Madison Square Garden Boxing, Inc. v. Shavers Court Opinion
Public Court Documents
August 26, 1977
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Madison Square Garden Boxing, Inc. v. Shavers Court Opinion, 1977. d3a780d8-bc9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/7849a714-a2be-4e53-8c97-7acc2928e8d2/madison-square-garden-boxing-inc-v-shavers-court-opinion. Accessed December 04, 2025.
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Hew York. N. Y. 10013
L I B R A R Y ' " '
m 2 6 19??UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
F or th e S econd C ircuit
Nos. 1538, 1556, 1557, 1559—September Term, 1976.
(Argued August 15, 1977 Decided August 19, 1977.)
Docket Nos. 77-7348, 7353, 7400, 7401
M adison S quare Garden B oxing , I n c .,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Y.
E arnie S havers,
Defendant,
T op R a n k , I n c .,
Proposed Intervenor-Appellant.
B e f o r e :
V an G raafeiland , W ebster,* Circuit Judges,
and D ooling,** U.S. District Judge
Appeal from an order of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, Owen, J.,
denying application of Top Rank, Inc. to intervene in
pending action; also from orders of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York,
Owen, «/. and Haight, J., enjoining Top Rank, Inc. from
* Of the U.S. Court of Appeals (8th Cir.). sitting by designation.
* Of the Eastern District o f New York, sitting bv designation.
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securing injunctive relief in the New York State Supreme
Court.
Appeal from order denying intervention dismissed as
moot. Appeal from orders enjoining State Court proceed
ings reversed.
------------ -----------------
T heodore H. F riedm an , New York, N.Y. (Arum,
Friedman & Katz, New York, N .Y.; David
G. Miller, Klari Neuwelt, Daniel A. Ruzow,
of Counsel), for Appellant Top Rank, Inc.
J ohn A. G tjzzetta, New York, N.Y. (Simpson
Thacher & Bartlett, New York, N.Y.; Barry
R. Ostrager, Dennis G. Jacobs, of Counsel),
for Plaintiff-Appellee.
V an Graafeiland , Circuit Judge:
Muhammad Ali and Earnie Shavers, two well-known
pugilists, are scheduled to fight for the heavyweight cham
pionship of the world on September 29, 1977. A prelim
inary bout between the would-be promoters of this event is
presently taking place. Madison Square Garden Boxing,
Inc. (MSG) and Top Rank, Inc., each of whom claims to
have an exclusive promotional contract with Shavers, are
now in the sixth round of an imbroglio which bids fair to
outdo the main event. For those who missed the earlier
rounds, a brief review of what has transpired to date will
he helpful.
In the Spring of 1977, MSG, which had an option contract
with Ali for a heavyweight title fight, undertook to secure
Shavers as All’s opponent. On May 16, Shavers’ manager
sent MSG a telegram indicating his conditional acceptance
of MSG’s suggested terms. A proposed letter agreement
was then sent hy MSG to Shavers, the terms of which dif-
5356
fered from those of the telegram in several respects. Oral
discussions followed; and Shavers, apparently concluding
that an agreement would not be reached with MSG, signed
a contract to fight for Top Rank. MSG felt, on the other
hand, that an agreement had been consummated between
it and Shavers prior to the execution of the Top Rank
contract. With these conflicting views, the parties entered
the legal arena.
The first action was by Top Rank, which commenced an
Article 78 proceeding in New York State Supreme Court
on June 10 seeking to restrain the New York State Athletic
Commission from making a determination as to the validity
of the purported agreement between MSG and Shavers.
By order dated June 30, 1977, Judge Sullivan of the State
Supreme Court held that there was no binding contract
between MSG and Shavers and vacated a decision by the
Athletic Commission which held to the contrary.
In the meantime, on June 16, MSG commenced an action
against Shavers in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York seeking to enjoin him
from participating in any boxing match until he fulfilled
his alleged contractual obligations with MSG. An order
was issued directing Shavers to show cause on June 22 why
a preliminary injunction for this relief should not be
granted. A hearing was held on June 23, and on June 24
the District Judge made an order preliminarily enjoining
Shavers from fighting for any promoter other than MSG
before October 11, 1977.1 On the same day, Top Rank sub
mitted an application to intervene in the action as an in
dispensable party which was denied by the District Court.2
1 A more detailed opinion and order followed on June 28.
2 The granting of Top Rank’s motion to intervene as an indispensable
party would have deprived the District Court of jurisdiction because of
lack of diversity between MSG and Top Rank. Johnson v. Middleton,
175 F.2d 535, 537 (7th Cir. 1949).
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Tiie District Judge found no basis for intervention as of
right. He also held that the application was untimely and
that Top Rank’s interests were being adequately protected
by Shavers. Shavers promptly appealed from the order
granting a preliminary injunction, and Top Rank appealed
from the order denying intervention.
On July 7, Top Rank commenced a new action against
Shavers and MSG in New York State Supreme Court seek
ing a declaratory judgment as to the rights of all the
parties and secured a temporary restraining order pro
hibiting MSG and Shavers from consummating their pro
posed agreement. On July 15, the District Court, in a
proceeding brought by MSG against Judge Sullivan and
Top Rank, enjoined the latter from enforcing the State
Court’s temporary restraining order on the ground that
it would nullify the District Court’s preliminary injunc
tion. Top Rank has appealed from this order of the Dis
trict Court.
Thereafter, MSG sweetened the terms of its proposed
contract with Shavers, and Shavers stipulated with MSG
that a final judgment containing a permanent injunction
might be entered against him and that his appeal was dis
continued on the merits. Pursuant to this stipulation, a
final judgment was entered in the District Court on July
20. MSG then moved to dismiss Top Rank’s appeal from
the order denying intervention on the ground of mootness.
MSG also moved in District Court to extend the scope
of the July 15 injunction order, and on July 27, a second
order issued from the District Court enjoining Top Rank
from taking any steps to obtain injunctive relief in any
court which would interfere with the contractual rights of
MSG or would nullify the final judgment and permanent
injunction granted on July 20. Once again, Top Rank ap
pealed. By order of this Court, the three appeals were
argued together, along with MSG’s motion to dismiss.
5358
The parties have briefed and argued at length the law
covering the rights of a would-be intervenor. Because of
the peculiar posture of this case, we see no reason to par
ticipate in this vigorous discussion. Whether rightly or
wrongly, MSG contended that Top Rank had no right to
intervene and prevailed in this position in the District
Court. It then proceeded to settle its differences with
Shavers, with the result that a final judgment containing
a permanent injunction was entered by stipulation. Under
the circumstances, this judgment had no binding effect
whatever on Top Rank.
A judgment entered by consent and stipulation is bind
ing upon the consenting parties only. Raylite Electric
Corp. v. Noma Electric Corp., 170 F.2d 914, 915 (2d Gir.
1948). Moreover, it is the general rule that no one can be
bound by an in personam judgment in litigation in which
he or his privy was not a party. Hansberry v. Lee, 311
U.S. 32, 41 (1940); Williamson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
468 F.2d 1201, 1203-04 (2d Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 411 U.S.
931 (1973). Whatever may have been the relationship
between Shavers and Top Rank when the District Court
denied the latter’s application to intervene, they were ob
viously not in privity when Shavers stipulated with MSG
for entry of judgment.
With the entry of the final judgment, the life of the pre
liminary injunction came to an end, and it no longer had a
binding effect on any one. The preliminary injunction was
by its very nature interlocutory, tentative and imperma
nent. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d
738, 742 (2d Cir. 1953). The findings of fact made therein
were not controlling on the ultimate issues, and the parties
would have been free to retry these issues during the hear
ing on the merits leading to a final judgment. Imperial
Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. National Distillers & Chemical
Corp., 354 F.2d 459, 463 (2d Cir. 1965). There is therefore
5359
no basis for enjoining Top Rank from seeking injunctive
relief in the State Courts on the ground that such relief
would nullify the terms of either the preliminary injunc
tion or the final judgment. Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas
International Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84, 94 (5th Cir. 1977).
A determination by the State Court that the contract
between Shavers and Top Rank is binding and enforce
able may possibly result in an injunction prohibiting
Shavers from fighting for MSG, in which case the federal
and state injunctions will offset each other and there will be
no fight. That is, however, a determination to be made by
the courts of New York, not by this Court. We hold simply
that, under the posture of this case, the District Court
erred in enjoining Top Rank from attempting to secure
full relief in our sister court.
The appeal from the order denying Top Rank’s applica
tion to intervene is dismissed as moot. The orders enjoin
ing Top Rank from securing injunctive relief in the state
courts are reversed. Costs are awarded to neither party.
5360
480-8-22-77 USCA— 4221
MEILEN PRESS INC., 445 GREENWICH ST., NEW YORK, N. Y. 10013, (212) 966-4177
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