Thompson v. Virginia Petition for Writ of Certiorari

    I k  the

Supreme Court of tljr Hmtrfc States
October T erm, 1961 

No. ..............

Mandaline E. T hompson,
Petitioner,

Commonwealth op V irginia.

PETITION FOR A W RIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

J ack Greenberg 
Constance B aker M otley 
James M. Nabrit, III 

10 Columbus Circle 
New York 19, New York

S. W . T ucker 
H enry L. Marsh, III

214 East Clay Street 
Richmond 19, Virginia

Attorneys for Petitioner

D errick A. Bell, Jr. 
Michael Meltsner ~-|;r 

Of Counsel



I N D E X

Opinion Below ................................ ................. ................. 1

Jurisdiction ..................................... ..................... ..........2

Questions Presented ...... ............... .......... ..... .............. 2

Statutory and Constitutional Provisions Involved ..... 3

Statement ....................        3

How the Federal Questions Were Raised and Decided .. 5

Reasons for Granting the Writ .................................. . 8

A. The Decision Below Conflicts With Prior Deci­
sions of This Court Which Condemn the Use 
of State Power to Enforce a State Custom of 
Racial Segregation..............      10

B. The Decision Below Conflicts With Decisions 
of This Court Securing the Right of Freedom 
of Expression Under the Fourteenth Amend­
ment to the Constitution of the United States .. 20

Conclusion.......................................       24

Appendix...............          25

Table op Cases

Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 ..............  21
Avent v. North Carolina, No. 85, Oct. Term 1961 .......8,11

Bailey v. Patterson, stay injunction denied, 30 U. S.
Law Wk. 3201, appeal docketed December 29, 1961,
No. 643, Oct. Term 1961 ................... ................. ......  9

PAGE



XI

Baldwin v. Morgan, 287 F. 2d 750 (5th Cir. 1961) ..... 19
Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F. 2d 531 ....... 19
Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U. S. 454 ............................. 8,10
Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622 ....................-.... 16, 21
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 .............. 11,18
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 74 ...................... —12, 24
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S.

715 ............................................. -..............................8,15,17

City of Charleston v. Mitchell, Sup. Ct. S. C. No. 4779,
decided Dec. 13, 1961 ------- ----- - ........—.......................  9

City of Columbia v. Barr, Sup. Ct. S. C. No. 4777,
decided Dec. 14, 1961 .............. -................................  9

City of Greenville v. Peterson, Sup. Ct, S. C. No. 4771,
decided Nov. 10, 1961................. ...... -........................... 9

Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 17 ............................. 11,18
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 ..........................-.............. 24

District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 
U. S. 100 ............................. .. ..................... -...............  15

PAGE

Fox v. North Carolina, No. 86, Oct. Term 1961 --------  8
Frank v. Maryland, 359 IT. S. 360 ............ ... ................  17
Freeman v. Retail Clerks Union, Washington Superior 

Court, 45 Lab. Rel. Ref. Man. 2334 (1959) ..............  23

Garner v. Louisiana, 30 U. S. Law Wk. 4070 (Dec. 11,
1961) .............................................8,15,18,19, 20, 21, 22, 24

Gober v. City of Birmingham, Ala. Ct. of Appeals,
Oct. Term 1960-61, 6th Div. 797 (May 30, 1961), cert, 
denied, Sup. Ct. of Ala., 6th Div. 762 (Sep. 14, 1961), 
rehearing denied, Nov. 2, 1961 8



Ill

PAGE
Harrison v. N. A. A. C. P., 360 U. S. 167____________ 18
Hopkins v. City of Richmond, 117 Ya. 692, 86 S. E.

139, 145 .................................................................. ........ 18
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349,

356 ................................................................................. 17

James v. Almond, 170 F. Supp. 331 ]E. D. Va. 1959) .... 18

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 6 L. ed. 2d 1081, 1090,
1103, 1104 .................. ........ ......... ................................ 16,17

Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501, 506, 90 L. ed. 265,
66 S. Ct. 276 (1946) ........ ....... ....... ................ ............12, 22

Martin v. Struthers, 319 IT. S. 141 .............................  22
Monroe v. Pape, 365 IT. S. 167 ....... ....... ................... ......  11
Munn v. Illinois, 94 IT. S. 113___________ __________ .12, 20

N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 ......... ........... 21
N. A. A. C. P. v. Patty, 159 F. Supp 503, 513-515

(E. D. Va. 1958) ................. .......... .............................. 18
Napue v. Illinois, 360 IT. S. 264 ............................... .....  11
Nashville C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Browning, 310 IT. S.

362, 84 L. ed. 1254, 60 S. Ct. 968 (At 6 L. ed. 2d 995) .. 18 
N. L. R. B. v. American Pearl Button Co., 149 F. 2d

258 (8th Cir. 1945) ................ .................... .......... ........  23
N. L. R. B. v. Fansteel Metal Corp,, 306 IT. S. 240, 252 .. 23

People v. Barisi, 193 Misc. 934, 86 N. Y. S. 2d 277, 279
(1948) ............................... .................................... ........  23

People v. King, 110 N. Y. 418, 18 N. E. 245 (1888) __  15
Pickett v. Kuchan, 323 111. 138,153 N. E. 667, 49 A. L. R.

499 (1926) ......... ....... ............................................ ........  14
Poe v. Ulman, 367 IT. S. 497, 6 L. ed. 2d 989, 1006, 

1022-1026 (dissenting opinions) _______ _________16,18



IV

Railway Mail Ass’n v. Corsi, 326 U. S. 88, 93, 94 .......14,15
Randolph v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 661, 119 S. E. 2d

817 (1961) ......... ....... ......... ..... ............................ .........  1
Randolph v. Virginia, No. 248, Oct. Term, 1961 .......  8
Republic Aviation Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 324 U. S. 793,

796, 802 .............................................-.................... ..... 13, 22

Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52 ............ -....  23
Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 .............................  10
Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F. 2d 877 (8th Cir. 1947), Cert.

Den. 332 U. S. 851 .................................... -.................  24
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 14-18, 22 .......10,11,12,17
State of Maryland v. Williams, Baltimore City Court,

44 Lab. Rel. Ref. Man. 2357, 2361 (1959) .............. 23
Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 ---------------- —  21

Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 -------------------- ----  24
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 105-106 ...........16, 21, 22
Turner v. City of Memphis, No. 84 Oct. Term, 1961 .... 9

United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U. S.
499, 510 ............................. ...........-...........-....................  12

United Steelworkers v. N. L. R. B., 243 F. 2d 593, 598 
(D. C. Cir. 1956), reversed on other grounds, 357 
U. S. 357 .................. ..........-................... .................... -  23

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
319 U. S. 624, 633-634 ............... ........................

Western Turf Asso. v. Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359

PAGE

21
14



V

Statutes

page

U. S. C., Title 28, Sec. 1257(3) ......         2

U. S. C., Title 42, Secs. 1981 and 1982 ....        7

Virginia’s Constitution of 1902, as amended, Art. IX,
§140 ......... .................... ...... .......... ........................ .........  18

Code of Va., 1950, §20-54 ..........       19

Code of Va., 1950, §38.1-597, 1953 Replacement Vol. 19
Code of Va., 1950, §53-42, 1958 Replacement Vol. ___  19

Code of Va., 1950, §56-326, 1959 Replacement Vol. ___  19

Code of Va., 1950, §18.1-173, 1960 Replacement Vol. .... 3, 5
Code of Va., 1950, §§18.1-356 and 18.1-357, 1960 Re­

placement V o l.__ ________ _____________________ _ 19

Code of Va., 1950, §37-183, 1960 Replacement Vol.........  19

Other A uthorities

Annotation 49 A. L. R. 505 .............. .............. .............. 15

2 Emerson and Haber, Political and Civil Rights in 
the United States, 1413 (2d ed. 1958) ...................... 15

Greenberg, Race Relations and American Law, Ap­
pendix A, para. 6, pp. 375-379 (1959) .................... 15

Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 16-22, 
81-85, 91-93 19



In the

^upmite (tort nt %  Im&fr B u tts
October T erm, 1961 

No.................

Mandarine E. T hompson,
Petitioner,

Commonwealth oe V irginia.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari issue to re­
view the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia entered October 12, 1961 (R. 59), in the above- 
entitled cause.

Opinion Below

None of the Courts below filed a written opinion.
The order of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 

dated October 12, 1961 refusing a writ of error, stated that 
the Court was of the opinion that the judgment of the 
Corporation Court “ is plainly right” (R. 59). The Su­
preme Court of Appeals recently decided Randolph v. 
Commonwealth, 202 Va. 661, 119 S. E. 2d 817 (1961), in­
volving similar issues.



2

Jurisdiction

The judgment sought to be reviewed is that of the Su­
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia, entered October 12, 
1961 (R. 59; Appendix p. 28, infra), refusing a petition 
for writ of error and supersedeas to review a judgment 
rendered against petitioner by the Corporation Court of 
the City of Lynchburg on April 6, 1961 in a prosecution 
for criminal trespass (R. 55; Appendix p. 25, infra). The 
effect of the denial of the petition for writ of error and 
supersedeas “is to affirm the judgment of the said Cor­
poration Court” (R. 59).

Chief Justice Eggleston granted a stay to allow peti­
tioner to present a petition for writ of certiorari to this 
Court provided the case is docketed in this Court by 
January 10, 1962 (R. 60). The jurisdiction of this Court is 
invoked pursuant to Title 28 U. S. C. '§>1257(3), petitioner 
having asserted below and claiming here a denial of rights, 
privileges and immunities secured by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Question Presented

Whether the Court below denied petitioner’s rights un­
der the due process and equal protection clauses of The 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States to freedom from state supported racial discrimina­
tion and freedom of expression, where petitioner has been 
convicted of the crime of trespass for having remained 
seated at the lunch counter of a licensed drug store which 
was opened to the public (including petitioner), but was 
pursuing a practice of serving food and beverages to 
Negroes only at a stand-up “take-out” section of the 
counter while serving white persons at the counter seats



3

in conformity with a State custom of segregation, and 
where petitioner was ordered to leave solely on the basis 
of race and was arrested and convicted in support of the 
racially discriminatory practice.

Statutory and Constitutional Provisions Involved

1. This case involves Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment to the Constitution of the United States.

2. The case also involves Section 18.1-173 of the Code 
of Virginia, 1950 (1960 Replacement Vol.), which provides:

§18.1-173. Trespass after having been forbidden to 
do so.—If any persons shall without authority of law 
go upon or remain upon the lands, buildings or prem­
ises of another, or any part, portion or area thereof, 
after having been forbidden to do so, either orally or 
in writing, by the owner, lessee, custodian or other 
person lawfully in charge thereof, or after having been 
forbidden to do so by a sign or signs posted on such 
lands, buildings, premises or part, portion or area 
thereof at a place or places where it or they may be 
reasonably seen, he shall be deemed guilty of a mis­
demeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be pun­
ished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars 
or by confinement in jail not exceeding twelve months, 
or by both such fine and imprisonment. (Italics added; 
the portions italicized were added by a 1960 amend­
ment. )

Statement

Petitioner, a sixteen year old Negro girl (R. 1) has been 
sentenced to thirty days in jail (R. 52) for having engaged



4

in a “ sit-in” protest. February 13, 1961, petitioner and five 
other Negroes seated themselves on stools at the lunch 
counter of a drugstore owned by the Patterson Drug Com­
pany, Incorporated in Lynchburg, Virginia (R. 11, 12). 
The store was open to the public (R. 10), including peti­
tioner. The remaining counter stools were vacant at the 
time petitioner was in the store (R. 10).

After waiting for service, the group was approached by 
a vice president and general manager of the corporation 
who informed them that it reserved the right to serve “whom 
we chose at our eating facilities” (R. 12), and twice asked 
them to leave (R. 12).

Petitioner was asked to leave not because of her be­
havior (R. 19), but solely because the company did not 
serve Negroes at the counter (R. 20). However, at a 
stand-up take-out” section of the counter Negroes are 
sold this company’s food and beverages which then must 
be eaten off the premises (R. 17). The drugstore is licensed 
and inspected by the City of Lynchburg (R. 20), and adver­
tises to and invites the general public as customers (R. 14, 
21).

When Petitioner, and those with whom she had entered, 
made no move to leave their seats at the counter (R. 13), 
the manager summoned a police officer (R. 13), before 
whom he asked them to leave (R. 13). Police Captain 
Gilliam informed the group that under Virginia law, one 
who remained on the premises of another after having 
been asked to leave was trespassing (R. 9). When they 
did not leave, he arrested them (R. 9).

Petitioner was charged in the Juvenile and Domestic 
Relations Court for the City of Lynchburg on February 
13, 1961, with remaining upon the lands, buildings and 
premises of the Patterson Drug Co., Inc. in violation of



5

Sections 18.1-173 of the Code of Virginia, 1950 (as amended 
1960) (E. 1) and convicted on February 23, 1961 (E. 2). 
She was sentenced to 30 days in jail (E. 2). In a de novo 
trial in the Corporation Court of the City of Lynchburg, 
a jury was waived, and petitioner was convicted of a vio­
lation of the same Code section in that she was “guilty 
of remaining upon the lands, buildings and premises of 
another, namely, Patterson Drug Company, Incorporated, 
after having been forbidden to do so by a person lawfully 
in charge thereof, as charged . . . ” (E. 55), and sentenced 
to 30 days in jail and to be held in jail until payment of 
costs, for a period not to exceed fifteen more days (E. 55). 
The Court declined to follow the Prosecutor’s recommenda­
tion that sentence be suspended (E. 52).

On May 29, 1961, petitioner filed timely notice of appeal 
to the Supreme Court of Appeals (E. 57, 58), which writ 
of error and supersedeas was denied by the Siipreme Court 
of Appeals on October 12, 1961. This denial had the effect 
of affirming the judgment of conviction rendered by the 
Court below (E. 59).

How the Federal Questions Were Raised ami Decided

The federal questions which petitioner seeks to have this 
Court review were raised prior to trial in the Corporation 
Court of the City of Lynchburg by a Plea in Bar filed with 
the Court (E. 3, 4). In her Plea in Bar, petitioner prayed 
that the warrant be dismissed and that she be discharged 
urging that any demand that she leave the premises of the 
Patterson Drug Company, Incorporated, was made pursu­
ant to a policy, practice and custom of racial segregation, 
and that a conviction would violate the equal protection and 
due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment (E. 4). 
The Court heard argument of counsel on the Plea and 
disallowed it without opinion (R. 5).



6

Subsequently, at the close of the state’s evidence (the 
defense called no witness) petitioner moved orally to strike 
the state’s evidence and dismiss the proceedings (E. 22 
et seq.). The following colloquy ensued:

“Mr. Tucker: Now, if your Honor please, we want 
to offer a motion, and would like to be heard on a mo­
tion to strike the evidence, and to dismiss these pro­
ceedings.

The Court: State, briefly, your grounds of the mo­
tion, without argument—just let me know the grounds.

Mr. Tucker: The grounds—there are several grounds 
of the motion.

The Court: Have you them in writing?
Mr. Tucker: Not in that form.
The Court: Gfo ahead.
Mr. Tucker: Any conviction here would be a viola­

tion of the rights of the Defendant to the equal pro­
tection of the laws, and to due process of law, as 
guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the Constitu­
tion____” (E. 22-23).

Continuing (at E. 24), petitioner’s counsel referred, in 
connection with a discussion of “ liberty” as protected by 
the Due Process clause, to the free expression or “ pro­
test” issue, stating:

“ . . .  So that we see that the abridgement of the present 
statute, to stifle any protest against equality (sic) in 
the public market, is a deprivation of liberty, which 
does not serve a proper governmental objective.”

In the lengthy oral elaboration of the motion, and the 
colloquy with the Court, defense counsel on several occa­
sions reiterated the equal protection argument that the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the State from thus 
enforcing racial segregation by use of its criminal trespass 
laws, and also reiterated the due process objection (see E.



7

48-49). These contentions were rejected by the Court and 
the motions were overruled (R. 51).

The “Notice of Appeal and Assignments of Error” prop­
erly presented the federal questions raised in the “Plea 
in Bar” and in the “ motion to strike the evidence” (R. 57); 
this pleading asserted that the Court erred:

1. When it overruled, disallowed and dismissed the 
plea in bar, the court erred in holding that neither 
the equal protection clause nor the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con­
stitution of the United States precludes state crim­
inal prosecution of one who merely sat at a lunch 
counter to purchase and consume food and bever­
age pursuant to the owner’s invitation to the gen­
eral public and continued to do so notwithstanding 
the owner’s demand that he leave when, as here, it 
is shown that such demand was made solely because 
of race and color.

2. When it overruled the motion to strike the evidence 
and, also, when it entered judgment of conviction, 
the court erred in holding that neither the equal 
protection clause nor the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution nor 
Title 42 United States Code, Sections 1981 and 
1982, precludes state criminal prosecution of one 
who merely sat at a lunch counter to purchase and 
consume food and beverage pursuant to the owner’s 
invitation to the general public and continued to do 
so notwithstanding the owner’s demand that he 
leave when, as here, it is shown that such demand 
was made solely because of race and color.

The petition for writ of error and supersedeas to the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia again presented the



8

federal questions for decision. The Supreme Court of Ap­
peals of Virginia disposed of the cause by a judgment or 
order summarily refusing said writ of error and super­
sedeas (R. 59). The effect of this refusal was to affirm the 
judgment of the trial court (R. 59).

Reasons for Granting the Writ

This case involves substantial questions affecting im­
portant constitutional rights, and presents for decision 
issues of great public interest which affect the rights of a 
large number of litigants in similar cases pending in many 
different courts.

In recent years this Court has considered several cases 
which have involved the rights of Negroes to nondiscrimina- 
tory use of the dining facilities of various private businesses 
in differing legal contexts. See e.g. Boynton v. Virginia,
364 U. S. 454; Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 U. S. 715; Garner v. Louisiana, 30 U. S. Law Wk. 4070 
(December 11, 1961). Requests for review have been made 
in other cases. See for example Avent v. North Carolina, 
No. 85, Oct. Term 1961; Fox v. North Carolina, No. 86, 
Oct. Term 1961; Randolph v. Virginia, No. 248, Oct. 
Term 1961. It is reasonably expectable that further 
requests will be made in the near future for review of other 
state court decisions deciding similar issues. The Ala­
bama Supreme Court recently refused to review several 
“ sit-in” trespass convictions. Gober v. City of Birmingham, 
Ala. Ct. of Appeals, Oct. Term 1960-61, 6th Div. 797 (May 
30, 1961), certiorari denied, Supreme Ct. of Ala., 6th Div. 
762, September 14, 1961, rehearing denied November 2, 
1961 (with nine other cases decided on same opinion in 
the Court of Appeals). Similarly the South Carolina Su­
preme Court recently affirmed trespass convictions in



9

several sit-in eases. City of Greenville v. Peterson, Sup. 
Ct. S. C., No. 4761, decided Nov. 10, 1961; City of Colum­
bia v. Barr, Sup. Ct. S. C. No. 4777, decided December 14, 
1961; City of Charleston v. Mitchell, Sup. Ct. S. C. No. 
4779, decided December 13, 1961. This Court has also 
had occasion to consider civil litigation touching upon 
some of the issues in these cases primarily involving 
travel-connected facilities. Turner v. City of Memphis, 
No. 84 Oct. Term 1961; Bailey v. Patterson, stay injunc­
tion denied, 30 U. S. Law Wk. 3201, appeal docketed De­
cember 29, 1961, No. 643, Oct. Term 1961.

The constitutional issues are presented in this case in 
the context of the trespass conviction of a sixteen year 
old Negro girl for failing upon demand to leave her seat 
at the lunch counter of a drug store owned by a private 
corporation in a store licensed by a municipality which 
invites the general public to enter, but limits food service 
to Negroes to the purchase of items to be taken off the 
premises, while serving white persons at the lunch counter 
stools. The case presents the important issues as to 
whether the racially discriminatory practices which were 
enforced against petitioner are prohibited by the Four­
teenth Amendment’s mandate against state enforced ra­
cial discrimination, and that Amendment’s protection of 
free expression. The case necessarily involves the scope 
and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment “ state action” 
concept, particularly the impact of community customs and 
the relevance of various components of nominally “private” 
conduct, where state executive (police) and judicial ac­
tion have the effect of enforcing racial discrimination 
against Negroes by means of the state’s criminal laws. 
The case also involves the use of state power in these cir­
cumstances to stifle the right of free expression secured 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.



10

A. The Decision Below Conflicts With Prior Decisions of 
This Court Which Condemn the Use of State Power 
to Enforce a State Custom of Racial Segregation.

In this case it is clear that the petitioner was refused 
service, ordered to leave the lunch counter, arrested and 
convicted of a crime on the basis of her race pursuant to 
and in the enforcement of a policy of racial discrimination. 
It is undisputed that the practice of the Patterson Drug 
Company was to stand ready to serve food at its lunch 
counter seats to white persons and to refuse such service 
to all Negroes; that it was the policy to serve Negroes 
only when they stood at the “take-out” section of the 
lunch counter; and that petitioner was refused service 
solely because of her race and for no other reason. It is 
also apparent that the arrest was made to support this 
discrimination, and that the trial court convicted peti­
tioner on evidence plainly indicating that race, and race 
alone, was the reason she was ordered to leave the lunch 
counter, and consequently arrested and charged upon her 
failure to leave. This is thus a case where the difference 
in treatment to which petitioner has been subjected is 
clearly a racial discrimination.

There are several dominant and relevant components 
of action by state officials in the chain of events leading 
to appellant’s conviction and punishment for violating the 
racially discriminatory customs. Here, as in all criminal 
prosecutions, there is action by state officers in the persons 
of the police, prosecutors and judges; the official actions 
of such officers are “ state action” within the meaning of 
the Fourteenth Amendment under clear authorities. The 
subject of judicial action as “ state action” was treated 
exhaustively in part II of Chief Justice Vinson’s opinion 
in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. 8. 1, 14-18; cf. Boynton v. 
Virginia, supra. Policemen (Screws v. United States, 325



11

U. S. 91; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167) and prosecutors 
(Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264) are equally subject to 
the restraints of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Ever since the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 17, it has 
been conventional doctrine that racial discrimination when 
supported by state authority, violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal protection clause; and since Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, it has been settled that 
racial segregation constitutes a forbidden discrimination.

However, in this case the involvement of the public law 
enforcement and judicial officers in the racial discrimina­
tion practiced against petitioner, through their use of 
the state’s criminal law machinery to support and enforce 
it, is now sought to be excused because, it is said, there is 
also “private action” in the picture, and the state is said 
to be merely enforcing “private property” rights through 
its criminal trespass laws. It is argued that the state is 
not really excluding and punishing Negroes, but only “ tres­
passers” , and that the state stands ready to punish white 
trespassers as well. While petitioners are aware of no 
case of a white person convicted for refusing to leave an 
all-Negro establishment under a trespass law,1 there is no 
reason to doubt that this might occur in communities 
deeply wedded to the segregation customs. The answer 
made to a parallel argument in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 
U. S. 1, 22, is apt—“Equal protection of the laws is not 
achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities.”

But the argument that it is only “ trespassers” and not 
Negroes qua Negroes who are punished by the State, and 
thus it is private property rights and not racial discrimina­
tion that is being preserved by the state’s officers and laws,

1 White persons have been convicted for trespass when in com­
pany with Negroes in “white only” establishments. Avent v. North 
Carolina, supra.



12

requires further analysis. We shall examine in turn, the 
specific nature of the property right here recognized and 
enforced by the state, its relation to the state’s legitimate 
interests including protection of the right to privacy, and 
its relation to state customs and laws.

As a starting point it is fit to observe, as this Court 
did in Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, that the mere fact that 
property rights are involved does not settle the matter. 
The Court said at 334 U. S. 1, 22:

“Nor do we find merit in the suggestion that prop­
erty owners who are parties to these agreements are 
denied equal protection of the laws if denied access 
to the courts to enforce the terms of restrictive cove­
nants and to assert property rights which the state 
courts have held to be created by such agreements. 
The Constitution confers upon no individual the right 
to demand action by the State which results in the 
denial of equal protection of the laws to other indi­
viduals. And it would appear beyond question that 
the power of the State to create and enforce property 
interests must be exercised within the boundaries de­
fined by the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Marsh v. 
Alabama, 326 IT. S. 501, 90 L. ed 265, 66 S. Ct. 276 
(1946).”

This Court has said on several occasions, “that dominion 
over property springing from ownership is not absolute 
and unqualified.” Buchanan v. W'arley, 245 IT. S. 60, 74; 
United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U. S. 499, 
510; Marsh v. Alabama, 326 IT. S. 501, 506; cf. Munn v. 
Illinois, 94 IT. S. 113. As the Court said in Marsh, supra, 
“ The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his 
property for use by the public in general, the more do 
his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and con­



13

stitutional rights of those who use it. Cf. Republic Avia­
tion Corp. v. N. L, R. B., 324 U. S. 793, 796, 802.”

Because it does matter a great deal what kind of prop­
erty interest is being created and enforced by the State 
in given circumstances, we must inquire: What is the 
nature of the property right of the Patterson Drug Com­
pany Inc. which is being enforced by the state in this 
criminal trespass prosecution?

The Patterson Drug Company Incorporated used the 
premises involved in its commercial business as a drug 
store opened to the public generally for the transaction 
of business including the sale of food and beverages at its 
lunch counter. This case does not involve enforcement of 
a general desire to keep everyone, or Negroes, or even 
this petitioner, from coming upon the premises. The white 
public was invited to use all the facilities of the drug 
store, and the Negro public was invited to use all facil­
ities except the lunch counter stools. Negroes were even 
welcomed to purchase food at the lunch counter provided 
they stood up to purchase it and left the store to eat. 
This case does not involve state enforcement of a property 
owner’s desire to exclude a person or persons for reasons 
of whim or caprice, for as we shall develop below the 
practice of excluding all Negroes (as a race) from such 
facilities is in conformity with community custom and a 
racially segregated “way of life” which has been sup­
ported, fostered and buttressed by law. The property in­
terests enforced for the Patterson Drug Company do not 
involve the integrity of a portion of its premises set aside 
for non-public use, such as space reserved for the owner 
or its employees. Nor does the property interest enforced 
here relate to an owner’s claim that a portion of its prem­
ises is being sought to be used for a purpose alien to its 
normal or intended function. Petitioner merely sought



14

to use a lunch counter stool while consuming food sought 
to be purchased on the premises, the purpose for which the 
stools were being maintained. The state is not being called 
upon here to enforce a property owner’s general desire not 
to sell its goods to Negroes, since food and beverages were 
offered for sale to Negroes at this counter if they re­
mained standing and took their purchases away with them.

The property interest which is being enforced here is 
a claimed right to open premises to the public generally 
(including Negroes) for business purposes, including the 
sale of food and beverages, while racially discriminating 
against Negroes qua Negroes at one of the facilities for 
the public in the business premises—including a claimed 
right to have Negroes arrested and criminally punished 
for failing to obey the owner’s direction for them to leave 
this portion of the store. This claimed property right— 
the right to racially discriminate against Negroes with 
respect to being seated in the circumstances indicated— 
is indeed a type of property interest. The question re­
mains whether the States’ laws can give recognition and 
enforcement to such an interest without violating the Four­
teenth Amendment.

Petitioner submits that it is readily apparent that the 
property interest being enforced against her on behalf of 
the Drug Company, bears no substantial relation to any 
constitutionally protected interest of the property owner 
in privacy in the use of his premises. The State is not in 
this prosecution engaged in protecting the right to privacy. 
It has long been agreed by the courts that a state can 
“take away” this property right to racially segregate in 
public accommodation facilities without depriving an owner 
of Fourteenth Amendment rights. Western Turf Asso. v. 
Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359; Railway Mail Ass’n v. Corsi, 
326 U. S. 88; Pickett v. Kuchan, 323 111. 138, 153 N. E.



15

667, 49 A. L. R. 499 (1926); People v. King, 110 N. T. 
418, 18 N. E. 245 (1888); Annotation 49 A. L. R. 505; cf. 
District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U. S. 
100. And indeed a great number of states in our Nation 
have enacted laws making it criminal to engage in just 
the type of racially discriminatory use of private prop­
erty which the Drug Company seeks state assistance in 
preserving here.2 From the fact that the States can make 
the attempted exercise of such a “ right” a crime, it does 
not follow necessarily and automatically that they must 
do so, and must refuse (as petitioner here urges) to recog­
nize such a claimed property right to discriminate racially 
in places of public accommodation. But the fact that the 
States can constitutionally prohibit such a use of property 
and that when they do so they are actually conforming to 
the egalitarian principles of the Fourteenth Amendment 
{Railway Mail Ass’n v. Corsi, supra at 93-94) makes it 
evident that the property interest asserted by the Drug 
Company is very far from an inalienable or “ absolute” 
property right. Indeed the property owner here is at­
tempting to do something that the state itself could not 
permit him to do on state property leased to him for his 
business use {Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 
365 U. S. 715), or require or authorize him to do by positive 
legislation (cf. Mr. Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion 
in Burton, supra).

A basic consideration in this case is that the drug store 
lunch counter involved is a public establishment in the 
sense that it is open to serve the public and is a part of 
the public life of the community. (Mr. Justice Douglas, 
concurring in Garner v. Louisiana, 30 U. S. Law Wk.

2 See collections of such laws in 2 Emerson and Haber, Political 
and Civil Bights in the United• States, 1413 (2d ed. 1958); and 
Greenberg, Race Relations and American Law, Appendix A, para. 
6, pp. 375-379 (1959).



16

4070, 4076, December 11, 1961.) As a consequence of the 
public use to which the property has been devoted by the 
owner, this case involves no real claim that the right to 
privacy is being protected by this use of the State’s tres­
pass laws. And, of course, it does not follow from the 
conclusion that the State cannot enforce the racial bias 
of the operator of a lunch counter open to the public, 
that it could not enforce a similar bias by the use of tres­
pass laws against an intruder into a private dwelling or 
any other property in circumstances where the state was 
exercising its powers to protect an owner’s privacy. This 
Court has recently reiterated the principle that there is a 
constitutional “ right to privacy” protected by the Due 
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 6 L. ed 2d 1081, 1090, 1103, 1104; see 
also Poe v. Uliman, 367 U. S. 497, 6 L. ed 2d 989, 1006, 
1022-1026 (dissenting opinions). It is submitted that due 
consideration of the right to privacy affords a sound and 
rational basis for determining whether cases which might 
arise in the future involving varying situations should be 
decided in the same manner urged by petitioner here— 
that is, against the claimed property interest. Only a very 
absolutist view of the property “ right” to determine those 
who may come or stay on one’s property on racial grounds 
—an absolutist rule yielding to no competing considera­
tions—would require that the same principles apply through 
the whole range of property uses, public connections, ded­
ications, and privacy interests at stake. The Court has 
recognized the relation between the right of privacy and 
property interests in the past. See e.g. Thornhill v. Ala­
bama, 310 U. S. 88, 105-106; Breard v. Alexandria, 341 
U. S. 622, 626, 638, 644.

Petitioner submits that a property right to determine 
on a racial basis who can stay on one’s property cannot 
be absolute at all, for this claimed right collides at some



17

points with the Fourteenth Amendment right of persons 
not to be subjected to racial discrimination at the hand 
of the government. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Author­
ity, supra; Shelley v. Kraemer, supra. Mr. Justice Holmes 
said in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 
349, 355.

All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their 
logical extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the 
neighborhood of principles of policy which are other 
than those on which the particular right is founded, 
and which become strong enough to hold their own 
when a certain point is reached.

Petitioner certainly does not contend that the prin­
ciples urged to prevent the use of trespass laws to enforce 
racial discrimination in a lunch counter operated as a 
public business would prevent the state from enforcing 
a similar bias in a private home where the right of privacy 
has its greatest meaning and strength. A man ought to 
have the right to order from his home anybody he prefers 
not to have in it, and ought to have the help of the gov­
ernment in making his order effective. Indeed, the State 
cannot constitutionally authorize an intrusion into a pri­
vate home except in the most limited circumstances with 
appropriate safeguards against abuses. Mapp v. Ohio, 
supra; cf. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360. Racial dis­
crimination in a private home, or office, or other property 
where the right of privacy is paramount is one thing. 
Racial discrimination at a public lunch counter is quite 
another thing indeed.

The involvement of the State of Virginia as a whole 
entity in the present discrimination is so intimate and 
manifold that the state action standard may be satisfied 
or bolstered by other criteria than the participation of its



18

police and courts in enforcing the discriminatory result 
complained of by petitioner. For racial discrimination has 
deep roots in Virginia custom and law. “ Custom” is 
specifically included in the opinion in the Civil Rights 
Cases as one of the forms of “state authority” which might 
be used in efforts to support a denial of Fourteenth Amend­
ment rights (109 U. S. 3, at 17). (See also Mr. Justice 
Douglas concurring in Garner v. Louisiana, 30 U. S. Law 
Week, 4070, 4076.)3

The Patterson Drug Company in excluding Negroes from 
its lunch counter was following a custom of segregating 
Negroes in public life which is characteristic of Virginia 
as a community, and which custom has been firmed up and 
supported by the segregation policies and laws of Virginia 
as a polity.

Virginia has had a long history of racial segregation 
laws. Virginia’s Constitution of 1902 as amended, Art. IX, 
§140, required segregation in all schools. In 1915 the 
state’s highest court stated that it was “the declared policy 
of this state that association of the races tends to breach 
the peace, unsanitary conditions, discomfort, immorality 
and disquiet.” Hopkins v. City of Richmond, 117 Va. 692, 
86 S. E. 139, 145. The history of “massive resistance” to 
implementation of this Court’s decision in Brown v. Board 
of Education, supra, is recounted in several opinions, 
James v. Almond, 170 F. Supp. 331 (E. D. Va. 1959) ; 
N. A. A. C. P. v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503, 513-515 (E. D. 
Va. 1958), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Harrison v. 
N. A. A. C. P., 360 U. S. 167. Virginia’s statute books still 
abound with segregation laws, including laws requiring

3 As the Court said in Poe v. Oilman, supra, “ ‘Deeply embedded 
traditional ways of carrying out state policy . . . ’— or not carrying 
it out—’‘are often tougher and truer law than the dead words of 
the written text’. Nashville C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Browning, 310 
U. S. 362, 369, 84 L. ed. 1254, 1258, 60 S. Ct. 968” (at 6 L. ed. 
2d 995).



19

segregation in jjlaees of public entertainment or assembly 
(Code of Va., 1950, 1960 Replacement Vol., §§18.1-356 and 
18.1-357), in prisons (Code of Va., 1950, 1958 Replacement 
Vol. §53-42); in fraternal organizations (Code of 1950, 
1953 Replacement Vol. §38.1-597); in hospitals for the 
feeble-minded (Code of Va., 1950, 1960 Replacement Vol. 
§37-183); in air terminals (Code of Va., 1950, 1959 Replace­
ment Vol., §56-326), and prohibiting interracial marriages 
(Code of Va., 1950, §20-54).

The segregation laws form an edifice created by law— 
the systematic segregation of Negroes in public life in 
Virginia. There is good ground for belief that the segrega­
tion system, of which the custom enforced by the Patterson 
Drug Co. is a part, was brought into being or at least given 
firm contour in its beginning, by State laws. Woodward, 
The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 16-22, 81-85, 91-93.

As Mr. Justice Douglas wrote recently concurring in 
Garner v. Louisiana, 30 IT. S. Law Wk. 4070, 4077 (Dec. 
11, 1961) :

“ Though there may have been no state law or municipal 
ordinance that in terms required segregation of the 
races in restaurants, it is jjlain that the proprietors 
in the instant cases were segregating blacks from 
whites pursuant to Louisiana’s custom. Segregation 
is basic to the structure of Louisiana as a community; 
the custom that maintains it is at least as powerful 
as any law. If these proprietors also choose segrega­
tion, their preference does not make the action ‘pri­
vate’, rather than ‘state’ action. If it did, a minuscule 
of private prejudice would convert state into private 
action. Moreover, where the segregation policy is the 
policy of a state, it matters not that the agency to 
enforce it is a private enterprise. Baldwin v. Morgan, 
supra; Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 P. 2d 
531.”



20

Finally the property involved in this case is “affected 
with a public interest,” Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113. By 
its use it has become “clothed with a public interest . . . 
[is] of public consequence, and affect[s] the., community 
at large” (Id. at 126). This property is operated as a 
lunch counter under a license granted by the City of Lynch­
burg (R. 20). The licensing by the state demonstrates the 
public’s interest in the business and the governmental 
recognition of this public character. As Mr. Justice Doug­
las stated concurring in Garner v. Louisiana, 30 U. S. 
Law Wk. at 4078: “A license to establish a restaurant is 
a license to establish a public facility and necessarily im­
ports, in law, equality of use for all members of the public.”

It is submitted that the totality of circumstances in 
this case, including the actions of the State’s officers in 
arresting and prosecuting petitioner, the municipal licens­
ing of the property involved and the consequent public 
character of the business property involved, the plain and 
invidious racial discrimination involved in the asserted 
property rights being protected by the state, the absence 
of any relevant component of privacy to be protected by 
the state’s action in light of the nature of the owner’s use 
of his property, and the state custom of segregation which 
has created or at least substantially buttressed the type of 
discriminatory practices involved, are sufficient to require 
a determination that the petitioner’s trespass conviction 
has abridged her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment

B. The Decision Below Conflicts With Decisions of This 
Court Securing the Right of Freedom of Expression 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States.

Petitioner, and the other Negroes arrested on the same 
occasion were engaged in the exercise of free expression



21

by means of verbal requests to the management of service, 
and the nonverbal requests for nondiscriminatory lunch 
counter service which were implicit in their continued re­
maining at the lunch counter when refused service. The 
fact that sit-in demonstrations are a form of protest and 
expression was mentioned in Mr. Justice Harlan’s con­
currence in Garner v. Louisiana, supra. Petitioner’s ex­
pression (asking for service) was entirely appropriate to 
the time and place at which it occurred. Petitioner, and 
the other Negroes at the lunch counter did not shout, ob­
struct the conduct of business, or engage in any expres­
sion which had that effect. There were no speeches, picket 
signs, handbills or other forms of expression in the store 
which were possibly inappropriate to the time and place. 
Bather petitioners merely expressed themselves by offer­
ing to make purchases in a place and at a time set aside 
for such transactions. Their protest demonstration was a 
part of the “ free trade in ideas” (Abrams v. United States, 
250 U. S. 616, 630, Holmes, J., dissenting), and was within 
the range of liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amend­
ment, even though nonverbal. Stromberg v. California, 283 
U. S. 359 (display of red flag); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 
IT. S. 88 (picketing); West Virginia State Board of Educa­
tion v. Barnette, 319 IT. S. 624, 633-634 (flag salute); 
N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (freedom of asso­
ciation) .

Petitioner does not urge that there is a Fourteenth 
Amendment right to free expression on private property 
in all cases or circumstances without regard to the owner’s 
privacy, and his use and arrangement of his property. 
This is obviously not the law. In Breard v. Alexandria, 
341 U. S. 622 the Court balanced the “householder’s desire 
for privacy and the publisher’s right to distribute publica­
tions” in the particular manner involved, and upheld a law 
limiting the publishers’ right to solicit on a door-to-door



22

basis. But cf. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 where 
different kinds of interests were involved with a correspond­
ing difference in result.

As was true with the discussion above of the racial 
discrimination issue, so the free expression issue is not 
resolved merely by reference to the fact that private prop­
erty rights are involved. The nature of the property rights 
asserted and of the state’s participation through its officers, 
its customs, and its creation of the property interest, have 
all been discussed above in connection with the state ac­
tion issue as it related to racial discrimination. Similar 
considerations should aid in resolving the free expression 
question.

In Garner v. Louisiana, Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring, 
found a protected area of free expression on private prop­
erty on facts regarded as involving “ the implied consent 
of the management” for the sit-in demonstrators to remain 
on the property. It is submitted that even absent the 
owner’s consent for petitioner to remain on the premises 
of this drug store, a determination of her free expression 
rights requires consideration of the totality of circum­
stances respecting the owner’s use of the property and the 
specific interest which state judicial action is supporting. 
Marsh v. Alabama, supra.

In Marsh, supra, this Court reversed trespass convic­
tions of Jehovah’s Witnesses who went upon the privately 
owned streets of a company town to proselytize for their 
faith, holding that the conviction violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In Republic Aviation Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 
324 IT. S. 793, the Court upheld a labor board ruling that 
lacking special circumstances employer regulations for­
bidding all union solicitation on company property consti­
tuted unfair labor practices. See Thornhill v. Alabama,



23

supra, involving- picketing on company-owned property; 
see also N. L. R. B. v. American Pearl Button Co., 149 
F. 2d 258 (8th Cir. 1945) ; United Steelworkers v. N. L. R. B., 
243 F. 2d 593, 598 (D. C. Cir. 1956), reversed on other 
grounds, 357 U. S. 357, and compare the cases mentioned 
above with N. L. R. B. v. Fansteel Metal Corp., 306 U. S. 
240, 252, condemning an employee seizure of a plant. In 
People v. Barisi, 193 Misc. 934, 86 N. Y. S. 2d 277, 279 
(1948) the Court held that picketing within Pennsylvania 
Eailroad Station was not a trespass; the owners opened 
it to the public and their property rights were “circum­
scribed by the constitutional rights of those who use it.” 
See also Freeman v. Retail Clerks Union, Washington Su­
perior Court, 45 Lab. Eel. Eef. Man. 2334 (1959); and 
State of Maryland v. Williams, Baltimore City Court, 44 
Lab. Eel. Eef. Man. 2357, 2361 (1959).

In the circumstances of this case the only apparent state 
interest being subserved by this trespass prosecution, is 
support of the property owner’s discrimination in conform­
ity to the State’s segregation custom and policy. This is 
all that the property owner has sought.

Where free expression rights are involved, the questions 
for decision is whether the relevant expressions are “in 
such circumstances and . . .  of such a nature as to create 
a clear and present danger that will bring about the sub­
stantive evil” which the state has the right to prevent. 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52. The only “ sub­
stantive evil” sought to be prevented by this trespass prose­
cution is the elimination of racial discrimination and the 
stifling of protest against it ; but this is not an “ evil” within 
the State’s power to suppress because the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits state support of racial discrimina­
tion. There is no claim that the state’s authority is being- 
exerted here to protect the public peace. There is no claim



24

that petitioner or those associated with her were in any way 
disorderly or that they threatened to breach the peace, 
nor any indication that it was threatened by anyone else. 
But even if others had threatened the peace, by a threat 
to attack petitioner for example, the state’s officers “are 
supposed to be on the side of the Constitution, not on the 
side of discrimination” (Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring 
in Garner v. Louisiana, supra) ;  see Buchanan v. Warley, 
245 U. S. 60; Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1; Sellers v. John­
son, 163 F. 2d 877 (8th Cir. 1947), Cert. Den. 332 U. S. 851; 
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1.

CONCLUSION

Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, it is respect­
fully submitted that the petition for a writ of certiorari 
should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

J ack Greenberg 
Constance B aker Motley 
James M. Nabrit, III 

10 Columbus Circle 
New York 19, New York

S. W. T uckeb 
H enry L. Marsh, III

214 East Clay Street 
Richmond 19, Virginia

Attorneys for Petitioner

Derrick A . B ell, J r.
Michael Meltsner 

Of Counsel



APPENDIX

Judgment of Trial Court

Virginia: At Lynchburg Corporation Court, April 6, 1961. 

Commonwealth

vs. Misdemeanor. Trespassing.
Mandaline E. Thompson, Accused.

This day, the day on which this case was set for trial, 
came the Commonwealth’s attorney, and the said Manda­
line E. Thompson appeared in court in her own proper 
person according to the condition of her recognizance, 
and the said accused also appeared by her attorney, and 
the accused in her own proper person pleaded not guilty 
to the charge of remaining upon the lands, building and 
premises of another, namely, Patterson Drug Company, 
Incorporated, after having been forbidden to do so by a 
person lawfully in charge thereof, and with the consent 
of the accused in person and by her attorney, and the 
concurrence of the Commonwealth’s attorney, and of the 
court, a jury was waived, and the whole matter of law and 
of fact was submitted to the court and the evidence being 
heard, the accused by her attorney moved the court to 
strike the commonwealth’s evidence upon the ground that 
it is not sufficient to support a conviction of the accused, 
which motion the court overruled, and the accused by her 
attorney excepted, and thereupon the court having heard 
the evidence and argument of counsel, the court doth find 
the said accused, Mandaline E. Thompson, guilty of re­
maining upon the lands, buildings and premises of another, 
namely, Patterson Drug Company, Incorporated, after hav­



26

ing been forbidden to do so by a person lawfully in charge 
thereof, as charged, and doth ascertain and fix her punish­
ment at confinement in jail for thirty days. It is there­
fore considered by the court that the said Mandaline E. 
Thompson be and she is hereby committed to jail for said 
term of thirty days, to be computed from the date of this 
judgment, no time having been spent by said accused in 
jail awaiting trial, and that she pay the costs of this prose­
cution, and it is ordered that said accused, who has been 
present in her own proper person at all time throughout 
the trial of this case, be further held in jail until payment 
of said costs, provided that said last mentioned term in 
jail shall not exceed fifteen days. At the instance of the 
accused by her attorney who intimated her intention to 
apply for a writ of error and supersedeas, the court doth 
order that execution of the foregoing judgment be sus­
pended until the 5th day of June, 1961 and the said ac­
cused is allowed bail. Thereupon the said Mandaline E. 
Thompson, together with Henry Q. Thompson and Bessie 
E. Thompson, her sureties, who justified as to their suf­
ficiency, was duly recognized in the sum of $500.00, upon 
condition that if the said Mandaline E. Thompson shall 
make her personal appearance before the corporation court 
for the city of Lynchburg, at the courtroom thereof, on 
the 5th day of June, 1961, at 9:30 o’clock A.M., to answer 
the said charge of trespassing and the foregoing judgment 
thereon, and shall make her personal appearance at any 
time or times to which this case may be continued or fur­
ther heard, before any court, judge or justice having or 
holding any proceeding in connection therewith, to answer 
for said offense of trespassing and to answer the said 
judgment thereon as aforesaid, and shall not depart thence



27

without leave of court, judge or justice, then said recog­
nizance to be void, otherwise to remain in full force and 
effect.

L.O .B. 42 p. 478

A Copy, Teste:

/ s /  H ubert H. Martin, Clerk.

Piled:

Apr. 6,1961 
H. Hm, Clk.



28

Judgment Below

VIRGINIA

In the Supreme Court of Appeals held at the Supreme 
Court of Appeals Building in the City of Richmond on 
Thursday the 12th day of October, 1961.

The petition of Mandaline E. Thompson for a writ of 
error and supersedeas to a judgment rendered by the Cor­
poration Court for the City of Lynchburg on the 6th day 
of April, 1961, in a prosecution by the Commonwealth 
against the said petitioner for a misdemeanor, having been- 
maturely considered and a transcript of the record of the 
judgment aforesaid seen and inspected, the court being 
of opinion that the said judgment is plainly right, doth 
reject said petition and refuse said writ of error and su­
persedeas, the effect of which is to affirm the judgment of 
the said corporation court.

A Copy, Teste:

/ s /  H. G. T urner, Clerk