Supplemental Brief of Appellees Dallas County Plaintiff/Intervenors
Public Court Documents
June 5, 1990
24 pages
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Case Files, LULAC and Houston Lawyers Association v. Attorney General of Texas Hardbacks, Briefs, and Trial Transcript. Supplemental Brief of Appellees Dallas County Plaintiff/Intervenors, 1990. 64b3aef1-1d7c-f011-b4cc-6045bdffa665. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/7c24aea2-80f8-4fca-9ff1-d87dc40dbb2d/supplemental-brief-of-appellees-dallas-county-plaintiffintervenors. Accessed November 07, 2025.
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W HUGHES & LUCE
2800 MOMENTUM PLACE
1717 MAIN STREET
DALLAS, TEXAS 7520! B00 FRANKLIN PLAZA
2 Il CONGRESS AVENUE
(214) ©9239-5500 AUSTIN, TEXAS 7870
FAX (214) 939-6100 (512)482-6800
TELEX 730836 FAX (512) 482-6859
Direct Dial Number
(214) 939-5577
June 4, 1990
VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS
RECEIPT NO. 4255309774
F. Ganucheau, Clerk
5th Circuit
amp Street
Orleans, Louisiana 70130
Re: League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC),
et al. v. F. Harold Entz, et al., Cause No. 90-8014
Dear Mr. Ganucheau:
Enclosed please find an original and 21 copies of
Appellant Dallas County District Judge F. Harold Entz's
Supplemental Brief for filing in the above-referenced matter.
Please return a file-marked copy to me in the enclosed
envelope. Please note that copies of the above document are
being sent by certified mail to the other parties.
Also enclosed are 20 copies each of 1) Brief of Appellant
F. Harold Entz, 2) Reply Brief of Appellant Dallas County
District Judge F. Harold Entz, and 3) Rule 28(j) filing of
April 20, ° 1990. We are not forwarding copies of these
documents to Counsel of Record because they already have
copies.
Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions
regarding this filing or the enclosed extra copies.
truly
BMR/pai
Enclosures
52800010:238
HUGHES & LUCE
»
Gilbert F. Ganucheau, Clerk
Page 2
June 4, 1990
CC. (CERTIFIED MAIL RRR)
William L. Garrett
Rolando Rios
Susan Finkelstein
Sherrilyn A. Ifill
Gabrielle K. McDonald
Edward B. Cloutman, III
E. Brice Cunningham
Renea Hicks
David R. Richards
J. Eugene Clements
Joel H. Pullen
Seagal V. Wheatley
John L. Hill, Jr.
Michael Ramsey
R. James George
Orlando Garcia
Paul Strohl
Tom Maness
Mark Gross
Walter Irvin
3301
(214)
By:
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
NO. 90-8014
LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN
CITIZENS, COUNCIL NO. 4434, ET AL.,
Plaintiff-Appellees,
and JESSE OLIVER, FRED TINSLEY and
JOAN WINN WHITE, ET AL.,
Dallas County Plaintiff/Intervenors-Appellees,
VS.
JIM MATTOX, ET AL.,
Defendant-Appellants,
VS.
JUDGE F. HAROLD ENTZ, ETC., ET AL.,
Defendant-Appellants.
On Appeal From the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEES
DALLAS COUNTY PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS
MULLINAX, WELLS, BAAB E. BRICE CUNNINGHAM
& CLOUTMAN, P.C. 771 8. R.L. Thornton Frwy.
Elm Street Suite 121
Dallas, Texas 75226-1637 Dallas, Texas 75203
939-9222 (214) 428-3793
Edward B. Cloutman, III By: E. Brice Cunningham
COUNSEL FOR DALLAS COUNTY
PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
NO. 90-8014
LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN
CITIZENS, COUNCIL NO. 4434, ET AL.,
Plaintiff-Appellees,
and JESSE OLIVER, FRED TINSLEY and
JCAN WINN WHITE, ET AL.,
Dallas County Plaintiff/Intervenors-Appellees,
VS.
JIM MATTOX, ET AL.,
Defendant-Appellants,
VS.
JUDGE F. HAROLD ENTZ, ETC., ET AL.,
Defendant-Appellants.
On Appeal From the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEES
DALLAS COUNTY PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS
MULLINAX, WELLS, BAAB E. BRICE CUNNINGHAM
& CLOUTMAN, P.C. 777 S. R.L. Thornton Frwy.
3301 Elm Street Suite 121
Dallas, Texas 75226-1637 Dallas, Texas 75203
(214) 939-9222 (214) 428-3793
Edward B. Cloutman, III By: E. Brice Cunningham
COUNSEL FOR DALLAS COUNTY
PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS
IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
POR THE PIFTH CIRCUIT
NO. 90-8014
LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN
CITIZENS, COUNCIL NO. 4434, ET AL.,
Plaintiff-Appellees,
and JESSE OLIVER, FRED TINSLEY and
JOAN WINN WHITE, ET AL.,
Dallas County Plaintiff/Intervencrs-Appellees,
VS.
JIM MATTOX, ET AL.,
Defendant-Appellants,
VS.
JUDGE F. HAROLD ENTZ, ETC., ET AlL.,
Defendant-Appellants.
nn mS Sn Spm se St SE ES SE St Sm i, SS ine
On Appeal From the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
The undersigned counsel of record hereby adopts the
Certificate of Service previously filed in the Brief of
Appellees Dallas County Plaintiff/Intervenors.
inh fon, 22
Edward B. Cloutman, III
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
The Statement Regarding Oral Argument previously
submitted in the Brief of Appellees Dallas County Plaintiff/In-
tervenors is fully incorporated herein as if set forth at length
verbatim and shall not be repeated here.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS + v o¢ o « «
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT . « « « « «
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES «io is. v0. os. + 0 te in vw. in"ie
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION oi oo vv vie .o o.%
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR BEVIEW « ¢ ¢ so is vo ons
STATEMENT OF "POR CASE. 0 wie v. 4 vo win =e
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT sie vo 4 o'¢ viv inn in
ARGUMENT
1. Multiple Elections of District Judges
From The Same Geographic Jurisdiction
Are Not For Single Offices . + «¢ »
2 District Judges Do Not Act Alone in
Thely Office voi via vin 0 0 vis win
Se Partisan Voting Considerations are
Irrelevant oa 6 oo in iv sx aaa leite
CONCLUSION [J ® ® LJ LJ [J LJ @ LJ LJ * LJ LJ LJ [J LJ LJ LJ
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE "4. os’ wie 07s » #400 w.o »
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Butts v. City of New York,
779 P.284 141 (2nd Cir. 1985) oat.
Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056
(5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
sub nom LJ LJ » L J LJ » ® ® [ J ® [J [ ] * LJ
Clark v. Edwards, 725 F.Supp.
285 (M.D. La., 1988) Po RE WC oF
Haith v. Martin, 618 F.Supp. 410,
413 (E.D. N.C.; 1985) aff'd...
477 U.S. 801 (1986) 0 a. .0 0 « win.»
Roemer v. Chisom, _ UeSe: 4 ’
109 S.Ct. 390, 102 L.EG.24 379
(1988) oii Folie wi wile tie wile nie letie
Southern Christian Leadership Conference
of Alabama v. Siegelman, 714 F.Supp.
11 (M.D. Ala. [ 4 1989) . LJ LJ] LJ] LJ LJ] ®
STATUTES
Section 2, Voting Rights Act ‘4's is 4 4»
MISCELLANEOUS
Article 42.12, Code of Criminal Procedure
Government Code, Section 24.306 PTI
Human Resources Code, Section 142.001,
et Sed. » @® L J L J ® L J ® [J L J LJ ® [ ] L J L J
Human Resources Code, Section 151.002 (b)
Local Government Code, Sections 84.002
(note) an@-B4.0211 «iv « '¢ +. 0 6 »
Local Government Code, Section 262.011 (a),
IRYrBNIR (1) ia sl ee vie en ee
iv
5, 8,
Page(s)
«245
vide 8
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olin
elie 03
ved
10, 11
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LJ LJ 9
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oink 9
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Statement of Jurisdiction previously submitted in
the Brief of Appellees Dallas County Plaintiff/Intervenors is
fully incorporated herein as if set forth at length verbatim and
shall not be repeated here.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The statement of Issues Presented for Review previous-
ly submitted in the Brief of Appellees Dallas County Plain-
tiff/Intervenors is fully incorporated herein as if set forth
at length verbatim and shall not be repeated here.
In addition to those issues presented for review in
the original brief filed before the panel in this cause,
plaintiff/intervenors from Dallas County, Oliver, et al. add the
following:
l. Whether the single office holder doctrine
applies to district judges in Texas in counties such as Dallas
County electing more than one district judge with county-wide
jurisdiction?
2. Whether district judges in Texas act
independently and are autonomous in their functions as held by
the original panel in this cause?
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEES,
DALLAS COUNTY PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS - Page 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts
previously submitted in the Brief of Appellees Dallas County
Plaintiff/Intervenors is fully incorporated herein as if set
forth at length verbatim and shall not be repeated here.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Summary of the Argument previously submitted in
the Brief of Appellees Dallas County Plaintiff/Intervenors is
fully incorporated herein as if set forth at length verbatim and
shall not be repeated here.
Additionally, plaintiff/intervenors fromDallas County
Oliver, et al. assert that whatever single office holder
exception has been created concerning multi-member at-large
election challenges, such defense does not apply to election of
multiple judges with coterminous county-wide jurisdiction from
the same geographical area. There is no legislative history to
support such an exception. Nor does the decision in Butts v.
City of New York, 779 F.24 141 (2nd Cir. 1985) apply to the
election of trial judges in the counties challenged in this
action.
The conclusion that district Judges in Texas act
autonomously in their function once elected to the multiple
offices in the counties at issue is error. By statute and by
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEES,
DALLAS COUNTY PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS - Page 2
practice, district judges in Texas act in many instances as a
"collegial" body and by law cannot act alone or independently
for these purposes. Partisan voting is no defense to racial
polarization.
ARGUMENT
The complete statement of the Argument previously
submitted in the Brief of Appellees Dallas County Plaintiff/In-
tervenors is fully incorporated herein as if set forth at length
verbatim and shall not be repeated here.
At the outset, it should be noted that the panel
opinion unanimously held that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
applies to judicial elections (Slip Opinion at 4080). This is,
of course, consistent with this Court's previous opinion in
Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
sub nom, Roemer v. Chisom, U.S. +r. 139 S.Ct. 390, 102
L.Ed.2d 372 (1988). The cases cited in the original briefs for
the parties clearly support this conclusion.
l. Multiple Elections of District Judges From The
Same Geographic Jurisdiction Are Not For Single Offices
The majority panel opinion in this case held that
notwithstanding the at-large election of thirty-seven (37)
substantially identical district judges in Dallas County, each
was a single office for purposes of the single office holder
exception to vote dilution challenges under the Voting Rights
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEES,
DALLAS COUNTY PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS - Page 3
Act. The majority concluded that while the multiple courts in
the counties in issue performed the same or part of the same
judicial tasks, each was a single member office (Slip Opinion
at 4084). The panel majority observed correctly that district
judges in Dallas County shared concurrent jurisdiction for many
duties (Slip Opinion at 4085) and that administrative duties
were also shared between judges in a collegial fashion on a
county-wide basis (Slip Opinion at 4086). Further, the majority
opinion also noted the extensive interlocking relationship
created by the Administrative Judicial Act, requiring district
judges to act together and conferring special powers upon the
presiding administrative judge (Slip Opinion at 4082). The
panel majority also recited that another facet of local joint
action by district judges included the assignment, docketing
and transferring of hearings and of any and all cases in a fair
and equitable division of case load (Slip Opinion at 4083).
These descriptions are obviously not of judges acting "alone".
The United States Attorney General's office has
consistently taken the position that multi-member at-large
elections which have dilutive effect are suspect under the
Voting Rights Act. This office recently interposed objection
to the preclearance of multi-member at-large elections for
district judges in the State of Georgia (Slip Opinion at 4088);
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEES,
DALLAS COUNTY PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS - Page 4
see also Haith v. Martin, 618 F.Supp. 410, 413 (E.D. N.C., 1985)
aff'd., 477 U.S. 901 (1986). Indeed, the Attorney General here
has taken the position through its brief filed as amicus curiae
that the election of multiple district judges from the same
county is not only covered by Section 2, but under the facts of
this case, was unlawful. The views of the United States
expressed by the Department of Justice regarding the Voting
Rights Act are entitled to great deference in this case.
The majority opinion relies exclusively on a single
decision to support its conclusion that district judgeships in
Texas are single office positions. The decision of Butts v.
City of New York, 779 F.2d 141 (2nd Cir. 1985) does not embrace
the concept created by the panel majority. In Butts, each
office in issue was one to which only one person in the entire
voting district could be elected, unlike the multiple district
judgeships per county at issue in this case. Butts dealt with
a vote dilution challenge to an office like that of sheriff or
district attorney in Texas (of which there can be no more than
one per county). The majority bootstraps onto the holding in
Butts that vote dilution challenges cannot successfully be
maintained regarding a single office, because the office may not
be divided into parts. Here, the Court does not need to divide
district judgeships into parts, for in Dallas County thirty-
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEES,
DALLAS COUNTY PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS - Page 5
seven (37) co-terminus, administratively interlocking district
judgeships exist for a vote dilution challenge. Each court in
essence represents 1/37th of the total judicial function.
The logical and intended narrow definition of the
single office exception would only include truly single or one
of a kind elected posts. On the state level, several such
offices obviously exist -- the Governor, Lieut. Governor and
Attorney General are examples of a single, unique elected
position not subject to an at-large vote dilution claim. As
also noted herein, on the county level, the positions of
district attorney, sheriff and county treasurer are single,
stand alone, non-duplicated elected offices.
Conversely, the sole fact that some, but clearly not
all, of a district judge's duties are performed alone, does not
a priori result in conversion of thirty-seven (37) duplicated
judicial offices into thirty-seven (37) unique, stand alone
elected officials, especially where each performs the same or
substantially the same task for the identical geographical unit
and whose authority is co-extensive one with the other. The
logic of such conclusion is respectfully lacking.
The panel majority cites no language from the legisla-
tive history of the Voting Rights Act, nor its amendments, that
suggests the result it reached. No wonder, since no history
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEES,
DALLAS COUNTY PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS - Page 6
exists to indicate that where a number of identical officials
are elected from one geographic district and these office
holders exercise some autonomy that the latter fact converts the
offices into "single offices" excepting each from vote dilution
challenges.
In its holding, the panel opinion specifically
disagrees with previously decided cases of Southern Christian
Leadership Conference of Alabama v. Siegelman, 714 F.Supp. 511
(M.D. Ala., 1989) and Clark v. Edwards, 725 F.Supp. 285 (M.D.
La., 1988). While the panel was not bound by these decisions,
it does not recite any authority to the contrary. Going further
out on its limb, the panel also predicts what the Eleventh
Circuit would decide on the issue, presumably finding some
comfort in that exercise.
Of course, the dissent takes strong issue with the
holding of the panel majority and casts the issue regarding the
single office holder exception clearly for resolution by the
full court. Plaintiff/intervenors from Dallas submit that with
no legislative history and no decisional authority for the
panel's opinion, this Court should not extend or create any
defense or exception to the Voting Rights Act's coverage. The
intent of Section 2 is to expand coverage not withdraw same for
protected voters. The full court should adopt the views of the
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEES,
DALLAS COUNTY PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS - Page 7
dissent.
2. District Judges Do Not Act Alone in Their Office
The function of an office such as district judge does
not determine whether Section 2 coverage exists (and presump-
tively therefore whether Section 2 is violated). Chisom v.
Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1988). However, the function
of a district judge in Texas and particularly Dallas County is
not for many purposes autonomous nor does the district judge
always act alone (see dissenting Slip Opinion at 4091). Each
district judge effectively shares the entire county's case load.
The civil and criminal dockets of Dallas County are divided
roughly equally by administrative mechanisms into many subparts
of the whole. The judges can and do act interchangeably and are
interchangeable because of their constitutional authority.
District judges exercise co-extensive power over the entirety
of Dallas County.
Notwithstanding the panel majority's conclusion that
district judges "act alone", district judges in Texas by state
statute must or may:
l. set and approve the salary of the county
auditor as well as set the budget and
staffing level for the county auditing
department (Local Government Code, Sections
84.002 (note) and 84.021);
2. act with the county commissioners court or
county judge to appoint the county purchas-
ing agent as well as set salary, staffing
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEES,
DALLAS COUNTY PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS - Page 8
and budget levels for that department (Local
Government Code, Section 262.011(a), (k) and
(1);
Jee serve as the Juvenile Board for the county
(Government Code, Section 24.306) and
supervise the juvenile probation department,
appoint its director, approve its budget and
staffing as well as set personnel policies
for that agency (Human Resources Code,
Section 142.001, et seq.;
4. supervise the county Domestic Relations
office (Human Resources Code, Section
151.002 (b); and
5. supervise the Adult Probation Department,
including hiring of the director as well as
approve that department's budget and
staffing (Article 42.12, Code of Criminal
Procedure).
In short, district judges in Texas in the affected
counties carry out together substantial administrative functions
as judges in and for the county as well as sharing common
judicial duties, noted by the panel majority and the dissenting
opinion.
Plaintiff/intervenors from Dallas County submit that
the single office holder exception, whatever it may be, is
narrow and should be limited to elected positions such as
sheriff and/or district attorney; that is, to offices which are
one-position per geographic jurisdiction. This doctrine should
not apply to the thirty-seven (37) coequal district judgeships
in Dallas County or to any other judgeships subject of this
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEES,
DALLAS COUNTY PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS - Page 9
lawsuit. However conceived, the single office holder exception
was not intended to withdraw from the rights granted by Section
2 of the Voting Rights Act. This concept was not designed to
render judicial voters "less equal", compared to voters in other
multi-member at-large elections subject to the protections of
Section 2. To the contrary, the right to vote protected by
Section 2 is the same right regarding all elective offices.
Liability issues under Section 2 cannot be differentiated
between elections for district judges compared to city council
positions, school board seats, state legislators and the like.
3. Partisan Voting Considerations are Irrelevant
While not reached by the panel opinion, considerable
attention has been devoted by appellants to the theory that
partisan voting patterns somehow mask, explain and therefore
immunize racially polarized voting in the affected counties.
This phenomenon and argument is nowhere more pronounced than in
Dallas County. Appellants' challenge premised upon partisan
voting is at best problematic. Nowhere do appellants address
the evidence at trial examining non-partisan voting patterns in
Dallas County which demonstrate the same high degree of racial
polarization without any party label to act as protective
coloration. Plaintiff/Intervenor Dallas County Exhibit 25 is
an analysis of a number of non-partisan races demonstrating the
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEES,
DALLAS COUNTY PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS - Page 10
same racial polarization as is found in judicial races conducted
on a partisan ballot. No coincidence is occurring =-- only
racial bloc voting.
The current running beneath appellants' arguments is
an assumption that black voters do not know whom they are voting
on nor why; that the African American electorate is not voting
on candidates but simply voting the party. This is, of course,
an assumption not borne out by any convincing evidence. This
premise completely ignores the obvious fact that black voters
are making a choice, whether it be to vote for all of one
party's candidates or some of them. It is this choice that is
frustrated by the majority white voting bloc strength in Dallas
County. It may well be that the black voting populace perceives
more congruity between their ideals and the candidates of one
party or another. The motivation of the voter is irrelevant to
a Section 2 inquiry. The voter's choice is frustrated by the
at-large voting in context of the larger white bloc electorate.
The choice made by black voters is frustrated by the white
voting bloc strength.
Also the extent that choices are made, they are being
made by the majority white voting bloc who vote less by straight
ticket but precisely to defeat the highly qualified black
judicial candidates. These are the candidates supported
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEES,
DALLAS COUNTY PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS - Page 11
overwhelmingly by the black voting populace (see plaintiff/in-
tervenor Dallas County Exhibits 13, 14 and 15 and the testimony
of black judicial candidates J. Winn, F. Tinsley, R. White and
J. Oliver).
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff/intervenors from Dallas County suggest that
there is no rational purpose served under the Voting Rights Act
to exclude district judges from vote dilution challenges. The
voter's choice is the issue, not the office held. The Voting
Rights Act and its amendments do not distinguish between rights
of judicial voters and those for other offices. Where multiple,
substantially identical offices are voted on within a single
geographic jurisdiction, vote dilution can surely occur. It has
occurred here. No reason exists to distinguish judicial
elections at the trial court level from any other.
Violation of voting rights must be examined from the
viewpoint of the protected group -- the voter, not the candidate
nor the office. To hold otherwise is to declare that the
emperor has new clothes despite his obvious appearance. To
support the panel opinion is to effectively repeal a very
important part of the Voting Rights Act. This Court should not
countenance that result and should shun the logic of the panel
opinion. This Court should, instead, affirm in all respects the
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEES,
DALLAS COUNTY PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS - Page 12
opinion of the trial court below.
Respectfully submitted,
MULLINAX, WELLS, BAAB
& CLOUTMAN, P.C.
3301 Elm Street
Dallas, Texas 75226-1637
(214) 939-9222
. od CBA. =
Edward B. Cloutman, III
E. BRICE CUNNINGHAM
Attorney at Law
777 South R.L. Thornton Frwy.
Suite 121
Dallas, Texas 75203
(214) 428-3793
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES DALLAS
COUNTY PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEES,
DALLAS COUNTY PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS - Page 13
mn tm Ss me i
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument has been served upon counsel of record, by
placing same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, on this
day of June, 1990:
Mr. Renea Hicks
Ms. Mary F. Keller
Mr. Javier Guajardo
Special Asst. Attorney General
P.O. Box 12548
Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
Mr. William L. Garrett
Ms. Brenda Hull Thompson
Garrett, Thompson & Chang, P.C.
8300 Douglas, Suite 800
Dallas, Texas 75225
Mr. Rolando L. Rios
Southwest Voter Registration
& Education Project
201 N, St. Mary's
Suite 521
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Ms. Susan Finkelstein
Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc.
201 N. St. Mary's
Suite 521
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Mr. E. Brice Cunningham
Attorney at Law
777 South R.L. Thornton Frwy.
Suite 121
Dallas, Texas 75203
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEE,
DALLAS COUNTY PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS - Page 14
Ms. Sherrilyn A. Ifill
N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense
& Educational Fund, Inc.
99 Hudson St., 16th Floor
New York, New York 10013
Ms. Gabrielle K. McDonald
Matthews & Branscomb
301 Congress Ave.
Suite 2050
Austin, Texas 78701
Mr. J. Eugene Clements
Mr. John E. O'Neill
Porter & Clements
700 Louisiana, Suite 3500
Houston, Texas 77002-2730
Mr. Robert BH. Mow, Jr.
Mr. David C. Godbey
Mr. Bobby M. Rubarts
Ms. Esther R. Rosenblum
Hughes & Luce
2800 Momentum Place
1717 Main Street
Dallas, Texas 75201
Mr. Jim Boyle
Law Offices of Jim Boyle
801 Congress Avenue
Suie 250
Austin, Texas 78701
Mr. Seagal V. Wheatley
Mr. Donald R. Philbin, Jr.
Oppenheimer, Rosenberg, Kelleher
& Wheatley, Inc.
711 Navarro, Sixth Floor
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Mr. John L. Bill, Jr.
Mr. Andy Taylor
Liddell, Sapp, Zivley, Hill
& LaBoon
3300 Texas Commerce Tower
Houston, Texas 77002
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEE,
DALLAS COUNTY PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS - Page 15
Mr. John N. Kennedy
Mr. Thomas A. Casey
Executive Counsel to the Governor
Fourth Floor
State Capitol Building
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804
Mr. Robert G. Pugh
Mr. Robert G. Pugh, Jr.
Pugh & Pugh
Commercial National Tower
Suite 3100
333 Texas Street
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101-5302
Mr. Kenneth C. Dejean
Assistant Attorney General
Louisiana Dept. of Justice
P.O. Box 44005
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804
Ms. Cynthia Rougeou
Legal Division
Office of the Secretary of State
State Capitol Building
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804
Mr. Michael H. Rubin
Rubin, Curry, Colvin & Joseph
Suite 1400
One American Place
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70825
SJL
Edward B. Cloutman, III
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEE,
DALLAS COUNTY PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS - Page 16