Goodwin v. Wyman Plaintiffs' Reply Brief
Public Court Documents
June 21, 1971

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Goodwin v. Wyman Plaintiffs' Reply Brief, 1971. 2884b9b3-b39a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/777b3e9a-4ea0-4201-b4eb-ca0b1bc1c2c4/goodwin-v-wyman-plaintiffs-reply-brief. Accessed April 29, 2025.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -x DAISY GOODWIN, JULIA CRUZ, LOUISE DARBY, individually and on behalf of her daughter STELLA DARBY, all individually and on behalf of their families and all other similarly situated. plaintiffs, 71 Civ. 1937 v . GEORGE K. WYMAN, Commissioner of Social Services for the State of New York, individually and in his official capacity and the NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, defendants -x PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY BRIEF IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -------------------------- x DAISY GOODWIN, JULIA CRUZ, LOUISE DARBY, individually and on behalf of her daughter : STELLA DARBY, all individually and on behalf of their families and all other similarly : situated, plaintiffs, 71 Civ. 1937 v . GEORGE K. WYMAN, Commissioner of Social Services for the State of New York, : individually and in his official capacity and the NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF : SOCIAL SERVICES, defendants. -------------------------------------------- x PLAINTIFFS' REPLY BRIEF This memorandum is submitted in reply to defendants' memorandum of law, dated June 14, 1971. First of all, however, plaintiffs wish to bring to the Court's attention the decision of the United States Supreme Court handed down on June 14, 1971 (the text of which has just become available to us) in the case of Palmer v. Thompson, 39 U.S.L.W. 4759. That case involved the question of whether the closing of public swimming pools in order to avoid their desegregation violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court held that it did not since the impact of the closing was felt equally by both the black and white community. 2 In the course of the Court's opinion it was made clear that the central issue in a Fourteenth Amendment case where claims of racial discrimination are made is the effect of the particular action of the state. Indeed, the Court stated that ordinarily a court should not attempt "to ascertain the motivation, or collection of different motivations, that lie behind a legislative enactment." 39 U.S.L.W. at 4761. The Court also explained that Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), and Griffin v. Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), did not stand for the proposition that the motive or purpose behind legislative action is the relevant issue in a Fourteenth Amendment case. Rather, "...the focus in those cases was on the actual effect of the enactments, not upon the motivation which led the States to behave as they did." Ibid. Thus, the position taken by plaintiffs in their original memorandum of law that this Court can look to the effect of the amendment of the New York State welfare laws,* regardless of whatever motivation there may have been for the amendment, is clearly correct. *Contrary to the statement in defendants' brief (p.8), plain tiffs do not rely on "mere pleadings" to demonstrate the racial effect. Such effect is demonstrated by defendants' own statistics and those set forth in the affidavit of Dr. Barbara Rubin. The discussion and cases cited at pages 9-11 of defend ants' brief are also not persuasive in light of Palmer; it is clear from this most recent decision that the racial discrimina tion or classification can be determined from the effect of the statute if not from its explicit language or stated purpose. 3 With regard to the question of whether the justifica tions for Chapter 133 are sufficient, the Supreme Court also spoke to that issue in the Palmer case. The Court noted the petitioners' position that the city's other motivations, including the desire to save money, could not validate an otherwise impermissible state action. The Court agreed, saying "Citizens may not be compelled to forego their constitutional rights because officials ... desire to save money." 39 U.S.L.W. at 4761. Defendants' reliance upon Jefferson v. Hackney, 304 F. Supp. 1332 (N.D. Tex.), vacated on other grounds, 397 U.S. 821 (1970) and Lampton v. Bonin, 299 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. La. 1967), vacated on other grounds, 397 U.S. 663 (1970), on pages 12-17 of its brief, is entirely misleading when the circumstances of those two cases are examined carefully in comparison with the current posture of the case now before this Court. In both Jefferson and Lampton, plaintiffs' equal protection claims were two-fold. Plaintiffs first contended that defendants were violating their right of equal protection because only ADC grants were being reduced while payments under other assistance categories were not being reduced. Plaintiffs' racial equal protection claims were treated separately by the Texas and Louisiana Courts under sections entitled "Ethnicity and Race" in Jefferson and "Plaintiffs' Allegation of Racial Discrimination" in Lampton. The quotations 4 relied upon by defendants are derived from the first discussion, and must be carefully limited to that context. Moreover, the Texas and Louisiana courts, referring to the backdrop of the recent invalidation of the "man in the house" and "suitable home" rules, the relatively unequal portion of the budget allotted to ADC despite its containing the most recipients, etc., focused on the question of legislative intent, as opposed to the discriminatory impact of legislative action, when consider ing plaintiffs' racial equal protection claims. Here, we represent only the class of Black and Puerto Rican ADC and HR recipients,* in a racial discrimination case which, we assert, clearly requires the "compelling interest" standard of determination. Furthermore, in contrast to the Texas and Louisiana cases, our allegations of racial discrimination are grounded upon the impact or effect of the Legislature's actions, not upon its subjective * See Plaintiffs' Complaint at p. 3, 517; "Plaintiffs are members of a class containing, on information and belief, more than one million persons. They are Black and Puerto Rican citizens who receive public assistance in the State of New York under the Aid to Dependent Children and Home Relief programs administered by defendants." (Emphasis added.) 5 intent. For these reasons, the language of the Jefferson and Lampton decisions should be construed most carefully when defendants attempt to apply it to the circumstances of the case presently before this Court. Similarly, defendants' reliance upon Stanley v. Brown, 313 F. Supp. 749 (W.D. Va. 1970), is misleading. There, Virginia limited payments to ADC families to a maximum of $280 per month for each family. The state calculated the amount of a grant on the basis of the number of persons in each family up to six; no additional payment was to be made to a larger family. Approximately 17% of the families receiving ADC grants were affected by the maximum. However, the establishment of such a ceiling, specifically authorized by the Dandridge decision, is far different from a reduction in payments only in those categories which are primarily Black. The establishment of a family maximum for ADC only in the context of Stanley v. Brown, was not necessarily a discriminatory act because ADC was the only multi-recipient category while OAA, AB and AD were single recipient categories. A "family maximum" in the latter categories does not make sense. However, a percentage reduction in the benefits accorded recipients,as now instituted by New York in the ADC and HR categories, can be applied to all categories, whether single or multiple recipient in nature; thus New York's application of the reduction to a few rather than to all categories, without a showing of "compelling need" violates the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, we are presented with a far different set of circumstances here in New York than were present in Virginia. 6 Again, as pointed out in our principal brief, the New York welfare scheme must be considered as unitary in contrast to the Texas, Louisiana, Virginia and Mississippi schemes. The New York Legislature annually establishes a unitary budget to be appropriated for all welfare categories and to be administered, according to need, by the State Department of Social Services. Neither the Constitution nor the Legislature divides these funds appropriated among the several welfare categories. See, e.g., Bills S. 2903, A. 3453 constituting the New York State Budget proposals for the present Fiscal Year and Ch. 53, Laws of 1971 (actual- budget) . The only qualification to be met is the constitutional mandate to meet the needs of the people. N.Y. State Constitution Art. XVII, §1. In Texas, however, the State Constitution pro vides not only a dollar ceiling upon the amount that can be paid for all welfare programs out of state funds, but also sets a ceiling in each of the various welfare categories so that the Texas legislature presumably makes separate legislative appropriations for assistance payments for each of the several categories. Likewise, in Louisiana there appears to have been an allotted figure per category: 7 "The evidence presented does not show that 10% reduction in ADC grants was ordered for any reason other than the purpose of living within the amount allotted for the ADC category...." Lampton v. Bonin, supra at p. 342 (emphasis added). The Louisiana Legislature reduced ADC without cutting OAA, AD, AB because after judicial invalidation of the "man in the house" rule ADC recipients had increased significantly while the State operated on a fixed ADC budget. Ibid. Here in New York, however, the ostensible purpose for reducing the ADC and HR categories was the "fiscal crisis" faced by the State. Yet no cuts were made in the OAA, AB and AD categories despite the "staggering proportions" to which the fiscal crisis existed; only the largely Black and Puerto Rican categories were cut, despite the fact that a reduction in all categories (permitting, alternatively, either a lesser reduction in the ADC and. HR categories than presently encountered or a larger saving to the State) would be perfectly compatible with the ostensible purpose of the Legislature's action. Defendants attempt to explain the separate treat ment of ADC and HR by pointing out that ADC and HR recipients total about 1,555,000 while OAA, AD and AB recipients total only about 215,000. (Defendants' Memorandum, footnote p.16.) It is futile to attempt to divine legislative intent from these figures. The obvious question they raise is why both HR and ADC were selected for cuts when the number of HR recipients is of the same magnitude as the number of recipients in the programs not cut. A selection based on number of 8 recipients might have cut just ADC or ADC and OAA without significantly changing the numbers involved. The one clear fact is the effect of the Legislature's action: the two categories chosen to bear the burden of budget cuts for the whole welfare program - and indeed the only categories in which recipients are actually receiving less money than a year ago - are the categories concentrated in the state's urban centers where the overwhelming majority of minority race citizens reside. The statistical evidence before this Court clearly shows the racial impact of this decision. Such action results in discrimination based on race and is violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, defendants seek to utilize,out of context, language from the recent Supreme Court decision in James v. Valtiera, 39 U.S. L. Week 4489 (U.S. April 26, 1971). At page 11, footnote, defendants referred to the claim made in the District Court in Valtiera that low income housing was a euphemism for areas of concentration of minority residents. However, defendants fail to note the resolution of that issue in the Supreme Court: i.e., that the record in Valtiera did "not support any claim that ... this law seemingly neutral on its face, is in fact aimed at a racial minority." I_d. at 4489. Instead, defendants attempt to twist the above quotation to their own advantage, at page 17 of their brief, by equivocating with respect to the word "record" - defendants 9 use it to refer to New York's historical legislative record; the Valtiera court was referring to the record of the case. Here, we make no claim regarding New York's historical legislative record - under Palmer it is irrelevant. But the record in this case clearly demonstrates the racially dis criminatory effect of Chapter 133 and, in such circumstances, it must be struck down. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above and for the reasons set forth in our principal brief, a judgment should be entered declaring Chapter 133 unconstitutional to the extent described above and enjoining its further discriminatory imple mentation . Dated: New York, New York June 21, 1971 Of Counsel: Community Law Offices Thomas McGanney Donald P. MacNaughton William B. Rozell Respectfully submitted, JOHN DEWITT GREGORY Community Action for Legal Services,In< 335 Broadway New York, New York 10013 Tel. No. 966-6600 Lawrence J. Fox, Of Counsel STEVEN J. COLE, GEORGE COOPER HENRY A . FREEDMAN Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law 401 West 117th Street New York, New York 10027 Tel. No. 280-4112 Fredric A. Newman Bruce Buck Jack Greenberg Charles Stephen Ralston 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York