Motion for Remand Proceedings; Plaintiffs' Brief Supporting Motion for Remand Proceedings
Public Court Documents
October 13, 1980

26 pages
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Case Files, Bolden v. Mobile Hardbacks and Appendices. Motion for Remand Proceedings; Plaintiffs' Brief Supporting Motion for Remand Proceedings, 1980. 630e7180-cdcd-ef11-b8e8-7c1e520b5bae. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/797215f8-1c12-479a-bbe7-2d656cf1ed8e/motion-for-remand-proceedings-plaintiffs-brief-supporting-motion-for-remand-proceedings. Accessed April 27, 2025.
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BLACKSHER, MENEFEE & STEIN, P.A. ATTORNEYS AT LAw » 405 VAN ANTWERP BUILDING P. QO. BOX 1051 MOBILE, ALABAMA 36601 JAMES J. BLACKSHER TELEPHONE LARRY T. MENEFEE (205) 4323-20000 GREGURY B. STEIN October 13, 1980 Honorable William J. O'Connor Clerk, United States District Court United States District Courthouse P.O. Box 2625 Mobile, Alabama 36652 RE: Wiley L, Bolden, et. al., v. City of Mobile, Alabama, et. al.; Civil Action No. 25-297-P Dear Mr. O'Connor: Please file the enclosed Motion for Remand Proceedings and Plaintiff's Brief Supporting Motion for Remand Proceedings in connection with the above referenced case. Thank you. Best regards. Sincerely, BLACKSHER, MENEFEE & STEIN, P.A. 7) { \/ J. 8.. Blacksher JUB :nwp Encls IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION WILEY L. BOLDEN, ET. AL., * Plaintiffs, * vs. x CIVIL ACTION RO, *® 75-297-P CITY OF MOBILE, ALABAMA, x FT. Al. y o Defendants. * MOTION FOR REMAND PROCEEDINGS Plaintiffs Wiley L. Bolden, et. al., through their undersigned counsel, move the Court to enter an order establishing the following issues to be addressed on remand, for reasons whichare set out in the brief accompanying this motion: (1) Has the at-large election plan been retained for invidious racial reasons? (2) Does the at-large election plan violate the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended? (3) What remedy is appropriate in light of Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535 (1978)7 Plaintiffs further pray that the Court will establish a schedule for discovery and pretrial pro- ceedings, then conduct additional evidentiary hearings on the aforesaid issues. Respectfully submitted this 3 day of October, 1980. BLACKSHER, MENEFEE & STEIN, P.A. 405 Van Antwerp Building P.O. Box 1051 Mobile, Alabama 36633 BY: Y/ IY C,/ IT BACKER IARRY T. MENEFEE L EDWARD STILL, ESQUIRE Reeves and Still Suite 400, Commerce Center 2027 First Avenue, North Birmingham, Alabama 35203 JACK GREENBERG, ESQUIRE ERIC SCHNAPPER, ESQUIRE Suite 2030 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York .00.9 Attorneys for Plaintiffs CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - 1 do hereby certify that on this / 3 day of October, 19830, a copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR REMAND PROCEEDINGS was served upon counsel of record: Charles B. Arendall, Jr., Esquire, William C. Tidwell, 111, Esquire, Hand, Arendall, Bedsole, Greaves & Johnson, Post Office Box 123, Mobile, Alabama 36601; Fred G. Collins, Esquire, City Attorney, City Hall, Mobile, Alabama 36602; Charles S. Rhyne, Esquire, William S. Rhyne, Esquire, 1000 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 800, Washington, D. C. 20036, by depositing same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid. Shires itor IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION WILEY 1... BOLDEN, ET. AL., * Plaintiffs, V w CIVIL, ACTION NGC. CITY OF MOBILE, ALABAMA, * 75-297-P ET. AL. * Defendants. * PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF SUPPORTING MOTION FOR REMAND PROCEEDINGS EDWARD STILL J. UV. BLACKSHER Suite 400, Commerce Center LARRY T. MENEFEE 2027 First Avenue, North F. 0. Box 1051 Birmingham, Alabama 35203 Mobile, Alabama 36633 JACK GREENBERG ERIC SCHNAPPER Suite 2030 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 Attorneys for Plaintiffs IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION WILEY L. BOLDEN, ET. AL., x Plaintiffs, * V. ’ CIVIL ACTION NO. CITY OF MOBILE, ALABAMA, x 75-297-P ET, AL.. * Defendants. PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF SUPPORTING MOTION FOR REMAND PROCEEDINGS Plaintiffs Wiley L. Bolden, et. al. through their undersigned counsel, submit this memorandum brief in support of their motion for further proceedings on remand. I. THE CASE IS NOT OVER: ON REMAND THIS COURT MUST DECIDE THE 1S5SUE OF INTENT, ADDRESS THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT CLAIM, AND REEXAMINE THE REMEDY On remand to the Fifth Circuit, the Defendants vigorously contended that under the Supreme Court's man- date the case was over. ''Defendants argue that all issues in this case have been finally settled and that no further proceedings are appropriate.’ 1/ They urged the Court of Appeals to remand the case to this Court ‘with instructions to enter a judgment for the Defendants." 2 / App. A, p. 21. Both Plaintiffs 2.4 and the United States 3/ as Amicus Curiae,= on the other hand, took the position that the Supreme Court had left open the question of main- tenance intent and the claim under §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.8.C. 31973. They urged the Pirth Circuit 1/ Defendants' Brief In Opposition To Plaintiffs’ Motion For Further Proceedings On Remand, pp. 1-2. A copy of said brief is attached to this brief as Appendix A. 2/ See Appendix B, Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Brief Supporting Motion For Additional Proceedings On Remand. 3/ See Appendix C, Memorandum For the United States As Amicus Curiae. to remand the case with instructions for this Court to conduct additional proceedings. App. B, p. 24; App. C, pp. 16-18. On September 15, 1980, the Fifth Circuit ruled as Plaintiffs and the United States had suggested; it vacated this Court's judgment and remanded "for further proceedings in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in Clty of Mobile v, Bolden, 64 1 ud. 24 47. 100 3.Ct. 1490 (1980) ." We understand that Defendants will persist in this Court with their contention that the case ought to be dismissed summarily. They probably will argue that the only "further proceedings" permitted by the mandates of the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court are dismissal and restoration of the status quo ante judgment. Plaintiffs contend that this argument was squarely rejected by the Court of Appeals; otherwise, its mandate would have reversed this Court's judgment and directed dismissal explicitly -- as Defendants had urged. E.g., See cases cited App. C, pp. 7-3, 10-11, A. The Intent Issue We will not attempt to paraphrase the extensive arguments to the Pifth Circuit of Plaintiffs and the United States concerning the meaning of the Supreme Court's mandate. the appendices to this brief. App. B, pp. 9-14; App. op. 711. Justice Powell's recent opinion denying a stay of the A z &E J Mobile School Board elections. Moore v. Brown. 49 U. ? 1..W. 3162 (Sept. 3, 1980). "That opinion leaves no We urge this Court to review them in C Compare App. A, 2-20. 'In addition, we cite 8. doubt that Plaintiffs, the United States ‘and the Fifth Circuit have correctly interpreted the Supreme Court's mandate in Bolden: Justice Powell, who was a member 49 U.S.L.W. at 3162 (emphasis added) Last Term, in City of Mobile v. Bolden, No. 77-1844 (April 22, 1980) this Court considered a constitutional challenge to Mobile's system of at- large elections for City Commissioners. Mr. Justice Stewart wrote for a plu- rality of four justices and concluded that the plaintiffs were required to prove a racially discriminatory purpose to show that Mobile's at-large voting system violated the Fourteenth Amend- ment. The District Court, by contrast, had thought it sufficient to show that the existing election system had the effect of impeding the election of blacks. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had affirmed, Because we disagreed with the analysis of the District Court and Cour¥T of Appeals, we reversed and remanded for further proceedings. JoAfn, omitted). of Thus, Justice Powell himself understood the plurality opinion as being based solely on an effect-only reading of the lower court decisions. He clearly infers what fn. 21 makes explicit: that the plurality did not reach and decide the question of whether intent had been proved by standards other than those in Zimmer. He states explicitly that the intent question must be re- Nor did the District Court explain how the plaintiffs would prove a purposeful plurality's « 49 U.S.L.W. at 3162 (emphasis added). The inescapable implication of this statement is that the intent issue has Deen left open for consideration in Bolden as well. Aside from the language of the Supreme Court's mandate, it would be fundamentally unfair to foreclose reconsideration of the evidence in this case under the new intent standard. 8 to 1, chat proof of a racial intent in the retention of at-large elections under the Arlington Heights - Feeney standards establishes a violation of the fourteenth amend- Ll Li " " i gy 7 . - . . ment. of The Court concluded, 5 to 4 .e all justices LA but the plurality), that such intent had been proved on this record.2/ The only reason this alignment did not result in affirmance of the liability issues (with reversal of the remedy pursuant to Justice Blackmun's opinion) is that Justice Stevens believed race had to be the sole motive -- an extreme position rejected by the other eight Justices. 4/ City of Mobile v. Bolden, 48 U.S.L.W. 4436, 4438-39 (Stewart, Burger, Powell and Rehnquist), 4443 (Blackmun) 4446 (Brennan), 4448 (White), 4458 (Marshall) (1980). , J 2/ 48 U.S.L.W. at 4446 (Stevens), 4443 (Blackmun) , 4446 (Brennan), 4449 (White). 4458 (Marshall). As stated in fn. 21, the plurality did not reach this issue. . A Presumably, if another case identical to Bolden came before the Supreme Court now, Justice Stevens would agree that a constitutional violation existed, accepting on stare decisis grounds the 8 to 1 rejection of his all-or- nothing position. Therefore, if this Court accepted the Defendants' argument that the case must be dismissed without further consideration of the intent issue, facts which would establish an unconstitutional condition if presented anew to the Supreme Court would escape judicial review altogether because of a procedural quirk. For sure, the Supreme Court need not have a majority reason for its reversal and remand, but the lower courts must be governed on each issue by the justices' majority view on each issue. It is unthinkable that the mandate of a Supreme Court so deeply and disjointedly divided could be construed to preclude plenary consideration of at-large elections in Mobile under correct legal standards. Finally, common sense dictates the anwer to this threshhold question. If this Court should dismiss the case without further proceedings on the merits, an appeal would refer right back to the Fifth Circuit this very narrow procedural issue. If the Fifth Circuit had been inclined to read the Supreme Court's mandate as requiring such summary disposition it would not have left open this possibility; it would have accepted the Defendants’ argument and directed dismissal in the remand. B. The Voting Rights Act Claim The Supreme Court did not decide (a) whether pri- vate litigants have a cause of action to challenge at-large election schemes under §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.85.C. §1973. or (b) whether §2 demands proof of racial intent. Only the plurality opinion discussed the statutory issues. 1t did not reach the pri- vate cause of action question, 48 U.S.L.W. at 4437 and nn. 3 , but, assuming one was available, it concluded that §2 required the same proof as does the fifteenth amendment. 48°U.5.1..W. at 4437. Because the other five justices disagreed with the plurality's narrow construction of the fifteenth amendment and made no reference at all to the Voting Rights Act, the lower courts must consider the statutory issues afresh and without specific guidance from the Supreme Court. The only thing that seems certain 1s the pluralitv's admonition that the statutorv issues P 3 should be considered before reaching the constitutional claims. 1d. Regarding the availability of a private cause of action, footnote 8 of the Bolden plurality opinion refers to Allen v. Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); TransAmerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 51 L.Ed. 2d 1979); and Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, ‘61 L.Ed 2d 82 (1979). Allen held that there is a private cause of action to enforce §5 of the Voting Rights Act. The latter two cases applied to non-civil rights statutes the standards of the two bellweather decisions on implied causes of action, Cannon v. University of Chicago, 60 L.Ed. 2d 560 (1979), and Cort v., Ash, 422 U.8. 66 (1973). These standards leave little doubt that there is a private cause of action toenforce §2 as well as §5 of the Voting Rights Act. Cannon, which construed §901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §1681., is indis- tinguishable from the instant case. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, like Title IX of the Education Amend- ments of 1972, "presents the atypical situation in which all of the circumstances that the Court has previously identified as supportive of an implied [private] remedy are present.” 60 L.Ed. 24 at 587. Both statutes were enacted for the benefit of a special class, id. at 371, and both employ "the right- or duty- creating language [which] has generally been the most accurate indicator of the propriety of implication of a cause of action.” .1d. at 571 mn. 12. Indeed, Cannon refers directly to the special class of black citizens protected by §2 and to Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, supra, which found a private right to relief under its sister provision, $5. 1d. ac 5371. Thus, §2 prohibits certain conduct and creates federal rights in favor of private parties in supra. Cannon, 60 L.Ed. 24 at 572, n. 13. The availability of private relief under §2 is supported by the legislative history of the Voting Rights Act. The House Report accompanying the 1965 bill described the purpose of $2 as "grant{ing] to all citizens of the United States a right to be free from [racially discrimin- atory voting practices}. House Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., June 1, 1965, reprinted in 2 U.S. Code, Congressional and Administrative News 2437, 2454 (1965) (emphasis added). The Act expressly authorized the Attorney General to enforce § 2. 42 U.S.C. 19733 (4d). The Attorney General was the only person expressly authorized to enforce §5 as well, but the Supreme Court nevertheless held that a private cause of action based on 35 was inferred in the statute. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, supra. By direct analogy, Allen had to mean there was a private cause of action under §2 also. Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 201, 237 (3th Cir. 1978) (J. Wisdom concurring), cert. denied, «i H1980)", Congress removed all doubt in 1975 As originally enacted, the Act's scheme gave primary enforcement responsi- bility to the Attorney General. States covered by §4's it automatic ''trigger' had to seek the Attorney General's approval before implementing new voting laws, or else seek preclearance in the District Court for the District of Columbia, 42 U.S.C. §1973¢c. Other states and sub- divisions could be subjected to similar preclearance requirements under §3 if the Attorney General obtained an injunction in the local federal district court against practices the Attorney General proved were violating fede- rally protected voting rights. Section 3 was called the "pocket trigger’, because it was aimed at "pockets of discrimination" not already covered by §4. House Rep. No. 439, supra, 2 U.S. Code, Congressional and Admin. The 1975 amendments to the Act substituted "Attorney General or an aggrieved person' for "Attorney General' everywhere it appeared in §3. The Senate Report explained that this change was intended to create a ''dual enforcement mechanism,' that is, "to afford to private parties the same remedies which §3 now affords only to the Attorney General." Sen. Rep. No. 94-295, 94th Cong., July 22, 19735, reprinted in 2 U.S. Code, Conzressional and Admin. News, 774, 806-07 (1975). The proponenets of this amendment made it clear that a private action was to be available under §2 for the purpose of providing : tly i LLG the special §3 remedies. Finally, at least one district court has squarely held that §2 of the Voting Rights Act affords black voters the right to seek judicial relief. McMillan v. Fscambia County, No. PCA 77-0432 (W.D.FPla. 1978) (J. Arnow), appeal pending, No. 78-3507 (5th Cir.). Whether §2 requires proof of racial intent need not be decided at this time. If this Court holds that the at-large City Commission election system has been retained, at least in part, for racial reasons, a clear violation of §2 will have been established. United States v. Uvalde 6/ Congressman Drinan, for example, noted that private ~ actions could be "based ... upon statutes pursuant to [the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments], such as 42 U.S.C. $1971, 1973, 1983." 121 Cong. Rec. H 4734 (daily ed. June 2, 1973), -1]1- consolidated Indep. School Dist., 625 F.2d 347 (1980). If no such purpose is found, Plaintiffs will still con-~ tend that the at-large elections violate §2 based solely on their previously determined adverse racial effects. For the time being, we will limit our arguments on this point to the following brief statements. While the Voting Rights Act employs a variety of procedures and remedies, it has but a single substantive standard. It is most explicitly stated in $5, which prohibits states covered by §4's automatic trigger from enforcing a new law unless the state proves that it "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." Section 2, which contains broader but similar language, should be read in pari materia with this part Of §5. See Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243-44 (1973). The only difference between actions brought under §5 and those based on §§2 and 3 is that the (auto- matically covered) state has the burden of proof under the former section, while the Attorney General or private plaintiff has the burden of proof under §§2 and 3. As Senator Scott of Virginia stated: Substantially all the rights that are in the temporary legislation are in the permanent legislation of the Voting Rights Act. The principal difference refers to the burden of proof. Under the perma- nent provision of law, the Govern- ment must prove its case. Under the temporary provision of the law there is a presumption of wrong- doing that has to be overcome by the state covered by the temporary provisons.// If §§2 and 5 contained different substantive standards, a number of clearly unintended anomalies would result. Practices forbidden in §5 jurisdictions would be permissable in other states, even if they had the same discriminatory purpose or effect. Even within a state covered by §4 the same election law with the same purpose or effect could be unlawful in one town but not in another based solely on when each put it in operation. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 394-95 (1971). Congressional moderates who supported the Voting Rights Act because the sponsors assured them 7/ 121 Cong. Ree. 513549 (Daily ed. July 24. 1975); see =~ also id. S 13601 (remarks of Sen. Scott) (82 is the permanent provision referred to); S$13376 (remarks of Sen. Brock) (§5 establishes a different "procedure’ than exists in non-covered jurisdictions). that the Southern states were being singled out only in the sense of requiring close procedural scrutiny of them, and that the Act provided the same underlying voting rights to all U. S. citizens, would be appalled if the courts were to conclude that §5 states had to meet a tougher substantive standard then did other states. That the use of at-large elections may have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote under the substantive standard of §5 has been repeatedly recognized by the Supreme Court. City of Rome v. United States, 100 8.Ctc. 1348, 1559 (1980); City of Richmond United States, 422 U.S. 338, 371 (1975); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 532-35 .(1973): Perkins Marthews, 400 U.S. 379, 383-91 (1971). Thus, the bur~- den on §2 plaintiffs as well is to prove that an at-larg system ''create[s] or enhances] the power of the white majority to exclude Negroes totally from participation in the governing of the city through membership on the city council.” The legislative history of the Voting Rights Act reveals that early versions of some sections referred solely to discriminatory "effect" or only to e discriminatory ''purpose', 8/ but that in every case Congress redrafted the section to cover both purpose and effect. Whenever Congress spelled out the relevant evidentiary standard under the Voting Rights Act, it re- fused to exclude either discriminatory purpose or discrimin- atory effect. Since each of these subsequent sections is intended to enforce the broadly worded, basic guarantees of §2, their purpose or effect standards clearly express 8/ As originally drafted §5 applied to practices with a discriminatory effect, but not a discriminatory purpose... S, 1564, § 8, 111 Cong. Rec. 28358... It was broadened to include both by the Senate Judiciary Committee. 111 Cong. Rec. 28360. Section 4, which describes when a jurisdiction can remove itself from coverage of §5, initially referred to denials of the right to vote '"by reason of race”. §. 1564, 111 Cong. Rec. 28358. It was changed by the Senate Committee to refer to tests or devices used "for the purpose’ of denying the right to vote "on account of race”, $5. 1564, §4(a), 111 Cong. Rec. 28360, but was modified on the floor to include discriminatory effect. 111 Cong. Rec. 28365. The pocket trigger in §3(b) referred to discriminatory purpose in the Senate version, 111 Cong. Rec. 28360, but the House bill included discriminatory effect as well and that version was adopted by the Conference Committee. 111 Cong. Rec. 28370; H. Rep. No. 711, 89th Cong., lst Sess,., PD. %. Challenges by the Attorney General to the use of tests or devices by jurisdictions which had bailed out under §4 at first were required to show discriminatory purpose, 111 Cong. Rec. 28360, but this too was amended to cover discriminatory effect. Id. at 28365, 28370. Congress' understanding of the §2's evidentiary require- ments as well. IL. ADDITIONAL EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ON THE ISSUE CF INTENT This Court should reopen the record and receive such additional evidence as the parties may wish to pre- sent on the issue left open by the Supreme Court: whether Mobile's at-large election system has been retained, at least in part, for racially discriminatory reasons, As previously discussed, the Supreme Court plurality declined to consider what Plaintiffs had argued were findings of racial intent by this Court over and beyond its Zimmer analysis. To avoid redundancy, we attach to this brief as Appendix {B] Plaintiffs’ remand brief to the Fifth Circuit, which summarizes at pages 14-22 the evidence we thought this Court had relied on to con- clude that the legislature had refused to change from at-large voting for racial reasons. The City, on the ~ other hand, told the Supreme Court that this Court's intent findings were based entirely on its Zimmer analysis and on an erroneous legal theory that foreseeability 2/ alone proves motive. The evidence of racial intent upon which the District Court below ordered a new City administrative structure and on which the Court of Appeals affirmed the disestablishment of Mobile's Commission form of govern- ment, was that the Alabama Legislature had on two occasions rejected authori- zation of a mayor-council, part single- member district system for Mobile, and had been conscious of the likeli- hood that such a measure would have enhanced black candidates' chances of election. App. B, p. 11 (emphasis added). Moreover, the City argued, only the motives of city commissioners are rele- - : ; : / vant in this case, not those of the legislators—2 App. B, P. 13. In the remand proceedings, this Court should clarify its earlier findings on intent and consider all the evidence anew under the Arlington Heights - Feeney Y/ Attached to this brief as Appendix D is a copy of - the City's reply brief in the Supreme Court. 10 In this respect, the City's position is directly ~~ the opposite that of the School Board, who contends that only the legislators' motives are relevant, not those of the school commissioners. Plaintiffs contend that the proper inquiry addresses the intent of all state officials who substantially influenced the legis- lative decision to block change to district elections. Wl standards developed subsequent to this Court's ruling. We will not now elaborate on our prior discussion of the existing evidence. But there is one point that should be reemphasized: the Arlington Heights - Feeney analysis does not require or even encourage the trial court to focus on any single legislative event; rather, invidious intent should be found or not found only after careful consideration of the whole series of events, historical and contemporary, that underlie the present electoral scheme. 111. THE REMEDY SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED If on reconsideration this court determines that the City's at-large election scheme is unlawful or unconsti- tutional, it should also reconsider the relief ordered in light of the intervening Supreme Court decision, Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 533 (1978). Briefly put, the legislature should be given a reasonable opportunity to devise its own timely remedy. If no legislative plan is forthcoming, the Court must order its own single-member district plan into effect. In the latter event, this Court -18- should notice Justice Blackmun's criticisms (with which none of the other justices disagreed) of a judicially ordered change in the form of government. If district elections can be imposed on the commission form, the Court should defer to Mobile's preference for commission form of government. Such relief is made more plausible in view of Justice Blackmun's opinion and because the Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit made it clear that Mobile can no longer conduct elections for predesignated executive functions under the 1965 law, which the Justice Department refused to preclear. 48 U.S5.L.W. at 4437 n.6; 571 FP. 248 ar 241, un.2. CONCLUSION The Fifth Circuit's mandate does not permit this Court to dismiss the case without first reconsidering the issues left undecided by the Supreme Court: (1) Has the at-large election plan been retained for invidious racial reasons? (2) Does the at-large election plan violate the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended? (3) What remedy is appropriate in light of Wise v. Lipscomb? The Court should receive such additional evidenc on these issues as the parties may offer Respectfully submitted this los day of October, BLACKSHER, MENEFEE & STEIN, P.A. 405 Van Antwerp Building P. 0. Box 1051 Mobile, Alabama 36633 ) //] NY: f BY, YL \/ p 4 lz {.. v jd reste fiffecti Za ARRY T. MENEFEE EDWARD STILL, ESQUIRE Reeves and Still Suite 400 Commerce Center 2027 Fi st AVenue, North ri Wel Alabama 35203 JACK GREENBERG ERIC SCHNAPPER Suite 2030 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 Attorneys for Plaintiffs CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I do hereby certify that on this [/.3 day of October, 1980, a copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF SUPPORTING MOTION FOR REMAND PROCEEDINGS was served upon counsel of record: Charles B. Arendall, Jr., Esquire, William C. Tidwell, III, Esquire, Hand, Arendall, Bedsole, Greaves & Johnson, Post Office Box 123, Mobile, Alabama 36601; Fred G. Collins, Esquire, City Attorney, City Hall, Mobile, Alabama 36602; Charles S. Rhyne, Esquire, William S. Rhyne, Esquire, 1000 Connecticut Avenue, N. W., Suite 800, Washington. D. C. 20036, by depositing same in the United States mail, postage prepaid. / J } 0 4 9) TA { I» {LH (/RKTTORNEY FOR P PLA INTIFFS Zl