).

4/ Apparently the Sixth C ircu i t  has frequently  
found i t s e l f  in t h i s  s i t u a t i o n .  The court  o f  
appeals stated: "This Court has been disturbed by 
the extraordinary va r ia t ions  in fee  awards that 
have come before  i t  on review,  and by a marked 
f a i l u r e  on the par t  o f  the  d i s t r i c t  cour ts  to 
explain th e i r  reasoning, making necessary f indings 
o f  f a c t ,  or  demonstrate  the c a l c u l a t i o n s  used 
to a r r ive  at a fee.  Such awards may wel l  con­
s t i tu t e  an abuse o f  d is c re t ion  while  rendering 
the award v i r t u a l l y  u n r e v i e w a b le . "  P e t . App. 
20 -A .



11

o f  counsel, with a r t icu la ted  adjustments upward or 

downward f o r  such f a c t o r s  as con t ingency  or 

dupl icat ion o f  e f f o r t .  In th is  context , there is 

no merit to p e t i t i o n e r s '  complaint (Board. Pet. 15)

that the court o f  appeals has usurped the preroga-
5/

t i v e s  o f  the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t . — P l a i n l y ,  i t  was 

not error  to remand the major part of  the case 

(the f i r s t  award) f o r  i n t e l l i g i b l e  d ispos i t ion ,  

and i t  is noteworthy that at leas t  as much remains 

to be decided in th is  case on these issues as has 

been dec ided  to  d a te ,  see pp. 12a~18a, i n f r a . 

I t  is just as d i f f i c u l t  to see how the court o f  

appeals erred, with re ference to a small aspect o f  

th is  extensive l i t i g a t i o n  (the second award), by 

app ly in g  the standards i t  a r t i c u l a t e d  f o r  the 

bene f i t  o f  the d i s t r i c t  judges in the Sixth C ir ­

cu i t ,  including th is  d i s t r i c t  court on remand. 

The determination of  fees simply does not r i s e  to

5/ The second award was f u l l y  l i t i g a t e d  in the 
d i s t r i c t  court and both p l a i n t i f f s  and the Board 
appealed. The Board did so much as even suggest 
to  e i t h e r  the d i s t r i c t  court  or  the court  o f  
appeals that a transcr ipt  o f  the f iv e -day  May 1977 
hearing was necessary to proper d ispos i t ion  o f  any 
aspect of the fees  dispute. The Board's current 
contention that such transcr ipt  is indispendable 
(Board Pe t .  15) comes too l a t e  in the  day; i t  
attempts to in jec t  an issue not l i t i g a t e d  below in 
any fashion.



12 -

an abuse o f  d iscre t ion .  Other c i r c u i t s ,  some o f

them even in h ighly  v i s i b l e  landmark decisions

have attempted to deal with the de ta i l s  o f  fees
6 /determinations in a s im i lar  manner.—

With r e s p e c t  t o  the d e c i s i o n  o f  the court  

o f  appeals to remand the major part o f  the case, 

tha t  d e c i s i o n  i s  "no t  y e t  r i p e  f o r  r e v iew  by 

t h i s  C o u r t , "  Brotherhood o f  Locomotive Firemen 

and Enginemen v .  Bangor A roos took  R. Co. , 389
U. S . 327 (1967 ) ,  and the i n t e r l o c u t o r y  nature  

o f  a decree  i s  "a f a c t  that  o f  i t s e l f  a lone 

furn ishe [s ]  s u f f i c i e n t  ground for  the denial  of 

the app l ica t ion "  fo r  c e r t i o r a r i .  Hamilton-Brown 

Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers & Co. ,  240 U. S. 251,

258 (1916).

Under the opinion below the d i s t r i c t  court 

reta ins  ample d is c re t ion  " to  assure fundamental 

fa irness  to a defendant" (Board Pet. 12), which,

6/ S ee , e . g . ,  Johnson v .  Georg ia  Highway
Express ,  I n c . , 488 F.2d 714 (5th C i r .  1974) ; 
L in d y  Bros.  B u i l d e r s , Inc ,  v .  American Rad. & 
Stand. Sanitary Corp. ,  487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.  1973) 
( Lindy I ) ;  C ity  o f  Detro i t  v. Grinnell  Corp. ,  495
F . 2d 448 (2d Cir.  1974) (Grinnel l  I ) ;  Lindy I I , 
540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir.  1976) ( en banc) ; Grinnell  
I I , 560 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir.  1977); King v. Green- 
b l a t t , 560 F . 2d 1024 (1 s t  C i r .  “1 9 7 7 ) ,  
denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978).

c e r t .



13

we might add, appears here as a proven " v i o l a t o r

o f  f edera l  law." Christiansburg Garment Co. v .

EEOC, 434 U.S.  412, 418 (1978 ) .  N ev e r th e l e s s

" th e  [ s ch oo l  d e s e g r e g a t i o n ]  p l a i n t i f f  i s  the

chosen instrument o f  Congress to v i n d i c a t e  'a

po l i c y  that Congress considered o f  the highest

p r i o r i t y . ' "  Id_.~^ In § 1988 Congress d i r e c t e d

that p reva i l in g  school desegregation p l a i n t i f f s '

lawyers should have th e i r  fees f ixed  "by the same

standards which p reva i l  in other types of  equally

complex F ed e ra l  l i t i g a t i o n ,  such as a n t i t r u s t

c a s e s . "  See P e t .  App. 12-A. A n t i t r u s t  and

s im i l a r  commercial cases are l e g i o n  in which

lawyers comparably s k i l l e d  and expe r ien ed  to

p l a i n t i f f s '  ch ie f  t r i a l  counsel have been awarded

much more than the base rate o f  $125/hr. which the
8/

court below, on a complete record,— found reason-

!_/ The Senate con s id e red ,  and r e j e c t e d  by a 
v o t e  o f  50-32, a proposed amendment o f  § 1988 
th a t  would have exc luded schoo l  d e s e g r e g a t i o n  
cases  from the s t a t u t e ' s  c o ve rage .  122 CONG. 
REC. SI 6451, SI 6457 (d a i l y  ed. 29 Sept. 1976); 
See a l s o  H.R. REP. NO. 94-12558, 94th Cong.,  
2d Sess. 4-5 ,  7 (15 Sept .  1976); 122 CONG.
REC. H12159 ( d a i l y  ed. 1 Oct. 1976) (remarks 
o f  Rep. Drinan).

8J  The reasonableness o f  the hourly ra te  claimed 
by p l a i n t i f f s '  ch ie f  counsel was attes ted  to by



- 14 -

able f o r  court room work.—

On the issue o f  compensating p r e v a i l i n g

p a r t i e s '  counsel " f o r  a l l  time reasonably expended
10/

on the matter,"-—  p e t i t i o n e r s '  asserted c o n f l i c t

8J  cont 'd .

the a f f i d a v i t s  o f  three prominent Memphis a t t o r ­
neys ;  the Board p resen ted  no c o u n t e r v a i l i n g  
evidence on th is  issue.

9/ Compare, e . g . ,  Shapiro  v .  C onso l ida ted
Edison Co. , CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. § 196, 364 (S .d7 
N.Y. 1978); Frankenstein v. McCrory, 425 F . Supp. 
762 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Quirke v. Chessie Corp. ,  368 
F. Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y7 1974); Arenson v. Board o f  
Trade, 372 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. 111. 1974); TWA
v. Hughes, 312 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); City  
o f  Philadelphia  v. Chas. P f i z e r  Co. ,  345 F. Supp. 
454 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Colson v, H i lton Hotels Corp.,  
59 F.R.D. 324 (N.D. 111. 1972); Oppenlander v.
Standard O i l  Co. ,  64 F.R.D. 597 (D. Colo. 1974); 
Hew Corp. v. Tandy Corp. ,  480 F. Supp. 758 (D.
Mass. 1979).

10/ The court  o f  a p p e a ls '  standard is  taken 
verbatim from S. REP. NO. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 6 (29 June 1976), which in turn quoted the
holdings in Davis v. County o f  Los Ange les , 8 EPD
1 9444 (C.D. CaTTf7~~l974), ~and Stanford Daily v . 
Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.C. C a l i f .  1974). In
S tan ford  D a i l y , 64 F.R.D. a t  684, a t  the  page 
c i t ed  in the l e g i s l a t i v e  h is to ry ,  the d i s t r i c t  
court re jec ted  the pos i t ion  taken by some federa l  
courts, " that hours spent on the l i t i g a t i o n  o f  un-



15

among the c i r cu i t s  is  considerably more imaginary 

than rea l .  The two courts o f  appeals and four 

d i s t r i c t  courts which pe t i t ione rs  c i t e  (Board Pet.

11-12; C i ty  Pet. 17-18) in fac t  are not in con-
11 /

f l i c t  w i th  the r u l in g  b e low .---  Moreover ,  the

courts which have expressly considered the app l i ­

cable l e g i s l a t i v e  h is to ry  are in complete agree-

10/ cont 'd .

successful claims should be deducted from the num­
ber o f  hours which an attorneys '  fees  award is  
computed." The Court held: "However, severa l  r e ­
cent decis ions,  adopting a d i f f e r e n t  tack, deny 
fees f o r  c l e a r l y  mer it less  claims but grant fees 
f o r  lega l  work reasonably calculated to advance 
th e i r  c l i e n t s '  in te res ts .  These decisions ac­
knowledge that courts should not require a t t o r ­
neys (o f ten  working in new or changing areas of 
the law) to devine the exact parameters o f  the 
c o u r t s '  w i l l i n g n e s s  to  grant r e l i e f . "  This  
was (and i s )  the usual ru le  in no n -c iv i l  r igh ts  
cases .  S ee , e . g . ,  L o c k l in  v.  Day-Glo Co lor  
Corp, 429 F .2d 873 (7th Cir.  1970), c e r t . denied, 
400 U.S. 1020 (1971); Farmington Dowel Products
Co. v. Forster  Mfg. Co. ,  421 F.2d 61 (1st Cir.  
1970); McGowan v. King, In c . ,  569 F.2d 845 (5th 
Cir.  1978). See a l s o , e . g . ,  Palmer Rodgers, 10 
EPD 1 10,499 (D. D.C. 1975); Walker v. Ralston
Purina Co. , 409 F. Supp. 101 (M.D. Ga. 1976); c fT  
United States v. M i t c h e l l , 580 F.2d 789 (5th Cir.  
1978).

11/ The c i r c u i t  decis ions r e l i e d  upon by p e t i ­
t i o n e r s  are  Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F,2d 275 
(1 s t  C i r .  1978) , and Schae fFer  v .  San Diego



16

ment with the Sixth C i r c u i t .—  Congress did no 

more than adopt the general rule  extant at the

11/ cont'd.

Yel low Cabs, In c . , 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir.  1972) 
(a pre-§ 1988 case construing T i t l e  V I I ) .  These 
d e c i s i o n s  are  w h o l l y  d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  from the 
in s ta n t  case on the s imple  ground that  they 
involved mult ip le  claims fo r  r e l i e f , on only one 
or a few o f  which p l a i n t i f f s  p reva i led ,  whereas 
t h i s  case  i n v o l v e s  a s i n g l e  c la im  f o r  s choo l  
desegregation on which p l a i n t i f f s  en t i r e l y  pre­
va i l ed .  The F i r s t  C ircu i t  has made i t  c lea r  that 
i t  does not d i s a g r e e  w i th  the S ix th  C i r c u i t ' s  
approach below. In Lamphere v. Brown Univ. , 610 
F. 2d 46, 47 (1st Cir.  1979), the court c i t ed  and 
distinguished i t s  e a r l i e r  decis ion in Nadeau as 
f o l l o w s :

A lso,  i t  was not e rror  to award fees fo r  the 
t ime spent by counse l  in  an unsuccess fu l  
attempt to broaden the scope o f  remedies 
ava i lab le  under the decree. This issue was 
a l l  part  o f  and p a r c e l  o f  one matter  - -  
counse l  should not be p e n a l i z e d  f o r  every  
lo s t  motion. This is not the same as a case 
where c la ims are t r u l y  f r a c t i o n a b l e . C f . 
Nadeau v. Helgemor, 1 C i r . ,  1978, 581 F.2d 
275.

The d i s t r i c t  cour t  d e c i s i o n s  r e l i e d  upon by 
p e t i t i o n e r s  are  s i m i l a r l y  d i s t in g u i s h a b l e  as 
cases "where c la ims are t r u l y  f r a c t i o n a b l e . "

12/ S e e , e . g . ,  Brown v Bathke , 588 F .2d 634 
(8th Cir.  1978); Donaldson v. O'Connor, 454 F. 
Supp. 311 (N.D. Fla. 1978). ' '



17

time i t  passed § 1988 ( see note 10, supra) , and

the S ix th  C i r c u i t  d id  no more than adhere to

c l e a r  c o n g r e s s io n a l  des ign  and in t e n t .  "The

statute  c a l l s  f o r  a reasonable fee ,  not a bargain- 
13/

basement f igure . -—- The Sixth C ircu it  has l e f t  

i n t a c t  the  t r a d i t i o n a l  d i s c r e t i o n  o f  d i s t r i c t  

cour ts  in  these  m a t te r s ;  the  court  has simply 

recognized that "such d iscre t ionary  choices are 

not l e f t  to a court 's  ' in c l in a t ion ,  but to i t s  

judgment; and i t s  judgment i s  t o  be guided by 

sound l e ga l  p r i n c i p l e s . ' "  Albemarle Paper Co.,  

v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416 (1975).

F ina l ly  there is  no v a l i d i t y  to  the Board's 

contention (Pet.  13-14) that the appl icat ion of 

§ 1988 and § 1617 to th is  continuously ac t ive  case 

is  in c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  th i s  C o u r t ' s  d e c i s i o n  in 

Bradley v. School Bd. o f  Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 

(1974)—  We have repeatedly  challenged the Board

13/ C f . P i t c h f o r d  S c i e n t i f i c  I n s t .  Corp. v 
P ep i ,  I n c . ,  440 F. Supp. 1175, 1177 (W.D. Pa.
1977).

14/ Wheeler v. Durham City Bd. o f  Educ. ,  585 F.2d 
"5T8 (4th C i r . 1978), is  not contrary. There the 
case had become dormant then the fee statute  was 
passed, and there was no pending l i t i g a t i o n  over 
any issue. This case, in t o ta l  contrast , was the 
subject o f  ac t ive ,  heated l i t i g a t i o n  when both 
appl icable  fee  statutes were enacted. See Hutto 
v .  F in n ey , 437 U.S. 678, 694-95 n.23 ("1 97 8 ) .



18

to a l l e g e  the pre judice and in ju s t i c e  necessary to 

f i t  the "m a n i f e s t  i n j u s t i c e "  e x c e p t i o n  to  the 

Bradley ru le ,  but the Board has f a i l e d  to respond 

and i t  does not respond here. Nowhere does the 

Board claim that i f  i t  had known o f  i t s  po ten t ia l  

statutory l i a b i l i t y  f o r  f e es ,  " rather  than simply 

the common-law a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  an award, [such 

knowledge] would hve caused the Board to order i t s  

conduct so as to render th is  l i t i g a t i o n  unecessary 

and thereby preclude the incurr ing o f  such c o s t s . "  

Id at 721. To the contrary,  the Board's e f f o r t  to 

undermine the desegregation plan in the spring of  

1977, we l l  a f t e r  the passage o f  both § 1617 and 

§ 1988, demonstrates that knowledge o f  potent ia l  

a ttorneys '  fees  l i a b i l i t y  had no impact on the 

conduct o f  th is  board o f  education. The court o f  

appeals was manifestly  correct in concluding that 

th e r e  i s  a complete  absence o f  p r e ju d i c e  to 

the Board. Pet. App. 17-A.

This case  does not m er i t  r e v i ew  by th i s  

Court.

14/ cont'd.

There are probably more than 100 lower court de­
c is ions in accord with the Sixth C i r c u i t ' s  de­
c is ion  in th is  case.



19

CONCLUSION

For the forego ing reasons, the pe t i t ions  fo r  

wr i ts  o f  c e r t i o r a r i  should be denied.

Dated: 13 May, 1980

Respect fu l ly  submitted,

WILLIAM E. CALDWELL
Ratner & Sugarmon 
525 Commerce T i t l e  Bldg. 
Memphis, Tennessee 38103 
(901) 525-8601

NORMAN J. CHACHKIN
520 Woodward Bldg.
733 15th Stree t ,  N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
(202) 628-7446

JACK GREENBERG 
JAMES M. NABRIT, I I I  
BILL LANN LEE

Suite 2030 
10 Columbus C irc le  
(212) 586-8397

Attorneys fo r  Respondents



APPENDIX



APPENDIX

The " l o n g ,  com p l ica ted  h i s t o r y  o f  th i s

b i t t e r l y  c o n te s t ed  schoo l  d e s e g r e g a t i o n  case"

(Pet.  App. 2-A) may be traced through the reported

opinions o f  th is  Court (which has twice granted

r e v i e w ) ,  the Court o f  Appeals f o r  the S ix th

Circuit  (ten reported dec is ions ) ,  and the d i s t r i c t

court (innumerable decis ions and orders ) .  See
la/

e_I_g_. , Board Pet. 2. A "general descr ip t ion , "

s u f f i c i e n t  " t o  g i v e  an understanding o f  the 

scope and qua l i ty  o f  representation provided by 

the p l a i n t i f f s '  attorneys in the course o f  the 

las t  two decades" (Pet .  App. 2-A to  3-A),  is  set 

out in the opinion below. Pet. App. 3-A to  4-A.

The F irs t  Appl icat ion and Award

Two weeks a f t e r  th is  Court declined to  review 

the f in a l  plan o f  desegregation ordered by the 

d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ,  416 U.S. 962 (22 A p r i l  1974),

la/ A comprehensive summary o f  the h is to ry  o f  
th is  l i t i g a t i o n  takes up nearly 50 pages o f  our 
opening B r i e f  f o r  P I a i n t f f s - A p p e l l a n t s  , f i l e d  
in the court below, 6th Cir Nos. 78-1289,-1290,- 
1291 (served 4 December 1978).

la



p l a i n t i f f s '  counsel wrote counsel fo r  the Board, 

i n i t i a t i n g  an e f f o r t  to s e t t l e  p l a i n t i f f s '  claim 

fo r  costs , including reasonable a ttorneys '  fees 

and out-of-pocket expenses. When these e f f o r t s  

f a i l e d ,  p l a i n t i f f s  f i l e d  a formal motion fo r  such 

an award, against both the Board and the C i ty  on 1 

August 1974. Protracted l i t i g a t i o n  over the fees 

issues then ensued.

The d i s t r i c t  cour t 's  24 March 1976 "Ruling on 

the App l icat ion  o f  P l a i n t i f f s  fo r  Attorneys Fees" 

addressed p l a i n t i f f s  entit lement to an award o f  

fees .  The court he ld:  (1 )  that,  as to the Board 

defendants, p l a i n t i f f s  are the "p r e va i l in g  party"  

and otherwise f u l f i l l e d  the requirements o f  § 718 

o f  the Emergency School Aid Act o f  1972, 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1617 ( P e t .  App. 4 2 -A ) ;  ( 2 )  th a t  § 1617, as 

construed in Bradley v.  School Bd. o f  Richmond, 

supra , a u th o r i z e s  an award on ly  f o r  s e r v i c e s  

rendered a f t e r  the e f f e c t i v e  date o f  the statute ,  

1 July 1972, because (a )  there was on that date no 

app l ica t ion  fo r  fees "pending under circumstances 

where in  i t  was su b jec t  t o  a d i r e c t  a p p e l l a t e  

rev iew" (Pet.  App. 44-A) or  (b) in the a l terna­

t i v e ,  because under the standard enunciated by the 

law o f  th is  case, Northcross v. Board o f  Educ. o f  

the Memphis City  Schools, 412 U.S. 427 (1972), 

"the lack o f  s p e c i f i c  guidelines and the resu l t ing

2a



t r i a l  and error  experimentation [ in  school deseg­

regat ion cases],  coupled with the fact that the 

p l a i n t i f f  never applied f o r  any attorneys fees 

p r i o r  to  the l a t t e r  par t  o f  1972, are c ircum­

stances  which would make a r e t r o a c t i v e  award 

unjust" (Pe t .  App. 48-A);  (3 )  that, add i t iona l ly  

as to the Board defendants, p l a i n t i f f s  are en­

t i t l e d  to an award o f  fees f o r  serv ices  rendered 

a f t e r  the decisions in Swann v . Charlotte-Meck- 

l enburg Bd, o f  Educ. , 402 U.S. 1 (Ap r i l  20, 1971), 

and companion cases, because the Board's l i t i g a ­

t ion  conduct in response to those decisions was 

"obst inate  and obdurate" (Pet.  App. 45-A to  46-A);  

and (4 )  that p l a i n t i f f s  are en t i t l ed  to recover 

fees as part o f  the costs to be assessed against 

the C i t y  de fendants  under both § 1617 and the 

"obstinate  and obdurate" standard. Pet. App. 49-A 

to  51-A.

Therea fter ,  p l a i n t i f f s  documented over 4,800
2a/

hours— o f  serv ices  rendered by p l a i n t i f f s '  law-

2a/ Nearly 4,000 hours were in connection with 
proceedings ar is ing  out o f  p l a i n t i f f s '  1968 Motion 
fo r  Further R e l i e f .  The 1968 motion was f i l e d  
pursuant to  t h i s  C o u r t ' s  d e c i s i o n  in Green v . 
County School  Bd. , 391 U.S. 430 (1968 ) ,  and 
companion cases. In i t s  24 March 1976 ruling the

3a



yers in l i t i g a t i o n  against the C ity .  P l a i n t i f f s  

also amended th e i r  app l ica t ion  to include re l iance  

on in t e r v e n in g  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  the C i v i l  R igh ts  

A ttorney 's  Fees Awards Act of  1976, amending 42 

U.S.C. § 1988. P l a i n t i f f s  supported th e i r  app l i ­

c a t i o n  w i th  a d e t a i l e d  f a c t u a l  p r e s e n ta t i o n :  

answers to  in t e r roga to r i e s ;  a 14-page s t ipu la t ion  

of  fac ts  perta in ing to the C i ty ,  along with an 

agreed  7-page p r e -h e a r in g  o rde r  d e s i g n a t in g  

re levant parts o f  the record; near ly  100 pages of  

a f f i d a v i t s  and suppor t ing  documentat ion from 

counsel f o r  p l a i n t i f f s  itemiz ing  the necessary 

s e r v i c e s  rendered  and l i t i g a t i o n  expenses i n ­

curred; o f  a f f i d a v i t s  from three prominent Memphis 

attorneys fam i l ia r  with the h is to ry  o f  th is  case

2a/ cont ' d .

d i s t r i c t  court c o r re c t l y  observed that "the denial  
of  c e r t i o r a r i  by the Supreme Court in A p r i l  1974 
was the cu lm ina t ion  o f  p roceed ings  which were 
in i t ia t e d  in August 1968 when there was f i l e d  on 
b e h a l f  o f  the p l a i n t i f f s  a Mot ion f o r  Further  
R e l i e f . . . "  P e t .  App. 47-A. As the court  o f  
appeals described the intervening years: "For the
next four and a h a l f  years, the case moved at a 
steady pace back and for th  between the d i s t r i c t  
court, th is  Court [ o f  Appeals] and the Supreme 
Court, as one phase a f t e r  another o f  an e f f e c t i v e ,  
comprehensive desegregation plan was hammered out. 
In 1973, a new tw ist  was added when the C ity  o f  
Memphis attempted t o  b lock  d e s e g r e g a t i o n . . . . "  
Pet.  App. 3-a.

-  4a -



and w i th  r a te s  charged in  the community f o r  

complex federa l  l i t i g a t i o n ;  and o f  a f f i d a v i t s  from 

out-of-town attorneys fam i l ia r  with school de­

segregation l i t i g a t i o n  in general and with the 

importance and complexity o f  th is  case in part icu­

la r .  In response, the Board f i l e d  no a f f i d a v i t s
3a/

or any other evidence,—  and the City  f i l e d  two 

a f f i d a v i t s  from Memphis lawyers ,  c o n s i s t i n g  

o f  a t o t a l  o f  three substantive sentences and not 

r e f e r r in g  at a l l  to federa l  court l i t i g a t i o n .  In 

addition,  the d i s t r i c t  court held a hearing on 22 

October 1976, resu l t ing  in a transcr ipt  of  109 

pages.

On 4 November 1977 the d i s t r i c t  court f i l e d  

th is  "Award on Appl icat ion o f  the P l a i n t i f f s  fo r  

Attorneys Fees" (Pet .  App. 53-A to  62-A),  dispos­

ing  o f  p l a i n t i f f s '  c la ims as f o l l o w s :  (1 )  the 

cour t  d e c l in e d  to  r e c o n s id e r  i t s  r u l i n g  tha t  

§ 1617 does not authorize fees  fo r  serv ices ren-

3a/ By agreement,  the Court was r e q u i r e d  to  
respond to  p l a i n t i f f s '  p r e s e n ta t i o n  only  as 
i t  re la ted  to serv ices  rendered since the Swann 
d e c i s i o n  in 1971. Pursuant to  the court  o f  
a p p e a ls '  remand, the Board w i l l  now have the 
o p p o r tu n i t y ,  i f  i t  chooses,  t o  respond to  the 
i t e m i z a t i o n s  r e l a t i n g  to  pre-1971 s e r v i c e s .

- 5a -



dered p r i o r  to  1 July  1972, and a l s o  h e ld  42 

U.S.C.  § 1988 to  be i n a p p l i c a b l e - ^ t h e r e b y

denying recovery f o r  about 2,084 hours o f  serv ices 

(Pet.  App. 55-A ) ; (2 )  the court awarded $21,490 to 

two o f  p l a i n t i f f s '  attorneys f o r  one-hal f  o f  816 

hours o f  serv ices  in connection with the Board's 

"obdurate and obst inate "  conduct in the l a t t e r  

h a l f  o f  1971 and the spring of  1972 (Pet .  App. 

55-A), and omitted a l together  347 hours o f  ser­

v i c e s  o f  these  two a t t o r n e y s  dur ing  th i s  t ime
5a/

frame without any discussion at a l l ; —  (3) the

4a/ The court had e a r l i e r  declined to award fees 
under § 1617 fo r  pre-July 1972 serv ices  on the 
ground tha t  that  s t a t u t e ' s  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  was 
" l im i ted  to  cases where the matter o f  an award for  
attorneys fees was pending under circumstances 
where in  i t  was su b jec t  t o  a d i r e c t  a p p e l l a t e  
r ev iew . "  Pet. App. 44-A. Although th is  condit ion 
was f u l f i l l e d  by the 1976 amendment to  42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988, passed w h i l e  the qu es t ion  o f  f e e s  was 
pending decis ion in the d i s t r i c t  court, the court 
refused to apply § 1988 on the new ground that 
" th e  Judgment in the  case had become f i n a l  in 
1974." Pet. App. 55-A).

5a/ The Board appealed the d i s t r i c t  court 's  bad 
fa i th  f inding and the l im ited  award o f  fees based 
on tha t  f i n d in g .  The court  o f  appeals  p r e -  
termit ted decis ion o f  those issues with i t s  ho ld­
ing that fees fo r  serv ices  rendered since 1968 
are a u th o r i z ed  by s t a t u t e .  The Board has not 
renewed i t s  pos i t ion  here.

- 6a -



court  awarded the same two lawyers  $7,200 f o r  

one-half  o f  240 hours o f  serv ices  rendered a f t e r  1 

July  1972 "because the p l a i n t i f f s '  [proposed 

desegregat ion]  plan was re jec ted  and there fore  to 

that extent they did not p r e v a i l "  (Pet.  App. 56-A 

to 57-A); and omitted, without discussion, 580 

hours o f  s e r v i c e s  rendered  by these  a t to rneys

dur ing  the same p e r i o d ,  as w e l l  as 39 hours
63./

c la imed by a t h i r d  a t t o r n e y ; ---  ( 4 )  the court

denied recovery o f  a l l  hours claimed by p l a i n t f f s '

New York cocounsel associated with the NAACP Legal

Defense and Educa t iona l  Fund, I n c . ,  w i th  the

s ing le  statement that "there  has been no showing

that his  serv ices  were necessary in addition to
7a/

the serv ices  of  l o ca l  counsel" (Pe t .  App. 58-A)—  

(the claim is f o r  829 hours, o f  which 619 were in

6a/ The d i s t r i c t  court 's  award nowhere id en t i ­
f i e s  or  d iscusses  the many hours o f  s e r v i c e s  
which were exc luded  from compensation a l t o ­
g e th e r .  In 31 pages o f  appendices a t tached  
to  our opening b r i e f  in  the court  o f  appeals  
( see note la, supra) , we "at tempted,"  in the words 
of  the court o f  appeals, " l a r g e l y  by guesswork, 
t o  i d e n t i f y  which hours o f  s e r v i c e  . . .  were 
excluded from cons iderat ion . "  Pet.  App. 21-A.

7a/ The court o f  appeals c o r re c t l y  noted that New 
York counsel " p ro v id ed  the p l a i n t i f f s  w ith  
many hours o f  serv ice  which were not provided by 
anyone e l s e ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  connec t ion  with  
th is  Court and the Supreme Court ."  611 F.2d at 
657.

- 7a -



t ime pe r iods  o th e rw ise  covered  by the c o u r t ' s

e n t i t l e m e n t  r u l i n g ) ;  ( 5 )  the court  awarded

a g a in s t  the C i t y  $6,930 f o r  ove r  115 hours o f

serv ices  (out o f  a claim f o r  over 305 hours) (Pet .
8a/

App. 58-A to 61-A)—  and $343.26 in costs and 
9a/

expenses;— (6 ) the court evaluated the serv ices 

o f  the two p l a i n t i f f s  1 lawyers who were allowed 

fees at a routine hourly ra te  o f  $60 per hour for  

" lead counsel" and $40 per hour for  subordinate 

counsel (Pet.  App. 57 -A ) , but summarily declined 

(Pet . App. 58-A) to consider e i th e r  the ex t rao rd i ­

nary circumstances urged by p l a i n t i f f s  to warrant 

an upward adjustment in the base r a t e  or  the

8a/ The d i s t r i c t  court i d e n t i f i e d  the excluded 24 
hours o f  serv ices  against the C ity  on grounds o f  
unnecessary dupl icat ion .  Pet.  App. 59-A and 60-A. 
These f ind ings,  the only ,s p e c i f i c  fac ts  found were 
not disturbed by the court o f  appeals, but are 
subject to reconsideration on remand.

9a/ The court, a lso  without f indings,  awarded 
p l a i n t i f f s  part ($8,007.31 o f  $19,548.77 expended) 
o f  th e i r  statutory costs and out-of-pocket ex­
penses incurred in l i t i g a t i o n  against the Board 
from September 1971 through 1974 (Pet .  App. 61-A),  
and denied, without mention, p l a i n t i f f s '  claim 
f o r  $12,619.95 in  c o s t s  and expenses incurred  
p r io r  to September 1971. Questions r e la t in g  to 
s t a t u t o r y  c o s t s  and l i t i g a t i o n  expenses were 
remanded f o r  r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n  by the court  o f  
appeals (Pet .  App. 25-A to  28-A);  none of these 
issues is presented f o r  review here.

- 8a -



extreme in f l a t i o n  of  the intervening years which 

had s i g n i f i c a n t l y  devalued the 1971-73 rates

A judgment in conformity with th is  ru l ing  was 

entered by the d i s t r i c t  court pursuant to FED. R. 

CIV. P. 54 (b ) ;  p l a i n t i f f s  appealed and both the 

Board and the C ity  cross appealed.

The Second Appl icat ion and Award

In the words o f  the court o f  appeals (Pet .  

App. 4- A ) :

In the meantime, a new controversy had 
f l a r e d  up, when the School Board sought 
s u b s t a n t i a l  m o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  P lan Z which

10a/ P l a i n t i f f s  presented documentation to the 
d i s t r i c t  court showing that by 1976 the Board o f  
Education lawyers over the years had been paid —  
when th e i r  serv ices  were rendered, win, lose or 
draw - -  the e q u i v a l e n t  o f  o v e r  350,000 1975 
do l lars  to defend the dual system. App l icat ion  o f  
the Consumer P r ice  Index increases since 1975 to 
the same f igures  ( i . e . ,  excluding fees paid by the 
Board since 1975) resu l ts  in an amount equivalent 
to about 550,000 1980 d o l l a r s .  These d o l l a r  
f igures  r e la t e  only to a ttorneys '  fees and revea l  
no th ing  about the  un to ld  worth o f  the end less  
hours devoted by the Board's superintendent and 
h is  s t a f f  t o  the de fense  o f  t h i s  l i t i g a t i o n .

9a



would  have  s l o w ed  down and undermined  
the progress o f  desegregat ion. A f ive -day  
t r i a l  was held in 1977, and the defendant’ s 
proposals were, fo r  the most part,  re jec ted  
by the court.

See also Pet. App. 63-A to 64-A. Pursuant to the,

d i s t r i c t  cour t 's  determination at the conclusion

of  i t s  24 May 1977 Memorandum that p l a i n t i f f s  were

the p reva i l in g  party en t i t l ed  to a ttorneys '  fees ,

p l a i n t i f f s  documented 271.25 hours o f  necessary
11a/

s e r v i c e s  r e l a t e d  to  the May 1977 h e a r in g . —  

On the question o f  amounts to be recovered, 

the d i s t r i c t  court entered i t s  ru ling  on 7 July 

1978 (Pet .  App. 63-A),  awarding $8,382.00 in fees 

and holding as fo l lows:  (1 )  the court awarded

f e es  f o r  197.25 hours o f  the 271.25 hours o f  

s e r v i c e s  rendered by p l a i n t i f f s '  a t t o r n e y s ,  

disapproving, without i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  or sp ec i f i c  

f indings,  74 hours o f  claimed necessary serv ices ;  

( 2 )  as to approved hours,  the  court  (a g a in ,  

without sp ec i f i c  f ind ings )  employed an across- 

the-board discount of  20% as "an adjustment [ that ]

11a/ P l a i n t i f f s  made no c la im  f o r  s e r v i c e s  
r e la ted  to  the i r  separate contention that a new 
high school ( rather  than renovation o f  an ex is t in g  
s c h o o l )  should be b u i l t  in  the Westwood area ,  
excep t  f o r  2 hours which were i n a d v e r t e n t l y  
included in the a f f i d a v i t s  and e x p l i c i t l y  excluded 
by the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t .  See Pe t .  App. 65-A to  
66-A.

- 10a -



should be made fo r  the time devoted to parts of

issues on which the p l a i n t i f f s  did not p r e v a i l "

(P e t .  App. 6 6 - A ) ; -----  ( 3 )  w h i l e  approv ing  the

"normal h o u r ly  r a t e s "  c la imed by p l a i n t i f f s '

attorneys Noel and F ie lds  ($60/hr. and $40/hr. ,

r e s p e c t i v e l y ) ,  the court reduced ( t o  $75/hr. ) as

"excess ive "  (but without explanation)  the base

rate  ($125/hr. ) claimed by p l a i n t i f f s '  ch ie f  t r i a l
13 /lawyer  Lucas ( P e t .  App. 6 6 - a ) ; --- -- ( 4 )  the

court re jec ted  p l a i n t i f f f  request for  an upward 

adjustment o f  the award, s ta t ing  i t s  "opinion that 

an incent ive  or m u l t ip l i e r  fac tor  is not author­

ized or al lowed fo r  the serv ices  rendered in th is

12a/ For example, p l a i n t i f f s  opposed the Board's 
m o d i f i c a t i o n  and schoo l  c l o s in g  plan in  i t s  
e n t i r e t y  on the  ground that  the proposa l  as a 
whole was in ten t iona l ly  r a c i a l l y  discr iminatory, 
was a rb i t ra ry ,  and portended disruption o f  deseg­
regated schools which appeared to  be s ta b i l i z ed .  
The d i s t r i c t  judge agreed with these contentions 
and en te red  p r e c i s e  f in d in g s  and conclus ions  
to th is  e f f e c t ,  but in the process o f  separately  
an a ly z in g  each p i e c e  o f  the t o t a l  package, 
he found a few proposals so innocuous as not to 
r e q u i r e  d i s a p p r o v a l .  These are the s o r ts  o f  
"parts of  issues" which the p l a i n t i f f s  are pre­
sumed to  have los t .

13a/ The rates fo r  Noel and Fie lds have not been 
disputed, but the rate  fo r  Lucas was reviewed and 
r e v i s e d  by the court  o f  appeals  and the Board 
makes i t  an issue here. Board Pet. 15-16.

11a -



1 A’S /
phase of  the case . "  Pet.  App. 66-a.— ■-

The court  o f  appea ls  c o n so l id a t e d  c ross  

appeals  from the f i r s t  and second awards f o r  

argument and decis ion.

The D e c i s i o n  o f  the Court o f  Appeals 

In i t s  d e c i s i o n  o f  23 November 1979, the 

S ix th  C i r c u i t  " c o n c lu d e [ d ] tha t  both orders  

g ra n t in g  a t t o r n e y s '  f e e s  and expenses p ro v id e  

inadequate compensation, contain l e ga l  e rrors ,  and 

reach factua l  conclusions not supported by the 

r eco rd . "  Pet.  App. 10-A. Since the record on the 

f i r s t  award was not in a posture f o r  f i n a l  dispo­

s i t i o n  ( see note 3a, supra) , the court remanded 

the p r in c ipa l  part o f  the case fo r  further pro­

ceed ings  in accordance w i th  the standards se t  

out in th is  op in ion . "  I d . The court determined, 

however, that the record on the second award was 

"adequate . . .  fo r  us to independently assess an 

appropriate award,. . .  and we do so to  demonstrate

14a/ On the ground that they were "excess ive "  or 
without " j u s t i f i c a t i o n , " the court awarded only 
one-hal f  o f  p la in t  i f f s 1 expenses fo r  exper t -w i t ­
ness fees ,  preparation o f  a pr ivate-school  pupi l -  
locator  map, and photocopying, thereby awarding 
$5,200.16 o f  the $7,788.96 expended by p l a i n t i f f s . 
P e t .  App. 67-A to  68-A. The court  o f  appeals  
sustained a l l  aspects o f  th is  ho lding, except the 
disallowance of photocopying expenses (Pet.  App. 
32-A to  33-A),  and none of  these issues is  pre­
sented fo r  review.

12a



the f in d in g s  and conc lu s ions  which we ho ld  

the d i s t r i c t  courts must enter in the record in 

making fee awards." Id. The court said ( id .  ) :

We understand th a t  the f in d in g s  o f  f a c t  
which are required to substantiate a court 's  
exerc ise  of i t s  d is c re t ion  in making a fee 
award are f r e q u e n t l y  v e ry  com p l ica ted .  
Nevertheless,  both the court 's  f indings and 
i t s  mode o f  analysis must be c lear  to enable 
an appel la te  court to i n t e l l i g e n t l y  review 
the award. The p l a i n t i f f s  are e n t i t l e d  t o  
some e x p la n a t io n  o f  the r eason ing  used to  
exclude those hours which were cut, and some 
descr ipt ion  o f  the f indings which were r e l i e d  
upon to f ind  that expenses and b i l l i n g  rates 
were excessive.  Any review o f  the court 's  
awards in th is  case would require substant ial 
amounts o f  sheer conjecture on our part,  as 
we sp ecu la te  as to  reasons why the court  
might have cut cer ta in  documented hours. In 
fa c t ,  i t  is  impossible to t e l l  whether the 
d i s t r i c t  judgement might not have s imply 
o v e r l o o k ed  c e r t a i n  s e r v i c e s  p ro v ided  by 
p l a i n t f f s '  a t t o r n e y s .  C e r t a in l y  no more 
substant ia l reason appeals in th is  record.

The court  o f  appea ls  h e ld ,  f i r s t ,  th a t  20 

U.S.C. § 1617 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988, both enacted 

while  th is  case was in ac t ive  l i t i g a t i o n ,  author­

i ze  fees fo r  serv ices rendered to p l a i n t i f f s  since

1968. 15a/
The court e lected  to focus i t s  decision

15a/ Because o f  an unresolved dispute about the 
meaning o f  a 1966 order, a f t e r  which the case was

13a



on the appl icat ion o f  § 1988 and i t s  comprehensive 

l e g i s l a t i v e  h i s t o r y .  P e t .  App. 11-A . On the 

b as is  o f  th i s  C o u r t ' s  d e c i s i o n  in B rad ley  v » 

School Bd. o f  Richmond, supra, and the e x p l i c i t  

l e g i s l a t i v e  h i s t o r y  o f  § 1988 th a t  the new 

statutory author izat ions f o r  at torneys '  fees apply 

to a l l  pending cases (cases in which " there  was an 

ac t iv e  controversy . . .  at the time the Act became 

e f f e c t i v e " ) ,  "unless spec ia l circumstances ex is t  

which would make an award m a n i f e s t l y  u n ju s t . "  

Pet.  App. 14-A. Applying that standard to th is  

case, the court held that while  " [ c ] e r ta in  interim 

aspects o f  the case may have been subject to a 

f i n a l  order s e t t l i n g  the issue o f  a t torney 's  fees 

to that point,  rendering the reopening of  long-  

s e t t l ed  aspects o f  the case un fa i r "  (Pet.  App. 

16-A), there has been no such order since 1968 in 

th i s  l i t i g a t i o n .  In response to  the d i s t r i c t  

court 's  reasons f o r  denying appl icat ion o f  the 

s t a t u t e ,  the  court  h e ld  (P e t .  App. 17-A and 

1 8 - A ) :

15a/ cont 'd .

dormant un t i l  p l a i n t i f f s  f i l e d  th e i r  Green motion 
in 1968 ( see Pet. App. 3 -A ) , the court o f  appeals 
remanded the question o f  ent it lement to fees for  
pre-1968 s e r v i c e s  to  the d i s t r i c t  cour t  f o r  
further  consideration. Pet. App. 17-A to 18-A. 
That issue is  not before  the Court.

14a -



However, we r e j e c t  the  n o t io n  tha t  mere 
uncertainty in the law is a "spec ia l  circum­
stance" ju s t i f y in g  r e j e c t i o n  of  the statutory 
remedy. A major purpose o f  the Fees Awards 
Act was to  encourage the bringing o f  suits  in 
new and undeveloped areas o f  c i v i l  r i g h t s  
law, and i t  would be anomalous indeed i f  we 
were t o  deny f e e s  f o r  the v e ry  reason the 
statute  was passed. F ina l ly ,  the p l a i n t i f f s '  
d e l a y  in  a p p l y i n g  f o r  f e e s  (w h ich  was 
l a r g e l y  due to  the f a c t  tha t  th e re  was no 
e a r l i e r  appropriate time to pause for  l i t i g a ­
t i o n  o f  the  f e e  i s su e ,  at l e a s t  not s in ce  
1966) i s  h a rd ly  grounds f o r  denying f e e s .  
The de fendants  have f a i l e d  t o  po in t  to 
any pre judice or harmful e f f e c t s  on them as a 
result  o f  the p l a i n t i f f s '  delay.  The pre­
ju d i c e ,  i f  any, has inured to  p l a i n t f f s '  
attorneys who have provided years o f  serv ice  
w i thout  compensat ion in hand. This is  
not a case where, years a f t e r  a case has been 
f i n a l l y  d isposed  o f ,  the p r e v a i l i n g  par ty  
seeks to  reopen the case to l i t i g a t i o n  of  the 
f e e s  is sue .  Cf Un ited  S ta tes  v. P in to ,  44 
F.R.D. 357 (W.D. Mich. 1968).

k k k k k k

However, from 1968 un t i l  shortly  before  the 
app l icat ion  f o r  fees was made by the p la in ­
t i f f s ,  the  case was in  cont inuous,  a c t i v e  
l i t i g a t i o n .  Not on ly  was th e r e  no " f i n a l  
judgment" which could reasonably be said to 
s e t t l e  the issue o f  fees during that period, 
but there was not time to  ra ise  the matter 
o f  fees at a l l .

15a



Second, the Sixth C ircu it  held that in th is  

s ing le -c la im  school desegregation case in which 

the p l a i n t i f f s  had "preva i led  on the case as a 

whole" (Pet.. App. 18-A) and "obtained the r e l i e f  

which they sought" (Pe t .  App. 19-A), the d i s t r i c t  

court p la in ly  erred "by deciminating the to ta l  

hours c la imed w i th  a r b i t r a r y  p e rc en ta g e s "  t o  

account fo r  " issues or parts o f  issues" on which 

p l a i n t i f f s  had asserted ly  not preva i led .  Pet. 

App. 18-A and 19-A. supra . The r u l e  adopted,  

based on the l e g i s l a t i v e  h is to ry  o f  § 1988, is 

that a l l  necessary serv ices  are to  be compensated, 

"as is  t r a d i t i o n a l  with attorneys compensated by a 

fee-paying c l i e n t ,  fo r  a l l  time reasonably ex­

pended on a matter . "  Pet.  App. 19-A. "The hours 

claimed need not be automatically accepted by the 

d i s t r i c t  court, but to  the extent that hours are 

r e jec ted ,  the court must indicate  some reason for  

i t s  a c t i o n . . . .  Hours may be cut f o r  duplicat ion, 

padding or f r i vo lous  c la ims."  Pet, App. 20-A. 

Since in  i t s  f i r s t  award the d i s t r i c t  court 

had "simply e l iminated, without comment, hundreds 

o f  hours o f  documented s e r v i c e , "  the court remand­

ed that part o f  the case " f o r  entry o f  f indings o f  

fact  and conclusions o f  law adequate to  permit our

16a -



review o f  the award."
16a/

Pet. App.21-A.

F in a l l y ,  the court addressed the appropriate 

standard f o r  determining a reasonable hourly ra te ,  

and concluded that the " f a i r  market value o f  the 

serv ices  provided" (Pet .  App. 23-A) is  the appro­

p r i a t e  standard to  implement the in t e n t  o f  

Congress.  The court  adhered to  i t s  e a r l i e r  

decis ion in O l iver  v. Kalamazoo Bd. o f  Educ. , 576 

F.2d 714 (6th Cir.  1978), d isa l lowing "a 'bonus' 

m u l t i p l i e r . "  Pet. App. 23-A. But the court did 

recognize (Pet.  App. 24-A ) :

This  does not mean that  the r ou t in e  
hour ly  r a t e  charged by a t t o rn eys  is  the 
maximum which can or should be awarded. In 
many cases tha t  r a t e  i s  not " r e a s o n a b l e , "  
because i t  does not take into account specia l  
c i rcum stances ,  such as unusual t ime con-

16a/ Pursuant to th e i r  attempt below to id en t i f y  
the hours excluded without comment by the d i s t r i c t  
court (see note 6a, supra) , p l a i n t i f f s  determined 
that the d i s t r i c t  court had el iminated a l l  hours 
during the period covered by i t s  award r e la t in g  to 
monitoring the f in a l  desegregation decree (136.8 
h r s . ) ,  to s e r v i c e s  rendered on appeal (231.5 
h r s . ) ,  and hours expended on the l i t i g a t i o n  o f  
p l a i n t i f f s  claim fo r  costs and fees (341 h r s . ) .  
The court o f  appeals held that compensation is  due 
fo r  these serv ices  (Pet .  App.21-A to 22-A),  and 
that holding is  not contested here.

17a -



s t r a i n ! , or  an unusual ly  unpopular cause, 
which a f f e c t  the market value o f  the serv ices  
rendered .  Perhaps the most s i g n i f i c a n t  
fac to r  in these cases which at time renders 
the routine hourly fee  unreasonably low is 
the fact that the award is contingent upon 
success.

The court there fore  held that in such appropriate 

cases an upward adjustment in the routine hourly 

r a t e  may be n ecessa ry  in  o rde r  to  a r r i v e  at a 

"reasonable" fee  fo r  par t icu la r  serv ices  rendered.

The court then applied these standards to  the 

second award, invo lv ing  a claim fo r  271.25 hours 

o f  se rv ices .  The d i s t r i c t  court had awarded an 

average o f  $31/hr. f o r  these serv ices .  The court 

o f  appea ls ,  f i n d i n g  tha t  "we have a complete 

record and conclude that the in teres ts  o f  ju s t ic e  

w i l l  be served, in  l i gh t  of  the long delay in th is  

case ,  by our r e c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  an a p p ro p r ia t e  

award . . , "  (Pet .  App. 28-A),  scrut in ized  the record 

and found the d i s t r i c t  court 's  award to  be inade­

quate. Pet.  App. 29-A to  32-A. The court there­

f o r e  made adjustments  to  the award, the end 

resu lt  of which was to award p l a i n t i f f s '  attorneys 

an average  o f  $63/hr. f o r  these  s e r v i c e s ,  in  

contrast to the $31/hr. awarded by the d i s t r i c t

18a -



court. With respect to the 74 hours o f  serv ices 

which the  d i s t r i c t  court  had exc luded  w ithout  

f ind ings ,  the court o f  appeals determined: "Not 

only is th is  cut unsupported in the record, but we 

conclude that i t  i s  c l e a r l y  excessive given the 

f a c t s  o f  t h i s  c a se "  where " th e r e  was l i t t l e  

over lapping o f  s e r v i c e s . "  Pety. App. 29-A. (For 

that " l i t t l e  over lapping" the court reduced the 

compensable hours by 5%). The court a lso  re jec ted  

the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  20% red u c t i o n  a l l e g e d l y  

des igned  to  d iscount  f o r  " p a r t s  o f  i s s u e s "  on 

which p l a i n t i f f s  did not p r e va i l .  See Pe t .  App. 

18-A.

The court further found that while  the normal 

hourly f e d e r a l - l i t i g a t i o n  rate  of  $125/hr. for  

p l a i n t i f f s '  experienced ch ie f  t r i a l  counsel was 

"high f o r  o f f i c e  s e r v i c e s , "  i t  was "reasonable and 

supported both by the record and our own expe­

r ience with fees charged by lawyers o f  his expe­

r i e n c e  and l e g a l  s ta tu re  f o r  t r i a l  s e r v i c e s . "  

Pet.  App. 39-A. In response to  p l a i n t f f s '  conten­

t io n  that there was a high degree o f  contingency 

in th is  aspect of  the case because s im i lar  though 

l e s s  e x t e n s i v e  Board-proposed m o d i f i c a t i o n s  

o f  the desegregation plan had been approved over 

p l a i n t i f f s '  ob jections during each o f  the three

19a



preceding years, the court o f  appeals found that 

although "there  was a rea l  element o f  contingency 

as to whether the attorneys would be compensated 

f o r  t h e i r  s e r v i c e s  at a l l , "  the con t ingency  

element was reduced by other fac tors ,  pr imari ly  by 

the fact  that "the burden was on the Board" which 

"here was seeking to a l t e r  a f in a l  judgment o f  the 

d i s t r i c t  court  which had been a r r i v e d  at  only  

a f t e r  many years o f  b i t t e r  l i t i g a t i o n . "  Pet.  App. 

31-A. The court there fore  concluded that an award 

adjustment o f  only 10% was adequate to a r r ive  at a 

reasonable f ee  in l i g h t  o f  the contingency fac tor ,  

i d , - ^
The Board (but not the C i t y )  pe t i t ioned  the 

court o f  appeals fo r  rehearing, with suggestion 

f o r  en banc considerat ion, which was duly denied 

without dissent.

17a/ The court a lso  aff irmed the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s 
d i s p o s i t i o n  w i th  r espec t  t o  c os ts  and o u t - o f -  
pocket expenses, except fo r  the denial of  photo­
copying costs .  These issues are not be fore  the 
court. See note 17, supra.

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