Morton v. Charles County Board of Education Petitioners' Reply Memorandum in Support of Certiorari
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1975

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Morton v. Charles County Board of Education Petitioners' Reply Memorandum in Support of Certiorari, 1975. 84dee3d2-be9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/6f3a1faf-3b75-47d9-bc28-5bb4b49f153a/morton-v-charles-county-board-of-education-petitioners-reply-memorandum-in-support-of-certiorari. Accessed May 18, 2025.
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IN THE Supreme OXuttrt nf % ImtTfr States O ctober T e r m , 1975 No. 75-609 J oseph H. M orton , et a l ., Petitioners v, C h arles C ou n ty B oard of E du cation , et a l ., Respondents. PETITIONERS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF CERTIORARI J oseph L . R a u h , J r . J o h n S h a r d E llio tt C. L ic h t m a n R a u h , S ilard an d L ic h t m a n 1001 Connecticut Avenue, N. W. Washington, D. C. 20036 Mrs. J u a n it a J ackson M it c h e l l M it c h e l l and M it c h e l l 1239 Druid Hill Avenue Baltimore, Maryland 21217 Attorneys for Petitioners J a c k G reenberg J a m e s M. N abrit I I I J a m e s C. G r a y , J r . 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 P ress of B yron S. A dam s P rinting, Inc., W ashington, D . C. 9 IN THE OXmtrt of % Inttri* States O otobeb T e r m , 1975 No. 75-609 J oseph H. M orton , et a l ., Petitioners V. C h arles C o u n ty B oard oe E du cation , et a l ., Respondents. PETITIONERS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF CERTIORARI Respondents;’ patent effort to factualize the clear legal issues presented by the Petition evidences their own recognition of the unusual significance of those legal issues. And it could not be otherwise, for it is in contestable that the District Judge applied the wrong legal standards to the facts before him. All three legal issues raised by the Petition are clear ly before the Court. Thus, the majority and dissenting opinions both expose the issue whether the District Court properly placed the burden on the plaintiffs rather than requiring defendants to justify their prac tices which indisputably sharply reduced the black 2 faculty component when student desegregation was undertaken in 1967. The equally clear question of law presented is whether a “ discriminatory effect” or a “ racial animus” standard applies to those School Board hiring and promotion practices which have had a strongly adverse impact on the employment of minority teachers and principals. And equally pre sented is the question whether the District Court, could totally shrug aside the State of Maryland’s own de terminations and remedial orders addressed to the Charles County school officials’ discriminatory hiring and promotion practices. Thus, respondents’ attempt to defuse and diffuse the Petition through a factual justification o f their conduct cannot vitiate the three central legal errors which tainted the District Court’s resolution of this case. Moreover, the School Board’s factual recitation to this Court wholly fails in its attempt to undermine the points on which we base our petition for review: (i) In attempting to explain the adoption of an an nual hiring ratio of four whites to one black in a school system which had approximately equal racial repre sentation before black teachers were first generally as signed to teach white students, respondents repeatedly cite inapposite and inconsequential facts. Thus, they rely (Opp. pp. 7-8, 11) on a decrease in the proportion o f black Charles County residents and a decrease in the proportion of black students in the Charles County School System during the 1960s which are totally ir relevant to the hiring of teachers. Further they point (id.) to the low percentages of Charles County black residents who hold college degrees, which equally fail to justify the School Board’s failure to hire blacks when, as the record shows, the teacher hires come from 3 more than half the states in the nation (A. 1225-26, 1231, 1235-38. See Petition p. 15 n.8), (ii) Concerning the School Board's discriminatory recruitment policies, respondents’ reliance (Opp. p. 11) on the eonclusory satisfaction of the majority below with the Board of Education’s recruitment efforts can not gainsay the undisputed fact that the School Board’s recruiting was at mostly white colleges with mostly white recruiters (see Petition, pp. 6-7, 10). (iii) Concerning the undisputed evidence that the Charles County School System hired numerous whites with the lowest State qualifications while hiring vir tually no blacks with such limited qualifications, it is no answer for respondents to rely (Opp. p. 11) on the District Court’s statement that such persons were hired from the local area just before the school year opened. The uncontested record shows that 60% of all new hires were usually hired that late in the school year (A. 873- 908), and there is no evidence that these hires were drawn only from the local area. The only relevant evidence is the the School Board in general hires ap plicants from the majority of states in the nation.1 All apart from respondents’ attempt to cloud the salient facts in this case, it is clear that petitioners were entitled to have the District Court review those facts under the proper legal standards. There is no possible dispute that the District Court refused to shift the bur den of justification to the School Board for its hiring and promotion practices which sharply reduced the 1 Respondents ’ reliance on their teacher assignments after this action was commenced in the one year just prior to the 1973 trial (Opp. pp. 11-12) hardly undercuts the undisputed record that dur ing the preceding six years the school system assigned teachers on a racially identifiable basis in the majority of its schools. 4 black faculty component immediately after the desegre gation of the student bodies.2 There is thus squarely presented the issue of whether Keyes-Chambers re quires transfer of the burden where the School Board has utilized the more “ sophisticated” means of refus ing to hire blacks instead of engaging in outright dis charges. Similarly, it is clear that the lower courts disre garded Maryland’s own findings that respondents en gaged in discriminatory employment practices and the State’s orders to correct those practices.3 The im portant issue whether the lower courts should have honored and given effect to the State’s own action is thus clearly presented. Also squarely raised iS the lower courts’ use of the motivation standard instead of the Wright “ effect” test. Here the Charles County Board repeats (Opp. p. 14) its specious argument to the Court of Appeals that because the District Court found no “ pattern of discrimination” the District Court applied an “ effect” standard. But the majority of the Court of Appeals failed to accept respondents’ assertion and 2 Respondents quibble (Opp. p. 14) that there is no “ history of segregation” here because the School Board had adopted a free dom of choice plan for some years prior to 1967. But that pro gram was totally ineffective, and the token transfers of a few blacks to white schools and a few whites to black schools in no way refute the undisputed fact that the student bodies and faculties remained essentially segregated until 1966 and 1967. 3 While Respondents attempt (Opp. p. 8) to disparage the findings of the State Board’s Committee because of the Commit tee’s informal procedures —which Charles County itself had suggested—-those findings were in fact the premise of the State Board’s remedial orders. 5 do not at all suggest that the District Judge applied the effect standard. Moreover, a careful reading of the District Court’s opinion exposes its application of the erroneous racial animus test (see Petition, pp. 23a, 24a, 27a, 29a, 34a, 36a, 40a-42a, 45a-47a, 49a). As dis senting Judge Butzner states, the District Court’s Opinion contains “ a basic error of law that flaws this case: the fallacious premise that the evidence must reveal purposeful discrimination in order for the com plainants to prevail” (Petition, p. 12a). In short, this case raises three vital legal issues which require grant of the writ. Respectfully submitted, J oseph L. R a u h , Jr. J o m S ilard E llio tt C. L ic h t m a n R a ih i , S ilard and L ic h t m a n 1001 Connecticut Avenue, 1ST. W. Washington, D. C. 20036 M rs. J u a n it a J ack so n M it c h e l l M it c h e l l and M it c h e l l 1239 Druid Hill Avenue Baltimore, Maryland 21217 Attorneys for Petitioners J a c k G reenberg J AMES M. N A BRIT I I I J a m e s C. G r a y , J r . 10 Columbus Circle Hew York, New York 10019 13073-1 1-75