Supplemental Brief of Appellees Dallas County Plaintiff/Intervenors

Public Court Documents
June 5, 1990

Supplemental Brief of Appellees Dallas County Plaintiff/Intervenors preview

24 pages

Includes Correspondence from Rubarts to Clerk.

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  • Case Files, LULAC and Houston Lawyers Association v. Attorney General of Texas Hardbacks, Briefs, and Trial Transcript. Supplemental Brief of Appellees Dallas County Plaintiff/Intervenors, 1990. 64b3aef1-1d7c-f011-b4cc-6045bdffa665. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/7c24aea2-80f8-4fca-9ff1-d87dc40dbb2d/supplemental-brief-of-appellees-dallas-county-plaintiffintervenors. Accessed November 07, 2025.

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    W HUGHES & LUCE 
2800 MOMENTUM PLACE 

1717 MAIN STREET 

DALLAS, TEXAS 7520! B00 FRANKLIN PLAZA 
2 Il CONGRESS AVENUE 

(214) ©9239-5500 AUSTIN, TEXAS 7870 
FAX (214) 939-6100 (512)482-6800 

TELEX 730836 FAX (512) 482-6859 

Direct Dial Number 
(214) 939-5577 

June 4, 1990 

VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS 
RECEIPT NO. 4255309774 

F. Ganucheau, Clerk 

5th Circuit 
amp Street 

Orleans, Louisiana 70130 

Re: League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), 
et al. v. F. Harold Entz, et al., Cause No. 90-8014 

Dear Mr. Ganucheau: 

Enclosed please find an original and 21 copies of 
Appellant Dallas County District Judge F. Harold Entz's 
Supplemental Brief for filing in the above-referenced matter. 

Please return a file-marked copy to me in the enclosed 
envelope. Please note that copies of the above document are 
being sent by certified mail to the other parties. 

Also enclosed are 20 copies each of 1) Brief of Appellant 
F. Harold Entz, 2) Reply Brief of Appellant Dallas County 
District Judge F. Harold Entz, and 3) Rule 28(j) filing of 
April 20, ° 1990. We are not forwarding copies of these 
documents to Counsel of Record because they already have 
copies. 

Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions 
regarding this filing or the enclosed extra copies. 

truly 

  

BMR/pai 

Enclosures 

52800010:238  



    

HUGHES & LUCE 

» 
Gilbert F. Ganucheau, Clerk 

Page 2 

June 4, 1990 

CC. (CERTIFIED MAIL RRR) 

William L. Garrett 

Rolando Rios 
Susan Finkelstein 
Sherrilyn A. Ifill 
Gabrielle K. McDonald 
Edward B. Cloutman, III 

E. Brice Cunningham 
Renea Hicks 
David R. Richards 
J. Eugene Clements 

Joel H. Pullen 

Seagal V. Wheatley 
John L. Hill, Jr. 

Michael Ramsey 
R. James George 

Orlando Garcia 
Paul Strohl 

Tom Maness 

Mark Gross 

Walter Irvin 

 



  

   

3301 

(214) 

By: 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

NO. 90-8014 

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN 
CITIZENS, COUNCIL NO. 4434, ET AL., 

Plaintiff-Appellees, 

and JESSE OLIVER, FRED TINSLEY and 
JOAN WINN WHITE, ET AL., 

Dallas County Plaintiff/Intervenors-Appellees, 

VS. 

JIM MATTOX, ET AL., 

Defendant-Appellants, 

VS. 

JUDGE F. HAROLD ENTZ, ETC., ET AL., 

Defendant-Appellants. 

On Appeal From the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Texas 

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
DALLAS COUNTY PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS 
  

MULLINAX, WELLS, BAAB E. BRICE CUNNINGHAM 
& CLOUTMAN, P.C. 771 8. R.L. Thornton Frwy. 

Elm Street Suite 121 

Dallas, Texas 75226-1637 Dallas, Texas 75203 

939-9222 (214) 428-3793 

Edward B. Cloutman, III By: E. Brice Cunningham 

COUNSEL FOR DALLAS COUNTY 

PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS  



  

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

  

NO. 90-8014 

  

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN 
CITIZENS, COUNCIL NO. 4434, ET AL., 

Plaintiff-Appellees, 

and JESSE OLIVER, FRED TINSLEY and 
JCAN WINN WHITE, ET AL., 

Dallas County Plaintiff/Intervenors-Appellees, 

VS. 

JIM MATTOX, ET AL., 

Defendant-Appellants, 

VS. 

JUDGE F. HAROLD ENTZ, ETC., ET AL., 

Defendant-Appellants. 

      

On Appeal From the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Texas 

  

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
DALLAS COUNTY PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS 
  

MULLINAX, WELLS, BAAB E. BRICE CUNNINGHAM 
& CLOUTMAN, P.C. 777 S. R.L. Thornton Frwy. 
3301 Elm Street Suite 121 
Dallas, Texas 75226-1637 Dallas, Texas 75203 
(214) 939-9222 (214) 428-3793 

Edward B. Cloutman, III By: E. Brice Cunningham 

COUNSEL FOR DALLAS COUNTY 
PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS 

 



    

IN THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

POR THE PIFTH CIRCUIT 

  

NO. 90-8014 

  

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN 
CITIZENS, COUNCIL NO. 4434, ET AL., 

Plaintiff-Appellees, 

and JESSE OLIVER, FRED TINSLEY and 
JOAN WINN WHITE, ET AL., 

Dallas County Plaintiff/Intervencrs-Appellees, 

VS. 

JIM MATTOX, ET AL., 

Defendant-Appellants, 

VS. 

JUDGE F. HAROLD ENTZ, ETC., ET AlL., 

Defendant-Appellants. 

nn mS Sn Spm se St SE ES SE St Sm i, SS ine 

On Appeal From the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Texas 

  

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS 
  

The undersigned counsel of record hereby adopts the 

Certificate of Service previously filed in the Brief of 

Appellees Dallas County Plaintiff/Intervenors. 

inh fon, 22 
Edward B. Cloutman, III 
  

 



STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
  

The Statement Regarding Oral Argument previously 

submitted in the Brief of Appellees Dallas County Plaintiff/In- 

tervenors is fully incorporated herein as if set forth at length 

verbatim and shall not be repeated here. 

 



    
TABLE OF CONTENTS   

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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT . « « « « « 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES «io is. v0. os. + 0 te in vw. in"ie 

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION oi oo vv vie .o o.% 

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR BEVIEW « ¢ ¢ so is vo ons 

STATEMENT OF "POR CASE. 0 wie v. 4 vo win =e 

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT sie vo 4 o'¢ viv inn in 

ARGUMENT 

1. Multiple Elections of District Judges 
From The Same Geographic Jurisdiction 
Are Not For Single Offices . + «¢ » 

2 District Judges Do Not Act Alone in 
Thely Office voi via vin 0 0 vis win 

Se Partisan Voting Considerations are 
Irrelevant oa 6 oo in iv sx aaa leite 

CONCLUSION [J ® ® LJ LJ [J LJ @ LJ LJ * LJ LJ LJ [J LJ LJ LJ 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE "4. os’ wie 07s » #400 w.o » 

iii 

 



  

   
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
  

Butts v. City of New York, 

779 P.284 141 (2nd Cir. 1985) oat. 
  

Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 

(5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 
sub nom LJ LJ » L J LJ » ® ® [ J ® [J [ ] * LJ 

  

Clark v. Edwards, 725 F.Supp. 
285 (M.D. La., 1988) Po RE WC oF 
  

Haith v. Martin, 618 F.Supp. 410, 
413 (E.D. N.C.; 1985) aff'd... 
477 U.S. 801 (1986) 0 a. .0 0 « win.» 

  

Roemer v. Chisom, _ UeSe: 4 ’ 

109 S.Ct. 390, 102 L.EG.24 379 
(1988) oii Folie wi wile tie wile nie letie 

  

Southern Christian Leadership Conference 

of Alabama v. Siegelman, 714 F.Supp. 
11 (M.D. Ala. [ 4 1989) . LJ LJ] LJ] LJ LJ] ® 

  

  

STATUTES 

Section 2, Voting Rights Act ‘4's is 4 4» 

MISCELLANEOUS 

Article 42.12, Code of Criminal Procedure 

Government Code, Section 24.306 PTI 

Human Resources Code, Section 142.001, 

et Sed. » @® L J L J ® L J ® [J L J LJ ® [ ] L J L J 

Human Resources Code, Section 151.002 (b) 

Local Government Code, Sections 84.002 
(note) an@-B4.0211 «iv « '¢ +. 0 6 » 

Local Government Code, Section 262.011 (a), 
IRYrBNIR (1) ia sl ee vie en ee 

iv 

5, 8, 

Page(s) 

«245 

vide 8 

“wwii l 

olin 

elie 03 

ved 

10, 11 

[J LJ o 

“ei 9 

LJ LJ 9 

* ® 9 

vie 9 

oink 9 

 



  

   
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
  

The Statement of Jurisdiction previously submitted in 

the Brief of Appellees Dallas County Plaintiff/Intervenors is 

fully incorporated herein as if set forth at length verbatim and 

shall not be repeated here. 

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
  

The statement of Issues Presented for Review previous- 

ly submitted in the Brief of Appellees Dallas County Plain- 

tiff/Intervenors is fully incorporated herein as if set forth 

at length verbatim and shall not be repeated here. 

In addition to those issues presented for review in 

the original brief filed before the panel in this cause, 

plaintiff/intervenors from Dallas County, Oliver, et al. add the 

following: 

l. Whether the single office holder doctrine 

applies to district judges in Texas in counties such as Dallas 

County electing more than one district judge with county-wide 

jurisdiction? 

2. Whether district judges in Texas act 

independently and are autonomous in their functions as held by 

the original panel in this cause? 

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEES, 
DALLAS COUNTY PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS - Page 1 
  

 



  

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
  

The Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts 

previously submitted in the Brief of Appellees Dallas County 

Plaintiff/Intervenors is fully incorporated herein as if set 

forth at length verbatim and shall not be repeated here. 

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
  

The Summary of the Argument previously submitted in 

the Brief of Appellees Dallas County Plaintiff/Intervenors is 

fully incorporated herein as if set forth at length verbatim and 

shall not be repeated here. 

Additionally, plaintiff/intervenors fromDallas County 

Oliver, et al. assert that whatever single office holder 

exception has been created concerning multi-member at-large 

election challenges, such defense does not apply to election of 

multiple judges with coterminous county-wide jurisdiction from 

the same geographical area. There is no legislative history to 

support such an exception. Nor does the decision in Butts v. 
  

City of New York, 779 F.24 141 (2nd Cir. 1985) apply to the 
  

election of trial judges in the counties challenged in this 

action. 

The conclusion that district Judges in Texas act 

autonomously in their function once elected to the multiple 

offices in the counties at issue is error. By statute and by 

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEES, 
DALLAS COUNTY PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS - Page 2 
  

 



    

practice, district judges in Texas act in many instances as a 

"collegial" body and by law cannot act alone or independently 

for these purposes. Partisan voting is no defense to racial 

polarization. 

ARGUMENT   

The complete statement of the Argument previously 

submitted in the Brief of Appellees Dallas County Plaintiff/In- 

tervenors is fully incorporated herein as if set forth at length 

verbatim and shall not be repeated here. 

At the outset, it should be noted that the panel 

opinion unanimously held that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 

applies to judicial elections (Slip Opinion at 4080). This is, 

of course, consistent with this Court's previous opinion in 

Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 
  

sub nom, Roemer v. Chisom, U.S. +r. 139 S.Ct. 390, 102 
  

L.Ed.2d 372 (1988). The cases cited in the original briefs for 

the parties clearly support this conclusion. 

l. Multiple Elections of District Judges From The 
Same Geographic Jurisdiction Are Not For Single Offices 

The majority panel opinion in this case held that 

notwithstanding the at-large election of thirty-seven (37) 

substantially identical district judges in Dallas County, each 

was a single office for purposes of the single office holder 

exception to vote dilution challenges under the Voting Rights 

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Act. The majority concluded that while the multiple courts in 

the counties in issue performed the same or part of the same 

judicial tasks, each was a single member office (Slip Opinion 

at 4084). The panel majority observed correctly that district 

judges in Dallas County shared concurrent jurisdiction for many 

duties (Slip Opinion at 4085) and that administrative duties 

were also shared between judges in a collegial fashion on a 

county-wide basis (Slip Opinion at 4086). Further, the majority 

opinion also noted the extensive interlocking relationship 

created by the Administrative Judicial Act, requiring district 

judges to act together and conferring special powers upon the 

presiding administrative judge (Slip Opinion at 4082). The 

panel majority also recited that another facet of local joint 

action by district judges included the assignment, docketing 

and transferring of hearings and of any and all cases in a fair 

and equitable division of case load (Slip Opinion at 4083). 

These descriptions are obviously not of judges acting "alone". 

The United States Attorney General's office has 

consistently taken the position that multi-member at-large 

elections which have dilutive effect are suspect under the 

Voting Rights Act. This office recently interposed objection 

to the preclearance of multi-member at-large elections for 

district judges in the State of Georgia (Slip Opinion at 4088); 

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see also Haith v. Martin, 618 F.Supp. 410, 413 (E.D. N.C., 1985) 
  

aff'd., 477 U.S. 901 (1986). Indeed, the Attorney General here 

has taken the position through its brief filed as amicus curiae 
  

that the election of multiple district judges from the same 

county is not only covered by Section 2, but under the facts of 

this case, was unlawful. The views of the United States 

expressed by the Department of Justice regarding the Voting 

Rights Act are entitled to great deference in this case. 

The majority opinion relies exclusively on a single 

decision to support its conclusion that district judgeships in 

Texas are single office positions. The decision of Butts v. 
  

City of New York, 779 F.2d 141 (2nd Cir. 1985) does not embrace 
  

the concept created by the panel majority. In Butts, each 

office in issue was one to which only one person in the entire 

voting district could be elected, unlike the multiple district 

judgeships per county at issue in this case. Butts dealt with 

a vote dilution challenge to an office like that of sheriff or 

district attorney in Texas (of which there can be no more than 

one per county). The majority bootstraps onto the holding in 

Butts that vote dilution challenges cannot successfully be 

maintained regarding a single office, because the office may not 

be divided into parts. Here, the Court does not need to divide 

district judgeships into parts, for in Dallas County thirty- 

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seven (37) co-terminus, administratively interlocking district 

judgeships exist for a vote dilution challenge. Each court in 

essence represents 1/37th of the total judicial function. 

The logical and intended narrow definition of the 

single office exception would only include truly single or one 

of a kind elected posts. On the state level, several such 

offices obviously exist -- the Governor, Lieut. Governor and 

Attorney General are examples of a single, unique elected 

position not subject to an at-large vote dilution claim. As 

also noted herein, on the county level, the positions of 

district attorney, sheriff and county treasurer are single, 

stand alone, non-duplicated elected offices. 

Conversely, the sole fact that some, but clearly not 

all, of a district judge's duties are performed alone, does not 

a priori result in conversion of thirty-seven (37) duplicated 

judicial offices into thirty-seven (37) unique, stand alone 

elected officials, especially where each performs the same or 

substantially the same task for the identical geographical unit 

and whose authority is co-extensive one with the other. The 

logic of such conclusion is respectfully lacking. 

The panel majority cites no language from the legisla- 

tive history of the Voting Rights Act, nor its amendments, that 

suggests the result it reached. No wonder, since no history 

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEES, 

DALLAS COUNTY PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS - Page 6 
  

 



    

exists to indicate that where a number of identical officials 

are elected from one geographic district and these office 

holders exercise some autonomy that the latter fact converts the 

offices into "single offices" excepting each from vote dilution 

challenges. 

In its holding, the panel opinion specifically 

disagrees with previously decided cases of Southern Christian 
  

Leadership Conference of Alabama v. Siegelman, 714 F.Supp. 511 
  

(M.D. Ala., 1989) and Clark v. Edwards, 725 F.Supp. 285 (M.D. 
  

La., 1988). While the panel was not bound by these decisions, 

it does not recite any authority to the contrary. Going further 

out on its limb, the panel also predicts what the Eleventh 

Circuit would decide on the issue, presumably finding some 

comfort in that exercise. 

Of course, the dissent takes strong issue with the 

holding of the panel majority and casts the issue regarding the 

single office holder exception clearly for resolution by the 

full court. Plaintiff/intervenors from Dallas submit that with 

no legislative history and no decisional authority for the 

panel's opinion, this Court should not extend or create any 

defense or exception to the Voting Rights Act's coverage. The 

intent of Section 2 is to expand coverage not withdraw same for 

protected voters. The full court should adopt the views of the 

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEES, 

DALLAS COUNTY PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS - Page 7 
  

 



    

dissent. 

2. District Judges Do Not Act Alone in Their Office 

The function of an office such as district judge does 

not determine whether Section 2 coverage exists (and presump- 

tively therefore whether Section 2 is violated). Chisom v.   

Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1988). However, the function 

of a district judge in Texas and particularly Dallas County is 

not for many purposes autonomous nor does the district judge 

always act alone (see dissenting Slip Opinion at 4091). Each 

district judge effectively shares the entire county's case load. 

The civil and criminal dockets of Dallas County are divided 

roughly equally by administrative mechanisms into many subparts 

of the whole. The judges can and do act interchangeably and are 

interchangeable because of their constitutional authority. 

District judges exercise co-extensive power over the entirety 

of Dallas County. 

Notwithstanding the panel majority's conclusion that 

district judges "act alone", district judges in Texas by state 

statute must or may: 

l. set and approve the salary of the county 
auditor as well as set the budget and 
staffing level for the county auditing 
department (Local Government Code, Sections 
84.002 (note) and 84.021); 

2. act with the county commissioners court or 
county judge to appoint the county purchas- 
ing agent as well as set salary, staffing 

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and budget levels for that department (Local 
Government Code, Section 262.011(a), (k) and 

(1); 

Jee serve as the Juvenile Board for the county 
(Government Code, Section 24.306) and 
supervise the juvenile probation department, 
appoint its director, approve its budget and 
staffing as well as set personnel policies 
for that agency (Human Resources Code, 
Section 142.001, et seq.; 

4. supervise the county Domestic Relations 
office (Human Resources Code, Section 
151.002 (b); and 

5. supervise the Adult Probation Department, 
including hiring of the director as well as 
approve that department's budget and 
staffing (Article 42.12, Code of Criminal 
Procedure). 

In short, district judges in Texas in the affected 

counties carry out together substantial administrative functions 

as judges in and for the county as well as sharing common 

judicial duties, noted by the panel majority and the dissenting 

opinion. 

Plaintiff/intervenors from Dallas County submit that 

the single office holder exception, whatever it may be, is 

narrow and should be limited to elected positions such as 

sheriff and/or district attorney; that is, to offices which are 

one-position per geographic jurisdiction. This doctrine should 

not apply to the thirty-seven (37) coequal district judgeships 

in Dallas County or to any other judgeships subject of this 

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lawsuit. However conceived, the single office holder exception 

was not intended to withdraw from the rights granted by Section 

2 of the Voting Rights Act. This concept was not designed to 

render judicial voters "less equal", compared to voters in other 

multi-member at-large elections subject to the protections of 

Section 2. To the contrary, the right to vote protected by 

Section 2 is the same right regarding all elective offices. 

Liability issues under Section 2 cannot be differentiated 

between elections for district judges compared to city council 

positions, school board seats, state legislators and the like. 

3. Partisan Voting Considerations are Irrelevant 

While not reached by the panel opinion, considerable 

attention has been devoted by appellants to the theory that 

partisan voting patterns somehow mask, explain and therefore 

immunize racially polarized voting in the affected counties. 

This phenomenon and argument is nowhere more pronounced than in 

Dallas County. Appellants' challenge premised upon partisan 

voting is at best problematic. Nowhere do appellants address 

the evidence at trial examining non-partisan voting patterns in 

Dallas County which demonstrate the same high degree of racial 

polarization without any party label to act as protective 

coloration. Plaintiff/Intervenor Dallas County Exhibit 25 is 

an analysis of a number of non-partisan races demonstrating the 

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same racial polarization as is found in judicial races conducted 

on a partisan ballot. No coincidence is occurring =-- only 

racial bloc voting. 

The current running beneath appellants' arguments is 

an assumption that black voters do not know whom they are voting 

on nor why; that the African American electorate is not voting 

on candidates but simply voting the party. This is, of course, 

an assumption not borne out by any convincing evidence. This 

premise completely ignores the obvious fact that black voters 

are making a choice, whether it be to vote for all of one 

party's candidates or some of them. It is this choice that is 

frustrated by the majority white voting bloc strength in Dallas 

County. It may well be that the black voting populace perceives 

more congruity between their ideals and the candidates of one 

party or another. The motivation of the voter is irrelevant to 

a Section 2 inquiry. The voter's choice is frustrated by the 

at-large voting in context of the larger white bloc electorate. 

The choice made by black voters is frustrated by the white 

voting bloc strength. 

Also the extent that choices are made, they are being 

made by the majority white voting bloc who vote less by straight 

ticket but precisely to defeat the highly qualified black 

judicial candidates. These are the candidates supported 

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overwhelmingly by the black voting populace (see plaintiff/in- 

tervenor Dallas County Exhibits 13, 14 and 15 and the testimony 

of black judicial candidates J. Winn, F. Tinsley, R. White and 

J. Oliver). 

CONCLUSION 
  

Plaintiff/intervenors from Dallas County suggest that 

there is no rational purpose served under the Voting Rights Act 

to exclude district judges from vote dilution challenges. The 

voter's choice is the issue, not the office held. The Voting 

Rights Act and its amendments do not distinguish between rights 

of judicial voters and those for other offices. Where multiple, 

substantially identical offices are voted on within a single 

geographic jurisdiction, vote dilution can surely occur. It has 

occurred here. No reason exists to distinguish judicial 

elections at the trial court level from any other. 

Violation of voting rights must be examined from the 

viewpoint of the protected group -- the voter, not the candidate 

nor the office. To hold otherwise is to declare that the 

emperor has new clothes despite his obvious appearance. To 

support the panel opinion is to effectively repeal a very 

important part of the Voting Rights Act. This Court should not 

countenance that result and should shun the logic of the panel 

opinion. This Court should, instead, affirm in all respects the 

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opinion of the trial court below. 

Respectfully submitted, 

MULLINAX, WELLS, BAAB 

& CLOUTMAN, P.C. 

3301 Elm Street 
Dallas, Texas 75226-1637 
(214) 939-9222 

. od CBA. = 
Edward B. Cloutman, III 
  

E. BRICE CUNNINGHAM 

Attorney at Law 
777 South R.L. Thornton Frwy. 
Suite 121 
Dallas, Texas 75203 
(214) 428-3793 

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES DALLAS 
COUNTY PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS 

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEES, 

  

DALLAS COUNTY PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS - Page 13 

 



    

mn tm Ss me i 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE   

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 

foregoing instrument has been served upon counsel of record, by 

placing same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, on this 

day of June, 1990: 

Mr. Renea Hicks 
Ms. Mary F. Keller 
Mr. Javier Guajardo 
Special Asst. Attorney General 
P.O. Box 12548 
Capitol Station 
Austin, Texas 78711-2548 

Mr. William L. Garrett 
Ms. Brenda Hull Thompson 
Garrett, Thompson & Chang, P.C. 
8300 Douglas, Suite 800 
Dallas, Texas 75225 

Mr. Rolando L. Rios 
Southwest Voter Registration 

& Education Project 
201 N, St. Mary's 
Suite 521 
San Antonio, Texas 78205 

Ms. Susan Finkelstein 
Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. 
201 N. St. Mary's 
Suite 521 
San Antonio, Texas 78205 

Mr. E. Brice Cunningham 
Attorney at Law 
777 South R.L. Thornton Frwy. 
Suite 121 
Dallas, Texas 75203 

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Ms. Sherrilyn A. Ifill 
N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense 

& Educational Fund, Inc. 

99 Hudson St., 16th Floor 
New York, New York 10013 

Ms. Gabrielle K. McDonald 
Matthews & Branscomb 
301 Congress Ave. 
Suite 2050 
Austin, Texas 78701 

Mr. J. Eugene Clements 
Mr. John E. O'Neill 
Porter & Clements 

700 Louisiana, Suite 3500 
Houston, Texas 77002-2730 

Mr. Robert BH. Mow, Jr. 

Mr. David C. Godbey 
Mr. Bobby M. Rubarts 
Ms. Esther R. Rosenblum 

Hughes & Luce 
2800 Momentum Place 
1717 Main Street 
Dallas, Texas 75201 

Mr. Jim Boyle 
Law Offices of Jim Boyle 
801 Congress Avenue 
Suie 250 
Austin, Texas 78701 

Mr. Seagal V. Wheatley 
Mr. Donald R. Philbin, Jr. 
Oppenheimer, Rosenberg, Kelleher 

& Wheatley, Inc. 
711 Navarro, Sixth Floor 

San Antonio, Texas 78205 

Mr. John L. Bill, Jr. 
Mr. Andy Taylor 
Liddell, Sapp, Zivley, Hill 

& LaBoon 
3300 Texas Commerce Tower 

Houston, Texas 77002 

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Mr. John N. Kennedy 
Mr. Thomas A. Casey 
Executive Counsel to the Governor 
Fourth Floor 
State Capitol Building 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804 

Mr. Robert G. Pugh 
Mr. Robert G. Pugh, Jr. 
Pugh & Pugh 
Commercial National Tower 
Suite 3100 
333 Texas Street 
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101-5302 

Mr. Kenneth C. Dejean 
Assistant Attorney General 
Louisiana Dept. of Justice 
P.O. Box 44005 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804 

Ms. Cynthia Rougeou 
Legal Division 
Office of the Secretary of State 
State Capitol Building 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804 

Mr. Michael H. Rubin 
Rubin, Curry, Colvin & Joseph 
Suite 1400 
One American Place 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70825 

SJL 
Edward B. Cloutman, III 
  

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DALLAS COUNTY PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS - Page 16

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This collection and the tools to navigate it (the “Collection”) are available to the public for general educational and research purposes, as well as to preserve and contextualize the history of the content and materials it contains (the “Materials”). Like other archival collections, such as those found in libraries, LDF owns the physical source Materials that have been digitized for the Collection; however, LDF does not own the underlying copyright or other rights in all items and there are limits on how you can use the Materials. By accessing and using the Material, you acknowledge your agreement to the Terms. If you do not agree, please do not use the Materials.


Additional info

To the extent that LDF includes information about the Materials’ origins or ownership or provides summaries or transcripts of original source Materials, LDF does not warrant or guarantee the accuracy of such information, transcripts or summaries, and shall not be responsible for any inaccuracies.