McCord v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Florida Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA BROWARD DIVISION

ALLIE K. MC CORD; JOSEPH POWELL, JR.,
ROSE MARIE SAULSBY, ILMA M. JAMES,MARGARET HARDEN, ALZEN F. FLOYD, SR., and the SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP 
CONFERENCE (SCLC) OF BROWARD COUNTY,
FLORIDA, on behalf of themselves and 
all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 83-6182-CIV-ROETTGER

CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA;
ROBERT A. DRESSLER, Mayor; ROBERT
0. COX, Vice-Mayor; VIRGINIA S.
YOUNG, Mayor Pro-Tern; Commission Members of the City of Fort Lauderdale, 
Florida, RICHARD A. MILLS, JR.; and 
JOHN E. RODSTROM, JR.; their successors and agents, all in their 
official capacities,

Defendants. /
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW_______

DAVID M. LIPMAN 
ROBERT E. WEISBERG

LIPMAN & WEISBERG 
5901 S.W. 74 Street 
Suite 304Miami, Florida 33143-5186 
(305) 662-2600

Of Counsel:

BENJAMIN F. LAMPKIN, ESQ. 
General Counsel for SCLC 
of Broward County 
P.O. Box 10876Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33310 
(305) 733-3166

JACK GREENBERG, ESQ.
LANI GUINIER, ESQ.
CLYDE E. MURPHY, ESQ.
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND 
EDUCATION FUND, INC.
99 Hudson StreetNew York, New York 10013
(212) 219-1900

DATED: 19 November, 1984 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS



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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

I. FINDINGS OF FACT 1
A. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1
B- GENERAL BACKGROUND 3
C. THE FACTS 3

1. HISTORY OF OFFICIAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 3
a. THE STATE OF FLORIDA 3
b. THE CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE 4

(i) 1911 to 1940 4
(ii) 1940 to 1954 6
(iii) 1954 to the Present Era 9

2. LINGERING EFFECTS OF PAST DISCRIMINATION
AND CONTINUING PRESENT CONDITIONS 14
a. RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IS
b. MAINTENANCE OF CITY’S AT-LARGE

ELECTION SYSTEM 16
c. DISCRIMINATORY EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 16
d. CITY ADVISORY BOARD AND COMMITTEE

APPOINTMENTS 18
(i) 1957-1983 19
(ii) 1984 - Boards and Committees 19

e. PUBLIC HOUSING 20
f. EDUCATION 21

3. PRESENT SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS OF BLACKS 22
4. RACIALLY POLARIZED VOTING - GENERAL FINDINGS 23

a. THE BI-VARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 24
b. SUPPORT FOR WINNING CANDIDATES 26

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c. SUPPORT FOR BLACK CANDIDATES
d. BLACKS IMPACT ON THE OUTCOME OF ELECTION
e. THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF VOTES CAST

BY THE VOTERS
f . 
g-

THE MULTI-VARIATE ANALYSIS 
THE BLACK CANDIDATES - 1957 to 1982
(i) 1957-1967
(ii) 1969-1971 - Alcee Hastings
(iii) 1973 - DeGraffenreidt
(iv) 1975-1977 - DeGraffenredit
(v) 1979 - DeGraffenredit
(vi) 1982

THE STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTION SYSTEM
a. LACK OF GEOGRAPHICAL SUBDISTRICTS

SIZE OF DISTRICT
THE EXTENT TO WHICH BLACKS HAVE BEEN ELECTED TO OFFICE
THE POLICY FOR USING THE AT-LARGE 
ELECTION SYSTEM IS TENUOUS

8.
9 .

UNRESPONSIVENESS
BLACK ACCESS TO THE CANDIDATE 
SLATING PROCESS

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. OVERVIEW OF SECTION 2 STANDARDSB. APPLICATION OF TYPICAL FACTORS SHOWING

SECTION 2 VIOLATION
1. HISTORY OF OFFICIAL DISCRIMINATION
2. RACIALLY POLARIZED VOTING
3. THE STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTION SYSTEM

27
28

28
29
36
36
37 
39
92
93 
95 
98 
98
98

99

99
51

53
59
59
56
56
58
62

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4. SLATING PROCESS 62
5. SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS 62

6. OVERT AND SUBTLE RACIAL CAMPAIGNS 63
7. ELECTION OF BLACKS TO PUBLIC OFFICE 64
8. UNRESPONSIVENESS 65
9. TENUOUSNESS OF STATE POLICY 66

C. TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES 67

III. RELIEF 67

APPENDIX I 69a
CERTIFICATE <OF SERVICE * * * *

EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS

In order to facilitate reference to the Record in this
case, the Court has utilized the following abbreviations to the 
trial transcript and parties' exhibits, 

a. Trial Transcript
(Name of Witness), Vol. ____, Pg- ----

Reference is made to one of the 7 
volumes of trial transcripts.
Note, all volumes are referred to 
by their number except the 
testimony of October 26, 1984 
which is given a number Vol. 5A. 
The name of the witness and page 
number of the record volume is 
identified.

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Exhibits
P. Ex.
D. Ex.

Referring to Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
or Defendants' Exhibit with 
numerical reference and page or 
Table when necessary.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

BROWARD DIVISION
ALLIE K. MC CORD, et al.,

Plaintiffs,
CASE NO. 83-6182-CIV 
ROETTGER

CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE,
FLORIDA, et al.,

Defendants.
____/

PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT ________AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW________
Aristotle has written:
If liberty and equality, as is thought by some, are chiefly to 
be founded in democracy, they will be best attained when all
persons alike share in the government to the utmost.Aristotle, Politics, Book II

This case evokes consideration of the extent to which the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, as amended in 1982, 42 U.S.C §1973 compels adherence 
to this principle in the context of Plaintiffs' challenge to the legality 
of the at-large system of electing Fort Lauderdale City Commissioners.

The issue before this Court is whether Fort Lauderdale's at-large 
election system results in blacks having "less opportunity" than whites 
to "participate in the political process and to elect representatives of
their choice." (Id.)

I. FINDINGS OF FACT
A. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Plaintiffs, six black citizens of Fort Lauderdale and the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) of Broward County,



Florida, filed this lawsuit on March 10, 1983, alleging that Fort 
Lauderdale's election system unlawfully dilutes black voting strength in 
violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

Defendants are the City of Fort Lauderdale and Mayor, Vice-Mayor, 
Mayor Pro-Tem, and two additional Commissioners, all sued in their 
official capacity. 115, Complaint.

2. The case was certified as a class action on September 26, 1984, 
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) F.R.C.P. Plaintiffs' class consists of "all 
black citizens who reside in the City of Fort Lauderdale." (Vol. I, Pgs. 
7-8.

3. Following extensive discovery by both parties, this case was 
tried without jury commencing on September 26, 1984, and continued 
intermittently over several weeks. Following the completion of the trial 
on November 1, 1984, the parties filed extesnive post trial submissions 
and the Court then entertained oral argument.

4. Having considered all of the evidence, the extensive post trial 
submissions, and oral argument, the Court now, pursuant to Rule 52(a) 
F.R.C.P., issues its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.1/

1/ This Court is mindful of the requirements of Rule 52(a) F.R.C.P., and 
of the admonitions of binding precedent in our Circuit in Voting Rights 
cases that "if the district court reaches a conclusion on one of the 
Zimmer inquiries without discussing substantial relevant contrary evidence, the requirements of Rule 52 have not been met and a remand may 
be called for if the court's conclusions on the other Zimmer inquiries 
are not sufficient to support a judgment." Cross v. Baxter, 604 F.2d 875, 
879 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Perhaps in no other area of the law is as much 
specificity in researching and fact finding required . . "), vacated—on
other grounds, 704 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1983); Velasquez v. City of 
Abllene, Texas, 725 F.2d 1017, 1020-21 (5th Cir. 1984).

This Court thus will carefully review the record evidence in this 
case with transcript and exhibit citations, the applicable legal 
authority, and the vying conclusions and inferences which the parties ask 
to be drawn.

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B. GENERAL BACKGROUND
5. Fort Lauderdale was incorporated in 1911 (P. Ex. 2). According 

to the 1980 Census, its population totals 153,279 persons, of whom 21X or
32,225 are black (P. Ex. 15, Tab 1).

6. Linder Fort Lauderdale's election system, city commissioners run 
in a primary and then general election. The ten candidates who obtain 
the highest number of votes in the primary can run in the general elec­
tion; and the five (5) candidates who receive the highest number of votes 
in the general election become city commissioners. Each voter may vote 
for up to 5 candidates in both elections (p. Ex. 2, Fact 12). All commis­
sioners run at-large with no subdistrict residency requirement (P. Ex. 2).

C. THE FACTS
1. HISTORY OF OFFICIAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 

a. THE STATE OF FLORIDA

7. Numerous judicial decisions have recounted Florida's long 
history of discriminating against black citizens by depriving them 
participation in the political process.2/ Dr. Jerrell Shofner,
Chairman of the History Department of the University of Central Florida, 
testified that although the Civil War had ended slavery by law, the ideas 
which produced slavery continued. (Shofner, Vol. Ill, Pg- 914).

e,g,, McGill v. Gadsden County2/ See , ~  ̂ , -----  -----------------(5th Cir. 1976) (widespread disenfranchisement 
1900 ' s) ; McMillan v. Escambia County, Florida

Commission, 535 F.2d 277, of blacks by early 
638 F.2d 1239, 1244

279
(5th

Cir. 1981) (Escambia I) (By early 1900's "the white citizens of Florida 
had adopted various legislative plans either denying blacks the vote entirely or making their vote meaningless"); NAACP by Campbell v Gadsden 
County. 691 F.2d 978, 982 (11th Cir. 1982) ("From 1901 through 1945,the contrivance of the all-white primary in Florida effectively denied blacks 
access to the only election that had substantial meaning ).

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8. By the early 1900's, through a series of actions: (i) poll tax 
requirements (Shofner, Vol. Ill, Pg. 420); (ii) the "Eight Ballot Box 
Law," designed to prohibit blacks from voting (Shofner, Vol. Ill, Pg. 
421); (iii) economic and violent intimidation against blacks (Shofner, 
Vol. Ill, Pg. 420); (iv) the creation of the all-white Democratic Party 
primary (Shofner, Vol. Ill, Pg. 424); and (v) the enactment of a series 
of Jim Crow laws to perpetuate "a system of legal segregation to 
reinforce the customary segregation that already had been in place" 
(Shofner, Vol. Ill, Pgs. 421-422), blacks were disenfranchised from 
participating in the electoral process throughout Florida.

b. THE CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE
(i) 1911 to 1940

9. In 1911 the City of Fort Lauderdale incorporated. (Shofner, Vol. 
Ill, Pg. 426). The City's initial charter required that poll taxes must 
have been paid for the two years prior to initial City elections in order 
to qualify for voting. (P. Ex. 2, Fact 7). Poll taxes remained a 
requirement for voting in subsequent City elections through the 1930's. 
(P. Ex. 14A, October 19, 1935).

10. By the end of World War I, Fort Lauderdale had become a segre­
gated town by law. (Shofner, Vol. Ill, Pg.430). A 1922, City Ordinance 
No. 140 had created a legal "color line" by segregating blacks into the 
northwest area of the City, west of the railroad tracks. Any violation 
of this Ordinance, which was passed with the expressed "purpose of promo­
ting the general welfare of the City" was punishable by both imprisonment 
and fine. (P. Ex. 6, Tab A), (Shofner, Vol. Ill, Pg. 430-431). This law 
remained in effect for 25 years. (Shofner, Vol. Ill, Pg. 432).

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11. The City's de lure segregation was refined in 1926, by Ordinance 
No. 407, which divided the City into five residential districts designat­
ed A-E (P. Ex. 3, Fact 8; Ex. 6, Tab C), and provided that "except in 
Residence 'E' district designated by law as the 'Negro District' no resi­
dence or apartment house could be used to house Negro families with the 
exception of 'servants quarters.'" (P. Ex. 6, Tab C).

12. Fort Lauderdale's segregation laws were enforced. In 1929, when 
306 white people requested the "immediate removal of a colony of blacks" 
residing outside their legally defined borders, the City Commission ad­
vised the City Manager to take steps to have the "Negroes removed from 
their present location" (P. Ex. 3, Fact 18).

13. During the 1920's, Fort Lauderdale’s white citizens actively 
sought to deny blacks equal societal participation (Shofner, Vol. Ill,
Pg. 421). For example, on a Thanksgiving Day afternoon in 1926, a 
thousand members of the Ku Klux Klan, an organization very active 
throughout the south, paraded through the City of Fort Lauderdale and 
burnt crosses in Stranahan Park while several thousand spectators looked 
on. (P. Ex. 14B, November 26, 1926).

14. In the 1930's the City continued to refine and enforce its
segregation laws. In 1936, the commission replaced segregation Ordinance 
No. 407 with Ordinance No. 820. (P. Ex. 3, Fact 26), which redefined the
boundaries of the "Negro District" (Residence E district) (P. Ex. 3, Fact 
26). These adjusted boundaries literally wedged all Fort Lauderdale 
blacks into an area between the tracks of the Florida East Coast and Sea­
board Railroads in the northwest section of the City. (P. Ex. 6, Tab E).

15. In 1939, based on a Planning and Zoning Commission recommenda­
tion to increase the size of the "Negro District," the segregation law

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was amended again (Ord. No. 983) "to permanently enlarge [the] boundaries 
of Negro District, Section E" (P. Ex. 3, Fact 34). However, Just five 
months later, in response to over 500 white property owners who protested 
"against the encroachment of Negroes" caused by the expansion, Ordinance 
No. 983 was repealed and Ordinance No. 1005 restored the Negro District 
to its earlier boundaries. (P. Ex. 3, Fact 39).

As the negro population grew, the City continued to enforce 
aggressively its segregation laws. (P. Ex. 3, Fact 34). In 1939 the 
Mayor took action to "get rid of the Negroes [outside their] section."
(P. Ex. 5, Fact 37).

16. By the 1930's, blacks were isolated from the mainstream.
(Shofner, Vol. Ill, Pg. 434). Blacks had their own medical and health 
facilities (P. Ex. 3, Facts 25, 28, 32); could not use City recreational 
facilities (colored ball team prohibited from using municipal park, 
blacks denied use of beaches), (P. Ex. 3, Facts 14 and 23); and were 
denied improvements in the "Negro District" (requests on improved 
services and enforcement of sanitary code denied) (P. Ex. 3, Fact 36 and
Pg. 11B-D attached to Fact 31).)

(ii). 1940-1954
17. The City's vigorous efforts to segregate blacks by law continued 

in the 1940's. In 1941, two further ordinances had redefined the "Negro 
District" (P. Ex. 3, Fact 45) (Ord. No. C-48); (P. Ex. 3, Fact 46), (Ord. 
No. C- 51) .

18. In April, 1942, the City's Planning and Zoning Advisory Board 
recommended that the City acquire land for a buffer area to create a 
district dividing line between the white and colored area which if 
possible could "eventually create a buffer entirely surrounding the
colored area" (P. Ex. 3, Fact 48). The City Commission recognized that

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the "buffer zone is very important in solving the problems permanently"
(P. Ex. 3, Fact 51). (Shofner, Vol. Ill, Pg. 432).

19. World War II altered race relations within the City of Fort 
auderdale (Shofner, Vol. Ill, Pgs. 435-436). During the war, Fort

Lauderdale blacks were viewed as a source of labor for local farms. The 
Dillard School would be closed periodically so black children could work 
in the vegetable fields. (Shofner, Vol. Ill, Pg- 455). Also, black men 
were picked up arbitrarily by the Broward County Sheriff to do field 
labor work. (Shofner, Vol. Ill, Pgs. 437-438).

20. At the end of World War II, blacks in Fort Lauderdale began to 
press for equal governmental services, benefits, and employment.
(Shofner, Vol. Ill, Pg. 439) In 1945, blacks requested judicial relief, 
challenging the school system's practice of closing the black Dillard 
School during harvest season. Clarence C. Walker Civic League v. Board 
of Public Instruction of Broward County, 154 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1946). In 
January, 1946, Dr. Mizell, representing the Negro Businessman's 
Improvement Association, asked the Commission to build a Negro park, but 
was unsuccessful (P. Ex. 3, Fact 55). In April, 1946, the Negro Business 
and Professional Men's League petitioned the Commission to hire Negro 
patrolmen for the black community (P. Ex. 3, Fact 56). Two months later, 
the Negro Ministerial Alliance made the same request (P. Ex. 3, Fact 
58). The City refused. (P. Ex. 3, Fact 61).

21. The segregation ordinance (then Chapter 198 of the City's Code 
of Ordinances) was not repealed until 1948 when the City finally 
recognized its questionable constitutionality. (P. Ex. 3, Fact 62); (P. 
Ex. 14B, March 17, 1947).

22. By 1947, the fact that blacks had constitutional rights to 
participate in the electoral process was becoming evident. The United

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States Supreme Court had ruled in 1944 that the Texas White primary was 
unconstitutional. Smith v. Allrlght. 321 U.S. 649 (1944), and in 1945, 
the Florida Supreme Court had struck down the white primary. Davis v. 
State ex rel. Cromwell. 156 Fla. 181, 23 So.2d 85 (1945) (en banc).

23. From 1929 to 1947, pursuant to a 1929 City Charter amendment, 
four of the five City Commissioners were required to be residents of the 
districts they represented (P. Ex. 2, Fact 10). This residency 
requirement was eliminated in the 1947 Charter which provided for the 
five Commissioners to be elected at large (P. Ex. 2, Fact 10).

24. On March 3, 1947, the Commission discussed holding a special 
election to ascertain the desires of the electorate relative to 
establishing five (5) commission districts in the City. (P. Ex. 3, Fact 
65) .

25. On March 11, 1947, the Commission considered a proposed election 
plan in which three of the five districts would each include "one-third 
of the zoned residence 'E'area Negro District." After being advised that 
a legal district could be based on population only, and that the "Negro 
District" could not legally be divided into three districts, the 
Commission withdrew the proposal for five commission districts from the 
ballot. (P. Ex. 3, Fact 67).

26. Dr. Shofner concluded that the decision to eliminate the 
residency district requirement in March, 1947, was taken to "keep blacks 
off the City Commission" (Shofner, Vol. Ill, Pg. 455). This Court agrees 
with Dr. Shofner's conclusion. First. by 1947, blacks had begun to 
assert their political rights. In fact, on March 10th, the day before 
the Commission’s decision to remove the district election question from 
the ballot, the Commission had received a petition with several hundred

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names which requested that a negro policeman be hired. (P. Ex. 3, Fact 
66). Second, the City had recognized the questionable constitutionality 
of de lure segregation, supra. 111121-23. Third, the decision by the City 
of Fort Lauderdale to change its election system emulated the Florida 
legislature, when in 1947, it changed the method of school board 
elections from a district primary system to an at-large primary system 
after the white primary had been declared illegal. See, NAACP by 
Campbell v. Gadsden County School Board. 691 F.2d 978, 982 (11th Cir. 
1982) (holding that the 1947 change to at-large school board elections 
was racially motivated); McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239, 
1245-46 (5th Cir. 1981) (Escambia I) (same). Fourth, the explicit 
language contained in the City Commission minutes reflects a conscious 
intent to dilute black voting strength. (P. Ex. 3, Fact 67).

27. Throughout the 1940's, black citizens and organizations 
unsuccessfully requested that a black be appointed to the City s police 
department (P. Ex. 3, Facts 56, 58, 60, 61. 63, 66, 69), (Shofner, Vol. 
Ill, Pgs. 442-444). It was not until September, 1952 that the City hired 
its first black police officer. (P. Ex. 14B, September 4, 1952),
(Shofner, Vol. Ill, Pg. 442).

28. Black citizens continued to be isolated and their needs 
rejected. In 1951, the County Health Director blamed the City for the 
slum conditions in the Negro section, as the City had failed to enforce 
its laws. The County Health Director noted a high incidence of 
tuberculosis in the black section due to over-crowding and poor sanitary 
conditions (P. Ex. 14B, September 11, 1951).

(iii). 1954 to the Present Era
29. The 1954 United States Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board 

of Education, and its implementing decision in 1955 were cataclysmic

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events within the South. (Shofner, Vol. Ill, Pg. 456). In Florida, a 
committee established by the State Attorney General Richard Ervin 
suggested that implementing the Brown decision would lead to widespread 
violence in Florida. (Shofner, Vol. Ill, Pg. 457) The Fort Lauderdale 
News criticized the Brown decision and predicted problems for the local 
tourist industry if public facilities were forced to desegregate. (P. Ex. 
14B, May 25, 1954).

30. On November 19, 1955, the City formally responded to judicial 
decisions that mandated integration. Through Ordinance No. 61-55, the 
City recognized the similarity of race relations in Fort Lauderdale to 
that throughout the South and declared that any desegregation of 
municipal facilities would not be taken voluntarily. (P. Ex. 6, Tab 5,
Ord. 61-55).

31. As part of the Ordinance, the City outlined its Policy setting 
forth various facts which recognized that: (a) Fort Lauderdale's racial 
pattern is a part of a larger pattern which has prevailed in much of the 
United States for generations; (b) many Fort Lauderdale citizens do not 
have a liberal view on segregation; (c) the City Commission did not seek 
responsibility to desegregate facilities, but viewed it as a burden and 
duty; (d) for the time being, the use of municipal facilities should be 
maintained in the status quo (P. Ex. 6, Tab 5, Ord. No. 61-55, Section 1).

32. Throughout the 1950's and 1960's, blacks in Fort Lauderdale 
continued to press for equal access to municipal facilities, and equal 
employment opportunities. In September, 1955, 122 Negros presented the 
Commission with a petition requesting the use of the City golf course (P. 
Ex. 3, Fact 85). Two months later, the Commission decided the course 
should remain segregated (P. Ex. 3, Fact 86) and appointed a committee to
review future action (P. Ex. 3, Fact 87). In January, 1956, the

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Northwest Golfers Association, a Negro organization, again requested to 
use the course. (P. Ex. 3, Fact 89). In March, 1956, the City’s 
/continual refusal to allow Negroes the use of the golf course (P. Ex. 3, 
Fact 91) was approved by white citizens' organizations. (P. Ex. 14B, 
March 20, 1956). In order to avoid integration, the City considered 
possible options such as selling the golf course or creating a private 
corporation to run it (P. Ex. 3, Fact 92). In January, 1957, the City 
Commission rated the continued racially segregated operation of the 
City's golf course and Country Club as a "highlight" of the Commission's 
1955-56 fiscal year's accomplishments. (P. Ex. 14B, January 20, 1957).

33. On February 21, 1957, United States District Judge Emett C. 
Choate ruled that the City's refusal to allow blacks' use of public 
facilities violated the Fourteenth Amendment and enjoined the City's 
segregation policy. Moorehead v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 152 F. Supp. 
131 (S.D. Fla. 1957), aff'd per curiam. 248 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1957). 
Immediately following the Court order, the City took steps to sell the 
golf course (P. Ex. 3, Fact 94), and in October, 1957, its sale was 
finalized. (P. Ex. 3, Fact 95).

34. Blacks had tried to gain access to the City's beaches since the
1920's, but repeated requests, spanning four decades, had been ignored.
Thus, in the late 1950's and early 1960's, blacks accelerated their 

3 /efforts.

3/ In 1926, a delegation of Negro citizens requested a district for 
ocean beach use. This request referred to City Manager (P. Ex. 3, Fact 
9). In 1927, Negroes' use of the beach north of Las Olas Boulevard was 
cited as a major problem by City Manager. (P. Ex. 14B, August 17, 1927). 
In 1930, the Commission ordered the Police Chief to regulate Negro bathing 
within city limits (P. Ex. 3, Fact 20). In 1932, the Commission warned 
of the growing Negro menace on our beaches (P. Ex. 14B, July 12, 1932).

(Footnote continued to next page)

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35. In 195**, the Fort Lauderdale News reported that Fort Lauderdale 
was years behind other Florida communities in providing Negro citizens 
with beach facilities and that Fort Lauderdale was an isolated trouble
spot:

Throughout the entire state, the Associated Press found 
there was little or no agitation for admittance of Negroes 
to white beaches. Said the AP: "The only potential
trouble spot at the moment appears to be the Fort Lauderdale area." (emphasis added) (P. Ex. 1**B, June 20,
195**)

36. In 1961, the Broward County Commission discussed the possibility 
of a Negro beach (P. Ex. 1**B, December 6, 1961), while blacks in Fort 
Lauderdale and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) contemplated litigation to integrate the City's beaches 
(P. Ex. 1AB, August 6, 1961). Through the mid 1960's, the City beaches
remained segregated. (P. Ex. 3, Fact 11**).

37. Although in 1952 black citizens had persuaded the City to employ 
black patrolmen, the City had not altered its discriminatory practices.
In 1959, the black community complained to the Commission about the 
absence of Negroes on the police force (P. Ex. 3, Fact 99). In 1963, the 
Bi-Racial Advisory Board requested that a "reasonable number" of Negroes 
be hired as policemen (P. Ex. 3, Fact 116).

(Footnote continued from previous page)
In 19**6 the Colored Business and Professional Men's League again 
requested a Negro beach. (P. Ex. 3, Fact 59). In 1952, the Commission 
acknowledged Negroes interested in obtaining a beach (P. Ex. 3, tact /y; 
In 1953, Negro community spokesman Dr. Mizell asked the City to provide 
beach for its Negro citizens (P. Ex. 3, Fact 81) anywhere in the county long as it is centrally located and accessible (P. Ex. 1**B, February 9, 195*+). In 1956, Fort Lauderdale's Mayor expressed concern that opening 
beaches to Negroes would be disastrous (P. Ex. 1**B, December 20, 19 ).

a
as

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38. During the 1960's, blacks repeatedly asked the city commission 
to seek federal urban renewal funds to improve slum conditions within the 
City (P. Ex. 3, Facts 125, 126). However, while the City objected to 
obtaining federal funds for improvements in the black community, it 
actively sought federal funds for improvements for white citizens. (P.
Ex. 3, Fact 109). In 1967, the NAACP initiated litigation to compel to 
the City to obtain federal urban renewal funds for black areas also (P. 
Ex. 14B, March 31, 1967).

39. In 1957, for the first time in the City's history, a Negro, 
Nathaniel WilKerson, ran for the City Commission (P. Ex. 14a , March 4, 
1957). Although unsuccessful, the Fort Lauderdale News deemed Mr. 
Wilkerson's effort as a ’’commendable showing” in which "(h)e [Wilkerson] 
polled 1,644 votes in the three Negro precincts and added 1,349 more in 
city-wide balloting." (P. Ex. 14A, April 29, 1959). In 1963, the second 
black candidate to make it to the runoff, Thomas Reddick, likewise polled 
heavily in the Negro precincts. (P. Ex. 14A, April 10, 1963).

40. During the 1960's and 1970's, although cognizant of its adverse 
effect on blacks' participation in the election system, the City retained 
its at-large election system. In 1961, the Commission discussed, but 
never acted upon, City Charter revisions to change the election system. 
(P. Ex. 3, Fact 106; P. Ex. 10, Fact 6).

41. At a February 1973 Charter Revision Board meeting, Thomas 
Reddick, the second black to have sought a City Commission position 
recommended that "there be further discussion concerning Commissioners 
running from districts rather than from the City at-large." (P. Ex. 10, 
Fact 7, Minute Attachments, pg. 2).

42. In April, 1975, at a joint meeting with the City Commission and 
the Charter Revision Board, the only black ever elected to the Fort

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Lauderdale City Commission, Andrew DeGraffenreidt, advocated districting 
for city elections. (P. Ex. 10, Fact 10). Mr. DeGraffenreidt testified 
that through his support for residency district requirements, he was 
trying to condition the Commission to "the idea of [single] districting." 
(DeGraffenreidt, Vol. I, Pg. 83).

2. LINGERING EFFECTS OF PAST DISCRIMINATION AND PRESENT CONDITIONS
43. The lingering effects of past discrimination against blacks in 

Fort Lauderdale impairs their present-day ability to participate on an 
equal footing in the political process and has "left blacks out of the 
mainstream of the political process." (Shofner, Vol. Ill, Pgs. 463-464).

44. Dr. Shofner concluded that the progress blacks have been able to 
achieve in Fort Lauderdale has been through litigation and the threats of 
lawsuits. (Shofner, Vol. Ill, Pg. 463). Dr. Shofner further described 
how two and a half decades of legal segregation has left blacks out of 
the mainstream of the political process, evidenced by the City's failure 
to employ black police officers; failure to provide blacks recreational 
facilities unless compelled; and failure to modify its election system. 
Significantly, the fact that the City is still segregated contributes to 
the isolation of blacks from the political process. (Shofner, Vol. Ill, 
Pgs. 463-464).

45. The effects of historical discrimination that presently linger 
in the City include: (1) rigid residential segregation; (2) maintenance 
of the City's at-large electoral system; (3) public discriminatory 
employment practices; (4) lack of black appointments to City advisory 
boards and committees; (5) discrimination in public housing; (6) a 
racially isolated and segregated educational system; and (7) a depressed 
socio-economic status of black citizens.

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a. RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION
46. Although residential segregation laws were repealed in 1948,

4 /their Impact on residential patterns have endured . (Shofner, Vol.
Ill, Pg. 464), (Dunn, Vol. IV, Pgs. 127-28). This Court has reviewed a 
City map which demonstrates the present pattern of racial segregation.
(P. Ex. 29). (An exact duplicate of Exhibit 29 is attached hereto as Ap­
pendix 1). It depicts the legal boundaries of the 1941 "negro district" 
with 1980 census tract data showing a high concentration of black resi­
dents. This color coded map illustrated that blacks concentrated in the 
nqrthwest quadrajxt-^f— present approximately 87.21 of all black 
IussidenX£-4n_the City. This concentration is literally within, ad joining 
or adjacent to the boundaries of the 1941 legally defined "negro dis­
trict." (See, P. Ex. 29).

47. Dr. Marvin Dunn, Community Psychologist and Professor at Florida
International University, stated, and the Court finds, that racially op­
pressive laws, such as those used in Fort Lauderdale to segregate blacks,
would continue to have the effect of segregation after the legal barrier
had been removed. (Dunn, Vol. IV, Pgs. 127-129). Dr. Dunn also testified
that isolation by law over a long period of time creates a "psychological
ghettoization" which fosters a sense of "powerlessness, isolation and 
alienation" (Dunn, Vol. IV, Pgs. 133-136) and limits "political

4/ Significantly, the lingering impact of the de jure residential segre­
gation in the City does not stem from one isolated unreinforced hidden 
ordinance. The City's legal efforts to segregate blacks began in 1922 
(P. Ex. 6, Tab A, Ord. No. 140) continued in 1926 (P. Ex. 3, Fact 4, Ord. 
No. 407); were publicly enforced in 1929 (P. Ex. 3, Fact 18); redefined 
in 1936 (P. Ex. 3, Fact 76, Ord. No. 820); redefined in 1939 (P. Ex. 3, Fact 34, Ord. No. 983); redefined again in 1939 (Ord. No. 1005); publicly 
enforced in 1939 (Plf. Ex. 3, Facts 34, 37); reinforced and redefined 
with two ordinances in 1941 (P. Ex. 3, Facts 45 and 46, Ord. Nos. C-48 
and C-51). In 1942 the City attempted to create a permanent buffer zone 
to surround the black community. (P. Ex. 3, Facts 48, 51).

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participation.” (Dunn, Vol. IV, Pg. 140).
b. MAINTENANCE OF CITY'S AT-LARGE ELECTION SYSTEM
48. Since 1957, when the first black candidate ran for the City 

Commission, it has been obvious that black voters in this highly 
segregated City provide overwhelming support for black candidates, infra, 
111185-86). However, the City's at-large election system, coupled with 
highly polarized racial bloc voting, has posed a severe obstacle to the 
election of blacks. Despite the obvious problems the at-large election 
system presents to black candidates, the system has been maintained. (P. 
Ex. 12, Fact 10; P. Ex. 10, Facts 6-11).

49. The districting issue was raised squarely by a former 
unsuccessful black candidate, now Judge Thomas Reddick, in 1973, during 
Charter Revision meetings, supra, 1141. Two years later, the only black 
ever elected to the City Commission, Andrew DeGraffenreidt, raised the 
same issue, supra, 1142. Significantly, the City's present Mayor, RobertV 
Dressier, candidly acknowledged the adverse impact of the City s at large 
election system and that a district election system would result in a 
black being elected to the Commission. (Dressier, Vol. V, Pg. 294).

.
C. DISCRIMINATORY EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES

50. On June 16, 1980, the United States government initiated a 
lawsuit against the City of Fort Lauderdale challenging employment 
practices within its Police and Fire Departments as racially 
discriminatory. United States v. City of Fort Lauderdale, et al., Civ 
No. 80-6289-CIV-ALH (S.D. 1980). (P. Ex. 23). The Federal District 
Court, upon entry of a Consent Decree, required the City to (a) implement 
a program to recruit qualified black applicants; and (b) adopt a goal to 
employ, assign and promote blacks in sufficient numbers to eliminate
possible discrimination. (P. Ex. 23, Pgs. 2-3).

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51. when United States v. City of Fort Lauderdale was filed, there 
were only six black police officers out of a sworn police force of 
approximately 400 (Mills. Vol. VI. Pgs. 606-611). Not one black served 
as a sergeant, lieutenant, captain, major, deputy chief, or chief.
(Mills, Vol. VI, Pg. 610).

52. Similarly, in the City's Fire Department, there were two black 
firemen out of approximately 268 positions. (Mills. Vol. VI, Pgs. 606, 
610). No blacks were employed at the higher level positions which 
included approximately 80 driver engineers, 71 lieutenants, 15 
commanders, one fire marshall, five batallion chiefs, one assistant 
chief, one deputy chief, and a chief. (Mills, Vol. VI, Pg. 612).

53. The 1980 Order means that essentially one-half of the City s 
entire work force is under a court decree to eliminate racial 
discrimination. (P. Ex. 23, p. 7), (Mills, Vol. VI, Pg. 607).

54. A review of the City's work force as of June 30, 1983, based on 
EEO-4 Reports submitted by the City to the federal government (P. Ex. 20, 
Tabs 9-13) shows that blacks are clustered in lower paid, blue 
collar-type positions.

55. Of the City's 353 black workers, 210 or 49.2% are classified as 
Service Maintenance employees (P. Ex. 20, Table 13). Similarly, 193 
black workers, or 54.6% of the City's 353 employees are concentrated in 
two of the City's ten designated departments - Sanitation and Sewage and
Parks and Recreation. (P. Ex. 20, Table 12).

56. Blacks comprise less than 1% of the City’s work force that earns
in excess of $33,000.00 annually, less than 2% that earns between 
$25,000.00 and $33,000.00 per year, and approximately 7% that earn 
between $20,000.00 and $25,000.00 per year. This is contrasted by the
Fact that blacks comprise nearly 36% of the City's work force earning

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between $10,000.00 and $13,000.00 per year, and 29X earn between 
$13,000.00 and $16,000.00 per year. (P. Ex. 20, Table 11).

57. Bruce Larkin, Deputy Personnel Director for the City of Fort 
Lauderdale, testified that racial disparities evident in the City's work 
force are "reflective of perhaps hiring practices that went on many years 
ago" prior to the application of the Civil Rights Act to state and local
governments." (Larkin, Vol. VI, Pgs. 698-699).

58. This Court agrees with Mr. Larkin's testimony that the fact that 
black employees are concentrated in two City departments and 
disproportionately occupy the lower paying positions can be traced in 
part to the City's historical discrimination against blacks. The 
relationship between past historical discrimination and the present 
employment patterns is most dramatically apparent in the fact that 
despite a 40 year effort by blacks to gain access to positions in the 
Police Department, it took a lawsuit in 1980 to achieve that result. (P. 
Ex. 23).

d. CITY ADVISORY BOARD AND COMMITTEE APPOINTMENTS
59. Historically and at present, blacks in Fort Lauderdale have been 

denied appointments to the City's various citizen advisory boards and 
committees. (P. Ex. 4 and 11).

60. Fort Lauderdale Mayor Robert Dressier testified to the very 
important function of citizen advisory boards and committees in the 
City's political process. (Dressier, Vol. V, Pg. 274). Dr. James Button, 
Professor of Political Science from the University of Florida, stated 
that board and committee appointments are important to black citizens for 
two reasons. First, board appointments provide blacks with input into

Second, they serve "as a means by which thepolicy making areas.



J (

citizens are educated into the political process, how it works and how it 
can be effective." (Button, Vol. IV, Pg. 202).

61. Plaintiffs submitted evidence, which the Court will now review, 
listing all appointments to boards and committees of Fort Lauderdale from 
January 1, 1957, and identifying each member's race. (P. Ex. 9 and 11).

(i) 1957-1983
62. From May, 1957 through June, 1983, there have been 66 different 

City citizen advisory boards or committees in existence. (P. Ex. 9) On 
90 of these boards and committees, no black had ever been appointed 
during this 16-year period. On 13 of these committees there had been 
only one black appointed during this period. Of the remaining 11 boards 
and committees to which more than one black had been appointed during 
this 16 year period, 7 of these Boards were created to address racial 
issues or needs isolated to the black community.5/ The number of 
individuals on these boards totaled 1,929, of which only 129, or 7.5T> 
were black. (P. Ex. 9, Facts 1-67).

(ii) 1989-Boards and Committees
63. At the time of trial, as of October, 1989, there were 29 City 

advisory boards and committees. (P. Ex. 11, Facts 1-29). There were no 
black members on 13 of these boards. There were 237 members on these

5/ Boards and Committees which were created to address racial issues and 
needs isolated to the black community were: 1) Bi-Racial Committee (P.Ex. 9, Fact 7); 2) Bi-Racial Advisory Board - Community Relations Board 
(P. Ex. 9, Fact 8); 3) Community Relations Board (P. Ex. 9, Fact 9); 9) 
Citizens' Advisory Committee (P. Ex. 9, Fact 20); 5) Sub-Library Board 
(P. Ex. 9, Fact 99); 6) Negro Cemetary Committee (P. Ex. 9, Fact 50); 7) 
Sunset Memorial Advisory Board (P. Ex. 9, Fact 61).

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24 boards and committees, (P. Ex. 11), of which 18, or 7.6X were black.
(P. Ex. 11). Additionally, of the 18 black members, 5 serve on the 
Community Services Board, which by ordinance requires appointment of 
members from the northwest quadrant and blighted areas of the City. (P. 
Ex. 11, Fact 12). Accordingly, of the remaining 23 boards and commit­
tees, blacks comprise 13 of the total 221 members, or 5.9X. (P. Ex. 11).

64. A significant number of blacks were appointed to boards and 
committees during the 6 year period that Andrew DeGraffenreidt 
(1973-1979) had served on the City Commission. (DeGraffenreidt, Vol. I 
Pg. 119). DeGraffenreidt cited his role, as one of his outstanding 
achievements, in placing many blacks on various boards and committees as 
a way of helping blacks "participate in the decision-making process in 
the City of Fort Lauderdale after [his] tenure in office." He hoped it 
might lead to a black board member becoming a City Commission member. 
(DeGraffenreidt, Vol. I, Pg. 103). DeGraffenreidt said he had no trouble 
locating interested, qualified black citizens for membership positions. 
(DeGraffenreidt, Vol. I, Pg. 104).

e. PUBLIC HOUSING
65. The Housing Authority of the City of Fort Lauderdale operates 

public housing within Fort Lauderdale. (Dressier, Vol. V, Pgs. 264-5). 
The City Commission appoints the Authority's members and has certain 
influence over the Authority, including its budgetary functions. 
(Dressier, Vol. V, Pg. 266).

66. Public housing in Fort Lauderdale is segregated. The Fort 
Lauderdale Housing Authority operates nine housing projects (P. Ex. 7.
Of these 9 housing projects, 6 are racially segregated. (P. Ex. 7).

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r

F. EDUCATION
67. Dr. Gordon Foster, Professor of Education at the University of 

Miami and Director of its School Desegregation Assistance Center for 
Race, and one of the nation's leading desegregation experts, (Foster,
Vol. V-A, Pgs. 478-491), (P. Ex. 16), has served as a consultant to the 
Broward County School Board since 1967, stemming from the Board's initial 
desegregation efforts. (Foster, Vol. V-A, Pgs. 491-493). Drawing upon 
that experience, as well as his desegregation background with virtually 
every school board in the State of Florida, (Foster, Vol. V-A, Pg. 481), 
Foster conducted a study to determine the: (i) extent of present 
isolation and segregation of black students attending schools located in 
or serving Fort Lauderdale; and (ii) how those conditions effect blacks' 
ability to participate in the political process.

68. The Court finds, based upon Dr. Foster's study, that in the
schools located in or serving Fort Lauderdale: (1)(A) The number of black 
students attending racially identifiable or segregated schools has almost 
doubled since 1971, the year that the initial desegregation plan was 
implemented through Court Order by the Fifth Circuit in Allen v. Board of 
Public Instruction of Broward, 432 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 402 U.S. 952 (1971 ) to 1983. Four out of five (801.) black 
students attend racially identifiable schools. In 1971, when integration 
was ordered, 48% of the black students attended identifiable schools. 
(Foster, Vol. I, Pgs. 5-7), (P. Ex. 24, Table 5A); (B) The number of
black students attending racially isolated schools has tripled since 
1971, Id.; (C) and reciprocally, the number of black students attending 
integrated schools has decreased from 52% in 1971 to 20% in 1983; (2) The 
same schools that were segregated through de 1ure restriction in 1968,
(Foster, Vol. I, Pg. 11) are likely to be "still predominantly black."

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(Foster, Vol. I, Pg. 13), (P. Ex. 24, Table 6); (3) Schools In Fort 
Lauderdale today have Increasingly higher enrollments of black students 
than in 1968, in comparison to the entire County. (Foster, Vol. I, Pgs. 
15-17), (P. Ex. 24, Table 7); (4) Black students in more racially 
isolated schools have generally performed poorer on standardized 
achievements tests, (Foster, Vol. I, Pg. 24), (P. Ex. 24, Table 8).

69. Based upon these findings, the Court determines, as related by 
Dr. Foster, that blacks are "still less fitted than their white 
counterparts" in Fort Lauderdale to "participate in the voting process." 
(Foster, Vol. I, Pg. 48).

3. PRESENT SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS OF BLACKS
70. Dr. Marvin Dunn, Community Psychologist and Professor at Florida 

International University, reviewed factors depicting the comparative 
socio-economic status of blacks and whites in Fort Lauderdale and their 
implications for black participation in the political process (Dunn, Vol. 
IV, Pgs. 112-126). Various socio-economic factors which include income, 
occupational status, educational level, home ownership, quality of 
neighborhoods and family structure indicate that "blacks are 
substantially less well-off in the City of Fort Lauderdale than whites" 
(Dunn, Vol. IV, Pg. 123).

71. Blacks earn significantly less income than whites in Fort 
Lauderdale (Dunn, Vol. IV, Pg. 114). In 1979, the average median income 
for all families in Fort Lauderdale was $15,410, while the median income 
for black families was $9,761. (P. Ex. 15, Tab 5).

72. Black adults in Fort Lauderdale are significantly under educated 
as compared to white adults (Dunn, Vol. IV, Pg. 118). As of 1980, one of 
every three (331) black adults had an eighth grade or less education as
compared to only one of every 10 (101) white adults. (P. Ex. 15, Table

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3). Over 421. of white adults had received some college education as 
compared to only 13X of black adults. (P. Ex. 15, Tab 3). Similarly, 
approximately 211 of white adults had four years of college as compared 
to only 4. lit of black adults. (P. Ex. 15, Tab 3).

73. Blacks are grouped at the lower level of the employment scale 
(Dunn, Vol. IV, Pg. 120). Approximately 281 of the white work force hold 
professional and executive type positions as compared to 101 of the 
blacks (P. Ex. 15, Tab 4), (Dunn, Vol. IV, Pg. 120). On the opposite end 
of the scale, nearly one in every three blacks work in service 
occupations. (P. Ex. 15, Tab 4).

74. Black households in Fort Lauderdale are nearly twice as likely 
to be renters as opposed to home owners. (Dunn, Vol. IV, Pg. 122), (P.
Ex. 15, Tab 6). 611 of white households live in homes they own as
opposed to 301 of black families. (P. Ex. 15, Tab 6). Black households 
also are more likely to occupy overcrowded living conditions and live in 
slum and blighted areas (P. Ex. 18, Tab 7), (Dunn, Vol. IV, Pg. 122).

75. Blacks' lower socio-economic status impedes their participation 
in the political process (Dunn, Vol. IV, Pg. 124). It deters their 
participation in civic groups and organizations that are effective 
instruments in a community's political participation. (Dunn, Vol. IV, Pg. 
125). By being poorer, blacks are discouraged from seeking political 
office because of the relative difficulty in raising campaign funds. 
(Dunn, Vol. IV, Pg. 126). By being less educated, a group is less 
knowledgeable and less likely to ascertain issues that are important to 
their future. (Dunn, Vol. IV, Pg. 126).

4. RACIALLY POLARIZED VOTING - GENERAL FINDINGS
76. Racially polarized voting occurs when there is a difference in

political behavior between white voters and black voters. Racially

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T

polarized voting, synonymous with racial bloc voting exists, as in this 
case, when members of a particular race to a substantial degree vote for 
candidates of the same race, (de la Garza, Vol. II, Pg. 161).

77. Dr. Rodolfo 0. de la Garza, qualified as an expert political 
scientist in the area of electoral behavior, (de la Garza, Vol. II, Pgs. 
150-157, 160, 280-281), testified on behalf of Plaintiffs concerning 
generally, the differences in political behavior between blacks and 
whites within the City of Fort Lauderdale over the past several decades, 
and particularly, the extent of racially polarized voting in City 
elections since black candidates first ran in 1957.

78. This Court now reviews the various measurements of racial 
polarization as presented by the parties.

a. THE BI-VARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
79. Dr. de la Garza conducted a series of different studies, one of 

which involved a "regression analysis of support received by various 
black candidates" who had run for the City Commission from 1957 to 1982. 
(P. Ex. 25, Table 2).

80. One standard measure of gauging racially polarized voting in 
this type of analysis examines the correlation between the number of 
voters of one race and the number of votes received by a candidate of the 
same race, (de la Garza, Vol. II, Pgs. 251-256), (P. Ex. 25, Table 2, 
Column 1). This technique is utilized in order to determine if the first 
variable, race, has had an impact or is associated with the second 
variable, election results, (de la Garza, Vol. II, Pg. 251-252). The 
regression coefficient, called "R", can range in size from 0 to 1. An 
"R" of 0 means that there is no relationship between the variables while 
a regression coefficient of 1.0 means a perfect relationship between the
two variables - as in this case, that the percentage of black registered

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voters per precinct and the percentage of the support received by a black 
candidate per precinct are directly related, (de la Garza, Vol. V, Pg. 
255). An analysis of voting, under this bi-variate model, showing 
correlations of .2 or .3 is considered good; .5, .6, or .7 is very well, 
and .9 is "extraordinary." (de la Garza, Vol. II, Pgs. 252-255) ("When 
you get over .9, it is simply phenomenal in any statistical test that you

£o run."). Dr. de la Garza did calculations on the 18 elections in 
which black candidates had run for office between 1957-1982. In 
measuring the percentage of black registered voters per precinct and the 
percentage of the support received by the black candidate, he found an 
absolute value between .81 and .99 with 13 of the 18 elections over .90. 
(P. Ex. 25, Table 2, Column 1).

81. In a second regression analysis, Dr. de la Garza, utilized the 
identical regression coefficient methodology and addressed another 
independent variable. Here, the same dependent variables were examined - 
the percentage of votes received by a black candidate as a function of 
another independent variable - the turnout ratio in a given precinct.
This independent variable, the turnout ratio, is simply the number of 
votes actually cast in relation to the number of votes that could have 
been cast, (de la Garza, Vol. II, Pgs. 256, 258), (P. Ex. 25, Table 2, 
Column 2). Nine of the sixteen elections examined had correlations 
calculated over .90; six elections fell between .72 and .89 and one 
election (1982 - Alston Primary) was calculated at .51. (P. Ex. 25, Table 
2, Column 2).

82. Finally, the two regressions were combined, resulting in 
correlations calculated between .82 and .99 in sixteen elections, 
fourteen of which had levels greater than .91. (de la Garza, Vol. II, Pg.
259, 261), (P. Ex. 25, Table 2, Column 3). Translated beyond its

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statistical context, a level beyond .91 means simply that 91% of all 
variance in votes received for the black candidate can be explained by 
the race of the voter, (de la Garza, Vol. II, Pg. 251-254, 330).

b. SUPPORT FOR WINNING CANDIDATES
83. Dr. de la Garza further analyzed differing black and white 

voters electoral behavior to determine polarization by measuring the two 
racial communities' ultimate support for the 5 winning candidates in each 
general election. (4 winning candidates in 1979). Voter support for the 
ultimate winning candidates was analyzed in all general elections between 
1971 through 1982 in racially homogenous precincts. In virtually every 
case, in each white precinct white voters cast their votes for one of the 
5 winning candidates more than 50% of the time and in many instances as 
much as 60% to 70%. Among black voters, the percentage of support of 
their votes for winning candidates was in the range of 10%-12% with the 
exception of the DeGraffenreidt elections, (de la Garza, Vol. II, Pgs.
207- 208), (P. Ex. 25, Table 4). The pattern that emerged over this 11 
year period, structured in graphic format in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 36, and 
recognized by Defendants' own expert (Bullock, Vol. V-A, Pgs. 505, 508), 
is that whites cast a disproportionate share of their votes for winners 
as compared to their black counterparts, (de la Garza, Vol. II, Pgs.
208- 209).

84. Defendants' analysis, entitled "Success of Candidates Most 
Favored by Blacks", (D. Ex. 13, Table 3 and 4, Pg. 12), did not address 
the degree or percentage of support blacks gave any of the 5 winners. 
(Bullock, Vol. V-A, Pg. 508). All Defendants measured in this analysis 
was the numerical order in which winning candidates had finished in black 
precincts.

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c. SUPPORT FOR BLACK CANDIDATES
85. An additional and corollary measure of polarization focused upon 

the different voting behavior of the black and white electorates in their 
support for black candidates. Black? overwhelmingly support black 
candidates. White voters do not.fln all elections analyzed from 
1971-1982, 861 of black voters cast at least one vote for a black 
candidate. Only 32* ofsll white voters cast a vote for a black
candidate. (P. Ex. 38). I

;is o'F’1786. An analysis oT~17 elections in which blacks ran for the 
Commission over a 25 year period between 1957 to 1982, encompassing a 
total of 89 black precincts and 968 white precincts, showed that in every 
primary and general election other than the one in which Alston ran in 
1982, a black finished first in every one of the black precincts -- every 
time, (de la Garza, Vol. II, Pgs. 245), (P. Ex. 25. Table 3). In 
contrast, (1) no black candidate has ever finished first in any one of 
the white precincts. (P. Ex. 1, Pgs. 84-157); (2) in the white 
precincts, black candidates in every election did significantly worse 
than every other white candidate; and when it really counted in terms of 
winning in the general rather than the primary, blacks faired even worse 
in those precincts; (de la Garza, Vol. II, Pg. 246), (P. Ex. 25, Table 
3), (Bullock, Vol. V-A, Pg. 541); and finally, (3) the only non-incumbent 
black candidate who ever won, DeGraffenreidt in the 1973 general 
election, finished in the top 5 in only 101 of the white precincts. (P. 
Ex. 25, Table 3). Even Defendants' expert recognized that black 
candidates, with the exception of DeGraffenreidt (1975 and 1979 primary), 
faired significantly worse in the white precincts as compared to the 
black precincts. (Bullock, Vol. V-A Pg. 537). See, also, (D. Ex. 13, Pg. 
17). ("The behavior of black voters is quite unlike that of whites.

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Except for Alston In 1982, and DeGraffenreidt in the 1975 primary, blacks 
have always gotten the votes of more than 90X of those who turned out in 
heavily black precincts.")

d. BLACKS IMPACT ON THE OUTCOME OF ELECTIONS
87. A further study conducted by Plaintiffs analyzed the election 

results to determine whether the polarization of voting was substantively 
significant. This inquiry simply addressed whether the voting was 
sufficiently polarized so that the result of any of the twelve primary 
and general elections between 1971 through 1982 would have been different 
if it had been held with only white voters. In every election between 
1971-1982, involving 120 candidates - other than one candidate in the 
1971 primary and another in the 1973 general - the results as to which \ 
candidate won, or in the instance of a primary election had finished in a

Nposition to qualify for the general, would have been identical even if no 
black voters had ever voted, (de la Garza, Vol. II, Pgs. 216-218), (P.
Ex. 25, Table 5).

88. The conclusion drawn from this analysis is that, with the 
exception cited, in an at-large system, votes cast by black citizens 
simply do not influence the outcome of the elections, (de la Garza, Vol.
II. Pg. 219).

e. THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF VOTES CAST BY THE VOTERS
89. Black voters use fewer of the votes available to them in an 

attempt to ameliorate the discriminatory effect of Fort Lauderdale's 
at-large elections. The ultimate measure of participation is the number 
of votes cast by each voter because what counts insofar as a candidate's 
success is simply the number of votes received, (de la Garza, Vol. II,

Pg. 195).

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90. Consistently and significantly, in order to increase the 
possibility of electing candidates of their choice, black voters cast 
less of their 5 ballots than white voters, (de la Garza, Vol. II. Pg- 
190), (Bullock, Vol. V-A, Pg. 500). In all elections analyzed, other 
than in 1979, white voters utilized more than A of their 5 votes, (de la 
Garza. Vol. II. Pg- 202), (P. Ex. 25, Table 1). Black electoral behavior 
significantly differs. In every election since 1971, black voters used 
less than three of their votes. (Id.) Indeed, this strategy was one of 
the factors attributable to the DeGraffenreidt victory in 1973, the only 
time in the history of the City of Fort Lauderdale that a black 
non-incumbent won. In that election, blacks cast less than two (1.7) of
their votes. (Id.)

91. The consequences of this electoral behavior, a behavior which 
differs between black and white voters, is two-fold. First, it signifies 
that white voters find almost twice the candidates of their choice to 
vote for than do blacks. See, e^. . (P. Ex. 14A. April 10, 1963) 
("Through 'one shot' voting a 'favored candidate gets a vote, and the 
other 24 candidates are in effect, voted against.") Second, the ability 
of blacks to influence the outcome of an election in Fort Lauderdale is 
greatly reduced since in order to maximize their effort to elect 
candidates of their choice, they must in turn forfeit their right to vote 
for a full slate of candidates. On the other hand, white voters in this 
system need not forfeit any of their votes in order to elect candidates
of their choice, (de la Garza, Vol. II, Pgs- 204-205).

f. THE MULTI-VARIATE ANALYSIS
92. The Court recognizes, as candidly admitted by the City's expert, 

that the use of a multi-variate analysis to explain electoral behavior
has never been embraced by any Court. Indeed, this is the first time it

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has ever been applied to voting dilution litigation. Further, it is the 
invention of the City's expert. Dr. Bullock, who is the only scholar to 
have written about it in one of his publications and has tested it out - 
for the very first time - in this litigation. (Bullock, Vol. V-A Pgs. 
517-518). Its very novelty, of course, does not in itself render the 
analysis invalid. It does, however, raise certain problems in its 
application to voting rights litigation which make the general findings 
unsound.

93. First. Defendants' multi-variate analysis, with its 
precision-1 ike crunch of numbers from the computer, as well as other 
statistical compilations wrenched from the political-social context of 
the City, lead to conclusions which are not supported by the reality of 
Fort Lauderdale politics. For instance, (1) under the multi-variate 
model for electoral success, Defendants have determined that candidates 
run better if, among other factors, they are female. (Bullock, Vol. V,
Pg. 387), (D. Ex. 13, Pg. 58). However, the political reality of Fort 
Lauderdale is simply that only one female--current Commissioner Virginia 
Young--has ever been elected to City office in the past 95 years. (P. Ex. 
5) (Genevieve Pynchon was elected in 1937.); (2) under other analysis, 
Andrew DeGraffenreidt, the single black elected in Fort Lauderdale's 
entire history, erroneously is counted as "three successful Black 
candidates" (Bullock, Vol. V-A, Pg. 923) ignoring his obvious uniqueness 
in city politics as well as his own personal unique characteristics 
resulting in his success; (3) the fact that an incumbent--or even 2 
incumbents as in the case of the initial DeGraffenreidt successful 
election in 1973--chose not to run for re-election was never considered 
as a factor in the multi-variate analysis. (Bullock, Vol. V-A, Pgs.
985-986). Since incumbency is recognized by both parties as a critical

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factor in a candidate's success (Bullock, Vol. V-A, Pg. 475), (D. Ex. 13, 
Pg. 73) ("[I]n Ft. Lauderdale incumbents rarely lose."), (de la Garza,
Vol. II, Pg. 220), the absence of this consideration simply defies the 
political reality of one of the explanations for the only successful 
non-incumbent black candidacy in the city history. (DeGraffenreidt, Vol. 
I, Pgs. 61-62), (de la Garza, Vol. II, Pg. 234); (4) in the multi-variate 
analysis, endorsements are considered a significant factor of candidate 
success. (Bullock, Vol. V, Pg. 384), (D. Ex. 13. Pg. 58). However, black 
candidates have received disproportionately more endorsements (Bullock, 
Vol. V-A, Pgs. 490-491) and yet the endorsed black candidates - Kennedy 
(Id.), Hastings (Id.), (Hastings, Dep., Pg. 34-35, 59-60), DeGraffenreidt 
in 1979 (Pg. 555)--continue to lose; (5) Defendants' statistical analysis 
of the success ratio of black candidates (D. Ex. 13, Tables 1 and 2) 
ignored 9 unsuccessful black candidates who had run in more than one-half 
of the elections in which black candidates ran and lost--all prior to 
1971. (Bullock, Vol. V-A, Pgs. 493-496); (Bullock, Vol. V-A, Pg. 494) 
(The explanation - "an arbitrary judgment" to discount these elections); 
(6) Defendants’ definition of what constitutes support--whether a white 
voter had cast a ballot for a black candidate (Bullock, Vol. V, Pg. 360), 
is totally divorced from the reality of how a candidate is elected to 
city office. That is, support insofar as having any meaning for a 
candidate's success, can only be considered in the context of the total 
number of votes a candidate receives in relationship to the total number 
of votes received by the other candidates (Bullock, Vol. V-A, Pg- 534). 
Simply, the political reality of an election is that a candidate succeeds 
or fails by virtue of the total number of votes received; (7) the 
Defendants' model for measuring electoral success (Bullock, Vol. V, Pg. 
384-385), ("[M]ore likely to win if you are an incumbent, you spend more

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£ r

money, if the newspaper endorses you, and when white turnout is lower.”), 
(D. Ex. 13, Pgs. 57-60) is virtually wrenched from the underlying factors 
which explain the most important election raised in this lawsuit--the 
DeGraffenreidt 1973 victory. In that election--so important because it 
is the first and only time a non-incumbent black has ever won--the 
factors which contributed to his victory, ignored in the multi-variate 
success model, include: (i) a City_record^turnout, which Included a
record 41.8X of the black voters (P. Ex. 25A), infra, Hill; (ii) the

can d 7 d ^ 3 ^ d by a n ^ acially _ ^ en̂ flable laSt namG Wh°
actively p ^ ^ T ^ ^ i g n  stra77gy in which he concealed his race from 
many of the w M t T T u ^ r a t e .  inf^T 111077111) a black electorate which

3.3 of their 5 votes in order to elect a single
candidate^ of their choice (P. Ex. 25, Table 1); (iv) an election in which 
two white incumbents had chosen not to run (DeGraffendreidt, Vol. I, Pgs. 
61^62v T ( de^lTGarzarv^l^lTPg. 234); (v) a primary election in which 
DeGraffenreidt --virtually unknown in the white community--was able to 
get "lost” among 30 other candidates (DeGraffenreidt, Vol. I, Pgs.
56-57), (de la Garza, Vol. II, Pg- 234); (8) the fact that the City's 
expert concluded that race plays an insignificant role in city elections 
notwithstanding: (i) that only one black citizen has ever won in the 
context of 16 other unsuccessful black candidacies spanning two and 
one-half decades (P. Ex. 8. Fact 1); (ii) that racial separation, 
isolation, and discrimination has and continues to play a major role in 
the life of black citizens in Fort Lauderdale in the context of ((a)) 
residential segregation, supra, 111146-47; ((b)) municipal employment
practices, supra, 111150-58; ((c)) educational opportunities, supra,
111167-69; ((d)) blacks' participation in the very threshold of the
political process, membership on policy-making City boards and

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committees, supra, 111159-64; ((e)) and public housing facilities, supra, 
111165-66; and (9) a finding by Dr. Bullock, that is in apparent conflict 
with the highest ranking current city official, Mayor Dressier, who 
candidly recognized that a single-member district system would highly 
likely" result in a "black representative on the Commission." (Dressier, 
Vol. V, Pg. 294).

94. Second. widely varying results may be obtained depending on 
subjective judgments as to which data is to be included or excluded. For 
instance, while political scientists - including Defendants’ expert 
(Bullock, Vol. V-A), Pgs. 433-434) - agree that other factors can 
significantly effect voting behavior, these factors or "independent 
variables" were not tested in the analysis. They include, (i) 
qualifications of the candidate, including education (Bullock, Vol. V-A, 
Pg. 434); (ii) past involvement or exposure in the political process, 
such as service on City boards or committees (Bullock, Vol. V-A, Pg.
437); (iii) support or endorsements from slating organization or 
associations, for example, in Fort Lauderdale, the Broward Citizens' 
Committee (Bullock, Vol. V-A Pgs. 437-438), (Shaw, Vol. V, Pg. 258, Dep. 
Pgs. 11-20); (Dressier, Vol. V, Pg. 281-283); infra; (iv) how well a 
candidate finishes in the primary beyond meeting the threshold of 
qualifying for the general election; e.g., his position between 1st and 
10th place. (Bullock, Vol. V-A, Pgs. 439-444); (v) the candidate’s name 
recognition as it relates to the racial or ethnic identity as a cue that 
influences voting behavior (Bullock, Vol. V-A, Pgs. 448-450); (vi) the 
general political climate of the times (Bullock, Vol. V-A, Pgs. 451 452), 
(vii) the varying socio-economic characteristics of the electorate which 
influence political behavior from precinct-to-precinct or within areas of

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(

the City. (Bullock, Vol. V-A, Pgs. 453-455); and (viii) the number of 
incumbents choosing not to run in an election, a consideration which 
directly increases the opportunity of success for a non-incumbent.

95. Third, significant methodological flaws exist as to those 
independent variables that were utilized in the multi-variate analysis:
(i) a total dollar figure with an inflation index utilized to measure 

/campaign contributions included only monetary donations (Bullock, Vol.
/ V-A, Pg. 460-461). However, non-monetary, in-kind campaign contributions 

V/ from the black community played a powerful and valuable role in the black 
candidates' campaigns. (DeGraffenreidt, Vol. I, Pgs. 53-54), (Free 

I office space, cars, food since "[t]hat's what you get mostly in the 
/ minority community bedcause there's limited funds in that area. ),

/  (Hastings, Dep., Pg. 26) (Tremendous in-kind contribution from black 
community.). These black candidates, whose natural constituency, the 
black community, has limited financial resources organized other forms of 
campaign contributions which were not translated into a monetary figure 
in the multi-variate computer runs. (Bullock, Vol. V-A, Pgs. 463-466),
(ii) a code for Incumbency was factored into the analysis, but there was 
no differentiation in the value assigned to account for past number of 
terms served or the incumbent's position, such as a mayor or 
commissioner. Each of those later factors would affect name recognition 
and reflect other built-in advantages derived from various incumbent 
positions. (Bullock, Vol. V-A, Pgs. 472-473); (iii) endorsements were 
factored into a code and utilized in the analysis, however, no 
distinction between either the Fort Lauderdale News or Miami Herald was 
made to account for circulation differences that were likely within the

(Bullock, Vol. V-A, Pgs. 485-486). >

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r

City of Fort Lauderdale or between the black and white communities.
(Bullock, Vol. V-A, Pgs. 487-488).

96. Fourth, and most significantly, several of the independent 
variables, while at least superficially unrelated to race, are in reality 
highly associated and intertwined with the role which race has played in 
the City's elections. Thus the causal factor that produces the values 
assigned to the independent variables are in fact race related. Although 
incumbency is viewed as a powerful factor in achieving success in Fort 
Lauderdale Commission elections, the fact is that except for the unique 
experience of the DeGraffenreidt incumbency campaigns of 1975 and 1977, 
it is a characteristic limited solely to past and now present white 
commissioners. It simply always has been and continues to be more 
difficult for a black candidate to win city office since there are no
black incumbents (Bullock, Vol. V-A, Pgs. 480-481).

97. Campaign contributions, which along with incumbency in the 
multi-variate computer run, explain a candidate's success, is also a race 
related variable. Black candidates have consistently received most, if 
not all, of their contributions from the black community (Reddick, Vol.
V, Pgs. 248-249); (Hastings, Pg. 11); (DeGraffenreidt, Vol. I, Pgs. 65. 
79). The natural result of dependence on the isolated and segregated 
black community of Fort Lauderdale, supra, 111146-47, which is poorer, 
supra, 111170 - 74, (Bullock, Vol. V-A, Pg. 464); smaller and has drastically 
less economical resources than its white counterpart, is a campaign in 
which a black candidate is highly disadvantaged financially. (Bullock, 
Vol. V-A, Pgs. 465-466).

98. Not only are the factors of incumbency and campaign 
contributions directly related to race, there exists a statistically 
significant association of each of the Independent variables, as well as

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r(

a third variable - endorsements (Bullock, Vol. V-A, Pgs. 476-477) (Stat­
istically significant relationship at .334 level between incumbency and 
campaign expenditures); (Bullock, Vol. V-A, Pgs. 478-48<f) (Even greater 
statistical relationship at .425 level between incumbency and endorsements).

99. Thus, where there exists a statistically significant, although 
not necessarily perfect, correlation of three of the variables it becomes 
difficult to disentangle their separate effects on the dependent 
variable. Moreover, these variables, analyzed in an artificially
isolated manner, cannot be compartmentized from and indeed are directly

\____ ^
associated with race itself.

g. THE BLACK CANDIDATES - 1957 to 1982 
(i) 1957-1967

100. In 1957, Nathaniel Wilkerson, the first black candidate to run 
for City Commission, announced his candidacy by stating: "he hope(d) to 
serve as a link between the negro population and the City government."
(P. Ex. 14A, March 4, 1957).

101. Although unsuccessful in his 1957 and 1959 campaigns, Wilkerson 
received winning support from all the City "negro precincts. (P. Ex. 14A, 
April 10, 1957; April 29, 1959), (P. Ex. 25, Table 3).

102. In 1963 and 1967, Thomas Reddick, described by the media as 
a "negro lawyer," was a candidate for the Commission. (Reddick, Vol.
V, Pgs. 247-249). In those campaigns, Reddick relied primarily on 
contributions from blacks because of difficulties raising funds from 
whites. (Reddick, Vol. V, Pg. 248). He also focused his campaign in 
the black community because of a lack of cooperation from the whites. 
(Reddick, Vol. V. Pg. 256). Despite his qualifications, which 
ultimately lead to his appointment as the first black County Judge in
Broward County. Reddick, in receiving significant support from black

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r

voters, and less than minimal support from whites. (P. Ex. 25, Table 3).
103. In 1967, blacks developed a campaign strategy in which five 

blacks ran for the Commission, (de la Garza, Vol. IV, Pgs. 221 222).
Alcee Hastings, an architect of that strategy, explained that the five 
black candidate strategy was taken to encourage black turnout. (Hastings, 
Dep., Pgs. 36-38). While not succeeding in electing any black 
commisioners, this strategy lead to increase black voter turnout in 
subsequent elections.

(ii) 1969-1971: ALCEE HASTINGS
109. Alcee L. Hastings, then an attorney in private practice in Fort 

Lauderdale and currently a United States District Judge in the Southern 
District of Florida, ran unsuccessfully in 1969 and 1971 for the City 
Commission. (Hastings, Dep., Pg. 1). Judge Hastings, who had waged 
perhaps more political campaigns than any present or past--white or 
black--politician in the State of Florida (Hastings, Dep., Pgs. 8-10) 
(Candidate for Florida House, Florida Senate, State Public Service 
Commission and United States Senate), was one of the most politically
experienced candidates for City office.

105. As a black, his race had been an issue in both of the 1969 and 
1971 campaigns. Hastings had been unable to secure significant campaign 
contributions in either election from the white community (Hastings,
Dep., Pg. 11) (Whites didn't "want to be on record as making a 
contribution"); had been limited to campaigning in certain areas in the 
white community (Hastings, Dep., Pgs. 19-20, 29, 72); and had been 
continually identified in the media by his race, unlike white candidates. 
(Hastings, Dep., Pgs. 18, 28).

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106. Hastings' observations that he had lost the election because he 

is black (Hastings, Dep. , Pgs. 13, 47-48) is corroborated by_the__elfiiLLioa 
result. In the 1971 election, he received a vote from virtually every 
black (98%) who walked into the poll booth, but received votes from less 
than one-third of the white voters (31.9%) (P. Ex. 38). Measured by the 
bi-variate regression analysis, his support from blacks was literally 
perfect (R-2 ■= .99) (P. Ex. 25, Table 2); and he had finished first 
the candidates in every one of the seven (7) black precincts but had not 
finished among the first 5 candidates in any of the 52 white precincts
(P. Ex. 25, Table 3).

107. Further, this record black support--the 98% vote support figure 
unequaled by any black or white candidate in any other election analyzed 
between 1971-1982 (P. Ex. 38)--occurred in a context of (i) a black elec­
torate that had adhered to Hastings’ campaign strategy and forfeited 3 of 
their 5 votes in order to attempt to elect a candidate of their choice 
(P. Ex. 25, Table 1), and (ii), a turnout of black voters (38.5%) at a 
level that was 80% higher than the white turnout in 1971 (21.4%.) (P. Ex. 
25A). Indeed, this black turnout has never been equaled in the white 
community in any of the 12 elections analyzed between 1971 1982. (̂ d.- )

108. In the final analysis, blacks had turned out in record numbers 
and supported Hastings in record numbers; however, the candidate was 
unable to win simply because he could not master an adequate number of 
white votes. Judge Hastings expressed it succinctly:

"And it was always fascinating to me because I would have 
people tell me, 'If your people had voted for you, you 
would have won.' Well, my people did vote for me, you 
know, in large measure and large numbers of them from a 
percentage turnout." (Hastings, Dep., Pg- 31)

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(ill) 1973 - DeGraffenreidt
109. An educator and administrator within the Broward County School 

System at the time (DeGraffenreidt, Vol. I. Pgs. 31-38), Andrew
DeGraffenreidt ultimately succeeded In 1973 as the first black ever 
elected to the City Commission. DeGraffenreidt's political experience 
prior to 1973 was limited to unsuccessful efforts to elect one of a slate 
of black candidates in 1967 (DeGraffenreidt, Vol. I* Pgs. 39-40) and 
later in 1971 to assisting what DeGraffenreidt himself observed was a 
•'well qualified and well known" (Id., Pg. 42) black candidate, Alcee 
Hastings.

110. Having been directly involved in past unsuccessful black 
campaigns, DeGraffenreidt employed various strategies in the 1973 race.
(1) He campaigned in areas of the white community in a manner which 
deliberately did not reveal the fact that he was black, capitalizing on 
the fact that his last name did not readily identify his race
(DeGraffenreidt, Vol. I, Pg. 52), (Bullock, Vol. V-A, Pg. 448).
DeGraffenreidt purposefully used two sets of campaign literature. In the 
white community he distributed pamphlets without his picture; in 
contrast, in the black community he included his picture on the materials 
(DeGraffenreidt, Vol. I, Pgs. 51-52, 112). Like all viable candidates 
must, DeGraffenreidt ran a newspaper ad with his picture. This single 
ad, however, did not affect his overall dual strategy.

111. The express purpose of this strategy was to "attempt to receive 
a larger number of white votes" (DeGraffenreidt, Vol. I, Pg. 112). 
Additionally, while campaigning in the white community, DeGraffenreidt 
used - as he explained - a "third person" campaigning style. He asked 
white voters to "support Andy DeGraffenreidt for the Fort Lauderdale City 
Commission" but never made it clear that he was referring to himself

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(DeGraffenreidt, Vol. I, Pgs. 52-53; Vol. II, Pgs. 220-223). This 
campaign strategy, to intentionally mask his racial identity in the white 
community, was possible only because of the candidate’s relatively low 
profile in that community. His work schedule had prevented his 
attendance at city commission meetings; his prior involvement in civic 
affairs had been limited to an uneventful and essentially inactive term 
on a municipal board; and, significantly, he never had had personal 
contact with any of the then existing or former city commissioners or 
mayors (DeGraffenreidt, Vol. I, Pgs. 38-39). See also, (Shaw, Vol. V,
Pg. 259, Dep. Pg. 22) ("Did not know DeGraffenreidt prior to the 1973 
election"). DeGraffenreidt's low profile in the white community 
contrasted sharply with the flamboyant character of the 1971 black 
candidate, Alcee Hastings. (2) Critical to the campaign was 
DeGraffenreidt's successful efforts in getting blacks .to turn out in 
unprecedented numbers (DeGraffenreidt, Vol. I, Pgs. 46-47, 58, 67), (de 
la Garza, Vol. IV, Pgs. 234-236). The 41.81 turnout of registered black 
voters was 271 greater than the white turnout in that election and 1221 
larger than the average white turnout (18.81) in all 12 elections between 
1971-1982 (P. Ex. 25A). (3) This record black turnout translated into
votes for DeGraffenreidt. 96.91 of all black voters cast a vote for him
at a rate 3 times greater than white voters who cast votes at a rate of 
321 for DeGraffenreidt. (P. Ex. 36). While DeGraffenreidt received 571 
(2001 black voters/3521 total black votes cast) of all votes cast by 
blacks the other successful white candidate received a mere fraction of 
their white constituent support: Shaw (151) (8291 white votes/55,859
white votes cast); Young (151) (8452/55,859); Mills (121) (6734/55.859);

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* ^

and Cox (11.51) (6445/55,859) (D. Ex. 13, Table 8, Pg. 28).6/ (4)
DeGraffenreidt aggressively and successfully educated the black 
electorate to the fact that in the context of Fort Lauderdale's election 
system, where each voter can cast 5 votes for various candidates, black 
votes must forfeit 3 or more of their ballots--in a manner unlike 
whites--in order for a black candidate to succeed (DeGraffenreidt, Vol.
I, Pgs. 47-48) (By voting "beyond two you were voting against your 
candidate."); (de la Garza, Vol. II, Pg. 235). The white electorate cast 
on the average more than 3 times the number of ballots (4.3) in the 
General election than the number cast by blacks (1.7) (P. Ex. 25, Table 
1). (5) Thirty-one (31) candidates ran in the 1973 Primary. This was a
significantly larger field than in any other election between 1971-1982 
(P. Ex. 1, Pgs. 84-85, 112-113, 126-127, 138, and 148) and it played 
directly in to DeGraffenreidt's strategy of obscuring his racial identity 
among whites by enabling him to get "lost" among the field. Importantly, 
it also fragmented the white electorate's votes among the 30 other white 
candidates (DeGraffenreidt, Vol. I, Pgs. 56-57) enabling DeGraffenreidt 
to prove his "electibility" to the voters in the primary by finishing in 
5th of 31 office seekers. (6) A final factor in DeGraffenreidt's 
success, although a factor over which the candidate had no control, was 
the reality that two incumbents had chosen not to run for reelection in 
1973, thus creating 2 new vacancies (DeGraffenreidt, Vol. I, Pgs.
61-62). As all parties agree, "incumbents rarely lose in Fort 
Lauderdale."

6/ This analysis is calculated directly from Table 8 of Dr. Bullock's 
report. All votes in the white precincts are added and the candidates 
share of these votes are then divided into that total (D. Ex. 13, Table
8).

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( r

U2. Thus for these 2 vacancies, there were 30 white candidates 
competing for white electorate support while a single black candidate 
appealed to the entire black community and received its total support.

(iv) 1975-1977 - DeGraffenreidt
113. Incumbents "rarely lose" in Fort Lauderdale City Commission 

elections. That the individual Commissioners run as an incumbent team is 
fortified by the very structure of the election system in which 
candidates do not run head-to-head against each other. DeGraffenreidt, 
as an incumbent, embraced this team campaign strategy (DeGraffenreidt,
Vol. I, Pgs. 74-79) as did his colleagues throughout these elections.
See, e,r .. (P. Ex. 14A, Article of March 9, 1977) ("I feel the team has 
been reelected." Shaw said, "I don’t think any single commissioner or the 
mayor can take credit for singly being elected.") (Mills agreed, "they’ve 
given us a vote of confidence-as a team. And we’ll give them the same 
dedicated type of government."); (Shaw, Vol. V, Pg. 259, Dep. Pg. 26) 
(Team concept of incumbents), and further reinforced through endorsement 
by the press (D. Ex. 6-C, Pg. 6, 1975 endorsement) ("We recommend the 
voters stay with the incumbent five tomorrow as we can see no reason to 
break up a ’winning team’ nor do we believe that any of the five 
opponents remaining offer the qualifications and experience of the
incumbents." ).

114. As in 1973, DeGraffenreidt continued in the 1975-1977 general 
elections to receive a high turnout in the black community in percentages 
that were equaled in the white community only in one election between 
1971-1982 (P. Ex. 25A). Black voters continued to forfeit their 
available votes casting half as many of the 5 available ballots than 
white voters (P. Ex. 25, Table 1). Most significantly, blacks, as in 
1973, gave DeGraffenreidt significantly higher, indeed more than twice

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the level of support than whites (P. Ex. 30). Reelected in each of the 
1975 and 1977 elections, DeGraffenreidt continued his tenure of office.

(v) 1979-DeGraffenreidt
115. DeGraffenreidt lost his commission seat in 1979 due to a 

decrease of white electorate support. A review of the election results 
compel this conclusion. (1) As the City's expert himself observed, 
generally black voters' overwhelming support black candidates (Bullock, 
Vol. V-A, Pgs. 431-432). The 1979 General election was no exception to 
this rule. 921 of all black voters cast a ballot for DeGraffenreidt. 
Black support, measured by the bi-variate regression analysis, translated 
into a R-2 of .96 in the 1979 election. This level of support, which is 
phenomenally high, mirrors DeGraffenreidt's other successful elections 
(1977 - .97; 1975 - .95; 1973 - .99) (P. Ex. 25, Table 2).

116. The percentage of blacks voting for DeGraffenreidt in 1979 
(921) was insignificantly lower in that election than in his successful 
general elections in 1973 (971), 1975 (951), and 1977 (951).

117. Had every black (1001) voted for DeGraffenreidt in 1979 rather 
than 921, he still would have lost the election by 800 votes.7/ In 
contrast, while DeGraffenreidt continued - like all other black 
candidates since 1957 except Alston - to rank first in every black 
precinct in 1979 as he did in 1973-1975-1977, he ranked as one of the top 
5 vote getters in only 16 of 64 (251) white precincts - a substantial 
drop from 1977 (top 5 within 29 of 63) (461) and 1975 (50 of 63) (791)

7/ 908 voters turned out in the black precincts. DeGraffenreidtreceived 838 votes. If every one of the 908 voters had cast a ballot and 
single-shot voted, he would thus have received an additional 70 votes and 
would have lost the election by 800 votes instead of 870 (P. Ex. 25,
Table 5, Pg. 27).



r

(P. Ex. 25, Table 3). (2) Although turnout of black voters in 1979 was
lower than the past it was not significantly different than the white
turnout in that year (P. Ex. 25A) (black turnout m 19.61; white
turnout «= 22.3%). Had blacks turned out at the Identical level as whites
in 1979 and black voters had single shot only one ballot for
DeGraffenreidt, he would have still lost the election by 746 votes rather
than 870.8/ Defendants' explanation for the DeGraffenreidt 1979 loss,
"A black turnout of 36 to 37% could have elected DeGraffenreidt" (D. Ex.
13, Pg. 73) merely underscores the inequality of the Fort Lauderdale
election system. The average white turnout in twelve elections analyzed
between 1971-1982 is 18.8% (P. Ex. 25A). If blacks must turn out in
numbers 100% greater than whites in order to elect candidates of their

9 /choice, then the system is simply and obviously unequal. Moreover, 
such a required black turnout of 36%-37% would exceed the actual white 
turnout in every single one of the 12 elections analyzed between 1971 and 
1982. Compounding this inequality is the fact that the additional black 
voters who must turn out at such record numbers, a phenomenon never 
matched in any other election by white voters, must also forfeit a number 
of their ballots to assure that their vote for DeGraffenreidt is not 
neutralized by virtue of supporting a white candidate. Finally, unlike

8/ An increase of black turnout from 19.6% to the turnout of whites at 22.3% constitutes an additional 2.7% black voters. Measured against the 
4,625 total number of black registered voters in 1979 this increase accounts for an additional 124 votes. If each of those additional 124 
blacks voted thus matching the white turnout, and all single-shot voted 
for DeGraffenreidt, he would have lost by 746 instead of 870 votes.
9/ Viewed from an additional perspective, the white turnout in the 1979 General election was 22.3%. If a black candidate must receive 37% of the 
vote, then blacks are required to turn out in numbers that are 70% 
greater than whites in that election in order to win.

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c

candidate success. He had received the endorsements of both newspapers 
as well as other major endorsements from the Fort Lauderdale Chamber of 
Commerce and Board of Realtors (Kennedy, Vol. V, Pg. 316, 322). He had 
received campaign contributions in the range between $15,000-22,000, 
which he prorated over both the primary and general elections, from the 
broad-based business, education, and religious communities (Kennedy, Vol. 
V, Pg. 318). Beyond the Bullock "success model," but in the context of 
the reality of Fort Lauderdale politics, Kennedy's extensive political 
background enabled him to run a broad-based campaign throughout the 
entire city. He had the political contacts and knew the key players. He 
utilized billboards, yard signs, TV and radio advertisements; obtained 
bipartisan support from both Democratic and Republican factions; and had 
the additional advantage of running in an election with a vacancy on the 
commission (Kennedy, Vol. V, Pg. 317-319). Kennedy’s handicaps in the 
election were that he was not an incumbent--only whites were incumbents; 
and that he was black--only one black has ever been elected to the City
Commission.

121. As all other black candidates, Kennedy had received 
overwhelming support from the black community. Consistent with every 
black candidate who has ever run, other than Alston, Kennedy finished 
first in all of the black precincts, but within the top 5 positions in 
only 13 of 69 white precincts (211.) (P. Ex. 25, Table 3); 951. of all 
black voters had cast one vote for Kennedy in contrast to 311. of the 
white voters (P. Ex. 37). Measured by the bi-variate regression analysis 
Kennedy’s support translated into a R-2 of .96; he was successful in his 
campaign strategy (Kennedy, Vol. V, Pg. 332) of convincing black voters 
to forfeit a portion of their other available votes, as black voters had

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r

cast on the average of 2.3 votes, two full votes less than the average 
white voter (P. Ex. 25, Table 1). Had every black voter supported 
Kennedy rather than 951 of those voters, he still would have lost the 
election by 504 votes rather than 568.10/ Kennedy lost the election, 
having received 951 of all the potential black votes, because he didn't 
receive a sufficient amount of white support.

122. The City's explanation for the Kennedy defeat, as with 
DeGraffenreidt in 1979, was based upon their view that had blacks turned 
out at a 28-311 level and voted in the same way as those who did turn 
out, that Kennedy would have won (Bullock, Vol. V-A, Pgs. 523, 527), (D. 
Ex. 13, Pg. 73) ("It appears then that recent black defeats may have been 
due more to declining political interest among blacks than to any growing 
unwillingness among whites to vote for blacks.").

123. This explanation, as with the City's similar argument in the 
context of the DeGraffenreidt 1979 loss, again underscores the inequality 
of the Fort Lauderdale election system. The black turnout (24.01) in the 
Kennedy 1982 general election was virtually identical to the white 
(24.71). Whites have turned out at the level of 28-311 at only one time 
in the 12 elections analyzed since 1971. Yet, under the Bullock 
analysis, that level of turnout would have been required by blacks in 
order to achieve a Kennedy victory (Bullock, Vol. V-A, Pg. 527), (P. Ex. 
25A). Moreover, the City's position requires the continual support of 
virtually all blacks and forces them to forfeit an average of 2.71 of 
their other votes in order to elect a candidate of their choice. This is

10/ 1405 voters turned out in the black precincts. Kennedy received
1341 votes. If every one of the 1405 voters had cast a ballot for Kennedy he would have received an additional 64 votes and would have lost 
the election by 504 votes instead of 568 (D. Ex. 13, Pg. 30), (P. Ex. 25, 
Table 5, Pg. 28).

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a burden the white voters need not ever shoulder in order to elect candi­
dates of their choice.

124. The second unsuccessful black candidate, Louis Alston, who ran
without prior political or community involvement (Kennedy, Vol. V, Pg.
338), received enough support from blacks--R-2 of .87 (P. Ex. 25, Table
2); was within the top 3 candidates in each of the 6 black precincts--to
have been a contender in the election had he received an equivalent num-

. „ 11/ber of votes in the white community.
5. THE STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTION SYSTEM 
a. LACK OF GEOGRAPHICAL SUBDISTRICTS

125. City commissioners are not required to reside in any set dis 
trict within Fort Lauderdale (P. Ex. 2. Fact 10). As reviewed in length, 
supra, 1141-42, blacks have repeatedly raised their concerns over the lack 
of any residency requirements. In the past 50 year period, only 5 (4.8%) 
of the 105 commissioners have resided in the northwest quadrant where 
literally all blacks in Fort Lauderdale reside (P. Ex. 9). See, (P. Ex. 
29) (A duplicate attached as Appendix 1 hereto).

126. Since 1957, when the first black candidate ran unsuccessfully 
for the City Commission, to the present, fifty-six (56) of the fifty-nine 
(59) City Commissioners have resided or currently reside in the north­
east, southeast, or southwest quadrants. Two, or 3.4%, of all Commis­
sioners have resided in the predominantly black northwest quadrant (P.
Ex. 8).

127. The lack of a residency requirement has produced an uneven geo­
graphical spread of representation. The result is that there is little

11/ Alston finished within the top 5 candidates 
precincts (P. Ex. 25, Table 3). He received 2%
white votes cast) of all white votes (D. Ex. 13,

in 0 of the 63 white (473 white v o t e s / 2 0 , 6 5 0
Table 16, Pg. 36).

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chance for black citizens to elect representatives who live in or near 
the black community. This geogographic inequity diminishes the black 
community's participation in the political process since blacks are 
denied informal social contacts with their representatives and because 
their representatives do not have first hand knowledge of their problems 
(Dunn, Vol. II, Pg. 142).

b. SIZE OF DISTRICT
12128. Fort Lauderdale's population of 153,279 / makes it the fifth

largest city in Florida. As a result of Fort Lauderdale's size, the 
expense of a city-wide campaign for an at-large position is expensive. 
Since blacks earn nearly half of what whites earn, supra, 1171, the 
population size of the city disadvantages blacks.

6. THE EXTENT TO WHICH BLACKS HAVE BEEN ELECTED TO OFFICE
129. Andrew DeGraffenreidt, who was initially elected in 1973, is 

the only black to have ever served on the Fort Lauderdale City 
Commission. (P. Ex. 5). The inability of black citizens to be elected 
to the City Commission is not due to a lack of black candidates. From 
1957 to 1982, there were 16 black candidates for the Commission positions 
(P. Ex. 8).

7. THE POLICY FOR USING THE AT-LARGE ELECTION SYSTEM IS TENUOUS
130. Recent Florida legislative enactments indicate a shift in state 

policy from at-large or multi-member election districts toward single 
member districts (Button, Vol. IV, Pg. 206) Dr. James Button, Professor

12/ Florida cities with a greater population than Fort Lauderdale are: 
Jacksonville (540,920); Miami (346,865); Tampa (271,523); and St. Petersburg (238,647). See, Census of Population, Florida-General Population Characteristics, Vol. I, Table 14. As data obtained from the 
United States Census, it can be judicially noticed by the Court. See, 
F.R.E. 201(b)(2), U.S. v. United Brothers of Carpenters and Joiners of 
America. Local 169, 457 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1972).

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n

of Political Science at the University of Florida, testified to recent 
changes in state policy favoring single member districts (Button, Vol.
IV, Pgs. 206-209).

131. in 1982, the Florida Legislature voted nearly unanimously to 
change from multi-member districts to single member districts for State 
House and Senate elections. (Button, Vol. IV, Pg. 206). The change, 
which had strong support in both legislative houses, (103 to 8 vote in 
House; unanimous vote in Senate) (Button, Vol. IV, Pg. 206) was made "to 
improve the opportunity of minority groups, especially blacks, to win 
legislative seats." (Button, Vol. IV, Pg. 206), (P. Ex. 17, Tab 1).

132. The first state-wide election that followed the change to 
single member districts occurred in November, 1982. In that election, 
blacks were elected to the State Senate for the first time since the 
Reconstruction period, (Button, Vol. IV, Pg. 207). In the Florida House 
of Representatives, the number of blacks doubled. (Button, Vol. IV, Pg. 
207).

133. Since the 1982 state-wide redistricting, the Florida 
Legislature has expressed additional support for single member districts. 
(Button, Vol. IV, Pg. 208). In 1984, the Florida Legislature voted to 
have placed on the ballot a referendum to amend the Florida Constitution 
to allow individual counties the option of electing County Commissioners 
by single member districts rather than at-large county-wide voting. 
(Button, Vol. IV, Pg. 208), (P. Ex. 17, Tab 3). Another legislative 
enactment in 1984 permits County school board districts to shift from 
county-wide at-large voting to single member districts. (Button, Vol. IV, 
Pg. 209), (P. Ex. 17, Tab 2).

134. Prior to the 1982 adoption of single member districts for 
elections, the State Legislature Committees conducted a series of

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state-wide public hearings to ascertain public sentiment on multi-member 
versus single member districts. (Button, Vol. IV, Pg. 207). In these 
hearings, approximately 70 percent of the citizens who testified 
supported a change to single member districts. (Button, Vol. IV, Pg.
207).

135. At the public hearing conducted by the Florida House of 
Representatives Select Committee on Reapportionment, and held in Fort 
Lauderdale on October 14, 1981, 15 of the 18 witnesses favored single 
member districts. (Button, Vol. IV, Pg. 108). One of the witnesses, Fort 
Lauderdale's present Mayor, Robert A. Dressier, said he favored single 
member districts in Broward County because multi-member districts 
"tended to deny representation to minority groups" and restricted their 
access to the electoral system because of the "high cost of campaigning." 
(Dressier, Vol. IV, Pg. 300).

8. UNRESPONSIVENESS
136. In attempting to prove that it has been responsive to the 

particular needs of its black citizens, the City presented evidence 
relating to the City's (i) employment practices (Testimony of Mills, Vol. 
VI, Pgs. 592-614; Hill, Vol. VI, Pgs. 614-626; and Larkin, Vol. VI, Pgs. 
665-710); (ii) provision of sanitary sewers (Testimony of Mehner, Vol.
VI, Pgs. 627-662); (iii) code enforcement (Testimony of Helms, Vol. VII, 
Pgs. 20-735); (iv) provision of park and recreational facilities 
(Testimony of Tapp, Vol. VII, Pgs. 746-784); and (v) expenditures of 
Community Development Block Grant funds (Testimony of Adams, Vol. VII, 
Pgs. 785-837).

137. While the City finally may be attempting to provide more equal 
employment opportunities "it has done so only after three decades of 
resistance," supra, 1HI20, 23, 27, 50-58, and a federal court order

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covering hiring and promotional decisions in approximately one half of 
the City's work force (since June 18, 1980) (Federal Court Order in 
United States v. City of Fort Lauderdale.) (P. Ex. 23).

138. The City's increased efforts at code enforcement in the black 
community (Helms, Vol. VII, Pgs. 721-728), are required because of the 
higher incidence of poverty and "blighted housing conditions" in the 
black community. (Helms, Vol. VII, Pg. 730). Further, these code 
enforcement efforts, which were increased in 1983 (Helms, Vol. VII, Pg. 
739), are in part necessitated by the City's prior neglect and failure to 
enforce various code and zoning ordinances in the black community, supra, 
111116, 27-28, 38, 99. (City's failure to enforce zoning laws and obtain 
federal funds for slum clearance).

139. The City cites also its recent provision of park and 
recreational facilities for black citizens as an indication of its 
responsiveness to black citizens. (Testimony of Tapp, Vol. Ill, Pgs. 
796-789). As with employment practices, the City, for over forty years, 
resisted requests by black citizens for equal use of City recreational 
facilities, supra. 111132-36. Even obtaining judicial relief had proved 
fruitless, since the City chose to sell its golf and country club rather 
than allow blacks to use it, supra, 1132. These minimum efforts in the 
areas of employment, parks and recreation, and code enforcement, can 
hardly be considered responsive to the interest of black citizens.

190. Additionally, the City presented evidence that they had 
expended or allocated approximately 90 to 95 percent of the 21 million 
dollars received in Community Development Block Grant Funds (CDBG) since 
1975 in the northwest section. (Adams, Vol. VII, Pg. 787). These CDBG 
funds were expended on services for the Northwest Community, including
street paving and sidewalks; park facilities; neighborhood park

A* ' ,I

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facilities; and housing rehabilitation (Vol. VII, Pgs. 790-794).
141. The use of CDBG funds is limited by federal law to persons of 

low and moderate income (Adams, Vol. VII, Pg. 799). Since "the 
overwhelming majority of the City’s low and moderate income residents 
live in the northwest section" the City's overwhelming allocation of CDBG
funds to the northwest quadrant would have to have occurred forv
compliance with federal guidelines. (See, P. Ex. 18, Tab 6 - Community 
Profile, City of Fort Lauderdale, Pg. 1) ___

142. The City's lack of responsiveness to black citizens is 
reflected also in its failure to appoint black citizens to its various 
advisory boards and committees, exemplified by the fact that on 13 of the 
City's existing 24 boards there is not one black member, supra, 111163-64. 
See also, (P. Ex. 11).

143. Additionally, the very lack of black elected officials denies 
them community role models which would increase political participation 
by young blacks. (Button, Vol. IV, Pgs. 198-199). Because of the present 
effects of discrimination, "black constituents" are generally more 
inclined to comunicate with black office holders than white elected 
officials which further denies blacks effective political participation 
(Button, Vol. V, Pgs. 198-199).

9. BLACK ACCESS TO THE CANDIDATE SLATING PROCESS
144. Both the former Mayor, now Congressman E. Clay Shaw, and the 

present Mayor, Robert A. Dressier, testified that the Broward County 
Citizens' Committee, a political organization, endorsed candidates for 
the City Commission (Shaw, Vol. 5, Pg. 258, Dep., Pgs. 12-14), and made 
contributions and campaigned for endorsed candidates, (Id.), (Dressier, 
Vol. V, Pg. 281) which each viewed as a positive factor in their
successful campaigns. (Shaw, Vol. 5, Pg. 258, Dep., Pg. 15), (Dressier,

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r

Vol. V, Pg. 282).
145. Four the five present City Commissioners who won in the most 

recent 1982 elections had received the Broward County Citizens’ Committee 
endorsement. (Dressier, Vol. V, Pg. 282). Candidates who have gotten the 
Committee's endorsement have utilized it in their campaign strategies. 
(See, D. Ex. 6 ■ F candidate advertisements listing Broward Citizens' 
Committee endorsement: (i) Richard A. Mills, Pgs. 2, 9, 21; (ii) Robert 
Dressier, Pg. 3; (iii) Robert Cox, Pgs. 5, 16.)

146. Congressman Shaw, whose relationship with the Citizens 
Committee began in 1971, was not aware of any black who has been a 
Committee member or attended any meeting. (Shaw, Vol. 5, Pg. 258, Dep., 
Pgs. 19-20). Similarly, Mayor Dressier, a Committee member since 1980, 
knew of no black members (Dressier, Vol. V, Pg. 283).

147. The Court finds that the Broward Citizens’ Committee, an all 
white organization, plays an influential role in City Commission 
elections and that the Committee's failure to endorse blacks for office 
disadvantages their candidacies.

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. OVERVIEW OF SECTION 2 STANDARDS

148. In June, 1982, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was 
amended, 42 U.S.C. §1973. The amendment to Section 2 was designed to 
eliminate the requirement, prescribed in City of Mobile v.— Bolden, 446 
U.S. 55 (1980), that a Plaintiff demonstrate purposeful discrimination in 
order to find that a voting practice is unlawful.

149. The statutory language of the new Section 2 "results" test 
demonstrates that Congress intended that the Courts, in applying this new 
standard, determine whether a challenged voting practices has the result
of denying minorities equal access to the political process, regardless

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('

of the Intent or motivation behind the practice. United—States— v_̂
Marengo Countv Comm. 731 F.2d 1546, 1363-1566 (11th Cir. 1984); United 
States v. Dallas County, 739 F.2d 1529, 1534 (11th Cir. 1984). Through 
the elimination of the intent requirement, Section 2 was amended "to 
prohibit any voting practice such as an at-large election system that 
•results in' discrimination." United States v. Marengo County, supra,
731 F.2d at 1563, 1565 n. 30 ("Congress noted that some at-large systems 
diluted black votes, and would be vulnerable under the amended statute"); 
United States v. Dallas County, supra, 739 F.2d at 1534.

150. In recognition of the legislative history, our Circuit 
enumerated the "typical factors" courts should consider under the 
"totality of circumstances" approach in deciding whether plaintiffs have 
established a violation of Section 2. United States v. Marengo Coupry 
Comm1n , supra, 731 F.2d at 1565, United States v. Dallas County, supra, 
739 F.2d at 1534-1535. These factors, derived from the Supreme Court's 
opinion in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973). as applied in this 
Circuit in Zimmer v. McKeithen. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc),
aff’d on other grounds sub, nom East Carroll Parish_School—Board—v_̂
Marshall. 424 U.S. 636 (1976), include, but are not limited to: (1) the
extent of any history of official discrimination in the jurisdiction 
affecting one’s ability to participate in the democratic process; (2) the 
existence of racial bloc voting; (3) the use of structural devices in the 
election system itself that may enhance the opportunity for 
discrimination; (4) the presence of a candidate slating process; (5) the 
continuing effects of discrimination in such areas as education, 
employment and health; (6) racial campaign appeals; and, (7) the extent 
to which minorities have been elected to office. Senate Rep. No. 97-417,
97th Cong. 2d Sess. 28-9 (1982). Additional factors which may be

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probative include: (8) unresponsiveness of past elected officials to 
minority needs and (9) a tenuous or strong state policy in favor of 
at-large elections. 1982 Senate Rep. at 28-29 (footnotes omitted), 
represented in U.S. Code Cong, and Admin. News 1982, Pgs. 206-07. See, 
United States v. Marengo County, 731 F.2d at 1565, n. 32.

151. In determining whether there is a Section 2 violation, "[t]hese 
factors are to be weighed under a 'totality of circumstances’ approach” 
with 'no requirement that any particular number of factors be proved, or 
that a majority of them point one way or another.' United States v__- 
Marene.0 Countv Com'n. supra. 731 F.2d at 1566 , n. 33.

B. APPLICATION OF TYPICAL FACTORS SHOWING SECTION 2 VIOLATION 
1. HISTORY OF OFFICIAL DISCRIMINATION

152. A history of "past discrimination can severely impair the 
present-day ability of minorities to participate on an equal footing in 
the political process." United States v. Marengo County Com'n, supra,, 
731 F.2d at 1567. Past discrimination may lead to "present 
socio-economic disadvantages, which in turn can reduce participation and 
influence in political affairs." United States v. Marengo County Com'n, 
supra, 731 F.2d at 1567.

153. Past discrimination as evidenced by (i) the denial of 
participation in the political process by measures such as "poll taxes" 
and the "white primary;" supra, 111119-22; (ii) discrimination against 
"blacks in education;" supra, 111167-69; (iii) discrimination in the 
"hiring of [city] employees;" supra, 111150-58; and (iv) denial of 
"appointments to boards and committees which oversee the [city] 
government," supra, 111159-69, can restrict "the present opportunity of 
blacks to participate in the political process." Rodgers v. Lodge, 958

U.S. 613, 625 (1982).

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t r

Ibb. The Court finds that blacks in Fort Lauderdale have been 
subjected to a longstanding history of racial discrimination which 
continues to presently impair the ability of blacks to participate on an 
equal footing in the political process. These historical actions are 
evident from: (i) a series of ordinances segregating blacks by creating
a "Negro district" through the late 1940's, supra, 111111-12, 14-15, 17-18, 
21, 46-47; (ii) enforcement of poll taxes through the 1930's, su£ra,
JI1I8-9; (iii) intimidation against black citizens, supra, 11118-13; (iv) 
continued denials of black citizens' use of white-only recreational 
facilities from the 1920 through 1960's, supra, 111132-36; (v) denial of 
equal educational benefits, supra, I1112 0, 67-69; (vi) denial of equal 
employment opportunities (City's refusal to employ black policemen), 
supra, I11120, 50-58; (vii) City's neglect of the legally defined "Negro 
district," supra, 111116, 27-28, 38, 44; and (viii) the failure to appoint 
blacks to City boards and committees, supra, 111159-64.

155. The lingering effects of these historical actions on Fort 
Lauderdale black citizens are evidenced by the (i) rigid residential 
segregation of the black community, supra, 111146-47; (ii) present 
discriminatory City employment practices, supra, 1(1150-58; (iii) present 
makeup and imbalance of blacks on City Boards and Committees, supra, 
111159-64; (iv) segregated public housing, supra, 111165-66; (v) the present 
depressed socio-economic status of blacks, supr a, 111170-75; and (vi) and 
the isolation and lower educational achievement of blacks in schools 
within or serving the City all of which impedes blacks access to the 
political process, supra, 111167-69; United States v. MarenRo—Coun t_y, 
supra, 731 F.2d 1567-69; United States v. Dallas County Com'n, supra, 739 
F.2d at 1537.

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2. RACIALLY POLARIZED VOTING
156. A. Racially polarized voting is most frequently measured by 

correlating the percentage of registered minority voters in a precinct 
with the percentage of the vote minority candidates received in that 
precinct. This correlation, which is the precise technique utilized in 
Plaintiffs' bi-variate regression analysis resulting in correlations 
between .82-.99 in 16 elections with 19 elections producing associations 
greater than .91, supra . I11179-82 , is the accepted statistical standard 
for gauging racial polarization in our Circuit. McMillan v. Escambia 
County. Fla.. 638 F.2d 1239, 1291 n. 6 (5th Cir. February 19, 1981)11/ 
(Racial bloc voting found, based "on very high correlations" between the 
percentage of blacks in a precinct and number of votes a black candidate 
received in that precinct) aff'd on rehearing, 688 F.2d 960, 966 n.12 
(5th Cir. 1982) (Correlations between .85-.98 as proof of polarization) 
and NAACP v. Gadsden County School Board. 691 F.2d 978, 983 (11th Cir. 
1982) (same bi-variate analysis). See also, City of Rome v. United 
States, 972 F.Supp. 221, 226, n. 36 (D.C. 1979) (Three-Judge panel) 
(Correlation method surest way of demonstrating racial bloc voting) aff'd 
996 U.S. 156 (1980). Other Courts have adhered to this same bi-variate 
correlation standard in their determinations that polarization existed. 
See, e.r ., Major v. Treen, 579 F.Supp. 325, 338 (E.D. La. 1983) 
(Three-Judge Court) (Range from .51 to .95); Gingles v. Edmlnsten, 590 
F.Supp. 395, 367-68 n. 29 (E.D. N.C. 1989) (Three-Judge panel) (Range 
between .7-.98 with most above .90) (These correlations "reflected

11/ Pre-October 1, 1981 decisions of the old Fifth Circuit are binding on 
the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 
(11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

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statistical significance at the .00001 level-probability of chance as 
explanation for the coincidence of voter's and candidate's race less than 
one in 100,000.") Racial polarization exists based upon Plaintiffs' 
correlation analysis.

157. B. From yet another measurement technique, polarization can be 
determined by ascertaining a "racial polarization index" United States v. 
Dallas County Com'n, 739 F.2d 1529, 1535 (11th Cir. 1984), which is 
calculated by determining the percentage of votes cast in the black 
precincts for a particular candidate, and then subtracting the votes cast 
for the same individual in the white precincts. Our Circuit, just 
several months ago, found polarization under this index technique in 
elections where index values ranged from 37 to 75, and held that an index 
of 40 or higher was significant. United States v. Dallas County, supra, 
739 F.2d at 1535, n. 4. See also. Jones v. City of Lubbock, 727 F.2d 
364, 380 (5th Cir. 1984) (Finding of polarization with index of 52 where 
minorities received 11% of the white vote compared to 63% in minority 
areas). In Fort Lauderdale, the polarization index average for all 
elections in which black candidates ran since 1971 is 53, supra, 1185, (P. 
Ex. 38). Racially polarized voting exists based upon this finding.

158. C. Additional analysis presented by Plaintiffs demonstrate 
that racial polarization was present when blacks have run for city 
office. (1) Whites cast a disproportionately higher share of their votes 
for winning candidates (almost always at least 50% of their votes and in 
many instances as much as 60-70%) than do black voters (10-12%), supra, 
111183-84; (2) blacks have overwhelmingly supported black candidates (86%) 
at a rate almost three times more than whites (32%), supra, 111185-86. Our 
Circuit has determined polarization exists when whites support, on the

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average, a black candidate 401 of the time. McMillan v.. Escambia County 
Fla,, supra, 638 F.2d at 1241 n. 6 (Significant majority [601] of whites 
don't vote for black candidates). See also, Glngles v. Edminsten. supra, 
590 F.Supp. at 368, n. 30 (Blacks never received a majority of white 
votes cast). (3) Voting has been so substantially polarized that in 10 
of the 12 elections since 1971, the results--as to which candidate 
won--would have been identical even if not one black voter had ever cast 
a ballot, supra, 111187-88. Singles v. Edminsten, supra, 590 F.Supp. at 368 
(Polarization "substantively significant" based upon identical 
finding.”); (4) Blacks utilize significantly less of their 5 votes than 
do whites in order to attempt to elect candidates of their choice, supra, 
111189-91. This practice, utilized in an attempt to ameliorate the 
discriminatory effect of the at-large system, greatly reduces blacks' 
ability to influence the outcome of elections since they must forfeit, 
unlike whites, their right to vote for a full slate of candidates. See, 
Gingles v. Edminsten, supra, 590 F.Supp. at 369 ("[T]o have a chance of 
success in electing candidates of their choice in these districts 
[majority white], black voters must rely extensively on single-shot 
voting, thereby forfeiting by practical necessity their right to vote for 
a full slate of candidates.")

159. D. The City essentially challenged Plaintiffs' bi-variate 
correlation analysis for its failure in not factoring in other 
circumstances that might influence voting behavior in the various 
elections involving black candidates.127 However, the Court has

12 /new
368,

The Court's rejection of the City’s multi-variate analysis breaks ground. The Court in Gingles v. Edminsten, supra, 590 F.Supp. at n. 32 arrived at the identical conclusion in rejecting defendants
no

(Footnote continued to next page)

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previously determined, supra. 111192-99, that the novel "multi-variate" 
analysis utilized by the Defendants to conclude that race plays no 
significant role in predicting a candidate's success is fundamentally 
unsound for at least four reasons: (1) it leads to conclusions that are
not supported by common sense or reality and the Court's intuitive 
assessment of Fort Lauderdale politics, supra. 1193; (ii) it produces 
widely varying results based on the subjective Judgments of which data 
are included or excluded and indeed, it did not test various factors 
affecting voting behavior--as recognized even by the City, supra, 1194;
(iii) it has substantial methodological flaws as to those independent 
variables that were used in the multi-variate runs, supra, 1195; and (iv) 
it failed to account for the fact that several of these independent 
variables are highly associated both with each other as well as 
intertwined with the role that race has played in city elections, supra, 
111196-99.

160. E. Additional non-statistical factors recognized by our 
Circuit which support this Court's finding of polarization include: (i)
past discrimination in general, supra. 11117-75, United States v. Marengo 
County, supra. 731 F.2d at 1567, n. 34; (ii) large districts, supra, 
11128, United States v. Marengo County, supra; (iii) the lack of 
residential geographic subdistricts, supra, 111141-42, 125, United States

(Footnote continued from previous page)
expert challenge of plaintiffs' bi-variate analysis because they "did not 
factor in all of the circumstances in a particular case." The Court 
determined:

This flies in the face of the general use, in litigation 
and in the general social science literature, of correlation analysis as the standard method for determining 
whether vote dilution in the legal (substantive) sense
exists, a use conceded by defendants." Id.

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v. Marengo County, supra; and (iv) the consistent lack of success of 
qualified candidates--with the exception of Andrew DeGraffenreidt--over a 
25 year period, supra. 11129, United States v. Marengo County,, supra.

3. THE STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTION SYSTEM
161. The Court concludes that the lack of any subdistrict residency 

requirement has enhanced the discriminatory impact of the at-large 
election system by allowing residents of white areas to dominate City 
office, supra. 111141-42, 125, Rogers v. Lodge, supra, 458 U.S. at 627;
Jones v. City of Lubbock, supra, 727 F.2d at 383.

162. The Court also concludes that because Fort Lauderdale has an 
unusually large population (fifth highest in Florida), the cost of 
City-wide campaigns increases, which, based on the lower income earned by 
blacks, "contributes to dilution," supra, 111(71-75; United States v. 
Marengo County, supra, 731 F.2d at 1570; United States v.— Dallas County, 
supra, 739 F.2d at 1536, n. 6 (Population of district consideration under
"structure" factor.)

4. SLATING PROCESS
163. Although no formal slating process exists, there is an 

influential all-white political organization which is actively involved 
in endorsing and campaigning for white commission candidates. Indeed, 
four (4) current Commisioners - all-white - were endorsed in the 1982 
election by the Committee. supra, 111(144-147; United States v_.— Marengo 
County, supra, 731 F.2d at 1569 (Informal slating process may assist 
white candidates' success.) See, generally, White v. Register, supra, 412 
U.S. 755, 766-67 (1973).

5. SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS
164. "Past discrimination may also lead to present socio-economic 

disadvantages, which in turn can reduce participation and influence in

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political affairs.” United States v. Marengo County Com'n, supra, 731 
F.2d at 1567; United States v. Dallas County, supra. 739 F.2d at 1537 
("Because blacks are poorer and less educated they have less political 
influence than whites."), citing Marengo County, supra, 731 F.2d at 1568.

165. The Court finds that blacks in Fort Lauderdale bear the effects 
of discrimination in the areas of education and employment, supra,
111150-58, 67-69, 72-73, fall into groups in lower occupational positions, 
supra, 1171; have lower median income than whites, supra, 1171; and are 
more likely to live in blighted areas, supra. 1174. Blacks' lower 
socio-economic status impedes their ability to participate in various 
civic organizations, supra, 1175; and makes it more difficult for blacks 
to wage campaigns, supra, 117 5.

166. Although the causal nexus between the depressed socio-economic 
status of blacks in Fort Lauderdale and a depressed level of political 
participation in the political process need not be proven, United States
v. Marengo County Com'n, supra. 731 F.2d at 1568-69, Klrksey v. Board_of
Supervisors. 554 F.2d 139, 145 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc) cert. denied,
434 U.S. 968 (1977), Plaintiffs nevertheless have demonstrated that 
depressed socio-economic status and other repercussions of historical 
discrimination deter political participation by black citizens.

6. OVERT AND SUBTLE RACIAL CAMPAIGNS
167. While the Court has not found evidence of overt racial appeals, 

its absence should "not weigh heavily against a Plaintiff" under the 
Section 2 results test, United States v. Marengo County, supra, 731 F.2d 
at 1571.

168. However, there have been subtle racial appeals in Commission 
election campaigns as evidenced by: a) media practice of racially
identifying black candidates but not white candidates, supra, 1111100-102,

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(Wilkerson - "negro candidate"), supra, 1111100-102; (Reddick "negro 
lawyer"), supra. 11105; Hastings - "negro attorney"); and b) by black 
candidates' inability to campaign in the same locations as white 
candidates, supra. 11105 (Hastings); (Kennedy. Vol. V, Pgs. 327-328).

7. ELECTION OF BLACKS TO PUBLIC OFFICE
169. The "extent to which members of the protected class have been 

elected" is of course "evidence of vote dilution," United—States—v^ 
Marengo Countv Com'n. supra. 731 F.2d at 1571.

170. While a failure by blacks to get elected does not automatically 
violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, "it is equally clear that the 
election of one or a small number of minority elected officials will not 
compel a finding of no dilution," United States v. Marengo County Com'_n, 
supra. 731 F.2d at 1572.13/ (Emphasis added.) See, also, Rogers v.
Lodge 958 U.S. 613, 623 (1982).

13/ For additional post-1982 Section 2 Amendment cases addressing this 
principle, see? McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239, 1290-91 (5th 
Cir 1981) (Dilution found where two blacks previously elected.), NAACP 
v, Gadsden Countv School Board, 691 F.2d 978, 983 (Dilution found where a 
black previously elected.); Ma1 or v. Treen, 579 F.Supp. 325, 339 (E.D.
La. 1983) (Three-Judge panel) (Dilution found where 15T, of 70 elected 
officials are black); Gingles v. Edmlnston, 590 F. Supp. 395, 365 (E-D- N.C. 1989) (Three-Judge Court) (Dilution found where between 1971 - 1982 
at any given time 2 - 9  blacks elected to House; from 1975 1982, 1 2 
blacks elected to Senate; since 1982, 11 blacks elected to House.), Rvblckl v. State Board of Elections of Illinois, 579 F.Supp. 1197, 1151 
n. 5 (N.D. 111. 1983) (Three-Judge panel) (Violation found where "many" 
blacks previously elected including: sixteen aldermen, thirteen state 
representatives, five state senators, and one mayor.).

For pre-1982 Amendment cases, see, White v. Regester, 912 U.S. 755 
(1973) affirming Graves v. Barnes, 393 F.Supp. 709, 726 (W.D. Tex. 1972) 
(Dilution found where two blacks previously elected); Zimmer v̂..
McKelthen. 985 F.2d 1297, 1307 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (Dilution found 
where three blacks previously elected) aff'd per curiam sub.— nom. East 
Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 929 U.S. 636 (1976); Kirksey v. 
Board of Supervisors of Hinds County, Miss., 559 F.2d 139, 193 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (One of the factors indicative of denial of access to the

(Footnote continued to next page)

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r

171. The Court finds that the fact that only one black has ever been 
elected to the Fort Lauderdale City Commission despite numerous black 
candidacies, constitutes "strong evidence of dilution." United States v., 
Marengo County Com’n. supra, 731 F.2d at 1572.

8. UNRESPONSIVENESE
172. Unresponsiveness is of limited importance under Section 2 since 

it "protects the access of minorities not simply to the fruits of 
government but to participation in the process itself." United—States—v_̂  
Marengo County Com’n, supra, 731 F.2d at 1572. For other Eleventh 
Circuit decisions on this issue, see, NAACP V. Gadsden County, supra, 691 
F.2d at 983 (Responsiveness has "nothing to do with discriminatory 
result."); McMillan v. Escambia County, supra, 638 F.2d at 1249 ("Whether 
current office holders are responsive to black needs ’is simply 
irrelevant;' a slave with a benevolent master is nonetheless a slave. ) 
While this Court, adhering to Circuit standards, deems evidence of 
unresponsiveness with limited reliance to the extent that evidence on 
unresponsiveness is relevant, it weighs in favor of finding dilution.

173. The Court bases this conclusion on the following: (i) while the 
City finally may be attempting to provide more equal employment 
opportunities, it has done so only after three decades of resistance, and 
under a present federal court order, supra, 111120, 27, 37, 50-58, (ii) 
present City efforts to improve park and recreational facilities and Code

(Footnote continued from next page)
political process is "a historical pattern of a disproportionately low 
number of minority group members being elected to the legislative body."); Wallace v. House, 515 F.2d 619, 623 (5th Cir. 1975) (Dilutionfound where one black previously elected.); and Steward_v_.— Wal ler, 404
F.Supp. 206, 215 (N.D. Miss. 1975) (Three-Judge panel) (Dilution found 
where blacks constituted IX of the council members elected in cities of a
certain size.).

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enforcement in the black community are in part necessitated by the City's 
prior egregious neglect, supra. 111132-36, 138-139; (iii) present racial 
polarization in City elections, supra. 111176-124, is strong evidence that 
the elected officials are not meeting the needs of Fort Lauderdale 
blacks, United States v. Marengo County Com'n, supra, 731 F.2d at 1573; 
NAACP V. Gadsden County. 691 F.2d at 983; (iv) the City cannot take 
credit for the allocation of CDBG funds since they were "derived [solely] 
from federal programs aimed at economically depressed areas." Jones v. 
Cltv of Lubbock. 727 F.2d 364, 382 (5th Cir. 1984). Indeed, the City's 
expenditure of federal funds restricted to a specific purpose is hardly 
sufficient to refute Plaintiffs' evidence that "[Fort Lauderdale]
neglected the needs of blacks." Perkins v. City of West Helena,_Ark_. ,
675 F.2d 201, 210, n. 12 (8th Cir. 1981), judgmt aff'd 459 U.S. 801 
(1982), and (v) the imbalance of blacks from policy-making positions on
City boards and committees, supra, 1159-64. McMillan v. Escambia_County,
688 F.2d 960, 968, n. 16 (5th Cir. 1982) (Underrepresentation of blacks 
on boards and committees as evidence of unresponsiveness.).

9. TENUOUSNESS OF STATE POLICY
174. Tenuousness of state policy supporting at-large elections "is 

circumstantial evidence that the [voting] device has a discriminatory 
result," United States v. Marengo County Com’n , supra, 731 F.2d at 1571; 
Major v. Treen, supra, 574 F.Supp. at 354-355, and "may indicate the 
policy is unfair." Id.., citing Hendrix v. Joseph, 559 F. 2d 1265, 1269-70 
(5th Cir. 1970).

175. The Court finds recent state legislative enactments including: 
(i) the 1982 legislative reapportionment to single member districts, 
supra, 11131; (ii) the 1984 constitutional referendum allowing county

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commissioners to utilize single member districts, supra, 11133; and (iii) 
1984 legislation allowing county school boards to use single member 
districts, supra, 11133; reflect state policy initiatives aimed at 
increasing the participation of Florida's black citizens in the political
process.

176. In light of these recent legislative enactments, the Court 
finds that a state policy presently exists which supports the use of 
single member districts to increase minority participation in the 
political process.

C. TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
177. The inquiry under Section 2 is whether "based on the totality 

of circumstances" the Fort Lauderdale at-large election system results in 
an abridgment of black citizens’ opportunity "to participate in the 
political process and to elect representatives of their choice." 42 
U.S.C. §1973.

178. Based on the "totality of circumstances" as evidenced by the 
Court's Findings, the Court concludes that Fort Lauderdale's at-large
system violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

Ill. RELIEF
179. Defendants are hereby enjoined from conducting any future 

elections under the City's present election plan. The parties are 
instructed to submit to this Court within thirty (30) days alternative 
plans that fully remedy the statutory violation.

180. The parties are instructed that the election plan must be 
tailored to remove the effects of the statutory violation found by this

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r. r

Court. Rogers v. LodRe, supra. 458 U.S. at 628 (1982)
(Constitutional violation) (In fashioning redistricting plan a remedy 
must be "tailored to cure the conditions" that offends the violation.

DONE AND ENTERED this ____ day of ________________ , 1984 in
Chambers, United States District Court, Fort Lauderdale, Florida.

NORMAN C. ROETTGER, JR. 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

14/ These fundamental principles governing relief are equally applicable 
to a Section 2 violation.

In the Legislative History of the 1982 amendments to the Voting 
Rights Act, Congress recognized:

The court should exercise traditional equitable powers to 
fashion the relief so that it completely remedies the prior dilution of minority voting strength and fully provides equal 
opportunity for minority citizens to participate and to elect 
candidates of their choice.

Senate Report at 31, Committee Report, Reported at 2 U.S. Code. Cong, and 
Admin. News 177-410 (1982).

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LIPMAN & WEISBERG 
5901 S.W. 74 Street 
Suite 304Miami, Florida 33143-5186 
(305) 662-2600

Of Counsel:

BENJAMIN F. LAMPKIN, ESQ. 
General Counsel for SCLC 
of Broward County 
P.O. Box 10876Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33310 
(305) 733-3166

DATED: 19 November, 1984

JACK GREENBERG, ESQ.
LANI GUINIER, ESQ.
CLYDE E. MURPHY, ESQ.
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND 
EDUCATION FUND, INC.
99 Hudson StreetNew York, New York 10013
(212) 219-1900

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

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*

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

BROWARD DIVISION
ALLIE K. MC CORD; JOSEPH POWELL, JR.,ROSE MARIE SAULSBY, ILMA M. JAMES,
MARGARET HARDEN, ALZEN F. FLOYD, SR., and the SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP 
CONFERENCE (SCLC) OF BROWARD COUNTY,
FLORIDA, on behalf of themselves and 
all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 83-6182-CIV-ROETTGER

CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA;
ROBERT A. DRESSLER, Mayor; ROBERT 
0. COX, Vice-Mayor; VIRGINIA S.
YOUNG, Mayor Pro-Tern; Commission Members of the City of Fort Lauderdale, 
Florida, RICHARD A. MILLS, JR.; and 
JOHN E. RODSTROM, JR.; their successors and agents, all in their 
official capacities,

APPENDIX 1
[Duplicate of Plaintiffs' Exhibit 29]

69a



tAdnsn )b.-Cjiy Cr Ei. Lauderdale

CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE 
PLANNING DEPARTMENT

8 7 .2 %  o f b lacks living. in  city

. “NEGRO DISTRICT- 1941 
_ "Black c o m m u n i t y d e n s i t y )  

ABASED ON I9BO CENSUS)
• "Bla c k  c o m m u n i t y  f5o-85%DENSi"Y) 

/BASED ON 1980 CENSUS)
0 . "Re s i d e n c e  of  p a s t  

c i t y  Co m m i s s i o n e r  
•  - "r?ESIDENC£ oF PRESENT 

C ity c o m m i s s i o n e r—  - "RAILROAD