McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education Transcript of Record

    TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1949

No. 34

G. W. MoLAURIN, APPELLANT,

vs.

OKLAHOMA STATE REGENTS FOR HIGHER EDU­
CATION, BOARD OF REGENTS OF UNIVERSITY 
OF OKLAHOMA, ET AL.

O N  A P P E A L  PRO M  T H E  U N IT E D  STATES D ISTRICT COURT FOR T H E  
W E ST E R N  D ISTR IC T OF O K L A H O M A

PILED MARCH 1, 1949.



SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OKLAHOMA STATE REGENTS FOR HIGHER EDU­
CATION, BOARD OF REGENTS OF UNIVERSITY

OUST A P PE A L  FR O M  T H E  U N IT E D  STATES D ISTR IC T COURT FOB T H E

OCTOBER TERM, 1949

No. 34

G. W. McLAURIN, APPELLANT,

vs.

OF OKLAHOMA, ET AL.

W E ST E R N  DISTRICT OF O K L A H O M A

INDEX
Original Print

Record from United States District Cpurt for the Western
District of Oklahoma .......................................   1 1

Complaint ................................................................................  1 1
Motion for preliminary injunction..................................... 14 10
Order convening three-judge court..................................... 17 12
Answer .....................................................................................  18 12
Proceedings of August 23, 1948........................................... 27 19
Agreed statement of facts..................................................... 28 19
Order reassigning ease........................................................... 32 22
Reporter’s transcript of trial proceedings, September

29, 1948 ...............................................................................  33 22
Appearances ...................................................................  33 22
Colloquy between Court and counsel........................... 35 23
Ruling of the Court....................................................... 38 25
Defendant’s Exhibit 1— Letter dated September 

27, 1948 from Governor of Oklahoma to District
Court ........................................................................... 41 26

Findings of fact and conclusions of law............................  47 31
Journal entry of judgment................................................... 54 34

Judd & Detweiler ( I nc.), Printers, W ashington, D. C., Nov. 18,1949.

— 5263



INDEX

Record from United States District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma— Continued Original Piint

Motion of plaintiff to modify order and judgment. . . .  57 35
Proceedings o f October 25, 1948....................................  61 39
Findings of fact and conclusions of law........................  62 39
Journal entry of judgment..............................................  68 43
Amendment to journal entry o f judgment....................  69 44
Reporter’s transcript of trial proceedings, October 25,

1948 ................................................................................. 70 45
Appearances ........................  ..................................  7,1
Colloquy between Court and. counsel........................... 72 46
Testimony of G. W. McLaurin................................   93 58
Colloquy between Court and counsel.......................... 100 63
Colloquy re status of additional party...................... 109 68
Plaintiff’s exhibits 1-5—Photographs of classroom 150 91
Plaintiff’s exhibit 6— Copy of excerpts from min­

utes of Special Meeting of Regents of Univer­
sity of Oklahoma of October 10, 1948.................  155 97

Plaintiff’s exhibit 7— Copy of letter from Attorney 
General, State of Oklahoma, to 'G. L. Cross,
President, University of Oklahoma........................ 156 9/

Petition for appeal .............................................................. 162 103
Assignment of errors ..........................................................  167 106
Order allowing appeal ........................................................  171 108
Citation .................................... (omitted in printing) . 198
Cost bond.................................. (omitted in printing) . . 199
Stipulation as to record........................................................ 200 109
Clerk’s certificate.................... (omitted in printing).. 203

Statement of points to be relied upon and designation of
record ..........................................................................................  204 110

Order noting probable jurisdiction............................................ 205 111

ii



1

[fol. 1]
TN THE

DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

Civil No. 4039

G. W. M cLaurin, Plaintiff, 
vs.

Oklahoma State R egents for H igher E ducation, 
B oard of R egents of University of Oklahoma, 

George L. Cross, Lawrence H. Snyder 
and J. E. F ellows, Defendants

Complaint— Filed August 5, 1948
1. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 

Judicial Code, Section 24 (1) (28 U.S.C., Section 41 (1 )), 
this being a suit in equity which arises under the Constitu­
tion and laws of the United States, viz., the Fourteenth 
Amendment of said Constitution and Sections 41 and 43 of 
Title 8 of the United States Code, wherein the matter in 
controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the 
sum of $3000. The jurisdiction of this Court is also invoked 
under Judicial Code, Section 24 (14) (24 U.S.C., Section 
41 (14)), this being a suit in equity authorized by law to be 
brought to redress the deprivation under color of law, 
statute, regulation, custom and usage of a state of rights, 
privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution of 
the United States, viz., the Fourteenth Amendment to said 
Constitution, and of rights secured by laws of the United 
States providing for equal rights of citizens of the United 
[fol. 2] States and of all persons within the jurisdiction of 
the United States, viz., Sections 41 and 43 of Title 8 of 
the United States Code. The jurisdiction of this Court is 
also invoked under Judicial Code, Section 266 (28 U.S.C. 
Section 380), this being an action for an interlocutory 
injunction restraining the enforcement and execution of a 
state statute and restraining the order, policy, custom and 
usage of an administrative board of a state pursuant to 
such statute.

2. All individual parties to this action, both plaintiff and 
defendants, are citizens of the United States and of the

1—34



2

State of Oklahoma and are resident and domiciled in said 
state.

3. The plaintiff is a Negro, is over eighteen years of age 
and holds a Masters Degree from the University of Kansas 
at Lawrence, Kansas, a duly accredited college; that he is 
of good moral character and has in all particulars met the 
qualifications necessary for admission to the graduate 
school of the University of Oklahoma in the field of educa­
tion which fact the defendants have admitted; that he is 
ready, willing and able to pay all lawful charges and tuition 
requisite to his admission, and he at all times material 
herein was and is willing and able to comply with all lawful 
rules and regulations requisite to his admission therein.

4. This is a class action authorized by rule 23A of the 
Rules of Civil Procedure of the District Courts of the 
United States. The rights involved are of common and 
general interest to the members of the class represented 
by the plaintiff, namely, Negro citizens of the United States 
and residents of the State of Oklahoma similarly situated 
who are duly qualified for admission to the University of 
Oklahoma and who are denied admission solely because of 
race or color. The members of the class are so numerous 
[fol. 3] as to make it impracticable to bring them all 
before the court and for this reason plaintiff prosecutes 
this action in his own behalf and on behalf of the class with­
out specifically naming said members herein.

5. The defendant, Oklahoma State Regents for Higher 
Education is a state board created by Article 13A of the 
Constitution of Oklahoma as a “ coordinating board of 
control for all state institutions”  for higher education; the 
defendant, Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 
is an administrative board and agency of the State of Okla­
homa and exercises over-all authority with reference to the 
regulation of instruction and admission of students in the 
University and is an agency of the state operating as a part 
of the educational system of the state and maintained by 
appropriations from the public funds of the state raised 
by taxations from the citizens and taxpayers of the State 
of Oklahoma; the defendant, George L. Cross, is the duly 
appointed, qualified, and acting President of the said 
University and as such is subject to the authority of the 
said Board of Regents as an immediate agent governing



3

and controlling the several colleges and schools of the said 
University; the defendant, Lawrence H. Snyder, is the Dean 
of the Graduate College of said University whose duty 
comprises the governing of the said department, including 
the admission and acceptance of applicants eligible to enroll 
as students therein, including your plaintiff, the defendant, 
J. E. Fellows, is the Dean of Admissions and Records of the 
said University possessing authority to pass upon the 
eligibility of applicants who seek to enroll as students 
therein, including your plaintiff. All of the individual 
[fol. 4] defendants come under the authority, supervision, 
and control, and act pursuant to the orders and policies 
established by the defendant, Board of Regents of the 
University of Oklahoma; all of said individual defendants 
are being sued in their official capacity.

6. The University of Oklahoma is the only school main­
tained and operated by the State of Oklahoma which offers 
a doctorate degree in School Administration sought by the 
plaintiff; the plaintiff desires to be admitted not later than 
the next regular registration period and is ready and willing 
to pay the uniform requisite fees and conform to the lawful 
uniform rules and regulations for admission.

7. During the enrollment period of the second semester 
of the 1947-1948 school term, plaintiff duly applied for 
admission to the said University for the purpose of taking- 
such courses offered at said University as would entitle him 
to a doctorate degree in School Administration and at the 
time of his application he was possessed and still possesses 
all of the scholastic, moral and other lawful qualifications 
prescribed by the constitution and statutes of the State of 
Oklahoma, by the defendants, and each of them, and by the 
rules and regulations of the said University; that he was 
then and still is ready and willing to pay all lawful, uniform 
fees and charges and to conform to all lawful, uniform rules 
and regulations established by lawful authorities for admis­
sion to the said school; that the plaintiff’s application has 
been arbitrarily and illegally rejected pursuant to a policy, 
custom and usage of denying to qualified Negro applicants 
the equal protection of the laws solely on the ground of race 
and color.

8. The plaintiff further states that on the 2nd day of 
February, 1948, after having complied with all of the rules



4

and regulations governing the admission of students to the 
said department of the said University and even though he 
admittedly possessed all of the qualifications entitling him 
[fol. 5] to be admitted, his application for admission was 
refused and denied solely on the ground of his race and 
color, in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United 
States.

9. The defendants acting pursuant to the statutes of 
the State of Oklahoma have established and are maintaining 
an order, policy, custom and usage of denying to qualified 
Negro applicants the equal protection of the laws guaran­
teed by the Constitution of the United States by refusing 
to admit qualified Negroes solely because of race or color 
to all courses of study at the University of Oklahoma includ­
ing those courses of study available only at the University 
of Oklahoma, such as the courses desired by the plaintiff.

10. The defendants, George L. Cross, Lawrence H. 
Snyder and J. E. Fellows, refuse to act favorably upon 
plaintiff’s application and although admitting that plaintiff 
possesses all the qualifications necessary for admission to 
the said graduate school, refused and will continue to refuse 
to admit him on the grounds that the defendant, Board of 
Regents of the University of Oklahoma, has established a 
policy that Negro qualified applicants are not eligible for 
admission to the said graduate school of the University of 
Oklahoma solely because of race or color, even though the 
state has furnished no other facility or opportunity for the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed directly to the Board of 
Regents of the University of Oklahoma for admission to 
the said graduate school and such board has, so far, refused 
to act in the premises and to admit plaintiff or other quali­
fied Negroes solely because of race or color. Subsequent 
thereto, plaintiff appealed to the defendant, the Oklahoma 
State Regents for Higher Education, to be afforded 
[fol. 6] an opportunity to take the required courses at 
an institution of higher learning within the State of Okla­
homa. This appeal has likewise been refused.

11. Plaintiff is informed and believes and therefore 
avers that but for the Oklahoma statutes set out in the 
following paragraph, defendants would not have established 
and would not be maintaining the order, policy, custom and 
usage of excluding qualified applicants from attending the 
University of Oklahoma to take courses offered only at



5

that institution. The plaintiff is informed and believes and 
therefore avers that but for the Oklahoma statutes set out 
in the following paragraph the defendants would not con­
tinue to deprive the plaintiff of his rights guaranteed by 
the Constitution of the United States as set out more fully 
below.

12. The defendant, Board of Regents, have established 
and are maintaining the order, policy, custom and usage of 
excluding all qualified Negroes solely because of race and 
color from all schools, colleges, and divisions of the Univer­
sity of Oklahoma including the Graduate School of the 
University of Oklahoma pursuant to sections 455, 456 and 
457 of Title 70 of the Oklahoma statutes (1941) which 
statutes provide in part as follow’s :

That 70 O.S. 1941, Section 455 makes it a misdemeanor, 
punishable by a fine of not less than $100.00 nor more than 
$500.00, for

“ any person, corporation or association of persons to 
maintain or operate any college, school or institution of 
this State where persons of both white and colored 
races are received as pupils for instruction,”  

and provides that each day same is so maintained or 
operated “ shall be deemed a separate offense.”
[fol. 7] That 70 O.S. 1941, Section 456, makes it a mis­
demeanor, punishable by a fine of not less than $10.00 or 
more than $50.00 for any instructor to teach

“ in any school, college or institution where members 
of the white race and colored race are received and 
enrolled as pupils for instruction,”  

and provides that each day such an instructor shall continue 
to so teach “ shall be considered a separate offense.”

That 70 O.S. 1941, section 457, makes it a misdemeanor, 
punishable by a fine of not less than $5.00 nor more than 
$20.00, for

“ any white person to attend any school, college or 
institution, where colored persons are received as 
pupils for instruction,”

and provides that each day such a person so attends ‘ ‘ shall 
be deemed a distinct and separate offense.”

13. Plaintiff, and other qualified Negroes, are excluded 
from the University of Oklahoma solely because of race



6

and color pursuant to the Oklahoma Statutes set out in 
the preceding paragraph, which statutes have been, are 
being and unless redress is granted by this Court will con­
tinue to be enforced by the orders of the defendants so as 
to deny to the plaintiff and others on whose behalf he sues 
the rights guaranteed by the equal protection and due 
process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment; and section 
43 of Title 8 of the United States Code. The above named 
statutes are enforced by the defendants to exclude plaintiff 
and other qualified Negro applicants solely because of race 
and color from attending the University of Oklahoma to 
take courses of education offered only at said University.

[fol. 8] 14. The Board of Regents in adopting and en­
forcing the order, policy, custom and usage set out above 
acted and is acting under and pursuant to the statutes of 
Oklahoma as set out above. The action of the defendants 
in enforcing said order, policy, custom and usage pursuant 
to state statutes denies to the plaintiff and others similarly 
situated rights guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of 
the United States and is therefore unconstitutional and void. 
Insofar as the Statutes of Oklahoma set out above are 
applied and enforced by defendants to deprive the plaintiff 
of the right to attend the University of Oklahoma said 
statutes are unconstitutional and void as denying to plain­
tiff the equal protection and due process of law guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con­
stitution.

15. The plaintiff was denied admission to the Graduate 
School of the University of Oklahoma solely because of race 
and color for the regular midterm beginning February, 
1948. Plaintiff is informed and believes and therefore avers 
that the next regular term of the Graduate School of the 
University of Oklahoma will begin in September, 1948. 
Plaintiff’s application has not been accepted up to the 
present time and plaintiff is informed and believes and 
therefore avers that he will not be admitted to the Septem­
ber term and will continue to be excluded solely because 
of race or color pursuant to the order, policy, custom and 
usage adopted and maintained by defendants acting under 
and pursuant to the Statutes of Oklahoma unless this Court 
enjoins the enforcement of the above mentioned order, 
policy, custom and usage by the defendants. Immediate



7

and irreparable injury, loss and damage will result to 
[fol. 9] plaintiff and others on whose behalf he sues by 
reason of the enforcement, of the above mentioned order, 
policy, custom and usage as has been particularly set forth 
above.

16. The action of the defendants in adopting and main­
taining the order, policy, custom and usage complained of 
above acting under and pursuant to the Statutes of Okla­
homa set out above denies to the plaintiff and others on 
whose behalf he sues the liberty guaranteed by the Four­
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

17. The defendants by their illegal and wrongful acts 
complained of herein damaged this plaintiff in the sum of 
and to the extent of Five Thousand ($5000.00) Dollars.

18. The plaintiff and others similarly situated and af­
fected, on whose behalf this suit is brought, are suffering 
irreparable injury and are threatened with irreparable 
injury in the future by reason of the acts herein complained 
o f; they have no plain adequate or complete remedy to 
redress the wrong and illegal acts herein complained of 
other than this action for damages, and injunction; any 
other remedy to which plaintiff and those similarly situated 
could be remitted would be attended by such uncertainties 
and delays as to deny substantial relief, would involve 
multiplicity of suits, and would cause further irreparable 
injury, damage, vexation and inconvenience to the plaintiff 
and those similarly situated.

19. The defendants are enforcing and will continue to 
enforce the order, policy, custom and usage set out above 
and unless this Court issues a preliminary injunction the 
rights of plaintiff and others on whose behalf he sues to 
attend the graduate school of the University of Oklahoma 
beginning the fall term of this year, will be unprotected 
and lost.
[fol. 10] WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays the 
Court that upon filing of this complaint:

1. That this Court immediately convene a Three Judge 
Court as required by Section 266 of the Judicial Code.

2. That this Court issue a preliminary or interlocutory 
injunction restraining the defendants and each of them,



8

their agents, and employees from excluding the plaintiff 
and others on whose behalf he sues from admission to 
courses offered only at the graduate schools of the Univer­
sity of Oklahoma solely because of race and color.

3. That this Court issue a preliminary or interlocutory 
injunction restraining the defendants and each of them, 
their agents, and employees from enforcing and maintaining 
the order, policy, custom and usage adopted pursuant to 
sections 455, 456 and 457 of the Oklahoma Statutes of 1941 
whereby the plaintiff and other qualified Negro applicants 
are excluded from admission to courses offered only at the 
graduate schools of the University of Oklahoma solely 
because of race and color.

4. That this Court issue a preliminary or interlocutory 
injunction restraining the defendants and each of them, 
their agents, and employees from all action pursuant to 
sections 455, 456 and 457 of the Oklahoma Statutes of 1941 
which preclude the admission of the plaintiff and other 
qualified Negroes to courses offered only at the graduate 
schools of the University of Oklahoma solely because of 
race and color on the grounds that said statutes as applied 
to this plaintiff and others on whose behalf he sues denies 
to them the rights guaranteed by the equal protection and 
due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and sections 41 and 43 of Title 8 
of the United States Code.
[fol. 11] 5. That this Court issue a permanent injunction
restraining the defendants and each of them, their agents, 
and employees from excluding the plaintiff and others on 
whose behalf he sues from admission to courses offered only 
at the graduate schools of the University of Oklahoma 
solely because of race and color.

6. That this Court issue a permanent injunction re­
straining the defendants and each of them, their agents, 
and employees from enforcing and maintaining the order, 
policy, custom and usage adopted pursuant to sections 455, 
456 and 457 of the Oklahoma Statutes of 1941 whereby the 
plaintiff and other qualified Negro applicants are excluded 
from admission to courses offered only at the graduate



9

schools of the University of Oklahoma solely because of 
race and color.

7. That this Court issue a permanent injunction re­
straining the defendants and each of them, their agents, 
and employees from all action pursuant to sections 455, 
456 and 457 of the Oklahoma Statutes of 1941 which pre­
clude the admission of the plaintiff and other qualified 
Negroes to courses offered only at the graduate schools 
of the University of Oklahoma solely because of race and 
color on the grounds that said statutes as applied to this 
plaintiff and others on whose behalf he sues denies to them 
the rights guaranteed by the equal protection and due 
process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the liberty 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and sections 41 and 43 of Title 8 of the 
United States Code.

8. That the plaintiff have judgment for Five Thousand 
($5000.00) Dollars damages.

[fols. 12-13] 9. That this Court will allow such costs
herein, and such further, other additional or alternative 
relief as may appear to the Court to be just and equitable in 
the premises.

Amos T. Hall, 107% N. Greenwood Avenue, Tulsa, 
Oklahoma; Tliurgood Marshall, 20 West 40th 
Street, New York, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

Duly sworn to by G. W. McLaurin. Jurat omitted in 
printing.



10

ffol. 14] In U nited States D istrict Court

Motion for P reliminary I njunction—Filed Aug. 5, 1948

Plaintiff, GL W. McLaurin, moves the Court for a pre­
liminary injunction in the above-entitled cause, enjoining 
the defendants, their agents, servants, employees, attorneys, 
and all persons in active concert or participation with them, 
pending the final hearing and determination of this cause, 
from

1. Excluding the plaintiff and others on whose behalf 
he sues from admission to courses offered only at the 
graduate schools of the University of Oklahoma solely 
because of race and color;

2. Enforcing and maintaining the order, policy, custom 
and usage adopted pursuant to Sections 455, 456 and 457 
of the Oklahoma Statutes of 1941 whereby the plaintiff 
and other qualified Negro applicants are excluded from 
admission to courses offered only at the graduate schools 
of the University of Oklahoma solely because of race and 
color;

3. All action pursuant to Sections 455, 456 and 457 of 
the Oklahoma Statutes of 1941 which preclude the ad­
mission of the plaintiff and other qualified Negroes to 
courses offered only at the graduate schools of the Uni­
versity of Oklahoma solely because of race and color on 
the grounds that said statutes as applied to this plaintiff 
and others on whose behalf he sues denies to them the 
rights guaranteed by the equal protection and due process 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the liberty guaran­
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Sections 41 and 43 of Title 8 of the United 
States Code.

The grounds in support of this motion are as follows:
1. Unless restrained the defendants will continue to 

exclude the plaintiff and others on whose behalf he sues 
from admission to courses offered only at the graduate 
schools of the University of Oklahoma solely because of 
race and color; and will continue enforcing and maintaining 
[fol. 15] the order, policy, custom and usage adopted



11

pursuant to Sections 455, 456 and 457 of the Oklahoma 
Statutes of 1941 whereby the plaintiff and other qualified 
Negro applicants are excluded from admission to the 
graduate schools of the University of Oklahoma solely 
because of race and color; .
. 2. Immediate and irreparable injury, loss, and damage 
will result to plaintiff by reason of the action of defendants 
in excluding plaintiff and others similarly situated from 
the next session of the graduate schools of the University 
of Oklahoma which begins in September 1948;

3. If defendant continues to exclude the plaintiff and 
others on whose behalf he sues from admission to the 
graduate schools of the University of Oklahoma solely 
because of race and color, and continues to enforce and 
maintain the order, policy, custom and usage adopted 
pursuant to Sections 455, 456 and 457 of the Oklahoma 
Statutes of 1941 whereby the plaintiff and other qualified 
Negro applicants are excluded from admission to the 
graduate schools of the University of Oklahoma solely 
because of race and color, any judgment which this Court 
may later render on final determination of this cause will 
be ineffective;

4. If this preliminary injunction be granted, the injury, 
if any, to defendant herein, if final judgment be in his 
favor, will be inconsiderable and will be adequately in­
demnified by bond.

Amos T. Hall, 107V2 N. Greenwood Ave., Tulsa, Okla­
homa; Thurgood Marshall, 20 West 40 Street, New 
York, Attorneys for Plaintiff.



12

Notice of Motion for Preliminary I njunction

T o : Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education; 
Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma 
George L. Cross, Lawrence H. Snyder and J. E. 
Fellows
Please take notice that the undersigned will bring the 

above motion for a preli»i-ary injunction on for hearing 
before this Court at United States Courts and Post Office 
[fol. 16] Building, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma on the 23 
day of Aug., 1948 at 10: A. M. o ’clock of that day or as 
soon thereafter as counsel can be heard.
Date

Amos T. Hall, 107% N. Greenwood Ave., Tulsa, Okla­
homa; Thurgood Marshall, 20 West 40th Street, 
New York, N. Y., Attorneys for Plaintiff.

[fol. 17]
I n the U nited States D istrict Court 

Order Convening T hree J udge Court— Aug. 6, 1948
It appearing from the complaint filed in this cause that 

the constitutionality of a state statute is involved, and the 
plaintiff having prayed for a three-judge hearing, as pro­
vided by Section 266 of the Judicial Code, the cause is set 
for hearing on the application for a preliminary injunction, 
August 23, 1948 at 10:00 A. M., and Judge Alfred P. 
Murrah, of the Circuit Court of Appeals, and Judge Bower 
Broaddus, District Judge in this District, are called to sit 
with the undersigned District Judge in the hearing of said 
matters.

Dated this 6th day of August, 1948.
Edgar S. Vaught, United States District Judge.

[fol. 18] I n the D istrict Court of the U nited States, 
W estern D istrict of Oklahoma

[Title omitted]
A nswer— Filed Aug. 23,1948

Come now the above defendants and in answer to the 
complaint filed herein, allege and state:

1. The complaint fails to state a claim against defend­
ants upon which relief can be granted.



13

2. The court, in so far as the cause of action in the 
complaint seeking to recover damages against defendants 
in the sum of $5,000.00 is concerned, lacks jurisdiction not 
only over the subject matter of said cause of action but over 
the person of defendants in relation thereto, because said 
cause of action is in reality, if not in name, a suit against 
the State of Oklahoma to which the state has not given its 
consent.

3. The court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter 
of this action and over the person of defendants because the 
amount in controversy is less than $3,000.00, exclusive of 
interest and costs.

4. The court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter 
of this action and over the person of defendants because 
said action, in effect, seeks to mandamus defendants to 
admit plaintiff to the course of instruction set forth in his 
complaint.
[fol. 19] 5. Defendants deny that this court has juris­
diction of this cause as is in effect asserted in Paragraph 1 
of the complaint.

6. Defendants admit the material allegations of fact set 
forth in Paragraph 2 of the complaint.

7. Defendants admit the material allegations of fact set 
for in Paragraph 3 of the complaint, except the allegation 
that plaintiff has “ in all particulars met the qualifications 
necessary for admission to the Graduate School of the 
University of Oklahoma in the field of education, which fact 
the defendants have admitted,”  and in this connection 
allege that while plaintiff is scholastically and morally 
qualified for “ tentative admission”  to said school in said 
field (and, upon the furnishing of certain transcripts of 
credits, to unqualified admission thereto), he does not have 
the qualifications necessary for admission to said school in 
said field by reason of the statutory provisions of this state 
abstracted in Paragraph 12 of the complaint. In relation 
to the “ furnishing of certain transcripts of credits,”  above 
mentioned, defendants further allege that when plaintiff 
on January 28, 1948 filed the application referred to in 
Paragraph 7 of the complaint for admission “ to the grad­
uate school of the University of Oklahoma in the field of 
education”  (same being refused and rejected on February



14

2, 1948, as alleged in said paragraph), which application 
stated that plaintiff had attended Langston University, 
Jackson College, Kansas State Teachers College and the 
University of Kansas, plaintiff failed to attach to said 
application transcripts of his credits at said institutions 
(other than at Langston University), as required by the 
rules and regulations of the University of Oklahoma, whi 
failure, although then called by said authorities to the 
attention of plaintiff, was not then, nor has since been 
remedied.

8. Defendants deny the material allegations of fact, if 
any, and the conclusions of law set forth in Paragraph 4 
[fol. 20] of the complaint, and in this connection allege 
that if this is a class action, as contended by plaintiff in said 
paragraph, the only persons coming within said class are 
negroes qualified to take a course of instruction given at 
the University of Oklahoma, but not given at Langston 
University, to take which a qualified negro duly applied 
for admission to the University of Oklahoma on or about 
January 28, 1948, the date of plaintiff’s application.

9. Defendants admit the material allegations of fact set 
forth in Paragraph 5 of the complaint.

10. Defendants admit the material allegations of fact 
set forth in Paragraph 6 of the complaint.

11. Defendants admit the material allegations of fact 
set forth in Paragraph 7 of the complaint, except the allega­
tion that plaintiff possessed and still possesses all “ other 
lawful qualifications’ ’ for admission to the course of 
instruction of the University of Oklahoma referred to 
therein, and the allegation that plaintiff’s application for 
admission to said course was “ arbitrarily and illegally”  
rejected.

12. Defendants admit the material allegations of fact 
set forth in Paragraph 8 of the complaint, subject to the 
exceptions noted in Paragraph 11 hereof.

13. Defendants admit the material allegations of fact 
set forth in Paragraph 9 of the complaint, but deny the 
conclusions of law set forth therein. In this connection 
defendants allege that up until January 28, 1948, the date 
of the application involved here, only one qualified negro, 
Ada Lois Sipuel, had applied for and been denied admission



15

to the University of Oklahoma, and that there has been 
no such applications filed with said University since said 
date.

14. Defendants admit the material allegations of fact 
relating to the defendants, Board of Regents of the Univer­
sity of Oklahoma, George L. Cross, Lawrence H. Snyder 
[fol. 21] and J. E. Fellows, set forth in Paragraph 10 
of the complaint, and specifically allege that said defend­
ants, on February 2,1948, acted upon plaintiff’s application 
of January 28, 1948 for admission to the University of 
Oklahoma by rejecting the same, as stated in Paragraph 7 
of the complaint. Defendants further allege that wdien an 
application, such as is involved here, has been refused or 
rejected by the proper authorities of the University, same, 
according to the rules and regulations of the University, 
is put in what is known as the “ Inactive F ile”  and is not 
further considered by said authorities unless and until the 
applicant, either in writing or orally, requests them to 
reactivate the same, at which time, before the application 
will be reactivated and again considered by said authorities, 
the applicant is required to furnish a statement as to 
whether or not he has attended any institution of higher 
education since he filed said application, and if so, to fur­
nish a transcript of his grades and standing thereat, and 
in this connection defendants allege that, although said 
rules and regulations were by said authorities on January 
28, 1948 called to the attention of plaintiff, no such request 
has been made by plaintiff since his said application was 
rejected on February 2,1948.

Defendants admit the material allegations of fact relat­
ing to the defendant, Oklahoma State Regents for Higher 
Education, set forth in the last two sentences of said 
Paragraph 10, to-wit: that plaintiff appealed to said regents 
“ to be afforded an opportunity to take the required courses 
in an institution of higher learning within the State of 
Oklahoma”  and that said appeal has not been granted, 
and in this connection allege that the position of said 
regents in the premises, as stated thereby in a letter to the 
Attorney General of Oldahoma, dated August 17, 1948, is 
as follows:
[fol. 22] “ On or about January 28, 1948, the Oklahoma 

State Regents for Higher Education received notice 
of the January 28, 1948 application of the above

2— 34



16

plaintiff [G. W. McLaurin], a negro, as well as notice 
of the applications of five other negroes of said date, 
to attend certain graduate courses of instruction at 
the University of Oklahoma for the semester begin­
ning January 29, 1948. While said courses of instruc­
tion are not given at Langston University (the only 
institution of higher education in Oklahoma for 
negroes), said Regents, by reason of the fact that 
they did not then, nor since, have sufficient appropri­
ations to establish said courses of instruction, nor any 
other course of instruction now given at the University 
of Oklahoma but not given at Langston University, 
have not established, nor begun to establish, at or in 
connection with Langston University, courses of in­
struction such as are above referred to. In this 
connection said Regents cannot establish such courses 
of instruction at or in connection with Langston Uni­
versity, unless and until they receive a sufficient ap­
propriation from our State Legislature to establish 
such courses of instruction ‘ substantially equal’ to 
like courses of instruction at the University of 
Oklahoma.”

15. Defendants admit the material, but not the specula­
tive, allegations of fact set forth in Paragraph 11 of the 
complaint, but deny that the “ order, policy, custom and 
usage,”  referred to therein, deprives plaintiff of rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.

16. Defendants admit the material allegations of fact 
set forth in Paragraph 12 of the complaint.

17. Defendants admit the material allegations of fact, 
if any, set forth in Paragraph 13 of the complaint, but deny 
the conclusions of law set forth therein.

18. Defendants admit the material allegations of fact, 
if any, set forth in Paragraph 14 of the complaint, but deny 
the conclusions of law set forth therein.

19. Defendants admit the material allegations of fact 
set forth in Paragraph 15 of the complaint, except the 
allegation set forth in the last sentence of said paragraph. 
Defendants allege that the “ next regular term of the 
graduate school of the University of Oklahoma,”  referred



17

to in said paragraph, will begin on Monday, September 20, 
1948.
[fol. 23] 20. Defendants deny the conclusions of law set
forth in Paragraph 16 of the complaint.

21. Defendants deny the material allegations of fact 
set forth in Paragraph 17 of the complaint.

22. Defendants deny the material allegations of fact, 
if any, and the conclusions of law set forth in Paragraph 18 
of the complaint.

23. Defendants admit the material allegations of fact, 
but not the conclusions of law, set forth in Paragraph 19 
of the complaint.

24. Defendants allege and admit that on January 28, 
1948, the last day of the regular registration period for 
the semester of the University of Oklahoma beginning 
January 29, 1948 and ending May 28, 1948 (same being the 
“ second semester of the 1947-48 school term”  of said 
University referred to in Paragraph 7 of the complaint), 
the plaintiff, Gf. W. McLaurin, a negro, who was then and 
there qualified, except as to race and color, to take a 
graduate course in the field of education leading to a 
doctorate degree in Oklahoma University, same being a 
state-supported institution for higher education, duly ap­
plied for admission (subject to the exception as to “ tenta­
tive admission”  referred to in Paragraph 7 hereof) to said 
University to take said course of instruction, and that on 
February 2, 1948, plaintiff’s said application was rejected 
by the proper authorities of the University of Oklahoma 
solely on the ground of his race and color.

25. Defendants allege and admit that the University of 
Oklahoma “ is the only school maintained and operated by 
the state which offers a doctorate degree”  in education, as 
stated in Paragraph 6 of the complaint, but allege that 
plaintiff’s application to take said course of instruction 
was the first and only such application ever made by a 
negro, either at the enrollment period of said “ second 
[fol. 24] semester of the 1947-48 school term”  or at the 
enrollment period of any other semester of said University, 
and that plaintiff’s said application was not made until 
the day before said course of instruction for said second 
semester began.



18

26. Defendants allege that if in a state, such as Oklahoma, 
having laws (70 0. S. 1941 §§ 455, 456 and 457, abstracted 
in Paragraph 12 of the complaint) requiring segregation 
of the white and negro races in education, there is a state 
agency which is under the mandatory duty to furnish sepa­
rate educational facilities for qualified negroes substantially 
equal to those furnished whites when the need therefor by 
qualified negroes is brought to its attention, the equal pro­
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Con­
stitution of the United States is not violated if during a 
period of time reasonably necessary to establish such 
facilities the proper authorities of the educational institu­
tion for the whites decline to admit applying qualified 
negroes thereto.

27. Defendants allege that the Oklahoma State Regents 
for Higher Education, as held by the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma in its opinion in the two Sipuel cases (180 Pac. 
2d. 135 and 190 Pac. 2d. 437), have such a mandatory duty.

28. Defendants allege that, as shown in the latter part 
of Paragraph 14 hereof, the defendant, Oklahoma State 
Regents for Higher Education, will not be able to establish 
a “ substantially equal”  course of instruction at or in con­
nection with Langston University to that involved here, 
that is, until they receive a sufficient appropriation from 
our state legislature to establish the same, and since said 
legislature will not convene until January 4, 1948, unless 
convened in a prior special session by the Governor, at 
which time it must be presumed the legislature will make 
such an appropriation and thereby enable the regents to 
carry out their said mandatory duty, defendants allege that 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
[fols. 25-26] of the Constitution of the United States will not 
be violated if until the time the legislature will be able to 
make said appropriation and the regents to thereon perform 
their said mandatory duty, the proper authorities of the 
University of Oklahoma decline to admit applying qualified 
negroes thereto.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants respect­
fully ask the court to deny plaintiff the relief prayed for in



19

the complaint, and that the costs of this action be taxed 
to plaintiff.

Mac Q. Williamson, Attorney General; Fred Hansen, 
First Assistant Attorney General; George T. Mont­
gomery, Assistant Attorney General, Attorneys for 
Defendants.

Duly sworn to by George L. Cross. Jurat omitted in 
printing.

[fol. 27] Isr U nited States D istrict Court, 
P roceedings of A ugust 23,1948.

Before J udges Murrah, V aught and Broaddus

On this 23rd day of August, 1948, the parties appear in 
person and by their respective counsel and this cause comes 
on for hearing on the application of plaintiff for prelimi­
nary injunction. Counsel for the defendants raise the 
question of service, waives insufficiency thereof, and enters 
appearance on behalf of each of the defendants. The plain­
tiff asks and is granted leave to dismiss Paragraph 17 of 
complaint and Paragraph 8 of the prayer thereof, and to 
waive all claim for damages herein. The defendants are 
granted leave to file their answer instanter. Counsel for 
the plaintiff and the defendants make opening statements 
of fact and state their respective contentions. The de­
fendants announce that they will stand on their answer 
and the stipulation of facts, and rest. Counsel for the 
plaintiff and defendant present their arguments on the 
law and said cause is submitted to the court for determi­
nation. Thereupon, ruling on said motion for preliminary 
injunction is taken under advisement and said cause is 
assigned for hearing on its merits and for final determi­
nation on Friday, September 24, 1948, at 10:00 A. M.

[fol. 28] In the D istrict Court of the United States, 
W estern District of Oklahoma 

[Title omitted]
A greed Statement of F acts—Filed Aug. 23,1948 

It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the 
plaintiff and the defendants, through their respective 
counsel, as follows:



20

1.

That the plaintiff is a resident and citizen of the United 
States, the State of Oklahoma, Oklahoma Connty and Okla­
homa City, and desires to take a graduate course in Educa­
tion leading to the Doctors degree.

2.
That Oklahoma University is a part of the educational 

system of the State of Oklahoma maintained hy the tax­
payers of the state from funds derived from taxation placed 
upon all of the taxpayers; that it is the only institution in 
the state supported by taxation in which the plaintiff can 
pursue a graduate course in Education leading to the Doc­
tors degree.

3.
That during the enrollment period of the second semester 

of the 1947-1948 school term, he duly applied for admission 
to the said university for the purpose of taking such course 
[fol. 29] as would entitle him to a Doctors degree in 
Education, and at the time of his application he was 
possessed and still possesses all of the scholastic and moral 
qualifications prescribed by the rules and regulations of the 
university entitling him to be admitted, except for the fact 
that he is a member of the Negro race.

4.
That he has complied with all of the rules and regulations 

of the said university entitling him to “ tentative admis­
sion”  to the graduate school of the university in the field 
of education, and, upon the furnishing of certain transcripts 
of credits, to unqualified admission thereto, and is willing 
and able to pay all lawful, uniform fees and charges of 
the university.

5.
_ That the defendant, the Board of Regents of the Univer­

sity of Oklahoma, is an administrative agency of the state 
and exercises over-all authority with reference to the regu­
lation and instruction and admission of students to the 
university. It is an agency of the state operating as a part 
of the educational system of the state and is maintained by 
appropriations from public funds raised by taxation from 
the citizens and taxpayers of the state.



21

That on the 28th day of January, 1948, same being the 
last day of the enrollment period for the semester beginning 
January 29, 1948, after having complied in the manner set 
forth in Paragraph 4 hereof with the rules and regulations 
of the university, he applied for admission to the said school 
and on the 2nd day of February, 1948, his application was 
denied solely on the grounds of his race and color,

7.
[fols. 30-31] That the failure of plaintiff to request reactiva­
tion of his January 28, 1948 application at or prior to the 
beginning of the 1948 summer term of the University of 
Oklahoma, will not prevent him from having said applica­
tion reactivated, by complying with the applicable rules 
and regulations of the university, during the enrollment 
period for the fall term of the University beginning Septem­
ber 20,1948.

8.
That if the plaintiff, being otherwise qualified for admis­

sion to the said university, applies during the enrollment 
period for admission to the fall term of the university, 
defendants, pursuant to the statutes set out in Paragraph 11 
of plaintiff’s complaint, that is, if said statutes have not 
then been repealed or modified, would deny his application 
solely because of his race and color.

Amos T. Hall, Attorney for Plaintiff. Mac Q. W il­
liamson, Attorney General of Oklahoma; Fred 
Hansen, First Assistant Attorney General; George 
T. Montgomery, Assistant Attorney General, At­
torneys for Defendants.

6.



22

[fol. 32] I n U nited States District Court

Order R eassigning Case— Sept. 21,1948 
Before Judges Murrah, Vaught & Broaddus

On this 21st day of September, 1948, it is ordered by the 
Court that this cause be re-assigned for trial on merits and 
for final determination from Friday, September 24, 1948 
to Wednesday, September 29, 1948, at 10:00 A. M.

[fol. 33]
I n the United States D istrict Court for the 

W estern D istrict of Oklahoma

No. 4039 (Civil)
0. W. M cLaurin, Plaintiff:

vs.
Oklahoma State R egents for H igher E ducation, et al.,

Defendants.
R eporter’s Transcript of Trial P roceedings 

B efore:
T he H onorable A lfred P. Murrah,

Judge of the United States Court of Appeals; 
T he H onorable E dgar S. V aught,

United States District Judge for the Western 
District of Oklahoma;

T he H onorable B ower B roaddus,
United States District Judge for the Northern, 
Eastern and Western Districts of Oklahoma.

R eporter’s Transcript of Proceedings

In the United States Court House and Post 
Office Building, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; 

September 29, 1948.
A ppearances:

For the Plaintiff:
A mos T. H all,

107% North Greenwood,
Tulsa, Oklahoma.

T iturgood Marshall,
20 West 40th Street,
New York, New York.



23

[fol. 34]
For the Defendant:

H onorable Mac Q. W illiamson, 
Attorney General, State of Oklahoma, 
State Capitol Building,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

[fol. 35] Proceedings

September 29, 1948
Colloquy Between Court and Counsel

Mr. Williamson: May it please your Honors, I desire at 
this time to offer for the record a carbon original of a 
letter—I believe that this is a copy, an exact copy, a signed 
copy of a four-page letter, which was written by the Gov­
ernor of this State, Honorable Roy J. Turner, directed to 
the three judges here by name, and which endeavors to 
reflect the views and policy of the Head of the government 
of this State with regard to the litigation at hand, and with 
regard to what conceivably ought to be done about it by the 
State.

I took the liberty to ask the Governor to write the letter, 
thinking that it was not inappropriate that this Court 
might have word from the Chief Executive of a sovereign 
state as to the policy, as to how the State felt, its responsible 
heads felt, about the issue; and for that reason the letter 
was written and has been delivered by mail to each of the 
gentlemen composing this three-judge court.

Now, because we deem the letter of sufficient relevancy 
to challenge at least the passing attention of the Court, I 
now move that it be admitted in the record as part of the 
record in this case, and I ’d like to offer it to the Clerk for 
identification as Defendant’s Exhibit 1.

(The letter from the Governor was identified by the 
[fol. 36] Court Clerk as Defendant’s Exhibit 1.)

Judge Murrah: The Court understands that counsel for 
the plaintiff has seen the proffered exhibit. What do you 
say?

Mr. Marshall: We were given a copy of the exhibit and 
we do not object to the authenticity or any of the technical 
objections to the letter, but we, of course, reserve the right 
as to its relevancy in this particular matter.

Judge Murrah: And you do object to its admission on 
the grounds of irrelevancy?



24

Mr. Marshall: Only on the grounds of its relevancy, as 
I said.

Judge Murrah: That is very fair. It will be admitted and 
made a part of the record in this case.

(Defendant’s Exhibit 1 was received in evidence.)
Mr. Williamson: Now if it please the Court, one other 

matter—two other matters—that I would like to call to the 
attention of the Court: One of them was a statement which 
I made in the first hearing in this matter to the effect that 
I was not entirely sure that I had formal authority to repre­
sent the Regents for Higher Education, as well as the 
Board of Regents of Oklahoma University. The Court 
will remember, no doubt, that I made the observation that 
the service was far from complete in my humble judgment 
and, notwithstanding that, the case proceeded, and I as- 
[fol. 37] sumed the duty and burden of obtaining from 
each Board a resolution, and I now wish to state for the 
record that each of those constitutional State boards has 
by resolution duly entered in the respective minutes 
authorized the Attorney General to be here and speak for 
them and represent them, though not individually.

Judge Murrah: Enter the appearance for the Board.
Mr. Williamson: Indeed.
Judge Murrah: For each Board.
Mr. Williamson: Yes, sir.
Judge Murrah: And to represent them in this Court.
Mr. Williamson: So that we understand the Boards are 

here properly. Now, one other matter that I would like to 
call to the attention of the Court: There was some dis­
cussion in the other hearing about the precise quality of 
the record, that is, the scholastic record of the plaintiff 
here, McLaurin. The Court will recall there were certain 
details that needed to be supplied, details as to the character 
of work he had received, and of that nature. The Court 
will recall there was some colloquy back and forth across 
the table and it was agreed that those matters that were 
not in order would be furnished. I now desire to state for 
the record that since the adjournment of the former hear­
ing, plaintiff McLaurin has supplied the needed and 
necessary detail in order to round out his application for 
admission to the School of Education, leading to a doctorate 
[fol. 38] in that School, so that the record may show our 
admission that his credentials have been put in order.



25

Judge Murrah: Anv further statement?
Mr. Hall: That’s all.
Mr. Marshall: No, sir, that’s all.
Judge Murrah: May the case close!
Mr. Williamson: The case may close.

R uling of the Court
Judge Murrah: The Court adopts the stipulation in this 

case as the facts, and so finds.
Based upon those facts, the Court holds that the plaintiff 

in this case is entitled to secure legal education.
Mr. Williamson: I don’t believe it is legal education.
Judge Murrah: Doctors education—I beg pardon—en­

titled to secure postgraduate education in this State by a 
state institution. The Court further holds that to this time 
he has been denied that right, although application has 
been duly made therefor during the same period these 
particular educational facilities have been afforded by 
the State to other groups.

The Court further holds that the State is under the 
constitutional duty to provide this plaintiff with the edu­
cation he seeks as soon as it does for applicants of any 
other group. That is the settled law, made applicable and 
apposite to this case.
[fol. 39] The Court further holds that in so far as the 
statutes of the State of Oklahoma drawn in issue here deny 
or deprive this plaintiff of admission to the University of 
Oklahoma for the purpose of pursuing the course he seeks 
to pursue there, are unconstitutional and void. Now that 
does not mean, of course, that these laws cannot be made 
to stand, with the power of the State to provide equal 
segregated facilities, provided that those facilities are 
equal and that they are afforded as soon as they are 
afforded to any other group.

Now our attention has been called, and we have seen 
a statement of the Governor of this State, in which he 
commits the State to a certain course of action designed to 
afford, to comply, with the constitutional mandate. In that 
connection, we think it appropriate for the Court to state 
that it is not our function to say what the State shall do 
in order to comply with its acknowledged responsibility to 
its citizens. Rather, it is our function to say whether what 
has been done or is being done meets the constitutional 
mandate.



26

In the performance of this important function, we sit 
as a court of equity with power to fashion our decree in 
accordance with right and justice under the law. Accord­
ingly we refrain at this time from issuing or granting in­
junctive relief on the assumption that the State will follow 
the law in the constitutional mandate.
[fol. 40] We retain jurisdiction of this case, however, 
with full power to issue such further orders and decrees 
as may be deemed necessary and proper to secure this 
plaintiff the equal protection of the laws, which, translated 
into terms of this lawsuit, means equal facilities—excuse 
me—equal educational facilities.

We therefore recess this case at this time, with the 
understanding that either party may apply for further 
relief consistently with the pleadings in the ease.

Anything further? You understand, gentlemen? That 
will be the judgment of this Court.

Mr. Williamson: I would like to request of the Reporter 
to transcribe a copy as soon as convenient.

Judge Murrah: We will prepare a formal judgment and 
decree in accordance with this forthwith, or within the 
next few days, but that is the judgment of this Court, and 
judgment entered as of this date.

Any comment, anything further?
Mr. Williamson: No, sir.
Mr. Marshall: That’s all.
(Whereupon, the proceedings in the above-styled cause 

were adjourned.)
CHARGES:
Plaintiff billed $6.40 
Defendant billed $6.40

(Daily copy rate)

[fol. 41] Defendant’s E xhibit 1
Mac Q. W illiamson 

Attorney General
State of Oklahoma

Office of the Attorney General, Oklahoma City 
September 28,1948 

Honorable Edgar S. Vaught 
United States District Judge 
Federal Building 
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma



27

E E : McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Board 
of Higher Education, et al.,
No. 4329, U. S. District Court for 
the Western District of Oklahoma

My dear sir :
Since our conference with the three members of the 

Court and opposing counsel, had in chambers at the con­
clusion of the formal presentation of argument herein on 
August 23rd and in view of comment there made, I have 
conceived the idea that it would not be inappropriate for 
the Court (as well as for all concerned) to have from the 
Governor of the State of Oklahoma a narrative statement 
as to his official views and policy in this controversy, which 
is fraught with such wide-spread interest in and to the 
State and its people.

Hence, I have taken the liberty to request, and the 
Governor has prepared, such a statement; and I am here­
with enclosing three signed copies of same, for the respec­
tive members of the Court, and would thank you to pass 
copies on to the other judges, retaining one for yourself.

Inasmuch as the Court re-convenes on Wednesday morn­
ing, September 29th (which is now a matter of hours), I 
am retaining in my files and will at Wednesday’s session 
personally present copies thereof to opposing counsel.

Very respectfully, Mac Q. Williamson, Attorney 
General of Oklahoma.

MQW :LW

[fol. 42]
B oy J. T uknee 

Governor
State of Oklahoma 

Office of the Governor 
Oklahoma City 

September 27, 1948 
Honorable A. P. Murrah, Judge,
U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
Honorable Edgar S. Vaught, Judge,
U. S. District Court for the Western District,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,.



28

Honorable Brower Broaddus, Judge,
U. S. District Court for the Western District,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

In re : McLaurin vs. Oklahoma State Board 
of Higher Education, et al., No. 
4239, U. S. District Court for the 
Western District of Oklahoma.

Gentlemen:
The Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma has re­

quested that I, as the Governor of the State, present in 
writing my views of the State’s policy with reference to 
the above case now pending in your court. Pursuant 
thereto I am pleased to submit the following statement.

The State’s position in the McLauren action was: That 
it was not aware of the desires of this plaintiff, or of any 
other person of African blood for instruction in the desired 
courses until January 28, 1948, and that it should have a 
reasonable time to provide such a course of study upon a 
separate but equal basis, or that it should have a reasonable 
time to amend its existing laws in such manner as to offer 
the desired courses in existing State institutions.

The State Statutes, of course, prevent the governing 
authorities from offering or permitting mixed classes, and 
also prevent faculty members from teaching mixed classes, 
and also prevent white students from attending a school 
or participating in a course of study where mixed classes 
are permitted. Neither the administrative officials, the 
[fol. 43] instructors, nor the students could have been 
expected to violate these express provisions of the Statutes.

From the statements made and the questions pro­
mulgated by this Court it is apparent that the State is faced 
with four alternatives:

(a) To do nothing about the matter and await the de­
cision of this Court;

(b) To establish separate schools offering equal educa­
tional facilities to colored students;

(c) To discontinue those courses of study in schools of 
higher education for the white race that are not offered 
to members of the colored race;

(d) To convoke the Legislature in special session to 
amend the existing State Statutes in such manner that this 
plaintiff and members of the colored race may receive 
courses of study in schools of higher education where such



29

courses are desired but not offered in separate schools 
for the colored race.

The first alternative would have the effect of abrogating 
the segregation laws of the State of Oklahoma relating to 
higher education that have been in effect and have been 
a policy of this State since 1909. It would have a much 
more far reaching effect than is contemplated or required 
by the Constitution of the United States.

The second alternative would require approximately 
$10,000,000 to provide such an educational institution, and 
it would require approximately $500,000 per year to main­
tain. It would require years to complete. It is questionable 
whether or not it could be adequately staffed with colored 
instructors. When and if such an institution is completed 
and staffed, it would serve a mere handful of students. It 
is impractical, and is beyond the State’s present financial 
ability.

The third alternative is a backward step that the State 
of Oklahoma cannot accept.

In my opinion, the fourth alternative is the answer to 
our problem. This is primarily a problem to be adjusted 
by the people and their duly authorized representatives, 
[fob 44] When the present action was instituted on 
August 5, 1948, I hesitated to call a special session of the 
Legislature. We had just concluded a primary election 
which resulted in the selection of sixty-two new House 
members out of a total of one hundred fifteen, and the 
selection of nine new Senate members out of a total of 
twenty-two. Thus, out of a total of 137 legislative seats 
to be filled, the July primaries actually furnished seventy- 
one new members of the Legislature. I feel that the people 
are entitled to adjust the problem through their newly 
chosen representatives. The general election may result 
in further changes. It will be held on November 2, 1948. 
The newly elected members of the Legislature may qualify 
fifteen days later. On or after November 18, 1948, the 
Legislature could be summoned into special session if the 
exigencies of the situation demand such action.

Let me point out, however, that the legislative body 
should be entitled to a few days notice of such special 
session. It would require a few days to organize itself 
properly. Its deliberations and actions would be inter­
rupted and impaired by the intervening Thanksgiving,



30

Christmas and New Year’s holidays. I know that if the 
State is allowed to pursue the fourth alternative above, that 
this plaintiff, as well as other members of his class, are 
entitled to immediate action; but, as a matter of fact, if 
the matter is deferred until November 18, this plaintiff 
will secure no greater benefit that he would secure by 
awaiting the general session of the Legislature. The second 
semester in Oklahoma schools of higher education com­
mences on January 31, 1948. Enrollments are permitted 
until February 23, 1949. A special session of the Legis­
lature during the month of November, and the amendment 
of the State Statutes would offer him instruction in the 
desired courses at the second semester. The general session 
of the Legislature, beginning January 4, 1949, will ac­
complish the same purpose. I know of no other State 
problem that requires a special session of the Legislature. 
The lai’ge sum of money that must be expended in a special 
session might just as well be expended in furnishing the 
type of education required.

Proposed amendments to our existing Statutes have 
been prepared and are now being discussed and studied. 
I have personally discussed the changes with many leaders 
of the Legislature, and have been assured that the problem 
will receive favorable consideration in the shortest possible 
time. If the matter can be thus deferred, I will include a 
request for the necessary statutory changes or amend­
ments in my message to the Legislature, and request that 
[fols. 45-46] it be given priority over other pending legis­
lation.

Not being learned in the law, I freely admit that my 
thoughts in the matter are controlled by the social and 
practical aspects thereof. Yet I believe that these matters 
should also be taken into consideration by the Court, and 
I hope that this Court can properly hold the matter in 
abeyance until the people’s representatives have an op­
portunity to consider the matter at the regular session of 
the Legislature beginning January 4, 1949.

As before stated, it is my belief that the interests of the 
State will be better served by a consideration of this 
problem at the general session of the Legislature. I further 
believe that the plaintiff will lose no school time from the 
action taken at the general session rather than action 
taken at a special session held on November 18, 1948.



31

However, let me repeat, if the exigencies of the situation 
demand action during this intervening six weeks’ period, 
I will call a special session to deal with the problem.

Yours very truly, Roy J. Turner, Governor of the 
State of Oklahoma.

[fol. 47]
I n the U nited States D istrict Court fob the 

W estern D istrict of Oklahoma

No. 4039 (C ivil)
G. W . McLaurin, Plaintiff,

vs.
Oklahoma State R egents for H igher E ducation, et al,

Defendants.

F indings of F act and Conclusions of Law—
Filed Oct. 6, 1948

Preliminary Statement

By this suit, we are asked to enjoin the defendants from 
refusing to admit the plaintiff to the University of Okla­
homa, for the purpose of pursuing a postgraduate course in 
education leading toward a doctor’s degree. It is said that 
although having made timely application for admission, 
and being morally and scholastically qualified, he has been 
denied admission solely because, as a member of the Negro 
[fol. 48] Race, the laws of Oklahoma forbid his admission 
under criminal penalty. It is said that in these circum­
stances, refusal to admit the plaintiff to the University of 
Oklahoma, for the purpose of pursuing the course of study 
he seeks, is a deprivation of his rights to the equal protec­
tion of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States.

F indings of F act

I
In accordance with the stipulation, the court finds that 

the University of Oklahoma is an educational institution
3—34



32

maintained by the taxpayers of the State, from funds 
derived from uniform taxation, and that it is the only 
educational institution supported by public taxation in 
which the plaintiff can pursue a postgraduate course lead­
ing to a doctor’s degree in education.

II
That during the enrollment period for the second 

semester for the 1947-1948 school term, plaintiff applied 
for admission to the University for the purpose of taking 
such courses which would entitle him to a doctor’s 
[fol. 49] degree in education, and that at the time of his 
application, he possessed and still possesses all of the 
scholastic and moral qualifications prescribed by the Uni­
versity of Oklahoma for admission to the courses he seeks 
to pursue, and that he was denied admission to the Univer­
sity on February 2, 1948, solely because as a member of 
the Negro Race, the applicable laws of Oklahoma (70 0. S. 
1941, Sections 455, 456 and 457) make it a criminal offense 
for any person to operate a school or college or any educa­
tional institution where persons of both white and colored 
races are received as pupils for instruction, or for any 
instructors to teach in, or any white person to attend, any 
such school.

Conclusion's of L aw

I
This suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the 

United States, and seeks redress for the deprivation of 
civil rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
court is therefore vested with jurisdiction, regardless of 
diversity of citizenship or amount in controversy. Hague 
[fol. 50] v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496, 514; Douglas v. Jean­
nette, 319 U. S. 157. Since a temporary injunction against 
the enforcement of the State laws on the grounds of their 
unconstitutionality is sought, the subject matter is properly 
cognizable by a three judge court under Section 266 of the 
Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. A. 380.

II
We hold, in conformity with the equal protection clause 

of the Fourteenth Amendment, that the plaintiff is entitled 
to secure a postgraduate course of study in education lead­
ing to a doctor’s degree in this State in a State institution,



33

and that he is entitled to secure it as soon as it is afforded 
to any other applicant. Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 
U. S. 631; Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337. 
That such educational facilities are now being offered to 
and received by other applicants at the University of Okla­
homa, and that although timely and appropriate application 
has been made therefor, to this time such facilities have 
been denied this plaintiff.

I l l
The court is of the opinion that insofar as any statute or 

[fol. 51] law of the State of Oklahoma denies or deprives 
this plaintiff admission to the University of Oklahoma for 
the purpose of pursuing the course of study he seeks, it is 
unconstitutional and unenforceable. This does not mean, 
however, that the segregation laws of Oklahoma are inca­
pable of constitutional enforcement. We simply hold that 
insofar as they are sought to be enforced in this particular 
case, they are inoperative.

IV
Our attention has been called to and we have seen a state­

ment of the Governor of this State in which he commits 
the State to a certain course of action, designed to afford 
equal segregated facilities to this plaintiff and members of 
his Race in compliance with the constitutional requirements. 
In that connection, we think it appropriate to state that it is 
not our function to say what the State shall do in order 
to comply with its acknowledged responsibilities to its 
citizens. Rather it is our function to determine whether 
what has been done and what is being done meets the con­
stitutional mandate.

V
[fols. 52-53] In the performance of this important function, 
we sit as a court of equity, with power to fashion our decree 
in accordance with right and justice under the law. Accord­
ingly, we refrain at this time from issuing or granting any 
injunctive relief, on the assumption that the law having 
been declared, the State will comply. We retain jurisdiction 
of this case, however, with full power to issue such further 
orders and decrees as may be deemed necessary and proper 
to secure to this plaintiff the equal protection of the laws,



34

which, translated into terms of this lawsuit, means equal 
educational facilities.

Alfred P. Murrah, Judge of the II. S. Court of Ap­
peals. Edgar S. Vaught, IT. S. District Judge. 
Bower Broaddus, U. S. District Judge.

[fol. 54]

In the United States District Court for the 
W estern D istrict of Oklahoma

No. 4039 (C ivil)

G. W. McLaurin, Plaintiff,
vs.

Oklahoma State R egents for H igher E ducation, et al,
Defendants.

J ournal E ntry of J udgment— Oct. 6,1948

Be it remembered that this cause came on regularly for 
hearing before this duly constituted court on August 23, 
1948. The plaintiff appeared in person and by his attorneys 
Thurgood Marshall and Amos T. Hall. The defendants 
appeared either in person, or by and through the Honorable 
Mac Q. Williamson, Attorney General of the State of Okla­
homa, Fred Hansen and George T. Montgomery, Assistant 
Attorneys General. Testimony was introduced, argument 
was had, and the matter was continued until September 
24, 1948, and was thereafter continued until September 
29, 1948. Further evidence was taken, argument heard, and 
the cause finally submitted.
[fols. 55-56] On this, the 6 day,of October, 1948, it is ordered 
and decreed that insofar as Sections 455, 456 and 457, 
70 0. S. 1941, are sought to be applied and enforced in this 
particular case, they are unconstitutional and unenforce­
able.

The court refrains at this time, however, from issuing or 
granting any injunctive relief, but jurisdiction over the 
subject matter is reserved for the purpose of entering any



35

such further orders as may be deemed proper in the circum­
stances to secure to the plaintiff the redress he seeks under 
the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Done this 6 day of October, 1948.
Alfred P. Murrah, Judge of the U. S. Court of Ap­

peals. Edgar S. Vaught, U. S. District Judge. 
Bower Broaddus, U. S. District Judge.

[fol. 57] [File endorsement omitted]

I n U nited States D istrict Court 
[Title omitted]

Motion oe Plaintiff to Modify Order 
and Judgment— Filed October 8, 1948

Now comes the plaintiff, G. W. McLaurin, and moves 
this Honorable Court for further relief. In support of 
said motion, plaintiff alleges and states:

1. That on August , 1948, plaintiff filed a complaint 
in the above-entitled cause, requesting that this Court 
convene a three-judge court, as required by Section 266 of 
the Judicial Code then in effect, and further requesting 
that this Court issue both preliminary and permanent 
injunctions restraining defendant from excluding the 
plaintiff and others similarly situated from admission to 
courses of study offered by the state only at the graduate 
schools of the University of Oklahoma solely because of 
race or color, such complaint being predicated upon the 
assertion of the unconstitutionality of Sections 455, 456 
and 457 of Title 70 of the Oklahoma Statutes of 1941.

2. That on August 23, 1948, the Honorable Alfred P. 
Murrah, Justice of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit, convened a three-judge court, consisting of 
the said Mr. Justice Murrah, the Honorable Edgar S. 
Vaught and the Honorable Bower Broaddus of the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma.

3. That on the 23 day of August, 1948, this matter came 
on before said three-judge court for a hearing, upon an 
agreed statement of facts; and that upon a further hearing 
held on the 29th day of September, 1948, the Honorable 
Mac Q. Williamson, Attorney General of the State of 
Oklahoma, stipulated that:



36

[fol. 58] “ The record may show our admission that his 
(plaintiff’s) credentials have been put in order.”  
(Matter in parenthesis ours)

4. That the said agreed statement of facts adopted by 
this Court together with the stipulation made in the 
hearing on September 29,1948, established that the plaintiff 
is a resident and citizen of the United States, State of 
Oklahoma, Oklahoma County and Oklahoma City;

That he was qualified for admission to the Graduate 
School for the purpose of taking courses in school ad­
ministration leading to the degree of Doctor of Education;

That the University of Oklahoma is part of the edu­
cational system of the State of Oklahoma and is the only 
institution in the state supported by taxation in which the 
plaintiff could pursue such a graduate course in education 
leading to a Doctor’s Degree;

That plaintiff had complied with all the rules and regu­
lations and was willing and able to pay all lawful, uniform 
fees and charges;

That on the 28th day of January, 1948, plaintiff, having 
complied with all applicable rules and regulations of the 
University, had applied for admission to the said Graduate 
School of the University of Oklahoma;

That on the 2nd day of February, 1948, his application 
was denied solely on the grounds of race and color and 
that but for the Oklahoma statutes requiring segregation 
in educational institutions (Sections 455, 456, and 457 of 
Title 70 of the Oklahoma Statutes, 1948), defendants would 
not have established and would not be maintaining the 
order, policy, custom and usage of excluding qualified 
applicants, solely because of race or color, from attending 
the University of Oklahoma to take the courses offered at 
that institution.

5. That after hearing the argument of the parties and upon 
the pleadings and memoranda in support thereof, this 
Court, on the 29th day of September, 1948, held as follows:

“ Based upon those facts, the court holds that the 
plaintiff in this case is entitled to secure . . . post­
graduate education in this state by a state institution. 
The court further holds that to this time he has been 
denied that right although application has been duly 
made therefor (and) during the same period these 
particular educational facilities have been afforded 
by the state to other groups.



37

[fol. 59] “ The court further holds that the state is under 
the constitutional duty to provide this plaintiff with 
the education he seeks as soon as it does for applicants 
of any other group . . . The court further holds that 
insofar as the statutes of the State of Oklahoma drawn 
in issue here deny or deprive this plaintiff of ad­
mission to the University of Oklahoma for the purpose 
of pursuing the course he seeks to pursue there, (they) 
are unconstitutional and void. . . .

“ Accordingly, we refrain at this time from issuing 
or granting injunctive relief on the assumption that the 
state will follow the law in the constitutional mandate.

“ We retain jurisdiction of this case, however, with 
full power to issue such further orders and decrees as 
may be deemed necessary and proper to secure this 
plaintiff the equal protection of the laws, which, trans­
lated in the terms of this law suit, means equal facili­
ties— equal educational facilities.

“ We therefore recess this case at this time with the 
understanding that either party may apply for further 
relief consistently with the pleadings in the case.”  
(Matter in parenthesis ours)

6. That pursuant to the holding of this Court in said 
judgment that the plaintiff was entitled to equal education 
as soon as such education is supplied to members of any 
other group, plaintiff herein, on the 5th day of October, 
1948, made application to the Board of Regents, University 
of Oklahoma, an administrative board and agency of the 
State of Oklahoma, exercising over-all authority _ with 
reference to the regulation of instruction and admission 
of students in the University and for admission to the 
graduate school of the University of Oklahoma for the 
purpose of taking courses in school administration leading 
towards a Doctor’s degree in education.

7. That said defendant, acting together with and upon 
the instruction of the other defendants herein and each of 
them, refused and denied the plaintiff admission to such 
courses in the University of Oklahoma solely on account 
of his race or color.

8. That the only purpose for the institution of these 
proceedings in this Court by the plaintiff was to secure



38

for plaintiff the rights guaranteed to him by the Con­
stitution and laws of the United States and particularly 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
thereof. Plaintiff, at the time of his application to the 
University, sought to secure graduate education in the 
field of education and a Doctor’s degree in that field. 
Plaintiff, in renewing his application on the 5th day of 
October, 1948, again sought to secure an education leading 
[fol. 60] to a Doctor’s degree at the only state-supported 
institution providing courses leading to such degree.

9. That white applicants for courses in school adminis­
tration who applied at or about the time that the plaintiff 
applied in January 1948 were admitted and have completed 
one term of work.

10. That white applicants for such courses who applied 
for the Fall term 1948 have been admitted and entered 
upon such course of study on September 20, 1948.

11. That qualified white applicants who seek enrollment 
prior to October 13, 1948 will be admitted to such courses.

12. That on October 1, 1948 plaintiff requested the Board 
of Regents of the University of Oklahoma to reconsider 
its rejection of his application for admission in the light 
of this court’s decision, but said defendants persisted in 
their refusal to admit plaintiff by failing to act upon such 
request-

13. That this Court has stated that plaintiff is entitled 
to receive an equal education “ as soon as”  such education 
is furnished to white students, and hence the refusal to 
admit plaintiff for two semesters is a substantial denial 
of his constitutional rights.

14. That plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law for the 
redress of this wrong and time is of the essence in securing 
a redress of such wrong.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff moves this Court to modify 
its order and judgment of September 29, 1948, and to enter 
an order requiring the defendants to admit the plaintiff 
to the Graduate School of the University of Oklahoma for 
the purpose of taking courses leading to a Doctor’s degree 
in education, subject only to the same rules and regulations 
which apply to other students in said school.



39

Amos T. Hall, 107% N. Greenwood Avenue, Tulsa, 
Oklahoma; Thurgood Marshall, 20 West 40th 
Street, New York, New York, Attorneys for Peti­
tioner.

[fol. 61]

In United States D istrict Court 

P roceedings of October 25,1948 

Before Judges Murrah, Vaught & Broaddus.

On this 25th day of October, 1948, the parties appear by 
their respective counsel, and this cause comes on for hear­
ing on motion of plaintiff to modify order of September 29, 
1948, motion of defendants to quash subpoenas duces tecum, 
and hearing on merits. Thereupon, pre-trial hearing is had, 
evidence heard, and exhibits introduced and facts stipu­
lated; the application of Mauderie Hudson Wilson to inter­
vene is heard, and all matters submitted to the Court for 
determination. Both parties are granted five days from 
this date to exchange briefs.

[fol. 62]
I n  the United States D istrict Court for the 

W estern D istrict of Oklahoma

No. 4039 ( C i v i l )

G. W. M cL aurin, Plaintiff, 

vs.

Oklahoma State R egents for H igher E ducation, et al,
Defendants.

F indings of F act and Conclusions of Law—Nov. 22,1948 

Preliminary Statement

At a former hearing of this cause, we held the segregation 
laws of the State of Oklahoma (70 O.S. 1941, Sections 455, 
456 and 457) unconstitutional and inoperative insofar as 
they deprived the plaintiff of his constitutional right to



40

pursue the course of study he sought at the University of 
Oklahoma. We were careful, however, to confine our decree 
to the particular facts before us, while recognizing the 
power of the State to pursue its own social policies regard­
ing segregation in conformity with the equal protection of 
the laws. We expressly refrained from granting injunctive 
relief, on the assumption that the State statutory impedi­
ments to equal educational facilities having been declared 
inoperative, the State would provide such facilities in 
obedience to the constitutional mandate.

Now this cause comes on for further consideration on 
[fob 63] complaint of the plaintiff, to the effect that 
although he has been admitted to the University of Okla­
homa, and to the course of study he sought, the segregated 
conditions under which he was admitted, and is required to 
pursue his course of study, continue to deprive him of 
equal educational facilities in conformity with the Four­
teenth Amendment.

F indings of F act

I
The undisputed evidence is that subsequent to our decree 

in this case, plaintiff was admitted to the University of 
Oklahoma, and to the same classes as those pursuing the 
same courses. He is required, however, to sit at a desig­
nated desk in or near a wide opening into the classroom. 
From this position, he is as near to the instructor as the 
majority of the other students in the classroom, and he can 
see and hear the instructor and the other students in the 
main classroom as well as any other student. His objection 
to these facilities is that to be thus segregated from the 
other students so interferes with his powers of concentra­
tion as to make study difficult, if  not impossible, thereby 
depriving him of the equal educational facilities. He says 
in effect that only if he is permitted to choose his seat as 
any other student, can he have equal educational facilities.

TI
He is accorded access to and use of the school library 

as other students, except if he remains in the library to 
study, he is required to take his books to a designated desk 
on the mezzanine floor. All other students who use the 
library may choose any available seat in the reading room 
in the library, but a majority find it necessary to study



41

elsewhere because of a lack of seating capacity in the 
library. The plaintiff says that this secluded and segregated 
arrangement tends to set him apart from other students 
and hence to deprive him of equal facilities.
[fol. 64] III

He is admitted to the school cafeteria, where he is served 
the same food as other students, but at a different time 
and at a designated table. He does not object to the food, 
the dining facilities, or the hour served, but to the segre­
gated conditions under which he is served.

In the language of his counsel, he complains that “ his 
required isolation from all other students, solely because 
of the accident of birth * * * creates a mental discomfiture, 
which makes concentration and study difficult, if not impos­
sible * # * that the enforcement of these regulations 
places upon him “ a badge of inferiority which affects his 
relationship, both to his fellow students, and to his pro­
fessors.”

Conclusions of Law

I
It is said that since the segregation laws have been 

declared inoperative, the University is without authority to 
require the plaintiff to attend classes under the segregated 
conditions. But the authority of the University to impose 
segregation is of concern to this court only if the exercise 
of that authority amounts to a deprivation of a federal 
right. See Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91.

The Constitution from which this court derives its 
jurisdiction does not authorize us to obliterate social or 
racial distinctions which the State has traditionally recog­
nized as a basis for classification for purposes of education 
and other public ministrations. The Fourteenth Amendment 
does not abolish distinctions based upon race or color, nor 
was it intended to enforce social equality between classes 
and races. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537; Cummings v. 
United States, 175 U. S. 528; Gung Lum v. Rice, 275 IT. S. 
78; Missouri ex rel Gains v. Canada, 305 U. S. 37. It is only 
when such distinctions are made the basis for discrim­
ination and unequal treatment before the law that 
[fol. 65] the Fourteenth Amendment intervenes. Traux v.



42

Raich, 293 U. S. 33, 42. It is the duty of this court to honor 
the public policy of the State in matters relating to its 
internal social affairs quite as much as it is our duty to 
vindicate the supreme law of the land.

III
The Oklahoma statutes held unenforceable in the previous 

order of this court have not been stripped of their vitality 
to express the public policy of the State in respect to mat­
ters of social concern. The segregation condemned in West­
minister School District v. Mendez, 161 F. 2d 774, was 
found to be “ wholly inconsistent”  with the public policy of 
the State of California, while in our case the segregation 
based upon racial distinctions is in accord with the deeply 
rooted social policy of the State of Oklahoma.

IV
The plaintiff is now being afforded the same educational 

facilities as other students at the University of Oklahoma. 
And, while conceivably the same facilities might be afforded 
under conditions so odious as to amount to a denial of equal 
protection of the law, we cannot find any justificably legal 
basis for the mental discomfiture which the plaintiff says 
deprives him of equal educational facilities here. We con­
clude therefore that the classification, based upon racial 
distinctions, as recognized and enforced by the regulations 
of the University of Oklahoma, rests upon a reasonable 
basis, having its foundation in the public policy of the State, 
and does not therefore operate to deprive this plaintiff of 
the equal protection of the laws. The relief he now seeks is 
accordingly denied.
[fob 66]

A pplication of Mrs. Maude F lorence H ancock W ilson

Mrs. Maude Florence Hancock Wilson, claiming to be a 
member of the same class and similarly situated with the 
plaintiff McLaurin, has renewed her application for en­
trance to the University of Oklahoma to pursue a course 
of study in social work, and upon being denied entrance, 
she comes here seeking the same relief sought by McLaurin 
in his class action.

The facts are that Mrs. Wilson applied for admission to 
the University of Oklahoma on January 28, 1948, for the 
purpose of studying for a master’s degree in sociology.



43

She was morally and scholastically qualified to pursue this 
course of study, and it was unavailable at any separate 
school within the State of Oklahoma. When her application 
for entrance was denied, solely because the laws of Okla­
homa forbade it, she filed suit in the District Court of 
Cleveland County, Oklahoma, in May 1948, for a writ of 
mandamus to compel her admission on substantially the 
same grounds now asserted here. Having been denied relief 
in the District Court, she has perfected her appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma, and that appeal is now pend­
ing and undecided. She did not renew her application for 
admission to the University until October 14,1948, two days 
after registration was closed to any applicant for any 
course of study at the University.

Having elected to pursue an equally adequate remedy in 
the courts of the State for the purpose of securing equal 
protection of the laws, and is now actively pursuing that 
remedy, she is not similarly situated with the plaintiff, 
McLaurin. Moreover, the course of study she now seeks 
to pursue is not the same as the one originally sought, and 
[fol. 67] not having applied for admission until all other 
persons would have been similarly denied admission, she 
is not within the class for which this suit is prosecuted. 
The relief sought by her is, therefore, denied.

(S.) Alfred P. Murrah, Edgar S. Vaught, Bower 
Broaddus.

[fol. 68]
In  the United States D istrict Court for the 

W estern District of Oklahoma

No. 4039 (C ivil)

G. W. McLaurin, Plaintiff,

vs.

Oklahoma State R egents for H igher E ducation, et al,
Defendants.

J ournal E ntry of J udgment—Nov. 22,1948
Be it remembered that this cause came on for further 

consideration on the 25th day of October 1948. The plain­
tiff, McLaurin, appeared in person and by his counsel,



44

Thurgood Marshall and Amos T. Hall. The applicant, 
Mauderie Florence Hancock Wilson, appeared in Person 
and by the same counsel of record. The defendants ap­
peared either in person or by and through the Attorney 
General of the State of Oklahoma, the Honorable Mac Q. 
Williamson, and Assistant Attorneys General Fred Hansen 
and George T. Montgomery. Testimony was heard, and the 
case was finally submitted on briefs of the parties.

Upon consideration of the evidence, argument and briefs, 
it is ordered that the relief now sought by the Plaintiff 
McLaurin should be and the same is hereby denied.

It is further ordered that the relief prayed by the ap­
plicant Wilson should be and the same is hereby denied, 
and the complaint is dismissed.

Alfred P. Murrah, Edgar S. Vaught, Bower Broad- 
dus.

[fol. 69]
I n U nited States D istrict Court

A mendment of J ournal E ntry

Upon suggestion of counsel for the plaintiffs, the last 
paragraph of the order entered on November 22, 1948, is 
hereby amended to read as follows:

It is further ordered that the relief prayed for by the 
applicant, Wilson, should be and the same is thereby denied. 
The complaint as to each of the parties is dismissed and 
judgment is entered for the defendants.

Alfred P. Murrah, Edgar S. Vaught, Bower Broad- 
dus.



45

[fol. 70] [Stamp:] Filed January 10, 1949. Theodore M. 
Filson, Clerk, by D. Lucille Leslie, Deputy

In the U nited States D istrict Court for the 
W estern District oe Oklahoma

No. 4039 (Civil)

G. W. McL aurin, Plaintiff

vs.

Oklahoma State R egents for H igher E ducation, B oard 
of R egents of University of Oklahoma, George L. Cross, 
Lawrence H. Snyder and J. E. Fellows, Defendants

Reporter’s Transcript of Trial Proceedings
Before:

T he H onorable A lfred P. Murrah,
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals;

T he H onorable E dgar S. V aught,
United States District Judge for the Western 
District of Oklahoma;

T he H onorable B ower Broaddus,
United States District Judge for the Northern, 
Eastern and Western Districts of Oklahoma.

R eporter’s T ranscript of H earing on Motion to Modify
Judgment

In the United States Court House and Post 
Office Building, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

October 25, 1948 

A ppearances:
For the Plaintiff:

A mos T. H all,
107% North Greenwood,
Tulsa, Oklahoma.

T hurgood Marshall,
20 West 40th Street,
New York, New York.



46

[fol. 71]
For the Defendants:

Mag Q. W illiamson, Attorney General,
State of Oklahoma,
State Capitol Building,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

F red H ansen, Assistant Attorney General,
State Capitol Building,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

George T. Montgomery, Assistant Attorney General, 
State Capitol Building,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

[fol. 72] P roceedings

October 25,1948.
Colloquy Between Court and Counsel

Judge Murrah: Are the parties ready in No. 4039 Civil, 
McLaurin versus Oklahoma State Regents?

Mr. Williamson: The State is ready.
Mr. Marshall: We are both ready, sir.
Judge Murrah: Now the Court understands that this case 

comes on for hearing this morning on the plaintiff’s ap­
plication to modify its order of September 29 to require 
the defendant to admit the plaintiff to the Graduate School 
of the University of Oklahoma for the purpose of taking 
courses leading to a Doctor’s Degree in Education, subject 
to the same rules and regulations which apply to other 
students in the said schools, is that correct?

Mr. Williamson: May it please the Court, that is the main 
motion or the main order of business, but I think the Court 
should be advised that in pursuance, I take it, that pro­
cedure, counsel for plaintiff caused to be issued subpoenas 
duces tecum directed to the Secretary of the Regents for 
Higher Education and the Secretary of the Regents of 
Oklahoma University, which subpoenas were properly 
issued and served, and which demanded each of those 
respective officers to bring all and entire the minutes of 
those two organizations for the past three years before 
this Court.



47

[fol. 73] Now when we learned of that we filed in this 
Court for reasons which will be more or less obvious, a 
Motion to Quash this subpoena duces tecum, and we believe 
that in the orderly process of things that should be taken 
up first, in order that we may see whether or not all of 
the records pertaining to every bit of the State’s business 
handled by two constitutional boards, should be brought 
here in this case at this time, for the past three years.

Judge Murrah: We will reach that immediately, but you 
agree, Mr. Counsel, that is the issue, the primary issue, 
the Motion to Modify!

Mr. Marshall: There is another issue, sir. We do believe 
that, and I think in all fairness we should make our 
position clear: It is our understanding throughout the two 
hearings in this case that this was a proceeding for class, 
which was limited to those who had applied and who had 
been refused, and this being a class action, in reference 
to the prayer for further relief, we have just been advised 
that one of the people who expected to go to school, Mrs. 
Mauderie Hancock Wilson has, according to a ruling of the 
Attorney General, been excluded, and in view of the fact 
that this is a class action and that she is clearly within 
the class as determined by the Court, and as I remember 
at the first hearing with the full agreement of the Attorney 
General, I do believe that we are entitled in this case to also 
[fol. 74] consider the facts as to the reason for her being 
excluded, which is a further reason, I submit, sir, for the 
request for further affirmative relief so everybody in the 
class will be protected.

Judge Murrah: You desire to enlarge your pleading, 
amend the pleadings before us at this time!

Mr. Marshall: To be perfectly frank, I think it could be 
handled in one of several ways. One is that she could 
request to intervene, the other that she could file a petition 
in the form of a petition for further relief, all of which 
would take time. There is also the question that her 
particular case is pending over, having been decided by 
a State court. It is now a question as to whether it will be 
appealed or not. All of which questions, it seems to me, 
just add up to a question of time to be consumed, and in 
this case we believe that if affirmative relief which we pray 
for is issued in the McLaurin case as such, it will apply to

4— 34



48

her. That is the reason we didn’t want to take any of these 
other proceedings, because of the matter of time involved.

Judge Murrah: But the Court inquired whether or not 
you cared to enlarge your pleadings to ask for further 
relief.
_ Mr. Marshall: The only question as to the pleadings, 

sir, if it isn’t necessary for an extension of time to give 
the other side a time to answer. We would be perfectly 
[fol. 75] willing to go as we are because time is of the 
essence, and we believe that if we request for permission 
to amend, that the other side might have, I don’t know, sir, 
on a petition for further relief, as to whether the other 
side would have a right to answer. Frankly, I don’t know 
the answer to that.
_ Judge Murrah: Mr. Attorney General, could you en­

lighten us on that point!
Mr. Williamson: I believe technically under the rules, at 

least as I understand it, we would; but I want to assure 
the Court that there is no disposition on our part to take 
unnecessary time away from reaching the issues as they 
appear in this series of litigation. We have never yet 
prayed for time and we shan’t begin it now. I do believe 
that in an orderly pleading, I would suggest that if counsel 
for plaintiff here wishes to include Mauderie Wilson within 
the scope of this litigation, I believe her name ought to 
appear by way of amendment to the pleadings. I think it 
would be very irregular and unusual for us to take it up 
without something in the pleadings indicating that she has 
now arrived as one of the parties in this lawsuit. I have 
no disposition to delay unduly. I would only ask for such 
time as would be a reasonable time under the circumstances, 
perhaps none at all.

Judge Murrah: Thank you. We will reach that when we 
get to it. Meanwhile, we have the more immediate issue 
[fol. 76] relating to the named plaintiff. Now what is the 
issue specifically with respect to the plaintiff McLaurin? 
Certainly his position is a little bit different than anyone 
else in this way, that he has— of course the Court doesn’t 
live in a vacuum, and we understand that certain events 
have transpired since this Motion was made and I would 
like for you to make a statement at this time concerning the 
issues involved at the present time.



49

Mr. Marshall: May it please the Court, as I understand 
the issue at the present time, the plaintiff G. W. McLaurin 
has been admitted to the University of Oklahoma to the 
courses he requested. There is no question but that he is 
getting the courses that he asked for.

However, as I understand the position, judging from 
copying of minutes that I have been privileged to see of 
the Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma which 
will be produced, the opinions of the Attorney General of 
the State of Oklahoma, it has been agreed that the segre­
gation statutes, the three statutes involved, do not apply 
to this case, having been declared unconstitutional as ap­
plied to McLaurin, that the officials, under the advice of 
the Attorney General, have admitted him without reliance 
upon these statutes. However that pursuant to an alleged 
inherent power of the Board of Regents as such, the Board 
of Regents without a statute requiring them to do so, have 
[fob 77] undertaken the task of placing McLaurin in an 
anteroom outside of the regular classroom.

Judge Vaught: Now just a moment. When did this Court 
say that the segregation statutes were void?

Mr. Marshall: The ruling, sir, as I remember the journal 
entry, was that as applied to McLaurin, they were void.

Judge Vaught: In so far as his admission to the State 
University was concerned. This Court has never held that 
they were void or that they were unconstitutional. They 
held that they were unconstitutional in so far as it pre­
cluded McLaurin from being admitted to the University, 
since there were no other facilities equal to that provided 
otherwise.

Mr. Marshall: Yes, sir. If I may say, sir, the paragraph 
says that it is ordered and decreed that in so far as Sections 
455, 456 and 457 are sought to be applied and enforced in 
this particular case, they are unconstitutional and un­
enforceable, sir— on the last page of the journal entry.

Judge Vaught: That has to do merely with his admission 
to the University.

Judge Murrah: We will construe our judgment in the 
light of the facts which have transpired. Now let me sug­
gest that you tell us your position in the case, what you 
expect to prove.

Mr. Marshall: What we expect, sir, is that, if I 
[fol. 78] may make just one preliminary statement as of



50

the present time, and the factual situation as it exists: 
Now the defendants cannot be enforcing these statutes 
because these statutes say—it is unlawful to teach a white 
and colored student in the same school. There is no 
question that he is in the same school, but as I understand 
it, the position is now taken that under the inherent power 
of the Board of Regents, in the absence of statute, he is 
being segregated and we are prepared to put on evidence 
to show one, that the effect of that upon the plaintiff him­
self in regard to whether or not he is getting an equal edu­
cation, and two, that there is one point of law on which 
there is no dispute, there is no law on the other side in 
the Federal and State courts, that in the absence of a State 
statute requiring segregation, no administrative board can 
set up segregation in public schools, and it is our position 
that the Board of Regents, the defendants in this case, 
not having a State statute requiring segregation, cannot 
on their own inherent power segregate in any fashion.

So that we have two points, one is that they cannot 
segregate in the absence of statute; and two, that this 
segregation itself deprives this plaintiff of getting what 
we started out for him to get, which is an equal education, 
and that is why in the petition for further relief we ask 
that further relief be granted, which is the only type of 
[fol. 79] relief which will give him what he is entitled to, 
that is an education subject only to the same rules and 
regulations.

Judge Vaught: What is it that you want? Just put it 
in plain English. What is it that you want?

Mr. Marshall: We wanted McLaurin admitted just like 
any other student, take his seat in the same way as any 
other student.

Judge Vaught: In other words, you want him in the 
same room with the other students.

Mr. Marshall: Why, yes, sir. That is the only way he 
can get an equal education. That is our point.

Judge Murrah: Very well. That defines the issue. Now 
I think it is appropriate to take up your Motion to Quash 
the subpoenas.

Now, cannot we have an agreement between the parties 
here that this plaintiff has been admitted to the University 
of Oklahoma on the date on which he was admitted, to



51

pursue the courses he sought to pursue there, and that 
conditions under which he was admitted, that is the physical 
conditions or the actual conditions.

Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, I would prefer to 
develop that by testimony if possible. We have the plaintiff 
here and we propose—

Judge Murrah: (Interposing) I want you to make a 
statement about it. We don’t want to take any testimony 
[fol. 80] unless it is necessary.

Mr. Marshall: I think he was admitted, I think it was on 
October 13, and that he was permitted to pick the courses 
he wanted to pick, and that he was carried to a room, 
placed behind a desk, and it was either an anteroom or 
another room from the main classroom, subsequent to that 
day, as I remember it, sir, the balance of the class was 
moved down to that room, and since that time he has been 
permitted to stay there on those conditions.

Judge Murrah: Well now, state where, the Court must 
have the picture there and I feel you ought to be able to 
state it as well as your witness can.

Mr. Marshall: I can state it, sir, that it is Room 103 and 
Room 104, one of the regular classrooms. The other is an 
anteroom that has been used for a small library with an 
area for opening between the two rooms, and the class is 
in the large classroom, and McLaurin’s desk is on an 
angle in the other room, nothing separating them in the 
area in the door there, and that is where McLaurin sits.

Judge Murrah: He can see the instructor!
Mr. Marshall: Yes, sir, he can see the instructor, he can 

see practically every student. He can hear the instructor 
and he can hear the other students. We have pictures by 
commercial photographers which will show the exact setup, 
taken from four or five different angles.
[fol. 81] Judge Murrah: Would you produce them! Do 
you wish to put them in evidence!

Mr. Marshall: Yes, sir.
Judge Murrah: Have them identified and submit them to 

the Attorney General.
Mr. Attorney General, is there an instructor here or 

someone who knows exactly what conditions are, or do you 
know!

Mr, Williamson: I wouldn’t know, your Honor.



52

Judge Mur rah: Anyone here who does?
Mr. Williamson: Yes, sir, we have the President of the 

University. We have Dr. Fellows.
Judge Murrah: Dr. Wrinkle would know. Dr. Wrinkle, 

would you examine these photographs and see if it can be 
agreed that they fairly represent the physical conditions 
under which this plaintiff is attending the University of 
Oklahoma and the classes in question.

Mr. Counsel, you agree or do you agree—I am not asking 
you to admit anything that you do not wish to or that 
might be prejudicial—but do you agree that the physical 
conditions under which this plaintiff is admitted are equal 
to the physical conditions under which the other students 
attend the class ?

Mr. Marshall: No, sir, because of the fact that he is not 
in the classroom itself, and by being placed outside 
[fol. 82] there is a certain pressure on him of being ex­
cluded, which is not conducive to the person’s ability, and 
there are other situations, I might say, about his library, 
his eating facilities and all which I hope to develop.

Judge Murrah: I see.
Mr. Williamson: I would like to state to the Court that 

counsel for the defendant has examined the five photographs 
showing the classrooms where the plaintiff herein is attend­
ing school and showing particularly his desk room and his 
seat in the classroom, and we agree that these pictures 
portray, are fairly representative of the situation as it 
exists there in the Education Building.

Judge Murrah: Mr. Counsel, will you ask him to mark 
1 hat so they can be admitted in evidence.

(Five photographs of classroom were marked Plain­
tiff ’s Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 for identification and 
received in evidence.)

Mr. Williamson: I might state further to the Court that 
it is entirely appropriate if somebody would interpret them 
for the Court to indicate which seat is the plaintiff’s.

Judge Murrah: All right.
Mr. Williamson: It will be difficult to pick it out other­

wise.
Judge Vaught: Let us look at it and if we need any inter­

pretation wTe will ask for it.



53

[fol. 83] Judge Mur rah: Now Mr. Counsel, will you please 
proceed with your proof, that is, with your statement.

Mr. Marshall: All right, sir.
Judge Murrah: I think we should say to you, perhaps we 

haven’t made ourselves clear, it is the settled policy of the 
Court of this jurisdiction to attempt to secure agreements 
as to proof about which there is no dispute to avoid the time 
and taking testimony. We call that pre-trial procedure in 
this jurisdiction, followed uniformly, and our purpose here 
is just to define our area of agreement, and of course that 
means that we are not going to require the production of 
any documentary evidence if it can be agreed upon.

Mr. Marshall: I understand, sir. Thank you.
Judge Murrah: Now you may proceed at your pleasure 

just to state what you expect to prove for the record, and 
the Attorney General will state whether or not he can 
agree to it, and if not what part he cannot agree to, and wTe 
will thereby be enabled to define the issues upon which there 
must be proof.

Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, we expect to produce 
evidence to show: One, the exact conditions under which 
the plaintiff is studying, from the plaintiff himself, as to 
the classroom, library and dining facilities. We expect to 
show by that proof—■

Judge Murrah: (Interposing) The pictures depict,
[fol. 84] I suppose you agree that they depict the actual 
conditions under which he attends the class.

Mr. Marshall: Up to the present time they are accurate, 
sir.

Judge Murrah: What is your next point about that! That 
is the classroom. There is some point about the dining 
facilities.

Mr. Marshall: We will wish to show that in the library he 
is stuck up behind a stack of books on, I think the 7th floor. 
The other graduate students have a regular Graduate Study 
Hall. That requires him to come downstairs, apply for his 
books, pick them up, go back upstairs and into his little 
place.

Judge Murrah: Will you state those circumstances, just 
state them, will you please.

Mr. Marshall: As I understand, he has been set aside a 
space behind the stacks on the 7th floor, and that is his study



54

place for library purposes, and if lie needs a book he has to 
come down and get the book at the regular place where all 
the students get their books, carry it back up into the li­
brary, his little place up in the library, to study.

Judge Murrah: The same library?
Mr. Marshall: The same library, same building.
Judge Murrah: Used by the other students?

[fol. 85] Mr. Marshall: Used by the other students. There 
is a private room for graduate students.

Judge Murrah: In other words, there is a place set 
apart for him to pursue his studies in the library, and in 
order to do that it is necessary for him to leave this place 
and go down or up?

Mr. Marshall: Go down.
Judge Murrah: Go down to the library, get his books and 

bring them back to this place and use them there at this 
designated or what we would call segregated place.

Mr. Marshall: That’s the point.
Judge Murrah: Do you have knowledge of that, Mr. 

Attorney General?
Mr. Williamson: Not personally but I have here and 

can produce testimony.
Judge Murrah: Can you agree that those are the facts?
Mr. Williamson: I can’t at all. In the first place I didn’t 

know we had a seven-story library at Norman.
Mr. Marshall: I am not sure of that.
Mr. Williamson: I am not, either. I just don’t think we do.
Judge Murrah: All we are trying to do—Judge Broaddus 

has to be in another jurisdiction tomorrow, supposed to be, 
and we are all exceedingly busy, Judge Vaught recessed 
[fol. 86] his court for this—what we would like to do is to 
handle this case as expeditiously as possible. We do not 
wish to prejudice anyone in the presentation of evidence, 
and we shall not, but we hope and we think that you ought 
to be able to agree upon these facts.

Mr. Marshall: With one exception, sir. I would prefer 
to have the plaintiff—he is the only one who can testify 
what this does to him. I can’t. It just won’t take over 
fifteen minutes.

Judge Murrah: All right. Wait a moment, just a moment.



55

Mr. Williamson: I might say to the Court and for the 
record after conferring with Dr. Wrinkle, who is Chairman 
of the Interim Committee on this particular field of edu­
cation, Dr. Wrinkle wTho is personally advised and is a 
member of the faculty of the University of Oklahoma, tells 
me that we have a library building now down there consist­
ing of a basement and two floors, in other words three 
floors, counting the basement; that the main desk where 
control is exercised over the library, where someone in 
authority sits, is on the street floor of the library, and that 
there is another floor, the second floor of the library above 
that, and that it is on the second floor of the library where 
the plaintiff, McLaurin’s desk is placed; that they have a 
series of landings, a stairway with landings, and that there 
[fol. 87] may be six or seven landings in order to ap­
proach the desk on the second floor; that the desk is 
probably actually located above the permanent second floor 
on a landing up above the floor itself, but that it is not even 
as high as the third floor because there is no third floor. 
Therefore his desk is on the second floor or perhaps 
slightly elevated above it, and that he would have to go 
the equivalent of one ordinary full flight of stairs from the 
second floor down to the main floor in order to make his 
record on books that he wants.

Judge Vaught: Do other students use the second floor 
also?

Mr. Williamson: I might say that the students generally 
-—the Court of course knows there are many thousands of 
them—they do go in and roam over the building and take 
their books. They can take them anywhere they can find a 
place to sit down. They sit down and study. They do not 
have the advantage of an individual desk, thousands of 
them there. They take the books and retire from the build­
ing and across the campus and take them to their homes, 
thousands of them, because they don’t have desks in the 
room. That privilege is accorded to all students to with­
draw books from the library because the library couldn’t 
hold six or eight thousand students, and there are some 
eleven thousand plus on the campus.

Judge Murrah: Let me see if I cannot state for 
[fol. 88] the parties substantially the facts developed up 
to this point: That it is agreed that the plaintiff McLaurin 
was on the blank day of October—



56

Mr. Williamson: 13th.
Judge Murrah: The 13th of October admitted to the 

University of Oklahoma and to the courses which he sought 
to pursue in his application to the University proper offi­
cials on January 28, 1948, that he was admitted to the same 
classes that other students pursuing these courses, under 
the same instructors, and that he was assigned a permanent 
desk or chair in an anteroom to the main classroom where 
other students were seated, that the Exhibits 1 to 5, which 
have been introduced into evidence, fairly represent the 
physical conditions under which he was admitted, and 
where he now sits and nowT pursues his course of study.

It is further admitted that he can from this position see 
the instructor and hear the lecture, that he can see all or 
most of his fellow students, and that he is not obstructed 
in listening to the lecture or pursuing his course, except 
under conditions which may be hereinafter discussed.

Mr. Marshall: Yes, sir.
Judge Murrah: Now it is further agreed that he is 

admitted to the library at the University of Oklahoma 
where all other students are admitted and on the same con­
ditions, except that he is assigned a permanent desk on 
[fol. 89] the landing above the second floor of the library, 
and that he is required by the administrative rules to occupy 
this desk while using the library, and in so doing he is 
required to leave his desk, go to the librarian, I suppose, 
and get the books he wishes, take them to this desk and use 
them there, while other students pursuing the same courses 
and using this library, go into the library, select the books 
they wish and take them home or any place that they may 
wish to pursue their studies.

Gentlemen, is that about right?
Mr. Williamson: That is about right as far as we are 

concerned except I wish to call the Court’s attention to 
the fact that the Court made the statement in dictating 
this agreed statement that this plaintiff is seated in an 
anteroom. We think he is seated in what had been an 
anteroom, all obstruction is removed.

Judge Murrah: Very well.
Mr. Williamson: WTe could agree to it if the Court 

please, with that change.
Judge Murrah: Well, take out the word “ anteroom”  and 

just say “ adjoining room” .



57

Mr. Williamson: Well, if the Court please, the idea of 
rooms—psychologically when you talk about an adjoining 
room you think about a wall between them, and I think that 
is really a bit unfair to the defendant because there is no 
[fol. 90] wall there.

Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, there is a wall there.
Judge Vaught: It is an alcove.
Mr. Williamson: There is no obstruction! to vision in 

the world. The photographs speak for themselves. It is 
a part of the same room after certain adjustments were 
made down there.

Judge Murrah: It is agreed that these exhibits depict 
conditions under which he is seated and under which he 
pursues his course of study there?

Mr. Williamson: That has been admitted and is agreed.
Judge Murrah: Nov/ is that satisfactory?
Mr. Marshall: Yes, sir.
Judge Murrah: Now then, very well, will you state any 

other conditions to which you object, such as I believe you 
stated something about dining facilities.

Mr. Marshall: The dining facilities, sir, would have to 
be developed, I think, by the plaintiff.

Judge Murrah: Can’t you make a statement about that?
Mr. Marshall: The only statement I could make on it 

is that he is assigned to a place in wdiat is known as the 
“ Jug”  which is an eating place on the campus, a regular 
[fol. 91] eating place where he eats by himself, and I might 
say, sir, that is the reason I would rather have him to 
explain it, because of the effect that that has on him, I 
think can only be explained by him because it is outside 
of the regular classroom work.

Judge Murrah: Well now, of course from a practical stand­
point we may as well face the issues. It is perfectly ap­
parent from what has been said here up to this point, that 
this plaintiff has been admitted to the University of 
Oklahoma for the purpose of pursuing the same course of 
studies, under the same instructors, attending the same 
classes, under segregated conditions.

Mr. Marshall: Yes, sir.
Judge Murrah: And that is the point that you wish to 

assail here in this lawsuit.
Mr. Marshall: Yes, sir.



58

Judge Murrah: The sooner we develop those points and 
crystallize the issues here, the quicker we will all be out. 
Can’t you make a statement about it! Of course the only 
alternative we would have would be to take testimony, but 
we hope that it will not be necessary to do that because we 
realize that if we get started introducing testimony here, 
that we will be here a great length of time, more than should 
be necessary to try this lawsuit.

Mr. Marshall: The only testimony we have, sir, on 
that point, is the plaintiff, to tell in a brief statement, 
[fol. 92] which will not take more than ten or fifteen 
minutes; and the other thing I think we can stipulate is 
that under the present existing situation at the University 
of Oklahoma, all other students, regardless of racial back­
ground or national origin or creed, are admitted freely 
without segregation of any kind and that the only group 
segregated in the University of Oklahoma at the present 
time is this plaintiff and all other Negroes who will apply.

Judge Murrah: I think that is perfectly apparent.
Judge Vaught: That is a State statute, isn’t it!
Mr. Marshall: They are doing it, sir, as I understand it, 

in the absence of the statute.
Judge Vaught: Now that “ Jug”  you speak about—that’s 

a restaurant!
Mr. Marshall: That’s a restaurant. The name “ Jug”  is 

just a name. There is nothing about its being not a decent 
place.

Judge Vaught: White students are accommodated there, 
too!

Mr. Marshall: Yes, sir, so far as we know, sir, but not at 
the time. It won’t take over a few minutes.

Judge Murrah: Well, we want to make sure. I hope it 
will not be necessary to cover ground that we have already 
covered.

Mr. Marshall: No, sir, I am not going into the 
[fol. 93] background at all.

G. W. M cLaurix
the plaintiff, called as a witness by the plaintiff, was duly 
sworn and testified as follows:

Direct Examination.
By Mr. Marshall:

Q. Mr. McLaurin, you are the plaintiff in this case!



59

A. Yes, sir, that’s right.
Q. Do you remember on October 13, is that correct, you 

were admitted to the University of Oklahoma?
A. That’s right.
Q. Will you state briefly the circumstances after your 

classes were arranged and you were placed in the room that 
you now use as your classroom.

A. Those pictures describe the room in which I was placed 
adjoining the main classroom, and sometimes I would sit 
by the wall and there would be just an opening and of course 
it is necessary for me to look with a greater angle than 
anyone else to see the west side of the blackboard and so 
forth, and quite strange and humiliating to be placed out in 
that position, and it handicaps me in doing effective work, 
always conscious of something, bring about unnatural con­
ditions and so forth. It is really handicapping me. Some­
times I can’t concentrate my mind on work as I should.

Q. Now Mr. McLaurin, you have touched on it, but 
[fol. 94] I wonder if you would give to the Court in your 
own words the exact effect, good or bad, upon you of being 
in this anteroom or as you have described it, the room just 
connected with the regular classroom, limited to the ques­
tion of you getting the education you want. That is the 
only thing that this Court is interested in.

A. Well, it hinders me from doing effective work as I 
have desired to do. That handicaps me and why of course 
I can’t study and concentrate like I would want to do. Of 
course if I was just, you know, free without any handicaps 
to take a seat in the regular classroom where I wouldn’t be 
conscious of anything else but got my mind right on my 
work.

Q. Realizing, Mr. McLaurin, you are hearing the same 
professor and hearing the same students, and getting the 
same instruction from the professor, why is it that you 
make the statement in your last answer, that still you are 
impeded in getting the education you desire?

A. I don’t quite catch your point.
Q. Just why is it that you cannot concentrate, I think is 

the word you used, just why?
A. Well, just different, just like now suppose that was 

the class over there, and then I am a member of the class 
sitting up here, so to speak, then you would have quite an 
effect on me, brings about a feeling that it is something



60

irregular that I can’t sit in the classes, which makes me 
[fol. 95] conscious that something out of the ordinary or 
something out of the way where I can’t sit in the class just 
like the other ones, brings about that consciousness and so 
forth.

Q. Does that have any effect on your studying, in your 
ability to take in what the professor is giving!

A. Absolutely does.
Q. How does it!
A. Keeps me from taking in the knowledge that I should 

because those conditions will hinder me from learning and 
grasping things as fast as I should.

Q. Now Mr. McLaurin, the library facilities that are 
offered to you, just where is the space that is assigned to 
you!

A. I go by floors and stacks, but you know when I go up 
there, I press the fourth button of the elevator and it says 
the fourth floor, fourth stack, something and supposed, re­
quired to have a special desk up there, and close to, I guess 
about half a carload of newspapers, old ones and so forth, 
I guess about two or three feet from me all those old 
newspapers, and of course I am required to remain at that 
desk and study and when I want to get books, I think it is 
on the second or third floor, I am not permitted to sit in the 
main study hall down there and study.

Q. Mr. McLaurin, is this space where you are assigned, 
is that a room or just what kind of a place is it!

A. Well, it is a place where they call the stacks, and my 
[fol. 96] desk being in front of the stacks, you know where 
they keep the books and so forth and not a regular study 
hali. Of course students come up and want to take notes, 
something like that, you might say, a few notes and go back, 
but that is my regular place where I must carry my books 
back and remain there and study them there except when I 
go to take them down.

Q. You can’t stay when you go down to check out a book!
A. Check out a book and go up behind the stacks.
Q. That is your only place assigned to you!
A. If I want to go in and study, why then I have to go 

up behind there, behind the stacks and study, whether I 
am looking up anything back up there or not, that is my 
regular place.



61

Cross Examination.
By Mr. Williamson:

Q. You entered school on the 13th of October?
A. That’s right.
Q. Moved into your place in the classroom. It is in the 

classroom, isn’t it?
A. Well, it ’s a double room, not in the regular classroom, 

this wall is between my room and the regular classroom. Of 
course it ’s an opening just large enough for a large double 
door, maybe about as large an opening as one of those 
double doors.

Q. As distinguished from a peek hole, it is just a 
[fol. 97] removable whole wall, isn’t it, in front of you?

A. How’s that now?
Q. There is no wall in front of you in between you and 

the class and instructor, there is no wall there?
A. Well, it is, I mean it ’s a wall in front and a wall in 

the rear of the building. Of course my desk is plaeed close 
to the door there.

Q. You don’t mean to tell the Court there is a wall in 
front of where you sit?

A. I mean it is a door there between two walls, it is a 
door there, an opening to the class, and then I don’t mean I 
am sitting behind a wall. There is a wall between me and 
the class, and something like that double door. You see 
the door is in about the middle of the wall there, I guess 
something like that.

Q. You have seen these pictures that have been intro­
duced in evidence, have you not?

Judge Murrah: That is a point I don’t think we can 
enlarge upon or that the plaintiff could make the picture 
plainer than the picture itself.

Mr. Marshall: We agree that those do represent the con­
ditions under which he is attending classes.

By Mr. Williamson:
Q. I ’d like to ask one question with reference to the 

library facilities. Now you have a desk there and you say it 
[fol. 98] is behind some newspapers.

A. I said stack of newspapers, not behind, close to it, I 
suppose a carload, something like that, old newspapers.

Q. Are you acquainted with the fact that there are eleven 
thousand students attending Oklahoma University and that



62

you are the only one that has the privilege of a desk in the 
library building, is that true ?

A. Naturally I was under the impression that advanced 
students working on a Doctor’s Degree, that they always 
receive a special desk in the Graduate Department. That is 
the way I was under the impression.

Q. All right, I will ask you this question: Do any of the 
other students, advanced students who are attending grad­
uate work leading to a Doctor’s Degree in Education, do 
any of them have desks in the library?

A. Well, now, I haven’t checked on that. I am up there 
by myself and of course I haven’t had a chance to go in 
and see.

Q. You mean nobody ever comes up there?
A. How’s that?
Q. You say nobody ever comes up?
A. Some of the boys come up and check out books and 

go back down.
Q. You tell the Court that you do not have the privilege 

of browsing through the book shelves?
A. I am not in the shelves, I mean down in the main 

library.
[fol. 99] Q. I am talking about browsing through the 
shelves, in the books on the shelves, you have that privilege, 
do you not?

A. I get the books, I mean the study hall where I have 
to get the books and have to go back.

Q. How many times have you been in the library since the 
13th of October.

A. Well, I didn’t check them, been there several times.
Mr. Williamson: I believe that’s all.
Judge Murrah: Is this place that you speak of a part of 

the library?
The Witness: I  don’t know whether or not they are 

arranged so that they could be used. I guess maybe people 
just kept their old books or something like that.

Judge Murrah: Do you wish to develop any further 
points ?

Mr. Marshall: No, sir, not with this witness, sir. That’s 
all, Mr. McLaurin.

Judge Vaught: One question. This restaurant, now you 
can get your meals down there at regular hours ?

The Witness: Well, it ’s an arrangement.



63

Judge Vaught: Just answer the question, can you get 
your meals there at regular hours ?

The Witness : I can.
Judge Vaught: And you get the same food that is pro­

vided other students as far as you know ?
[fol. 100] The Witness: Well, I couldn’t tell because I 
haven’t been in there when they are served. I couldn’t tell 
just whether I get the same service or not but then I know 
I am assigned a special place. I am the only one in there, 
and of course I do not have my meals served on the cafeteria 
order, where they go right around and make his own selec­
tion. Why of course it is that I just have to take what is 
brought me, that’s all.

Judge Vaught: That’s a cafeteria, isn’t it? What is it?
The Witness: That’s a cafeteria. I am not served on a 

cafeteria order.
Judge Vaught: But this is a regular cafeteria?
The Witness: Well, I don’t think it is because it ’s got 

an ad out there, doesn’t say—called the “ Jug.”
Judge Vaught: Well, the “ Jug”  is the same as the 

‘ ‘ Copper Kettle, ”  isn’t it ?
The Witness: Well, that’s the particular name for this 

place.
Judge Vaught: All right.
Judge Murrah: That’s all.
(Witness withdraws.)

Colloquy between Court and Counsel.
Mr. Marshall: May it please the Court, did we agree with 

the Attorney General about the stipulation that every­
body else, under the present ruling of the University, 
[fol. 101] the only group that is excluded from general 
participation in everything are Negroes, the only group 
that is segregated are Negroes?

Mr. Williamson: I don’t know about general participation 
in everything. Of course we can’t agree to that because T 
know one or two Jewish organizations down there, when 
you talk of everything, that gentiles can’t participate in.

Mr. Marshall: I am not interested in that sort of thing. 
I am perfectly glad to limit it to that question.

Mr. Williamson: Let’s limit that.
Mr. Marshall: That the only group of citizens attending 

the University of Oklahoma who are segregated are 
Negroes.

5—34



64

Mr. Williamson: Segregated, yes, to the extent shown 
here in the record.

Mr. Marshall: Are Negroes.
Mr. Williamson: Yes.
Judge Murrah: That seems to be fair and it is so agreed, 

then, gentlemen.
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor pleases, that’s all in so far 

as the McLaurin case, with the exception of the letters from 
the Attorney General to the Board of Regents, the Minutes 
of the Board of Regents.

Judge Murrah: Very well.
[fol. 102] Mr. Marshall: I would like to have those in 
evidence.

Judge Murrah: Do you have them, Mr. Attorney 
General?

Mr. Williamson: We are certainly in possession of them, 
I presume. Now comes on the necessity of a constitutional 
hoard bringing in the Minutes for the past three years 
covering every conceivable official activity, but I don’t 
understand you have asked for that.

Mr. Marshall: I asked for everything, every Minute of the 
Board of Education, the Board of Higher Regents from 
October 1st, I think it is, to the present time, and every 
opinion of the Attorney General during the same period 
of time.

Judge Murrah: I think, Mr. Counsel, without consulting 
my associates, that the Court would not be disposed to 
require them to produce every Minute and every Opinion. 
I think that is entirely too general. I f you will be specific.

Mr. Marshall: On this subject matter, I beg pardon—I 
meant on this subject matter.

Judge Murrah: Now I think you should be a little more 
specific than that if you can and limit your question to 
what dates. Are you familiar with them?

Mr. Marshall: I am familiar.
[fol. 103] Judge Murrah: You are familiar with every 
Minute and every Opinion that you wish to put in evidence, 
aren’t you?

Mr. Marshall: Yes, sir.
Judge Murrah: Why don’t you take them up, sir, one at a 

time?
Mr. Marshall: I think, sir, we can agree if you will give 

us a few minutes.



65

Judge Murrah: I am sure we can. I haven’t any doubt 
that you can. Now would you like to have a recess or can 
you—

Mr. Marshall: I think we can do it in five minutes.
Mr. Williamson: I would like to say to the Court we 

originally handed copies of our Opinions as they are issued 
to Mr. Hall because Thurgood Marshall has been in another 
state. Amos Hall, I think, will say that we have.

Judge Murrah: Do you have them now!
Mr. Williamson: Do you have them in possession, Mr. 

Marshall ?
Mr. Marshall: No, sir, the only one that I don’t have is 

the Minutes of the meeting of October 10th.
Judge Murrah: Do you have all the rest of them?
Mr. Marshall: I have the ruling.
Judge Murrah: Why don’t you offer them?
Mr. Marshall: They are copies.

[fol. 104] Judge Murrah: If they handed them to you they 
are authentic and they are entitled to be admitted if other­
wise material.

(A  short recess was taken with the Court on the bench.)
A fter R ecess

Judge Murrah: Now in order that we may understand 
each other as we go along, the Court is of the opinion, we 
don’t want to render judgment before it ’s submitted to us, 
but in connection with these records of which you speak, 
we think it perfectly competent to show the action of the 
Board of Regents in respect to the matters involved, but 
we doubt very seriously if it is competent to show its 
deliberations.

Mr. Marshall: No, sir. May I suggest, if the Court 
pleases, the Attorney General has had prepared photostats 
of the Minutes concerning this particular one.

Judge Murrah: Very good, sir.
Mr. Marshall: 1 was about to make the suggestion, sir, 

that the whole thing that they have there, which are photo­
stats, be placed in so that either side can use what portion 
they want, if there is any question ever comes in your 
H onor’s mind about it, it will be here, but no question of 
the authenticity of them and that they be in there for that 
purpose.



66

[fol. 105] Judge Murrah: The Court does not wish to 
encumber this record with matters that are not material.

Mr. Marshall: Yes, sir.
Judge Murrah: It is perfectly all right for them to be 

made available so long as it does not encumber the record.
Mr. Marshall: There are only two pages in the one that 

we want in the record, and what has taken place since the 
judgment of the Court, and let the other just sit there 
in case.

Judge Murrah: That is a matter for you to decide.
Mr. Williamson: There are some fifteen or twenty pages 

here and we had them photostated, it ’s true, but it seems 
to me like that the record ought not to be encumbered with 
the entire fifteen or twenty pages consisting of telegrams 
and opinions the Court knows about.

Judge Vaught: Can’t you agree and stipulate what the 
action of the Board was ?

Mr. Williamson: 1 rather think we can. We have it 
boiled down. Where is that here? I think it is really the 
essence of the lawsuit.

Judge Murrah: Take your time, Mr. Marshall and see if 
that does not epitomize the facts you wish to present.

Mr. Marshall: This is all right for the 10th, this is 
October 10th, but if your Honor pleases, the October 6th 
[fol. 106] meeting, the Board decided at that meeting not 
to admit McLaurin.

Judge Murrah: You wish that for the record?
Mr. Marshall: I want that in the record.
Judge Murrah: Does the Attorney General agree, then, 

that those are the actual notes of the Board at that meeting?
Mr. Williamson: Yes, this was very relevant and we will 

admit it is in the Minutes, I think we can find it in a minute 
here.

Judge Murrah: I t ’s been agreed now at the October 6th 
meeting of the Regents, the Board of Regents of the 
University of Oklahoma declined to admit this plaintiff 
to the University. That’s all you seek to prove, isn ’t it?

Mr. Marshall: Yes, sir.
Mr. Williamson: At that time.
Judge Murrah: At that time. Now let’s proceed to the 

next step. W hat’s the next step?
Mr. Marshall: The next, sir, that we want is a copy of 

the letter from the Attorney General to, I mean this Resolu­



67

tion here—excuse me, which is an excerpt from the Minutes 
of the special meeting of the Regents of the University of 
Oklahoma held on Sunday, October 10, 1948, sir.

Judge Murrah: It is admitted, you agree to it?
[fol. 107] Mr. Williamson: I agree that it reflects the ac­
tion of the Board held on that date.

Judge Murrah: It is admitted in evidence.
(Copy of an excerpt from the Minutes of a special 
meeting of the Board of Regents of the University of 
Oklahoma held October 10, 1948, marked Plaintiff’s 
Exhibit No. 6 for identification, was received in evidence.) 
Mr. Marshall: There is another letter from the Attorney 

General to President Cross, October 6, concerning the 
McLaurin case.

Mr. Williamson: We have furnished them two copies. 
Judge Murrah: Do you wish that admitted in evidence? 
Mr. Marshall: We would like to have that in evidence. 
Judge Murrah: Any objection? It is admitted in 

evidence.
(Copy of letter from the Attorney General of Oklahoma 
to G. L. Cross, President, University of Oklahoma, dated 
October 6, 1948, marked Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 7 for 
identification, was received in evidence.)
Judge Murrah: What is your further pleasure?
Mr. Williamson: I ’d say to the Court and to counsel that 

one of the final statements in this October Opinion is that 
we refer to an Opinion that our office, the Attorney General, 
gave to Governor Turner as of October 2 and enclosed a 
copy. Now we have no objection to a copy of the Turner 
letter. I don’t know how relevant it is but that is referred 
[fol. 108] to in the October 6 Opinion, a copy was attached. 

Mr. Marshall: I have no objection to it.
Judge Murrah: If you don’t want it, it ’s not a question 

of what anyone else—it ’s what you want.
Mr. Marshall: I don’t need it, I don’t object to it. The 

other letters of the Attorney General of October concern­
ing Mrs. Mauderie Hancock Wilson—

Judge Murrah: Can’t you lay that aside for the present? 
Let’s deal with Mr. McLaurin, the plaintiff McLaurin. 

Mr. Marshall: I think, sir, that’s all we have.
Judge Murrah: That’s all the Minutes of the record that 

you deem pertinent to this particular inquiry?



68

Does the Attorney General wish to supplement this proof 
in any way?

Mr. Williamson: I have nothing to offer, your Honor, 
except that I would like to make about a two-line supple­
ment in the form of testimony of Dr. Cross, to the effect 
that the “ Jug”  is a pet name for a luncheon room which 
is a part of the Student Union Building at Norman, where 
the same food is served in the various dining rooms. It is 
just merely one of a series of dining rooms on the floor 
above the cafeteria, I think, there.

Judge Murrah: Which is maintained by the University?
Mr. Williamson: Maintained by the University. They 

have a menu to select from, whereas eleven thousand or 
[fol. 109] more, more or less who desire to eat, have to 
line up and wait in line. A  person in the “ Jug”  sits, is 
approached by a waiter, his order is taken, and his food 
brought to him.

Judge Murrah: I t ’s been agreed.
Mr. Marshall: Of course we agree to it. The only point 

Mr. McLaurin was making was that he was there at a time 
all by himself.

Judge Murrah: He doesn’t dispute those facts.
Mr. Marshall: I don’t think so. He only knows what 

happens when he is there, he doesn’t know what happens 
the other times, so we don’t wish to question Dr. Cross at 
all, sir.

Judge Murrah: The Attorney General’s statement is 
treated as if the testimony of Dr. Cross had been presented, 
and is considered part of the evidence in this case as such.

Now what’s your further pleasure, gentlemen, on the 
facts?

Mr. Williamson: Defendant rests.
Judge Murrah: Very well.
Mr. Marshall: We rest.

Colloquy Re Status 
A dditional P arty

Judge Murrah: Now we come to what might be termed 
the supplemental matter of the question of another party 
who claims to be a member of the class represented by 
this plaintiff, would that be correct?

Mr. Marshall: That is it exactly, sir.



69

[fol. 110] Judge Murrah: You may proceed as you wish 
in that respect. Perhaps you would wish to make a short 
statement.

Mr. Marshall: The statement I would like to make, sir, 
is that as I understand this being a class action, the relief 
granted in the case can be used by any member of the class, 
that there is no question that Miss Wilson is a member of 
the class, and I think that the Attorney General will agree 
that she did apply back in January, approximately the same 
time as Mr. McLaurin, and that the officials of the Uni­
versity of Oklahoma agreed that she is qualified in all 
respects except that she is a Negro.

The issues involved in her case are exactly the same as 
this case. There is therefore no question but that she is in 
the class, which was agreed upon, as I understand it, at the 
first hearing between the Court, the Attorney General— 
and this said—that the class was limited to that group but 
that it did apply to everyone in that group; that for that 
reason we were unable to proceed as to Miss Wilson as 
such because she has not been definitely refused.

I assumed that after the decision of this case, that all of 
these applications were standing more or less together, 
but the Attorney General as of October 22, there is no 
question about that, did rule that the University was not 
required to accept her at this time, and for that reason it 
is a further reason for us asking for affirmative relief, 
[fol. I l l ]  because if this Court does issue affirmative re­
lief it most certainly will apply to M iss Wilson as a member 
of the class. If she wants any further affirmative relief 
she will of course have to come in court and apply for it, 
but if an injunction is issued it would apply to the policy, 
custom and usage of excluding all members of this class, 
and she is a member of the class.

That is our position. I don’t think we need any testimony. 
I don’t think any one of the factual statements I have made 
will be disputed, and that, sir, is our position at this time 
as to Miss Wilson.

Judge Murrah: What does the Attorney General say?
Mr. Williamson: May it please the Court, I must differ 

with my friend and counsel across the table on the state­
ment that the Wilson case is on all fours with the McLaurin 
case. You have an entirely different situation. On the 
McLaurin case itself this Court said “ as to this particular



70

case” . It is needless to go further in reminding this Court 
of its language. The McLaurin case decided the facts and 
circumstances in the McLaurin ease, and we are now about 
to try another lawsuit, and may I say incidentally, so far 
without any pleadings, but here is the situation in the 
Hancock Wilson case: There were five or six of those people, 
three of them saw fit to file State court actions in mandamus 
[fol. 112] in the District Court of Cleveland County. One of 
them was dismissed, that action was McLaurin, and came 
for relief to this court. The other two actions are pending, 
including Mrs. Hancock Wilson.

Mrs. Hancock Wilson pursued her remedy in the State 
court and was met with a decision of the trial court at 
Norman denying her the mandamus. She ordered the 
record and appeal is now in process, and she has a full 
grown lawsuit on these various issues, pending in the State 
court at this time.

Judge Murrah: Wilson?
Mr. Williamson: Wilson, yes. I t ’s not been dismissed. 

The situation is entirely different. She is battling on 
another legal front this good minute, while coming in here 
and informally so far asking for relief here. I don’t say 
that is a violation of law, and I am just telling the Court 
about it.

Now it ’s different to this extent also: That while battling 
on that front, pursuing the- remedy in that lawsuit, she 
comes down to Norman on the 14th of October, in the fact 
of the fact that the University of Oklahoma has a stand­
ardized rule, printed and published in the Summer of 1948, 
saying to the world and to all who are interested, that on 
and after October 13, 1948 all enrollment privileges cease. 
That is a rule of the University. The University Board of 
Regents caused that rule to be passed, and they are a con- 
[fol. 113] stitutional body and entrusted by the Consti­
tution of this State with the full government of that 
institution, and that is one of their rules; on the 13th of 
October the curtain falls on any further enrollment activi­
ties, and in my opinion of the 22nd, and capable of being 
produced as testimony and as true, Dr. Cross tells me in a 
letter that since the 13th of October, 1948 no person, black, 
white, brown or yellow, has enrolled in the University of 
Oklahoma for any cause whatsoever, and that will be in 
the record when my October 22 Opinion will be read.



71

Now that is a situation where there is a vast difference 
between someone coming in after the curtain falls and in 
addition may I say to the Court that this applicant on the 
14th, having come in later than anyone—the last person 
who substituted and asked for and is receiving instruction 
in sociology applied on September 18 and classes began on 
September 20—and this person comes in on the 14th of 
October and changes, without any warning or notice to the 
University, changes entirely her application for admission 
and strikes out the course in social work and enters up a 
course in sociology on the 14th of December after the gate 
has dropped and without notice to the University.

Judge Murrah: 14th of October.
Mr. Williamson: 14th of October, and initialed the 

change and went through all that procedure of changing 
[fol. 114] her course without notice, without warning, 
entirely different instructors, entirely different course of 
study, some of the subjects overlap.

Now on those particulars, on coming in after every and 
any university student has been in and at work, after this 
rule has been invoked and has taken effect as of the 13th, 
coming in on the 14th—that is the main point of difference 
between the two, that and the pursuance of legal remedies 
in another forum.

Judge Vaught: Now Mr. Attorney General—
Mr. Williamson: Yes.
Judge Vaught: I may have misunderstood you. When 

she applied in January, for what course did she apply?
Mr. Williamson: For the course in social work, or for 

graduate instruction leading to a degree in social work.
Judge Vaught: What you say is when she came in on the 

14th of October, why she applied for an entirely different 
course.

Mr. Williamson: Took a pen and struck out “ social work”  
on the afternoon of October 14, and inserted the word 
‘ ‘ sociology, ’ ’ an entirely different court-, and then initiated 
it with her own initials on her application.

Judge Vaught: Is that recognzed as a separate course in 
the University?

Mr. Williamson: It is. Some of the hours of in- 
[fol. 115] struction interlap, but it is a separate course, 
separate hours in the main.



72

Judge Murrah: You have made your position, Mr. Attor­
ney General. The Court thinks that the first matter to be 
considered is whether or not the relief you seek is within 
the pleadings.

Mr. Marshall: Yes, sir.
Judge Murrah: And within the scope of the relief granted 

by this Court in its judgment.
You have made yourself clear on that point, that is, as 

I understand it, you say that this suit was brought as a 
class action, and that the plaintiff McLaurin is repre­
sentative of the class of which this party, Wilson, is a mem­
ber; being similarly situated she is entitled to the same 
relief. That is about right, isn’t it ?

Mr. Marshall: Yes, sir.
Judge Murrah: May it be agreed, or can it be agreed, that 

the statements on the part of the counsel for Wilson are the 
true facts and may be treated as received in evidence, and 
that the statement on the part of the Attorney General with 
respect to the position of the State, so far as it states the 
facts, are true and may be considered as part of the evidence.

Mr. Williamson: I see no objection to it.
Judge Murrah: Instead of suggesting that they are 

[fol. 116] true—that those will be the evidence in the case.
Mr. Williamson: We have no objection to that.
Mr. Marshall: Also the letters of the Attorney General.
Judge Murrah: Yes, and you of course want to introduce 

the litigation, such pertinent parts of the State court litiga­
tion, I assume, in support of your statement.

Mr. Williamson: I want, of course, in the record it to be 
noted that State litigation.

Judge Murrah : You have so stated, and if the parties 
agree, that will be taken as evidence.

Mr. Williamson: It is now pending.
Judge Murrah: I do not know whether this court would 

be aided by a more particular statement or more particular 
evidence of the litigation.

Mr. Williamson: As to the issues in the State litigation?
Judge Murrah: Yes. The issues there and the progress 

of the litigation. We deem it quite important, I think that 
to consider, whether or not this plaintiff’s rights are being 
litigated in the State court. That being true we would cer­
tainly be most reluctant to interfere to grant any relief for 
that reason alone.



73

Mr. Marshall: I know that line of cases along that 
line, sir, and the question is that there are two ways, 
[fol. 117] of course, to meet it: One is to drop the State 
court case prior to final litigation, but on the other hand 
that is a law action, mandamus. Here we have an equity 
action and this court having taken over jurisdiction of the 
subject matter, that in this type of case this court for that 
reason is entitled to cover the subject matter of the case, 
which is the small group of six people that is involved in it, 
and for that reason only I believe that having taken juris­
diction of this particular subject matter that the court 
should retain jurisdiction until complete relief is given 
for the entire class.

Judge Murrah: The Court appreciates your position in 
that respect, but you also must admit that this court, sitting 
as a court of equity, should so fashion its decree with 
respect to the subject matter as to grant the relief and at 
the same time have it sufficiently flexible to accord to the 
State processes the dignity that they are entitled to.

Mr. Marshall: I think so, sir, but I might say if this point 
is to be decided, it cannot be decided on the narrow issue of 
McLaurin. I think that if this Court, I think that the Court’s 
declaratory judgment was enough for the defendants in this 
case to understand what the law is, not as to McLaurin but 
as to all Negroes who stay in that category, and that having 
failed to do so in the McLaurin case, it seems to me that that 
[fol. 118] is a basis for our coming again to the court and 
saying that the declaratory judgment is not enough, we 
have to have clearer, more affirmative relief so that the 
officials of the University of Oklahoma, those who want to 
follow the law, will have the protection of this court, so that 
they can take Miss Wilson or anybody else who happens to 
fall in this peculiar category; and that is the reason that I 
believe Miss Wilson’s case is a part of this action any way 
it ’s looked at, because it would be strange for the University 
officials to say that here are two people in almost the same 
position, and when we say “ yes”  to one, to the other we 
say “ no.”

I don’t think this thing about October 14—to my mind that 
she applied in January, she didn’t apply in October.

Judge Vaught: If she applied for one course in January, 
now if she applies for another course in October—



74

Mr. Marshall: I think any student, sir, is entitled to 
change courses.

Judge Vaught: Well, of course she would be bound by the 
regulations in effect.

Mr. Marshall: There is no regulation that says you can­
not change courses in the University of Oklahoma.

Judge Vaught: I don’t know. I am just assuming that 
there is.

Mr. Marshall: To my mind the same rule applies in 
equity, that is the clean hands doctrine, and the only reason 
[fol. 119] that she was not in school on October 13th was 
that the defendants hadn’t admitted her, and furthermore 
she was there on October 13 and in the presence of her 
counsel, who was there, I think, to try to keep them from 
pulling that type of thing.

Judge Vaught: Don’t use the word “ pulling that type of 
thing. ’ ’ This is a legal matter.

Mr. Marshall: Sir, I say quite seriously that we are 
dealing with fundamental rights, and to say that the mere 
fact that a person applies through a lawyer who says that 
she is ready to come, can she come, on the 13th, sir, then 
on the 14th she goes herself, and I do say, sir, I do use 
the word, the technicality that she goes one day late—

Judge Vaught: (Interposing) If she knew the printed 
regulations provide that the entrance would be to the l'3th 
and none thereafter, why did she not comply with that?

Mr. Marshall: The reason she didn’t comply, sir, is be­
cause she sent her lawyer to find out whether she was 
wasting her time in coming out there, and the law doesn’t 
require anybody to do a vain act. The onus was placed on 
the defendants in January and this court has so held that 
they were wrong in not admitting her in January, and they 
kept her out from January until now, and then they come 
in the court room and say that she hasn’t complied. She 
met all the lawful requirements and the only reason she 
[fol. 120] wasn’t admitted was because of the rulings 
which have been declared invalid in this particular case as 
to McLaurin, so I think they are precluded from coming 
in and saying that she did not apply in time. She applied 
away ahead of time.

Mr. Williamson: I might make one observation. The 
January application was, as the Court well remembers, 
without any notice, and without any warning. That whole



75

matter was presented to the Court. The January applica­
tion resulted in a temporary turndown, so that she knew 
and felt the necessity of applying again, and did apply 
again, because of the fact that she realized and recognized 
that her first application had been denied, and she came on 
the 14th personally and applied.

Judge Murrah: Now Mr. Counsel'—
Mr. Marshall: Yes, sir.
Judge Murrah: Treating this matter as a class action, 

which it is, and the plaintiff as the representative of that 
class, it is incumbent upon you, of course, fundamental, to 
show that any other party claiming to be a member of that 
class is similarly situated.

Mr. Marshall: Yes, sir.
Judge Murrah: Now have you done so ?
Mr. Marshall: In this case, we will say the case is similar­

ly situated. It was limited to the group who had applied, 
who were qualified and who had applied, and who had 
[fol. 121] been refused.

Judge Murrah: Now you have done so to your satis­
faction ?

Mr. Marshall: I think, sir, that we have shown that Miss 
Wilson—•

Judge Murrah: That is the point I inquired about. I 
wanted to give you an opportunity to meet that, issue and to 
advise you that, of course, you must do that before the 
Court could consider it at all.

Mr. Marshall: I agree, sir. It is my understanding that 
in the stipulation we agreed to in open court, it was to the 
effect that Miss Wilson was qualified in all respects other 
than race for admission when she applied in January of 
this year, and she was refused admission to the Graduate 
School solely because of her race or color pursuant to the 
statutes 455, 456 and 457, and for that reason she stood in 
the same position as McLaurin and stood in the class of 
qualified applicants who had applied who had been refused 
solely because of race or color in around about the same 
time.

Judge Murrah: Is it a fact that plaintiff McLaurin as of 
January 28, and sometime in September we will say made 
further application to the University officials for admission?

Mr. Marshall: Made application.



76

Judge Murrah: The real issue—I am not sure about 
that—but wasn’t the real issue before us when we rendered 
[fol. 122] our judgment in this case, whether or not your 
plaintiff McLaurin, having made application for admission 
in January of ’48 and again having made application in 
September sometime ?

Mr. Marshall: Yes, sir.
Judge Murrah: I am not sure about that date, I am 

merely trying to illustrate the point, that the question 
remains whether it was not incumbent upon any other 
member of this class who claims to be similarly situated, to 
have made application to the proper authorities and sub­
mitted their credits and credentials during the enrollment 
period before September 23 or October 13 as the case might 
be. I  don’t know which is the critical date. The point I am 
trying to illustrate or call your attention to is, she must be 
in all respects similarly situated before you can have the 
prerequisites to seeking the relief we have granted your 
plaintiff McLaurin.

Mr. Marshall: I think so, but she did not reapply in 
September.

Judge Murrah: Now she did not, and conceding that, 
conceding that she did not reapply, put it this way, Mr. 
Reporter: Conceding that she did apply on January 28, 
1948, that she was denied, tentatively denied admittance 
February 2, 1948, but did not thereafter pursue her applica­
tion for admission until October 14, 1948; meanwhile plain­
tiff McLaurin reapplied to the University—while I don’t 
[fol. 123] know the date, I know he reapplied and that date 
was pleaded and was material and was in the original hear­
ing, because the reason it was, if you will recall at least one 
of the members of the Court expressed the view that in 
order to have a collision of issues, it was necessary for him 
to make normal application for admission in the University. 
I know I entertained that view, and when we met to render 
the final decision in this case, or that is the interlocutory 
decision, it was again stipulated that he had made applica­
tion or an application was unnecessary, I believe that was, 
for him.

Mr. Marshall: Yes, if your Honor pleases.
Judge Murrah: The point is certainly in the case.
Mr. Marshall: I take this position and I have taken it 

all along, that especially in an equity case, whoever sets



77

up the chain of circumstances which create harm, I don’t 
think that particular person can rely on anything in that 
chain of circumstances—I think under normal circumstances 
and not matters of evidence but as a matter of what actually 
happens when an application is made and not followed 
through, the student does not renew the application. The 
application sets in the files and it can he reactivated by just 
a letter, telephone call or anything. It can be reactivated 
but it is an old application that carries on through unless 
there has been a change in the rule, as to the type of applica­
tion that is to be filed. Now the wrongdoing in this case 
[fol. 124] was the result solely of the defendants. They 
didn’t let her in.

Judge Vaught: Could they have let her in legally in 
January?

Mr. Marshall: I think so, your Honor.
Judge Vaught: I don’t think they could. There was a 

State statute. The Board of Regents has no power to de­
clare an Act unconstitutional and before McLaurin was 
admitted it was necessary that there be either a decree of a 
court or a repeal by the legislative body before an adminis­
trative body could take action. They couldn’t ignore the 
law. That was in a statute.

Mr. Marshall: All right, sir, I agree with that, but it does 
not change the position, I don’t think, sir. My position is 
now either that the State of Oklahoma by statute or the 
defendant by administrative action denied to this plaintiff, 
or rather Miss Wilson, the protection of the Federal Con­
stitution back in January of ’48.

Judge Vaught: But that wouldn’t be a matter that an 
administrative body could determine. It would be necessary 
either for the Legislature to repeal these laws, or for some 
court of competent jurisdiction by decree to hold them 
unconstitutional.

Mr. Marshall: So the statutes deprive Miss Wilson of 
her education.

Judge Vaught: Yes, sir.
[fol. 125] Mr. Marshall: State of Oklahoma.

Judge Vaught: Yes, sir.
Mr. Marshall: Now the State of Oklahoma, this time 

speaking through the Attorney General and the defendants, 
the Board of Regents, say that because of the fact that our 
State statutes deprived you of admission to the University



78

of Oklahoma back in January, you have to reapply in 
October, when she has done what any other students did. 
All the other students are in. They didn’t have to reapply. 
This is not a normal situation that can be compared with 
the ordinary.

Judge Vaught: There was no occasion for the other 
application, but when she applied, under the laws of this 
state, neither the Board of Regents nor the faculty of the 
University of Oklahoma, could have permitted her to enter.

Mr. Marshall: Yes, sir.
Judge Vaught: There is a law against it, a statute. Well, 

an administrative body can’t ignore State law. They have 
no power to declare it unconstitutional. They couldn’t even 
go far enough to say that it conflicts with the Constitution 
of the United States. It is a matter either for a legislative 
body or for a court before they would have the power to 
admit. Now in the MeLaurin case our reason for holding 
that he was entitled to equal educational facilities, was 
because our Constitution said so, and the laws of the 
State said so, and the Supreme Court of the United States 
[fol. 126] said so, but the State comes in and then admits 
we have no other place where equal facilities can be pro­
vided.

Mr. Marshall: Yes, sir.
Judge Vaught: So in that case, this court under that state 

of facts held that in so far as MeLaurin was denied the 
right to enter the University, since there was no other place 
where he could acquire this education, that the segregation 
laws, so far as he was concerned in this particular case, 
were null and void, and unconstitutional, and that is as far 
as this court has gone.

Mr. Marshall: I think this court did recognize in the first 
hearing that this was a class action and it would apply to 
the group.

Judge Murrah: Conceding that, and this is the point about 
which I wish to inquire — conceding that this suit was 
brought as a class action and prosecuted as such, and that 
all persons similarly situated are entitled to the same relief, 
that is your contention ?

Mr. Marshall: Yes, sir.
Judge Murrah: And you contend Miss Wilson—I don’t 

know, I can’t recall the full name, is, if similarly situated, 
entitled to the same relief that we have granted and which



79

you ask and for further relief you ask for the plaintiff 
McLaurin. When was her suit filed in the State court!
[fol. 127] Mr. Marshall: June.

Judge Murrah: June of ’48?
Mr. Marshall: Yes, sir.
Judge Murrah: And what relief did she seek?
Mr. Marshall: Mandamus in the District Court in 

Norman.
Judge Murrah: And she sought to mandamus the State 

authorities to admit her?
Mr. Marshall: Yes, sir.
Judge Murrah: To the course for which she made applica­

tion on January 28,1948?
Mr. Marshall: Yes, sir.
Judge Murrah: And on the ground asserted there, I 

assume, that the statutes which forbade her admission were 
unconstitutional and void?

Mr. Marshall: Yes, sir.
Judge Murrah: And they never had any right under the 

law to deny her admission ?
Mr. Marshall: I  might say this, sir, there was quite a 

bit of dispute as to whether or not the statutes were cor­
rectly—

Judge Murrah: (Interposing) You sought to compel her 
admission and on the ground she had a constitutional right?

Mr. Marshall: Statutes notwithstanding, your Honor.
[fol. 128] Judge Murrah: To pursue the course of study, 
the statutes to the contrary notwithstanding. Now the ques­
tion in my mind and one which I must decide, is whether 
conceding, as you say, that this is a class action, and that all 
parties similarly situated are entitled to like relief, whether 
a party who makes application on January 28, 1948 for 
admission to pursue a course of study in the University of 
Oklahoma, which is not offered elsewhere in the State, and 
having been denied that admission tentatively on February 
2, 1948, thereafter in June, 1948 brought an action in the 
State court to compel her admission on the ground that the 
State had no constitutional right to deprive her of admis­
sion to the course of study, and thereafter while pursuing 
that remedy in the State court refrain from making further 
application or further pursuing her application for admis­
sion, while at the same time the plaintiff McLaurin was 
relying solely upon the processes of this court for relief.

6—34



80

That is apparently as the facts are, whether she now stands 
in the same position, whether she is similarly situated, seems 
to me to be, as far as I am concerned, the paramount ques­
tion, the dominant question in this case, the one that it is 
certainly incumbent upon you to show. We can’t assume 
that she is similarly situated simply because she made ap­
plication in January.

Mr. Marshall: I agree.
[fol. 129] Judge Murrah: I think the proof is conceded, of 
course, that she made application in January, 1948 and was 
denied in February. Now that is as far as the similarity 
goes except that she is still qualified.

Mr. Marshall: And that as I understand it, she has 
reapplied not later than October 14.

Judge Murrah: Yes, sir, reapplied for admission and 
denied, and then back to court and now in this court claim­
ing relief in a class action, while admitting at the same 
time she has been pursuing the same remedy or substan­
tially the same remedy in another forum with jurisdiction, 
with concurrent jurisdiction to grant relief.

Mr. Marshall: Judge Murrah, I was trying to leave that 
point to the last. That’s tough.

Judge Murrah: Well, eventually we will have to get to it.
Mr. Marshall: That’s tough. As I understand it, if this 

were a brand new action that she was filing, that is if I may 
for a minute forget about the State court.

Judge Murrah: Proceed as you wish.
Mr. Marshall: She reapplied on the 14th and came into 

this court and asked for an injunction to restrain them from 
holding her out, I think then we are up against a very real 
proposition.

Judge Murrah: Yes, sir.
[fol. 130] Mr. Marshall: Where this court has already 
said that State statute cannot deprive a person of equal 
protection, it seems to me that if a State statute falls, any 
rule and regulation of a university could fall also, and that 
unless it could be shown that it was a crime or something 
to admit a student one day late, I am accepting the Attorney 
General’s point that she was one day late, recognize that 
she has already applied back in January, and she comes in 
one day late and because of that reason, credence is given 
to the rule and regulation of a school, when as a matter of 
fact statutes have been declared unconstitutional, applied



8 1

to ray mind in an equity court, I think that an equity court 
has the power to even go so far as to ignore that rule, and 
I think that one day, neither wrecks nor helps any school 
for anybody.

Judge Vaught: Suppose, as has been stated here, that no 
one, no other students of any color were or would have been 
admitted after the 13th. Would you say that she didn’t have 
equal privileges then with others ?

Mr. Marshall: No, sir, she didn’t have equal privileges 
because there are no other students in her category. There 
is no other student that was held out from January.

Judge Murrah: I fully appreciate that, Mr. Counsel.
[fol. 131] Mr. Marshall: But now it comes to the point 
whether—you see, it ’s not a question of comity, but as the 
courts have said, it is a question of law.

Judge Murrah: And if it is compelling law, it certainly 
will be a question of comity, and requiring a Federal equity 
court to stay its hand. I t ’s been the policy of this court 
and must be the policy of this court to act only when all 
other processes have failed, and in that connection, be sen­
sitive of those repeated admonishings down through the 
years so we not usurp vested jurisdiction of a State court, 
if we were to grant relief when she is seeking it in a State 
tribunal charged with responsibility equal with this court 
of interpreting and applying the constitutional laws of the 
United States.

Mr. Marshall: I think, sir, that—well, I think I can go this 
far, s ir : That this is not only the law but I agree with it, 
and the only thing I said is what I said in the beginning, that 
if she were to come in here herself at this time, no question 
but that you pick your forum and you stay there until you 
exhaust your remedies—the only thing I am saying is that 
we have here a decision by this court which applies to 
McLaurin, who happened to pick this procedure, and we 
have other members of the class in the State court, and 
it was for that reason and that reason only of this 
court having once taken jurisdiction over the subject 
[fol. 132] matter and giving complete relief, that is the 
only exception, sir, that we claim, and we are not quarreling 
with the law on the other side.

Judge Murrah: "We will hear you further at one-thirty.



82

Might the Court, let the Court suggest that the State 
court proceedings are certainly pertinent to consideration 
of the issues in this case, and not only the time of filing 
hut the relief sought there, and the status of litigation there 
is pertinent. If you have that, if it is available, the Court 
would greatly appreciate it if you would tender it in 
evidence.

Mr. Williamson: On that point, your Honor, I confess I 
didn’t know how far we were going to proceed in this.

Judge Murrah: That’s all right.
Mr. Williamson: That is another lawsuit to us because 

it ’s pending in the State court. A  case made was served on 
us some two or three weeks ago and the latter is lodged in 
the Supreme Court now. I didn’t—

Mr. Marshall: (Interposing) It isn’t lodged there.
Mr. Williamson: It is about to be, I will put it that way, 

will be.
Judge Murrah: No criticism of the Attorney General. 

You have been very diligent, no doubt about that.
[fol. 133] Mr. Williamson: I really think the matter is of 
sufficient importance that in all fairness we should have a 
day or two perhaps to file here with this court exhibits 
constituting the applicable portions of record in that ease.

Judge Murrah: May I interrupt, Mr. Attorney General, 
the nature of the case has been stated. If that is the nature 
of the case, if those dates mentioned here on that record 
are correct, the Court doesn’t need the actual exhibits of the 
pleadings.

Mr. Williamson: I misunderstood the Court, I thought 
the Court just now said that the Court did wish to be 
advised in detail about the case. I misunderstood you.

Judge Murrah: I did say that, surely did, but what I 
mean to say, sir, is if we are sufficiently advised as to the 
details, the case may be submitted, and we will render our 
decision forthwith.

Mr. Marshall: If your Honor pleases, any statement that 
the Attorney General makes about the case as it is pending 
we most certainly agree with it, sir, because we were in 
the case, and I mean we both understand exactly what it is, 
and if he will just make a statement or whatever your 
Honor agrees, we will agree with whatever he says.

Judge Murrah: We are not going to make the case for 
you. It is not our province to do so. If you are satisfied with



83

[fol. 134] the proof, both of you are satisfied with it, the 
Court certainly is.

Mr. Williamson: We are quite satisfied with the proof. 
It is just simply a case in mandamus where the decision 
went against her in the trial in the trial court, and she is 
appealing to the Supreme Court.

If your Honor please, may I interrupt just to this extent: 
There are two gentlemen here who are under subpoenas to 
bring all the records for the last three years of these Boards. 
May they be released ?

Mr. Marshall: I am very sorry I didn’t think about it 
before.

Judge Murrah: That’s all right. Witnesses are excused 
from further attendance on this court. Any other witnesses 
subpoenaed here? All witnesses under agreement and all 
witnesses who have been subpoenaed to testify in these 
proceedings are excused from further attendance.

Judge Vaught: Let me ask you, did you gentlemen desire 
to orally argue this case or do you want to submit a brief?

Mr. Williamson: I would much prefer to submit briefs. 
We have rather tried to hurry each other and tried to get 
through the case.

Judge Murrah: If you wish to argue it, we think that 
perhaps we will give a full opportunity to argue the case 
orally, and we shall endeavor to arrive at a conclusion forth- 
[fol. 135] with, because the matter of course is very 
familiar to us, and we have studied it. It is just your 
pleasure.

Mr. Marshall: If your Honor pleases, I made my position 
clear in the beginning, and I don’t know about the Attorney 
General, but if I could have just five minutes to cite one case, 
that will be all the argument I would want,

Judge Murrah: You may proceed not only five minutes 
but thirty minutes if you wish.

Mr. Marshall: No, sir, not thirty minutes.
I f  your Honor pleases, I think that it is clear that the 

issue in this case has narrowed down, as to the McLaurin 
case, is narrowed down to the question as to whether or not 
the Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, in the 
absence of any State statutes specifically requiring segrega­
tion of the races, has inherent power to segregate. I think 
the only issue left in the case, and the law on that ease 
is summed up in—if I can get it, the Westminster School



84

District vs. Mendez. I t ’s a Ninth Circuit Case in 161 Fed­
eral 2d 774, decided last year.

Judge Vaught: What page number?
Mr. Marshall: 774, sir.
Judge Murrah: 161 ?
Mr. Marshall: 161 2d. I t ’s a question of segregation of 

Mexican children in California, and the defendant school 
board put up several defenses. One was language 
[fob 136] difficulties, that the Mexican children all spoke 
Spanish, but it developed in the trial in the lower court 
that the real question was the segregation of Mexicans 
because they were Mexicans. There were some side issues 
in the case as to treaties between Mexico and the United 
States, which always come up in these Mexican cases, but 
the basic issues in the Circuit Court of Appeals was nar­
rowed to the point that in the absence of a statute requiring 
segregation, that the particular school board did not have 
authority to segregate, that such segregation was in viola­
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is not new law. 
There are cases, some are cited in the case itself and there 
are others, Ward versus Flood, a California case.

Judge Vaught: I t ’s their contention we don’t contend that 
isn’t the law.

Mr. Marshall: Well, sir, if that be the facts, then the State 
has no right to segregate McLaurin.

Judge Vaught: Where we differ is that your contention 
is that there are no segregation laws in Oklahoma.

Mr. Marshall: That apply to the University.
Judge Vaught: Yes, sir. We, this court hasn’t held that. 

This court has held that the laws of Oklahoma, the State 
not having provided equal facilities anywhere else, do not 
prevent the admission of this man to the University, since 
that’s the only place he can get it.
[fol. 137] Mr. Marshall: I f  your Honor pleases, the 
statute ruled on makes it a crime to teach white and colored 
pupils in the same school. That is what the statute says. 
It is no qualification of that statute. He is being taught in 
the same school, so that statute cannot apply.

Judge Vaught: That is the part that was held was void 
as far as it applied to him.

Mr. Marshall: The only other statute in the State of 
Oklahoma that requires segregation is a provision of the 
Oklahoma Constitution which applies to public schools and



85

has been construed several times as not applying to uni­
versities, not in Oklahoma but in other states, as not apply­
ing to universities, and the school, the Board of Regents 
of the University of Oklahoma, the letters from the 
Attorney General, make it clear, which are in evidence, are 
operating on the inherent authority of that Board to set 
up segregation, and that these cases all say that in the 
absence of State statute, the Board does not have the right 
to segregate.

The other point is that—
Judge Murrah: (Interposing) Before you leave that, 

what about the provision of the Constitution of the State?
Mr. Marshall: It says public schools, and there are cases, 

if your Honor is interested, that I can get.
Judge Murrah: I am not interested except that 

[fol. 138] thought occurred to me. It hasn’t been men­
tioned anywhere either in our Judgment or in argument 
here.

Mr. Marshall: This litigation has been going on, not this 
particular case, I don’t know, sir, but I think the Attorney 
General, we agreed away back, that that statute did not 
apply to universities.

Judge Murrah: That is, this provision in the Constitution.
Mr. Marshall: It means public schools and does not mean 

universities. There are now cases in other states, and the
question first came up in............ v. University of Maryland.
That is the first case that came up, and it ’s been on the 
fringes of each one of these cases, and there has been no 
question that in the absence of a specific statement includ­
ing “ universities” —the only statutes that I know of in the 
State of Oklahoma are those which are now being, the 
schools are now operating under.

Judge Murrah: A  State constitutional inhibition has no 
application to these facts?

Mr. Marshall: No, sir, and that the State criminal 
statutes have no application, obviously. They say that it 
is a crime to teach in the same school, being no statute, 
they are acting on their own inherent authority, which they 
don’t have.

Judge Murrah: I think that does not quite answer 
[fol. 139] the question as far as we are concerned. Con­
ceding now that they have no inherent authority as you 
state to administratively segregate, that would be what we



86

are dealing with, the question yet remains whether or not 
it is of concern to this court.

Mr. Marshall: Well, sir, the Westminster case is the 
first case that passed on that point.

Judge Murrah: I will certainly he interested to know 
and my mind is open on the matter, but this is the ques­
tion, it seems to me—which is undecided in my mind—and 
that is, conceding the lack of authority to segregate, how 
it is our concern unless the action amounts to a deprivation 
of equal protection of the law. We don’t supervise the 
University of Oklahoma. We don’t supervise the State 
action, unless this State action constitutes an infraction of 
the equal protection of the law. Now I may say to myself, 
“ Well, they of course have no right to do that, they are 
doing things that I am satisfied are unauthorized under 
State law,”  but I am sitting here as a court, the Federal 
court, and I don’t dip my finger into it unless there is a 
collision with the Federal law of which I am the judge.

Mr. Marshall: I am mistaken about the Westminster case. 
There is a lower District Court case in Texas that was 
issued about June of this year on the Mexican question, so 
that those are the only Federal cases.

Judge Murrah: What is that ease ?
[fol. 140] Mr. Marshall: I will have to get it, sir.

Judge Murrah: What did the Ninth Circuit say?
Mr. Marshall: The last part of this opinion is to my mind 

the important part. It cites all of the segregation cases, 
Plessy v. Ferguson and all of those, and then points out, 
“ In the first place we are aware of no authority justifying 
any segregation fiat by an administrative or executive 
decree, as every case cited to us is based upon legislative act. 
The segregation in this case is without legislative support 
and comes into fatal collision with the legislation of the 
State,”  talking about the other side.

Then they proceed to hold that it is a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and they use the Screws case and 
a number of others in this special concurring opinion. That 
goes back and takes in the Snowden case and the Screws 
case, but it definitely declared it a violation of the Four­
teenth Amendment. The position that we take on these is 
that classification, when examined under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, unless based—and there is no dispute on 
those cases—unless based on a rational basis connected



87

with the purpose of the classification, violates the Four­
teenth Amendment. However, all of those cases show that 
the plaintiff, the complaining party, actually has lost some­
thing that you can put your hand on as a result of that 
classification. We take the position as to the McLaurin case 
[fol. 141] that McLaurin is losing something, what he is 
particularly losing is by being put in a situation of being 
a leper, or something wrong with him to exclude him from 
a room. It interferes with his ability to study. It would 
interfere with mine or I think it would interfere with 
anybody’s. That takes something away from him.

Therefore the Court has a right to look at the classifica­
tion, and these defendants have not put on one piece of 
testimony to show a basis for that classification. No theory 
lias been produced to this Court, evidence or otherwise, 
justifying this classification, so it stands as a classification 
without justification. It is a racial elassificaton which both 
the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Murphy here in a case say 
that classifications on the basis of race are odious. Of 
course they were speaking there of the Fifth Amendment, 
Japanese cases from California. There were about three of 
them, and at the same time it was repeated in there that 
they were odious, that is, these racial distinctions, and we 
think in this case that so far as I am concerned it is the first 
time that, the true result of segregation laws is apparent. 
You take one person. You don’t put him in with a whole 
lot of other people, you don’t segregate that group from 
another group and not put any bad opinion on either 
group—that’s not true in this case. Here we take one man 
and put him on the outside and let him peep in from the 
outside, that the purpose of that segregation is not to 
[fol. 142] maintain separation of the races, the purpose 
of segregation is to humiliate him. To humiliate, maybe is 
not enough for a court to pass upon, but when the humilia­
tion is coupled up with a frame of mind that will prevent 
that man from getting the same thing that everybody else 
gets, it most certainly is the type of classification that comes 
within the regular classification cases in the 14th Amend­
ment.

Judge Murrah: In other words, to epitomize your argu­
ment, it is to the effect that the segregation as shown by 
these facts is humiliating and so odious and so humiliating



as to deprive him of the equal protection of the law or equal 
facilities.

Mr. Marshall: Yes, sir.
Judge Murrah: Or equal facilities, which in turn deprive 

hi in of equal protection of the law.
Mr. Marshall: Yes, sir.
Judge Murrah: Gentlemen, do you wish to add some­

thing at this time, or would you prefer to brief the matter, 
what is your pleasure about it ?

Mr. Williamson: I should like to do a little of both, if 
your Honor please. I ’d like to make about two oral observa­
tions, and at the conclusion of which I would pray the Court 
for a day or two, or a few days to brief. Now I would like 
to refer for a moment to our book here, jointly used. 
Frankly, I wTill say to the Court that I personally haven’t 
[fol. 143] read this case but my associate has during the 
little interim here, and I desire to point out to the Court 
that this case—

Judge Murrah: Had you seen the authority until today?
Mr. Williamson: I had not seen it today, but Mr. Hansen 

during the moments he had available, has checked into it 
and we find that, and call the Court’s attention to the fact, 
that this of course is a construction of the statutory law of 
California and constitutional law of California, upon a 
situation, a factual situation entirely different from the 
McLaurin case in this: That in California they sought to 
segregate the Mexican, and they segregated the Mexican 
children not by giving them benches in the same classroom 
listening to the same professors, visiting in the interim 
between classes with the other students not at all—they put 
them way over in another building and at another location, 
different students, different hours, perhaps, of study, a 
complete physical segregation.

There is no such thing in the McLaurin case. It is just 
vastly different. Construction of California laws.

One other observation, I am sure the Court will take 
cognizance and I ’d like, of course, permission to recite in 
my brief, to call the Court’s attention to the Oklahoma case 
of' Rheam versus Board of Regents, where the Supreme 
Court of Oklahoma has laid down the law that the Board 
[fol. 144] of Regents of the University of Oklahoma has 
the implied power to do everything necessary and con­
venient to accomplish the objects for which that school was



89

founded and which is not prohibited either expressly or im­
pliedly by law. And with that final observation—

Judge Broaddus: What is that citation, General!
Mr. Williamson: 161 Oklahoma 268.
I also call the Court’s attention in conclusion to the 

decision of the State Supreme Court of Oklahoma in the 
first Sipuel case. Of course the second Sipuel case the Court 
will remember, was an application or action filed originally 
in the Supreme Court of the United States. In this 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in this case in an Opinion 
January 17, 1948, in construing 190 Pacific 2d 437, in con­
struing the Constitution and statutes, takes issue with my 
friend the lawyer from New York there when he says that 
these three statutes having fallen there is nothing left on 
which to base segregation. Well, the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma, and I spoke about that in the early portion of 
this case—there was some little difference of opinion prob­
ably between we lawyers, and the Court itself, our State 
court says this, it says “ Policy established by Constitution 
and statutes is to segregate white and Negro races for 
purpose of education at institutions of higher learning. ’ ’

In our brief we will develop the fact that there 
[fol. 145] are two sections, two articles in the Oklahoma 
Constitution, one of them is Article 13, which provides for 
what practically all lawyers in all courts agree is the method 
and plan and constitutional provision for common school 
education in Oklahoma. That is Article 13 in the Con­
stitution, but Article 23 of the Constitution, Section 11, I 
believe it is, says that wherever in this Constitution the 
word “ colored person or Negro”  is used, that it means all 
and every age of person of that race. Now that is not the 
exact wording. I am recalling it from memory.

We would like leave to cite those and other applicable 
matters that we deem applicable in a brief to be filed with 
all expedition. We don’t desire to delay it at all.

Judge Murrah: Just a moment. Now the Court under­
stands that, in order that counsel may understand i t : The 
questions presented to us are first, whether or not the 
plaintiff McLaurin has on the facts developed today been 
denied and is being denied the equal protection of the law. 
You agree to that.

Now with respect to Wilson, the Court is of the opinion 
that she comes within the scope of the pleadings, so you will



90

have no precedural problems of pleadings. The narrow 
question is whether or not she is similarly situated. Do you 
understand that ?

Mr. Marshall: Yes, sir.
[fol. 146] Judge Murrah: Is that your understanding 
about it? Well, of course you do not agree. You think that 
she doesn’t come within the scope of the pleadings or you 
suggest she does not.

Mr. Williamson: That’s right.
May I observe to the Court that we are not prepared to 

go into the formal hearing of the Mauderie Wilson matter 
without further pleadings being filed.

Judge Murrah: Well, I understand that the matter is 
squarely presented to us.

Mr. Williamson: I understand, but I say that it is our 
position in the case, the Court understands me, in case the 
ruling is against us, I want the record there sure.

Judge Murrah: Your protest is recorded but we will 
decide this question first: Whether or not McLaurin has on 
these facts been deprived of the equal protection of law, 
and second: Whether or not Wilson is similarly situated, 
therefore entitled to the same relief.

Now you have the privilege of filing a brief if you wish 
or memorandum authorities. We hope that you will make 
it very brief. Primarily we are interested in authorities. 
We understand your position.

Mr. Marshall: I f your Honor pleases, if it is all right 
with the Attorney General, since we are the moving par­
ties, may I be permitted to answer his brief when he files 
[fol. 147] his, because anything we said in our brief will be 
what I have already said.

Judge Murrah: We thought you would exchange it and 
expedite the matter in five days, give you five days, both 
parties, to file whatever they wish to file. If we wait to 
answer it, it might be thirty days.

Mr. Marshall: We agree with the five days, sir.
Judge Murrah: Five days.
Mr. Williamson: Quite all right.
Judge Murrah: File anything you wish to file, but we 

hope you will keep it short.
Mr. Williamson: Our briefs will cross in the mail.
Judge Murrah: And if you wish to add surrebuttal the 

next day, that will be permissible.



91

Would it be necessary to convene the Court or can the 
Court file its Judgment? If we do so it will be necessary 
to give notice.

Mr. Williamson: We would think the matter ought to 
stand submitted at this time subject to briefing and decision.

Mr. Marshall: If there be any technicalities we waive 
them.

Judge Murrah: Well, there are no technicalities that 
except unless you think it is necessary for us to formally 
convene.
[fol. 148-149] Mr. Marshall: No, sir.

Judge Murrah: This matter is submitted and this Court 
is at recess.

(Whereupon, the proceedings in the above-styled case 
were adjourned.)



150

PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 1



PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 2



PjEAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 3



153

PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 4



154



97

[fol. 155] P laintiff ’s E xhibit 6

From the minutes of a special meeting of the Regents of 
the University of Oklahoma held on Sunday, Oct, 10, 1948.

Regent Emery: “ I now offer the following motion and 
move its adoption: ‘ That the Board of Regents of the 
University of Oklahoma authorize and direct the President 
of the University, and the appropriate officials of the Uni­
versity, to grant the application for admission to the 
Graduate College of G. W. McLaurin in time for Mr. 
McLaurin to enroll at the beginning of the term, under such 
rules and regulations as to segregation as the President 
of the University shall consider to afford to Mr. G. W. 
McLaurin substantially equal educational opportunities as 
are afforded to other persons seeking the same education 
in the Graduate College and that the President of the 
University promulgate such regulations’. ”

A  roll call vote was asked for with the following voting 
A Y E :

Regent Emery 
Regent Shepler 
Regent White 
Regent Benedum 
Regent Deacon 
Regent McBride 

Absent:
Regent Noble ---------

[fol. 156] Plaintiff ’s E xhibit 7
T he A ttorney General of Oklahoma 

Oklahoma City, Okla.
October 6,1948

Honorable G. L. Cross, President 
University of Oklahoma 
Norman, Oklahoma
Dear S ir :

Your telegram of Saturday afternoon, October 2 (de­
livered Monday morning), reads as follows:

“ It is the legal obligation of the Board of Regents 
to admit McLaurin in event he presents himself for 
admission to graduate college of University of Okla­
homa next week. Urgency of the matter necessitates 
immediate action and your opinion by Wednesday,

7—34



98

October 6 by 3 P.M. when Board of Regents reconvenes 
will be appreciated.

G. L. Cboss, President. ’ ’

On September 29,1948, and after a prior hearing thereon, 
the three-judge federal court of the Western District of 
Oklahoma has convened in the McLaurin case (speaking 
through Circuit Judge Murrah), rendered an oral declara­
tory judgment upon the law and facts in the McLaurin case, 
the pertinent part thereof reading as follows:

“ the Court holds that the plaintiff in this case is 
* * # entitled to secure post graduate education in this 
State by a state institution. The Court further holds 
that to this time he has been denied that right, although 
application has been duly made therefor during the 
same period these particular educational facilities have 
been afforded by the State to other groups.

“ The Court further holds that the State is under 
the constitutional duty to provide this plaintiff with 
the education he seeks as soon as it does for applicants 
of any other group. # # #

“ The Court further holds that in so far as the 
statutes of the State of Oklahoma drawn in issue here 
deny or deprive this plaintiff of admission to the Uni­
versity of Oklahoma for the purpose of pursuing the 

[fol. 157] course he seeks to pursue there, [said statules] 
are unconstitutional and void. Now that does not mean, 
of course that these laws cannot be made to stand, with 
the power of the State to provide equal segregated 
facilities, provided that those facilities are equal and 
that they are afforded as soon as they are afforded to 
any other group. * * *

“ * * * we sit as a court of equity with power to 
fashion our decree in accordance with right and justice 
under the law. Accordingly, we refrain at this time 
from issuing or granting injunctive relief on the as­
sumption that the State will follow the law in the 
constitutional mandate.

“ We retain jurisdiction of this case, however, with 
full power to issue such further orders and decrees as 
may be deemed necessary and proper to secure this 
plaintiff the equal protection of the laws, which, trans­
lated into terms of this lawsuit, means * * * equal 
educational facilities. We therefore recess this case at



99

this time, with the understanding that either party may 
apply for further relief consistently with the pleadings 
in the case. # *

“ We will prepare a formal judgment and decree in 
accordance with this forthwith, and within the next 
few days, but that is the judgment of this Court, and 
judgment entered as of this date. ”

Referring to your injuiry as to “ . . . the legal obligation 
of the Board of Regents to admit McLaurin in event he 
presents himself for admission to graduate college of 
University of Oklahoma next week,”  your attention is 
directed to an opinion of this office dated October 2, 1948, 
based on the McLaurin . case ruling by the three-judge 
court, and directed to Governor Roy J. Turner, wherein 
(among other things) it was held as follows (referring to 
MeLauring’s application for admission to the University 
of Oklahoma for scholastic work leading to a doctorate 
degree—admittedly not offered as a course of Langston 
University):

“ (1) Plaintiff [McLaurin] will be entitled to enroll in 
said classes in said graduate courses of instruc­
tion, in which courses he will be entitled to remain 
on the same scholastic basis as other students until 

[fol. 158] similar classes in substantially equal courses of 
instruction are established and ready to function 
at Langston University; or

“ (2) The University of Oklahoma will not be entitled 
to enroll any applicant of any group in said classes 
until substantially equal courses of instruction are 
established and ready to function at Langston 
University.”

We arrive at the conclusion above expressed as a result 
of the ruling of said three-judge court hereinabove set 
forth and more particularly, upon consideration of the 
following paragraph of said ruling:

“ The Court further holds that in so far as the 
statutes of the State of Oklahoma drawn in issue here 
deny or deprive this plaintiff of admission to the Uni­
versity of Oklahoma for the purpose of pursuing the 
course he seeks to pursue there, are unconstitutional 
and void. Now that does not mean, of course, that these 
laws cannot be made to stand, with the power of the 
State to provide equal segregated facilities, provided



100

that those facilities are equal and that they are afforded 
as soon as they are afforded to any other group. ’ ’ 

While this language follows the logic and purport of the 
United States Supreme Court decision in the Sipuel case, 
yet it stands as the first time that any court has directly 
declared the penal statutes (70 O.S. 1941 §§ 455, 456 and 
457) prohibiting scholastic intermixture in higher education 
to be unconstitutional and void. Also, it is the first in­
stance where a court has passed upon the precise question 
of a negro plaintiff’s admission to a state supported col­
lege, using the University of Oklahoma, by name. Thus, 
we have by judicial decree, a voiding—a striking down— of 
the state’s traditional policy of scholastic segregation 
in higher education, directly applied to entrance of plain­
tiff, McLaurin, to the University of Oklahoma.

While the injunctive relief was (for the time being) 
withheld, yet the decision notes the assumption of the
court “ that the State will follow the la w ..........”

So that now, the duty and policy of the Regents of the 
University of Oklahoma is for the first time laid down by 
order of court, directed to the regents, and premised upon 
the assumption that they, as agents of the state, will follow 
the law. This is, of course, an entirely different situation 
from any that the Board of Regents has faced in the 
various recurring angles of the segregation litigation with 
[fol. 159] which the state has been beset, in and during 
the past year, or more. And the fact should not be here 
lost sight of, that colored applicants generally are not 
privileged as a class to enter any and all graduate schools 
for higher instruction (not provided at Langston); but 
only those who have heretofore made application at Okla­
homa University for courses similar to the McLaurin 
application.

Now, directing your attention for the moment to the 
concluding paragraph of the judgment of the three-judge 
court, as follows:

“ We will prepare a formal judgment and decree in 
accordance with this forthwith, and within the next 
few days, but that is the judgment of this Court, and 
judgment entered as of this date.”

It is the considered judgment of the Attorney General 
that the Regents of the University of Oklahoma would be 
justified in withholding (should they so desire) final judg­



101

ment on such course as they may determine to pursue until 
they have had opportunity to receive, study and compare 
the formal judgment and decree of the court herein. Of 
course, it is understood that this will be forthcoming in a 
matter of a very few days.

In the opinion of the Attorney General, the above para­
graphs numbered 1 and 2, together with the above-stated 
observation upon temporary delay pending receipt of a 
formal decree, constitute the bounds and limits within 
which the Regents of Oklahoma University are required 
to chart a course of action in the McLaurin case; this, by 
virtue of the clear and concise language in the court’s 
judgment, as above quoted. And upon this point we may 
here observe that in our opinion, if the Regents of Oklahoma 
University should not see fit to follow one of the alterna­
tives above set forth, then in that event and upon appli­
cation therefor by McLaurin, the writ of injunction, as 
prayed for, would by said court be issued.

Consequently, the Attorney General holds that the 
Regents of Oklahoma University will have to determine, 
in the exercise of their sound discretion, which of the two 
alternatives above set forth they will follow, or whether 
they will by inaction put themselves in the position of 
inviting compulsion of the writ against them.

In this connection you may be interested in knowing 
that one of the questions in Governor Turner’s recent 
(October 1, 1948) inquiry to this office was as follows:
[fol. 160] 2. ‘ ‘ I would like to be further advised as to the

authority of the Board of Regents of the University 
of Oklahoma to enact rules and regulations that would 
offer instruction to McLaurin in accordance with the 
Federal Court’s ruling, but would preserve, in so far 
as we may do so, segregated instruction at the 
University. ’ ’

Upon this point, we advised the Governor (in our October 
2 opinion) as follows :

“ In reply to your second question, you are advised 
that Section 8, Article 13 of our State Constitution, 
adopted July 11, 1944, provides that the ‘ government 
of the University of Oklahoma shall be vested ’ in the 
Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma. 
Chapter 32, Title 70, page 546, Oklahoma Session Laws



102

1947, vitalizes or amplifies said constitutional amend­
ment. Section 3 of said act provides that said board

‘ shall constitute a body corporate, by the name 
of “ Regents of the University of Oklahoma” , and 
shall possess all the powers necessary or con­
venient to accomplish the objectives and perform 
the duties prescribed by law,’

and Section 5 of said act provides that the board 
‘ shall enact rules for the government of the University 
and all its branches.’

“ The Attorney General has been unable to locate 
any decision expressly holding that the Governing 
board of an educational institution, such as the Board 
of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, has au­
thority to enact a rule or regulation such as is referred 
to by you, or whether same would or would not violate 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment of the Constitution of the United States. How­
ever, during the oral argument before the Supreme 
Court of the United States in the Sipuel case, supra, 
Justic Frankfurter suggested from the bench three 
ways in which Oklahoma could comply in said case 
with said clause. In this connection we quote from 
a news story relating to the Sipuel case in the 

[fol. 161] Daily Oklahoman of January 14, 1948, wherein 
under the headline ‘ STATE EXPECTS EARLY RE­
VIEW  OF NEGRO CASE,’ it is in part stated:

‘ While the case was being argued before the 
high bench last week, Justice Felix Frankfurter 
suggested three ways in which Oklahoma could 
handle the matter:

‘ Let Mrs. Fisher attend law school classes with 
white students.

‘ Let her into the law school on a segregation 
basis, giving her a private teacher.

‘ Admit her according to Plan No. 1 or No. 2, 
but only until a Negro state law school is es­
tablished. ’

“ Inasmuch as no other member of said court ex­
pressed a different view, we assume that the sug­
gestions made by Justice Frankfurter represented not 
only his personal views but those of the Court.



103

“ The Attorney General is, therefore, of the opinion 
that the Board of Regents of the University of Okla­
homa is authorized to enact rules and regulations such 
as are referred to by you, and that same would not 
violate said equal protection clause nor the ruling of 
the federal district court herein.”

A copy of said opinion to Governor Turner is herewith 
enclosed.

Most Respectfully,
Attorney General

MQW :LW 
Enc.
Approved by Attorney General 10-6-48 LW

[fol. 162] I n U nited States D istrict Court
P etition eor A ppeal--—Filed Jan. 18,1949 

Now comes, G. W. McLaurin, plaintiff in the above-en­
titled cause, by his attorneys and respectfully shows that: 

On the 22d day of November, 1948 in the above-entitled 
cause the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Oklahoma, convened in a three-judge court pur­
suant to Title 28, United States Code, sections 2281 and 
2284, rendered a judgment against plaintiff and in favor of 
defendants by which judgment the court denied plaintiff 
the relief requested and refused to enjoin the enforcement 
of certain statutes of the State of Oklahoma and a certain 
order of the Board of Regents of the University of Okla- 
[fol. 163] homa acting as a state board on the ground that 
said statutes and order were unconstitutional in that they 
were in violation of the Constitution of the United States.

On the 5th day of August, 1948, plaintiff filed in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Oklahoma a complaint seeking the convening of a three- 
judge court as required by the then existing section 266 of 
the Judicial Code for the purpose of securing a preliminary 
injunction and a permanent injunction against the Okla­
homa State Regents for Higher Education, the Board of 
Regents of the University of Oklahoma and the adminis­
trative officers of the University of Oklahoma restraining 
them from enforcing sections 455-457 of the Oklahoma 
statutes of 1941. The complaint alleged that plaintiff and 
other qualified Negro applicants were excluded from admis­



104

sion to courses of study offered only at the graduate schools 
of the University of Oklahoma pursuant to the above 
statutes and orders of the defendants issued thereunder. 
A  preliminary and a permanent injunction against the en­
forcement of these statutes and orders were sought on the 
grounds that said statutes and orders denied to the plaintiff 
and others similarly situated rights and liberties guaran­
teed by the equal protection and due process clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con­
stitution and sections 41 and 43 of Title 8 of the United 
States Code.

On the 6th day of October, 1948, the three-judge court 
filed a journal entry that “ it is ordered and decreed that 
insofar as sections 455, 456 and 457, 70 O.S. 1941, are sought 
[fol. 164] to be applied and enforced in this particular 
case, they are unconstitutional and unenforceable.”  The 
court expressly refrained from issuing and granting any 
injunctive relief but retained jurisdiction over the subject 
matter for entering any further orders as may be deemed 
proper.

On the 7th day of October, 1948 plaintiff filed a motion 
for further relief alleging that despite the prior ruling 
of the court, plaintiff had again been denied admission to 
the graduate school of the University of Oklahoma and 
requested that the court enter an order requiring the de­
fendants to admit plaintiff “ to the graduate school of the 
University of Oklahoma for the purpose of taking courses 
leading to a doctor’s degree in education, subject only to 
the same rules and regulations which apply to other stu­
dents in said school. ’ ’

At this hearing there was placed in issue the order of 
the defendant Board of Regents of the University of Okla­
homa ordering that the plaintiff be admitted only on a 
basis of segregation solely because of his race. The plain­
tiff challenged the order as unconstitutional and the de­
fendants rested upon the validity of such order as within 
the power of the Board of Regents of the University of 
Oklahoma as a state board.

At the hearing on said motion for further relief, the 
essential facts were agreed upon by counsel for both parties 
and, in addition, plaintiff testified as to the conditions 
under which he was admitted to the University of Oklahoma 
subsequent to the filing of the motion for further relief.



105

[fol. 165] On the 22d day of November, 1948, the three- 
judge court issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Journal Entry. In the Conclusions of Law, the Court 
held:

a. That the United States Constitution “ does not 
authorize us to obliterate social or racial distinctions which 
the State has traditionally recognized as a basis for classi­
fication for purposes of education and other public minis­
trations. The Fourteenth Amendment does not abolish 
distinctions based upon race or color, nor was it intended 
to enforce social equality between classes and races.”

b. “ It is the duty of this court to honor the public policy 
of the State in matters relating to its internal social affairs 
quite as much as it is our duty to vindicate the supreme law 
of the land. ’ ’

c. “ The Oklahoma statutes held unenforceable in the 
previous order of this court have not been stripped of 
their vitality to express the public policy of the State in 
respect to matters of social concern.”

d. “ We conclude therefore that the classification, based 
upon racial distinctions, as recognized and enforced by the 
regulations of the University of Oklahoma, rests upon a 
reasonable basis, having its foundation in the public policy 
of the State, and does not therefore operate to deprive this 
plaintiff of the equal protection of the laws. ’ ’

The journal entry entered by the Court denied the relief 
prayed for, dismissed the complaint of plaintiff and entered 
judgment for the defendants.

In the record and proceedings and in the rendition of 
said judgment there was drawn in question by plaintiff 
[fol. 166] herein the constitutionality of the above-stated 
statutes of the State of Oklahoma and the above-stated 
order of the Board of Regents of the University of Okla­
homa acting as a state board. Plaintiff contended that said 
statutes and order herein are in contravention of and 
repugnant to the equal protection and due process clauses 
of the Constitution and Sections 41 and 43 of Title 8 of the 
United States Code. The decision and judgment of the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Oklahoma upheld the constitutionality of said statutes and 
order as against the rights set up and claimed by plaintiff 
herein under said clauses of the Constitution of the United 
States all of which is both apparent in the record and



106

proceedings of the cause and rendition of said decision and 
judgment.

Wherefore, plaintiff, G. W. McLaurin, feeling ag­
grieved by the judgment of the Court entered herein on the 
22d day of November, 1948, for the reasons set forth in his 
assignment of errors which is filed herewith, hereby prays 
an appeal from such judgment to the Supreme Court of the 
United States and further prays that an order be entered 
fixing the amount of bond and security to be given by the 
plaintiff as appellant and conditioned as the law directs 
and that a transcript of the record on appeal be certified 
and sent to the Supreme Court of the United States.

Respectfully submitted, Amos T. Hall, 107 % N. 
Greenwood Avenue, Tulsa, Oklahoma; Thurgood 
Marshall, 20 West 40th Street, New York, 18, N. Y., 
Attorneys for Plaintiff.

Robert L. Carter, Constance Baker Motley, Marian W. 
Perry, Franklin H. Williams, 20 West 40 Street, New York, 
18, N. Y., of Counsel.

[fol. 167]
I n United States D istrict Court

A ssignm ent  of E rrors—Filed Jan. 18, 1949
Plaintiff files the following assignment of errors on which 

he will rely in his appeal to the Supreme Court of the 
United States from the judgment of this Court entered on 
November 22,1948.

The Court erred:
1. In refusing to enjoin the defendants as state officers 

from enforcing Sections 455, 456 and 457 of the Oklahoma 
Statutes of 1941 upon the ground that the enforcement of 
said statutes violated the equal protection and due process 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States and Title 8, Sections 41 and 43 of the 
United States Code.
[fol. 168] 2. In refusing to enjoin the defendants as state
officers from enforcing the order of defendant Board of 
Regents of the University of Oklahoma requiring the 
segregation of plaintiff from all other students of the 
University of Oklahoma solely because of race or color



107

upon the ground that said order is a violation of the equal, 
protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and 
Title 8, Sections 41 and 43 of the United States Code.

3. In ruling as a matter of law that the claim of the 
plaintiff to an education in a state institution on a non- 
segregated basis without distinction as to race or color was 
not a constitutional right but a mere matter of public policy 
of the State in regard to its internal social affairs.

4. In ruling as a matter of law that the plaintiff’s right 
to public education without racial distinction, segregation 
or ostracism by the State of Oklahoma was a matter of the 
internal social affairs of the State of Oklahoma controlled 
solely by the public policy of the State and was not a right 
protected by the Constitution of the United States.

5. In ruling as a matter of law that the Oklahoma 
Statutes previously held by the Court to be unconstitutional 
and unenforceable could nevertheless be used as a con­
stitutional basis for subsequent orders of the defendants to 
segregate plaintiff from all other students and thereby 
ostracize him solely because of race or color.

6. In ruling as a matter of law that state statutes 
previously declared unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff 
[fol. 169] by state officers could be applied as a source of 
public policy to authorize the segregation of plaintiff from 
all other students of the University of Oklahoma solely be­
cause of race or color.

7. In ruling as a matter of law that the order requiring 
the segregation of plaintiff from the other students solely 
because of race or color rested “ upon a reasonable basis 
and did not deprive the plaintiff of the equal protection of 
the laws or the right to liberty as guaranteed by the 
Constitution. ’ ’

8. In ruling as a matter of law, in the absence of any 
evidence whatsoever to establish reasonableness of the 
classification, that the order requiring the segregation of 
the plaintiff from all other students solely because of race 
or color was a classification which rested upon a reasonable 
basis and did not violate the due process or equal protection 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States.



108

9. In ruling as a matter of law that the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not prohibit the State of Oklahoma from 
making racial distinctions among its citizens in the per­
formance of its governmental function of providing public 
education at the graduate school level.

P rayer for R eversal

For which errors plaintiff prays that the said decision 
and judgment of the District Court for the Western District 
[fol. 170] of Oklahoma in the above-entitled cause be re­
viewed by the Supreme Court of the United States and 
that the said judgment be reversed and that a judgment be 
rendered in favor of plaintiff.

Respectfully submitted, Amos T. Hall, 107% N. 
Greenwood Avenue, Tulsa, Oklahoma; Thurgood 
Marshall, 20 West 40th Street, New York, 18, New 
York, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

Robert L. Carter, Constance Baker Motley, Marian W. 
Perry, Franklin H. Williams, 20 West 40th. Street, New 
York, 18, New York, of Counsel.

[fol. 171]
In United States District Court 

Order A llowing A ppeal—Jan. 18,1949

It- appearing to the court that the plaintiff has filed his 
petition for appeal to the Supreme Court of the United 
States, and has filed therewith his assignment of errors, 
and also his statement as to the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, as required by Rule 12 of the 
Supreme Court Rules, duly disclosing that the Supreme 
Court of the United States has jurisdiction upon appeal to 
review the judgment in question,

IT IS ORDERED that the appeal prayed for be and the 
same is hereby allowed and granted to the Supreme Court 
of the United States from the judgment rendered in this 
cause on the 22nd day of November, 1948, and that plaintiff 
give a bond with good and sufficient security in the sum of 
------Dollars ($250.00), that he as appellant shall prosecute



109

his appeal to effect, and answer all damages and costs if he 
fails to make his appeal good.
Dated Jan. 18, 1949

Alfred P. Murrain

[fols. 172-198] Citation in usual form omitted in printing.

[fol. 199] Cost Bond on Appeal for $250.00 filed Jan. 18, 
1949 omitted in printing.

[fol. 200]
I n United States D istrict Court

Stipulation as to R ecord—Filed Jan. 26,1949
It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the 

plaintiff and the defendant, above-named, by and through 
their respective counsel, that the following parts of the 
record may be prepared as the record to be transmitted to 
the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States:

1. Complaint
2. Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Notice of 

Hearing
3. Answer of Defendants
4. Stipulation of Facts (Agreed Statement of Facts)
5. Order of August 6,1948
6. Minutes of August 23,1948
7. Order of September 21 re-assigning cause for trial 

on Merits
8. Letter of Governor Turner (Exhibit 1 of Defendants)
9. Transcript of proceedings of September 29, 1948

10. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (October
6.1948)

11. Journal Entry and Order of Court (October 6, 1948)
12. Motion of Plaintiff to Modify Order and Judgment of 

September 29,1948
13. Minutes of hearing of October 25,1948
14. Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law (November

22.1948)
15. Journal Entry and Judgment of November 22, 1948



110

16. Amendment of Journal Entry of November 22, 1948
17. Transcript of Hearing of October 25,1948
18. All of Exhibits introduced by plaintiff and defend­

ants, including copies of minutes of Board of Regents
19. Petition for Appeal
20. Assignment of Errors
21. Statement of Jurisdiction
22. Citation
23. Stipulation and Acknowledgement of Service
24. Appeal Bond
25. Stipulation as to Designation of Record

Amos T. Hall, 107% N. Greenwood Street, Tulsa,
[fols. 201-202] ------■; Thurgood Marshall, 20 West
40th Street, New York 18, New York, Attorneys for 
Plaintiff. Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen.; Fred 
Hanson, 1st Asst. Atty. Gen.; George T. Mont­
gomery, Asst. Atty. Gen., Attorneys for Defendants.

Dated Jan. 21,1949

[fol. 203]
Clerk’s Certificate to foregoing transcript omitted in 

printing.

[fol. 204] [Stamp:] Office of the Clerk, Supreme Court, U. S.
Mar. 9, 1949

Supreme Court of the United States, October T erm, 1948

No. 614 

[Title omitted]

Statement of P oints to be R elied Upon and Designation 
of Parts of the R ecord to be Printed— Filed March 9,1949

Now comes the appellant in the above-entitled cause and 
for his statement of points to be relied upon adopts his



I ll

assignment of errors and states that the entire record 
should be printed.

Thurgood Marshall, 20 W. 40th Street, New York 18, 
N. Y., Counsel for Appellant.

I hereby certify that I have this date mailed a copy of the 
Above Statement of Points to be Relied Upon and Designa­
tion of Parts of the Record to be Printed to the Honorable 
Mac Q. Williamson, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Attorneys 
for Respondents by Air Mail.

Thurgood Marshall, Attorney for Appellant.

[fol. 205] Supreme Court of the U nited States, October
T erm, 1949

No. 34

G. W. M cLaurin, Appellant,
vs.

Oklahoma State R egents for H igher E ducation et al.

Order Noting P robable J urisdiction— November 7, 1949
The statement of jurisdiction in this case having been 

submitted and considered by the Court, probable jurisdic­
tion is noted.
November 7,1949.

[fol. 206]
Endorsed on Cover; Enter Thurgood Marshall. Pile No. 

53,616, U. S. D. CL, Western Oklahoma, Term No. 34, G. W. 
McLaurin, Appellant, vs. Oklahoma State Regents for 
Higher Education, Board of Regents of University of Okla­
homa, et al. Filed March 1, 1949. Term No. 34 O.T. 1949.

(5263)



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