Furman v. Georgia Brief Amicus Curiae

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Fights for Criminal Justice

    IN THE

Supreme Court of The United States

No. 69-5003

W illiam H usky F urman,
Petitioner,

v .

State op Georgia,
Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME 
COURT OF GEORGIA

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE

T heodore L. S endak 
Attorney General of Indiana

David O. Givens 
Deputy Attorney General

Offices of the Attorney General 
219 State House 
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204 
Telephone: 317-633-5512

C entral Publish ing  Company, Inc., Indianapolis, Ind. 46206



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Table of Authorities ......................................................  ii

Question presented for review......... ............................ 2

Statement of the case ....................................................   2

Summary of the argum ent..................................    2

Argument ...............................................    4

Conclusion .................................................    15

i



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page
Adams v. State (1971), 271 NE 2d 425 .................... 8
Bailey v. United States (1934), 74 F. 2d 451......... . 7
Robinson v. California (1962), 370 U.S. 660 ...........  4
Troy v. Dulles (1958), 356 U.S. 86 ..........................3, 5,6
Weems v. United States (1910), 217 U.S. 349 ............. 8

Miscellaneous:
Barshay, Sr. Schol. 71:6 ..............................    15
Gerstein, J. Crim. L. 51:252 (1961) .........................  10
Harvard Law Review, 79:635 (1966) ........................ 8,9
Parry, History of Torture in England 9 (1934) .........  5
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Report 18, 

note 15 ....................................................................... 13
Sendak, Vital Speeches of the Day, July 1, 1971 . .11,12,13
Sherman, 14 Crim and Delinquency 73, (1968) .........  5
William & Mary, Sess 2, Ch. 2 ..................................... 4

United States Constitution:
Fifth Amendment ................................................... Passim
Eighth Amendment ...............................................  Passim
Fourteenth Amendment ................      Passim

Indiana Constitution:
Article I, Section 16 ....................................................  1

Indiana Statutes:
IC 1971 35-1-46-9 et. seq. (Burns’ Section 9-2236 et. 

seq.) ................................................   2

ii



IN THE

Supreme Court of The United States

No. 69-5003

W illiam H enry F urman,
Petitioner,

v.

State oe Georgia,
Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME 
COURT OF GEORGIA

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE

The interest of the State of Indiana is in the preserva­
tion of the Indiana Constitution and statutes that are 
directly analogous to those in question. In the Bill of 
Rights of the Indiana Constitution, at Section 16, it is pro­
vided that:

“ Excessive bail shall not .be required. Excessive fines 
shall not be imposed. Gruel and unusual punishments

1



2

shall not he inflicted. All penalties shall he propor­
tioned to the nature of the offense.” (My emphasis.)

Indiana statutes, IC 1971, 35-1-46-9, as found in Bums’ 
(1956 Repl.) Section 9-2236 et. seq. provide for the death 
penalty by electrocution.

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether Georgia’s statute allowing the death penalty 
for a conviction of. first, degree murder constitutes cruel 
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitu­
tion.

■ STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Statement of the Case contained in the Brief of 

Respondent is accurate and concise and is referred to here.
; y . v  /; ;; . . - : / ■' »

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Capital punishment is not “ cruel and unusual punish­

ment’’ in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The framers 
of the Bill of Rights had in mind the abolishment of other 
penalties such as those attributed to the infamous English 
Court of Star Chamber.

The Fifth Amendment, which was ratified at the same 
time as the Eighth Amendment, only requires that due 
process be observed in assessing the ultimate penalty. The 
intent of the framers is to be found in the explicit language 
of the Fifth Amendment and not in the nebulous “ cruel 
and unusual punishment” phrase contained in the Eighth 
Amendment; which has until this day defied precise def­
inition.



3

Petitioners argue that the “ cruel and unusual punish­
ment” clause should be viewed from the ‘! evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.” 1 In their view, a majority of the population is. 
opposed to capital punishment and, because of this, the 
penalty is no longer acceptable. Yet at the same time, they 
argue that neither legislation nor constitutional amend­
ment is an effective means for changing the law because 
public feeling is not strong enough to compel change, 
either in Congress or the state legislatures. By this reason­
ing, they attempt to justify: change in the law through 
judicial action rather than by proper legislation or consti­
tutional amendment.

Capital punishment is a deterrent to future crime. It' 
is argued by opponents that statistical evidence refutes1 
this reasonable conclusion. However, the statistics which 
form the basis of the petitioner’s argument omit all the 
essential subjective variables and are therefore of limited 
value. This issue is far too important to be decided ex­
clusively by bare statistics'.

Capital punishment was contemplated by the framers 
of the Bill of Rights and the concept was re-affirmed in 
1869 when the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment 
borrowed the explicit language of the Fifth Amendment 
which allows the death penalty provided due process, has) 
been, observed. ... .

1 Trop v. Dulles (1958), 356 U.S. 86, 101



ARGUMENT

The issue involves a question of whether capital punish­
ment is in violation of the “ cruel and unusual punish­
ment” clause of the U. S. Constitution, Eighth Amend­
ment. This amendment provides that:

“ Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments in­
flicted. ’ ’

The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States included capital punishment in its scope. Histori­
cally the Fifth and Eighth Amendments were ratified to­
gether as part of the Bill of Eights. The Fifth Amend­
ment states in part, that:

“ No person shall . . .  be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; . . . ”

This same language appears again in the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, which 
states, in part, that:

“ . . . nor shall any state deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; . . .”2

The Eighth Amendment was adopted as part of the Bill 
of Rights in 1791. This wording initially appeared in the 
Act of Parliament of 1688,3 to abolish the atrocities of 
the English .Court of the Star Chamber. In that 
“ judicial” body, confessions were extracted in open court

2 Robinson v. California (1962), 370 US 660
3 William and Mary, Sess. 2, ch. 2 at 192 (1869)

4



5

through various diabolical means, and the punishments 
that were meted out included the loss of ears for perjurers, 
face branding and nose splitting for forgers and con­
spirators, and whipping for those guilty.of “ unnatural” 
offenses.4 The adoption of the Eighth Amendment ver­
batim from the 1688 Act of Parliament, with no reported 
controversy, would suggest that it was intended to apply 
to the kinds of medieval torture described above.5

Courts which have heard questions of “ cruel and un­
usual punishment” have refused to follow the inflexible 
theory that cruel and unusual punishment must be de­
termined by the same standards that were in effect at the 
time of the drafting of the Bill of Rights. They have con­
tinually applied a less rigid standard of “ a developing 
and maturing society.” Opponents of capital punishment 
have ignored this judicial test and have erroneously 
stated that our society has progressed to the point that 
capital punishment is no longer acceptable. Chief Justice 
Warren, in the majority opinion in Trop v. Dulles 
(1958), 356 U.S. 86, 100, explained that:

“ The exact scope of the constitutional phrase ‘.cruel 
and unusual’ has not been detailed by this court. But 
the basic policy reflected in these words is firmly es­
tablished in the Anglo-American tradition of criminal 
justice. The phrase in our Constitution was taken 
directly from the English Declaration of Rights of 
1688, and the principle it represents can be traced 
back to the Magna Carta. The basic concept under­
lying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the 
dignity of man. While the state has the power to pun­
ish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power 
be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.”

4 Parry, “The History of Torture in England,” 9 (1934)" '
5 Sherman, “----Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments In­

flicted,” 14 Crime and Delinquency 73, (1968)



6

Indeed, in the same decision, Trop v. Dulles, supra, 
Chief Justice Warren expressly recognized the necessity 
of the retention of capital punishment where the offense 
requires its imposition. He stated that:

“Fines, imprisonment and even execution may be im­
posed depending upon the enormity of the crime, but 
any technique outside the bounds of these traditional 
penalties is constitutionally suspect . . . The Amend­
ment must draw its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.” (My emphasis.)

It must be emphasized that although Chief Justice 
Warren recognized the flexible standard of contemporary 
society, he did not find that capital punishment was un­
constitutional when the facts of the case showed that the 
death penalty was proportionate to the severity of the 
crime. In the case presently being considered, the death 
penalty was imposed as a just and proportionate punish­
ment for a cold-blooded and wanton murder.

Opponents have never presented sufficient evidence to 
show that opposition to the death penalty is, indeed, as 
widespread as they would have us believe. Chief Justice 
Warren, in Trop v. Dulles, supra, at 99, further stated 
that:

“ Whatever the arguments may be against capital 
punishment, both on moral grounds and in terms of 
accomplishing the purposes of punishment—and they 
are forceful—the death penalty has been employed 
throughout our history, and, in a day when it is still 
widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the con­
stitutional concept of cruelty.” (My emphasis.)

At this point, opponents introduce numerous polls to 
show that a certain percent of the population is opposed



7

to capital punishment. Without going into the myriad of 
problems inherent in these polls and the accuracy of their 
findings, one point remains a mystery. If the anticapital 
punishment advocates are so sure of public opinion, why 
are they not willing to submit this question to the voters 
in a referendum; or why do they feel that state and 
federal legislators are not sufficiently in tune to realize the 
alleged feeling against this punishment! The fallacy in 
the reasoning of the opponents is quite obvious. They con­
tinually talk of the ‘great movement’ to abolish the death 
penalty. They say that since the citizens of the United 
States are against this punishment, it no longer meets 
the “ standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.” At the same time, they state that this 
change must be initiated through the courts as public 
opinion is not sufficiently strong to influence this 
change through legislation. Obviously, one of their con­
clusions is erroneous, and they are asking the Court to 
usurp this legislative function. The fixing of penalties for 
crimes has always been a legislative function, and courts 
should intervene only when the legislative discretion is 
violated.

In Bailey v. U.S. (1934), 74 P. 2d 451, the opinion of 
the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals stated that:

“ The fixing of penalties for crimes is a legislative 
function. What constitutes an adequate penalty is a 
matter of legislative judgment and discretion, and the 
courts will not intervene therewith unless the penalty 
prescribed is clearly and manifestly cruel and un­
usual.”

(A reading of cases in this area fails to develop an ade­
quate definition of “ cruel and unusual.” Also, the courts 
which have considered whether there is a difference be­



8

tween “ cruel” and “ unusual” have not arrived at a pre­
cise distinction between the two terms.)

The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White in Weems 
v. U.S. (1910), 217 U.S. 349, stated that:

“ This interpretation curtails the legislative power of 
Congress to define and punish crime by asserting a 
right of judicial supervision over the exertion of that 
power, in disregard of the distinction between the 
legislative and judicial departments of Government.”

In Adams v. State (1971), 271 NE 2d 425, the Indiana 
Supreme Court viewed its function as follows:

“ We feel the question in our jurisdiction hardly needs 
to be discussed, since precedent and authority have 
determined the question against the position taken 
by the appellant; and although a judge may personally 
not approve the punishment fixed by the legislature 
for some crimes, it is not the judge’s privilege, be­
cause he does not agree with the legislative policy, 
to attempt to nullify legislative enactment. We would 
be violating our oaths and stepping outside our juris­
dictional function to do so.”

The entire argument of the desirability of legislative 
change or judicial decision was summarized in 79 Harvard 
Law Review 635, 639 (1966):

“ In light of these difficulties and the uniform au­
thority sustaining capital punishment, to hold that 
it is a method of punishment wholly prohibited by 
the eighth amendment would be to confuse possible 
legislative desirability with constitutional require­
ments.”

The desire of some advocates for social change should 
not be confused with the desire of the entire nation for 
a constitutional amendment. How can capital punishment



9

be abolished by a judicial tribunal, albeit the United 
States Supreme Court, without, in effect, amending the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments? Since the death pen­
alty is not cruel and unusual, any change ought to be 
sought through legislation or by a constitutional amend­
ment.

There are several reasons for the privacy, not secrecy, 
of legal executions in the United States. An execution has 
a deterrent effect only to the degree that a person con­
templating the crime has knowledge of the penalty at­
tached to the crime committed. In this day and age, this 
knowledge is not acquired by means of public executions. 
Are the opponents so naive as to think the potential crim­
inal is unaware of the death penalty unless he is re­
minded by a public execution?

The privacy of executions is evidence that as a develop­
ing and maturing society, we are simply insuring the 
dignity of man. There is no reason to put the families of 
those sentenced to execution through the traumatic experi­
ence of a public display since the deterrent effect is the 
knowledge that the death penalty is imposed. Any reason­
able person dislikes confinement but this attitude does 
not buttress the conclusion that he is against imprison­
ment for crime or that he wishes to abolish sentences of 
incarceration.

It is well to remind ourselves of the purpose of legal 
punishment itself. “ Punishment is ordinarily justified 
under a utilitarian theory as being necessary for the 
achievement of a long-range benefit.”6 The long range 
benefit discussed in relation to punishment is its deterrent 
effect, which is often defined as the preventive effect

6 Harvard Law Review, 79:635 (1965-66)



10

which actual or threatened punishment of offenders has 
upon potential offenders. This principle has always in­
fluenced our penal codes and is largely responsible for 
the lawful and justified use of capital punishment. 
Bichard M. Gerstein, State Attorney for Dade County, 
Miami, Florida, stated that:

“ As do many members of our profession, I take the 
position that deterrence is necessary for the mainte­
nance of the legal system and the preservation of 
society, as clearly stated by Sir John Salmond:

‘ Punishment is before all things deterrent, and 
the chief end of the law of crime is to make the 
evil doer an example and a warning to all who 
are likeminded with him.’ ” 7

The deterrent effect of the death penalty is a vital con­
sideration in discussing the necessity of its retention. The 
basic question to be considered here is the deterrent effect 
on potential offenders. In other words, does the knowl­
edge that he may be executed have a discernible influence 
on the potential murderer’s decision to commit the murder 
or the felony that leads to the murder. It is the contention 
of a vast majority of prosecutors that the deterrent effect 
of capital punishment is significant. Forgetting for the 
moment the wealth of evidence available to substantiate 
its deterrent effect, we should rely more on the prac­
titioner instead of the academic reformer. We should be­
lieve the person who deals with the accused murderer in 
the real-life situation, rather than the person who has an­
alyzed what he would or should have done in a clinical 
psychological vacuum.

7 Gerstein, J. Crim. L. 51:252 (1961)



11

Vital Speeches of the Day recently carried the following 
pertinent observations from a presentation on law enforce­
ment :

“ The propaganda drive to abolish capital punishment 
appears to be a geared part of a general drive 
toward leniency in the treatment of criminals in our 
society. Such leniency has, in my opinion, had un­
deniable psychological impact on potential murderers, 
and has contributed to the upward spiral of the crime 
rate. There is a striking over-all correlation between 
the recent decline in the use of the death penalty and 
the rise in violent crime. Such crime has increased 
by geometric proportions.
In the first three years of the last decade, the number 
of executions in the United States was by present 

. standards relatively high. Fifty-six persons were exe­
cuted in 1960; 42 in 1961; and 47 in 1962. During these 
same three years the number of people who died 
violently at the hands of criminals actually declined 
and the murder rate per 100,000 of population also 
declined.
Beginning in 1963, however, there was a drop in the 
number of legal executions, and the graph line of 
violent crime simultaneously began moving up instead 
of down. In the following years the number of legal 
executions has decreased dramatically from one year 
to the next, until in 1968 there was none at all. But 
each of those years has seen murders increase sharply 
both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of popu­
lation.
In 1964, for example, the number of legal executions 
dropped to 15. Yet the number of violent deaths 
moved up from 8,500 to 9,250, and the murder rate 
per 100,000 went up from 4.5 to 4.8. In 1965, the num­
ber of legal executions dropped to seven, while the 
number of violent deaths increased to 9,850, and the 
murder rate went to 5.1. Similar decreases in legal



12

executions have occurred in the following years ac­
companied by similar increases in the murder rate.
In 1968, with no legal executions at all, the total 
number who died through criminal violence reached 
13,650, while the murder rate climbed to 6.8 per 
100,000.

The movement in these figures, with murders increas­
ing as the deterrence of the death penalty diminished, 
confirms the verdict of ordinary logic: That a relaxa­
tion in the severity and certainty of punishment leads 
only to an increase in crime.
These remarks concern the deterrent effect of the 
death penalty on those who might commit murder but 
do not. That is a negative phenomenon which can be 
inferred both from the record and the assessment of 
common sense. The repeal of the death penalty would 
not repeal human nature. To these truisms we may 
add the fact that there are numerous cases on record 
in which criminals have escaped the capital penalty 
for previous murders and gone on to commit 
others . . .
Is a course of action humanitarian which actually en­
courages a vast and continuing increase in the number 
of people killed and maimed and otherwise brutal­
ized? There have been many sentimental journeys into 
the psychological realm of the criminals who are to 
be executed; I think there should be more sympathetic 
concern expressed for the thousands of innocent vic­
tims of those criminals.
Opponents of the death penalty may rejoice that in 
1968 there were 47 fewer murderers executed in this 
country than was the case in 1962; but, do they say 
anything of the fact that some 5,150 more innocent 
persons died by criminal violence in 1968 than was 
the case in 1962?
In the question of human suffering, this is a stagger­
ing loss of more than 5,000 individual innocent lives.



13

What about the human rights and civil rights of the 
individual victim? Are not those 5,000 persons en­
titled to the dignity and sacredness of life! Is that 
a result of which humanitarians can be proud? I think, 
not.
Only misguided emotionalism., and not facts, dispute 
the truth that the death penalty is a deterrent to 
capital crime.
Individuals must be held responsible for their indi­
vidual actions if a free society is to endure.”8

Additionally, the Royal Commission on Capital Punish­
ment made the following finding in relation to deterrence 
and. the abolition of capital punishment:

“ The general conclusion which we reach, after care­
ful review of all the evidence we have been able to 
obtain as to the deterrent effect of capital punish­
ment, may be stated as follows. Prima facie the pen­
alty of death is likely to have stronger effect as a de­
terrent to normal beings than any other form of 
punishment and there is some evidence (though no 
convincing statistical evidence) that this is in fact 
so.” (My emphasis.)9

The statistics used to minimize the deterrent effect of 
capital punishment categorically omit the essential vari­
ables that would have, otherwise, given these statistics 
some meaning. One of the most glaring omissions from 
the statistical standpoint is the input of common sense. 
If the death penalty is no more of a deterrent than life 
imprisonment, as the opponents would have us believe,

8 Sendak, Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. 38, No. 18, page 
574, (July 1, 1971)

9 Royal Commission on Capita] Punishment, Report 18, note 
15 at page 24.



14

why do convicted murderers exhaust all legal barriers in 
attempting to get a death sentence commuted to life im­
prisonment! They want us to believe that at the time just 
prior to and during the act, the criminal sees no dis­
cernible difference between life and death, but upon ap­
prehension, he suddenly feels the importance of life 
imprisonment. It is the contention of this Amicus Curiae 
that deductive, reasoning leads to the conclusion that in 
view of the importance of life imprisonment over the 
death penalty to those who are awaiting execution, this 
same importance must, either' consciously or sub­
consciously, be in the mind of the potential slayer as he 
is preparing to perpetrate his crime. It is, therefore, a 
deterrent.. ; _

Further evidence of the unreliable nature of the op­
ponents’ statistics on the deterrent effect of the death 
penalty is that none of their statistics shows the number 
of persons who were aware that they could be put to death 
for their act, and for that reason decided not to perpetrate 
the crime. Their statistics only show the failure, i.e. the 
persons who were not deterred and actually committed 
the crime. No one can reduce to cold, impersonal, statisticaj.. 
columns: the number: of persons who have refrained from: 
murder because of Tear of the death penalty. There is’nd 
way to : gauge this most essential variable. Judge Hyman 
Barshay had this fact in mind when he made the follow­
ing observation:

“ The death penalty is a warning, just like h light- 
v.: house throwing.its. beam.out ,to. ,sea. .We hear abqut

the shipwrecks, but we do not hear aboyl jj*ei. ships'



15

that the lighthouse guides safely on their way. We 
do not have proof of the number of ships it saves, but 
we do not tear the lighthouse down.”10

CONCLUSION

Capital punishment is not in violation of the United 
States Constitution. Attackers of the death penalty rely 
on the ambiguous and elusive “ cruel and unusual punish­
ment” clause of the Eighth. Amendment in the attempt 
to have it declared unconstitutional. These attackers ig­
nore the explicit language of the contemporaneous Fifth, 
and Fourteenth, Amendments that recognize capital pun­
ishment provided due process is observed.

Those who wish to abolish capital punishment say, with­
out proof, that it is now offensive to the general popula­
tion. If and when the voice of the people is strongly 
against capital punishment, their representatives in 
Congress and the legislature will change the laws and 
amend the Constitution to abolish it. There have been, 
to date, twenty-six amendments to the United States 
Constitution which clearly shows that there is no necessity 
for the Judiciary to take over that procedure instead of 
utilizing the prescribed procedures for constitutional 
amendment.

Opponents of capital punishment document their case 
with statistics which are intended to show that there is 
no deterrent effect in the death penalty. But strong sta­
tistics also buttress support of capital punishment. Capital 
punishment is, in fact a deterrent and is not in violation 
of the United States Constitution.

10 Sr. Schol., Capital Punishment: Pro and Con. 71:6.



Therefore, the decision of the Georgia Supreme Court 
upholding the constitutionality of capital punishment for 
conviction of first degree murder should he affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

T heodore L. S en d a k  
Attorney General of Indiana

D avid 0 .  Giv e n s  
Deputy Attorney General

Offices of the Attorney General 
219 State House 
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204 
Telephone: 317-633-5512



\

EDC? 6 l 6 / S p r i n g ,  1978 Huffm an

S tudy- Q u e s t io n s  f o r  C l i e n t - C e n te r e d  T h erap y

1 . Do you b e l i e v e  t h a t  m ost c l i e n t s  have th e  c a p a c i ty  to  u n d e rs ta n d  
and r e s o l v e  t h e i r  own p ro b lem s w ith o u t  d i r e c t i v e  ty p e s  o f 
i n t e r v e n t i o n  by th e  c o u n s e lo r ?  Why o r  why n o t?

2 . What p ro b lem s do you s e e  f o r  th e  c o u n s e lo r  who o n ly  s u p e r f i c i a l l y  
a c c e p t s  th e  key  c o n c e p ts  and p h ilo s o p h y  o f  th e  c l i e n t - c e n t e r e d  
a p p ro a c h ?  Can a c o u n s e lo r  who d o e s n 't  f u l l y  em brace t h a t  p h i l o ­
so p h y  r e a l l y  be e l l e n t - c e n t e r e d ?

3 . Do you t h i n k  t h a t  th e  c l i e n t - c o u n s e l o r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  th e  
c l i e n t - c e n t e r e d  m odel i s  s u f f i c i e n t  to  e f f e c t  b e h a v io r  and 
p e r s o n a l i t y  c h a n g e s  i n  th e  c l i e n t ?  Why o r  why n o t?

k . I n  i t s  s t r e s s  on th e  a c t i v e  r o l e  o f th e  c l i e n t ,  do you se e  th e
a p p ro a c h  a s  r e l o c a t i n g  th e  c o u n s e lo r  to  a p a s s iv e  r o l e ?  E x p la in .

5 . Do you b e l i e v e  t h a t  m in im iz in g  te c h n iq u e s  and s t r e s s  i n s  c l i e n t -  
c o u n s e lo r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a r e  s t r e n g t h s  o r  w e ak n e sse s  in  th e  
a p p ro a c h ?  E x p la in .

6 . W hat, i n  you v iew , a r e  th e  m a jo r s t r e n g t h s  and w e ak n e sses  o f 
th e  c l i e n t - c e n t e r e d  a p p ra c h ?  E x p la in .

7 . R o v ers  a d v o c a te s  a  p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l a p p ro a c h  n o t  o n ly  to  
h c o u n s e l in g  b u t  a l s o  to  r e s e a r c h .  Can "p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l

kn o w led g e"  be a c c e p ta b l e  a s  s c i e n t i f i c  d a ta ?  Why o r  why n o t?

. P r a c t i c a l  a p p l i c a t i o n s -  you sh o u ld  be a b le  t o :  a )  i d e n t i f y
i n c o n g r u i t i e s  o r  i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s  i n  what  t h e  c l i e n t  s a y s  o r  
does  ( v e r b a l s  and n o n - v e r b a l s )  and ,  b)  u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  c l i e n t ' s  
i n t e r n a l  f r ame  o f  r e f e r e n c e .

8