Morton v. Charles County Board of Education Petitioners' Reply Memorandum in Support of Certiorari
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1975
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Morton v. Charles County Board of Education Petitioners' Reply Memorandum in Support of Certiorari, 1975. 84dee3d2-be9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/6f3a1faf-3b75-47d9-bc28-5bb4b49f153a/morton-v-charles-county-board-of-education-petitioners-reply-memorandum-in-support-of-certiorari. Accessed November 19, 2025.
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IN THE
Supreme OXuttrt nf % ImtTfr States
O ctober T e r m , 1975
No. 75-609
J oseph H. M orton , et a l ., Petitioners
v,
C h arles C ou n ty B oard of E du cation , et a l .,
Respondents.
PETITIONERS' REPLY MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF CERTIORARI
J oseph L . R a u h , J r .
J o h n S h a r d
E llio tt C. L ic h t m a n
R a u h , S ilard an d L ic h t m a n
1001 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
Mrs. J u a n it a J ackson M it c h e l l
M it c h e l l and M it c h e l l
1239 Druid Hill Avenue
Baltimore, Maryland 21217
Attorneys for Petitioners
J a c k G reenberg
J a m e s M. N abrit I I I
J a m e s C. G r a y , J r .
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019
P ress of B yron S. A dam s P rinting, Inc., W ashington, D . C.
9
IN THE
OXmtrt of % Inttri* States
O otobeb T e r m , 1975
No. 75-609
J oseph H. M orton , et a l ., Petitioners
V.
C h arles C o u n ty B oard oe E du cation , et a l .,
Respondents.
PETITIONERS' REPLY MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF CERTIORARI
Respondents;’ patent effort to factualize the clear
legal issues presented by the Petition evidences their
own recognition of the unusual significance of those
legal issues. And it could not be otherwise, for it is in
contestable that the District Judge applied the wrong
legal standards to the facts before him.
All three legal issues raised by the Petition are clear
ly before the Court. Thus, the majority and dissenting
opinions both expose the issue whether the District
Court properly placed the burden on the plaintiffs
rather than requiring defendants to justify their prac
tices which indisputably sharply reduced the black
2
faculty component when student desegregation was
undertaken in 1967. The equally clear question of
law presented is whether a “ discriminatory effect” or
a “ racial animus” standard applies to those School
Board hiring and promotion practices which have
had a strongly adverse impact on the employment of
minority teachers and principals. And equally pre
sented is the question whether the District Court, could
totally shrug aside the State of Maryland’s own de
terminations and remedial orders addressed to the
Charles County school officials’ discriminatory hiring
and promotion practices. Thus, respondents’ attempt
to defuse and diffuse the Petition through a factual
justification o f their conduct cannot vitiate the three
central legal errors which tainted the District Court’s
resolution of this case.
Moreover, the School Board’s factual recitation to
this Court wholly fails in its attempt to undermine the
points on which we base our petition for review:
(i) In attempting to explain the adoption of an an
nual hiring ratio of four whites to one black in a school
system which had approximately equal racial repre
sentation before black teachers were first generally as
signed to teach white students, respondents repeatedly
cite inapposite and inconsequential facts. Thus, they
rely (Opp. pp. 7-8, 11) on a decrease in the proportion
o f black Charles County residents and a decrease in the
proportion of black students in the Charles County
School System during the 1960s which are totally ir
relevant to the hiring of teachers. Further they point
(id.) to the low percentages of Charles County black
residents who hold college degrees, which equally fail
to justify the School Board’s failure to hire blacks
when, as the record shows, the teacher hires come from
3
more than half the states in the nation (A. 1225-26,
1231, 1235-38. See Petition p. 15 n.8),
(ii) Concerning the School Board's discriminatory
recruitment policies, respondents’ reliance (Opp. p. 11)
on the eonclusory satisfaction of the majority below
with the Board of Education’s recruitment efforts can
not gainsay the undisputed fact that the School
Board’s recruiting was at mostly white colleges with
mostly white recruiters (see Petition, pp. 6-7, 10).
(iii) Concerning the undisputed evidence that the
Charles County School System hired numerous whites
with the lowest State qualifications while hiring vir
tually no blacks with such limited qualifications, it is
no answer for respondents to rely (Opp. p. 11) on the
District Court’s statement that such persons were hired
from the local area just before the school year opened.
The uncontested record shows that 60% of all new hires
were usually hired that late in the school year (A. 873-
908), and there is no evidence that these hires were
drawn only from the local area. The only relevant
evidence is the the School Board in general hires ap
plicants from the majority of states in the nation.1
All apart from respondents’ attempt to cloud the
salient facts in this case, it is clear that petitioners were
entitled to have the District Court review those facts
under the proper legal standards. There is no possible
dispute that the District Court refused to shift the bur
den of justification to the School Board for its hiring
and promotion practices which sharply reduced the
1 Respondents ’ reliance on their teacher assignments after this
action was commenced in the one year just prior to the 1973 trial
(Opp. pp. 11-12) hardly undercuts the undisputed record that dur
ing the preceding six years the school system assigned teachers on a
racially identifiable basis in the majority of its schools.
4
black faculty component immediately after the desegre
gation of the student bodies.2 There is thus squarely
presented the issue of whether Keyes-Chambers re
quires transfer of the burden where the School Board
has utilized the more “ sophisticated” means of refus
ing to hire blacks instead of engaging in outright dis
charges.
Similarly, it is clear that the lower courts disre
garded Maryland’s own findings that respondents en
gaged in discriminatory employment practices and the
State’s orders to correct those practices.3 The im
portant issue whether the lower courts should have
honored and given effect to the State’s own action is
thus clearly presented.
Also squarely raised iS the lower courts’ use
of the motivation standard instead of the Wright
“ effect” test. Here the Charles County Board repeats
(Opp. p. 14) its specious argument to the Court of
Appeals that because the District Court found no
“ pattern of discrimination” the District Court applied
an “ effect” standard. But the majority of the Court
of Appeals failed to accept respondents’ assertion and
2 Respondents quibble (Opp. p. 14) that there is no “ history of
segregation” here because the School Board had adopted a free
dom of choice plan for some years prior to 1967. But that pro
gram was totally ineffective, and the token transfers of a few
blacks to white schools and a few whites to black schools in no
way refute the undisputed fact that the student bodies and
faculties remained essentially segregated until 1966 and 1967.
3 While Respondents attempt (Opp. p. 8) to disparage the
findings of the State Board’s Committee because of the Commit
tee’s informal procedures —which Charles County itself had
suggested—-those findings were in fact the premise of the State
Board’s remedial orders.
5
do not at all suggest that the District Judge applied
the effect standard. Moreover, a careful reading of the
District Court’s opinion exposes its application of the
erroneous racial animus test (see Petition, pp. 23a,
24a, 27a, 29a, 34a, 36a, 40a-42a, 45a-47a, 49a). As dis
senting Judge Butzner states, the District Court’s
Opinion contains “ a basic error of law that flaws this
case: the fallacious premise that the evidence must
reveal purposeful discrimination in order for the com
plainants to prevail” (Petition, p. 12a).
In short, this case raises three vital legal issues
which require grant of the writ.
Respectfully submitted,
J oseph L. R a u h , Jr.
J o m S ilard
E llio tt C. L ic h t m a n
R a ih i , S ilard and L ic h t m a n
1001 Connecticut Avenue, 1ST. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
M rs. J u a n it a J ack so n M it c h e l l
M it c h e l l and M it c h e l l
1239 Druid Hill Avenue
Baltimore, Maryland 21217
Attorneys for Petitioners
J a c k G reenberg
J AMES M. N A BRIT I I I
J a m e s C. G r a y , J r .
10 Columbus Circle
Hew York, New York 10019
13073-1 1-75