Margaret v. Edwards Minute Entry; Order; Correspondence from Larson to Menefee Re Fee Application in Margaret v. Treen; Court Documents Re: Award of Attorney's Fees; Affidavits and Time Records (Redacted)

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MINUTE ENTRY 
STR ER R [TRY 

L X 

January 13, 1981 RELY oii. opDa 
COLLINS, J. clengh 

MARGARET S., ET Al. CIVIL ACTION 

VERSUS NO. 78-2765 

EDWIN W. EDWARDS, ET AL. SECTION "C" 

This matter came on for hearing on October 22, 1980, on 

the motion of counsel for plaintiffs seeking attorneys’ 

fees, pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards 

Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §1988, in the following amounts: 

counsel fees of $146,602.50; prrilessl and law clerk fees of 

$5,375.00; and costs of $6,532.06. 

WHEREFORE, after due ccnsideration of the arguments of 

counsel, the submitted memoranda, accompanied by the attached 

exhibits and affidavits, and the applicable law, the Court 

will and hereby does GRANT the motion of counsel for plaintiffs. 

The Court will and hereby does ORDER that defendants pay as 

costs of these proceedings the following amounts in attorneys’ 

fees, paralegal and law clerks' fees, and costs: Ms. Janet 

Benshoof, Esq. shall receive counsel fees in the amount of 

$25,300.00; Ms. Judith Levin, Esq. shall receive counsel 

fees in the amount of $20,900.00; Ms. Ellen Leitzer, Esq. 

shall receive counsel fees in the amount of $8,540.00; Mr. 

George M. Strickler, Jr., Esq. shall receive counsel fees in 

the amount of $2,720.00; paralegal and law clerks' fees 

shall be paid in the amount of $3,550.00; and costs shall be 

paid in the amount of $6,532.06. 

CCAD. / yr An re 
TED STATES DISTRICT gland 

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REASONS 
  

‘Counsel for plaintiffs seek attorneys' fees, law clerks’ 

fees, and costs from defendants, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§1988, the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976. 

That statute provides in pertinent part: '"In any action or 

proceeding to enforce a provision of [United States Code] 

sections 1981, 1982, 1983. 1985, and 1986 of this title, 

ticle IX of Public Law 92-318, ... the court, in its discretion, 
  

may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's 
  

fee as part of costs." 42 U.S.C. §1988 (emphasis added). 

Plaintiffs in this matter brought suit pursuant to £2 1.8.0. 

§1983, and the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the Constitution, alleging that the Louisiana 

statutes regulating abortion, La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §40:1299.35.1, 

et seg., 1978 La. Acts, No. 435§1, were unconstitutional. 

Plaintiffs further alleged that these statutes deprived a 

woman of her constitutional right to obtain an abortion, 

under color of state law. 

A complaint seeking a temporary restraining order was 

filed on August 22, 1978. On September 7, 1978, the Court 

granted plaintiffs' application for a temporary restraining 

order. On September 15, 1978, by agreement of counsel, the 

restraining order was extended until such time as the Court 

rendered a decision on the merits. The hearing of the 

preliminary injunction was consolidated with trial on the 

merits, which commenced on October 18, 1978. ‘Trial was held 

on October 18th-20th, 25th-28th, November 20th-22nd, and 

November 28th. Final arguments were heard on December 13, 

1978. .50n January 9, 1979, “the Court certified two classes 

with Margaret S. and Dr. Roy C. Wood as named representatives 

of their respected classes. Post-trial briefs were filed on 

March 5, 1979. Prior to the preparation of post-trial 

briefs, counsel for plaintiffs and defendants noted discrep- 

ancies in their recollection of the testimony given at  



® e 
trial and the transcript which they received from the Court 

Reporter. It was subsequently determined that the transcript 

contained major errors. On May 23, 1979, the Court granted 

plaintiffs’ motion to correct the record. On July 12, 1979, 

the Court similarly granted defendants' motion to correct 

the record. On March 3, 1980, the Court entered judgment in 

plaintiffs' favor, holding that approximately fifteen sections 

of the Louisiana statutes regulating abortion were untonsti- 

tutional, in violation of 42 U.S.C. $1983, and the First, 

Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. 

Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F.Supp. 181 (E.D. la. 1930) 
  

(Margaret S.). On August 29, 1980, counsel for plaintiffs   

filed the instant motion seeking fees, and the motion was 

heard on October 22, 1980. 

In the motion for fees, counsel for plaintiffs seek 

counsel fees, paralegal and law clerks' fees, and costs. 

Affidavits have been submitted characterizing and describing 

the tasks performed by each attorney, the number of hours 

each attorney worked, and the rates at which compensation is 

requested. The affidavits also describe each attorney's 

past work experiences and the relevance of such experience 

to the instant case. The affidavit of Ms. Janet Benshoof, 

Esq. sets forth that in 1978, she worked 281 hours; in 1979, 

she worked 164 hours; and in 1980, she worked 23 hours, for 

a total of 468 hours overall. Benshoof requests payment at 

the rate of $90 per hour for work performed in 1978; $100 

per hour for work performed in 1979; and $115 per hour for 

work performed in 1980. Benshoof seeks a total of $44,335.00 

in counsel fees. The affidavit of Ms. Judith Levin, Esq. 

sets forth that in 1978 she worked 246.5 hours; in 1979 she 

worked 137 hours; and in 1980 she worked 8 hours, for a 

total of 391.5 hours. Levin seeks the same hourly rate of 

compensation as Benshoof: $90 per hour for 1978, $100 per 

hour for 1979, and $115 per hour for 1980. Levin seeks a  



total of $36,805.00 in counsel fees. The affidavit of Mr. 

George M. Strickler, Jr., Esq. sets forth that he worked 34 

hours in 1978 and seeks compensation at the rate of $80 per 

hour, a total of $2,720.00 in counsel fees. The affidavit 

of Ms. Ellen Leitzer, Esq. sets forth that she worked a 

total of 185 hours and seeks compensation at the rate of $75 

per hour, a total of $13,875.00 in counsel 250v. The total 

amount of counsel fees sought is $97,735.00. Additiomally, 

counsel seek the application of a multiplier of 1.5 to the 

counsel fees award because of such factors as the complexity 

of the case, the significance of the statutes at issue 

herein, the undesirability of this case, and the benefits 

reaped by the women of Louisiana from plaintiffs' successful 

litigation. Applying a 1.5 multiplier to the total counsel 

fees of $97,735.00, counsel seeks a grand total of $146.602.50 

in counsel fees. 

Counsel for plaintiffs also seek fees for work performed 

by a paralegal and law clerks and for costs expended in the 

prosecution of this cause. The affidavit of Patricia Arthur 

sets forth that she worked 55 hours on this case as a law 

clerk for Levin. The affidavit of Peggy B. Rosenthal sets 

forth that she worked 100 hours on this case as a law clerk 

for Benshoof and Levin. In paragraph 12 of Benshoof's 

affidavit, Benshoof sets forth that Lourdes Soto, a certified 

paralegal employed by the Reproductive Freedom Project of 

the American Civil Liberties Union, worked a total of 60 

hours on this case. Counsel for plaintiffs seek an award of 

$25 per hour for the 215 hours of work performed by a paralegal 

and law clerks, a total of $5,375.00. Finally, counsel seek 

the sum of $6,532.06 for expenses incurred in litigating 

this cause. The total amount of fees and costs counsel for 

plaintiffs seek, including the 1.5 multiplier for counsel 

fees, is $158,509.56. 2 

The criteria a district court must weigh in determining 

an appropriate award of attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.  



§1988 have been clearly set forth by the Fifth Circuit Court 

of Appeals in Johnson v. Georgia Highwav Express, Inc., 488 
  

F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974) (Johnson), and more recently, 

in Rainey v. Jackson State College, 551 F.2d 672, 676-77 
  

(5chi Cir. 1977). The factors the district court must 

consider include: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the 

novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill 

requisite to perform legal services properly; (4) therspre- 

clusion of other employment caused by counsels' participation 

in the case at bar; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the 

fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by 

the circumstances; (8) the importance of the litigated 

issues; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of 

counsel; (10) the undesirability of ‘the case; (11) the 

nature and length of the professional relationship with the 

client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Johnson, 488 F.2d 

at 717-19. 

The time and labor required to litigate this cause is 

the first factor the Court must evaluate. Benshoof, Levin, 

and Leitzer are attorneys employed by the New York Office of 

the American Civil Liberties Union (A.C.L.U.). Strickler 

served as local counsel for the A.C.L.U. in this case. As 

previously stated; the affidavits submitted by New York 

counsel state that Benshoof worked 468 hours; Levin, 391.5 

hours; and Leitzer, 185 hours. The Court concludes that a 

distinction should be made between hours worked in trial and 

hours worked in preparation for and after trial. See Johnson, 
  

488 F.2d at 717. The Court has carefully reviewed the time 

sheets submitted by counsel. The following figures represent 

counsels' in-court and out-of-court hours: Benshoof, 88 

hours in court, 380 hours out of court; Levin, 26.5 hours in 

court, 365 hours out of court; Leitzer, zero hours in 

court, 185 hours out of cout 

The Court is concerned by the possibility of duplication 

of effort in this case. Benshoof and Levin were both in 

court and in conferences a number of times when the presence  



of only one attorney was necessary. Additionally, Benshoof 

and Levin's hours include time for travel to and from New 

Orleans. The Court is also concerned with the out-of-court 

hours submitted by New York counsel. As counsel for defen- 

dants point out, the issues raised in this case were similar 

to those briefed by Ohio counsel for A.C.L.U. in the case of 

Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v, Akron, 479 
  

F.Supp. 1172 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (Akron). The statute oonstrued 

in the Akron case was almost identical to the Louisiana 

statute construed by this Court. The Court is of the opinion 

that counsel in Margaret S. had access to the briefs and 
  

other research memoranda submitted by Ohio A.C.L.U. counsel 

in the Akron case. Rather than review each individual task 

identified by affiants to determine whether duplication 

exists, the Court is convinced that an overall percentage 

reduction of hours would be a more practical means of dealing 

with these problems. Therefore, the Court will authorize 

payment of fees for New York A.C.L.U. counsel in the amount 

of 66%, or two-thirds of the hours they have submitted. 

This reduction permits New York counsel to obtain fees for the 

following number of hours: Benshoof, 58 hours in court, 251 

hours out of court; Levin, 18 hours in court, 241 hours out 

of court; leitzer, zero hours in court, 122 hours out of court. 

The fourth attorney who has submitted a request for 

fees is local counsel, George M. Strickler, Jr. His affidavit 

specifically sets forth the tasks accomplished and requests 

compensation for 34 hours of out-of-court work. The court 

is aware of Strickler's efforts in this matter and considers 

the amount of hours for which he seeks payment to be both 

reasonable and fair. The Court will therefore authorize 

payment of fees for 34 hours of out-of-court work performed 

by Strickler in this case. 

In determining the rate ‘of fees to be awarded to counsel, 

the other Johnson factors, taken as a whole, are relevant to 

the Court's decision. The Court recognizes that the issues 

ot  



construed in Margaret S. were novel and difficult. As 
  

counsel for plaintiffs point out in their memoranda, many of 

the issues were undecided at the time final arguments were 

made in December of 1978. While the case was under submission, 

the Supreme Court rendered two important decisions having a 

direct impact on the issues presented by the Louisiana 

statute: Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (Colautti) 
  

  

and Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti)’. 

This Court relied on both of these cases in its opinion. 

Colautti dealt with the significant issue of viability, see 

Margaret S., 488 F.Supp. at 197-200, and Bellotti was a 
  

major statement by the Supreme Court on the issue of a 

minor's access to abortion. See Margaret S., 483 F.Supp. at 
  

202-05. The Supreme Court's resolution of these major 

problems in the period while Margaret S. was under submission 
  

attests to the novel and difficult questions confronted by 

counsel for plaintiffs in litigating this case. 

The third and fourth Johnson factors are the skill 

requisite to perform legal services properly and the pre- 

clusion of other employment. The Court is of the opinion 

that all counsel for plaintiffs demonstrated ample skill in 

the performance of their work, both in court and out of 

court. Trial counsel, Benshoof and Levin, presented factual 

evidence and testimony highly relevant to this Court's 

opinion. See Margaret S., 488 F.Supp. at 194-96 (dilation 
  

and evacuation method of abortion up to eighteenth week of 

pregnancy is safer than childbirth). Additionally, counsels’ 

briefs were on point, persuasive, and adequately highlighted 

the issues relevant to the Court's decision-making process. 

Based upon my experiences at the Bar and at the Bench, I 

commend all plaintiffs' counsel for their efforts. As for 

the preclusion of other employment, this factor is more 

subjective and more difficult to evaluate. The Court does 

recognize, however, that in the period from September through 

December, 1978, it would have been difficult for Benshoof 

and Levin to have taken on other significant employment.  



Counsel for plaintiffs have made available to the Court 

many opinions wherein fees were awarded for work analogous 

to the efforts put forward herein. Generally, district 

courts have awarded higher fees for in-court work as compared 

with out-of-court work. These fees range from $100 per hour 

to $60 per hour. See Donaldson v. O'Connor, No. TCA 1693 
  

(Mar, 19, 1930; N.D. Fla.); Emma GC. v. Edwards, No. 77-1342 
  

(April 24, 1979; E.D. La.); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of 
  

Kansas City, Mo. v. Ashcroft, No. 79-4142 (May 7, 1980; VW.D. 
  

Mo.); Crawford v. Roadway Express, Inc., No. 78-1311 (June 
  

9, 1980; W.D. La.). New York counsel in this case have 

relvested that their fees be set at New York shandaids 

rather than Louisiana standards. The Court declines this 

request and will instead fashion a fee scale which reflects 

local rates. Counsel have also requested an enhancement of 

their attorneys' fees by a multiplier of 1.5. The Court 

notes that the exact language of 42 U.S.C. §1988 permits the 

exercise of the Court's discretion to allow the Prevelling 

party "a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 
  

42 U.S.C. §1988 (emphasis added). The Court is also mindful 

of the admonition of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals: 

"[C]ourts must remember that they do not have a mandate 

to make the prevailing counsel rich." Johnson, 488 F.2d at 

719. The Court considers an enhancement of fees to be 

unreasonable in this case and will exercise its discretion 

to deny a 1.5 multiplier of counsels' fees. 

Taking into consideration the other factors identified 

in Johnson, such as the importance of the issues involved 

and the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, 

the Court will award the following fees to counsel: Benshoof, 

Levin, and Strickler, $80 per hour for out-of-court work, 

$90 per heurifor in-court work; Leitzer, $70 per hour for 

out-of-court work. These rates are based upon the experience 

and ability of each attorney. Benshoof received her Juris 

% T  



Doctor degree from Harvard Law School in 1972 and is a 

member of the state bar of New York. Since April 1977, she 

has served as the Director of the Reproductive Freedom 

Project of the A.C.L.U. and has specialized in litigating 

abortion cases throughout the United States. Levin received 

her Juris Doctor degree from Rutgers Law School in 1973 and 

is a member of the state bar of New York. She has served as 

an attorney with the Reproductive Freedom Project of fhe 

A.C.L.U. since 1978. Levin has also litigated many abortion 

cases throughout the United States. The Court was highly 

impressed with the quality and thoroughness of these attorneys’ 

work and is convinced that the fees awarded to them, based 

on prevailing Louisiana standards, recognizes the quality of 

their combined work product. The Court is aware of Strickler's 

reputation as an outstanding practitioner in the field of 

constitutional and civil rights litigation. Strickler was 

admitted to the state bar of Louisiana in 1969. He has 

requested an hourly fee of $80 per hour. His expertise and 

long years of activity in this and other related legal areas 

were similarly recognized in Crawford v. Roadway Express, Inc., 
  

No. 78-1311 (June 9, 1980; W.D. La.) at p.5.. The award to 

Strickler is one of the factors the Court considered in 

setting an $80 per hour rate for out-of-court work performed 

by Benshoof and Levin. Finally, the Court has fixed Leitzer's 

fee at $70 per hour for out-of-court work. Leitzer received 

her Juris Doctor from Emory Law School in 1974 and is a 

member of the state bar of Georgia and the bar of the District 

of Columbia. She has less experience in the field of abortion 

litigation, when compared with Benshoof and Levin, as Leitzer 

has primarily served as an A.C.L.U. staff attorney on the 

national level and in the Georgia A.C.L.U. of firs, 

Counsel for plaintiffs haye also requested an award for 

paralegal and law clerks' fees and for costs incurred in the 

  

litigation of Margaret S. The total amount of hours submitted 

for law clerks and paralegal work is 215 hours. The Court  



& " 

will reduce this figure by 33% or one-third, for reasons 

previously stated, leaving a total of 142 hours. Counsel 

have requested compensation at the rate of $25 per hour for 

law clerks and paralegal work. The Court considers this to 

be reasonable and will award fees at that rate. See 

Donaldson v. O'Connor, No, TCA 1693 (March 19, 19380, N.D. 
  

Fla.) at p.l4. Counsel has requested reimbursement in the 

amount of $6,532.06 for costs incurred in Visteation The 

Court has scrutinized the individually listed costs and 

considers them to be both fair and reasonable. The Court 

will therefore award counsel for plaintiffs $6,532.06 for 

costs, 

The Court is of the opinion that remaining factors 

discussed in Johnson are less relevant to the Court's decision 

awarding fees in this case. Because this case began with a 

prayer for injunctive relief, time limitations were imposed 

upon counsel by the Court and by the rules of procedure 

governing injunctions. The case went to trial less than two 

months after the initial application for temporary injunctive 

relief. There can be no doubt that weighty issues were 

involved and that the results obtained by plaintiffs’ counsel 

were very favorable for their clients. The .Court considered 

this factor in fashioning the fee schedule. The Court is 

also mindful of the fact that this case was an undesirable 

one. Discussion of abortion often triggers highly charged, 

emotional debate rather than the more rational, scholarly 

tone of legal argument usually encountered by the Court in 

deciding constitutional issues. Two of the Johnson factors 

can not be evaluated by the Court: whether the fee is fixed 

or .contingent, and. the nature and length of the professional 

relationship with the client. The Court notes that the New 

York office of the A.C.L.U. has successfully represented one 

of the plaintiffs, Delta Women's Clinic, .in prior litigation 

in this district. See Emma G. v. Edwards, 434 F. Supp. 1048 
   



6. R 
(E.D. La. 1977). However, the Court does not consider this 

factor to be relevant in the award of attorneys' fees in 

this case. 

Accordingly, for the reasons aforestated, the Court, in 

its discretion, will award counsel for plaintiffs the 

following fees, which are both reasonable and fair, con- 

sidering the amount of work done and the quality of cpunsels' 

endeavors: 

Janet Benshoof, Esq. - in-court hours, 58 at $90 
per hour or $5,220.00; out-of-court hours, 
251 at $80 per hour or $20,080.00; total - 
$25,300.00 

Judith Levin, Esq. - in-court hours, 18 at $90 
per hour or $1,620.00; out-of-court hours, 
241 at $30 per hour or $19,280.00; total - 
$20,900.00 

George M. Strickler, Jr., Esq. - out-of-court 
hours, 34 at $80 per hour or $2,720.00; 
total - 82,720.00 

Ellen Leitzer, Esq. - out-of-court hours, 122 at 
$70 per hour or $8,540.00; total - $8,540.00 

Total Counsel Fees - $57,460.00 

Paralegal and Law Clerks - 142 hours at $25 
per hour or $3,550.00; total - $3,550.00 

Total Costs - $6,532.06 

Total Award - $67,542.06 

Cl 

 



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA Jin 1 ile 

Nols 

va 

hE 

MARGARET S., ET AL. : CIVIL ACTION ERad] 

VERSUS BO. 78-2785 

EDWIN W. EDWARDS, ET AL. SECTION "C" 

ae Jo Mla 
“w A) "~ 

ORDER 
  

This matter came on for hearing on October 22, 1980, on 

the motion of counsel for plaintiffs seeking attorneys' fees 

in this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, as amended, the 

Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976. After due 

consideration of the arguments of counsel, the submitted 

memoranda, and the applicable law, pursuant to the Minute 

Entry of this Court dated January cde 1981; 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that defendants 

pay to counsel for plaintiffs the following fees, .as costs 

of this litigation: 

Janet Benshoof, Esq. - in-court hours, 58 at $90 
per hour or $5,220.00; out-of-court hours, 
.251 at $80 per hour or $20,080.00; total - 
$25,300.00 

Judith Levin, Esq. - in-court hours, 18 at $90 
per hour or $1,620.00; out-of-court hours, 
241 at $30 per hour. or $19,280.00; total - 

$20,900.00 

George M. Strickler, Jr., Esq. - out-of-court 

hours, 34 at $80 per hour or $2,720.00; 
total - $2,720.00 

Ellen Leitzer, Esq. - out-of-court hours, 122 at 

$70 per hour or $8,540.00; total - $8,540.00 

Total Counsel Fees - $57,460.00 

Paralegal and Law Clerks - 142 hours at $25 

per. hour or $3,550.00; total - $3,530.00 

Total Costs - $6,532.06 

Total Award - $67,542.06 

New Orleans, Louisiana, this the / 324 day of January, 

ILTTED STATES 
   



“ 

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION Nationa! Headauaners \& 
132 West 43 Street 

New York, NY 10036 

(212) 944-3800 

Norman Dorsen 
PRESIDENT 

Ira Glasser 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 

March 11 ’ 1985 Eleanor Holmes Norton 
CHAIR 

AL ADVISORY COUNCIL 

E. Richard Larson 

Larry T. Menefee Siro 

Blacksher, Menefee & Stein 

405 Van Antwerp Bldg. 
P.O. Box 1051 
Mobile, AL 36633 

Re: Fee Application in Margaret S. v. Treen, 

No. 78-2765 (E.D. La.) (Judge Collins) 
  

Dear Larry: 

Enclosed is our Motion and our accompanying Memo of Law in 

which we seek fees in MS II and MS III at a $160 hourly rate, 

which we allege is on the low end of the New York scale. 

Also enclosed is Judge Collins' unreported decision in 

MS I, awarding us fees not at New York rates but at New Orleans 

rates. 

I'll let you know what happens with this fee application. 

Please keep me advised about developments in Major. And please 

send me copies of any papers you think I should know about. 

Thanks. Talk with you later. 

Sincerely, 

E. Richard Larson 

ERL:1n 

En sures 

c: Lani Guinier  



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 

  

MARGARET S., et al., 

Plaintiffs, 
: Civil Action 

-v- : No. 78-2765 

DAVID C. TREEN, et al., 

Defendants. 

  

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW 

IN SUPPORT OF 

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF 

ATTORNEYS FEES, EXPENSES AND COSTS 

SUZANNE M. LYNN 

NAN D. HUNTER 

E. RICHARD LARSON 

American Civil Liberties Union 

Foundation 

132 West 43rd Street 

New York, New York 10036 

212/944-9800 

JANE JOHNSON 

7031 Freret Street 

New Orleans, Louisiana 70118 

504/865-5153 

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS 

 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT . ccc ecco eesooosssoscccsssessssorssosocscsaocs 

INTRODUCTION ss esse nsisssnsssoesssssssssecsssonssvoisseenss 

he. Litigation on the Merits in MS II and MS III.... 
  

B. Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys Fees, Expenses 

ANA COBEL Sis cisinnvssonisssessosaesisieinissesisisesivisvisees 

ARGUMENT cov sans vnnsisiesioe sie esvsniseesssosssiseseasseesiseses 

i fH In Determining Fees, the Relevant Johnson Factors 

Are Properly Applied Through the Lodestar Method 

of Fee Computation..cceeeesescssscccscsossccocsce 

A. The Hours Billed by Plaintiffs' Counsel 

Are Reasonable and Fully Compensable..... 

ig Plaintiffs Are Entitled to 

Compensation for All Time Expended 

in Winning the Judgment in Their 

Favor in MS Ill.ccsecvvesvsscnsesnns 

2. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Compensa- 

tion for All Time Expended in MS II. 

The Hourly Rates Are Prevailing Market 

RACES ceo vv sis sss sssssssesssvssvsossineesese 

An Upward Adjustment of the Hours-Times- 

Rates Lodestar Would Be Reasonable in 

THIS CAGE. ao closiss sive ssioisssissssnieielnes sine 

The Johnson Factors Fully Support the 

Reasonableness of the Lodestar Sum and 

of an Upward Adjustment....ceceeecccese 

Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Their 

Out-of-Pocket EXPENSES. ceecsscsccsscsoccccse 

Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Their 

Statutory COStSeeeesseecccccscssscrercccncce 

CONCLUSION. sees enssvsinesssssssesssnsvssessisnsvnsisss  



PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 

In this Memorandum of Law, we primarily address the 

applicable legal principles, under the lodestar method of fee 

computation in conjunction with the Johnson factors, governing an 

award of reasonable attorneys fees, expenses and costs in this 

case. By way of introduction, however, we initially address: 

(a) the litigation on the merits in MS II and MS III, for which 

the award of fees, expenses and costs is now sought; and (b) the 

nature of and support for the accompanying Plaintiffs’ Motion for 

an Award of Attorneys Fees, Expenses and Costs. 

INTRODUCTION: THE MERITS AND THIS MOTION FOR FEES 

This Margaret S. litigation occurred in three stages, 
  

hereafter referred to as MS I, MS II, and MS III. 
  

MS I involved a constitutional challenge to a 1978 Louisiana 

statute restricting abortion. On March 3, 1980, this Court 

entered judgment in plaintiffs' favor, holding most of the 

challenged statute unconstitutional. Thereafter, on January 13, 

1981, this Court awarded plaintiffs’ counsel $67,542.06 in 

attorneys fees, expenses and costs. 

MS II involved a constitutional challenge to a 1980 

successor statute, whose effect was enjoined by this Court. MS 

III involved a constitutional challenge to yet another successor 

statute, virtually all of which was struck down as 

unconstitutional by this Court on June 29, 1984. Plaintiffs now 

seek an award of attorneys fees, expenses and costs in the amount 

of $130,379.60 covering MS II and MS III.  



A. Litigation on the Merits in MS II and MS III 

Subsequent to this Court's decision on March 3, 1980, the 

Louisiana Legislature enacted a new statute, La.R.S. §§ 

40:1299.35 et seq, restricting access to abortion. The new 1980 

statute included, among other things, a requirement of parental 

consent for minors seeking abortions, an informed consent 

"script," an emergency exemption, a requirement for the disposal 

of fetal remains, and standards for licensing. La.R.S. §§ 

40:1299.35.5 (minors); 35.6(B)(3)-(7) (informed consent); 35.12 

(emergencies); 35.14 (disposal); and 35.17 (licensing). These 

statutory requirements, among others, were challenged as 

unconstitutional in MS II. 

On November 17, 1980, this Court granted plaintiffs' motion 

for a temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the 

statute's parental consent requirement as to an individual minor 

who had intervened as a plaintiff. On December 2, 1980 the 

temporary restraining order was expanded to protect all minors 

and also expanded to cover all challenged provisions in the 

entire statute. Shortly thereafter, the parties agreed that the 

temporary restraining order would remain in effect until a final 

decision on the merits was rendered. In its order granting the 

temporary restraining order, this Court found that plaintiffs had 

demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. 

In March, 1981, the parties jointly moved for a continuance 

of the forthcoming trial in view of the defendants’ 

representation that the State Legislature would very likely amend  



the challenged statute yet again. On May 14, 1981, the parties 

stipulated that the temporary restraining order presently in 

effect would run against any new statute enacted by the 

Legislature that summer. The parties further agreed that this 

arrangement would in no way constitute a waiver of attorneys fees 

or costs accrued to that date. 

On July 23, 1981, the Legislature passed a new statute, 

La.R.S. §§ 1299.35 et seq, which subsequently was challenged as 

unconstitutional in MS III. The new 1981 statute left unchanged 

those sections of the old law which dealt with informed consent 

and emergencies, La.R.S. S§§ 1299.35.6(B)(3)-(7) and 35.12. The 

licensing requirements, La.R.S. § 1299.35.17, were abolished. 

Requirements that all abortions be preceded by ultrasound tests, 

La.R.5. § 1299.35,2(B), and that all post-first trimester 

abortions be performed in hospitals, La.R.5. § 1299.35.33, were 

added. The provisions on fetal disposal, La.R.S. § 1299.35.14, 

and parental consent, La.R.S. § 1299.35.5, were re-enacted in 

amended form. 

The extensive changes in the parental consent requirement 

were a result of advice given by defense counsel to the 

Legislature that the earlier provision on minors in the 1980 

statute was unconstitutional. That advice, in turn, was based 

upon defense counsel's awareness of arguments submitted by 

1/ 
plaintiffs in opposition to the 1980 statute.= For instance, 

  

1. In fact, at an August 24, 1981 pretrial conference, counsel 

for the defendants told plaintiffs' counsel that the parental 

consent section was drafted by defense counsel using plaintiffs’ 

briefs as a guide. See affidavit of Suzanne Lynn at 5 411.  



plaintiffs had pointed out that the 1980 statute provided no time 

limit within which a court would have to decide a minor's 

abortion petition, that there were no procedural guidelines in 

order to ensure that the court proceeding would be simple enough 

for minors to use, and that there was no guarantee a minor's 

parents would not be notified by a court against her wishes. The 

1981 law addressed itself to all of these defects. 

On August 25, 1981, this Court re-issued the temporary 

restraining order against the new 1981 statute. On November 18, 

1981, defendants moved for summary judgment with regard to the 

second trimester hospitalization requirement, the parental 

consent requirement, and various other provisions. Plaintiffs 

cross-moved for summary judgment on the second trimester 

hospitalization provision, and opposed defendants' motion with 

regard to the parental consent requirement and all other 

sections. On November 27, 1981, this Court granted plaintiffs’ 

motion with respect to the second trimester hospitalization 

requirement, striking it down as unconstitutional; the Court 

granted defendants' motion with respect to the parental consent 

requirement, upholding it as constitutional, and denied 

defendants' motion with respect to all other provisions. 

On December 7, 1981, trial was commenced on the remaining 

sections of the statute. .2/ On June 29, 1984, this Court rendered 

  

2. The disposal of fetal remains provision, La.R.S. § 

1299.35.14, was severed from the rest of the trial and held over 

for a separate trial. On April 9, 1982 plaintiffs moved for 

summary judgment on that provision. The provision was held 

unconstitutional in this Court's decision rendered on June 29, 

1984.  



a decision upholding the parental consent and emergency 

requirements, and striking down all other sections of the statute 

as unconstitutional. 

Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys Fees, Expenses and Costs 

As is set forth in the accompanying Plaintiffs' Motion for 

an Award of Attorneys Fees, Expenses and Costs, the components of 

the $130,379.60 requested award are as follows: 

Suzanne Lynn 

497.55 hours $ 79,603.00 

Nan Hunter 

256.10 hours S 40,976.00 
  

Total Fees $120,584.00 $120,584.00 

EXPENSES: 

Out-of-Pocket Expenses 8S 9,072.32 S$: 9,072.32 

COSTS: 

Statutory Costs S$ 723.28 
  

TOTAL AWARD: $130,379.60 

Attached to Plaintiffs' Motion are supporting affidavits of 

plaintiffs' counsel Suzanne Lynn and Nan Hunter, exhibits 

thereto, and an affidavit from New York lawyer William Josephson 

who is not counsel in this case. 

1. The affidavit of plaintiffs' attorney Suzanne Lynn sets 

forth the basis for the total award and for the components 

thereof, and also documents the reasonableness of her 497.55  



billable hours and of the $160 hourly rate. More specifically, 

plaintiffs' attorney Suzanne Lynn addresses in her affidavit: 

(a) fees and expenses for which no compensation is sought; (b) 

the hours billed; (c) the prevailing hourly rates; (d) the 

relevant Johnson factors; (e) the expenses incurred; and (£f) the 

statutory costs incurred. Attached to her affidavit as Exhibit A 

is a report of her contemporaneously recorded billable hours. 

Attached as Exhibit B is her resume. 

2, The affidavit of plaintiffs' attorney Nan Hunter 

documents the reasonableness of her 256.10 billable hours and of 

the $160 hourly rate. Exhibit A to her affidavit is a report of 

her contemporaneously recorded billable hours. Exhibit B is her 

resume. 

3. The affidavit of attorney William Josephson, a lawyer 

who is not an attorney of record in this case, attests to the 

reasonableness fo the $160 rate, a rate which in fact is on the 

low end of the scale based on the $165 to $190 prevailing market 

rates in New York for attorneys with the experience, reputation 

and ability of Suzanne Lynn and Nan Hunter. 

In view of the applicable law as is briefly set forth 

hereafter, plaintiffs' request for an award of $130,379.60 is 

eminently reasonable and should be allowed as requested. 

 



ARGUMENT 

In Determining Fees, the Relevant Johnson Factors Are 

Properly Applied Through the Lodestar Method of Fee 

Computation 

As set forth in Plaintiffs' Motion for an Award of Attorneys 

Fees, plaintiffs have calculated their request for an award of 

reasonable fees pursuant to the lodestar method. This lodestar 

approach is now required by the Fifth Circuit and by the Supreme 

Court. 

"The Fifth Circuit recently adopted the 'lodestar' method of 

calculating attorney's fees." Graves v. Barnes, 700 F.2d 220, 
  

222 (5th Cir. 1983), citing, e.g., Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph 
  

Coors Co., 624 P.24 575, 583 n.15 (5th Cir. 1980); see also 

Greenhaw v. Lubbock County Beverage Association, 721 F.2d 1019, 
  

1032 (5th Cir. 1983), 

Lest there be any doubt about the applicability of this 

lodestar methodology, it has twice been approved by the Supreme 

Court in the past two years. 

The initial estimate [the lodestar sum] of a reasonable 

attorney's fee is properly calculated by multiplying 

the number of hours reasonably expended on the litiga- 

tion times a reasonable hourly rate. Adjustments to 

that fee then may be made as necessary in the particu- 

lar case. 

Blum v. Stenson, 79 L.Ed.2d 891, 895-96 (1984) (brackets and 
  

emphasis added); see also Hensley Vv. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 
  

(1983). 

Under this lodestar method, the lodestar sum is determined 

by multiplying the hours reasonably expended times the prevailing 

hourly rates, with possible adjustments thereafter based upon 

other factors. Id. This method essentially provides a useful  



analytical framework for applying the relevant fee computation 

factors listed by the Fifth Circuit more than a decade ago in 

Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 
  

1974) .3/ 

A. The Hours Billed by Plaintiffs' Counsel 

Are Reasonable and Fully Compensable 

Under the hours component of the lodestar, plaintiffs seek 

compensation for 753.65 hours reasonably expended on thig litiga- 

tion (530.07 hours on MS III, and 223.58 hours on MS 11) in which 

they unquestionably obtained excellent if not exceptional 

results. 

As the Supreme Court explained last year in Hensley v. 
  

Bckerhart, 461 U.S. at 435: "Where a plaintiff has obtained 

excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensa- 

tory fee. Normally this will encompass all hours reasonably 

expended on the litigation, and indeed in some cases of excep- 

tional success an enhanced award may be justified. In these 

circumstances the fee award should not be reduced simply because 

the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention raised in the 

lawsuit." 

Based on these controlling legal principles, plaintiffs are 

entitled to compensation for all time reasonably expended on MS 

  

Sie Under the lodestar method, a determination of the hours 

reasonably expended ordinarily includes consideration of Johnson 

factors one, two, four, and seven; reasonable hourly rates 

include Johnson factors three, five, nine, ten and eleven; 

adjustments to the hours-times-rates lodestar are usually based 

on Johnson factors six and eight, and may be based on other 

factors as well.  



III and also for all time reasonably expended on the earlier 

phase of this litigation known as MS II. 

l. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Compensation 
for All Time Expended in Winning the 
Judgment in Their Favor in MS III 

As just pointed out, plaintiffs who obtain "excellent 

results . . . should recover a fully compensatory fee," and 

"should not" have that fee reduced "simply because the plain- 

tiffs] failed to prevail on every contention raised in the law- 

suit." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 435, Under this con- 
  

trolling standard, plaintiffs here are entitled to compensation 

for all time expended in obtaining through final judgment excel- 

lent if not exceptional results in the final portion of this 

litigation referred to as MS III. 

Nonetheless, despite the overall excellent results achieved 

in MS III, and despite the fact that the parental consent and 

emergency issues were factually and legally closely intertwined 

with the other issues in this case, plaintiffs concede that they 

lost the parental consent and emergency issues in MS III. 

Because the time expended on these issues may arguably be 

noncompensable under Hensley, and because plaintiffs' counsel 

were able to segregate the 103.85 hours expended on these issues, 

compare, e€.g., United States v. Terminal Transport Co., 653 F.2d 
  

1016 (5th Cir. 1981), plaintiffs here are not seeking 

compensation for those 103.85 hours. Those hours, in other 

words, have already been subtracted from the total hours 

expended, as documented by plaintiffs' counsel, with the result  



that plaintiffs seek compensation only for 530.07 billable hours 

expended on MS III. 

These hours for which compensation is sought are entirely 

reasonable and should be fully compensated. 

2. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Compensation 
for All Time Expended on MS II 

Although the second phase of this litigation known as 

never resulted in a final order in plaintiffs' favor after 

trial, plaintiffs nonetheless are entitled to compensation 

all time expended (including time expended on the parental 

consent and emergency issues) for the simple reason that they 

obtained the entirety of the result sought in MS II: a bar 

against the implementation of the challenged statute, in toto, in 

its then existing form. 

The "generous formulation that brings the plaintiff across 

the statutory threshold" entitles plaintiffs to fees so long as 

they "'obtain some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing 

suit.'" Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 433 (citation omit- 
  

ted). Plaintiffs here obtained in MS II not just some of the 

benefit sought but all of the benefit sought. 

First, plaintiffs here obtained all of the relief sought 

through a consensual TRO which remained in effect throughout MS 

II, and they accordingly are entitled to fees for all time 

expended. Id.; see also, e.g., Smith v. Thomas, 725 F.2d 354 
  

(5th Cir. 1984) (plaintiffs prevailed through a TRO whose 

subsequent extension was unopposed); Deerfield Medical Center v. 
  

Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1981) (preliminary 
   



injunction). 

Second, even if plaintiffs had not obtained injunctive 

relief extending throughout the pendency of MS II, plaintiffs 

still would be entitled to fees covering the parental consent 

issue in view of the conceded fact that plaintiffs' lawsuit acted 

as a catalyst in causing the defendants ultimately to amend the 

statute in ways responsive to plaintiffs’ challenge .4/ Demier v. 

Gondles, 676 F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 1982); see also e.g., Hennigan v. 
  

Ouachita Parish School Board, 749 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1985); 
  

Wooten v. Housing Authority of Dallas, 723 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 
  

1984); Williams v. Fairburn, Georgia, 640 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 
  

1981); Dayan v. Board of Regents of University of Georgia, 620 
  

F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1980). 

Accordingly, in view of plaintiffs' success in MS II, 

plaintiffs are entitled to full compensation for the 223.58 

billable hours expended on MS II not only because their lawsuit 

acted as a catalyst, but because they in fact won a consensual 

injunction which remained in effect throughout the proceeding. 

B. The Hourly Rates Are Prevailing Market Rates 

Under the hourly rate component of the lodestar, plaintiffs 

are entitled to flat hourly rates of at least $160 per hour for 

Suzanne Lynn, plaintiffs' lead counsel, and also of $160 per hour 

for co-counsel Nan Hunter, both of whom are 1975 law graduates 

with special expertise as national experts in abortion 

  

4. The factual premise establishing the catalytic effect of 

plaintiffs' lawsuit is discussed supra at 2-5 & n.l See 

generally the affidavit of Suzanne Lynn at 5 911. 

iy ye,  



litigation. 

These rates not only are reflective of the experience, 

reputation and ability of plaintiffs' counsel, but also are 

actually on the low end of the prevailing market rates at which 

counsel are entitled to be compensated. See generally Blum v.   

Stenson, 79 L.Ed.2d 891, 898-900 (1984). As such, the 

entitlement rates are (1) flat, (2) current, (3) New York rates. 

l. Although a few courts in the past awarded different 

rates for different tasks, that no longer represents the manner 

in which lawyers bill their clients, nor does it represent the 

manner in which the courts within the Fifth Circuit award fees. 

See, e.g., Chescheir v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 713 F.2d 
  

1142 (5th Cir. 1983) (flat rates up to $150 per hour under Title 

VII); Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 684 F.2d 1087 (5th 
  

Cir. 1982) (flat rates up to $150 per hour under the Clayton 

Act); Hendrick v. Hercules, Inc., 658 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1981) 
  

(flat rate of $120 per hour under the ADEA); cf. Blum v. Stenson,   

79 L.Ed.2d 891, 897 & n.4 (1984) (flat rates of $95, $100 and 

$105 for three attorneys, respectively, under § 1988). 

2 Also consistent with judicial practice within the Fifth 

Circuit, the requested rates are current rates rather than a 

series of historical rates, i.e., the appropriate rates are "the 

rates prevailing at the time the fee application was filed, 

rather than those rates prevailing at the time the services were 

actually rendered." Graves v. Barnes, 700 F.2d 220, 222 (5th 
  

Cir. 1983). As explained in another case by District Judge 

William Wayne Justice,. the "most direct and managable way of  



compensating plaintiffs' attorneys for the losses associated with 

diminished value of money because of inflation, and, 

additionally, the deprivation of the actual use of the money, is 

to award current rather than historical rates for all past 

work." Ruiz v. Estelle, 553 PF. Supp. 567, 591 (S.D. Tex. 
  

1982). And, as pointed out in Graves, 700 F.2d at 224, use of 

current rates avoids the necessity of adjusting the hours-times- 

rates lodestar upward to account for the contingency factor of 

delay in payment. See infra at 15 n. 6. 

3% Finally, and also consistent with judicial practice 

generally, the appropriate rates for out-of-town New York counsel 

are the prevailing market rates in New York. See, e.g., 

Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 ¥.24:760 (7th Cir. 1982) (trial 
  

court reversed in a Title VII case tried in South Bend for 

allowing less than $175 per hour for plaintiffs' Washington D.C. 

counsel and less than $200 per hour for plaintiffs' New York 

counsel); Maceira v. Pagan, 698 F.2d 38 (lst Cir. 1983) (Detroit 
  

counsel entitled to higher Detroit rate in a case litigated in 

Puerto Rico). As the Eleventh Circuit concluded in a related 

context in Dowdell v. Apopka, Florida, 698 F.2d 1181, 1192 (llth 
  

Cir. 1983): "Civil rights litigants may not be charged with 

"Sy. 
selecting the nearest and cheapest attorney. 

  

5. This conclusion was reached, in Dowdell v. Apopka, Florida, 

698 F.2d 1181 (llth cir. 1983), in the context of the Eleventh 

Circuit's holding that out-of-town counsel may not be denied 

reasonable travel expenses. Under this principle, plaintiffs’ 

counsel here are entitled to recover all reasonable travel 

expenses, see infra at 19-21, and they similarly are entitled to 

full hourly rates for lost-opportunity travel time, see, e.g., 

Henry v. Webermeier, 738 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1984): Craik v. 

Minnesota State University Board, 738 F.2d 348 (8th Cir. 1984). 

  

  

  

- 13 -  



Overall, and consistent with the standards set forth by the 

Supreme Court in Blum v. Stenson, 79 L.Ed.2d at 900 n. 11, the   

current market rates awardable here are fully and properly 

supported by counsel's own affidavits and by the affidavit of New 

York lawyer William Josephson who is familiar with the prevailing 

market rates. In fact, the prevailing market rate of $160 per 

hour is actually at the low end of the $165 to $190 prevailing 

market rates at which counsel are entitled to be compensated. 

Cc. An Upward Adjustment of the Hours-Times—-Rates 
Lodestar Would Be Reasonable in This Case 

As a result of the Supreme Court's decisions in Blum v. 

Stenson, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984), and Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461   

U.S. 424 (1983), there no longer is any doubt that in appropriate 

cases the hours-times-rates lodestar sum may be adjusted upward 

to take account of "the important factor of the 'results ob- 

tained,'" Blum, 79 L.Bd.2d at 901 n. 14, quoting from Hensley,   

461 U.S. at 434; and also to take account of the contingency 

"risk of not prevailing, and therefore the risk of not recovering 

any attorney's fees" at all, Blum, 79 L.Ed.2d at 904 (Brennan, 

J., with Marshall, J., concurring). 

Upward adjustments to account for the contingency risk of 

not prevailing are unquestionally awardable in appropriate 

cases. See generally the post-Blum appellate decisions in Craik 
  

v. Minnesota State University Board, 738 F.28 348 (3th Cir. 1984) 
  

(25% upward adjustment, to account for contingency, in award of 

appellate fees), and Burney v. Housing Authority of Beaver, 735 
  

F.2d 113 (34 Cir. 1984) (upward adjustment available so long as 

pV  



plaintiffs satisfy their burden of proof on remand). See also, 

e,.j., Graves v, Barnes, 700 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (affirming a   

100% upward adjustment for contingency risks); Flowers v. Wiley,   

6.75 F.2d= 704, 706 (5th Cir. 19382) (upward adjustment of 33% in a 

case in which it was "hardly conceivable that the plaintiffs 

could lose"); cf. Yates v. Mobile County Personnel Board, 719 
  

F.2d 51530 (11th Cir. 1983) (reversal of. a refusal to allow an 

upward adjustment, plus a court of appeals' express award of a 

35% upward adjsutment in appellate fees). As the Fifth Circuit 

en banc observed in-Jones v, Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1382. (5th 
  

Cir 1981), cert. dismissed, 453 U.8. 950 (1981): "Lawyers who 
  

are to be compensated only in the event of victory expect and are 

entitled to be paid more when successful than those who are 

assured of compensation regardless of result." 

This case is an appropriate one for at least a small upward 

adjustment of the lodestar, an adjustment based on the contin- 

gency risk of nonpayment ..2/ Nonetheless, no specific upward 

adjustment is sought by plaintiffs in this case. 

  

6. An additional contingency factor requiring an upward adjust- 
ment, the delay in payment factor, is not present here to the 
extent that this Court adheres to controlling precedent requiring 
an award of fees based on prevailing market rates rather than on 
historical rates. See generally Johnson v. University College, 
706 F.2d 1205 (11th Cir. 1983) (the contingency factor of delay 
in payment must be reflected, if not through the use of current 
hourly rates, by an upward adjustment of the lodestar); see also 
Morgado v. Birmingham-Jeferson County Civil Defense Corps, 706 
F.2d 1184 (llth Cir. 1983) (reversal of a refusal to allow a 
lodestar adjustment for the contingency factor of delay in 

payment). ¥ 
Here, as in Graves v. Barnes, 700 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1983), 

an upward adjustment would be only for the contingency risk of 

not prevailing, and not for delay in payment at least so long as 
current hourly rates are used in setting the lodestar. 

  

  

  

- 15%.  



D. The Johnson Factors Fully Support the 
Reasonableness of the Lodestar Sum and 
of an Upward Adjustment 

Although the lodestar method of fee computation has been 

given formal approval by the Supreme Court and by the Fifth Cir- 

cuit, see also Fitzpatrick v. Internal Revenue Service, 665 F.2d 
  

327, 332 (11ith Cir. 1982), the Fifth Circuit's: continued, occa- 

sional reference to the twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. 
  

Georgia Highway Express, lInc,, 438 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 
  

1974), warrants a brief review of those factors here. The rele- 

vance of these factors is also explained -- in greater detail -- 

in the affidavit of plaintiffs' lead counsel, Suzanne Lynn. 

He The "time and labor required" constitute the primary 

element of the hours component of the lodestar. Here, the time 

and labor required -- 753.65 billable hours expended by attorneys 

Suzanne Lynn and Nan Hunter -- are fully documented in the 

affidavits of plaintiffs' counsel. More than 300 additional 

hours were expended by plaintiffs' counsel for which compensation 

is not sought. 

2 The "novelty and difficulty of the questions" are also 

an element of the hours component of the lodestar since they 

essentially reflect the number of hours necessary to litigate a 

particular case. A case such as this, which contained several 

novel challenges to the constitutionality of the statutory provi- 

sions struck down, is an inherently difficult case requiring a 

considerable expenditure of lawyer time. The very length of this 

Court's final decision, in fact, attests to the novelty and 4if-  



ficulty of the questions in this case. 

% The "skill requisite to perform the legal service pro- 

perly" is one of the basic factors in the hourly rate component 

of the lodestar. Here, plaintiffs submit, their attorneys' work 

product, their preparation, and their general ability before the 

court illustrate the excellent skills of plaintiffs' counsel. 

4, The "preclusion of other employment by the attorney due 

to acceptance of the case" is a factor relevant primarily to the 

hours expended yet also to the hourly rate. Although this factor 

is present in all litigation, it becomes significant in litiga- 

tion such as this requiring a considerable expenditure of time 

over a period of years, as this is precisely the type of litiga- 

tion which precludes acceptance of other cases. 

Bie The "customary fee," an hourly rate factor, involves an 

examination in a case such as this of the prevailing market rates 

for complex litigation. This factor is documented here in the 

supporting affidavit filed by New York attorney William 

Josephson. 

6. "Whether the fee is fixed or contingent" is one of the 

primary factors leading to an appropriate upward adjustment of 

the hours-times-rates lodestar. Where, as here, there is no 

fixed fee, but rather the availability of any fee whatsoever is 

based entirely on the contingency of plaintiffs' success, an 

upward adjustment of the lodestar is ordinarily appropriate. 

Fe "Time limitations imposed by the client or the 

circumstances" constitute a factor -- similar to the preclusion 

of other employment -- which is relevant primarily to the hours  



expended and yet also to the hourly rate, and which is ordinarily 

present in most litigation. Yet, it is particularly relevant 

when, as in this case, the demands of the litigation require 

counsel to expend considerable time and effort over a period of 

years. 

8. The "results obtained" constitute a factor leading to an 

upward adjustment of the lodestar. Where excellent results are 

obtained, as was the case here, the hours—-times-rates lodestar 

may be enhanced. 

9. The "experience, reputation, and ability of the 

attorneys" are primary considerations in determining the hourly 

rates appropriate for particular attorneys within the general 

spectrum of prevailing market rates. Plaintiffs' counsel here 

are extremely experienced and able counsel with particular 

expertise in complex federal litigation in general, and in 

reproductive freedom litigation in particular. 

10. The "'undesirability' of the case" is an economic 

factor which may call for an increase above and beyond prevailing 

market hourly rates. Although reproductive freedom (or abortion) 

advocacy is unpopular and even dangerous in many communities, it 

is not a factor necessarily warranting an hourly rate increase 

here because of the fact that plaintiffs' counsel have 

voluntarily chosen to make reproductive freedom an area of their 

litigation expertise. 

11. The "nature and length of the professional relationship 

with the client" constitute a factor which may lead to an 

increase of the prevailing market rates in situations where  



counsel do not have an on-going relationship with clients who pay 

(30-day billing) for this and their other legal servcies. This 

factor may warrant an increase in market rates here since there 

is no on-going professional relationship between counsel and the 

plaintiffs, and because there in any event have never been any 

fees paid by plaintiffs to their counsel in this case or for any 

other matter. 

12. “Awards in similar cases" can be used as a referent for 

the reasonableness of the overall fee award. Although this 

factor is ordinarily of minimal significance to setting a fee 

award, there can be little question about the reasonableness of 

the fee award requested here. 

On this record, this Court's application of the twelve 

Johnson factors would fully support a fee award greater than 

plaintiffs' request for $120,584 in fees (prior to expenses and 

costs). With the relevant factors applied through the lodestar 

methodology -- a route this Court must follow -- plaintiffs' fee 

request is eminently reasonable. 

II. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Their 
Out-of-Pocket Expenses 

In addition to fees, plaintiffs also are entitled to an 

award of $9,072.32 in out-of-pocket expenses, under §1988. 

As is set forth in the affidavit of Suzanne Lynn at 94 26, 

the out-of-pocket expenses incurred by plaintiffs' counsel for 

which plaintiffs' counsel have documented receipts are as 

follows: 

MS 11  



Transportation 81,108.30 

Food $% 150.07 

Federal Express S$ 395,73 

Temporary Local Typist $1,491.53 

Supplies 21.94 

SUBTOTAL EXPENSES MS II $3,367.57 $3,367.57 

Transportation $3,024.88 

Lodging $ 365.92 

Food 5 267.83 

Telephone S 4.00 

Federal Express S$. 993.70 

Temporary Local Typist $ 837.25 

Supplies $+ 201.82 

Express Mail S$ 9.35 

SUBTOTAL EXPENSES MS 111 $5,704.75 $5,704.75 

TOTAL EXPENSES MS II AND MS 111 $9,072.32 $9,072.32 
  

Reasonable out of pocket expenses, such as the foregoing 

expenses, have been viewed by the Fifth Circuit for more than a 

decade as "completely recoverable” in civil rights cases. Fairly 

v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 607 n.l1l7 (4th Cir. 1974) (expenses of   

developing a reapportionment plan). See also, e.g., Barry v. 
  

McLemore, 670 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1982) (expert witness fees); 

Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1382 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc 
  

(expert witness fees), cert. dismissed, 453 U.S. 950 (1981); 
  

Gates v. Collier, 616 F.28 1268 (5th Cir. 1980) (general 
   



expenses), modified, 636 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1981); Miller v. 

Carson, 563 F.2d 741, 754-56 (5th Cir. 1977) (telephone and 

postage) . 

The Fifth Circuit view is hardly an isolated one. In fact, 

as Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit recently 

commented, "the case law overwhelmingly supports the proposition 

that "attorneys fee includes out-of-pocket expenses." Henry v. 

Webermeier, 738 F.2d 188, 192 (7th Cir. 1984) (investigation,   

travel, and other activities related to case preparation). See 

also, e.g., Redding V, Fairman, 717 P.24 1105, 1119 (7th Cir. 
  

1983) (transportation, phone calls, and other expenses); 

Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 707 P.2d 636, 637 (lst Cir. 1983) 
  

(transportation, lodging, parking, food, and telephone); Johnson 

v. University College, 706 F.2d 1205, 1209 (11th Cir. 1983) 
  

(computer services); Dowdell v. Apopka, Florida, 698 F.2d 1181, 
  

1188-92 (llth Cir. 1983) (travel, telephone and postage); 

Thornberry v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 676 P.2d 1240, 1244-45 (7th 
  

Cir. 1982) ($83,918 award for out-of-pocket expenses and expert 

witness fees); Northcross v. Board of Education of Memphis, 611 
  

F.2d 624, 639-40 (6th Cir.l1l979) (photocopying, travel, telephone, 

and paralegals), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980). 
  

The request here for $9,072.32 covering the out-of-pocket 

expenses of plaintiffs' counsel is entirely reasonable and fully 

recoverable. 

III. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Their 

Statutory Costs 

Plaintiffs finally are entitled to an award of $723.28 in 

BD YR  



statutory costs under Rule 54(d) of the Fed. R. Civ. P. and under 

28 U.5.C.. $1920. 

AS is set forth in the affidavit of Suzanne Lynn at 4 28, 

and as is set forth in our separately filed Bill of Costs, the 

breakdown of the taxable costs is as follows: 

MS 11 Xeroxing $386.50 

MS III Witness fees 8165.00 

Service of process $108.50 

Deposition $:.25,00 

Xeroxing 5:38,28 

TOTAL COSTS. MS II AND MS TIT 8i723 .28 
  

Plaintiffs, as prevailing parties, are entitled to recover 

these costs as a matter of course under Rule 54(d). 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion for an Award 

of Attorneys Fees, Expenses and Costs should be granted. 

Dated: March 12, 1985 

Respectfully submitted, 

  

SUZANNE M. LYNN 

NAN D. HUNTER 

E. RICHARD LARSON 

American Civil Liberties Union 

Foundation 

132 West 43rd Street 

New York, New York 10036 

212/944-9800  



  

JANE JOHNSON 

7031 Freret Street 

New Orleans, Louisiana 70118 

504/865-5153 

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS 

 



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 

MARGARET S., et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

Ve 

Civil Action 

Mo. 78-2765 

DAVID C. TREEN, et al.; 

Defendants. 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

Suzanne M. Lynn, counsel for plaintiffs in the above-styled 

case, hereby certifies that one copy of the attached Plaintiffs’ 

Memorandum of Law in Support of plaintiffs' Motion for an Award 

of Attorneys Fees, Expenses and Costs was mailed, first class 

postage prepaid, on March 11, 1985, upon counsel for defendants 

as follows: 

william J. Guste, Jr. 

Attorney General 

Patricia Bowers 

Assistant Attorney General 

Thomas Rayer 

Special Assistant Attorney General 

234 Loyola Avenue 

seventh Floor 

New Orleans, Louisiana 70118 

All persons required to be served have been served. 

  

SUZANNE M. LYNN  



é 9 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT .COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 

  

MARGARET S., et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

Civil Action 

-v- No. 78-2765 

DAVID C. TREEN, et al., 

Defendants. 

  

NOTICE OF MOTION 

WILLIAM J. GUSTE, JR. 

Attorney General 
PATRICIA BOWERS 

Assistant Attorney General 

THOMAS RAYER 

Special Assistant Attorney General 
234 Loyola Avenue, 7th Floor 

New Orleans, Louisiana 70112 

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that plaintiffs, through their 

undersigned counsel, will bring on the attached Plaintiffs’ 

Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees, Expenses and Costs for a 

hearing before the Honorable Robert F. Collins, United States 

District Judge, at the United States Court House, 500 Camp 

 



Street, New Orleans, Louisiana on the 10th day of April, 1985 at 

9:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. 

Dated: : March 12,.1985 

Respectfully submitted, 

  

SUZANNE M. LYNN 

NAN D. HUNTER 

E. RICHARD LARSON 

American Civil Liberties 

Union Foundation 

132 West 43rd Street 

New York, New York 10036 

212/944-9800 

  

JANE JOHNSON 

7031 Freret Street 

New Orleans, Louisiana 70118 
504/865-5153 

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS 

 



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 

  

MARGARET S., et al., 

Plaintiffs, 
: Civil Action 

-v- : No. 78-2765 

DAVID D. TREEN, et al., 

Defendants. 

  

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF 

ATTORNEYS' FEES, EXPENSES AND COSTS 

Plaintiffs, pursuant to this Court's final judgment, are the 

prevailing parties in this action. 

Plaintiffs, upon the attached affidavits and exhibits 

thereto, upon the supporting memorandum of law, and upon the 

record in this case, hereby move this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1988 for an award of attorneys fees, expenses and costs in the 

amount of $130,379.60, plus interest from the date of the award. 

The components of this requested award of fees, expenses and 

costs are as follows: 

Suzanne Lynn 

497.55 hours @ $160 $ 79,608.00 

Nan Hunter 

256.10 hours @ $160 S$ 40,976.00 
  

Total Fees $120,584.00 $120,584.00  



EXPENSES: 

Out-of-Pocket Expenses $ 9,072.32 9,072.32 

Statutory Costs S 723.28 
  

TOTAL AWARD: $130,379.60 

This requested award specifically excludes compensation for 

the estimated 50 hours expended by plaintiffs' local counsel Jane 

Johnson and Carole Shauffer, the estimated 150 hours expended by 

plaintiffs' attorney Wendy Wells, and the estimated 75 hours of 

paralegal work performed by the staff of the ACLU of Louisiana. 

The award also specifically excludes the 103.85 recorded hours 

expended in the third and final stage of this litigation by 

plaintiffs' attorneys Suzanne Lynn and Nan Hunter on the parental 

consent and emergency issues on which plaintiffs did not 

prevail. Additionally, although New York counsel Suzanne Lynn 

and Nan Hunter are entitled to be compensated for their services 

at full New York hourly rates, the $160 rate at which 

compensation is sought here is based at the low end of the 

prevailing market rates in New York for attorneys of comparable 

experience, reputation and ability. Finally, reimbursement is 

sought only for those expenses and costs for which plaintiffs’ 

counsel have documented receipts. 

Attached to this Motion are three supporting affidavits, 

several with exhibits. 

1. The affidavit of plaintiffs' attorney Suzanne Lynn sets 

forth the basis for the total award and for the components  



thereof, and also documents the reasonableness of her 497.55 

billable hours and of the $160 hourly rate. Exhibit A to her 

affidavit is a report of her contemporaneously recorded billable 

hours. Exhibit B is her resume. 

2. The affidavit of plaintiffs' attorney Nan Hunter 

documents the reasonableness of her 256.10 billable hours and of 

the $160 hourly rate. Exhibit A to her affidavit is a report of 

her contemporaneously recorded billable hours. Exhibit B is her 

resume. 

3. The affidavit of attorney William Josephson attests to 

the reasonableness of the $160 hourly rate based on prevailing 

market rates in New York of $165 to $190 per hour for attorneys 

with the experience, reputation and ability of plaintiffs’ 

counsel. 

Pursuant to this Motion, plaintiffs seek compensation only 

with regard to the services rendered by plaintiffs' attorneys 

Suzanne Lynn and Nan Hunter in litigating the issues on which 

plaintiffs prevailed on the merits of this case. No compensation 

is yet sought for the services rendered in preparing this Motion, 

or for services which may be rendered in litigating this 

Motion. A supplemental motion covering these services may be 

filed later. 

 



For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motion for an award 

of $130,379.60, plus interest, should be granted. 

Dated: March 12, 1985 

  

SUZANNE M. LYNN 

NAN D. HUNTER 

E. RICHARD LARSON 

American Civil Liberties 
Union Foundation 

132 West 43rd Street 

New York, New York 10036 

212/944-9800 

  

JANE JOHNSON 

7031 Freret Street 

New Orleans, Louisiana 70118 

504/865-5153 

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS 

 



Affidavit of Suzanne Lynn 

With Exhibits A & B 

 



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 

MARGARET S., et al.) 

Plaintiffs, 

Civil Action 

No. 78-2765 
Ve. 

DAVID C. TREEN, et al., 

Defendants. 

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AFFIDAVIT OF SUZANNE M. LYNN 

State of New York ) 

) 

County of New York) 

SUZANNE M. LYNN, being first duly sworn under penalty of 

perjury, hereby affirms the following: 

1. I am an attorney with the Reproductive Freedom Project of 

the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation. I represent the 

plaintiffs in this action and submit this affirmation in support 

of Plaintiffs' Motion for an Award of Attorneys Fees, Expenses 

and Costs. Plaintiffs seek $120,584.00 in fees based on 753.65 

billable hours, multiplied by an hourly rate of $160, for a 

lodestar fee award of $120,584.00. Plaintiffs also seek 

$9,072.32 in out-of-pocket expenses, in addition to $723.28 in 

taxable statutory costs. The specific breakdown of the total 

request is as follows:  



Suzanne Lynn: 

497.55 hours @ S160 $ 79,608.00 

Nan D. Hunter: 

256.10 hours @ $160 $ 40,976.00 
  

Total Fees $120,584.00 $120,584.00 

EXPENSES: 

Out-of-Pocket Expenses 5: 9,072.32 

COSTS: 

Statutory Costs S$ 723.28 
  

TOTAL AWARD: $130,379.60 

2. In this affidavit, I address: (a) the fees and expenses 

covering legal services rendered but for which no compensation is 

sought; (b) the hours billed; (c) the prevailing hourly rates; 

(d) the relevant Johnson factors; (e) the expenses incurred; and 

(f) the statutory costs incurred. 

A. Fees and Expenses for Which No Compensation Is Sought 

3. This litigation occurred in three stages. MS I involved 

a challenge to a 1978 statute restricting abortion. That case, 

which resulted in a decision by this Court striking the statute 

as unconstitutional, ended in March, 1980. On January 13, 1981, 

this Court awarded plaintiffs attorneys fees and expenses in the 

amount of $67,542.06. The second and third phases of this liti- 

gation, MS II and MS III, spanned the period from September, 1980 

through June, 1984.  



4. Plaintiffs now seek an award of attorneys fees, expenses 

and costs for those latter two phases of this litigation. In MS 

Il, plaintiffs challenged a 1980 abortion statute. Plaintiffs 

were initially represented by Carole Shauffer and Jane Johnson, 

attorneys associated with the American Civil Liberties Union of 

Louisiana; but at an early stage I assumed almost sole respon- 

sibility for this phase of the litigation until it ended in 

August, 1981 with the enactment of a new statute. From August, 

1981 through June, 1984, Nan Hunter and I together undertook the 

litigation of the third phase of this case, MS 111. During the 

trial and for the month immediately preceding it, we were assis- 

ted by Wendy Wells, an attorney whom we hired to work solely on 

this case. 

5. As is set forth hereafter in 4% 9, compensation is sought 

here only for the billable services rendered by me and by Nan 

Hunter and only with regard to those issues on which plaintiffs 

prevailed. 

6. No compensation is sought for the services rendered by 

plaintiffs' local counsel Jane Johnson, who spent an estimated 20 

hours; or by plaintiffs' local counsel Carole Shauffer, who spent 

an estimated 30 hours. Neither of these attorneys for the plain- 

tiffs spent enough hours on this case to warrant the work neces- 

sary to compile their time records. Additionally, no compensa-  



tion is sought for plaintiffs' attorney Wendy Wells, who spent an 

estimated 150 hours, as she did not keep adequate contemporaneous 

time records. Plaintiffs also do not request compensation for 

the paralegal work done by the staff of the ACLU of Louisiana, an 

estimated 75 hours. 

7. In addition, no compensation is sought for the 92.85 

hours spent by me or for the 11 hours spent by Nan Hunter on the 

parental consent and emergency issues in MS 11!. Because 

plaintiffs did not prevail on those issues, and because the 

103.85 hours attributed to those issues could be discerned from 

counsel's time records, no compensation is being sought for those 

103.85 hours expended on the two issues in MS III on which 

plaintiffs did not prevail. 

8. Plaintiffs also are not seeking reimbursement of all 

expenses and costs incurred during the course of this litigation, 

because we do not have records for all of the expenses and costs. 

B. Hours Billed 

9. Plaintiffs seek compensation for 753.65 billable hours 

expended on this litigation by me and Nan Hunter: 497.55 bill- 

able hours were expended by me, and 256.10 were expended by Nan 

Hunter. Stated otherwise, 223.58 hours were expended for the MS 

II phase of the case, and 530.07 hours for MS III. See Exhibit A 

to this affidavit, and Exhibit A to the affidavit of Nan Hunter.  



10. Plaintiffs request a fee award for the time spent by Nan 

Hunter and me on all issues in MS II. With regard to MS I11, 

however, we ask for an award for the hours expended only on those 

issues on which plaintiffs ultimately prevailed; thus, no award 

is sought for the 103.85 hours expended by Nan Hunter and me on 

the parental consent and emergency issues in MS 1II. 

11. Despite the fact that plaintiffs lost their challenge to 

the parental consent and emergency requirements in MS III, all 

work performed in MS II in challenging the earlier version of 

those provisions is compensable. The first version of the paren—- 

tal consent provision and of the emergency provision, challenged 

in MS II, was enjoined by this Court throughout the MS II 

proceeding. Additionally, the parental consent provision there- 

after was amended as a direct result of plaintiffs’ lawsuit. 

Defendants' lawyers admitted this causal relationship when, 

during a pre-trial conference held on August 24, 1981, they told 

plaintiffs' counsel that the legislature had amended the statute 

on their advice. Further, defendants' lawyers admitted that the 

recommendations they had made to the legislators were based on 

objections made by plaintiffs. Accordingly, since the early 

version of the parental consent and emergency provisions was 

enjoined throughout MS II, and since plaintiffs' lawsuit served 

as a catalyst for the amendment of the statute, plaintiffs should 

be awarded fees for all billable time expended on MS II.  



C. Hourly Rates 

12. I am a 1975 law graduate of Columbia University Law 

School. I have been a practicing civil rights lawyer for nearly 

ten years. I have been a staff lawyer with the Reproductive 

Freedom Project of the ACLU Foundation for more than five years, 

during the course of which I have litigated on a nationwide basis 

many cases involving the constitutional right to abortion, as 

well as other reproductive freedom matters. For example, I was 

one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs in Akron v. Akron Center 
  

for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983), the most important 
  

re-—affirmation of the right to abortion since Roe v. Wade. I 
  

also was lead counsel for the private plaintiffs in New York v. 
  

Schweiker, 557 F.Supp. 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 719 F.24 1191 

(2d Cir. 1983), the successful nationwide challenge to the "squeal 

rule" regulations promulgated by the federal government. In ad- 

dition to direct litigation, I am often called upon to advise 

lawyers in various localities about lawsuits they bring challen- 

ging assaults upon reproductive freedom. I have also lectured 

extensively on the privacy right, especially in the procreative 

area, throughout the country. Because of my concentrated work in 

this area (see Exhibit B attached hereto), I have an expertise 

that few lawyers in the country can match. 

13. I believe that based on my professional experience, 

reputation and ability, plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys fees 

for the time I expended in this case, and for the time expended 

by Nan Hunter who has comparable professional experience, reputa- 

tion and ability (see Exhibit B to her affidavit), at the rate  



charged by attorneys in New York City for work of comparable 

skill, That rate is at least S165 to S190 per hour, if not 

higher. Nevertheless, fees for my services in MS II and MS 111, 

and for Nan Hunter's services on MS III, are being sought at the 

lower rate of $160 per hour. 

D. The Relevant Johnson Factors and the Appropriateness of an 

Upward Adjustment 

14. Johnson Factor 1. The "time and labor required" are fully 

documented in the time records kept by me and by Nan Hunter. The 

contemporaneous time records, however, do not reflect all of the 

hours we actually spent on the case, especially at the beginning 

stages of this litigation before we had been asked to take over 

the major responsibility for this case. Moreover, no compensation 

is being sought for the estimated 200 hours of time expended by 

three of plaintiffs' attorneys (Johnson, Shauffer and Wells) for 

the reasons stated in 16 of this affidavit. Additionally, no 

compensation is being sought for the estimated 75 hours of para- 

legal time expended by the staff of the ACLU of Louisiana. And 

no compensation is sought for the recorded 103.85 hours expended 

in MS III on the parental consent and emergency issues. 

15. Johnson Factor 2. The "novelty and difficulty of the 

questions" amply demonstrate why the hours spent on litigating 

this case were necessary. The many provisions of the challenged 

statutes presented a variety of novel and complex questions. For 

instance, the requirement that every abortion be preceded by an 

ultrasound test was one of first impression; no court had ever 

been faced with this issue before. The informed consent provi-  



sions presented this Court with a myriad of issues to decide. 

For example, the requirements that the attending physician per- 

sonally do the counselling, and that the women be given a 

detailed anatomical and physiological description of the fetus 

particular were the subjects of an extensive analysis by this 

Court in its opinion striking them as unconstitutional. The 

fetal experimentation ban was a more difficult issue for this 

Court than a similar ban challenged in MS I since the later 

version involved a question as to whether it limited women's 

future, as well as current, procreative choice. 

16. Johnson Factor 3. Plaintiffs' attorneys have demon 

strated that they have the "skill requisite to perform the legal 

service properly" and that they should be compensated at an ap- 

propriate rate. Nan Hunter and I are among the handful of 

attorneys in the country who specialize in nationwide reproduc- 

tive rights litigation on a full-time basis. We are recognized 

experts to whom attorneys from all over the country turn to for 

legal advice in this area, In the MS 11 phase, plaintiffs’ 

attorneys demonstrated great skill: on the basis of our legal 

memoranda, the State Legislature decided to repeal its original 

parental consent provision, and adopted a new one drawn along the 

lines suggested by the plaintiffs. It was this amended version 

which was ultimately upheld by this court in MS III. Plaintiffs’ 

attorneys are also experienced trial advocates. The concise pre- 

sentation of plaintiffs' evidence, which was accomplished in less 

than three days, would not have been possible without extensive 

preparation. Intensive preparation was necessary given that  



plaintiffs presented several expert witnesses of national stature 

in their fields as well as local doctors and counselors. Because 

of our broad understanding of the issues involved, Nan Hunter and 

I were able to keep to a minimum the number of witnesses needed 

to establish plaintiffs' case. 

17. Johnson Factor 4. Acceptance of this case by plaintiffs’ 

attorneys "preclu[ded] . . . other employment." Nan Hunter and 1 

spent considerable time working on this case in the period from 

the fall of 1980 through the spring of 1982. During 1981, in 

particular, it was necessary for us, plaintiffs' counsel, to make 

several trips to New Orleans in order to meet with our clients 

and with local and opposing counsel, as well as to gather evi- 

dence for trial. In the weeks prior to trial, plaintiffs’ 

counsel worked on practically nothing else in order to prepare 

adequately. For a period of approximately 2 weeks prior to 

trial, plaintiffs' attorneys stayed in New Orleans full-time in 

order to put the case together. Moreover, there were periods, 

notably from September through November of 1981, when Nan Hunter 

and I worked virtually full-time on this case. This pattern of 

work is consistent with the ACLU's policy of accepting very few 

cases, in order to be able to provide legal representation of 

high quality. 

18. Johnson Factor 5. The "customary fee" for plaintiffs’ 

attorneys is at least $160 per hour, a rate which is on the low 

end of the $165 to $190 prevailing market rates for attorneys of 

comparable experience, reputation and ability. See affidavit of 

William Josephson.  



19. Johnson Factor 6. Fee entitlement in this case was 

entirely "contingent" upon plaintiffs' success on the merits. 

There was an understanding between plaintiffs and their counsel 

that the plaintiffs would not compensate their attorneys for 

their work in this case, no matter what the ultimate disposition 

of the case was. Therefore, plaintiffs' counsel (more appro- 

priately, the ACLU Foundation) ran a risk of not being at all 

compensated for work done over a year and a half period. 

20. Johnson Factor 7. The "time limitations imposed by the 

circumstances" were such that there were substantial periods when 

Nan Hunter and I were unable to work on any case other than this 

one. Moreover, as pointed out above, the active portion of this 

litigation for plaintiffs’ counsel spanned a period of a year and 

a half, which is unusually long for the type of litigation done 

by the Reproductive Freedom Project of the ACLU Foundation. 

Since there are only three attorneys on the staff of the 

Reproductive Freedom Project, the taking on of a case such as 

this represents a considerable investment of time and resources. 

21. ‘Johnson Factor 8. Because plaintiffs ultimately prevailed 

on almost all of their claims, and because they succeeded in sub- 

stantially changing the parental consent requirement so that it 

accorded minors more protection, the results they obtained were 

excellent, if not exceptional, especially given the novelty of 

many of the issues and given the relatively modest number of 

hours for which compensation is sought.  



22. Johnson Factor 9. Plaintiffs' counsel, as pointed out 

in ¥16 and 4 18, supra, have the "experience, reputation and 

ability" to justify hourly rates higher than those actually 

requested. Plaintiffs' attorneys are specialists in the area of 

reproductive rights litigation, are nationally recognized as 

such, and provide back up for many lawyers around the country 

litigating these issues. It was precisely because of plaintiffs’ 

counsel's connections and reputation that they were able to 

produce at trial expert witnesses of national stature. 

23. Johnson Factor 10. There is no question that, in 

Louisiana, this was a highly undesirable case in that it was 

politically unpopular. The ACLU was unable to attract any local 

attorneys, except for those affiliated with the ACLU of 

Louisiana, to participate in the case. Nonetheless, in view of 

the fact that Nan Hunter and I have voluntarily chosen to become 

experts in reproductive freedom litigation, this case was not 

from our perspective wholly undesirable. 

24. Johnson Factor 1l. Plaintiffs' counsel do not have a 

previous or ongoing professional relationship with the plaintiffs 

themselves from which plaintiffs' counsel might benefit financi- 

ally; and plaintiffs’ counsel in any event received no compensa-= 

tion whatsoever from plaintiffs for this litigation. The "nature 

and length" of plaintiffs’ counsel's professional relationship 

with the plaintiffs were to represent them in this litigation.  



25. Johnson Factor 12. Plaintiffs' counsel are requesting 

an extremely reasonable fee award in this case, as shown by awards 

in other cases. See generally the cases cited in our accom- 
  

panying Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Lav in Support of Plaintiffs’ 

Motion for an Award of Attorneys Fees, Expenses and Costs 

Expenses Incurred 

26. Plaintiffs request an award of $9,072.32 for out-of-pocket 

expenses incurred in MS II and MS III, broken down as follows: 
  

MS Il: 

Transportation $1,108.30 

Food 150.07 

Federal Express 595.73 

Temporary typist in New Orleans 1,491.53 

Supplies 21.94 

Subtotal Expenses MS II $3,367.57 $3,367.57 

MS TI11: 

Transportation $3,024.88 

Lodging 365,92 

Food 267.83 

Telephone 

Federal Express 

Temporary typist in New Orleans 

Supplies 

Express Mail 

Subtotal Expenses MS III $5,704.75 $5,704.75 

TOTAL EXPENSES MS II AND MS III $9,072.32 $9,072.32  



27. The foregoing expenses do not represent all of cur 

expenses in MS II and MS III, but they instead represent only 

those expenses for which we retain documented receipts and 

records. Each and all of the foregoing expenses are correct, all 

were necessarily incurred in MS II and MS III, and all services 

for which fees were charged were actually and necessarily 

performed. 

F. Costs Incurred 

28. Plaintiffs request an award of $723.28 in taxable 

statutory costs for MS II and MS 111, broken down as follows: 

MS 11 Xerox ing $ 386.50 

MS 111 Witness fees 165.00 

Service of process 108.50 

Deposition 25.00 

Xerox ing 38.28 

TOTAL STATUTORY COSTS MS II AND MS TII S$ 723.28 

29, The foregoing costs do not represent all of our taxable 

costs in MS II and MS III, but they instead represent only those 

costs for which we retain documented receipts and records. Each 

and all of the foregoing costs are correct, all were necessarily 

incurred in MSII and MSIII, and all services for which fees were 
  

charged were actually and necessarily performed. 

WHEREFORE, plaintiff's counsel respectfully request that 

this court grant an award of attorneys fees, expenses and costs 

in the amount of $130,379.60.  



I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is 

true and correct. 

Dated: March 7,1985 feegprcne Wilner 
oS rarity M. LYNN 
  

Sworn to before me this [Hh 

day of March, 1985 

om i¢ hey 4 

  

TTS Public 

Mew York 

D U9 HY) 

Quai Bod in Ne + York County 

Commission Expires March 30, 19:& 

NU 

 



EXHIBIT A: 

Contemporaneous Time Records of Suzanne Lynn 

 



SUZANNE M. LYNN HOURS 

MARGARET S. v. EDWARDS II 
  

DATE DESCRIPTION 
  

9/18/80 C: Janet Benshoof - re: new Louisiana statute 

TC: Carole Shauffer - re: challenge to above 

9/19 Read M.S. I papers 
C: J. Benshoof - re: above 

TC: C. Shauffer 

9/22 Research on TRO 
TC: C. Shuaffer - re: above 

9/23 C: : 3. Benshoof —- re: TRO 
TC: C. Shauffer —- re; TRO 

9/24 TC: C. Shauffer, Jane Johnson - re: TRO strategy 

9/25 C: J. Benshoof - re: TRO additional papers 

C3: C., Shauffer -— re: same 

9/26 TC: Dr. Hoffman — re: affidavit for TRO 
Draft Hoffman affidavit 

9/29 TC: George Gross - re: affidavit for TRO 
Draft Gross affidavit 

TC: CC. Shauffer - re: TRO affidavits 

9/30 TC: Dr. Scrignar - re: TRO affidavit 

Draft Scrignar affidavit 

10/1/80 TC: Dr. Gross - re: changes in affidavit 

Revise Gross affidavit 

10/3 TC: Dr.Gross - re: new affidavit 
TC: Dr. Hoffman - re: changes in affidavit 

Revise Hoffman affidavit 

TC: Dr. Scrignar - re: changes in affidavit 

Revise Scrignar affidavit 

TC: C. Shauffer, J. Johnson - re: TRO hearing 

C: J. Benshoof - re: TRO hearing 

TC: C. Shauffer, J. Johnson, J. Benshoof - re: 

TRO hearing 

Jay Pultz - re: financial arrangements  



DATE 
10/21 

10/23 

10/24 

10/29 

10/30 

10/31 

11/3/80 

DESCRIPTION 
  

C. Shauffer - re: TRO hearing 

Peggy Cottle - re: getting minors 

Judy levin - re: M.S, 1 

C. Shauffer - re: TRO hearing 

C. Shauffer - re: TRO hearing 

Research for preliminary injunction memo 
TC: CC. Shauffer - re: results of TRO hearing, 

scheduling, proof and appeal 

TC: C. Shauffer - re: preliminary injunction 
memo 

Research on preliminary injunction memo 
TC: C. Shauffer, J. Benshoof - re: post-TRO 

denial strategy 

Background reading on fetal description, informed 
consent and licensing requirements 

C: J. Benshoof —- re: same 

TC: C. Shauffer - re: preliminary injunction 

memo 
C: J. Benshoof - re: preliminary injunction 

memo 
Pre-trial brief draft on same physician require- 

ment, viability, informed consent provision 

TC: C. Shauffer - re: pre-trial conference 
TC: C. Shauffer, Jay Pultz =- re: locating a 

minor, harassment at Bozier City Clinic 

Statement of material facts 
TC: C. Shauffer - re: changing date of meeting 

with attorney general re: stipulation to facts 
Preparation - re: statement of facts; pre- 

trial conference 

Preparation of findings of fact for meeting 

with attorney general 

Preparation - re: trip to New Orleans and 

meeting with attorney general 

TC: C. Shauffer - re: two minors, new TRO 

TC: CC. Shauffer - re: intervention, class 

action 
Preparation for trip to New Orleans  



DESCRIPTION HOURS 
  

Pre-trial conference preparaton and motion 
to intervene 

TC: C. Shauffer - re: same 

TC: C. Shauffer - re: same 

Travel to New Orleans 

C: J. Benshoof - re: pre-trial conference 
Pre-trial preparation and motion to intervene 
TC: C. Shauffer - re: intervention 

Preparation for pre-trial conference 

Cs Jd... Johnson, .C. Shauffer, P. Cottle ~ 

possible minor intervenor 

Draft intervention papers 

Pre-trial conference 

CC: C. Shauffer and J. Johnson — re: case 

generally 

C: C. Shauffer - re: case generally 

Motion to enroll as counsel 

Travel to New York 

C: J. Benshoof - re: new TRO motion 

TC: C. Shauffer - re: new TRO motion 
Preparation for Forrest meeting 

C: Dr. Forrest - re: testimony at trial 
Research for Forrest testimony 
TC: C. Shauffer re: TRO pending trial 
TC: J. levin — re: papers 
TC: C. Shauffer - re: same as above 

C: J. Benshoof ~ re: minors, proposed consent 
decree 

TC: C. Shauffer - re: same as above 
Preparation for Forrest testimony 

Minors research 

Minors research 

TC: C. Shauffer - re: hearing on continuation 

Of trial 

TC: Aida Torres - re: study on minor 

TC: C. Shauffer, J. Johnson - re: adjournment 

Memo on M.S. II minors 

Minors research 

Informed consent research  



DATE 

11/25 

11/26 

11/28 

11/29 

11/30 

12/1/80 

12/2 

12/3 

12/9 

12/10 

12/11 

12/16 

12/17 

1/26/81 

1/27 

1/29 

DESCRIPTION 
  

TC: C. Shauffer — re: possible discovery 
Read article on notice 

Minors, informed consent research 

Informed consent, fetal disposal research 

Informed consent, fetal disposal research 

Minors research 

Informed consent, fetal research and preparation 
of testimony 

Shauffer - re: continuance 

Shauffer, J. Johnson - re: same 
Shauffer - re: pre-trial discovery 

Forrest, M. Torres — re: minors survey 

Shauffer - re: AGI study in Louisiana 

Forrest - re: AGI study in Louisiana 
Shauffer - re: AGI study in Louisisana 

Reading M.S. I transcripts 

Preparation for meeting on Louisiana study 

TC: C. Shauffer - re: someone to supervise 

study 
Meeting with Jeannie Rosoff, J. Forrest, A. 

Torres - re: study on Louisiana minors 

TC: A. Torres - re: questionnaire for teenagers 

TC: A. Torres - re: questions on Louisiana 

questionnaire 

TC: C. Shauffer - re: discovery on minors 

Discovery on minors; minors' survey 

Minors' survey 

TC: Dr. Sheley - re: minors' survey 
C: J. Benshoof '— re: experts 
TC: Dr. Porrest = re: minors 

T™C2 C. Shauffer - re: experts 
Discovery 
Research for experts 

Revising minors' survey  



DESCRIPTION 
  

Letter to Dr. Forrest 

Experts 

TC: Dr. Sheley ~ re: minors' survey 
Letter to Dr. Sheley 

Interrogatories and requests for admission 

Interrogatories and requests for admission 

Preparation for trip to New Orleans 

Travel to New Orleans 
C: C. shauffer, J. Benshoof - re: pre-trial 

preparation 

C: Dr. Smith re: testimony 

Preparation of trial notebook on minors 
C: P. Cottle - re: minor witnesses 

Read M.S. I transcripts 
Research on Louisiana Civil Procedure for 

up-dating interrogatories 

Read M.S. I transcript; pre-trial statement 

of facts 

C: Dr. STernberg and preparation for meeting 
re: fetal experimentation 

C:. K. Goldring 
Pre-trial memo 
TC: J. Johnson 
C: Dr. Tolmas - re: minors' testimony 
TC: Madeline Kochen - re: updating statistics 

on minors 

TC: . J. Benshoof and M. Kochen 

Pre-trial memo 

C: C. Shauffer and J. Johnson - re: pre-trial 
memo issues 

Pre-trial memo 

Travel to New York 

TC: C. Shauffer - re: depositions 
Pre-trial memo 

Pre-trial memo final 

Proposed witness list 

Opposition to defendants' request for continuance  



DESCRIPTION   

TC: C. Shauffer - re: opposition to defendants’ 
request for continuance 

TC: J. Johnson - re: same as above 

Read M.S. I transcripts 

Read M.S. I transcripts 
J. Benshoof —-.re: effect of H.L. On 

J. Benshoof - re: necessity of new plaintiff 
in light of H,.,L. 

Preparation of notice to produce 
TC: C. Shauffer - re: motion for continuance, 

witness list, depositions 
TC: C. .Shauffer - te: H.,L.'s effect 

TCs: C. Shauffer —- re: H.L, and extension of 
trial date - possible stipulation 

TCs J. Johnson - re: same 

TCr J. Collins’ clerk - re: same 
Cs: J. Benshoof ~- re: H.L. 

Read M.S. I transcripts 
Edit pre-trial memo on H.L.'s effect 

TC: C. Shauffer - re: H.L. and extension 
stipulation 

TC: J. Collins' clerk - re: pre-trial schedule 
TC: Dr. Forrest - re: extension 
C: E.R. Larson, J. Benshoof, B.J. Ennis ~ 

re: attorneys' fees implications of extension 
stipulation 

Letters to witnesses and experts - re: post- 

ponement of trial 
223.58 

 



SUZANNE LYNN 

MARGARET S. III ATTORNEYS FEES 

(without work on minors 

and emergency issues) 

  

DESCRIPTION 
  

TC: J. Johnson re: new statute; TRO 

TC: J.J. re: new statute; TRO 

Amended and supplemented complaint 

and memo of law 

TC: J.J. re: proposed stipulation 

TC: J. Collins! clerk re: pro- 

posed stipulation 

Draft stipulation 

Complaint 

TCs Ju Collins' clerk re: TRO 

negotiations 

Draft TRO papers 

Preparation for trip to New Orleans 

Travel to New Orleans 

Status conference with Judge 

Preparation of TRO 

Meeting with clients 

Travel to and from meeting 

Filing TRO 

Travel to New York City  



DESCRIPTION 
  

Letter to experts 

Research on second trimester abortions 

Motion for leave to file second 

amended complaint 

Motion to file second amended 

complaint 

Second amended complaint draft 

Research on second trimester for 

summary judgment motion 

Research on second trimester 

Research on second trimester 

TC: P. Bowers re: 

TC: J. Collins' clerk re: M.S. 1 fees 

Research on M.S. II fees 

M.S. II fees 

TC: P. Bowers re: requests for 

admission  



DESCRIPTION 
  

TC: J. Collins' clerk re: dlis- 

covery conference 

C: N.H. re: discovery 

TC: W. Wells re: working on M.S. III 

TC: T. Serrata re: Dr. Dott testifying 

Research on summary judgment motion - 

second timester 

summary judgment motion 

10-19-81 TC: Celeste, Bossier City Clinic 

re: testimony 

TC: D. Royster re: depositions 

TC: Ls White re: same 

Cs: N.H. and W.W. on trial co— 

ordination 

TC: Dr. Sternberg re: testimony 

Draft proposed list of witnesses 

TC: P. Bowers re: depositions 

C: N.H, re: trial 

Summary judgment motion: second 

trimester 

TC: T. Rayer re: depositions 

TC: P. Bowers re: same  



DESCRIPTION 
  

Summary judgment motion: and 

second trimester 

TC: P. Bowers re: summary judgment 

motion 

TC: T. Rayer re: depositions 

TC: T. Rayer re: depositions 

TC: C.S. re: M.S, 11 feecsy 

Scrignar testimony 

TC: Ward Cates re: possible testimony 

TC: J.J. re: Scrignar testimony 

C: M. Kochen re: defendants summary 

judgment motion 

C: W.W. re: pre-trial brief 

TC: P. Cottle re:travel and trial 

arrangements 

J.J. re: discovery problems 

Dr. Ritter re: deposition 

Dr. Ehrensing re: same 

Dr. Lawson re: same 

W.W. re: pre-trial brief 

TC: Dr. Steinberg 

TC: P. Bowers re: discovery 

Interrogatories with N.H. 

TC J.J. re: discovery 

TC: T. Rayer re: discovery  



DESCRIPTION 
  

Summary judgment motion on second 

trimester and pre-trial brief on 

informed consent 

Pre-trial brief - informed consent 

Pre-trial brief - informed consent 

and emergency 

TC: J.J. re: discovery 

TC: Dr. Sternberger re: testimony 

Pre-trial memo -informed consent; 

emergency 

C: N.H. re: pre-trial discovery 

schedule 

TC: Dr. Ehrensing re: his deposition 

TC: M. Kegel re: arrangements for 

depositions 

Amended witness list 

Reading AGI book on Louisiana 

Medical research 

Dr. Sternberg re: appointment 

Dr. Sheley re: appointment 

Dr. Ritter re: deposition 

M. Kegel re: deposition scheduling 

J.J. re: discovery 

Preparation for Ehrensing deposition  



DESCRIPTION 
  

TC: P. Cottle re: travel arrangements 

Preparation for Ehrensing deposition 

Pre-trial order preparation 

Ehrensing deposition preparation 

Ritter deposition preparation 

Ehrensing deposition preparation 

Research on informed consent for 

for depositions 

Laws on deposition preparation 

Pre-trial order preparation 

Preparation for New Orleans trip 

Laws on deposition preparation 

Travel to New Orleans 

Meeting with T. Rayer, N.H. on 

pre-trial order 

Lawson deposition 

C: Dr. Dott re: testimony 

Ehrensing deposition 

Meeting with plaintiff clinics 

Preparation for summary judgment 

motion argument 

Summary judgment motion argument  



DESCRIPTION 
  

Pre-trial order 

Ritter deposition 

Pre-trial conference 

C: Dr. Sternberg 

Calls re: pre-trial conference 

General research 

Travel to New York 

TC» T. Barnes 

TC: Dr. Jackson 

Preparation for Forrest meeting 

C: J.B., N.H. re: evidentiary 

problems at M.S. I trial 

TC: J. Collins re: pre-trial 

conference 

TC: P. Cottle re: pre-trial 

conference and summary judgment 

ruling 

TC: . Dr. Forrest re: same 

TC: J.J. res: same 

Ci Dr. Forrest, Dr. Friedman 

Preparation Forrest testimony 

Preparation Friedman testimony 

C: J.B., N.H. re: summary judgment 

ruling  



DESCRIPTION 
  

Cas B. Oakes re: same 

TC: Dr. Forrest re: same 

TC: J. Glick re: argument on TRO 

Memorandum of law in support of 

stay pending appeal 

Research on appeal 

stay pending appeal 

same 

J.J. re: same 

J. Glick re: arguments on TRO 

P. Cottle re: TRO 

Re-draft pre-trial order +23 

Read Jackson transcript from M.S. I .66 

Research for informed consent testimony 3.5 

Preparation for informed consent 

witnesses 

Preparation for Jackson, Oakes, Dott 

and Cottle testimony 

P. Cottle re: travel arrangements 

Dr. Dott re: trial preparation 

Dr. Jackson re: same  



DESCRIPTION 
  

Travel to New Orleans 

TC: Jackson re: trial preparation 

appointment 

Dott re: same 

Cottle re: same 

Oakes re: same 

Forrest re: same 

N.H. re: handling Forrest direct 

W.W. Re: deposition transcripts 

of defendants' experts 

Preparation Jackson questions 

Preparation Dott questions 

TC: Dr. Jackson re: trial preparation 

C: Dott re: preparation for trial 

C: Jackson re: same 

Preparation for meeting with P.C. 

Read deposition transcripts of 

defendants' experts 

C: P.C. re: preparation for trial 

Preparation for meetin with Barbara 

C: Jackson re: preparation for trial 

Read deposition transcripts of 

defendants' experts 

 



DESCRIPTION 
  

C: Barbara re: preparation for trial 

C: Dr. Sternberg res same 

TC:  P.C. re: trial testimony 

Reading deposition transcripts of 

defendants' experts 

Preparation opening statement 

Preparation Jackson, Dott direct 

Preparation Cottle, Oakes direct 

C: J.P., N.H. re: preparation for trial 

Trial (in court) 

Preparation for next 

Trial (in court) 

Preparation for next 

Trial (in court) 

Preparation for next 

Trial (in court) 

Preparation for next 

Trial (in court) 

Travel to New York 

Letters to Witnesses 

Draft findings of fact 

Draft findings 

Draft findings  



DESCRIPTION 
  

Draft findings 

Draft findings 

Draft findings 

Draft findings 

TC: D. Royster re: findings 

and conclusions 

Draft findings 

C: WW re: emerg. findings 

TC: D. Royster re: conclusions 

of law 

Draft conclusions of law 

Draft conclusions 

Revise findings and conclusions 

Revise findings and conclusions 

Preparation for closing argument 

TC: P. Bowers re: findings and 

conclusions 

Preparation for closing argument 

Travel to N.O. 

Closing argument  



EXHIBIT B: Resume of Suzanne Lynn 

 



SUZANNE M.LYNN 

American Civil Liberties Union 

 132 West 43rd Street 

(212) 362-4416 
New York, New York 10036 

(212) 944-9800 

ACCREDITATIONS 
  

Ad mitted to practice in New York, January 1976; 

Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, May 1976; 

United States Court of Appeals for the Second, Fourth, 

Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits; 

United States Supreme Court, April 1980 

EDUCATION 
  

J.D. Columbia University School of Law (1975) 

R.A. Radcliffe College (1971) (Magna Cum Laude) 

Romance Languages and Literatures 

(Spanish, French and Portuguese) 

  

EXPERIENCE 
  

September 1974 —- Present: Am erican Civil Liberties Union 
  

staff attorney, Reproductive Freedom Project: 

- litigation on a nationwide basis in cases involving 

abortion rights, sterilization abuse, and access to 

birth control; major cases include City of Akron Vv. 

Akron Center for Reproductive Health, the mostim- 

portant post Roe Vv. Wade reaffirmation of the right 

to abortion; MHRA V. Heckler, a successful challenge 

to the so-called "squeal rule" which would have re- 

quired federally-funded family planning clinics to 

notify parents of adolescent patients. 

  

  

  

- public speaking and lecturing on legal and political 

aspects of reproductive rights 

- legal analysis of and testim ony on bills affecting 

reproductive rights on Congressional and state legisla- 

tive levels  



i 
w 

— coordination of the nation-wide ACLU effort to stop the 

move ment in state legislatures to force Congress to call 

a constitutional convention on a "Human Life" A mend ment. 

March 1978 - August 1979: Attorney General of the State of New York 
  

Assistant Attorney Generalin Litigation Bureau responsible for 

the defense of the State in actions broughtin state and federal 

courts. Cases involved state-wide programs, including social 

services, insurance, medicaid, housing and civil service. 

August 1975 - March 1978: Conrad J. Lynn, Esq. 
  

Associate Attorney responsible for litigation in areas such as 

ad ministrative law, real estate, employment and housing dis- 

crimination, contracts, criminal, trusts and estates, small 

corporate, matrimonial, bankruptcy and negligence. 

OTHER ACTIVITIES 
  

Vice-Chair, National Abortion Rights Action League Board of 

Directors; Chairperson, Com mittee on Sterilization and the 

Mentally Retarded, N.Y.C. Health and Hospitals Corporation; 

Member, Advisory Panel to National Council of Negro Women 

Reproductive Rights Project, 1983; Member, National Conference 

of Black Lawyers, and Association of Black Women Attorneys; 

Member, Women and the Law conference Board of Directors; 

Organizer and panelist at the Black Women and the Law 

Conference, 1981. 

ARTICLES 

"mechnology and Reproductive Rights," Rutgers Women's Law 

Journal (Spring, 1983). 

  

"Rlack Women and Feminism", DuBois Review (Harvard Univ. 

Law School) (to be published). 
  

REFERENCES WILL BE PROVIDED UPON REQUEST.  



Affidavit of Nan Hunter 

With Exhibits A & B 

 



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 

MARGARET S., et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

Vv. 
Civil Action 

No. 78-2765 

DAVID C. TREEN, et al., 

Defendants. 

a
r
 

f
f
 

n
f
 

N
d
 

a
r
 

S
F
 

AFFIDAVIT OF NAN D. HUNTER 

State of New York ) 

County of New So) 

NAN D. HUNTER, being duly sworn under penalty of perjury, 

hereby affirms the following: 

1. I am co-counsel for the plaintiffs in the instant case. 

Since July of 1981, I have been employed as a full-time staff 

attorney for the Reproductive Freedom Project of the American 

Civil Liberties Union Foundation. Because I am a salaried 

employee of the A.C.L.U., I will receive no personal renumeration 

from an award of attorneys fees in this case. 

2. The attached Exhibit A is a compilation of my billable 

hours derived from the contemporaneous records which I kept of 

the time spent on Margaret S. III as plaintiffs' counsel. The 
  

total of my billable hours on Margaret S. III is 256.10. 
   



3 In reviewing my time records, I have deleted the 33.0 

hours I spent on work relating to the parental consent provision 

of the challenged statute. I have also deleted all time spent on 

public education concerning the case and conversations, meetings 

or other responses to requests for information. 

4. The hourly rate for which I am requesting compensation 

is $160. This rate is based on the affidavit of William 

Josephson attesting to the prevailing market rates for an attor- 

ney of my experience, reputation and ability. I have attached a 

copy of my resume as Exhibit B. 

5. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is 

true and correct. 

Nan Dir 
NAN D. HUNTER 
  

Sworn to before me this 27% 

day of March, 1985. 

Notary Public 
  

 



EXHIBIT A: 

Contemporaneous Time Records of Nan Hunter 

 



MARGARET S. v. TREEN: 

TIME RECORDS OF NAN D. HUNTER 
  

  

DESCRIPTION OF WORK TIME IN HOURS 
  

  

8/18/81 Briefing on case by SL, JB 5.2 

Review pleadings, MS I decision, 

and internal memos 

8/21/31 Review new statute 

Memo to plaintiffs re: new 

statute 

8/28/81 Interview Linda S. 
Draft affidavit of Linda S. 

Research memo of law for motion 

to intervene 

8/31/81 Draft motion for leave to intervene 

Linda S., memo of law and 

proposed order 

Final draft - affidavit of Linda S. 

9/4/81 Draft amendments to complaint 

Motion for leave to file amd. 

complaint 

9/11/81 Draft request for admissions 

Draft request for document 

production 

TC: D... Smith 

9/16/81 Revise discovery 

9/29/81 Research on defendants discovery 

arguments 

Conference with SL re: discovery 

9/30/81 TC: P. Bowers, T. Rayer re: 

discovery 

™Ts J. Johnson, J. Porrest 

10/6/81 Draft supplemental affidavit of 

Linda S. 
Draft affidavit of Dr. Helms 

Review defendants' responses 

to discovery 

10/7/81 Research motion to compel 

10/8/81 Draft motion to compel  



10/9/81 

10/14/81 

10/19/81 

10/20/81 

10/21/81 

10/23/81 

10/30/81 

11/2/81 

11/3/81 

11/4/81 

11/5/81 

11/6/81 

11/7/81 

11/8/81 

11/9/81 

11/10/81 

TC: J. Johnson. re: discovery 
Fdit motion to compel 

Read Research on the Fetus 
  

TC: J. Johnson re: motion to 

compel 
Conference: SL, W. Wells, re: 

trial planning 

TC: J. Johnson, A. Dott 

Review ultrasound material 

TC: T. Kerenyl 

Conference: SL re: trial planning 

Research summary judgment motion 

on experimentation 

Review materials on fetal 

research 
Draft exper. section - summary 

judgment motion 

TC: J. Johnson, J. Forrest 

Edit summary judgment motion 

TC. J. Johnson 

TC's: C. Merrit, P. Bowers, 

J. Johnson 

TC: Chrestman, J. Johnson 

Letters to Chrestman & Merrit 

Reserarch & draft pre-trial 

memo section: ultrasound 

Draft & revise pre-trial memo 

sections on experimentation, 

disposal of tissue 

Conference: SL re: pre-trial 

depositions 

Edit pre-trial memo 

Conference: T. Kerenyi 

TC's: D. Smith, B. Oaks, 

C. Frye, M. Cottle 

Draft opposition to defendants 

summary judgment - experimentation, 
disposal of tissue  



11/11/81 

11/12/81 

11/13/81 

11/15/81 

11/16/81 

11/17/81 

11/18/81 

11/19/81 

11/20/81 

11/23/81 

Clg A Dott, C. Merrit 

Review materials on ultrasound 

Draft deposition questions on 

ul trasound 

TC's: B. Gator, M. Cottle, 

D. Smith, M. Smith 

Deposition questions re: ultrasound 

Compile exhibits 

Pre-trial order - draft sections 

on ultrasound, experimentation, 

disposal of tissue 

Travel to N.O. 

Meet with T. Rayer 
Deposition of Lawson 

Meet with Dott 

Meet with Dr. Smith 

Deposition of Chrestman 

Deposition of Ehrensing 

Meeting with clinic reps. 

Prep. for argument of motn. compel 

Summary judgment motion hearing 

Motion to compel argument 

Finalize pre-trial order 

TC: M. Pernoll 

Revised Request for Admissions 

Review defendants proposed 

sections of pre-trial order 

Prepare direct examination 

for Dr. Smith 

Pre-trial conference 

Meet w. Dr. Sternberg 

Travel N.O. to N.Y.C. 

Draft direct examination 
questions re: ultrasound 

Letters: M. Smith, Sternberg 

Draft direct examination for 

Sternberg 

Review defendants pre-trial brief 

Memo re: student research on 

experimentation 

Conference: JB, SL re: evidentiary 

issues  



11/24/81 Conference: JB, SL. .rer 8J ruling 

TC w. Judge Collins, other counsel 

re: SJ 

11/25/81 Draft direct examn. of T. Kerenyi 

TC's: T. Rerenyi, M, Pernoll 

11/30/81 Read & take notes on Chrestman depn. 

Draft cross-examination of Chrestman 

TC's: P. Cottle, B. Oakes, J. Harris 

12/1/81 Travel to N.O. 

Meet w. SL, JJ re: stay 

Meet w. SL re: Forrest testimony 

12/2/81 Edit direct examination of 

J. Forrest 

Review Forrest exhibits 

Review arguments on tissue disposal 

Memo to file 

12/3/81 Witness conference w. A. Dott 

Witness conference w. C. Jackson 

Deposition of C. Merrit 

12/4/81 Witness conference w. M. Cottle 

Plan testimony of B. Oakes 

Witness conference w. C. Jackson 

TC: J. Penton re: disposal 

12/5/81 Witness conference w. B. Oakes 

Witness conference w. W. Sternberg 

Review evidentiary questions 

12/6/81 Witness conference w. J. Forrest 

Revise direct exam. of J. Forrest 

12/7/81 Trial (in court) 

Preparation for next day 

12/8/81 Trial {in court) 

Preparation for next day 

12/9/81 Trial (in court) 

Preparation for next day 

12/10/81 Trial (in court) 

Preparation for next day 

12/11/81 Trial (in court) 

Travel to New York 

12/14/81 Letter: J. Penton re: disposal 

of tissue  



12/15/81 

12/17/81 

12/30/81 

1/5/82 

1/25/82 

1/28/82 

2/1/82 

3/22/82 

3/31/82 

4/8/82 

4/9/82 

4/13/82 

4/23/82 

4/28/82 

5/25/82 

6/2/82 

Draft Findings of Fact (ultra-sound, 

disposal of tissue & experimen- 

tation) 

Letter fr. B. Farris re: disposal 

regs. 

Letters: B. Parris, J. Penton re: 

disposal regs. 

Revise PFindings of Fact 

Draft conclusions of law (ultra- 

sound, disposal of tissue & 

experimentation) 

Revise Findings & Conclusions 

Edit Findings & Conclusions 

Review new DHHR regns on disposal 

Memo to plaintiffs 

letter: B. Farris 

TC: . B. Farris 

Research, draft sum. judg. motn. & 

memo of law on disposal 

Revise sum. judg. memo of law 

Letter: J. Frwin re: DHHR regs. 

Review defendants Oppn to Sum Judgmt 

TC: R. Raver, P. Bowers 

TC: J. Erwin 

Letter: T. Rayer & P. Bowers 

Review final DHHR regs; letters 

TC's: M. Cottle, B. Oakes 

 



EXHIBIT B: Resume of Nan Hunter 

 



RESUME NAN D. HUNTER 
  

Mailing Address: American Civil Liberties Union 

132 West 43rd Street 
New York, New York 10036 

Telephone: (212) 944-9800 

EMPLOYMENT 
  

American Civil Liberties Union: National Staff Counsel, Repro- 

ductive Freedom Project; July, 1981 to present. 

Federal court litigation of constitutional and statutory 

challenges to laws infringing right of reproductive 

choice; legislative analysis; preparation of memoranda on 

selected issues; public education. 

Private law practice, Hunter, Polikoff, Bodley and Bottum, 

washington, D.C.; 1976 to 198]. 

General civil practice with emphasis on family law and 

women's rights. 

TEACHING 

George Washington University School of Law, Washington, D.C. 

Women and the Law - 1981 

Catholic University School of Law, Washington, D.C. 

Women and the Law - 1979, 1980, and 1981 

Antioch School of Law, Washington, D.C. 

Family Law - 1981 

EDUCATION 

J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1975 

Declined law review; instructor of legal writing and 

research (honors course). 

B.A. in Political Science, Northwestern University, 1971  



NAN D. HUNTER Page 2 
  

SELECTED LITIGATION 
  

Rendrick v. Heckler, Civil Action No. 83-3175, U.S. District 

Court, District of Columbia - in litigation. 
  

Establishment Clause challenge to federal statute 
providing public funds to religious and other 
organizations for sex education programs which plaintiffs 

assert advance religions teachings. 

Scheinberg v. Smith, 550 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D. Fla. 1982). 
  

Successful trial (on remand) of challenge to restrictive 
abortion law, involving detailed medical evidence on 

sequelae of abortions. 

Planned Parenthood Assn. of Utah. v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. 1001 

{D.. Utah 1983). 
  

Successful challenge to statute imposing parental 

notification requirement on minors' access to con- 

traceptives. 

City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S.Ct. 

2481 (1983). 
  

Member of litigation team; decision struck down ordinance 

imposing barriers to women's exercise of abortion choice. 

Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983), noted 11 No. 

Ky. L. Rev, 213 (1984). 
  

Amicus brief arguing against including fetus within scope 

of homicide statute, focusing on constitutional and tort 

law principles which provide remedies for interference 

with reproductive choice without creating a false concept 

of "personhood" for the fetus. 

v, Collins, F.Supp. {W.D. Ry. 1984). 
  

Summary judgment granted on invalidity of various 

abortion restrictions, including finding of facial 

invalidity of parental consent requirement. 

Planned Parenthood of Rhode Island v. Bd. of Medical Review, 

F. Supp. {D.R.I. 1984). 
  

Ruling that pre-abortion husband notification requirement 

violates married woman's privacy rights; Equal Protection 

point briefed but not reached.  



NAN D. HUNTER 
  

PUBLICATIONS 
  

"Abortion Affirmed: What Akron Does and Does Not Say," 
The Nation, Aug. 20-27, 1983. 
  

"Child Support Law and Policy: The Systemic Imposition of Costs 

on Women," 6 Harvard Women's Law Journal 1 (1983). 
  

"Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Litigation 

Strategy," 25 Buffalo Law Review 691 (1976) (co-author). 
  

"False Promises: Feminist Anti-Pornography Legislation in the 

U.S.," in V. Burstyn (ed.), Women Against Censorship, 

forthcoming, 1985. (co-author). 
  

"Women and Child Support," in I. Diamond (ed.), Families, 

Politics and Public Policy, Longman Press, 1983. 
  

SELECTED PUBLIC SPEAKING 
  

Congressional testimony: Hearings on the Adolescent Family Life 

Act Before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment 

of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, April 27, 

1984. 

Testimony before the City Council of Cincinnati, Ohio, on 

proposed ordinances regulating minors' access to abortion 

services, Sept. 9, 1981. 

Guest lectures and speeches on the topic of reproductive rights 

at N.Y.U Law School; Kennedy School of Government Insti- 

tute of Politics, Harvard University; Brooklyn Law 

School; State University of New York, Buffalo; Hunter 

College; Hampshire College, and various community and 

civic groups. 

Numerous TV, radio and newspaper interviews.  



Affidavit of William Josephson 

With Exhibits A & B 

 



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 

  

MARGARET S., et al., 

Plaintiffs, 
: Civil Action 

-v- : No. 78-2765 

DAVID D. TREEN, et al., 

Defendants. 

  

AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM JOSEPHSON IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES 
  

WILLIAM JOSEPHSON, being duly sworn under penalty of 

perjury, hereby affirms the following: 

1. I have been a partner in Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver 

& Jacobson since January 1, 1968. Prior to that time, among 

other things, I was General Counsel of the Peace Corps, Far 

East Regional Counsel in the International Cooperation 

Administration of the Department of State, and an associate 

with Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison in New York. I 

graduated from Columbia University School of Law in 1955 where 

I served as an editor of the Columbia Law Review and from The 

University of Chicago in 1952. I had honor scholarships at 

both schools. I am a member of the bars of the State of New 

York, the District of Columbia and Supreme Court of the United 

States.  



2. I have practiced law either as a member of a law firm 

or as a lawyer working for the United States Government for 

virtually the whole of the 30 years since I graduated law 

school. At the beginning of my practice I was trained as a 

litigator. Most of my experience during the last ten years has 

been in the area of public finance. TI have, however, continued 

to handle my own litigation including recent cases in the 

Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of New 

Hampshire, as well as the Supreme Court of the State of New 

York. 

3. Fried, Frank bills its clients on the basis of hourly 

time charges. These hourly time charges depend mainly but not 

entirely on the seniority and the rates of compensation of each 

lawyer. Each lawyer's rate of compensation also is determined 

mainly on the basis of seniority. Most partners' current 

hourly rate is $250.00 an hour. Rates for partners at Fried, 

Frank generally range from $180.00 an hour to $275.00 an hour. 

4. TI have reviewed the resumes of Ms. Suzanne M. Lynn and 

Ms. Nan D. Hunter, copies of which are attached as Exhibits A 

and B. I note that both in 1975 graduated from major national 

law schools, Ms. Lynn from Columbia and Ms. Hunter from 

Georgetown. Both have had experience in private practice. 

Ms. Lynn has also had experience as a litigator with the 

Attorney General of the State of New york. Either would have 

been seriously considered for employment at Fried, Frank had 

they applied for employment on their graduation from law school,  



5. Fried, Frank is now considering for partnership 

persons who graduated from law school in 1978. Time charges 

for associates in the class of 1978 are $175.00 an hour. Time 

charges for associates who graduated from law school earlier 

than 1978 range from $165.00 to $190.00 an hour. 

6. Fried, Frank's time charges for associates were 

recently reviewed and redetermined as of January 1, 1985. In 

the course of this review and redetermination we satisfied 

ourselves that the hourly rates we fixed for the charging of 

time for our associates as of January 1, 1985 were competitive 

with the rates of similar firms in Washington and New York 

City, the two places where this firm maintains its most 

substantial offices. Prior to this redetermination, associates 

in the class of 1978 had $160.00 hourly time charges, and 

associates in earlier classes had hourly time charges which 

ranged from $155.00 to $190.00. 

7. Based upon the foregoing and my own experience with 

the time charges of other lawyers in New York and the bills 

they render, it is my opinion that a time charge rate of 

$160.00 for Ms. Lynn and Ms. Hunter is fully comparable with 

the time charge rates of other New York lawyers similarly 

qualified. 

  
gel 

illiam Jose on / 

Sworn to me before this 
7 day of March, 1985 

MAUREEN GABRIEL 
Notary Public, State of N 

isdn Plot flo FtsEaial 
Certificat, 

Notary Pydblic Commission Expires March 30.18 — 
   



EXHIBIT A: 

Copy of the Affidavit of Suzanne Lynn 

 



SUZANNE M. LYNN 

American Civil Liberties Union 

132 West 43rd Street 

New York, New York 10036 

(212) 944-9800 

ACCREDITATIONS 
  

Ad mitted to practice in New York, January 1976; 

Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, May 1976; 

United States Court of Appeals for the Second, Fourth, 

Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits; 

United States Supreme Court, April 1980 

EDUCATION 
  

J.D. Columbia University School of Law (1975) 

R.A. Radcliffe College (1971) (Magna Cum Laude) 

Romance Languages and Literatures 

(Spanish, French and portuguese) 

  

EXPERIENCE 
  

September 1974 - Present: American Civil Liberties Union 
  

staff attorney, Reproductive Freedom Project: 

- litigation on a nationwide basis in cases involving 

abortion rights, sterilization abuse, and access to 

birth control; major cases include City of Akron v. 

Akron Center for Reproductive Health, the mostim- 

portant post Roe V. Wade reaffirmation of the right 

to abortion; MHRA V. Heckler, a successful challenge 

to the so-called "squeal rule" which would have re- 

quired federally-funded family planning clinics to 

notify parents of adolescent patients. 

  

  

  

- public speaking and lecturing on legal and political 

aspects of reproductive rights 

- legal analysis of and testimony on bills affecting 

reproductive rights on Congressional and state legisla- 

tive levels  



— coordination of the nation-wide ACLU effort to stop the 

move ment in state legislatures to force Congress to ca 

a constitutional convention on a "Human Life" Amendment 

March 1978 - August 1979: Attorney General of the State of New York 

  

Assistant Attorney Generalin Litigation Bureau responsible for 

the defense of the State in actions brought in state and federal 

courts. Cases involved state-wide programs, including social 

services, insurance, medicaid, housing and civil service. 

August 1975 - March 1978: Conrad J. Lynn, Esq. 
  

Associate Attorney responsible for litigation in areas such as 

ad ministrative law, real estate, em ployment and housing dis- 

crimination, contracts, criminal, trusts and estates, small 

corporate, matrimonial, bankruptcy and negligence. 

OTHER ACTIVITIES 
  

Vice-Chair, National Abortion Rights Action League Board of 

Directors; Chairperson, Com mittee on Sterilization and the 

Mentally Retarded, N.Y.C. Health and Hospitals Corporation; 

Me mber, Advisory Panel to National Council of Negro Women 

Reproductive Rights Project, 1983; Member, National Conference 

of Black Lawyers, and Association of Black Women Attorneys; 

Member, Women and the Law conference Board of Directors; 

organizer and panelist at the Black Women and the Law 

Conference, 1981. 

ARTICLES 

"mechnology and Reproductive Rights," Rutgers Women's Law 

Journal (Spring, 1983). 

  

"Black Women and Feminism", DuBois Review (Harvard Univ. 

Law School) (to be published). 
  

REFERENCES WILL BE PROVIDED UPON REQUEST.  



EXHIBIT B: 

Copy of the Affidavit of Nan Hunter 

 



RESUME NAN D. HUNTER 
  

Mailing Address: American Civil Liberties Union 

132 West 43rd Street 

New York, New York 10036 

Telephone: (212) 944-9800 

EMPLOYMENT 
  

American Civil Liberties Union: National Staff Counsel, Repro- 

ductive Freedom Project; July, 1981 to present. 

Federal court litigation of constitutional and statutory 

challenges to laws infringing right of reproductive 

choice; legislative analysis; preparation of memoranda on 

selected issues; public education. 

Private law practice, Hunter, Polikoff, Bodley and Bottum, 

washington, D.C.; 1976 to 1981. 

General civil practice with emphasis on family law and 

women's rights. 

TEACHING 

George Washington University School of Law, Washington, D.C. 

Women and the Law - 1981 

Catholic University School of Law, Washington, D.C. 

Women and the Law - 1979, 1980, and 1981 

Antioch School of Law, Washington, D.C. 

Family Law - 1981 

EDUCATION 

J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1975 

Declined law review; instructor of legal writing and 

research (honors course). 

B.A. in Political Science, Northwestern University, 1971  



NAN D. HUNTER 
  

SELECTED LITIGATION 
  

Kendrick v. Heckler, Civil Action No. 33-3175, U.S. District 

Court, District of Columbia - in litigation. 
  

Establishment Clause challenge to federal statute 

providing public funds to religious and other 

organizations for sex education programs which plaintiffs 

assert advance religions teachings. 

Scheinberg v. Smith, 550 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D. Fla. 1982). 
  

Successful trial (on remand) of challenge to restrictive 

abortion law, involving detailed medical evidence on 

sequelae of abortions. 

Planned Parenthood Assn. of Utah. v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. 1001 

(D. Utah 1983). 
  

Successful challenge to statute imposing parental 

notification requirement on minors' access to con-= 

traceptives. 

City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S.Ct. 

2481 (1983). 
  

Member of litigation team; decision struck down ordinance 

imposing barriers to women's exercise of abortion choice. 

Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983), noted 11 No. 

Ky. L. Rev. 213 (1984). 
  

Amicus brief arguing against including fetus within scope 

of homicide statute, focusing on constitutional and tort 

law principles which provide remedies for interference 

with reproductive choice without creating a false concept 

of "personhood" for the fetus. 

Eubanks v. Collins, F.Supp. (W.D. Ky. 1984). 
  

Summary judgment granted on invalidity of various 

abortion restrictions, including finding of facial 

invalidity of parental consent requirement. 

Planned Parenthood of Rhode Island Vv. Bd. of Medical Review, 

¥. Supp. {D.R.I. 1984), 
  

Ruling that pre-abortion husband notification requirement 

violates married woman's privacy rights; Equal Protection 

point briefed but not reached.  



NAN D. HUNTER 
  

PUBLICATIONS 
  

"Abortion Affirmed: What Akron Does and Does Not Say," 

The Nation, Aug. 20-27, 1983. 
  

"Child Support Law and Policy: The Systemic Imposition of Costs 

on Women," 6 Harvard Women's Law Journal 1 (1983). 
  

"Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Litigation 

Strategy," 25 Buffalo Law Review 691 (1976) (co-author). 
  

"False Promises: Feminist Anti-Pornography Legislation in the 

U.S.," in V. Burstyn (ed.), Women Against Censorship, 

forthcoming, 1985. (co-author). 
  

"Women and Child Support," in I. Diamond (ed.), Families, 

Politics and Public Policy, Longman Press, 1983. 
  

SELECTED PUBLIC SPEAKING 
  

Congressional testimony: Hearings on the Adolescent Family Life 

Act Before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment 

of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, April 27; 

1984. 

Testimony before the City Council of Cincinnati, Ohio, on 

proposed ordinances regulating minors' access to abortion 

services, Sept. 9, 1981. 

Guest lectures and speeches on the topic of reproductive rights 

at N.Y.U Law School; Kennedy School of Government Insti- 

tute of Politics, Harvard University; Brooklyn Law 

School; State University of New York, Buffalo; Hunter 

College; Hampshire College, and various community and 

civic groups. 

Numerous TV, radio and newspaper interviews.  



Certificate of Service 

 



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICGT.OF LOUISIANA 
Ld 

MARGARET S., et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

Ve 
Civil Action 

Mo. 78-2765 

DAVID C. TREEN, et al., 

Defendants. 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

Suzanne M. Lynn, counsel for plaintiffs in the above-styled 

case, hereby certifies that one copy of the attached Notice of 

Motion and Plaintiffs' Motion for an Award of Attorneys Fees, 

Expenses and Costs was mailed, first class postage prepaid, on 

March 11, 1985, upon counsel for defendants as follows: 

William J. Guste, Jr. 

Attorney General 

Patricia Bowers 

Assistant Attorney General 

Thomas Rayer 

Special Assistant Attorney General 

234 Loyola Avenue 
Seventh Floor 

New Orleans, Louisiana 70118 

All persons required to be served have been served. 

  

SUZANNE M. LYNN