Bossier Parish School Board v. Lemon Brief for Appellees
Public Court Documents
August 1, 1965
Cite this item
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Bossier Parish School Board v. Lemon Brief for Appellees, 1965. ce4cc928-ca9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/7bed77e5-ef87-4d14-8ca9-0d0f16692861/bossier-parish-school-board-v-lemon-brief-for-appellees. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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I s r t h e
(E m tri n f Kppmlz
F or the F ieth Circuit
No. 22,675
B ossier P arish School B oard, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants,
versus
Ura B ernard L emon, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees.
appeal erom the united states district court for the
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES
J esse N. Stone, J r.
854i/2 Texas
Shreveport, Louisiana
J ack Greenberg
Norman C. Amaker
S heila Rush
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019
Attorneys for Appellees
I N D E X
PAGE
Statement of the Case ............ ..................................... 1
A rgument :
The District Court Properly Found That Plain
tiffs Have Standing to Bring This Suit to Desegre
gate the Public Schools in Bossier Parish .............. 4
A. The Contract Between the School Board and
the Government Created an Identity of Eight
Between Federal Children and Resident Chil
dren .......................... -............ ........................... 4
B. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to a Desegregated Edu
cation Under the Fourteenth Amendment and
Under Title VI of the Civil Eights Act of 1964 6
C. Negro Children Attending Segregated Public
Schools Have a Constitutional Eight to a De
segregated Education Independent of the Con
tract and Statute..................................-............. 7
Conclusion..................... -.......................................................... 8
Table op Cases
Brunson v. Board of Trustees of Clarendon County, 311
F. 2d 107 (4th Cir. 1962) ........................................... 8
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) .... 6
Burke v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 234 U. S. 669
(1914) ................. .......-.......- ............................... -...... 4
Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, 308 F. 2d 491,
499 (5th Cir. 1962) 8
11
PAGE
Flagler Hospital, Inc. v. Hayling, 344 F. 2d 950 (5th
Cir. 1965) .......................... ................................... . 6
Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States, 356
U. S. 1 (1958) ........................................ ...... .............. 4
Potts v. Flax, 313 F. 2d 284 (5th Cir. 1963) .............. 8
Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F. 2d
959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert, denied 376 U. S. 938 (1964) 6
Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc., 336 F. 2d 630
(6th Cir. 1964) ............................................................. 6
U. S. v. Bossier Parish School Board, 220 F. Supp. 243
(W. D. La. 1963) aff’d per curiam 336 F. 2d 197
(5th Cir. 1964) ........................................................... 5
U. S. v. County School Board of Prince George County,
Va., 221 F. Supp. 93 (E. D. Va. 1963) ..................... 4, 5
U. S. v. Madison County Board of Education, 326 F. 2d
237 (5th Cir. 1964) ..................................................... 5
U. S. v. Sumter County School District No. 2, 232 F.
Supp. 945 (E. D. S. C. 1964)....................................... 5
Statutes I nvolved
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, §§601, 602 ....2, 3, 6, 7
20 U. S. C. A. §§631-645 .................................................. 2
1st the
llnxUb Stater* (Enter! of Appeals
F ob the F ifth Circuit
No. 22,675
B ossier P arish School B oard, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants,
versus
U ra Bernard Lemon, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees.
appeal from the united states district court for the
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES
Statement of the Case
Appellants (defendants below), The Bossier Parish
School Board and its superintendent, Emmett Cope, appeal
an order granting an injunction against continued opera
tion of a racially segregated school system and requiring
submission of a desegregation plan in accordance with the
requirements of the decisions of this court (R. 6, 113-115,
125, 126). The sole ground of their appeal is lack of stand
ing of appellees (plaintiffs below) to sue.
Appellees are Negro citizens of the United States who
are military personnel stationed at the time of suit at
Barksdale Air Force Base, Bossier Parish, Louisiana.
2
They sued on behalf of their minor children to enjoin the
School Board from operating racially segregated schools in
Bossier Parish, Louisiana (R. 1-3). Upon attempting on
or about August 31,1964 to enroll in “white” Bossier Parish
schools closer to their homes than “Negro” schools, plain
tiffs were required by the principals of the “white” schools
to obtain transfer applications from the “Negro” schools (R.
5, 6). On September 29, 1964, plaintiffs’ requests for trans
fer were denied.
Plaintiffs and the United States plaintiff-intervenor,
moved for summary judgment, relying particularly upon
the applications for federal assistance filed by the School
Board with the United States Office of Education and the
affidavit of the Assistant Commissioner and Director of
the Division of School Assistance in Federally Affected
Areas which showed that since 1951 defendants had received
more than $1,860,000 from the United States for school
construction under 20 U. S. C. A. §§631-645 (R. 62, 69-91).
The School Board’s applications for construction funds
all contained substantially the following assurance set forth
in the 1962 application:
The Applicant’s school facilities will be available to
the children for whose education contributions are
provided in Public Law 815, as amended, on the same
terms, in accordance with the laws of the state in which
Applicant is situated, as they are available to other
children in Applicant’s school district (R. 81).
Despite defendant’s affidavit that no federal money had
been received for construction since the passage of the 1964
Civil Rights Act (R. 96), the court determined that since
3
the School Board had accepted without reservation $446,338
on November 9, 1964 and $157,302 on November 13, 1964
for the operation and maintenance of its schools (R. 108),
the acceptance of federal money constituted a ratification
of the earlier contract, estopping defendants from denying
plaintiffs the same rights to school attendance as resident
children (R. 107, 108). Federal children were thus in the
same position as resident children and “entitled to bring
this suit on behalf of the class consisting of all Negro chil
dren eligible to attend Bossier Parish schools, whether be
cause of residence or contract” (R. 107).
The court also found that as a result of the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, defendants’ acceptance of
funds in 1964 obligated them to provide education to fed
eral children without racial discrimination. Plaintiffs, at
tending schools operated and maintained by these funds,
thus had standing under §601 to maintain the desegregation
action (R. 109, 110).
Defendants’ specifications of error, restated, challenge
the following two district court findings:
(1) That there was an enforceable contract giving the
federal children the same rights to school attendance
as resident children;
(2) That plaintiffs have standing to sue under §601 of
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
4
A R G U M E N T
The District Court Properly Found That Plaintiffs
Have Standing to Bring This Suit to Desegregate the
Public Schools in Bossier Parish.
A. T he Contract Betw een the School B o a rd and the
G overnm ent Created an Identity o f R ight Between
Federal C hildren and R esident C hild ren .
It is beyond question that the Bossier Parish School
Board’s assurance that its facilities would be available to
federal children on the same basis as resident children
gave federal children the same right of school attendance.
These assurances, given in exchange for the receipt of
federal money, effectively eliminated any distinction be
tween the two groups and gave the federal children what
the trial court described as “rights . . . identical in weight
and effect” (R. 106).
It is, therefore, inapposite for defendants to argue:
(1) that as non-residents, federal children have no right
to attend state schools, and (2) that Bossier Parish is
under no obligation to educate federal children. It has
long been recognized that federal grants authorized by
Congress for a specific purpose create binding contracts.
Burke v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 234 U. S. 669
(1914); Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1
(1958). Recently, and under facts strikingly similar to
those here, this rule was reaffirmed. In U. S. v. County
School Board of Prince George County, Va., 221 P. Supp.
93 (E. D. Va. 1963), where defendants contended, as the
School Board does here, that an assurance making school
facilities available to federal children on the same basis
5
as local children did not create a contractual obligation,
the court found an enforceable contract. Similarly, in U. S.
v. Sumter County School District No. 2, 232 F. Supp. 945,
950 (E. 13. S. C. 1964), the court upheld the federal chil
dren’s contractual right to an education, holding that the
federal grants given in exchange for the assurance of the
School Board “create binding contracts.”
In support of their contention that no enforceable con
tract was created, defendants rely heavily upon U. S. v.
Madison County Board of Education, 326 F. 2d 237 (5th
Cir. 1964). As the trial court pointed out, however, that
case did not hold that no enforceable contract was created,
but determined, rather, that under the contract the Attor
ney General was not authorized to sue to desegregate the
schools. In the instant case, plaintiffs do not base their
right to a desegregated education on the contract; they
rely on the contract solely for the right to attend Bossier
Parish schools.1
1 The trial court specifically found that the contractual assur
ances did not give plaintiffs the right to a desegregated education
(R. 105). See U. 8. v. Bossier Parish School Board, 220 F. Supp.
243 (W. D. La. 1963) aff’d per curiam 336 F. 2d 197 (5th Cir.
1964), and U. S. v. Madison County Board of Education, supra.
In TJ. S. v. County School Board of Prince George County, Va.,
supra, however, the court not only recognized the existence of a
contract but also found that the rights of federal children were
determined by the law of the state, including modifications in the
state segregation law caused by United States Supreme Court
decisions. Cf. TJ. S. v. Sumter County School District No. 2, supra.
6
B. P laintiffs Are Entitled to a D esegregated Education
U nder the Fourteenth Am endm ent and Under Title
VI o f the Civil R ights Act o f 1964 .
Nowhere in their brief do defendants dispute the pro
hibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment as enunciated in
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954). More
over, the School Board does not contest the lower court’s
conclusion that once the identity of right between federal
children and resident children is established, plaintiffs are
entitled to the equal protection of the laws granted by the
Fourteenth Amendment and can sue on behalf of all Negro
children to desegregate the public schools.
What defendants dispute is the lower court’s finding
that §601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 19642
provides plaintiffs with an alternative basis for relief.
Specifically, defendants contend that the administrative
provisions set forth in the Title create an exclusive rem
edy and bar private civil actions.
The district court’s determination that standing to de
segregate the public schools of Bossier Parish could be
premised on §601 of Title VI is wholly consistent with the
line of cases affording individual relief against institu
tions receiving federal funds. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital, 323 F. 2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert,
denied 376 U. S. 938; cf. Flagler Hospital, Inc. v. Ilayling,
344 F. 2d 950 (5th Cir. 1965); Smith v. Holiday Inns of
America, Inc., 336 F. 2d 630 (6th Cir. 1964).
2 Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.
7
Nothing in the statute or the legislative history suggests
that an exclusive, remedy was intended. Section 602 which
sets forth the administrative remedy, in addition, au
thorizes the effectuation of §601 “by any other means au
thorized by law.” This is hardly language describing an
exclusive administrative remedy. It is more aptly a refer
ence to the variety of actions brought by private parties to
enforce constitutional rights. Moreover, it is highly un
likely that Congress intended Title VI to limit the unfold
ing of a private right to sue to desegregate institutions
receiving federal funds to judicial development. It is much
more reasonable to conclude, as did the district court, that
private rights were extended under Title VI.
This is even more likely when we consider that the exist
ence of a Title VI administrative remedy is not inconsistent
with the creation of private rights. Plaintiffs are not at
tempting to cut off federal funds going to Bossier Parish
schools as the government would in an administrative pro
ceeding to enforce a school district’s obligation under Title
VI. Plaintiffs, rather, are suing to require desegregation
where federal funds have been accepted, drawing upon the
obligation set forth in §601 as the source of their right to
enforce their right to a desegregated education.
C. Negro Children Attending Segregated P ublic Schools
Have a C onstitutional R ight to a Desegregated Educa
tion Independent o f the Contract and Statute.
It is clear from decisions of this Court that standing re
quirements for class relief against system-wide segrega
tion differ from those where individual rights are being
vindicated. Where the suit aims at the desegregation of
a school system, any member of the class to be benefited
8
has standing to sue. Potts v. Flax, 313 F. 2d 284 (5th Cir.
1963). Cf. Brunson v. Board of Trustees of Clarendon
County, 311 F. 2d 107 (4th Cir. 1962). This distinction was
carefully drawn in Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board,
308 F. 2d 491, 499 (5th Cir. 1962), a school desegregation
case where the court held that “Negro children in the public
schools have a constitutional right to have a public school
system administered free from . . . segregation.” The
court found this right belonged to the class “irrespective of
any individual’s right to be admitted on a non-raeial basis
to a particular school.”
CONCLUSION
W herefore, plaintiffs respectfully submit tha t the order
of the d istrict court be affirmed.
Eespectfully submitted,
J esse N. Stone, J r.
854% Texas
Shreveport, Louisiana
J ack Greenberg
Norman C. A maker
Sheila R ush
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019
Attorneys for Appellees
9
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that I have served copies of the fore
going Brief for Appellees upon Jack P. F. Gremillion,
Attorney General, State of Louisiana, William P. Schuler,
Assistant Attorney General, Louis H. Padgett, Jr., Dis
trict Attorney, Bossier Parish, Louisiana, J. Bennett John-
ston, Jr., 930 Giddens-Lane Building, Shreveport, Louisi
ana, attorneys for appellants, and St. John Barrett, De
partment of Justice, Washington, D. C., by mailing copies
to them at the above addresses, air mail, postage prepaid.
This day of August, 1965.
Attorneys for Appellees
o£S||lp|si 38