Naimaster v. NAACP Brief for Appellee
Public Court Documents
February 6, 1970
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Naimaster v. NAACP Brief for Appellee, 1970. 67069c03-bf9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/74974065-e25f-4207-8ced-b81b48560085/naimaster-v-naacp-brief-for-appellee. Accessed November 03, 2025.
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In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit
No. 13,463
(V i f i f
VERNON JOHN NAIMASTER,
Appellee,
v.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE,
a body corporate; LILLIE M.
JACKSON; and JUANITA MITCHELL.
Appellants.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
W. GILES PARKER,
11 1 West Susquehanna Avenue
Towson, Maryland 21204
M. JACQUELINE McCURDY,
203 West Chesapeake Avenue
Towson, Maryland 21204
ALAN H. MURRELL,
Fidelity Building
Baltimore, Maryland 21201
Attorneys for Appellee.
INDEX
Page
Issue Presented ............................................................................................................................... *
Statement of the C ase ...................................................................................................................... 1
Argument
Appellants Have No Sufficient Claim To Civil Rights Removal Jurisdiction
Pursuant To 28 U.S.C. 1443 (1) .............................................................................................. 2
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 8
Table of Cases
Baines v. City of Danville, 357 F. 2nd 756 ................................................................................... 4,7
Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 86 S. Ct. 1783 .......................................................................... 3
Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 86 S. Ct. 1800 .................................................................. 3,6
Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 88 S. Ct. 2 1 8 6 ............................................................................... 6
Maryland v. Brown, 295 F. Supp. 63 (Cert, denied by S. C t . ) ..................................................... 7
NAACP v. Overstreet, (384 U.S. 71,86 S. Ct. 1306 and 221 Ga. 16, 142 SE 2nd 816) ......... 3,7
Naimaster v. NAACP et al (296 F. Supp. 1277) ........................................................................... 7
New York v. Davis, 41 1 F. 2nd 750 ................................................................................................ 2
Schoen v. Sulton, 297 F. Supp. 538,411 F. 2nd 793, 90 S. Ct. 370 ....................................... 6
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 399 F. 2nd 529; 382 U.S. 87, 86 S. Ct. 211 ............................... 5
S n y p p v. Ohio (CCA 9-1934) 70 F. 2nd 535, Cert, d e n ie d 293 U.S. 563 ................................. 3
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit
No. 13,463
VERNON JOHN NAIMASTER,
Appellee,
v.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE,
a body corporate; LILLIE M.
JACKSON; and JUANITA MITCHELL.
Appellants.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
Issue Presented
Does appellants’ petition for removal state a claim for the exercise of civil rights removal
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U. S. C. SI443(1)?
Statement of the Case
This is an appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland remanding the case to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Maryland, from which
removal was attempted.
upon the claim that a fair trial could not be obtained in the State Courts. There is a recent case
which, in our mind, is very close on a factual basis to the allegations of the case at Bar; namely,
N.A.A.C.P., et al, v. Overstreet (384 U.S. 71, 86 S. Ct. 1306) in which the Court per Curiam
refused certiorari to the Georgia Courts; however, the facts are stated in a dissenting opinion by
Mr. Justice Douglas. (The reference to the Georgia case is 221 Ga. 16, 142 S.E. 2nd 816). This
was a suit for damages for unlawful and malicious interference with the Plaintiffs operation of
his business. Apparently no effort was made to remove this case for trial to the Federal Court
for the District of Georgia.
The cases cited by the Defendants both in this Court and below and every case which we
have been able to find involving removal of causes under the Civil Rights Laws concern criminal
prosecution; namely, a controversy between some branch of government and individual citizens,
almost all of whom alleged in their petitions for removal that they had been arrested or
prosecuted, primarily, because of their race or activities on behalf of voting rights, equal
accommodations, and other civil rights guaranteed them by law. With the general trend of these
cases we have no dispute, but it is our opinion that they are completely immaterial when applied
to the removal of a simple suit for damages which involves no attempt to deny any rights of the
Defendant of any nature. The line of cases determining this is exemplified pretty well in the case
of Snypp v. Ohio (1934 - CCA 9, 70 F. 2nd 535; certiarari denied, 293 US 563). This was a
case of prosecution under the State Blue Sky Laws in which the Defendant petitioned for
removal on the ground that he could not obtain justice in any court of the State of Ohio because
of prejudice and local influence. The Court held that removal was not in order and said “If
susceptible of proof, this allegation would not constitute a discrimination by the State Courts,
affecting the Civil Rights of the Appellant” (at P. 536). The most recent cases, and the most
important ones to our mind, are State o f Georgia v. Rachel (384 U.S. 780, 86 S. Ct. 1783) and
City o f Greenwood v. Peacock, et al. (384 U.S. 808, 86 S. Ct. 1800). In the Rachel case, it is
obvious that removal was allowed because the State of Georgia was prosecuting the Defendants
under a local statute, which was itself in direct conflict with the Equal Public Accommodations
section of the Civil Rights Law. It was obvious that any prosecution under the Georgia statute,
regardless of its outcome, would have been a violation of civil rights sufficient to warrant
removal to the Federal Courts. The Court was very careful in its opinion to point out that such
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issued against picketing and the defendants were being prosecuted for, among other things, a
violation of the injunction. The State cases were removed to the U.S. District Court. The Circuit
Court of Appeals held (at P. 764) that there could be no basis for removal to the Federal Courts
on grounds involving the 1st and 14th Amendments which, of course, provide rights applicable
to all citizens and are not specifically civil rights provided by law for Negroes. At P. 765 the
Court points out that the right of removal cannot be predicated on a supposition that any of the
defendant’s Constitutional rights will be denied by the State Courts; and at P. 769 and 770 the
Court pointed out that the question of whether or not a fair trial could be had in the State
Courts would “ . . . require the Federal Judge to try the State Court.” This case is well worth
reading in toto, although too long to include here, as Judge Haynesworth in his Opinion goes
into quite a long dissertation on the history and background of the Civil Rights Legislation. The
opinion makes reference to the Cox, Rachel and Peacock cases, and specifically cites the older
case of Powers (201 U.S. 1, 26 S. Ct. 387). It is interesting that there was a dissent by Judge
Sobolof in which he cites the Peacock case, but only has reference to the Fifth Circuit’s decision
in that case; and was, of course, not aware of the Supreme Court’s decision in the Peacock case,
which was not handed down until June 20, 1966. (The Baines case was decided in January
1966). The Fifth Circuit’s decision was reversed by the Supreme Court in the Peacock case. (384
U.S. 808, 86 S. Ct. 1800).
Another case which illustrates the useless consumption of time in cases of this nature, if
nothing else, decided in August, 1968, by the Circuit Court of Appeals, is Shuttlesworth v. the
City o f Birmingham (399 F. 2nd, 529). Shuttlesworth has been to the Supreme Court of the
U.S. with this case five times, the latest time being reported in 382 U.S. 87, 86 S. Ct. 211, and
involves a charge by the municipality and the State of Alabama against the Defendant for
“ loitering.” In the previous Supreme Court decision (1965) which arrived in the Supreme Court
by certiorari from the Court of Appeals of Alabama, it was held that the conviction should have
been reversed and remanded for a new trial on the loitering charge. This opinion is worth reading
because it recites the facts of the case. The latest case (399 F. 2nd 529) which was determined
in August, 1968, points out the further facts that, having been remanded to the Courts of
Alabama for a new trial, the defendant one day before the trial date removed the case to the
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243). The two latter opinions affirmed the decision of the District Court by “Per Curiam”
memorandum decisions affirming Judge Northrup’s order to remand the case after removal from
Prince George’s County, Maryland, to the District Court. This was a suit to enjoin an alleged
nuisance which held that even vexatious litigation is not, per se, removable to the Federal
Courts. The present case; i.e., Naimaster v. NAACP, was cited in a footnote to Judge Northrup’s
opinion in the Sulton case (supra), as were the cases of Baines v. Danville, 357 F. 2nd 756, and
Maryland v. Brown, 295 F. Supp. 63, (in which case certiorari has been denied by The Supreme
Court January 12, 1970). (Citation not available.)
In the words of Judge Northmp (at Page 541 of 297 F. Supp.), “In conclusion, the Court
notes that if the Defendant’s theory was accepted, Federal Court would have to hold, at the very
least, evidentiary hearings in every case brought in the State Court which the Defendant alleged
was motivated by racial prejudice. Such a result, aside from the immense administrative problems
it would pose, would sound the destruction of the independent State judiciary system and would
establish a Federal judiciary that was never intended by the Constitution or by Congress.”
The “Per Curiam” memorandum opinion of this Honorable Court, in addition to affirming
Judge Northrup’s decision, cited the case of N.Y. v. Davis (411 F. 2nd 750, 2nd Circuit, March
28, 1969, Friendly, Judge) to which this Court is respectfully referred. It is noteworthy that
having, in effect, conceded that the Sulton case (supra) certainly involved similar issues of
construction to the present case, if not conceding that the decision would be controlling in this
case, the appellants have not cited or referred to Sulton in the Appellant’s brief.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on January I served two copies of the foregoing Brief for
Appellee upon the following attorneys of record for Appellants by United States Mail, postage
prepaid:
CLARENCE M. MITCHELL, Jr., Esq.
1239 Druid Hill Avenue
Baltimore, Maryland 21217
GERALD A. SMITH
Howard, Brown & Williams
1500 American Building
Baltimore, Maryland 21202
JACK GREENBERG
MELVYN ZARR
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019
Attorney for Appellee
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