Goodwin v. Wyman Plaintiffs' Reply Brief

    IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-x
DAISY GOODWIN, JULIA CRUZ, LOUISE 
DARBY, individually and on behalf of her 
daughter STELLA DARBY, all individually 
and on behalf of their families and all 
other similarly situated.

plaintiffs,
71 Civ. 1937

v .

GEORGE K. WYMAN, Commissioner of Social 
Services for the State of New York, 
individually and in his official capacity 
and the NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES,

defendants
-x

PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY BRIEF



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
-------------------------- x

DAISY GOODWIN, JULIA CRUZ, LOUISE DARBY, 
individually and on behalf of her daughter : 
STELLA DARBY, all individually and on behalf 
of their families and all other similarly : 
situated,

plaintiffs,
71 Civ. 1937

v .

GEORGE K. WYMAN, Commissioner of Social 
Services for the State of New York, :
individually and in his official capacity 
and the NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF :
SOCIAL SERVICES,

defendants.
-------------------------------------------- x

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY BRIEF

This memorandum is submitted in reply to defendants' 
memorandum of law, dated June 14, 1971.

First of all, however, plaintiffs wish to bring to 
the Court's attention the decision of the United States Supreme 
Court handed down on June 14, 1971 (the text of which has just
become available to us) in the case of Palmer v. Thompson,
39 U.S.L.W. 4759. That case involved the question of whether 
the closing of public swimming pools in order to avoid their 
desegregation violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme 
Court held that it did not since the impact of the closing was 
felt equally by both the black and white community.



2

In the course of the Court's opinion it was made 
clear that the central issue in a Fourteenth Amendment case 
where claims of racial discrimination are made is the effect 
of the particular action of the state. Indeed, the Court stated 
that ordinarily a court should not attempt "to ascertain the 
motivation, or collection of different motivations, that lie 
behind a legislative enactment." 39 U.S.L.W. at 4761.

The Court also explained that Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 
364 U.S. 339 (1960), and Griffin v. Prince Edward County,
377 U.S. 218 (1964), did not stand for the proposition that 
the motive or purpose behind legislative action is the relevant 
issue in a Fourteenth Amendment case. Rather, "...the focus 
in those cases was on the actual effect of the enactments, 
not upon the motivation which led the States to behave as they 
did." Ibid.

Thus, the position taken by plaintiffs in their 
original memorandum of law that this Court can look to the 
effect of the amendment of the New York State welfare laws,* 
regardless of whatever motivation there may have been for 
the amendment, is clearly correct.

*Contrary to the statement in defendants' brief (p.8), plain­
tiffs do not rely on "mere pleadings" to demonstrate the racial 
effect. Such effect is demonstrated by defendants' own 
statistics and those set forth in the affidavit of Dr. Barbara 
Rubin. The discussion and cases cited at pages 9-11 of defend­
ants' brief are also not persuasive in light of Palmer; it is 
clear from this most recent decision that the racial discrimina­
tion or classification can be determined from the effect of the 
statute if not from its explicit language or stated purpose.



3

With regard to the question of whether the justifica­
tions for Chapter 133 are sufficient, the Supreme Court also 
spoke to that issue in the Palmer case. The Court noted the 
petitioners' position that the city's other motivations, 
including the desire to save money, could not validate an 
otherwise impermissible state action. The Court agreed, saying 
"Citizens may not be compelled to forego their constitutional 
rights because officials ... desire to save money." 39 
U.S.L.W. at 4761.

Defendants' reliance upon Jefferson v. Hackney,
304 F. Supp. 1332 (N.D. Tex.), vacated on other grounds,
397 U.S. 821 (1970) and Lampton v. Bonin, 299 F. Supp. 336 
(E.D. La. 1967), vacated on other grounds, 397 U.S. 663 (1970),
on pages 12-17 of its brief, is entirely misleading when the 
circumstances of those two cases are examined carefully in 
comparison with the current posture of the case now before 
this Court. In both Jefferson and Lampton, plaintiffs' equal 
protection claims were two-fold. Plaintiffs first contended 
that defendants were violating their right of equal protection 
because only ADC grants were being reduced while payments 
under other assistance categories were not being reduced. 
Plaintiffs' racial equal protection claims were treated 
separately by the Texas and Louisiana Courts under sections 
entitled "Ethnicity and Race" in Jefferson and "Plaintiffs' 
Allegation of Racial Discrimination" in Lampton. The quotations



4

relied upon by defendants are derived from the first discussion, 
and must be carefully limited to that context. Moreover, the 
Texas and Louisiana courts, referring to the backdrop of 
the recent invalidation of the "man in the house" and "suitable 
home" rules, the relatively unequal portion of the budget 
allotted to ADC despite its containing the most recipients, etc., 
focused on the question of legislative intent, as opposed to 
the discriminatory impact of legislative action, when consider­
ing plaintiffs' racial equal protection claims. Here, we 
represent only the class of Black and Puerto Rican ADC and 
HR recipients,* in a racial discrimination case which, we 
assert, clearly requires the "compelling interest" standard 
of determination. Furthermore, in contrast to the Texas and Louisiana 
cases, our allegations of racial discrimination are grounded upon the 
impact or effect of the Legislature's actions, not upon its subjective

* See Plaintiffs' Complaint at p. 3, 517;
"Plaintiffs are members of a class containing, on 
information and belief, more than one million 
persons. They are Black and Puerto Rican citizens 
who receive public assistance in the State of New 
York under the Aid to Dependent Children and 
Home Relief programs administered by defendants." 
(Emphasis added.)



5

intent. For these reasons, the language of the Jefferson 
and Lampton decisions should be construed most carefully 
when defendants attempt to apply it to the circumstances of 
the case presently before this Court.

Similarly, defendants' reliance upon Stanley v. Brown,
313 F. Supp. 749 (W.D. Va. 1970), is misleading. There,
Virginia limited payments to ADC families to a maximum of $280 per 
month for each family. The state calculated the amount of a 
grant on the basis of the number of persons in each family up 
to six; no additional payment was to be made to a larger 
family. Approximately 17% of the families receiving ADC 
grants were affected by the maximum. However, the establishment 
of such a ceiling, specifically authorized by the Dandridge 
decision, is far different from a reduction in payments only in 
those categories which are primarily Black. The establishment 
of a family maximum for ADC only in the context of Stanley v. 
Brown, was not necessarily a discriminatory act because ADC 
was the only multi-recipient category while OAA, AB and AD were 
single recipient categories. A "family maximum" in the latter 
categories does not make sense. However, a percentage reduction 
in the benefits accorded recipients,as now instituted by New 
York in the ADC and HR categories, can be applied to all 
categories, whether single or multiple recipient in nature; 
thus New York's application of the reduction to a few 
rather than to all categories, without a showing of "compelling 
need" violates the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, we are



presented with a far different set of circumstances here in 
New York than were present in Virginia.

6

Again, as pointed out in our principal brief, the 
New York welfare scheme must be considered as unitary in 
contrast to the Texas, Louisiana, Virginia and Mississippi 
schemes. The New York Legislature annually establishes a 
unitary budget to be appropriated for all welfare categories 
and to be administered, according to need, by the State 
Department of Social Services. Neither the Constitution nor 
the Legislature divides these funds appropriated among the 
several welfare categories. See, e.g., Bills S. 2903,
A. 3453 constituting the New York State Budget proposals for 
the present Fiscal Year and Ch. 53, Laws of 1971 (actual- 
budget) . The only qualification to be met is the constitutional 
mandate to meet the needs of the people. N.Y. State Constitution 
Art. XVII, §1. In Texas, however, the State Constitution pro­
vides not only a dollar ceiling upon the amount that can 
be paid for all welfare programs out of state funds, but also 
sets a ceiling in each of the various welfare categories
so that the Texas legislature presumably makes separate 
legislative appropriations for assistance payments for each 
of the several categories. Likewise, in Louisiana there 
appears to have been an allotted figure per category:



7

"The evidence presented does not show that 10% 
reduction in ADC grants was ordered for any 
reason other than the purpose of living within 
the amount allotted for the ADC category...."
Lampton v. Bonin, supra at p. 342 (emphasis added).
The Louisiana Legislature reduced ADC without cutting 

OAA, AD, AB because after judicial invalidation of the "man in 
the house" rule ADC recipients had increased significantly 
while the State operated on a fixed ADC budget. Ibid. Here in 
New York, however, the ostensible purpose for reducing the 
ADC and HR categories was the "fiscal crisis" faced by the 
State. Yet no cuts were made in the OAA, AB and AD categories 
despite the "staggering proportions" to which the fiscal 
crisis existed; only the largely Black and Puerto Rican 
categories were cut, despite the fact that a reduction in 
all categories (permitting, alternatively, either a lesser 
reduction in the ADC and. HR categories than presently encountered 
or a larger saving to the State) would be perfectly compatible 
with the ostensible purpose of the Legislature's action.

Defendants attempt to explain the separate treat­
ment of ADC and HR by pointing out that ADC and HR recipients 
total about 1,555,000 while OAA, AD and AB recipients total 
only about 215,000. (Defendants' Memorandum, footnote p.16.)
It is futile to attempt to divine legislative intent from 
these figures. The obvious question they raise is why both 
HR and ADC were selected for cuts when the number of HR 
recipients is of the same magnitude as the number of recipients 
in the programs not cut. A selection based on number of



8

recipients might have cut just ADC or ADC and OAA without 
significantly changing the numbers involved. The one clear 
fact is the effect of the Legislature's action: the two 
categories chosen to bear the burden of budget cuts for the 
whole welfare program - and indeed the only categories in 
which recipients are actually receiving less money than a 
year ago - are the categories concentrated in the state's 
urban centers where the overwhelming majority of minority 
race citizens reside. The statistical evidence before this 
Court clearly shows the racial impact of this decision. Such 
action results in discrimination based on race and is 
violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.

Finally, defendants seek to utilize,out of context, 
language from the recent Supreme Court decision in James 
v. Valtiera, 39 U.S. L. Week 4489 (U.S. April 26, 1971).
At page 11, footnote, defendants referred to the claim made
in the District Court in Valtiera that low income housing
was a euphemism for areas of concentration of minority residents.
However, defendants fail to note the resolution of that issue
in the Supreme Court: i.e., that the record in Valtiera
did "not support any claim that ... this law seemingly neutral
on its face, is in fact aimed at a racial minority." I_d. at
4489. Instead, defendants attempt to twist the above
quotation to their own advantage, at page 17 of their brief,
by equivocating with respect to the word "record" - defendants



9

use it to refer to New York's historical legislative record; 
the Valtiera court was referring to the record of the case. 
Here, we make no claim regarding New York's historical 
legislative record - under Palmer it is irrelevant. But the 
record in this case clearly demonstrates the racially dis­
criminatory effect of Chapter 133 and, in such circumstances, 
it must be struck down.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above and for the reasons 
set forth in our principal brief, a judgment should be 
entered declaring Chapter 133 unconstitutional to the extent 
described above and enjoining its further discriminatory imple­
mentation .

Dated: New York, New York 
June 21, 1971

Of Counsel:
Community Law Offices 
Thomas McGanney 
Donald P. MacNaughton 
William B. Rozell

Respectfully submitted,
JOHN DEWITT GREGORY
Community Action for Legal Services,In< 
335 Broadway
New York, New York 10013 
Tel. No. 966-6600

Lawrence J. Fox, Of Counsel
STEVEN J. COLE,
GEORGE COOPER 
HENRY A . FREEDMAN 
Center on Social Welfare Policy 

and Law
401 West 117th Street 
New York, New York 10027 
Tel. No. 280-4112



Fredric A. Newman 
Bruce Buck

Jack Greenberg 
Charles Stephen Ralston 

10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York