Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Morris Petitions and Briefs
Public Court Documents
June 22, 1994
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Morris Petitions and Briefs, 1994. e2426da7-b59a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/7dd79947-f071-4eb0-9ea5-eafeb11489d4/hawaiian-airlines-inc-v-morris-petitions-and-briefs. Accessed October 08, 2025.
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The Supreme Court of the United States
JU N 22 1994
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.
versus (92-2058)
Norris
Petitions and Briefs
M A A CP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND
LIBRARY
99 HUDSON STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. 1«0B?
Labor Law Series
Volume 27, No. 11
1993/94 Term of Court
Law Reprints
TAME OF COHTEHTS
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.
versus (92-2058)
Grant T. Morris
Docket Sheet.......................................3
Petition for frit of Certiorari....................... 5
Opposition......... .69
Reply Brief of Petitioner............. 101
AMICI CURIAE BRIEFS 01 JURISDICTION
Air Transport Association.......................... 141
United States.....................................115
BRIEFS OB THE MERITS
Petitioner......... 159
Respondent......... 225
Reply Brief of Petitioner...........................281
Ana CURIAE BRIEFS OB THE MERITS
Air Transport Association.......................... ..347
Allied Educational Foundation........................ 385
National Enplopent Lawyers Association................ 413
National Railway Labor Conference................... ...439
Railway labor Executives Association.................. .479
State of Bew Jersey................................ 517
States of Hawaii, Arizona, Connecticut, et al............557
United States.....................................309
1
Editor’s Note
As a general rule Law Reprints’ reproduces appendix
materials containing original research that is not generally
available, such as compilations of case or statute citations.
However, decisions that are readily available in the state or
federal reporter system and the text of state or federal
statutes are not reprinted.
2
Docket Sheet
No. 92-2058-CSX
Status: GRANTED
Docketed:
May 17, 1993
Title: Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., Petitioner
v.
Grant T. Norris
and
Paul J. Finazzo, et al., Petitioners
v.
Grant T. Norris
Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii
Counsel for petitioner: Hipp,Kenneth Byron, Moore Jr.,Raich
J.
Counsel for respondent: Boyle,Edward DeLappe
Ptn due & mid 5-17-93, see ml label re dkt dt. 45
cps ptn red 5-20-93, 1 retained; 45 corr cps red 6-
25-93.
Entry Date
1 May 17
2 Jul 8
3 Jul 14
4 Jul 23
5 Sep 21
6 Oct 4
7 Oct 4
8 Jan 5
9 Jan 5
10 Jan 21
Note Proceedings and Orders
1993 G Petition for writ of certiorari filed.
1993 Brief of respondent Grant T. Norris in opposition filed.
1993 DISTRIBUTED. September 27, 1993
1993 G Motion of Air Transport Association of America for leave
to file a brief as amicus curiae filed.
1993 X Reply brief of petitioner filed.
1993 Motion of Air Transport Association of America for leave
to file a brief as amicus curiae GRANTED.
1993 P The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this
case expressing the views of the United States.
1994 REDISTRIBUTED. January 21, 1994 (Page 1)
1994 X Brief amicus curiae of United States filed.
1994 Petition GRANTED. The brief of petitioner is to be filed
with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or
before 3 p.m., Friday, March 4, 1994. The brief of
respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served
upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, April
1, 1994. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the
Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3
p.m., Friday, April 15, 1994. Rule 29 does not apply.
********************************************************
11 Feb 14 1994 Record filed.
* Partial proceedings Supreme Court of Hawaii (Box).
14 Feb 22 1994 Record filed.
* ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS FIRST CIRCUIT COURT OF HAWAII (15
BOXES)
12 Mar 3 1994 Brief of petitioner Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. filed.
13 Mar 3 1994 Joint appendix filed.
15 Mar 4 1994 Brief amicus curiae of petitioner National Railway Labor
Conference filed.
16 Mar 4 1994 Brief amicus curiae of Air Transport Association of America
filed.
17 Mar 4 1994 Brief amicus curiae of New Jersey filed.
18 Mar 7 1994 SET FOR ARGUMENT WEDNESDAY, APRIL 27, 1994. (2ND CASE).
3
N o . 9 2 - 2 0 5 8 - C S X
Entry Date Note Proceedings and Orders
19 Mar 8 1994 CIRCULATED.
20 Mar 15 1994 G Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate
in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided
argument filed.
21 Mar 21 1994 Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate
in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided
argument GRANTED.
22 Apr 1 1994 X Brief amicus curiae of United States filed.
23 Apr 1 1994 X Brief amicus curiae of Railway Labor Executives' Association
24 Apr 1 1994 X Brief amici curiae of Hawaii, et al. filed.
25 Apr 1 1994 Brief amicus curiae of National Employment Lawyers
Association filed.
26 Apr 1 1994 X Brief amicus curiae of Allied Educational Foundation filed
27 Apr 1 1994 X Brief of respondent Grant T. Norris filed.
28 Apr 15 1994 X Reply brief of petitioners Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. et al
filed.
29 Apr 15 1994 LODGING consisting of one set of 5 NRAB awards received
from counsel for the Petitioner.
30 Apr 26 1994 LODGING consisting of 10 sets of various decisions of
Railway Labor Act Adjustment received from counsel for
the respondent.
31 Apr 28 1994 AR GU ED.
4
No. 92-2058
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1992
4 c ifs 4s
HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC., PETITIONER
v.
GRANT T. NORRIS
and
PAUL J. FINAZZO, HOWARD E. OGDEN and
HATSUO HONMA, PETITIONERS
v.
GRANT T. NORRIS
* * * *
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF HAWAII
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
GOODSILL ANDERSON QUINN & STIFEL
KENNETH B. HIPP*
MARGARET C. JENKINS
JENNIFER C. CLARK
1099 Alakea Street
1800 Alii Place
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813
(808) 547-5600
Counsel fo r Petitioners
*Counsel o f Record
5
1
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the Hawaii Supreme Court erred by applying the nar
row test for preem ption under Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, articulated in Lingle
v. Norge Dir. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988), to find
that Norris’ wrongful discharge tort claims were not preempted by
the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”), 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., contrary
to the plain language and intent of the RLA and the decisions of
the United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth, Fourth and
Sixth Circuits holding that the Lingle analysis does not apply to
RLA preemption.
6
11
LIST OF INTERESTED PARTIES
Petitioner Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., a Hawaii corporation, is a
wholly-owned subsidiary of HAL, Inc., a publicly traded Hawaii
corporation. HAL, Inc. is also the parent corporation of West Maui
Airport, Inc.
7
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED....... ............................ j
LIST OF INTERESTED PARTIES............................................... ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.......................................................... iv
OPINIONS BELOW........................................................................ 1
JURISDICTION................................................................................ 1
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED............................................................. 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE....................................................... 2
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND................................................ 2
B. NORRIS v. HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC.,
CIV. NO. 87-3894-12.............................................. 4
C. NORRIS v. FINAZZO, ET AL„ CIVIL NO. 89-2904-09.... 5
D. DECISION OF THE HAWAII SUPREME COURT............6
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ......................... 8
I. NORRIS IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE EXPLICIT
LANGUAGE OF THE RLA AND THE DECISIONS
OF THREE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
BECAUSE IT WRONGLY APPLIES LINGLE TO
DETERMINE THE SCOPE OF PREEMPTION
UNDER THE RLA................................................................. 8
II. THE HAWAII SUPREME COURT S ERRONEOUS
RULING ON RLA PREEMPTION RAISES ISSUES
WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION BY THIS COURT
SINCE IT IS ONE OF A NUMBER OF
ERRONEOUS RULINGS ON THE SCOPE OF
RLA PREEMPTION................ 15
CONCLUSION............................................................ 17
Ill
8
IV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,
406 U.S. 320 (1972)................................................................10, 12
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell,
480 U.S. 557 (1987) ............ .................. ................. .................. .15
Davies v. American Airlines, Inc., 971 F.2d 463
(10th Cir. 1992) ........................................................................ 7, 16
Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R. Co. v. Burley,
325 U.S. 711 (1945) ..................................................................... 12
Gilmer v. InterstatelJohnson Lane Corp.,
I l l S. Ct. 1647 (1991) .......................................................... 13, 16
Grote v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 905 F.2d 1307
(9th Cir.), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 958 (1990) .....................passim
Groves v. Ring Screw Works, 498 U.S. 168 (1990) .................8, 10
Hubbard v. United Airlines, Inc.. 927 F.2d 1094
(9th Cir. 1991) ..........................................................................7, n
Lingle v. Norge Div. o f Magic Chef, Inc.,
486 U.S. 399 (1988) ............................................................ passim
Lorenz v. CSX Trans., Inc., 980 F,2d 263
(4th Cir. 1992) ......................................................................... 7, n
Maher v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc.,
125 N.J. 455, 593 A.2d 750 (N.J. 1991) ............................ passim
Mayon v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 805 F.2d 1250
(5th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 488 U.S.
925 (1988) ......................................................................................15
McCall v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 844 F.2d 294
(6th Cir. 1988) ..............................................................7, 12, 13, 15
Norris v. Finazzo, et al„ Civil No. 89-2904-09,
-—.— Haw.__ , 842 P.2d 634 (1992).....................................passim
9
V
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES-Continued
Smolarek v. Chrysler Carp., 879 F.2d 1326
(6th Cir. 1989) ........................................................................ 7 12
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.. 369 U.S. 95 (1962) ....................... 9
OTHER AUTHORITIES
U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause)............................. 2
29 U.S.C. § 185 (Labor Management Relations Act)...........passim
45 U.S.C. § 151 (Railway Labor Act) ..................................passim
49 U.S.C. § 1301 (Federal Aviation Act)........................................4
H.R.S. § 378-61 (Hawaii Whistleblowers’
Protection Act) ............................................................. 4
Rule 54(b) of the Hawaii Rules of
Civil Procedure ...................................................... g
10
1
N O .__________
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM. 1992
iff
HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC.. PETITIONER
i’.
GRANT T. NORRIS
and
PAUL J. FINAZZO, HOWARD E. OGDEN and
HATSUO HONMA, PETITIONERS
v.
GRANT T. NORRIS
* * * *
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF HAWAII
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
OPINIONS BELOW
The decision of the Supreme Court for the State of Hawaii in
Norris v. Finazzo, et al., Civil No. 89-2904-09, is reported a t ___
Haw. ___, 842 P.2d 634 (Haw. 1992) (Appendix “App.” A). The
companion decision in Norris v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., Civil No.
87-3894-12, is not reported (App. B). The orders of the Circuit
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, which were the subject
of the appeal are not reported.
JURISDICTION
The judgments of the Hawaii Supreme Court were entered
February 16, 1993 (App. C). The jurisdiction of this Court is time
ly invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).
11
2
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Supremacy Clause, Article VI, clause 2 of the Con
stitution, provides in relevant part:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be
the supreme Law of the Land . . . .
The pertinent sections of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.
§ 151 et seq., are reproduced at App. D. The pertinent provisions
of Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§185, are reproduced at App. E.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On February 2, 1987, Grant T. Norris (“Norris”) became
employed by Petitioner Hawaiian Airlines. Inc. (“Hawaiian Air
lines”) as an aircraft mechanic. Finazzo, 842 P.2d at 637. The
terms and conditions of Norris’ employment were governed by a
collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) (App. F) negotiated
between Hawaiian Airlines and the International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers (AFC-CIO) (“IAM” or “the
Union”) pursuant to the provisions of the Railway Labor Act
(“RLA”), 45 U.S.C. § 151 ef seq. (App. D).
On July 15, 1987, Norris was involved in a dispute with his
supervisor concerning a tire change on an Hawaiian Airlines’ jet
aircraft. 842 P.2d at 637. Norris expressed concerns regarding the
airworthiness of the “axle sleeve” portion of the tire assembly, but
an Hawaiian Airlines’ inspector found the axle sleeve to be air
worthy and directed that the tire change be completed. Id.
Norris’ supervisor asked Norris to sign a work record reflect
ing the tire change, pursuant to Article IV, U D.4(a) of the CBA,
which provides in relevant part: “An Aircraft Mechanic may be
required to sign work records in connection with the work he per
forms.” Norris refused to sign the record, citing his concern
regarding the safety of the axle sleeve, and claiming that he him
self had not performed the work in question.1 (R. 1:4) Norris’
'Record cites to the record fited in the Hawaii Supreme Court in Finazzo
and Hawaiian Airlines will be (“R." “Volume Number:” “page(s)”).
12
3
supervisor told him that the supervisor and the inspector had
signed a work record regarding the condition of the axle sleeve
and that Norris’ signature for the tire change was not an endorse
ment of the condition of the sleeve. Nevertheless, Norris would
not change his position. After Norris refused to sign the work
record, he was held out of service pending an investigation into
his conduct in accordance with the CBA. CBA, Art. XV, 1] F. 1; (R.
1:5).
Articles XV and XVI of the CBA set forth detailed procedures
for the adjustment of grievances and other employment disputes
and establish an arbitral panel, a System Board of Adjustment
(“System Board”), for final and binding resolution of claims
through arbitration. The CBA provides that the System Board
“shall have exclusive jurisdiction over disputes between any
employee covered by this Agreement and the Company and be
tween the Company and the Union, growing out of grievances
concerning disciplinary action, rules, rates of pay, or working con
ditions covered by [the CBA] . . . or out of the interpretation or
application of any terms of [the CBA] . . . .” CBA, Art. XVI, j] C.
The CBA grievance process regarding Norris began on July
15, 1987, when a Step 1 grievance hearing was scheduled for July
31, 1987. 842 P.2d at 637. The grievance proceeding focused on
whether Norris’ failure to sign the work record provided just cause
for disciplinary action against him in light of the CBA’s require
ment that mechanics sign off for work performed. (R. V: 100-105,
at f][21-22; V: 109-110) Norris took the position that his refusal to
complete the requested work record was justified by his questions
about the safety of the axle sleeve. Article XVII ]] F of the CBA
provides that “[a]n employee’s refusal to perform work which is in
violation of established health and safety rules, or any local, state
or federal health and safety law shall not warrant disciplinary
action.”
Norris had an opportunity to present his argument at the Step
1 grievance hearing on July 31, 1987. Norris was present and rep
resented at the hearing by his union representative. (R. V: 100-105,
at ^ 21-22; V: 109-110) On August 3, 1987, the hearing officer
issued a Step 1 report finding Norris guilty of insubordination and
recommending his termination. (Decision of Step 1 hearing offi
cer, Aug. 3, 1987 (App. G))
At some time between July 15 and August 3, 1987, Norris
13
4
contacted the Federal Aviation Authority (“FAA”) and reported
that the axle sleeve he had observed was not airworthy. (R. XVII:
Deposition of Grant Norris, Vol. 4, Feb. 10, 1990, at 709-10) On
August 4, 1987, after the Step 1 determination had been made, the
FAA contacted Hawaiian Airlines, inspected the axle sleeve and
had it removed from the aircraft.
Pursuant to the CBA, Norris, through the IAM, filed an appeal
to the Step 3 grievance level regarding the Step 1 determination.
(R. 1:8, at 36; V:134) Prior to the Step 3 hearing, Hawaiian
Airlines reduced Norris’ punishment from a termination to a sus
pension without pay for the period from August 3, 1987 to Sep
tember 15, 1987, and ordered him reinstated effective that latter
date. (Ltr. of Reinstatement, Sept. 10, 1987 (App. H))
Norris did not return to work on September 15, 1987, and he
took no further steps to pursue his grievance through the System
Board procedures mandated by the CBA. Instead, he abandoned the
grievance process and several months later commenced litigation in
state court. On March 2, 1988, three months after Norris filed suit,
the FAA notified Hawaiian Airlines of a proposed civil penalty con
cerning the axle sleeve. In April 1990, the FAA settled all pending
cases involving Hawaiian Airlines — including the axle sleeve mat
ter — without making any findings of fact or conclusions of law.
B. NORRIS v. HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC., CIV. NO.
87- 3894-12
Norris filed suit against Hawaiian Airlines in the First Circuit
Court for the State of Hawaii on December 8, 1987, alleging ter
mination in violation of public policy (Count I), violation of the
Hawaii Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, H.R.S. § 378-61 et seq.
(Count II), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count III),
punitive damages (Count IV), and breach of the CBA (Count V)'
Count I specifically alleged that Norris was terminated in violation
of public policies embodied within the Federal Aviation Act, 49
U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.. and the Federal Aviation Regulations (col
lectively “the Federal Aviation laws”) due to his refusal to com
plete work records regarding the tire change.
Hawaiian Airlines removed the case to the United States Dis
trict Court for the District of Hawaii on January 6, 1988, pursuant
to the “complete preemption” doctrine. Thereafter, Hawaiian
Airlines moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety on the
14
5
grounds that Norris' claims were subject to the mandatory arbitra
tion procedures of the RLA. The Federal District Court dismissed
Count V of the complaint for breach of the CBA as “completely
preempted,” but remanded the remaining Counts, reasoning that
the state court was competent to determine the issue of whether
Hawaiian Airlines had a valid “preemption” defense based on the
RLA.
In state court, Hawaiian Airlines filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to RLA preemption. The
circuit court dismissed Count I (termination in violation of public
policy), finding that claim to be cognizable under the CBA arbi
tration procedure and therefore preempted by the RLA.
C. NORRIS v. FINAZZO, ET AL., CIVIL NO. 89-2904-09
On September 20, 1989, Norris filed a second suit against
three Hawaiian Airlines' supervisory employees—Paul J. Finazzo,
Howard E. Ogden and Hatsuo Honma (“the Individual De
fendants”). Norris' claims against the Individual Defendants were
for termination in violation of the public policies embodied in the
Federal Aviation laws (Count I), termination in violation of the
public policies embodied in the Hawaii Whistleblowers' Protection
Act (Count II), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count
III), and punitive damages (Count IV). The suit against the
Individual Defendants was consolidated with the Hawaiian
Airlines suit.
The Individual Defendants moved to dismiss Counts I and II
of the Finazzo complaint on grounds that those claims were pre
empted by the RLA. The state circuit court agreed and dismissed
those counts. The circuit court certified the orders of partial dis
missal in Hawaiian Airlines and Finazzo, as well as the order
denying Norris' motions for reconsideration thereof, for immediate
appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Hawaii Rules of Civil
Procedure.2
After Norris appeal was fully briefed, the Hawaii Supreme Court dismissed
the Hawaiian Airlines action sua sponte because the record on appeal did not
contain a certified copy of the order of remand from the Federal District Court.
The remand order was eventually reissued and certified, and the record of prior
proceedings in the case, including the dismissal of Count I of the Hawaiian
Airlines complaint, was ordered reinstated. The Rule 54(b) appeal of Count 1
then proceeded, and the parties once again briefed the preemption issues in the
Hawaiian Airlines case.
15
6
D. DECISION OF THE HAWAII SUPREME COURT
In judgments entered February 16, 1993, the Hawaii Supreme
Court reversed the dismissal of Count I of the Hawaiian Airlines
complaint and Counts I and II of the Finazzo complaint. The court
held, as a matter of federal law, that Norris’ tort claims for wrong
ful discharge were not preempted under the RLA and should not
have been dismissed. Norris v. Finazzo, _ Haw.__, 842 P.2d 634
(Haw. 1992).’
The Hawaii Supreme Court acknowledged that the determina
tion of whether the RLA preempts state law claims is a question
of congressional intent. 842 P,2d at 639. The court also recognized
that the RLA was enacted to promote stability in railroad and air
line industry labor-management relations by providing a compre
hensive non-judicial framework for resolving employment
disputes. Id at 640. The court nevertheless decided that congres
sional intent would not be frustrated by allowing Norris’ claims
for wrongful discharge to go forward in state court outside the
RLA arbitration process. 842 P.2d at 648.
In rejecting the RLA preemption defense, the Hawaii Supreme
Court applied a preemption test derived from Section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act (“Section 301”), 29 U.S.C. §
185, as explicated in Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486
U.S. 399 (1988), and Maher v. New Jersey Transit Rail Opera
tions, Inc., 593 A.2d 750 (N.J. 1991). The Lingle case held that
Section 301 preempts only those state law claims in which “the
application [of state law] requires the interpretation of a collective
bargaining agreement.” 486 U.S. at 407. In Maher, the New Jersey
Supreme Court extended the holding of Lingle to govern RLA
preemption. 593 A.2d at 758. The Hawaii court concluded that,
under the Lingle standard, Norris’ claims were not preempted
since resolving those claims, in the court’s view, does not require
any interpretation of the CBA. 842 P.2d at 645.
The decision in Finazzo was issued December 16, 1992. In a subsequent
memorandum opinion issued February 2. 1993 in the Hawaiian Airlines case, the
Hawaii court adopted its reasoning and holding in Finazzo to find that Norris’
claim for wrongful discharge against Hawaiian Airlines was not preempted. Since
the Hawaiian Airlines' decision simply adopted the Finazzo reasoning and hold
ing by reference, Petitioners will refer to the decision in Norris v. Finazzo in
their discussion of the court’s actions and in their arguments as to why certiorari
should be granted.
16
7
Despite extensive briefing by both parties of the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Grote v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 905 F.2d
1307 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 958 (1990) ( “Grote"),
which found RLA preemption on facts similar to those in Norris,
the Hawaii Supreme Court did not cite or follow Grote or the
Ninth Circuit’s other decisions regarding RLA preemption. In
Grote, the Ninth Circuit held that the test articulated by the
Supreme Court in Lingle for preemption under Section 301 did not
apply to RLA preemption since Congress intended for the RLA to
have broader preemptive power. 905 F.2d at 1309-10. Un
constrained by Lingle, Grote held the RLA would preempt any
state law claim “arguably governed” by a collective bargaining
agreement “where the gravamen of the complaint is wrongful dis
charge.” 905 F.2d at 1309. The Hawaii Supreme Court also failed
to discuss other cases from the Fourth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits
finding that the Lingle analysis does not apply to RLA preemption
issues. See Lorenz v. CSX Trans., Inc., 980 F.2d 263 (4th Cir.
1992); Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp., 879 F.2d 1326, 1334 n.4 (6th
Cir. 1989) (discussing McCall v. Chesapeake & Ohio Rv., 844
F.2d 294 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 879 (1988)); Hubbard v.
United Airlines. Inc., 927 F.2d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1991). But see
Davies v. American Airlines, Inc., 971 F.2d 463 (10th Cir. 1992)
0Lingle analysis does apply to RLA preemption), petition for cer
tiorari filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3481 (1993).
Hawaiian Airlines and the Individual Defendants now respect
fully petition this Court for a writ of certiorari to the Hawaii
Supreme Court. As set forth more fully below, Petitioners believe
review of the Hawaii court’s decision presents an appropriate
opportunity for exercise of this Court’s certiorari jurisdiction since
review would effectuate the clear mandate by Congress in the
RLA that employment disputes such as those raised by Norris be
resolved through arbitration; would resolve a split between the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and the
Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits regard
ing the standard for determining RLA preemption; would resolve
an intra-circuit split between the Hawaii Supreme Court and the
Ninth Circuit regarding the RLA preemption standard; and would
provide much needed guidance and uniformity regarding the pre
emption standard to be applied to employment disputes in the vital
interstate railroad and airline industries governed by the RLA.
17
8
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
I. NORRIS IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE EXPLICIT
LANGUAGE OF THE RLA AND THE DECISIONS
OF THREE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
BECAUSE IT WRONGLY APPLIES LINGLE TO
DETERMINE THE SCOPE OF PREEMPTION
UNDER THE RLA.
In Norris, the Hawaii Supreme Court was called upon to
determine whether an employee can assert state tort “wrongful dis
charge” claims in state court when the dispute underlying those
claims arises out of an application of the terms of the CBA and
the grievance process itself and when the CBA explicitly grants to
the System Board “exclusive jurisdiction over disputes between
any employee covered by [the CBA] and the Company . . . grow
ing out of grievances concerning disciplinary action, rules, rates of
pay or working conditions covered by [the CBA] or out of the
interpretation or application of any terms of [the CBA].” CBA
Article XVI, j] C (emphasis supplied). The state circuit court had
found Norris’ wrongful discharge claims preempted by the RLA.
By applying the holding from Lingle v. Norge Div. o f Magic Chef,
Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988), to revive Norris’ state law claims, the
Hawaii Supreme Court ignored clear congressional intent, misap
plied this Court’s precedent in the preemption area, and put itself
in square conflict with the decisions of three federal courts of
appeals. Those three courts have held, based on their analysis of
the provisions of the RLA, its legislative history and this Court's
decisions, that the Lingle test is inapplicable to preemption under
the RLA.
The Lingle test was developed by this Court to address pre
emption under Section 301. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 401. Section 301
provides that suits for breach of collective bargaining agreements
may be brought in federal court. 29 U.S.C. § 185. Nothing in the
text of Section 301 or its legislative history requires or even men
tions arbitration as a mandatory forum for resolving workplace
disputes. Id. In fact, this Court recently held that an employee was
entitled to sue in federal court under Section 301 where his collec
tive bargaining agreement was silent and did not specifically limit
resolution of disputes to the grievance process. Groves v. Ring
Screw Works, 498 U.S. 168 (1990).
Section 301 was first found to have preemptive power over
18
9
state court actions by this Court in Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.,
369 U.S. 95 (1962). Since the text of Section 301 does not evince
a legislative intent to remove labor disputes from the courts or to
commit them to an arbitral forum, it is clear that Section 301 pre
emption is a matter of “judicial imposition" rather than statutory
creation. Grote, 905 F.2d at 1310.
In Lingle, this Court outlined the limited scope of Section 301
preemption:
Even if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective bar
gaining agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on
the other, would require addressing precisely the same
set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be
resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the
claim is “independent" of the agreement for § 30!
pre-emption purposes.
486 U.S. at 410 (footnote omitted). The Lingle Court emphasized
that its discussion pertained only to Section 301 preemption and
that “it is important to remember that other federal labor law prin
ciples may pre-empt state law." 486 U.S. 409 at n.8. The Lingle
test was properly crafted to protect the interests identified by Con
gress in enacting Section 301—namely, to assure uniformity in the
interpretation of collective bargaining agreements. Congress had
broader purposes in enacting the RLA—namely, to require arbitra
tion of a broad range of workplace disputes involving not only the
interpretation of collective bargaining agreements, but also dis
putes arising out of the application of terms of those agreements.
Thus, unlike Section 301, which is silent on the issue of arbi
tration of workplace disputes, the RLA requires airlines with
unionized employees to establish an arbitral forum—a System
Board of Adjustment—for the resolution of “disputes between an
employee . . . and a carrier . . . growing out of grievances or out
of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rate
of pay, rules, or working conditions.” 45 U.S.C. § 184 (emphasis
supplied). By use of the disjunctive, Congress plainly expected the
System Board to resolve not only employment disputes requiring
interpretation of agreements, but also disputes growing out of
grievances concerning discipline or out of the application of
agreem ents. Indeed, in Section 2 of the RLA, 45 U.S.C.
§ 151a, Congress went further and unequivocally stated that the
purposes of the RLA included a statutory scheme to
19
10
provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all dis
putes concerning rates of pay, rules or working condi
tions (emphasis supplied)
and, in addition,
to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all
disputes growing out of grievances or out of the inter
pretation or application of agreements covering rates of
pay, rules or working conditions, (emphasis supplied).
45 U.S.C. § 151a.
This Court has already held that the arbitral procedures man
dated by the RLA cannot be avoided by an employee through
characterization of a discharge as a state claim for breach of con
tract. Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 406 U.S. 320
(1972). The Andrews Court found after review of the text of the
RLA and its legislative history that the arbitral procedures mandat
ed by Section 151a of the Act are compulsory. 406 U.S. at 322.
The Court reasoned that, since Congress in the RLA clearly
intended to direct transportation industry employment disputes into
arbitration, the parties could not opt out of arbitration by mutual
agreement, and an employee could not avoid arbitration simply by
pleading a claim as one arising under state law. Id. The Court
noted that Section 301 had in certain circumstances been held to
require arbitration and that the RLA presented an even stronger
case for compulsory arbitration “since the compulsory character of
the [RLA] administrative remedy . . . stems not from any con
tractual undertaking between the parties but from the Act itself . .
. Id. at 323. Cf. Groves v. Ring Screw Works, 498 U.S. 168
(1990) (under Section 301 employee could bypass grievance
process and file suit in federal court because the parties to the col
lective bargaining agreement had not contracted to arbitrate all
disputes).
Given the mandatory arbitration provisions in the RLA and
this Court’s pronouncements on the scope of RLA preemption,
three federal courts of appeals have held that the formula for
Section 301 preemption set forth in Lingle is not the proper mea
sure for preemption under the RLA. In accordance with the plain
language of Section 2 of the RLA, those courts have held that
RLA preemption is not limited to claims requiring an inter
pretation of CBA provisions, but extends beyond Lingle to pre
20
i l
empt “all disputes growing out of grievances or out of the inter
pretation or application” of collective bargaining agreements. 45
U.S.C. § 151a. The Hawaii Supreme Court in Norris failed to dis
cuss or distinguish those three courts’ decisions, and, as discussed
in more detail below, the Hawaii court’s decision is clearly in con
flict with those courts, including the Ninth Circuit.
In Grote v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 905 F.2d 1307 (9th
Cir.), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 958 (1990), the Ninth Circuit specifi
cally rejected an employee’s attempt to apply the Lingle test to a
dispute regarding RLA preemption. The Ninth Circuit held that
the scope of preemption under the RLA and Section 301 are not
the same. 905 F.2d at 1309. The RLA contains a statutory provi
sion requiring arbitration of employment disputes, and the LMRA
does not. Id. The Ninth Circuit further found Lingle inapposite
because the RLA, unlike Section 301, was enacted for the express
purpose of keeping employment disputes in the railroad and airline
industries “simple and out of reach of the often lengthy court pro
cess.” Id.
Grote’s facts are similar to those in Norris. In Grote, the
employee had claimed that he was discharged in retaliation for his
refusal to give false medical information to the FA A at his
employer’s request. 905 F.2d at 1309. The employer asserted his
termination was warranted under the collective bargaining agree
ment because Grote had failed to maintain the requisite medical
certification. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that Congress intended for
the RLA arbitration procedure to preempt state law remedies in all
cases where the gravamen of the employee’s claim is wrongful
discharge and the employer’s actions are “arguably justified” by
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Id. Accordingly,
Grote’s state law claims arising from the alleged wrongful dis
charge were dismissed. Id.
A separate panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals fol
lowed Grote to affirm that the Lingle standard does not apply to
RLA preemption. Hubbard v. United Airlines, Inc., 927 F.2d 1094,
1097 (9th Cir. 1991).
In Lorenz v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 980 F.2d 263 (4th Cir.
1992), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
refused to apply Lingle’s Section 301 analysis to narrow the scope
of RLA preemption because “the [Supreme] Court has clearly rec
ognized that preemption under the RLA is more pervasive.” 980
21
12
F.2d at 268 (citing Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R. Co. v. Burley, 325
U.S. 711 (1945)). The Fourth Circuit cited this Court's decision in
Andrews as the “starting point for considering the preemptive
effect of the RLA,” 980 F.2d at 266, and found that Andrews and
its progeny require preemption of all state tort claims “inextricably
intertwined” with a collective bargaining agreement’s grievance
procedure. Id.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has also concluded that
Lingle does not apply to RLA preemption analysis. In McCall v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Rv. Co., 844 F.2d 294 (6th Cir.), cert, denied,
488 U.S. 879 (1988), a case decided prior to Lingle, the Sixth
Circuit held an employee’s claim for violation of Michigan’s dis
ability discrimination law was preempted under the RLA due to
the “strong similarity between the inquiry made by the arbitration
board and the inquiry made by the jury in the state cause of action
. . . .” 844 F.2d at 301. The McCall Court cited the broad federal
policy articulated in the RLA to channel dispute resolution into
non-judicial fora and held that, “[i]f the federal dispute resolution
mechanism is to have any force, juries cannot be allowed to sec
ond-guess the decisions of arbitration boards.” Id. at 302. On a
motion for rehearing filed after Lingle, the Sixth Circuit issued a
one-paragraph order stating that Lingle did not require reversal of
its preemption finding. 844 F.2d at 304. In a subsequent decision,
the Sixth Circuit cited McCall as a case in which Lingle’s Section
301 preemption did not apply. Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp., 879
F.2d 1326, 1334 n.4 (6th Cir. 1989).
Norris is in clear conflict with the above decisions of the
Ninth, Fourth and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals because it
applies Lingle’s Section 301 analysis to unduly confine the intend
ed scope of RLA preemption. Norris also conflicts in principle
with this Court’s decision in Andrews since it permits Norris to
bypass the RLA-mandated arbitral forum by recasting a claim
cognizable under the CBA as a breach of state law. The Hawaii
court has also wholly disregarded the plain language of the RLA
and the CBA, both of which dictate resolution of all such employ
ment disputes exclusively through the RLA’s System Board proce
dures and specifically require arbitration of disputes growing out
22
13
of grievances or the application or interpretation of the CBA.4
Had the Hawaii Supreme Court followed the plain language of
the RLA and the United States Courts of Appeals’ decisions in
Grote, Lorenz and McCall, it clearly would have found Norris’ state
law claims preempted because those claims arise from an applica
tion of the CBA and from the grievance process itself. Furthermore,
Norris’ state claims involve the same operative facts and issues as
his claim for wrongful discharge under the CBA, and the CBA by
its unambiguous terms commits all such disputes to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the System Board. Norris himself recognized the
identity of his state claims and his CBA claims when he drafted his
complaint against Hawaiian Airlines to incorporate all of the allega
tions of his state claims (Counts I-IV) within his CBA breach claim
(Count V).
Norris’ state claims clearly arise out of the application of a
number of provisions of the CBA and out of the grievance process
itself. When the dispute arose between Nonas and his supervisor
about his refusal to sign the work record for the tire change, the
two disagreed about whether the signature on the work record
meant that Norris was signing for the condition of the axle sleeve.
Since the CBA provides that “ [a]n Aircraft Mechanic may be
required to sign work records in connection with the work he per
forms,” Norris’ discipline for refusing to sign the work record
clearly grew out of an application of the CBA. CBA, Article IV
D.4(a). Since the CBA explicitly commits all employment disputes
“growing out of . . . the interpretation or application of any terms
of [the CBA]” to the exclusive jurisdiction of the System Board,
the CBA by its terms precluded Norris’ resort to the state courts.
Cf. Gilmer, 111 S.Ct. 1647 (1991) (arbitration agreement covered
by Federal Arbitration Act by its tenns required arbitration of fed-
'Hawaiian Airlines and its mechanic employees, through the IAM, unequivo
cally adopted the RLA's broad commitment to arbitration in the CBA. Given that
fact, the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision also conflicts in principle with this
Court’s recent decision in Gilmer v. Interstate!Johnson Lane Corp., I l l S.Ct.
1647 (1991), holding an employee may not avoid a contractual agreement cov
ered by the Federal Arbitration Act. 9 U.S.C. § I et seq., to submit disputes to
arbitration by filing suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. § 621 et seq. The Court noted the liberal federal policy favoring arbitra
tion agreements and held the claimant had not overcome that strong preference
by showing Congress intended to provide a mandatory judicial forum under the
ADEA.
23
14
era! statutory age discrimination claim and precluded resort to
courts).
The determination of the propriety of Hawaiian Airlines’
actions will also turn on whether the airline is precluded by the
CBA from disciplining Norris for refusing to sign the work record
based on a concern for public safety. Article XVII f F of the CBA
provides: “An employee's refusal to perform work which is in vio
lation of established health and safety rules, or any local, state or
federal health and safety law shall not warrant disciplinary
action.” The CBA also requires just cause for the termination or
suspension of an employee. CBA, Article IX H 1.5; Article XV,
H.
The Hawaii court conducted its own analysis of Article XVII
f F and found that that provision did not protect a mechanic who
refused to sign off on work records or who refused to perform
work out of safety concerns regarding the airworthiness of an air
craft. 842 P.2d at 634. A System Board with knowledge of the
industry practices and working conditions would almost undoubt
edly disagree with the court’s narrow construction, thereby afford
ing additional substantive protections to covered employees and,
by extension, to the flying public. Indeed, an arbitration expert
witness testified without contradiction in the record before the
Hawaii Supreme Court that the CBA did protect employees who
refused to sign work records out of safety concerns and that the
CBA was remarkably broad and unusual in its protection of
employees who refuse to work out of concern for public safety.
(R. XXVII: Deposition of Ted Tsukiyama, Vol. II, Aug. 2, 1990 at
158)
Finally, an essential element of Norris’ claims is a “dis
charge,” and proving that will require interpretation and applica
tion of the CBA and of the grievance process itself. In Norris’
case, the hearing officer at the Step 1 level recommended Norris’
termination, but while the grievance was pending at the Step 3
level, the Step 3 hearing officer reduced the discipline to a suspen
sion. Norris never returned to work or attempted to have his sus
pension overturned. Instead, several months after his
reinstatement, he filed suit in state court claiming he had been dis
charged.
The nature and classification of the disciplinary action taken
against Norris is a matter within the expertise of the System
24
15
Board, and it is a matter requiring uniformity of treatment
throughout the airline and railroad industries. Certainly that is why
Congress committed resolution of such disputes to the RLA arbi
tral process. Cf. Mayon v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 805 F.2d
1250, 1253 (5th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 925 (1988)
(worker who won reinstatement through the RLA grievance
proceeding cannot subsequently sue for “wrongful discharge”
under state law). Despite this fundamental purpose of the RLA,
the Hawaii Supreme Court completely ignored Hawaiian Airlines’
argument that the RLA precluded a state court from deciding the
nature of Norris’ discipline since that determination is part and
parcel of the grievance process. If allowed to stand, the court’s
decision will require a state court jury to interpret the CBA and its
application and the CBA’s grievance procedure to determine if
Norris was discharged; for Norris cannot prevail in his wrongful
discharge claims if he was merely suspended.
II. THE HAWAII SUPREME COURT’S ERRONEOUS
RULING ON RLA PREEMPTION RAISES ISSUES
WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION BY THIS COURT
SINCE IT IS ONE OF A NUMBER OF ERRONEOUS
RULINGS ON THE SCOPE OF RLA PREEMPTION.
Norris is not the only recent decision applying Lingle to nar
row the scope of RLA preemption and threaten the speedy and
uniform dispute resolution procedure envisioned by Congress. Cf.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 562
(1987) (RLA enacted to promote stability in labor-management
relations by promoting a comprehensive framework for resolving
disputes).
Maher v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 125 N.J.
455, 593 A.2d 750 (N.J. 1991), is another state court decision
which refused to acknowledge the differences between Section
301 and RLA preemption and applied Lingle to determine preemp
tion under the RLA. The New Jersey Supreme Court flatly reject
ed the premise that the RLA was intended by Congress to have
greater preemptive force than the LMRA;
When a collective-bargaining agreement subject to the
[LMRA] establishes a grievance and arbitration remedy,
that remedy preempts state-law-based claims by force
of section 301. That preemptive effect is no different
25
16
from that granted to the arbitral remedies established by
the [RLA].
Id. at 759 (citations omitted). The Norris court relied on the quot
ed passage from Maher to find that Lingie applied in the RLA
context. 842 P.2d at 643. Neither Norris nor Maher cite or distin
guish the numerous federal cases finding Lingie inapplicable to
RLA preemption.
In another recent case, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit relied on Lingie to hold that the RLA preempted
only those claims requiring an interpretation of a collective bar
gaining agreement. Davies v. American Airlines, Inc., 971 F.2d
463 (10th Cir. 1992), petition for certiorari filed, 61 U.S.L.W.
3481 (1993). The Davies court explicitly disagreed with the Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning in Grote. 971 F.2d at 467 n.5. American
Airlines’ petition for certiorari in the Davies case is currently
pending before this Court.
Davies, Maher, and Norris ignore the legislative history and
plain language of the RLA, as well as the decisions construing it,
and instead apply a Section 301 preemption doctrine that unduly
limits the congressionally-intended scope of RLA preemption.
With two opposing bodies of RLA preemption case law, trans
portation industry employees will be encouraged to forum shop
among state and federal courts to find the ones which remain open
to their artfully pled state law claims. Given the interstate nature
of operations of most airline and railroad industry employers, the
opportunity for such forum shopping is substantial. The need for
uniform employment dispute resolution procedures lies at the heart
of the RLA. Petitioners respectfully submit that this Court should
review and correct the Hawaii court’s analysis in Norris to clarify
RLA preemption and require employment disputes such as Norris’
wrongful discharge claim s to be resolved as Congress
intended—through arbitration.
26
17
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Hawaiian Airlines and the
Individual Defendants respectfully request that the writ of certio
rari be granted.
Respectfully submitted.
KENNETH B. HIPP
MARGARET C. JENKINS
JENNIFER C. CLARK
GOODSILL ANDERSON QUINN & STIFEL
1099 Alakea Street,
1800 Alii Place
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813
(808) 547-5600
Counsel for Petitioners
21
APPENDICES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
APPENDIX A
Decision of the Supreme Court for the State of
Hawaii in Norris v. Finazzo, et al., Civil No.
89-2904-09, December 16, 1992.....................................................la
APPENDIX B
Decision of the Supreme Court for the State
of Hawaii in Norris v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.,
Civil No. 87-3894-12, February 2, 1993 .................................... ,27a
APPENDIX C
Judgments on Appeal, Supreme Court of the
State of Hawaii, Norris v. Finazzo, et al., and
Norris v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., entered
February 16, 1993...........................................................................30a
APPENDIX D
Excerpts from Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. Section 151 ...... 42a
APPENDIX E
Labor Management Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. Section 185.........................................................................44a
APPENDIX F
Excerpts from Collective Bargaining Agreement between
Hawaiian Airlines and the International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers............................................. 46a
APPENDIX G
Decision of Step 1 hearing officer, August 3, 1989...................63a
APPENDIX H
Letter of Reinstatement, September 10, 1987 ............................66a
28
27a
APPENDIX B
NO. 16263
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII
CIVIL NO. 87-3984-12
GRANT T. NORRIS,
) CIV. NOS. 87-3894-12 and
) 89-2904-09
)
) APPEAL FROM THE FINALPlaintiff-Appel lant.
) JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO
VS ) RULE 54(b) OF THE HAWAII
) RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC., ) WITH REGARD TO COUNT I
) OF THE COMPLAINT IN
Defendant-Appellee. ) CIVIL NO. 87-3894-12
.) (REINSTATED ON JUNE 30, 1992)
)
) FIRST CIRCUIT COURTCIVIL NO. 89-2094-09
GRANT T. NORRIS. )
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VS.
PAUL J. FINAZZO,
HOWARD E. )
OGDEN, HATSUO HONMA,)
and
DOES 1-10,
)
)
)
)
-)
Defendants-Appellees.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff-appellant Grant T. Norris (Norris) appeals from the
“reinstated” final judgment of the Circuit Court of the First
Circuit, which was certified as final, pursuant to Hawaii Rules of
Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 54(b), and entered in favor of
29
28a
defendant-appellee Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (HAL) on June 30,
1992. The “reinstated" final judgment was originally entered on
December 5, 1990 from which a prior appeal was taken. See
Norris v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., No. 15022 (Haw. Dec. 16,
1992). However, this court on July 24, 1991, issued an order dis
missing the appeal from the December 5 judgment1 because, hav
ing previously removed the case to federal court, “there [was] no
certified order of remand in the record as required by 28 U.S.C.
1447(c) for the state court to proceed with the case.” Id., slip op.
at 7 n.7. (quoting this court's order of partial dismissal, filed July
24, 1991, in case No. 15022). A certified copy of the remand
order was thereafter properly placed in the court file. Norris then
successfully moved to reinstate the orders and final judgment from
which this timely appeal is taken.
Norris had filed suit against HAL alleging discharge from his
employment in violation of public policy. The circuit court grant
ed HAL’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
dismissing count I of Norris' complaint on the ground that Norris’
claims were preempted by the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45
U.S.C. 151-188 (1988). For the reasons stated in our recent opin
ion, Norris v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., No. 15022 (Haw. Dec. 16,
1992), we disagree with the circuit court’s determination and hold
that the RLA does not preempt Norris’ state tort claims.
We therefore vacate the “reinstated” final judgment entered by
the circuit court on June 30, 1992 and remand this case for further
proceedings.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, February 2, 1993.
On the briefs:
Edward deLappe Boyle,
Susan Oki Mollway, and
Dennis W. Chong Kee,
of Cades, Schutte,
Fleming & Wright, for
plaintiff-appellant
Grant T. Norris
'The court retained jurisdiction over Norris’ action against the individual
representatives authorized to act on behalf of (Civ. No. 89-2904-09), which
Norris had named in a separate lawsuit that had been consolidated with the action
against (Civ. No. 87-3894-12).
30
29a
Kenneth B. Hipp and
Jennifer Cook Clark,
of Goodsill, Anderson,
Quinn & Stifel, for
defendant-appellee
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.
31
30a
NO. 16263
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII
APPENDIX C
CIVIL NO. 87-3984-! 2 ) CIV. NOS. 87-3894-12 and
GRANT T. NORRIS, ) 89-2904-09
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) APPEAL FROM THE FINAL
) JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO
vs. ) RULE 54(b) OF THE HAWAII
) RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
HAWAIIAN AIRLINES. INC.,) WITH REGARD TO COUNT I
Defendant-Appellee.
CIVIL NO. 89-2094-09
GRANT T. NORRIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
PAUL J. FINAZZO,
HOWARD E.
OGDEN, HATSUO
HONMA, and
DOES 1-10,
Defendants-Appellees.
) OF THE COMPLAINT IN
) CIVIL NO. 87-3894-12
.) (REINSTATED ON JUNE 30, 1992)
)
) FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
)
) HONORABLE ROBERT G. KLEIN
) HONORABLE PHILIP T. CHUN
) HONORABLE SIMEON R ACOBA, JR
) HONORABLE PATRICK K.S.L. YIM
) HONORABLE MARCIA WALDORF
)
) HONORABLE SHUNICHI KIMURA
)
) HONORABLE BARRY KURREN
) HONORABLE WENDELL K. HUDDY
) Judges
)
)
32
31a
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
EDWARD deLAPPE BOYLE 1372-0
SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY 3000-0
DENNIS W. CHONG KEE 5538-0
CADES SCHUTTE FLEMING & WRIGHT
1000 Bishop Street, 10th Floor
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813
Telephone: 521-9200
JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
GRANT T. NORRIS
33
32a
NO. 16263
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII
CIVIL NO. 87-3984-12
GRANT T. NORRIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
)CIV. NOS. 87-3894-12 and
) 89-2904-09
)
) APPEAL FROM THE FINAL
) JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO
) RULE 54(b) OF THE HAWAII
) RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC.,) WITH REGARD TO COUNT I
) OF THE COMPLAINT IN
Defendant-Appellee.
CIVIL NO. 89-2094-09
GRANT T. NORRIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
PAUL J. FINAZZO,
HOWARD E.
OGDEN, HATSUO
HONMA, and
DOES 1-10,
Defendants-Appellees.
) CIVIL NO. 87-3894-12
) (REINSTATED ON JUNE 30, 1992)
)
) FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
)
) HONORABLE ROBERT G. KLEIN
) HONORABLE PHILIP T. CHUN
) HONORABLE SIMEON R. ACOB A JR.
) HONORABLE PATRICK K.S.L. YIM
) HONORABLE MARCIA WALDORF
)
) HONORABLE SHUNICHI KIMURA
)
) HONORABLE BARRY KURREN
) HONORABLE WENDELL K. HUDDY
) Judges
)
)
34
33a
Pursuant to the Memorandum Opinion of the Hawaii Supreme
Court entered on February 2, 1993, the reinstated final judgment
of the Circuit Court of the First Circuit entered on June 30. 1992
is vacated and this case is remanded to the Circuit Court of the
First Circuit for further proceedings consistent with this Court's
Memorandum Opinion filed on February 2, 1993.
DATED: Honolulu. Hawaii; February 16. 1993
BY THE COURT
/s/ Sandra H. Yasui
CLERK
JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
APPROVED:
/s/ RONALD T. Y. MOON
JUSTICE
35
34a
NO. 16263
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII
CIVIL NO. 87-3984-12 ) CIV. NOS. 87-3894-12 and
GRANT T. NORRIS.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
) 89-2904-09
)
) APPEAL FROM THE FINAL
) JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO
) RULE 54(b) OF THE HAWAII
) RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC.,) WITH REGARD TO COUNT I
) OF THE COMPLAINT IN
Defendant-Appel lee.
CIVIL NO. 89-2094-09
GRANT T. NORRIS.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
PAUL J. FINAZZO,
HOWARD E.
OGDEN, HATSUO
HONMA, and
DOES 1-10,
Defendants-Appellees.
) CIVIL NO. 87-3894-12
) (REINSTATED ON JUNE 30, 1992)
)
) FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
)
) HONORABLE ROBERT G. KLEIN
) HONORABLE PHILIP T. CHUN
) HONORABLE SIMEON R. ACOBA JR
) HONORABLE PATRICK K.S.L. YIM
) HONORABLE MARCIA WALDORF
)
) HONORABLE SHUNICHI KIMURA
)
) HONORABLE BARRY KURREN
) HONORABLE WENDELL K. HUDDY
) Judges
)
)
36
3 5 a
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that two copies of the fore
going document was duly served upon the following on
February 05, 1993. addressed as follows:
MARTIN ANDERSON
DAVID J. DEZZANI
KENNETH B. HfPP
STEVEN M. NAKASHIMA
BARBARA A. PETRUS
MICHAEL F. NAUYOKAS
RAE A. HARDER
JENNIFER COOK CLARK
Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel
1600 Bancorp Tower
130 Merchant Street
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellees
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii; Feb. 05, 1993
EDWARD deLAPPE BOYLE
SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY
DENNIS W. CHONG KEE
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant GRANT T. NORRIS
37
36a
NO. 15022
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII
GRANT T. NORRIS, )
)
Plaintiff- )
Appellant, )
TO
)
vs. )
)
PAUL J. FINAZZO; )
HOWARD E. OGDEN: )
HATSUO HONMA; )
and DOES 1-50, )
)
Defendants- )
Appellees. )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
CIVIL NO. 89-2904-09
APPEAL FROM THE:
(1) FINAL JUDGMENT PURSUANT
RULE 54(b) WITH REGARD TO (A)
COUNT I OF THE COMPLAINT IN
CIVIL NO. 87-3894-12, AND (B)
COUNTS I AND II OF THE
COMPLAINT IN CIVIL NO. 89-
2904-09 AND (2) ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AS TO COUNT I
OF (A) ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART HAWAIIAN
AIRLINES, INC.’S MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION FILED ON
NOVEMBER 1, 1989 AND (B) ORDER
GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO STRIKE SECOND AND
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES OR
IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AS TO DEFENSE OF
PREEMPTION FILED ON OCTOBER
27, 1989 (MOTION FILED ON
NOVEMBER 6, 1989)
FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT G. KLEIN
Judge
38
37a
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
CADES SCHUTTE FLEMING & WRIGHT
EDWARD deLAPPE BOYLE 1372-0
SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY 3000-0
1000 Bishop Street
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813
Telephone No. 521-9200
JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
GRANT T. NORRIS
39
38a
NO. 13022
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII
GRANT T. NORRIS, ) CIVIL NO. 89-2904-09
)
Plaintiff-
Appellant,
TO
) APPEAL FROM THE:
) (1) FINAL JUDGMENT PURSUANT
vs.
) RULE 54(b) WITH REGARD TO (A)
) COUNT I OF THE COMPLAINT IN
) CIVIL NO. 87-3894-12, AND (B)
PAUL J. FINAZZO; )
HOWARD E. OGDEN; ) COUNTS I AND II OF THE
HATSUO HONMA;
and DOES 1-50,
) COMPLAINT IN CIVIL NO. 89-
) 2904-09 AND (2) ORDER DENYING
) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
Defendants-
Appellees.
) RECONSIDERATION AS TO COUNT I
) OF (A) ORDER GRANTING IN PART
) AND DENYING IN PART HAWAIIAN
) AIRLINES, INC.’S MOTION TO
) DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT
) MATTER JURISDICTION FILED ON
) NOVEMBER 1, 1989 AND (B) ORDER
) GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S
) MOTION TO STRIKE SECOND AND
) THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES OR
) IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
) JUDGMENT AS TO DEFENSE OF
) PREEMPTION FILED ON OCTOBER
) 27, 1989 (MOTION FILED ON
) NOVEMBER 6, 1989)
)
) FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
) HONORABLE ROBERT G. KLEIN
) Judge
)
40
39a
Pursuant to the opinion of the Hawaii Supreme Court entered
on December 16, 1992, the judgment of the Circuit Court of the
First Circuit entered on December 5, 1990 is reversed and vacated
insofar as it dismissed Counts 1 and II in Civil No. 89-2904-09,
and this case is remanded to the Circuit Court of the First Circuit
for further proceedings consistent with this Court's Opinion filed
on December 16, 1992.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii; February 16, 1993
BY THE COURT
/s/ Sandra H. Yasui
CLERK
JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
APPROVED:
/s/ RONALD T. Y. MOON
JUSTICE
41
40a
GRANT T. NORRIS, ) CIVIL NO. 89-2904-09
)
Plaintiff- ) APPEAL FROM THE:
Appellant. ) (1) FINAL JUDGMENT PURSUANT
NO. 15022
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII
TO
vs.
) RULE 54(b) WITH REGARD TO (A)
) COUNT I OF THE COMPLAINT IN
) CIVIL NO. 87-3894-12, AND (B)
PAUL J. FINAZZO; )
HOWARD E. OGDEN; ) COUNTS I AND II OF THE
HATSUO HONMA;
and DOES 1-50,
) COMPLAINT IN CIVIL NO. 89-
) 2904-09 AND (2) ORDER DENYING
) PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
Defendants-
Appellees.
) RECONSIDERATION AS TO COUNT I
) OF (A) ORDER GRANTING IN PART
) AND DENYING IN PART HAWAIIAN
) AIRLINES, INC.’S MOTION TO
) DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT
) MATTER JURISDICTION FILED ON
) NOVEMBER 1, 1989 AND (B) ORDER
) GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S
) MOTION TO STRIKE SECOND AND
) THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES OR
) IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
) JUDGMENT AS TO DEFENSE OF
) PREEMPTION FILED ON OCTOBER
) 27, 1989 (MOTION FILED ON
) NOVEMBER 6, 1989)
)
) FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
) HONORABLE ROBERT G. KLEIN
) Judge
)
42
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that two copies of the fore
going document was duly served upon the following on this date
by hand delivery, addressed as follows:
MARTIN ANDERSON
DAVID J. DEZZAN1
KENNETH B. H1PP
STEVEN M. NAKASHIMA
BARBARA A. PETRUS
MICHAEL F. NAUYOKAS
RAE A. HARDER
JENNIFER COOK CLARK
Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel
Alii Place, Suite 1800
1099 Alakea Street
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellees
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii: Feb. 05, 1993
/s/ Susan Oki Mollway
EDWARD deLAPPE BOYLE
SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant GRANT T. NORRIS
43
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RAILWAY LABOR ACT
Section 2, 45 U.S.C. §151a
§151a. General purposes
The purposes of the chapter are: (1) To avoid any interruption
to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein:
(2) to forbid any limitation upon freedom of association among
employees or any denial, as a condition of employment or other
wise, of the right of employees to join a labor organization; (3) to
provide for the complete independence of carriers and of employ
ees in the matter of self-organization to carry out the purposes of
this chapter; (4) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement
of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working condi
tions; (5) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all
disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or
application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working
conditions.
APPENDIX D
* * * *
Section 204, 45 U.S.C §184
§184. System, group, or regional boards of adjustment
The disputes between an employee or group of employees and
a carrier or carriers by air growing out of grievances, or out of the
interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay,
rules, or working conditions, including cases pending and unad
justed on April 10, 1936 before the National Labor Relations
Board, shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including
the chief operating officer of the carrier designated to handle such
disputes; but, failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the
disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by either
party to an appropriate adjustment board, as hereinafter provided,
with a full statement of the facts and supporting data bearing upon
the disputes.
It shall be the duty of every carrier and of its employees, act
ing through their representatives, selected in accordance with the
provisions of this subchapter, to establish a board of adjustment of
jurisdiction not exceeding the jurisdiction which may be lawfully
44
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exercised by system, group, or regional boards of adjustment,
under the authority of section 153 of this title.
Such boards of adjustment may be established by agreement
between employees and carrier either on any individual carrier, or
system, or group of carriers by air and any class or classes of its
or their employees; or pending the establishment of a permanent
National Board of Adjustment as hereinafter provided. Nothing in
this chapter shall prevent said carriers by air, or any class or class
es of their employees, both acting through their representatives
selected in accordance with provision of this subchapter, from
mutually agreeing to the establishment of a National Board of
Adjustment of temporary duration and of similarly limited juris
diction.
45
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Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. §185
§185. Suits by and against labor organizations
(a) Venue, amount, and citizenship
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor
organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.
(b) Responsibility for acts of agent; entity for purposes of suit;
enforcement of money judgments
Any labor organization which represents employees in an
industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter and any
employer whose activities affect commerce as defined in this
chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor
organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the
employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States.
Any money judgment against a labor organization in a district
court of the United States shall be enforceable only against the
organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be
enforceable against any individual member or his assets.
(c) Jurisdiction
For the purposes of actions and proceedings by or against
labor organizations in the district courts of the United States, dis
trict courts shall be deemed to have jurisdiction of a labor organi
zation (1) in the district in which such organization maintains is
principal office, or (2) in any district in which its duly authorized
officers or agents are engaged in representing or acting for
employee members.
(d) Service of process
The service of summons, subpena, or other legal process of
any court of the United States upon an officer or agent of a labor
APPENDIX E
46
4 5 a
organization, in his capacity as such, shall constitute service upon
the labor organization.
(e) Determination of question of agency
For the purposes of this section, in determining whether any
person is acting as an “agent" of another person so as to make
such other person responsible for his acts, the question of whether
the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subse
quently ratified shall not be controlling.
47
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APPENDIX F
AGREEMENT
Between
HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC.
and
INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS
AND AEROSPACE WORKERS
(AFL-CIO)
Representing
AIRCRAFT INSPECTORS, MECHANICS.
LINE SERVICEMEN AND CLEANERS
January 16, 1987 - January 15, 1989
48
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ARTICLE I
PURPOSE OF AGREEMENT
A. The purpose of this Agreement is, in the mutual interest of
the Company and of the employees, to provide for the operation
of the services of the Company under methods which will further
to the fullest extent possible the safety of air transportation, the
efficiency of operation, and the continuation of employment under
conditions of reasonable hours, proper compensation, and reason
able working conditions. It is recognized by this Agreement to be
the duty of the Company and of the employees to cooperate fully,
both individually and collectively, for the advancement of that
purpose.
B. No employee covered by this Agreement will be interfered
with, restrained, coerced, or discrim inated against by the
Company, its officers, or agents because of membership in or law
ful activity on behalf of the Union.
C. It is understood that wherever in this Agreement employ
ees or classifications are referred to in the male gender, it shall be
recognized as referring to both male and female employees, and
that the terms and conditions hereunder apply equally to all
employees regardless of sex. color, race, creed, or national origin.
* * * *
ARTICLE IV
CLASSIFICATIONS OF WORK & QUALIFICATIONS
A. For the purpose of this Agreement, the recognized classifi
cations of work shall be as hereunder listed:
Lead Inspector
Inspector
Lead Aircraft Mechanic
Lead Mechanic
Aircraft Mechanic
Mechanic
Mechanic Helper
Lead Line Serviceman
Line Serviceman
Lead Cleaner
Cleaner
49
48a
B. It is understood that it is not necessary to have each of the
above classifications in each shop.
C. It is further understood that any employee covered by this
Agreement may be required to do the work of a lower classifica
tion; provided, however, that when performing such work, he will
be paid at the rate in which he is regularly classified. Any
employee hereunder assigned by the Company to perform the
duties and accept the responsibilities of a higher classification of
work shall be paid the minimum established rate for said classifi
cation for the time so worked, but in no event will he be paid less
than twenty-five cents (250) per hour above the rate he was earn
ing immediately prior to such temporary upgrading.
D. QUALIFICATIONS
* * * *
2. Inspector
An Inspector must be capable of performing the
inspection work assigned to the satisfaction of the Company.
Future Inspectors must pass a practical and written examination as
conducted by the Company prior to assignment.
The primary duties of an Inspector shall be the overall
inspection of Company flight equipment in connection with
checks, repairs, and overhauls. The work of an Inspector shall
also include the inspection of materials, parts, and sub-assemblies
as required, but his work shall not necessarily include the inspec
tion of materials, parts, and sub-assemblies where such inspection
is required of an Aircraft Mechanic or Mechanic to accomplish his
own work. The Inspector's work may also include giving class
room instructions and training to employees of any classification.
He may also be required to perform any other work related to his
primary duties as Inspector. An Inspector will not supervise or
direct the work of lower classified employees.
* * * *
4. Aircraft Mechanic and Mechanic
(a) Aircraft Mechanic
To qualify as an Aircraft Mechanic, an employee shall
possess sufficient experience and training to perform the type of
work outlined below. The work of an Aircraft Mechanic shall
consist of work generally recognized as Aircraft Mechanic's work
perform ed by the Company in or about Company shops,
Maintenance Base, line service stations, Company buildings, or
50
49a
equipment. Such work shall include but will not be limited to
checking, dismantling, overhauling, repairing, fabricating, assem
bling, welding, and erecting all parts of aircraft, aircraft engines,
radio equipment instruments, electrical systems, heating systems,
hydraulic systems, and machine tool work in connection therewith.
In addition, it may include all mechanical maintenance work when
performed by the Company including, but not limited to, the dis
mantling, repairing, fabricating, welding, altering, and maintaining
of all machinery and mechanical devices, automotive equipment,
ramp equipment, buildings, hanger and field storage or dispensing
equipment. Aircraft Mechanics will also perform work which is
incidental to their primary duties as an Aircraft Mechanic.
Aircraft Mechanics will not be required to inspect parts, sub-
assemblies, or completed assemblies, except to the extent neces
sary to determine, accomplish, and approve their own work.
Aircraft Mechanics must be capable of performing the work satis
factorily and must hold the valid and necessary certificates as
required by law. The present ratio (to the nearest man) of licensed
Aircraft Mechanics to unlicensed Aircraft Mechanics by shifts, as
required on Line Maintenance as of the date of the signing of this
Agreement, will not be increased except by agreement with the
Local Committee. An Aircraft Mechanic may be required to sign
work records in connection with the work he performed.
* * * *
ARTICLE IX
SENIORITY
* * * *
I. An employee covered by this Agreement shall lose his
seniority status and his name shall be removed from seniority list
under the following conditions:
1. He resigns from the Company.
2. He resigns from a classification or steps down to
accept a lower classified job or part-time job for which he is the
successful bidder.
3. He is displaced and refuses to exercise his seniority
rights to bump laterally into another job for which he is qualified.
4. He refuses recall to a higher classified job of more
than thirty (30) days anticipated duration for which he is qualified.
Under the circumstances listed in sub-paragraph 2, 3
and 4, it is understood that he will lose only such seniority he had
51
earned in the classification from which he resigned, stepped down,
was displaced, or refused recall, provided he shall not lose this
seniority if he must change his domicile in order to bump or
accept recall. This will not restrict him from bidding on future
vacancies in any classification.
5. He is discharged for cause.
6. He is absent from work for two (2) consecutive work days
without properly notifying the Company of the reason for his
absence and not then if a satisfactory reason is given for not so
notifying the Company.
7. He does not inform the Company in writing, by telegraph,
or by radiogram of his intention to return to service within ten
(10) days of sending out notice offering him re-employment.
8. He does not return to the service of the Company on or
before a date specified in the notice from the Company offering
him re-employment, which date shall not be prior to fifteen (15-
days after sending such notice; provided, however, that sub-para-
graphs 7 and 8 of this paragraph shall not apply to offers of
temporary work of less than ninety (90) consecutive days duration.
9. He is not recalled after having been laid off from the
Company for a continuous period of three (3) years. The three (3)
years shall be considered broken only if an employee is recalled
for a period of ninety (90) or more consecutive days.
10. He accepts a bargaining unit position not covered by this
Agreement and successfully completes his probationary period.
This condition is effective April 1, 1980.
11. He is presently holding a bargaining unit position not cov
ered by this Agreement and refuses a position under this
Agreement to which his seniority entitles him.
* ♦ * *
ARTICLE XV
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
A. In order to properly administer this Agreement and to dis
pose of all disputes or grievances which may arise under this
Agreement or between the parties, the following procedure shall
be followed:
1. The Union will be represented by not more than one
(1) properly designated steward for each shift, at any activity at
which employees covered by this Agreement are located.
5 1 a
2. The Union will be further represented by a Local
Committee based in Honolulu consisting of three (3) members
elected by the local membership.
3. The Company will designate a representative at each
location where persons covered by this Agreement are employed
who is empowered to settle all local grievances not involving
change in Company policy or interpretations or changes in the
intent and purpose of this Agreement.
4. The Union and the Company will at all times keep the
other party advised through written notice of any change in autho
rized representatives.
5. The System General chairman or his representative
shall be permitted at any appropriate time to enter shops and facil
ities of the Company for the purpose of investigating grievances
and disputes arising under the Agreement after contacting the
Company officer in charge and advising him of the purpose of the
visit.
B. For the presentation and adjustment of disputes or griev
ances that may arise, the procedure will be:
1. Any employee having a complaint or grievance in con
nection with the terms of this Agreement may present his com
plaint or grievance to the steward, or Committeeman if the
steward is not available, of the Union who in turn will discuss the
matter with the employee's immediate supervisor and endeavor to
arrive at a satisfactory adjustment of same.
2. If the steward, or committeeman if the steward is not
available, or employee is not satisfied with the decision of the
employee's immediate supervisor, the matter will be referred to
the Local Committee in writing on a standard grievance form.
The Local Committee will then take the matter up with the official
in charge at the base or station for adjustment, furnishing two (2)
copies of the signed complaint to the Company representative, one
(1) to be retained by the Company and one (1) to be returned to
the Union representative with the written decision.
3. If the Local Committee or the System Chairman is dis
satisfied with the decision of the official designated in Paragraph 2
above, the matter may be appealed to the Department Head under
whose jurisdiction the employee works. Further appeal, if desired,
shall be to the System Board of Adjustment as provided for in
Article XVI of this Agreement.
53
52a
4. In step number one, the employees' immediate supervi
sor will give his decision within twenty-four (24) hours after dis
cussion of the issue. If, as a result of his decision, the Union
decides to appeal, notice of such appeal accompanied by the stan
dard grievance form must be given the official in charge at the
base or station within fifteen (15) days of the date of the decision
rendered in step number one. Within fifteen (15) days thereafter,
hearings on the appeal between appropriate representatives of the
Company and Union will be held; and a written decision on the
standard grievance form will be issued by the Company to the
Union within ten (10) days after the final hearing has been held
and the Company may request an additional seventy-two (72) hour
extension to answer the second step grievance. If the second step
grievance is not answered within the required time limits, the
grievance will be considered sustained for the aggrieved. If the
hearing officer is away from Hawaii during this period, the
Company may request an extension if the Local Grievance
Committee is notified. Appeals to the third step of the grievance
procedure and hearings outlined above shall conform to the time
limitations set forth for appeals to step number two, and the
Company representative shall issue his decision in writing on the
standard grievance form within fifteen (15) days after the final
presentation.
C. Grievance involving wage claims must be filed promptly
after the cause giving rise to the grievance is evident, and wage
claims will not be valid and collectible for a period earlier than
thirty (30) days prior to the date of filing a grievance or the date
the grievance arose, whichever is most recent.
D. 1. Stewards will be permitted, after reporting to their
foreman or supervisor, a reasonable amount of time during their
working hours to investigate or present grievances. In the event it
is necessary to go to another shop, they will report in with the
foreman or supervisor of the other shop before contacting the
affected employees. Local Committeemen will also be allowed a
reasonable amount of time for this purpose. A Local
Committeeman, regardless of seniority, will be assigned to
whichever shift in his work unit the Union requests, provided that
such shift carries a job assignment in his work classification for
which he is qualified.
2. The authorized representatives of the Union shall be
54
53a
permitted at any time to enter shops and facilities of the Company
supervisor and advising him of the purpose of the visit.
E. Necessary hearings and investigations called by the
Company shall, insofar as possible, be conducted during regular
business hours, and stewards and Local Committeemen and neces
sary .witnesses shall not suffer loss of normal pay while attending
such hearings or investigation.
F. 1. No employee covered by this Agreement shall be dis
charged or suspended without pay from the service without a
prompt, fair and impartial hearing and may be represented and
assisted at such hearing by Union representatives. A member of
the Local Committee will be notified within two (2) hours from
the time an employee is held out of service of the reason for such
action. Within forty-eight (48) hours (excluding Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays) after such verbal notification, the Union
and the employee will be advised in writing of the exact charges
against the employee. No later than five (5) days after the
employee recieves the formal written charges against him, a hear
ing, as noted above, will be held at a place designated by the
Company at a mutually agreed date and time to determine final
disciplinary action.
2. An employee who is to be questioned by Company
representatives in the investigation of an incident which may result
in disciplinary action being taken against him may request a
Union representative to be present as an observer. The above does
not apply to inquiries of employees by supervisors in the norma!
course of their work.
G. Any employee dissatisfied with the action of the Company
in disqualifying, suspending or discharging him may appeal from
such action by filing an appeal to the third step of the grievance
procedure as provided for in this Agreement, and a hearing shall
be held within five (5) days of submitting such appeal. Oral and
written evidence may be introduced at such hearings, and witness
es may be required to testify under oath. All decisions by
Company representatives and all appeals filed by the employee or
Union shall be in writing and shall conform to the time limitations
set forth in the second step of the grievance procedure.
H. If as a result of any hearing or appeals therefrom it is
found the suspension or discharge was not justified, the employee
shall be reinstated without loss of seniority and made whole for
55
54a
any loss of pay he suffered by reason of his suspension or dis
charge. and his personnel records shall be corrected and cleared of
such charge. If a suspension rather than discharge results, the
employee shall have that time he has been held out of service
without pay credited against his period of suspension. In deter
mining the amount of back wages due an employee who is rein
stated as a result of the procedures outlined in this Agreement, the
maximum liability of the Company shall be limited to the amount
of normal wages he would have earned in the service of the com
pany had he not been discharged or suspended.
I. When it is mutually agreed that a recording is to be made
or a stenographic report is to be taken by a public stenographer of
any investigation or hearing provided for in this Agreement, the
cost will be borne equally by both parties to the dispute. When it
is not mutually agreed that a stenographic report of the proceed
ings be taken by a public stenographer, the stenographic record of
any such investigation or hearing may be taken by either of the
parties to the dispute. A copy of such stenographic record will be
furnished to the other party to the dispute upon request at pro rata
cost. The cost of any additional copies requested by either party
shall be borne by the party requesting them, whether the steno
graphic record is taken by mutual agreement or otherwise.
J. No steward or Local Committee member shall serve in
such capacity while he is on leave of absence.
K. Any grievance which the Company may have against the
Union at any place on the system shall be presented by the
Company’s Chief Operating Officer or his designee to the System
General Chairman. In the event the matter is not satisfactorily
adjusted within two (2) weeks after such presentation, it may be
appealed to the System Board of Adjustment provided for herein.
L. All time limits for appeals and decisions will be exclusive
of Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays.
ARTICLE XVI
SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
A. In compliance with Section 204, Title II, of the Railway
Labor Act, as amended, there is hereby established a System
Board of Adjustment for the purpose of adjusting disputes or
grievances which may arise under the terms of this Agreement and
which are properly submitted to it after all steps for settling dis-
56
55a
putes and grievances as set forth in Article XV have been exhaust
ed.
B. Unless otherwise agreed to by the Company and the
Union, the System Board of Adjustment shall consist of three (3)
members, one (1) appointed by the Company (hereinafter referred
to as the Company Member), one (1) appointed by the Union
(hereinafter referred to as the Union Member), and for each dis
pute one (1) member selected from a panel of potential referees in
a manner agreeable to the Company and the Union (hereinafter
referred to as the Neutral Member). The Company and the Union
Member shall serve until their successors are duly appointed.
C. The Board shall have exclusive jurisdiction over disputes
between any employee covered by this Agreement and the
Company and between the Company and the Union, growing out
of grievances concerning disciplinary action, rules, rates of pay, or
working conditions covered by this Agreement, or any amendment
or supplement thereto, or out of the interpretation or application of
any terms of this Agreement, or any amendment or supplement
thereto. The jurisdiction of the Board shall not extend to proposed
changes in rules, basic rates of compensation, or working condi
tions covered by this Agreement or any amendments thereto. The
Board shall not have jurisdiction or power to add to or subtract
from this Agreement or any amendments thereto or any agreement
between the parties.
D. The Board shall consider any dispute properly submitted
to it by any employee covered by this Agreement, by the System
General Chairman of the Union, or by the Chief Operating Officer
of the Company when such dispute has not been previously settled
in accordance with the terms provided for in this Agreement, pro
vided that the dispute is filed with the Board within forty (40) cal
endar days after the procedure provided for in this Agreement has
been exhausted. If a dispute is not filed within such time the
action of the Company or Union shall become final and binding.
The date the submission is received by the Board shall determine
the order of hearing, unless the parties mutually agree otherwise.
E. The Neutral Member of the Board shall preside at meet
ings and hearings of the Board and shall be designated as
Chairman of the System Board of Adjustment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Chairman to guide the parties in the presenta
tion of testimony, exhibits, and argument at hearings to the end
that a fair, prompt, and orderly hearing of the dispute is afforded.
57
5 6 a
F. The Board shall meet in the city where the General
Offices of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., are maintained (unless a differ
ent place of meeting is agreed upon by the parties, with the con
sent of the Neutral).
G. All disputes properly referred to the Board for considera
tion shall be addressed to the Company Member and the Union
Member jointly. The submissions of the dispute to the Board shall
include:
1. The question or questions at issue.
2. A statement of the specific Agreement provisions
which are claimed to have been violated.
3. A statement of all facts relating to the dispute which
the appealing party asserts exist and alleges can be proved and
which support its position.
4. The full position of the appealing party. A copy of the
initial submission shall be served on the other party or parties.
H. Upon the filing of the submission with the Company
Member and Union Member, the Company and Union shall within
five (5) days select a Neutral Member to sit with the Board in the
consideration and disposition of the case and shall advise the
appealing party and interested parties of the name and address of
the Neutral Member.
I. Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the appealing
party’s submission, the other party to the dispute shall file a
Statement of Position with the Company Member, the Union
Member, and the party or parties involved which shall include:
1. If the parties are unable to agree on the question or
questions at issue, the other party will state the question or ques
tions at issue.
2. All facts relating to the dispute which the party asserts
exist and alleges can be proved and which support its position.
3. The party’s full position.
J. Upon the filing of the Statement of Position, the appealing
party shall forward a copy of the submission to the Neutral
Member, and the other party to the dispute shall file with the
Neutral Member a copy of the Statement of Position. All subse
quent documents to be filed with the Board shall be addressed to
all three members of the Board.
K. Within fifteen (15) days after the date the Statement of
Position is filed with the Company Member and the Union
58
57a
Member, the parties shall advise the Board of the facts on which
they desire the present evidence during the hearing of the dispute
before the Board unless they mutually agree not to present any
evidence or oral argument. Each party shall have the opportunity
at the hearing to present evidence on the facts on which the other
party presents evidence. The Neutral Member may also advise the
parties the facts on which he desires to have evidence. If any
party does not desire to present evidence or oral argument, that
party shall so advise the other party or parties and the Board with
in the time limits specified in this paragraph.
L. 1. As soon as the parties and the Neutral Member
(Chairman) have been advised of the facts on which evidence will
be presented, the Chairman shall set a date for hearing which shall
be mutually satisfactory with the Union and Company Members of
the Board and shall be within thirty (30) days of said date, unless
the Chairman is notified that the Company and the Union have
agreed to a mutually satisfactory later date. The Chairman shall
give the necessary notices in writing of such hearing to the parties.
The decision of the Board shall be rendered within thirty (30)
days after the close of the hearing. If neither party nor the
Chairman requests evidence to be presented at the hearing, hearing
shall be waived except where any of the parties or the Chairman
requests a hearing for the purpose of oral argument.
2. In the event neither party desires to present evidence
or oral argument at the hearing, the Chairman shall be so advised
within the time limits specific in Paragraph K of this Article. If
there is to be no hearing for presentation of evidence or oral argu
ment, the Chairman shall set a date for an executive session of the
Board during or after which a decision shall be rendered, but in
any event said decision shall be rendered within forty (40) days of
the date the Chairman was advised that no evidence or oral argu
ment would be presented.
M. Employees covered by this Agreement may be represented
at Board hearings by such person or persons as they may choose
and designate, and the Company may be represented by such per
son or persons as it may choose and designate. Evidence may be
presented either orally or in writing, or both. All witnesses testi
fying orally or by deposition shall do so under oath. On request
of individual members of the Board, the Board may, by majority
vote, or shall at the request of either the Union Member or the
59
58a
Company member thereof, summon any witnesses who are
employed by the Company and who may be deemed necessary by
the parties to the dispute or by either party or by the Board itself.
The number of employee witnesses summoned at any one time
shall not be greater than the number which can be spared from the
operation without interference with the services of the Company.
N. A majority vote of all members of the Board shall be
competent to make a decision.
O. Decisions of the Board in all cases properly referable to it
shall be final and binding upon the parties to the dispute and the
parties to this Agreement.
P. Nothing herein shall be construed to limit, restrict, or
abridge the rights or privileges accorded either to the employees
or to the Company or to their duly accredited representatives
under the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, as amended.
Q. Each of the parties hereto will assume the compensation,
travel expense, and other expenses of the Board Member selected
by it and one-half (A) of the compensation, travel expense, and
other expenses of the Neutral Member.
R. Each of the parties hereto will assume the compensation,
travel expense, and other expenses of the witnesses called or sum
moned by it. Witnesses who are employees of the Company shall
receive free contingent air transportation over the lines of the
Company from the point of duty or assignment to the point at
which they must appear as witnesses and return, to the extent per
mitted by law.
S. The Company Member and the Union Member, acting
jointly, shall have the authority to incur such other expenses as in
their judgment may be deemed necessary for the proper conduct
of the business of the Board, and such expenses shall be borne
one-half ('A) by each of the parties hereto. Board Members who
are employees of the Company shall be granted necessary leaves
of absence for the performance of their duties as Board Members.
So far as space is available, the Company and the Union Board
Members shall be furnished free transportation over the lines of
the Company for the purpose of attending meetings of the Board,
to the extent permitted by law.
T. It is understood and agreed that each and every Board
member shall be free to discharge his duty in an independent man
ner, without fear that his individual relations with the Company or
60
59a
with the Union may be affected in any manner by any action
taken by him in good faith in his capacity as a Board Member.
U. A stenographic report will not be made on each case on
which a hearing is held unless the parties mutually agree other
wise.
V. The Chairman's copy of all transcripts and/or all records
of cases will be filed at the conclusion of each case in a place to
be provided by the Company and will be accessible to Board
Members and to the parties.
ARTICLE XVII
SAFETY AND HEALTH
A. Employees entering the service of the Company may be
required to take a physical examination specified by the Company.
The cost of such examination will be paid by the Company.
Thereafter the Company may request an employee to submit to
further physical examinations during the course of his employment
or recall to service after a layoff due to reduction in force. If it
becomes necessary to hold an employee out of service due to his
physical condition, the Union will, on the employee’s request, be
fully informed of the circumstances, and every effort will be made
to return the employee to service at the earliest possible date. The
cost of such further examination shall be paid by the Company.
B. The Company shall institute and maintain all reasonable
and necessary precautions for safeguarding the health and safety
of its employees. Both the Company and the Union recognize
their respective obligations to assist in the prevention, correction,
and elimination of all hazardous and unhealthy working conditions
and practices.
C. The Company hereby agrees to maintain safe, sanitary,
and healthful working conditions in all shops and facilities and to
maintain on all shifts emergency first aid equipment at a first aid
station to take care of its employees in case of accident or illness.
It is understood that this does not require the Company to main
tain a nurse or doctor on the property, but the Company will des
ignate a doctor to be called in an emergency.
D. The Company agrees to furnish good drinking water and
sanitary fountains; the floors of the toilets and washrooms will be
kept in good repair and in clean, dry, sanitary condition.
Employees will cooperate in maintaining the foregoing conditions.
61
60a
Shops and washrooms will be lighted in the best manner possible,
consistent with the source of light available. Individual lockers
will be provided for all employees where space and lockers are
available. Every effort will be made as early as possible to pro
vide space and lockers for all employees. Lockers will be made
available to all employees provided Company equipment or cloth
ing necessary in the performance of their job.
E. 1. In order to eliminate as far ns possible accidents and
illness, a safety committee will be established at each point on the
system where employees hereunder are based, composed of a
member from each department and shop. The safety committee
will meet at least once a month with management in regard to
safety rules, regulations and recommendations. The Union will
appoint one (I) member to each neighbor island safety committee.
Insofar as practical, all matters of occupational safety and health
are normally to be handled directly between the designated Union
safety representative(s) or committee and the designated manage
ment safety representative(s). Discussions between these parties
will be directed toward the rapid and efficient solution of safety
and health problems.
2. The duty of the safety committee will be to see that all
applicable State and municipal safety and sanitary regulations are
complied with, as well as to make recommendations for the main
tenance of proper standards.
3. This committee shall receive and investigate com
plaints regarding unsafe and unsanitary working conditions and
make recommendations concerning such complaints. The Union
safety committee member(s) or representative(s) shall be allowed
with permission from the immediate supervisor a reasonable
amount of time during working hours without loss of pay for these
purposes.
F. Proper and modem safety devices shall be provided for all
employees working in hazardous or unsanitary work, such devices
to be furnished by the Company. Employees will not be required
to use unsafe tools or equipment or perform work that involves an
imminent danger to his or any other employee’s health or physical
safety once a complaint has been lodged with the immediate
supervisor. However, employees will be expected to report unsafe
tools or equipment. An employee’s refusal to perform work
which is in violation of established health and safety rules, or any
62
6 1 a
local, state or federal health and safety law shall not warrant disci
plinary action.
G. The Company shall make available at its expense all nec
essary safety devices for employees working on hazardous or
unsanitary work, and employees will be required to use or wear
such devices in performing such work.
H. The Company will furnish protective apparel, equipment
and devices to all employees required to work with acids or chem
icals that are injurious to clothing or employees.
The Company will make available at its expense appropri
ate aprons, gloves, and shoes for use of all employees while
required to work with acids and chemicals that are injurious to
clothing while such employees are engaged in such activities, and
employees will be required to wear such equipment.
I. Employees injured or who become ill because of occupa
tional hazards while at work shall be given medical attention as
promptly as reasonably practicable. Employees will not be
refused permission to return to work because they have not signed
releases of liability pending the disposition or settlement of any
claims which they may have for compensation arising out of such
sickness or injury.
J. Suitable rain repellent garments and boots shall be kept
available at all shops and service stations for use of employees
covered by this Agreement when they are required to work outside
in the rain.
K. The Company will make available at its expense, ear
muffs for employees working on the line.
L. The Company will make available, at its expense, safety
goggles where required and will also provide replacement of safe
ty prescription lenses and frames broken in the act of work when
worn.
M. Employees required to have x-ray examinations will be
sent, if possible, during their working hours at Company expense.
Time spent outside normal working hours obtaining this examina
tion will be paid at straight time.
N. Employees will be required to wear safety equipment des
ignated and provided for their job. Failure to wear such equip
ment shall be a basis for disciplinary action.
* * * *
63
62a
ARTICLE XXIII
EFFECTIVE DATE AND DURATION
This Agreement, as amended, shall become effective January
16, 1987. and shall continue in full force and effect through
January 15, 1989. and shall renew itself without change unless
written notice of intended change is served in accordance with
Section 6, Title 1, of the Railway Labor Act, as amended, sixty
(60) days prior to January 15, 1989, or in accordance with the pro
visions of Paragraph 8, Article III, of this Agreement, by either
party hereto.
64
63 a
APPENDIX G
AUGUST 03, 2987
BASE MAINTENANCE & ENGINEERING
JULY 31, 1987
SUSPENSION HEARING
A HEARING WAS HELD IN THE BASE MAINTENANCE
OFFICE JULY 31. 1987
AT 10:00 A.M.
REPRESENTING THE UNION:
REPRESENTING THE COMPANY:
SUSPENDED EMPLOYEE:
COMPANY OBSERVER:
F. BAPTIST
J. CULAHARA
G. NORRIS - DATE OF
HIRE: FEBRUARY 2, 1987
C, ROBINSON
THE HEARING OFFICER PRIOR TO THE START OF
THIS HEARING EMPHASIZED THE EMPLOYEE REQUEST
ED THE LATE SCHEDULED TIME AS STATED ON THE
LETTER DATE JULY 15, 1987 NOTIFIED TO HIM.
QUESTION AT ISSUED: EMPLOYEE’S REFUSAL TO
SIGN WORK RECORDS FOR
WORK PERFORMED BY HIM;
SUBSEQUENTLY, SUSPENDED
FOR INSUBORDINATION AFTER
A DIRECT ORDER WAS GIVEN
TO DO SO.
POSITION OF UNION: EMPLOYEE REFUSAL TO SIGN
COMPANY WORK RECORD
BASED ON; HE FELT IT WAS
UNSAFE FOR WORK PER
FORMED.
65
64 a
POSITION OF COMPANY: THE COMPANY IS RESPONSI
BLE FOR THE AIRWORTHINESS
OF IT ’S AIRCRAFT AND THE
PERFORMANCE OF MAINTE
NANCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
IT’S MANUAL, WHICH MUST
ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH
THE FAR’S. ALSO, COMPETENT
PERSONNEL, MR. HENRY
WONG, QUALITY CONTROL
INSPECTOR, WHO IS TECHNI
CALLY QUALIFIED TO ANA
LYZE, JUDGE THE MERIT OF
EACH ITEM AND MAKE THE
DECISION WHETHER OR NOT
TO SIGN THE ITEM OFF AS AIR
WORTHY.
THE BASE MAINTENANCE LINE
MANAGER, MR. JUSTING
CULAHARA, PERSONALLY
OBSERVES THIS WORK BEING
DONE TO THE EXTENT NECES
SARY TO INSURE THAT IT IS
BEING DONE PROPERLY. HE IS
READILY AVAILABLE IN PER
SON FOR CONSULTATION. HE
SEES ALL AIRCRAFT IN A CON
DITION SATISFACTORY TO
INSPECTION SECTION PRIOR
TO RELEASE FOR FLIGHT.
IN THIS CASE, THE DECISION
IN SIGNING A WORK SHEET
SIGNIFY ONLY IT IS COVERED
BY HIS SIGNATURE. THIS WAS
THE ONLY REQUISITE IN THIS
CASE. A DIRECT ORDER WAS
GIVEN AND HIS REFUSAL TO
COMPLY BROUGHT ABOUT
66
6 5 a
DECISION:
THIS UNHAPPY SITUATION.
MANAGEMENT HAS NEVER
MANDATED FOR A “SIGN OFF”
FOR WORK NOT DONE BY AN
INDIVIDUAL.
MR. GRANT NORRIS TERM I
NATED AS OF THIS DAY,
AUGUST 3, 1987. FOR INSUBOR
DINATION.
/s/ NORMAN MATSUZAKI
NORMAN MATSUZAKI
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF BASE
MAINTENANCE
HEARING OFFICER
NM:hpa
cc: GRANT NORRIS
IRD
A.P. WELLS
H.E. OGDEN
C. ROBINSON
H. HONMA
IAM
57
66a
APPENDIX II
September 10, 1987
Mr. Grant T. Norris
1125-A 2nd Avenue. #4
Honolulu, HI 96816
Dear Mr. Norris:
I have reviewed your case file very carefully and, as the next
appropriate individual in the chain of command, I have decided to
mitigate the punishment imposed on you from discharge to sus
pension without pay for the period August 3, 1987 to September
15, 1987.
You are to report to duty on September 15, 1987 at 1930 hours.
This action being taken by me should not be interpreted by you as
an indication that the Company condones your conduct. You are
hereby warned that any further instance of failure to perform your
duties in a responsible manner will result in consideration of more
severe disciplinary action to include discharge.
Very truly yours,
/s/ HOWARD E. OGDEN
Howard E. Ogden
Vice President
Maintenance and Engineering
cc: Personnel
Norman Matsuzaki
Samson Poomaihealani/IAM
68
N o . 9 2 -2058
In T h e
Suprem e Court of the United States
O c to b e r T erm , 1992
--------------- ♦----------------
HA W A IIA N AIRLINES, INC.,
Petitioner,
v.
G R A N T T. NORRIS,
a n d
R espondent,
PAUL J. F IN A Z Z O , H O W A R D E. O G D EN , and
HATSUO H O N M A ,
P etitioners,
v.
G R A N T T. NORRIS,
R espondent.
--------------- ♦----------------
O n P e t i t io n For A W rit O f C e r t io ra r i To T h e
S u p re m e C o u r t For T h e S ta te O f H a w a i i
--------------- ♦----------------
BRIEF IN O P P O S I T IO N TO
P E T IT IO N FO R A W R IT O F C E R T IO R A R I
--------------- ♦----------------
C ades Schutte Fleming & W right
Edward deLappe Boyle*
Susan O ki M ollway
1000 Bishop Street, 10th Floor
H o n o lu lu , H aw aii 96813
(808) 521-9200
C ou n sel f o r R espondent
*C ounsel o f R ecord
69
1
Q U E S T I O N P R E S E N T E D
W h e t h e r th e H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t c o r r e c t ly h e ld
t h a t a n a i r l i n e e m p l o y e e ' s c la im , a l l e g in g t h a t th e a i r l in e
f i r e d h i m in v i o l a t i o n o f th e p u b l i c p o l i c y o f th e S ta te of
H a w a i i w h e n h e r e p o r t e d th e a i r l i n e ' s d a n g e r o u s m a i n t e
n a n c e p r a c t i c e to t h e F e d e r a l A v ia t io n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n
( " F A A " ) , d i d n o t d e p e n d o n a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the
e m p l o y e e ' s c o l le c t iv e b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t ( " C B A " ) , a n d
th e r e f o r e w a s n o t p r e e m p t e d b y th e R a i lw a y L a b o r Act
( " R L A " ) , 45 U .S .C . § 151 ef s e q ., a n d w a s n o t su b je c t to
a d j u d i c a t i o n b y a n a r b i t r a t o r w h o o r d i n a r i l y h a s no
e x p e r t i s e in a n d c a n n o t c o n s i d e r p u b l i c i n t e r e s t o r d e t e r
m in e v i o l a t i o n s o f la w o r p u b l i c po licy .
70
11
L IS T O F I N T E R E S T E D P A R T IE S
P a r t i e s o t h e r t h a n th e c o r p o r a t i o n s i d e n t i f i e d in th e
P e t i t io n a r e l i s te d in th e c a p t io n .
71
Il l
T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S
P a g e
Q U E S T IO N P R E S E N T E D .............. ............................................ i
LIST O F IN T E R E S T E D P A R T I E S .............................. ii
TA BLE O F C O N T E N T S ................................................................ iii
TA BLE O F A U T H O R I T I E S ..................... iv
J U R I S D I C T I O N .................................................................................. 1
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E C A S E .................................................... 4
A R G U M E N T ....................................................................................... 11
I. S U M M A R Y O F A R G U M E N T ........................................ 11
II. W H I L E P E T I T I O N E R S F R A M E T H E IS S U E
R A I S E D BY T H E I R P E T I T I O N A S B E I N G
W H E T H E R L IN G L E A P P L IE S T O R L A P R E
E M P T IO N ISSU ES, A P P L IC A T IO N O F L IN G L E
IS N O T N E C E S S A R Y T O S U S T A I N T H E
H A W A I I S U P R E M E C O U R T 'S D E C I S I O N ,
W H I C H F IN D S S U P P O R T IN C O N R A I L ............ 12
III. T H E R E IS N O C O N F L I C T B E T W E E N T H E
D E C IS IO N IN N O R R IS A N D T H E D E C IS IO N S
O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S C O U R T S O F
A P P E A L S R E L IE D O N BY P E T I T I O N E R ............ 19
C O N C L U S I O N ................................................................................... 25
72
IV
C ases
A n d rew s v. L o u is v il le & N a sh v ille R a ilro a d C o., 406
U.S. 320 ( 1 9 7 2 ) ............................ 18
B elkn ap , In c. v. H a le , 463 U.S. 491 (1983).............................. 3
C o n so lid a ted R a il C orp . v. R a ilw a y L abor E x ec u t iv e s ’
A sso c ia t io n , 491 U.S. 299 ( 1 9 8 9 ) ..................................p a ss im
C ox B ro a d ca s t in g C orp . v. C oh n , 420 U.S. 469 ( 1 9 7 5 ) ..........2
D avies v. A m er ica n A ir lin e s , In c ., 971 F,2d 463 (10 th
Cir. 1992), p e t it io n f o r cert, f i l e d , 61 U.S.L.W. 3481
(U.S. D ec. 22, 1992) (N o . 9 2 -1 0 7 7 ) .............................. 23, 24
C rote v. Trans W orld A ir lin e s , In c ., 905 F.2d 1307
(9 th C ir.) , cert, d en ied , 498 U.S. 958 (1990). . 11, 22, 23
H u bbard v. U n ited A ir lin e s , In c ., 927 F.2d 1094 (9 th
Cir. 1 9 9 1 ) ............................ 22
In te r n a t io n a l A s s o c ia t io n o f M a c h in is ts v. C en tra l
A ir lin es , In c ., 372 U.S. 682 (1963) ......................................... 18
L in g le v. N org e D iv is ion o f M a g ic C hef, In c ., 486 U.S.
399 ( 1 9 8 8 ) .................................................................................... p a ss im
L oren z v. C S X T ra n sp o rta tio n , In c ., 980 F.2d 263 (4 th
Cir. 1 9 9 3 ) ................................................... ............. ........ 19, 20, 21
M a h er v. N ew Je r s e y T ran sit R a il O p era tio n s , In c .,
593 A .2 d 750 (N.J. 1 9 9 1 ) ................ ............. ...........................23
M arx & C o. v. D in er's C lu b , 550 F.2d 505 (2d C ir.) ,
cert, d en ied , 434 U.S. 861 ( 1 9 7 7 ) ................................................ 17
M cC a ll v. C h esa p ea k e & O h io R a ilw a y C o ., 844 F.2d
294 (6 th C ir.) , cert, d en ied , 488 U.S. 879 (1 9 8 8 ) ......... 21
N orris v. H a w a iian A ir lin e s , In c ., 842 P.2d 634 (H aw .
1 9 9 2 ) ...................................................... .... .................................. p a ss im
T A B L E O F A U T H O R I T I E S
P a g e
73
V
O 'D ell v. E s p in o z a , 456 U.S. 430 (1982)................................... 2
P a rn a r v. A m er ica n a H o te ls , In c ., 652 P.2d 625 (H aw .
1 9 8 2 ) ................................................................................................ 10, 13
P u ch ert v. A g sa lu d , 677 P.2d 449 (H aw . 1984), a p p ea l
d is m is s ed f o r w an t o f s u b s ta n t ia l f e d e r a l q u e s t io n ,
472 U.S. 1001 ( 1 9 8 5 ) .................................................................... 18
R a d io S ta tio n W OW , Inc. v. J o h n so n , 326 U.S. 120
( 1 9 4 5 ) ........................................................ 2
S k o ta k v. T en n eco R es in s , In c ., 953 F.2d 909 (5 th
C ir .) , cer t, d en ied , 113 S. C t. 98 ( 1 9 9 2 ) ......... .. 16
S m o la rek v. C h ry s le r C o rp ., 879 F.2d 1326 (6 th Cir.
1 9 8 9 ) . . ................................................................................................... 21
S p ech t v. J e n s e n , 853 F.2d 805 (1 0 th Cir. 1 9 84) ................. 16
S tew a rt v. B ren n a n , 748 P.2d 816 (H a w . A p p . 1988) . . . . 16
U n ited S ta te s v. Z ip k in , 729 F.2d 384 (6 th Cir. 1984) . . . . 17
Statutes
28 U .S .C . § 1 2 5 7 ...................................... ......................... ............. 2, 3
28 U .S.C . § 1 2 5 7 ( a ) ............... 1
29 U .S .C . § 1 8 5 ............. 12
45 U .S.C . § 151 et s e q .................................................. .........................i
49 U .S .C . § 1 4 2 9 ...................................................................................... 4
49 U .S.C . § 1 4 7 1 ............. 4
H a w . Rev. S ta t . §§ 378-61 to 378-69 .......................................... 8
T A B L E O F A U T H O R I T I E S - C o n t i n u e d
P a g e
74
Vi
T A B L E O F A U T H O R I T I E S - C o n t i n u e d
P a g e
O ther A uthorities
14 C.F.R. § 4 3 .9 ..........
14 C.F.R. § 43 .9(a)(4) .
14 C.F.R. § 4 3 .1 2 .........
14 C.F.R. § 4 3 . 1 3 . . . . .
14 C.F.R. § 6 5 .8 5 .........
14 C.F.R. § 6 5 .8 7 .........
H aw . R. Civ. P. 54(b)
H aw . R. E v id . 702 . . .
. . . . 4
. A , 5
. . . . 4
. . . . 4
. . . . 4
. . . . 4
.1, 10
. . . 16
75
J U R I S D I C T I O N
T h is C o u r t d o e s n o t h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n to c o n s i d e r the
P e t i t i o n b e c a u s e th e H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t s
a r e n o t " f in a l j u d g m e n t s o r d e c r e e s " a s r e q u i r e d b y 28
U .S .C . § 1257(a). T h e H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t s
r e v e r s e o r d e r s d i s m i s s i n g o n l y s o m e o f t h e c l a im s
b r o u g h t b y R e s p o n d e n t G r a n t T. N o r r i s ( " N o r r i s " ) a n d
r e m a n d th o s e m a t t e r s fo r t r ia l . O t h e r c o u n t s w e re n o t in
i s s u e o n th e a p p e a l , w h i c h w a s b a s e d o n a c e r t i f i c a t io n of
th e a p p e a l e d r u l i n g s a s f ina l p u r s u a n t to R u le 54(b ) o f the
H a w a i i R u le s o f C iv i l P r o c e d u r e . P e t i t i o n e r s h a d m o v e d
u n s u c c e s s f u l l y fo r d i s m is s a l o f th e o t h e r c o u n t s o n the
s a m e ju r i s d i c t i o n a l g r o u n d th a t led to th e d i s m is s a l o f the
c o u n t s in i s s u e o n th e a p p e a l . R e c o rd o n A p p e a l in N orris
v. H a w a iia n A ir lin e s , Inc. ( " R ." ) , vo l . 5, a t 1-136. B ecause
th e s e o t h e r c o u n t s w i l l be t r i e d r e g a r d l e s s o f w h a t h a p
p e n s w i t h r e s p e c t to th e m a t t e r s t h a t a re th e su b je c t of
th i s a p p e a l , f e d e r a l i s s u e s m a y b e r a i s e d in a s u b s e q u e n t
a p p e a l f r o m a n y t r ia l r u l i n g o n th o s e o t h e r c o u n t s . T h u s ,
it w i l l b e o n ly a f te r th e p r o c e e d i n g s in th e t r ia l c o u r t are
c o m p l e t e d t h a t all o f th e f e d e ra l i s s u e s in th i s ca se w il l be
d e c i d e d a n d f r a m e d fo r p o s s ib le r e v ie w b y th i s C o u r t . At
th i s p o i n t , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g h o w th e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l i s s u e is
h a n d l e d o n th i s a p p e a l , it is im p o s s ib l e to s a y w h e th e r
n e w tw i s t s o n th e j u r i s d i c t io n a l i s s u e m a y b e r a i s e d w ith
r e s p e c t to t h e o t h e r c la im s t h a t a re n o t a d d r e s s e d o n this
a p p e a l . It w o u l d b e p r e m a t u r e fo r th is C o u r t to c o n s id e r
s e l e c t e d r u l i n g s r e g a r d i n g fe d e ra l i s s u e s a t th i s t im e .
T h e g e n e r a l r u le is t h a t a ll f e d e ra l i s s u e s in a p a r t i c u
l a r ca se s h o u l d b e r e v ie w e d o n c e r t i o r a r i a t th e sam e
t im e . S e c t io n 1257(a) p r o v i d e s , in r e l e v a n t p a r t :
76
1
2
F in a l j u d g m e n t s o r d e c r e e s r e n d e r e d b y th e
h ig h e s t c o u r t o f a S ta te in w h i c h a d e c i s io n
c o u ld b e h a d , m a y b e r e v i e w e d b y th e S u p r e m e
C o u r t b y w r i t o f c e r t io r a r i . . . w h e r e a n y ti t le ,
r ig h t , p r iv i l e g e , o r i m m u n i t y is s p e c ia l ly s e t u p
o r c l a im e d u n d e r th e C o n s t i t u t i o n o r th e t r e a t ie s
o r s t a t u t e s o f , o r a n y c o m m i s s i o n h e l d o r
a u t h o r i t y e x e rc i s e d u n d e r , th e U n i t e d S ta te s .
In i n t e r p r e t in g th e r e q u i r e m e n t of a f in a l j u d g m e n t :
T h e C o u r t h a s n o te d t h a t " [ c j o n s i d e r a t i o n s of
E n g l i s h u s a g e as w e l l a s th o s e o f ju d i c i a l p o l i c y "
w o u l d ju s t i f y a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f th e f i n a l - j u d g
m e n t ru le to p r e c l u d e re v ie w " w h e r e a n y t h i n g
f u r th e r r e m a i n s to b e d e t e r m i n e d b y a S ta te
c o u r t , n o m a t t e r h o w d i s s o c i a t e d f ro m th e o n ly
fe d e ra l i s s u e t h a t h a s b e e n a d j u d i c a t e d b y th e
h ig h e s t c o u r t o f th e S ta te ."
C ox B ro a d ca s t in g C orp . v. C o h n , 420 U.S. 469, 477 (1975)
(q u o t in g R ad io S ta tio n WOW, In c . v. J o h n s o n , 326 U.S. 120,
124 (1945)).
A l t h o u g h th e C o u r t h a s a c k n o w l e d g e d a " l i m i te d se t
o f s i t u a t io n s in w h i c h [ th e C o u r t ] h a s f o u n d f in a l i ty a s to
th e f e d e ra l i s s u e d e s p i t e th e o r d e r i n g o f f u r th e r p r o c e e d
in g s in th e l o w e r s t a t e c o u r t s , " O 'D ell v. E sp in o z a , 456 U.S.
430, 430 (1982), th e C o u r t h a s n o t e x p a n d e d th is l im i te d
se t to i n c l u d e c i r c u m s ta n c e s in w h i c h a d d i t i o n a l p o t e n
t ia l ly a p p e a l a b l e f e d e ra l i s s u e s r e m a i n to b e d e c id e d .
T h u s , in C ox B ro a d ca s t in g C o rp ., t h e C o u r t sa id :
T h e re a r e n o w a t l e a s t f o u r c a te g o r i e s o f s u c h
c a s e s in w h i c h th e C o u r t h a s t r e a t e d th e d e c i
s io n o n th e f e d e r a l i s s u e a s a f in a l j u d g m e n t fo r
th e p u r p o s e s o f 28 U SC § 1257 [28 U SC S § 1257]
a n d h a s t a k e n j u r i s d i c t io n w i t h o u t a w a i t i n g th e
77
3
c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e a d d i t i o n a l p r o c e e d i n g s a n t i c i
p a t e d in t h e l o w e r s t a t e c o u r t s . In m o s t , if n o t
a ll , o f th e c a s e s in t h e s e c a te g o r i e s , th e s e a d d i
t io n a l p r o c e e d i n g s w o u l d n o t r e q u i r e th e d e c i
s i o n o f o t h e r f e d e r a l q u e s t io n s that m ig h t a ls o
r eq u ir e r ev iew hy th e C o u rt at a la te r d a te , a n d
i m m e d i a t e r a t h e r t h a n d e l a y e d r e v ie w w o u l d be
t h e b e s t w a y to a v o i d " th e m is c h ie f o f e c o n o m ic
w a s t e a n d o f d e l a y e d ju s t ic e ," [c i ta t io n o m i t t e d ]
a s w e l l a s p r e c i p i t a t e in t e r f e r e n c e w i th s t a t e l i t i
g a t io n .
420 U.S. a t 477-78 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . 1
U n d e r th e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f th e p r e s e n t c a se , n e i th e r
th e f in a l j u d g m e n t r u le n o r th e j u s t i f ic a t io n b e h i n d the
l im i t e d e x c e p t i o n s to th e r u le p r e v io u s l y r e c o g n i z e d by
th e C o u r t w o u l d b e s e r v e d b y g r a n t i n g th e P e t i t io n . 1
1 In Belknap, Inc. v. H ale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983), this Court
found a K en tucky C o u rt of A ppea ls ju d g m e n t "final" for p u r
poses of 28 U.S.C. § 1257, explain ing:
[I]t f inally d isp o sed of the federal p re -em ption issue;
a r e v e r s a l h e re w o u ld t e r m in a t e the s t a t e - c o u r t
action; a n d to p e rm it the p roceed ing to go fo rw ard in
the s ta te co u r t w i th o u t re so lv in g the p re -e m p t io n
issue w o u ld involve a ser ious risk of e ro d in g the
federa l s ta tu to ry po licy of " ' r e q u ir in g the subject
m a t t e r o f r e s p o n d e n t s ' c a u s e to be h e a r d by
the . . . Board, no t by the s ta te cou r ts . ' "
Id. a t 497 n.5 (c ita tions om itted ) . Here, by con trast, a ru l ing by
this C o u r t cou ld no t te rm ina te the s ta te cou r t action. Petitioners
d id no t o b ta in com ple te s u m m a ry ju d g m e n t ag a in s t N orr is , nor
hav e P e ti t ioners h ad the o p p o r tu n i ty to have the h ighes t state
cou r t rev iew the low er sta te co u r t 's den ial of the ir m otion to
d ism iss N o rr is 's o ther claims.
78
4
N o rr is p r e s e n t s th e fo l lo w in g d i s c u s s io n , h o w e v e r , in th e
ev e n t the C o u r t d o e s c o n s i d e r th e P e t i t io n o n i ts m e r i t s .
------------------- 4 --------------------
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E C A S E
T h is is a w r o n g f u l d i s c h a r g e ca se . N o r r i s w a s a
l icensed a i rc ra f t m e c h a n ic h i r e d b y P e t i t i o n e r H a w a i i a n
A ir l ines , Inc. ( " H A L " ) o n F e b r u a r y 2, 1987. N o rr is v.
H aw aiian A ir lin es , In c ., 842 P.2d 634, 637 (H a w . 1992).
N o r r i s ' s l ic en se f ro m th e FAA c a r r i e d a n A i r f r a m e a n d
P o w e rp la n t r a t i n g th a t g a v e h im th e a u t h o r i t y to a p p r o v e
a n d r e tu r n to s e rv ic e a n a i r c r a f t a f te r m a k i n g , s u p e r v i s
ing, o r in s p e c t in g c e r t a in r e p a i r s . Id. S ee a ls o 14 C.F.R.
§§ 65.85, 65.87. A m e c h a n ic a p p r o v e s th e a i rc ra f t b y s i g n
ing th e m a i n t e n a n c e re c o rd . 14 C.F.R. § 43.9(a)(4). H o w
ever, th e m e c h a n i c m a y n o t a p p r o v e fo r s e r v ic e a n y
a irc ra f t o r p a r t if th e r e p a i r is n o t in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h th e
m a n u f a c t u r e r ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s o r s p e c i f i c a t io n s o r i f th e
r e p a i r d o e s n o t o t h e r w i s e c o n f o r m to th e F e d e r a l A v ia t io n
R e g u l a t i o n s ( " F A R 's " ) . 14 C .F .R . §§ 4 3 .9 , 43 .13 . T h i s
r e s t r ic t io n is s t a t e d o n th e b a c k o f e v e r y m e c h a n i c ' s
l icense . If a m e c h a n ic m a k e s a f r a u d u l e n t o r in t e n t io n a l ly
fa lse e n t r y in a r e c o rd o r r e p o r t r e q u i r e d b y th e F A R 's ,
the FAA m a y s u s p e n d o r r e v o k e th e m e c h a n i c ' s l ic en se ,
o r a s se ss a c iv il f ine . 49 U.S.C . §§ 1429, 1471; 14 C.F.R.
§ 43.12.
O n a r o u t i n e p r e f l ig h t i n s p e c t io n o f o n e o f H A L 's
D C-9 a i rc ra f t , A i rc ra f t 70, in th e e a r ly m o r n i n g o f Ju ly 15,
1987, N o r r i s n o t i c e d th a t o n e o f th e m a i n l a n d i n g g e a r
tires w a s w o r n . 842 P.2d a t 638. T h e t ire a n d b e a r i n g w e r e
r e m o v e d , a n d N o r r i s a n d th e o t h e r m e c h a n ic s p r e s e n t
79
5
s a w t h a t th e ax le s le e v e u n d e r n e a t h , w h i c h n o r m a l l y h a s
a m i r r o r - s m o o t h s u r f a c e , w a s s c a r r e d a n d g r o o v e d , w i th
g o u g e s a n d b u r n m a r k s c le a r ly v is ib le . Id.
N o r r i s a n d o t h e r m e c h a n i c s w h o s a w th e s l e e v e
t h o u g h t it w a s u n s a f e a n d n e e d e d to b e c h a n g e d a t on ce .
Id . J u s t i n C u l a h a r a , th e l in e m a n a g e r , h o w e v e r , o r d e r e d
th e m e c h a n i c s to h a n d s a n d th e s le e v e a n d s i m p ly p u t a
n e w b e a r i n g a n d t ire o v e r it. Id . C u l a h a r a k n e w th e p l a n e
w a s to b e g i n i ts s c h e d u le o f f l ig h ts v e r y s o o n , w i t h p a s
s e n g e r s o n b o a r d . R., vo l . 3, a t 288-302 *1 12. S ee a lso R.,
v o l . 27 ( D e p o s i t i o n o f T h o m a s Sealy , v o l . 1, Jan . 9, 1990, a t
137-41).
W h e n N o r r i s w a s a b o u t to l e a v e a t th e e n d o f h is
s h i f t , C u l a h a r a o r d e r e d h im to " s i g n o ff" th e t i re c h a n g e ,
t h e r e b y c e r t i f y in g t h a t th e r e p a i r h a d b e e n p e r f o r m e d
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . 8 4 2 P .2 d a t 6 3 8 . S e e a l s o 14 C .F .R .
§ 43 .9 (a)(4 ) . N o r r i s r e f u s e d , s a y in g t h a t t h e s le e v e w a s
u n a i r w o r t h y a n d u n s a f e . C u l a h a r a to ld N o r r i s to s ig n th e
w o r k o r d e r o r b e f i re d . 842 P.2d a t 638. N o r r i s r e f u s e d to
s ig n . C u l a h a r a s u s p e n d e d N o r r i s o n th e s p o t , p e n d i n g a
t e r m i n a t i o n h e a r in g . Id. A i r c r a f t 70 m a d e i ts s c h e d u le d
f l ig h t c a r r y i n g p a s s e n g e r s . Id.
W h e n N o r r i s r e t u r n e d h o m e , h e c o n ta c t e d th e FAA to
s a y th a t th e r e w a s a p r o b l e m w i t h th e H A L a i r c r a f t th a t
h e h a d s e r v ic e d . Id . In th e a f t e r n o o n , a f t e r C u l a h a r a h a d
b e e n r e l i e v e d o f h i s sh i f t , N o r r i s r e t u r n e d to th e off ice of
N o r m a n M a t s u z a k i , th e A s s i s t a n t D i r e c to r o f B ase M a i n
te n a n c e , a n d C u l a h a r a ' s s u p e r io r , to tell h im w h a t h a d
h a p p e n e d . R., vo l . 3, a t 288-302 ^ 18. N o r r i s m e n t i o n e d
h i s c o n ta c t w i t h th e FAA. M a t s u z a k i t h e n c h a s e d N o r r i s
f r o m h i s o ff ice a f te r a s s u r i n g N o r r i s t h a t N o r r i s w a s
80
6
" g o n e " n o m a t t e r w h a t N o r r i s o r th e u n i o n s a id in
N o r r i s ' s d e f e n s e . Id. 1 19.
N o r r i s i n v o k e d th e g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e o u t l i n e d in
A r t ic le s XV a n d XVI of th e C B A b e t w e e n th e I n t e r n a
t io n a l A s s o c ia t io n of M a c h in i s t s a n d H A L . 842 P.2d a t
638. T h e C B A p r o v i d e d fo r a n e m p lo y e e to b e d i s c h a r g e d
o r d i s c i p l in e d o n ly for ju s t c a u se . T h e C B A a lso s t a t e d
th a t a n a i rc ra f t m e c h a n ic " m a y b e r e q u i r e d to s ig n w o r k
re c o rd s in c o n n e c t io n w i t h th e w o r k h e p e r f o r m s . " R.,
vo l . 5, a t 42 a n d A p p e n d ix F to P e t i t io n .
O n J u ly 31, 1987, N o r r i s ' s t e r m i n a t i o n h e a r i n g w a s
h e ld p u r s u a n t to A r t ic le XV of th e C BA . 842 P.2d a t 638.
M a t s u z a k i p r e s i d e d o v e r th e h e a r i n g a n d r u l e d t h a t
N o r r i s w a s t e r m i n a t e d fo r " i n s u b o r d in a t i o n . " Id.
N o r r i s f i led a g r i e v a n c e r e g a r d in g h is t e r m in a t io n ,
s e e k in g r e in s t a t e m e n t a n d b a c k pay . N o r r i s ' s u n i o n r e p r e
s e n ta t i v e r e f e r r e d th e g r i e v a n c e fo r a S te p 3 h e a r in g
p u r s u a n t to th e CBA . B efore th e h e a r in g w a s c o n d u c te d ,
h o w e v e r , H A L 's Vice P r e s id e n t o f M a in t e n a n c e a n d E n g i
n e e r in g , H o w a r d E. O g d e n , w r o te a l e t te r d a t e d S e p t e m
b e r 10, 1987, o f f e r in g to " m i t ig a t e " N o r r i s ' s p u n i s h m e n t
to s u s p e n s i o n w i t h o u t pay , b u t ex p l ic i t ly w a r n i n g th a t
" a n y f u r t h e r i n s ta n c e of fa i lu re to p e r f o r m y o u r d u t i e s in
a r e s p o n s ib l e m a n n e r " c o u ld b e p u n i s h e d b y d is c h a r g e .
Id. a t 638-39. H A L w r o t e to the u n i o n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a n d
s t a t e d t h a t H A L 's a c t io n " n e g a te s the n e e d " fo r th e S te p 3
h e a r in g . R.; vo l . 3, a t 300. N o r r i s r e fu s e d to a c c e p t th e
r e in s t a t e m e n t o ffe r u n d e r th e c i r c u m s ta n c e s . H e f i led th is
a c t io n in s t a t e c o u r t o n D e c e m b e r 8, 1987. 842 P.2d a t 639.
N o S te p 3 h e a r i n g w a s h e ld .
81
7
O n A u g u s t 3, 1987, a f te r N o r r i s h a d b e e n t e r m i n a t e d ,
h e w e n t b a c k to th e FA A a n d g a v e th e fe d e ra l a g e n c y the
d e t a i l s o f w h a t h a d h a p p e n e d o n th e e v e n i n g / e a r l y
m o r n i n g o f J u ly 1 4 / J u l y 15, 1987, i n c lu d in g th e lo c a t io n
o f th e d a m a g e d ax le s leev e . T h e FAA se iz e d th e ax le
s le e v e o n A u g u s t 4, 1987, a n d b e g a n a c o m p r e h e n s iv e
in v e s t i g a t i o n in to h o w lo n g th a t s le e v e h a d b e e n o n th e
p l a n e a n d h o w m a n y t im e s th e s le e v e h a d b e e n s ig n e d off
w h i l e it w a s d a m a g e d . R „ vo l . 17 (D e p o s i t io n o f R ic h a rd
S. T e ix e ira , R e c o r d s o f F e d e ra l A v ia t io n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,
D ec. 6, 1989). S ee a ls o 842 P.2d a t 638.
O n M a r c h 2, 1987, th e FAA p r o p o s e d a c iv i l p e n a l ty
o f $964 ,000 .00 a g a i n s t H A L o n th e b a s i s o f 958 f l ig h ts the
a i rc ra f t h a d m a d e w i t h th e d a m a g e d s leev e . R., vo l . 3, a t
80-81. T h e FA A i n s p e c t o r w h o se iz e d th e s le e v e f o u n d it
to b e d a m a g e d b e y o n d a l lo w a b le r e p a i r l im i ts s e t o u t in
th e m a n u f a c t u r e r ' s m a i n t e n a n c e m a n u a l . Id.
T h e FA A p r o p o s e d to r e v o k e th e FAA l icen se of
C u l a h a r a , th e l in e m a n a g e r w h o h a d s u s p e n d e d N o r r i s .
Id . a t 83.
In S e p te m b e r , 1987, th e FA A b r o a d e n e d its i n v e s t i g a
t io n to i n c l u d e o t h e r H A L D C -9 S erie s 50 a irc ra f t . Id. a t
89-91. T h e FA A n o t i f i e d H A L th a t it i n t e n d e d to in s p e c t
th e a x le s l e e v e s o f tw o o th e r a i r c ra f t , A irc ra f t 68 a n d 69,
o n S e p t e m b e r 21, 1987. Id . B efo re th e i n s p e c t io n c o u ld
t a k e p la c e , h o w e v e r , a n FAA in s p e c to r c a u g h t H A L p e r
s o n n e l r e m o v i n g th e s le e v e s o n th o se a i rc ra f t . Id. H e
o r d e r e d th e s l e e v e s m a d e a v a i l a b le to h im . Id. H A L ,
h o w e v e r , d i d n o t t u r n o v e r th e s leev e s ; it t o ld th e FAA
t h a t it h a d " m i s p l a c e d " o r " lo s t " a t le a s t s ix of e ig h t
s le e v e s o n th e tw o a i rc ra f t . Id. T h e FAA th e n re c e iv e d
82
8
i n f o r m a t i o n i n d i c a t in g th a t th e s le e v e s f ro m A irc ra f t 68
a n d 69 w e r e a lso d a m a g e d b e y o n d a l lo w a b le l im i ts . Id.
T h e FA A i s s u e d a fo r m a l O r d e r of I n v e s t ig a t io n o n A p r i l
13, 1988, to d e t e r m i n e the fac ts s u r r o u n d i n g th e d i s a p
p e a r i n g ax le s leev e s . Id.
O n F e b r u a r y 10, 1989, th e FAA i s s u e d th e " W o o d r u f f
R e p o r t , " a r e p o r t c o n ta in in g th e f in d in g s a n d c o n c lu s io n s
in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h th e O r d e r o f In v e s t ig a t io n . R., v o l . 9,
a t 341-97. T h e W o o d r u f f R e p o r t c o n c lu d e d t h a t t h e re w a s
" e v id e n c e o f a c t io n s o n th e p a r t o f c e r t a in H A L m i d d le
m a n a g e m e n t p e r s o n n e l to i n t e n t io n a l ly ta k e th e s le e v e s
a s s o o n as th e y w e r e r e m o v e d from th e a i r c r a f t . " Id. a t
380. T h e FAA q u e s t i o n e d " w h e t h e r H A L m i d d l e m a n
a g e r s w o u l d t a k e s u c h a c t io n o n th e i r o w n v o l i t io n ." Id.
a t 383. U l t im a te ly , H A L a n d th e FAA r e a c h e d a c o m p r o
m is e , w i t h th e p a y m e n t b y H A L of $360,000 r e s o lv in g all
p e n d i n g c h a r g e s . R., v o l . 27 ( D e p o s i t i o n o f S t e p h e n
T h o m p k i n s , vo l . 2, A u g . 1, 1990, a t 308-19, E x h ib i t 9). S ee
a ls o H A L 's A n s w e r i n g B rie f f i led J u n e 10, 1991, a t 19-20
n.6.
N o r r i s ' s s u i t a g a in s t H A L a l le g e s th a t h i s d i s c h a r g e
w a s in v io l a t io n o f c le a r m a n d a t e s of p u b l i c p o l ic ie s a s
a r t i c u la te d in th e F e d e ra l A v ia t io n A ct a n d th e H a w a i i
W h i s t l e b l o w e r s ' P r o te c t io n A c t, H aw . Rev. S ta t . §§ 378-61
to 378-69. R., vol. 1, a t 1-11. C o u n t 1 of th e C o m p la in t
i n c lu d e s t h e fo l lo w in g a l le g a t io n :
22. T h e f o r e g o in g ac ts c o n s t i t u t e d a d i s
c h a r g e i n v i o l a t i o n o f t h e p u b l i c p o l i c y
e x p r e s s e d in th e F e d e r a l A v ia t io n A c t a n d th e
F e d e r a l A v ia t io n R e g u la t io n s , b e c a u s e th e y h a d
th e i n t e n t o r th e ef fec t o f a l l o w in g u n s a f e a i r
c r a f t to c a r r y p a s s e n g e r s a n d o f i n t im i d a t i n g
83
9
F A A -l ic e n s e d m e c h a n ic s to ig n o re th e i r o b l ig a
t io n s to th e f ly in g p u b l i c in o r d e r to k e e p th e i r
jobs .
H A L r e m o v e d th e e n t i r e c a se to f e d e ra l d i s t r i c t c o u r t ,
R., vo l . 1, a t 48-91, w h e r e th e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r f e d e ra l
l a b o r la w p r e e m p t e d N o r r i s ' s c la im s w a s l i t ig a te d . R.,
v o l . 7, a t 71-75. T h e fe d e ra l c o u r t d i s m is s e d C o u n t V of
N o r r i s ' s C o m p l a i n t o n th e g r o u n d th a t it w a s p r e e m p t e d
b y f e d e ra l l a b o r l a w a n d r e m a n d e d th e r e m a i n in g c la im s
to s t a t e c o u r t . R., vo l . 30, a t 196-242. H A L m o v e d for
r e c o n s id e r a t io n , w h ic h th e fe d e ra l d i s t r i c t c o u r t d e n ie d ,
sa y in g :
T h e q u e s t i o n u n d e r L in g le is w h e t h e r a
c l a im fo r w r o n g f u l d i s c h a r g e in v i o l a t i o n o f
p u b l i c p o l ic y is a c la im d e r iv e d f ro m o r d e p e n
d e n t o n th e t e r m s o f a c o l le c t iv e b a r g a i n i n g
a g r e e m e n t . To s t a t e a c la im for w r o n g f u l d i s
c h a rg e in v io l a t io n of p u b l i c p o l icy , a n e m p lo y e e
m u s t s h o w (1) th a t t h e r e is a c le a r m a n d a t e o f
p u b l i c p o l ic y ; a n d (2) t h a t h i s d i s c h a r g e w a s
m o t i v a t e d b y r e a s o n s t h a t c o n t r a v e n e a c le a r
m a n d a t e of p u b l i c po licy . S ee g e n e r a lly P arn ar,
652 P.2d a t 631-32; T h om p son v. St. R eg is P a p er
C o., 685 P.2d 1081, 1089 (W ash . 1984) (en ban c).
O n c e th e e m p l o y e e h a s m a d e th i s t h r e s h o l d
s h o w in g , th e b u r d e n s h i f t s to th e e m p l o y e r to
s h o w t h a t th e d i s c h a r g e w a s fo r r e a s o n s o th e r
t h a n th o s e a l l e g e d b y th e e m p lo y e e . T h o m p so n ,
685 P.2d a t 1089.
T h is c a u s e o f a c t io n , l ike th e c a u s e o f a c t io n
in L in g le , d o e s n o t r e q u i r e a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of
th e c o l le c t iv e b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t . T h e p u b l i c
p o l i c y is n o t f o u n d in th e c o l le c t iv e b a r g a i n i n g
a g r e e m e n t b u t in "a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , s t a tu to r y , o r
r e g u la t o r y p r o v i s i o n o r s c h e m e ." P a rn a r a t 631.84
1 0
T h e m o t i v a t i o n o f th e e m p l o y e r is a " p u r e l y
f a c tu a l " q u e s t io n . L in g le , 108 S. C t., a t 1882. To
d e f e n d a g a i n s t th e c la im a n e m p l o y e r m u s t
s h o w t h a t it w a s n o t m o t iv a t e d b y a re a s o n th a t
c o n t r a v e n e s p u b l i c p o l icy : " th i s p u r e ly fa c tu a l
i n q u i r y l ik e w is e d o e s n o t t u r n o n th e m e a n in g
o f a n y p r o v i s i o n o f a c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g
a g r e e m e n t . [" ] Id . I t h e r e f o r e c o n c l u d e t h a t
N o r r i s ' s c la im t h a t H A L d i s c h a r g e d h im in v io
l a t i o n of p u b l i c p o l ic y is n o t p r e e m p t e d u n d e r
L in g le .
R., vo l . 3, a t 1-136 (E x h ib i t I a t 20-21).
In s t a t e c o u r t , H A L m o v e d to d i s m is s N o r r i s ' s c la im s
on th e g r o u n d t h a t th e s ta te c o u r t lack e d su b je c t m a t t e r
j u r i s d i c t io n o v e r th e m . T h e lo w e r s ta te c o u r t g r a n t e d th a t
m o t io n a s to C o u n t I b u t n o t a s to o th e r c o u n ts . ( C o u n t I
w a s b a s e d o n P a rn a r v. A m er ica n a H ote ls , In c ., 652 P.2d 625
(H aw . 1982), w h i c h h e l d th a t it w a s a g a in s t th e p u b l i c
p o l i c y o f th e S ta te o f H a w a i i fo r a n e m p l o y e r to fire a n
e m p lo y e e fo r r e p o r t i n g v io l a t io n s o f law .) T h e s t a t e c o u r t
c e r t i f ie d i ts o r d e r s a s f in a l u n d e r H aw . R. Civ. R 54(b).
842 P.2d a t 639. N o r r i s a p p e a l e d f ro m th e j u d g m e n t d i s
m i s s in g C o u n t I a g a in s t H A L a n d a lso a p p e a l e d f ro m
r u l in g s in f a v o r o f P a u l ]. F in a z z o , H o w a r d E. O g d e n , a n d
H a t s u o H o n m a . R., vo l . 29, a t 117-26. T h e se th re e i n d i v i d
u a l s w e r e d e f e n d a n t s in C iv il N o . 89-2904-09, w i t h w h ic h
N o r r i s ' s c a se a g a in s t H A L h a d b e e n c o n s o l id a te d . R., vol.
18, a t 407-08. T h e r u l in g s in f a v o r o f M ess rs . F in a z z o ,
O g d e n , a n d H o n m a h a d d i s m is s e d C o u n t s I a n d II, b o th
o f w h i c h a l le g e d v io l a t io n s of p u b l i c policy.
O n a p p e a l , th e H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t r e ta in e d j u r i s
d ic t io n o v e r C iv i l N o . 89-2904-09 b u t d e t e r m in e d th a t th e
s t a t e c o u r t s h a d n o j u r i s d i c t io n o v e r C iv il N o . 87-3894-12
85
11
( N o r r i s ' s c a s e a g a in s t H A L ) . 842 P.2d a t 639 n.7. H A L
t h e n a t t e m p t e d to p e r s u a d e th e fe d e ra l d i s t r i c t c o u r t to
r e c o n s i d e r i ts 1988 d e c i s io n to r e m a n d th e case . T h e f e d
e r a l d i s t r i c t c o u r t d e n i e d H A L 's r e p e a t e d r e c o n s id e r a t io n
m o t i o n s a n d g r a n t e d H A L le a v e to s e e k a p p e l l a t e p e r m i s
s io n to t a k e a n i n t e r l o c u t o r y a p p e a l . T h e N i n t h C i rc u i t
d e c l i n e d to p e r m i t a n in t e r l o c u t o r y a p p e a l o r to c la r i fy
th e d e c i s i o n d e n y i n g l e a v e to file a n in t e r l o c u t o r y a p p e a l .
R., vo l . 35 ( A f f id a v i t o f J e n n i f e r C o o k C la rk , s u b m i t t e d b y
w a y of s u p p l e m e n t a l R e c o rd ) (E x h ib i ts L, N , R, T). T h e
s t a t e c o u r t u l t im a t e ly r e in s t a t e d o r d e r s a n d e n t e r e d a
r e in s t a t e d j u d g m e n t , f ro m w h i c h N o r r i s a p p e a l e d . T h e
H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t r e v e r s e d th e l o w e r s t a t e c o u r t ' s
j u d g m e n t s in N o rr is v. F in a z z o a n d in N o rr is v. H A L . See
824 P .2d 634 (1992) a n d A p p e n d ic e s B a n d C to the
P e t i t i o n .2
---------------- ♦ — — ------ ----------------------
A R G U M E N T
I. S u m m a r y o f A r g u m e n t .
P e t i t i o n e r s f r a m e th e i s s u e b e fo re th is C o u r t a s b e in g
w h e t h e r th e p r e e m p t i o n a n a ly s i s in L in g le v. N org e D iv i
s io n o f M a g ic C h e f , In c . , 486 U .S . 399 (1988) , w h i c h
2 The Petition complains that the Hawaii Supreme Court
did not cite or follow G ro te v. T ra n s W o r ld A i r l i n e s , In c . , 905 F.2d
1307 (9th Cir.), cer t , d e n ie d , 498 U.S. 958 (1990), "[djespite exten
sive briefing by both parties" of G ro te . So that there will be no
misunderstanding, Norris explains that his "extensive briefing"
of the case consisted of discussion as to why G r o te was inappli
cable or, in the alternative, distinguishable, as more fully d is
cussed below.
£6
1 2
a n a l y z e d p r e e m p t i o n u n d e r S e c t io n 301 o f th e L a b o r
M a n a g e m e n t R e la t io n s A ct ( " L M R A " ) , 29 U.S.C . § 185,
a p p l i e s in th e R L A p r e e m p t i o n c o n te x t . P e t i t io n e r s a r g u e
th a t it d o e s n o t , a n d th a t th e H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t , in
a p p l y i n g L in g le , is in co n f l ic t w i t h s e v e ra l d e c is io n s o f the
U n i t e d S ta te s C o u r t s o f A p p e a ls . N o r r i s s u b m i t s , firs t ,
t h a t th e a p p l i c a b i l i t y of L in g le n e e d n o t e v e n b e c o n s i d
e r e d to s u s t a i n th e H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s d e c is io n ,
w h ic h is e n t i r e ly c o n s i s t e n t w i t h th i s C o u r t ' s s u b s e q u e n t
d e c is io n in C o n so lid a ted R a il C orp . v. R a ilw ay L a b o r E x ecu
tives' A sso c ia t io n , 491 U.S. 299 (1989) (" C o n ra il" ). C o n ra il
p r o v i d e s t h a t a d i s p u t e b e t w e e n a n e m p l o y e e a n d
e m p l o y e r is a " m i n o r " d i s p u t e th a t m u s t b e a r b i t r a t e d
u n d e r th e R L A o n ly if th e e m p l o y e e 's c la im c a n b e " c o n
c lu s iv e ly r e s o l v e d " b y i n t e r p r e t i n g th e C B A . N o r r i s ' s
c la im c a n n o t b e " c o n c lu s iv e ly r e s o lv e d " u n d e r th e CBA .
N o r r i s f u r t h e r s u b m i t s t h a t th e H a w a i i S u p r e m e
C o u r t ' s u s e o f L in g le w a s a p p r o p r i a t e in a n y e v e n t , a n d
th a t i ts d e c i s io n c a n b e s q u a r e d w i t h th e fe d e ra l d e c is io n s
c i ted b y P e t i t io n e r s . II.
II . W h i l e P e t i t i o n e r s F r a m e t h e I s s u e R a i s e d b y T h e i r
P e t i t i o n as B e in g W h e t h e r L in g le A p p l i e s to R LA
P r e e m p t i o n I s s u e s , A p p l i c a t i o n o f L in g le i s N o t
N e c e s s a r y to S u s t a i n th e H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s
D e c i s io n , w h i c h F i n d s S u p p o r t in C o n r a i l .
P e t i t i o n e r s ' fo c u s o n L in g le a s th e l in c h p in o f th e
H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s d e c is io n is m is p la c e d . D e s p i t e
th e H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s d i s c u s s io n o f L in g le , th a t
ca se is n o t e s s e n t i a l to th e H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s d e c i
s ion . I n s te a d , th e d e c is io n is fu l ly s u p p o r t a b l e , w i t h o u t
87
1 3
r e g a r d to L in g le , u n d e r C o n ra il, a ca se d e a l in g w i t h th e
R LA a n d d e c id e d a f te r L in g le , b u t n e v e r m e n t i o n e d in the
P e t i t io n ,
N o r r i s ' s p u b l i c p o l i c y c la im d o e s n o t r e q u i r e a n y
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f th e C B A a t all. T h e c la im ra is e s th e is su e
o f w h e t h e r H A L f i r e d N o r r i s in r e t a l i a t i o n for h i s r e p o r t
in g of d a n g e r o u s m a i n t e n a n c e p ra c t i c e s to th e FAA. A n y
s u c h d i s c h a r g e w o u l d h a v e v io la te d H a w a i i ' s p u b l i c p o l
icy, a s s t a t e d in P arn ar. W h e th e r , as P e t i t io n e r s c la im ,
N o r r i s w a s " i n s u b o r d i n a t e " w o u l d n o t " c o n c l u s i v e l y
r e s o lv e " N o r r i s ' s c la im . N o r r i s ' s c la im t u r n s o n w h e t h e r
P e t i t io n e r s w e r e m o t iv a t e d b y a n in te n t to g e t r id of
N o r r i s b e c a u s e N o r r i s w a s r e p o r t i n g s h o d d y m a i n t e n a n c e
p ra c t ic e s .
A s th i s C o u r t n o t e d in C o n ra il, th e RLA g o v e r n s
d i s p u t e s t h a t c a n b e c la s s i f ie d a s e i t h e r " m a jo r " d i s p u t e s
o r " m i n o r " d i s p u t e s . A " m a jo r " d i s p u t e is a d i s p u t e o v e r
th e f o r m a t io n o f a C B A o r e f fo r t s to s e c u re a CBA . A
" m a jo r " d i s p u t e is r e s o lv e d t h r o u g h co l le c t iv e b a r g a i n i n g
o r m e d ia t io n . If th o s e m e t h o d s fail , th e p a r t i e s m a y re s o r t
to th e u s e o f e c o n o m ic force . C o n ra il, 491 U.S. a t 302-03. A
" m i n o r " d i s p u t e is a d i s p u t e o v e r th e m e a n i n g o r a p p l i c a
t io n o f a p a r t i c u l a r p r o v i s i o n in a C B A in th e c o n te x t o f a
sp ec if ic s i t u a t io n . A " m i n o r " d i s p u t e is r e s o lv e d t h r o u g h
c o m p u l s o r y a n d b i n d i n g a r b i t r a t io n . Id . a t 303. T h e d i s
p u t e is " m i n o r " if th e e m p l o y e r ' s a c t io n is " a r g u a b l y
ju s t i f i e d " b y th e C B A , b u t it is " m a jo r " if th e e m p l o y e r ' s
c l a im s o f j u s t i f ic a t io n u n d e r th e CBA a re " f r i v o lo u s o r
o b v io u s ly i n s u b s t a n t i a l . " Id . a t 307. T h e " d i s t i n g u i s h i n g
f e a tu r e " o f a " m i n o r " d i s p u t e is t h a t " th e d i s p u t e m a y b e
c o n c lu s iv e ly r e s o lv e d b y in t e r p r e t in g the e x i s t in g a g r e e
m e n t . " Id. a t 306.
1 4
P e t i t i o n e r s a g r e e th a t n o " m a jo r " d i s p u t e is in v o lv e d
h e re , 842 P.2d a t 641, b u t th e y c o n te n d th a t N o r r i s ' s
p u b l i c p o l i c y c la im ra is e s a " m i n o r " d i s p u t e b e c a u s e it
fa lls w i t h i n A r t ic le s IV a n d XVII of th e CBA . P e t i t io n e r s
a re in c o r re c t .
A r t ic le IV p r o v i d e s th a t a n a i rc ra f t m e c h a n ic " m a y be
r e q u i r e d to s ig n w o r k re c o rd s in c o n n e c t io n w i t h th e
w o r k h e p e r f o r m s . " S ee A p p e n d ix F to th e P e t i t io n . B u t
t h i s p r o v i s i o n c a n n o t " c o m p l e t e l y r e s o l v e " N o r r i s ' s
c la im , a s it d o e s n o t s p e a k to N o r r i s ' s c la im th a t R e s p o n
d e n t s ' a c tu a l r e a s o n for t e r m i n a t i n g h im w a s th a t h e h a d
r e p o r t e d H A L to th e FAA, r a th e r t h a n th a t h e h a d fa iled
to s ig n a w o r k re c o rd . A s th e H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t sa id ,
" [ D j e f e n d a n t s d o n o t s u g g e s t th a t a r e ta l ia to r y d i s c h a r g e
is s a n c t io n e d o r ju s t i f ie d b y a p r o v i s io n in th e a g r e e m e n t
n o r d o th e y p o i n t to a n y p a r t o f th e CBA w h ic h d e m o n
s t r a te s th a t th e c a r r i e r a n d u n i o n h a v e a g r e e d o n s t a n
d a r d s r e le v a n t to N o r r i s ' s s i tu a t io n . " 842 P.2d a t 644.
N o r r i s ' s c l a im t u r n s o n P e t i t i o n e r s ' a l l e g e d ly r e ta l ia to r y
a n i m u s in f i r in g h im . W h a t th e p a r t i e s d id a n d w h a t
m o t iv a t e d th e m is n o t a s c e r t a in a b le b y re fe re n c e to the
C B A .3
3 Petitioners state at page 17 of their Petition that the
Hawaii Supreme Court decision requires a jury to interpret the
CBA to determine whether Norris was discharged or merely
suspended. This is not true at all. The hearing report contained
in Appendix G to the Petition specifically concludes, "Mr. Grant
Norris terminated as of this day, August 3, 1987, for insubor
dination." Thus, Petitioners' own document states unequivo
cally that a termination occurred. Following receipt of this
report, Norris left Hawaii and moved to California to attend
nursing school "because [he] figured that [his] career in the
airline industry had ended." R., vol. 3, at 388-302, <f 24. It is true
89
15
A rt ic le XVII is s im i l a r ly i n a p p l i c a b le . A r t ic le XVII
r e fe r s to e m p l o y e e s a f e ty a n d s a n i t a t i o n a n d s t a te s , " A n
e m p l o y e e ' s r e fu s a l to p e r f o r m w o r k w h ic h is in v io l a t io n
o f e s t a b l i s h e d h e a l t h a n d s a f e ty ru le s , o r a n y local , s t a t e
o r f e d e r a l h e a l t h a n d s a f e ty l a w sh a l l n o t w a r r a n t d i s c i
p l i n a r y a c t io n . " A r t ic le XVII d o e s n o t c o n c e rn th e s a f e ty
o f th e f ly in g p u b l i c , w h i c h N o r r i s w a s t r y in g to p ro te c t .
T h e f ly in g p u b l i c w a s n o t a p a r t y to th e CBA a n d s im p ly
is n o t c o n s i d e r e d in th e C B A a t all. A r t ic le XVII s p e a k s of
p h y s i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n s fo r e m p l o y e e s , c l e a n a n d d r y
w a s h r o o m f lo o rs , l ig h ts , e m p l o y e e lo c k e rs , u n s a f e a n d
u n s a n i t a r y w o r k i n g c o n d i t i o n s , p r o te c t iv e a p p a r e l , r a in
r e p e l l a n t g a r m e n t s , b o o t s , e a r m u f f s , a n d s a f e ty g o g g le s .
It d o e s n o t m e n t i o n , m u c h le s s e n c o m p a s s , F A R 's o r o th e r
a v i a t i o n s a f e ty is su es . T h e r e fo r e , A r t ic le XVII c a n n o t b e
s a id to p r o v i d e th e f r a m e w o r k fo r d e t e r m in i n g N o r r i s ' s
c la im t h a t h e w a s f i re d in v io l a t io n o f p u b l i c p o l i c y w h e n
h e r e f u s e d to p a r t i c ip a t e in a n d in s t e a d r e p o r t e d d a n
g e r o u s a i r c r a f t m a i n t e n a n c e p ra c t ic e s . C e r t a in ly N o r r i s ' s
that, after Norris had relocated and begun preparing for a new
career, he received a letter from Howard Ogden "mitigatfing]
the punishment imposed on [him] from discharge to suspension
without pay," but warning that "any further instance of failure
to perform [his] duties in a responsible manner will result in
consideration of more severe disciplinary action to include dis
charge." Id. and Appendix H to Petition. However, nothing in
the CBA relates to whether such a "mitigation" has any effect at
all if the employee has already moved out of the state and begun
a new career, or whether a "mitigation" may threaten discharge
if there is a "further instance" of irresponsibility, such as a
further report to authorities of unsafe maintenance practices.
Thus, the jury will not have to refer to the CBA at all in consider
ing this "mitigation."
90
16
c la im c a n n o t b e " c o n c lu s iv e ly r e s o lv e d " b y re fe re n c e to
A r t ic le XVII.
N o r w o u l d it m a k e s e n s e fo r a p u b l i c p o l ic y i s su e to
be r e s o lv e d t h r o u g h a g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e o r t h r o u g h
a r b i t r a t io n . A r b i t r a to r s d o n o t m a k e p u b l i c policy . W h ile
a n a r b i t r a t o r m a y b e e x p e r i e n c e d in la b o r l a w is su e s ,
s u c h e x p e r i e n c e p r o v i d e s n o e x p e r t i s e in p u b l i c po licy ,
w h ic h is t y p ic a l ly left to c o u r t s , l e g i s l a tu re s , a n d e le c te d
offic ia ls . If a r b i t r a t o r s c o u ld d e t e r m in e p u b l i c po licy , th e n
th e p o l i c y w o u l d n o t b e p u b l i c , fo r a r b i t r a t io n is n o r m a l ly
a p r iv a t e m a t t e r in w h ic h th e p u b l i c h a s n o say. T h u s ,
P e t i t i o n e r s ' a r g u m e n t a t p a g e 16 o f th e P e t i t io n th a t th e y
h a v e e x p e r t t e s t im o n y e s t a b l i s h in g th a t th e CBA d o e s
i n d e e d c o v e r N o r r i s ' s p u b l i c p o l ic y c la im is u n p e r s u a
s ive . P u b l ic p o l i c y is n o t a s u b je c t fo r C B A 's o r for e x p e r t
w i tn e s s e s .4
4 The expert's testimony was not in the Record when the
trial court entered its original ruling in HAL's favor in 1989.
This ruling was the basis for other rulings. (The testimony was
placed in the case files subsequently. R., vol. 27, Deposition of
Ted T. Tsukiyama.) See Skolak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909
(5th Cir.), cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 98 (1992) (on appeal from
summary judgment ruling, party may not rely on materials not
brought to lower court's attention in connection with ruling). In
addition, there is no reason that any court should rely on an
expert with respect to matters of law. The courts are the ultimate
authorities on matters of law. Were this case to go to trial, the
expert's opinion would not even be admissible. An expert wit
ness may testify in the form of an opinion only if his "scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."
Haw. R. Evid. 702. The expert testimony Petitioners rely on
would not help the trier of fact to determine any fact in issue. See
Stewart v. Brennan, 748 P.2d 816 (Haw. App. 1988). See also Specht
91
17
F a c e d w i t h a C B A t h a t d o e s n o t a d d r e s s N o r r i s ' s
p u b l i c p o l i c y c la im , P e t i t i o n e r s c o n s p i c u o u s l y i g n o re th e
s t a t e m e n t in C o n ra il t h a t a r b i t r a t i o n u n d e r a C B A w il l b e
r e q u i r e d o n ly if a d i s p u t e c a n b e " c o n c lu s iv e ly r e s o lv e d "
b y r e f e r e n c e to th e C B A . I n s t e a d , P e t i t i o n e r s a r g u e th a t
th e H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t e r r o n e o u s l y r e l i e d o n L in g le.
B u t if th e H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s d e c is io n is c o n s i s t e n t
w i t h C o n ra il, a l a t e r c a se t h a t d e a ls s p e c i f ic a l ly w i t h th e
R L A , t h e n it is d i f f ic u l t to see w h y th i s C o u r t s h o u ld
g r a n t c e r t i o r a r i to r e s o lv e th e i s s u e o f w h e t h e r L in g le
a p p l i e s . In fac t, th e H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t e x p r e s s ly s a id
th a t th e h o l d i n g in L in g le " i s v i r t u a l l y i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e
f ro m th e S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s r e a d i n g o f § 153 F ir s t (i) o f th e
R LA in C o n so lid a ted R a il." N o rr is , 842 P.2d a t 643.
O f c o u r s e , N o r r i s s u b m i t s th a t , as h e s u c c e s s fu l ly
a r g u e d to t h e H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t , L in g le , a l t h o u g h
d e c id e d in th e L M R A c o n te x t , d o e s i n d e e d p r o v i d e g u i d
a n c e in th is ca se . L in g le h e ld t h a t S e c t io n 301 o f th e L M R A
d id n o t p r e e m p t a n e m p l o y e e ' s c la im t h a t h e h a d b e e n
f i re d in v i o l a t i o n of I l l in o is l a w in r e ta l i a t i o n fo r f i l in g a
w o r k e r ' s c o m p e n s a t i o n c la im . T h e C o u r t n o t e d th a t the
c a se t u r n e d o n " p u r e l y fa c tu a l q u e s t io n s " p e r t a i n i n g to
" t h e c o n d u c t o f t h e e m p l o y e e a n d th e c o n d u c t a n d
m o t iv a t i o n o f th e e m p lo y e r , " a n d th a t " th i s p u r e l y fa c tu a l
i n q u i r y l ik e w is e d o e s n o t t u r n o n th e m e a n i n g of a n y
p r o v i s i o n o f a c o l l e c t iv e - b a r g a in in g a g r e e m e n t . " 486 U.S.
v. J e n se n , 853 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1984) (lawyer expert should not
be permitted to usurp court's function by directing jury's under
standing of legal standards); U n i t e d S ta t e s v. Z i p k i n , 729 F.2d 384
(6th Cir. 1984) (prejudicial error to allow testimony of bank
ruptcy judge on matters of law); M a r x & Co. v. D i n e r ' s C lu b , 550
F.2d 505 (2d Cir.), cert, d e n ie d , 434 U.S. 861 (1977).
92
18
a t 407. T h e C o u r t h e ld th a t " a s lo n g as th e s t a t e - l a w c la im
c a n b e r e s o lv e d w i t h o u t i n t e r p r e t in g th e a g r e e m e n t i tse lf ,
t h e c la im is ' i n d e p e n d e n t ' o f th e a g r e e m e n t . " Id . a t 410.
T h e d i s p u t e d i d n o t h a v e to b e a r b i t r a t e d b e c a u s e it d id
n o t r e q u i r e c o n s t r u i n g a CBA . Id. a t 413.
T h e h i s t o r i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t o f R L A p r e e m p t i o n
e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t L M R A p r e e m p t i o n p r i n c i p l e s p r o v i d e
g u i d a n c e in th e R LA c o n te x t . S ec t io n 301 of th e L M R A
w a s f i r s t l i n k e d to th e RLA in In te rn a t io n a l A sso c ia t io n o f
M a ch in is ts v. C en tra l A ir lin es , In c ., 372 U.S. 682, 691-92
(1963), w h i c h in v o lv e d th e RLA a n d w h ic h r e c o g n iz e d
th a t th e C B A in q u e s t io n , l ik e a n LM R A c o n t r a c t , w a s a
f e d e ra l c o n t r a c t g o v e r n e d b y fe d e ra l law a n d e n f o rc e a b le
in f e d e r a l c o u r t s . In 1972, in A n d rew s v. L o u is v il le &
N a sh v ille R a ilro a d C o ., 406 U.S. 320, 323 (1972), th i s C o u r t ,
r e v i e w i n g a n R L A c a s e , a p p l i e d c o n c e p t s d e v e l o p e d
u n d e r S e c t io n 301 o f th e L M R A . S im i la r q u e s t i o n s o f t e n
a r is e in th e L M R A a n d RLA c o n te x ts . T h u s , fo r e x a m p le ,
L in g le i t s e l f , d e c id e d in th e L M R A c o n te x t , d i s c u s s e s
m a n y o f th e s a m e i s s u e s d i s c u s s e d s e v e ra l y e a r s e a r l i e r in
th e R L A c o n te x t in P u ch ert v. A g sa lu d , 677 P.2d 449 (H aw .
1984), a p p e a l d ism is s ed f o r w an t o f su b s ta n tia l f e d e r a l q u e s
tion , 472 U.S. 1001 (1985). P u ch ert , l ike L in g le , i n v o l v e d a
c o m p l a i n t o f a d i s c h a r g e in r e ta l ia t io n fo r th e f i l in g o f a
w o r k e r ' s c o m p e n s a t i o n c la im , a n d , l ike L in g le , f o u n d th e
c la im n o t p r e e m p t e d b y th e fe d e ra l l a b o r law s . In l ig h t of
th e s i m i l a r i t y o f i s s u e s r a i s e d in th e L M R A a n d RLA
c o n te x ts , it m a k e s s e n s e to lo o k to L M R A p r e e m p t i o n
c a se s fo r g u i d a n c e in th e R LA c o n te x t . It m a y w e l l b e th is
s im i l a r i t y th a t p r o d u c e d w h a t th e H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t
f o u n d to b e t h e n e a r i d e n t i ty o f th e L in g le a n d C o n ra il
fo r m u la t io n s .
93
19
III. There is No Conflict Between the Decision in
Norris and the Decisions of the United States
Courts of Appeals Relied on by Petitioners.
P e t i t i o n e r s a r e in c o r r e c t in a r g u in g th a t th e H a w a i i
S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s d e c is io n is in co n f l ic t w i t h d e c is io n s
f r o m th e F o u r th , S ix th , a n d N i n t h C irc u i ts . T h e fac ts
l e a d i n g to th e d e c i s io n s o n w h ic h P e t i t io n e r s r e ly a r e
d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f ro m th e fac ts in is su e h e re , so th a t th e
H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s d e c is io n m a y be s q u a r e d w i th
th o s e d e c is io n s .
T h e F o u r th C i r c u i t d e c is io n o n w h ic h P e t i t io n e r s re ly
is L oren z v. C S X T ra n sp o rta tio n , In c ., 980 F.2d 263 (4 th Cir.
1993), a tw o - to - o n e d e c is io n . L o re n z f i led a d e f a m a t i o n
l a w s u i t , c l a i m i n g t h a t h e w a s d e f a m e d w h e n h i s
e m p l o y e r p o s t e d a n o t ic e o n th e office b u l l e t i n b o a r d
s t a t i n g th e r e s c h e d u l e d d a t e of a h e a r i n g o n c h a r g e s
a g a in s t L o re n z o f i n s u b o r d i n a t i o n a n d r e m o v a l o r th e f t o f
c o m p a n y p r o p e r ty . T h e h e a r i n g i tse lf w a s c o n d u c t e d p u r
s u a n t to th e C B A , a n d L o re n z w a s fo u n d g u i l ty . P u r s u a n t
to th e C B A , L o re n z a p p e a l e d , b u t h e w a s u n s u c c e s s f u l .
L o re n z t h e n a p p e a l e d to a p u b l i c la w b o a r d d e s i g n a t e d to
a r b i t r a t e th e m a t t e r in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h th e p r o v i s i o n s o f
t h e R L A , a n d th e d i s c ip l in a r y a c t io n a g a in s t L o re n z w a s
r e d u c e d . In th e m e a n t i m e , L o re n z f i led h is d e f a m a t i o n
l a w s u i t , w h i c h w a s r e m o v e d fro m s ta te c o u r t to f e d e r a l
c o u r t . B e c a u s e th e d e f a m a t i o n c la im c h a l l e n g e d th e
e m p l o y e r ' s h a n d l i n g o f a m a t t e r g o v e r n e d b y th e C B A ,
th e F o u r th C i r c u i t s a id th a t th e is su e of w h e t h e r th e
e m p l o y e r h a d a c te d w r o n g f u l ly h a d to b e d e t e r m i n e d
u n d e r th e CBA:
S4
2 0
L o r e n z 's c la im is g r o u n d e d in s t a t e law a n d , in
e f fec t , c h a l l e n g e s C SX 's c o n d u c t in th e a p p l i c a
t io n o f th e i n v e s t i g a t o r y p r o c e d u r e s r e q u i r e d by
th e B M W E [ th e C BA ], T h e d e f a m a t io n c la im
a r i s e s f r o m th e i s s u a n c e o f a n o t ic e i n c id e n t to
th e g r i e v a n c e p r o c e s s u n d e r th e BM W E. T h e
B M W E r e q u i r e d th e n o t ic e to b e g iv e n b e fo re a n
e m p l o y e e c o u ld b e d i s c ip l in e d . T h e a l l e g e d ly
d e f a m a t o r y s t a t e m e n t is, fac ia lly , a s im p le re c i
t a t io n o f th e c h a r g e s a g a in s t L o re n z a n d n o t ice
o f a h e a r i n g w h i c h CSX w a s r e q u i r e d to h o ld .
T h is ac t w a s i n e x t r i c a b ly i n t e r t w i n e d w i t h the
g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e s m a n d a t e d b y th e B M W E
a n d th i s d i s p u t e c a n n o t be s e t t l e d w i t h o u t re fe r
e n c e to th e B M W E a n d th e g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e s
m a n d a t e d b y it.
Id. a t 268.
L oren z is d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m N orris . U n l ik e N o r r i s ' s
p u b l i c p o l i c y c la im , w h i c h t u r n e d o n s u c h p u r e ly fa c tu a l
i s s u e s a s th e e m p l o y e r ' s m o t iv a t io n , L o r e n z 's d e f a m a t io n
c la im t u r n e d o n w h e t h e r th e e m p l o y e r w a s f o l lo w in g th e
r e q u i r e m e n t s o f t h e C B A . If th e C B A r e q u i r e d th e
e m p l o y e r ' s a c t io n s , t h e n th e C B A w o u l d " c o n c lu s iv e ly
r e s o lv e " th e d e f a m a t i o n c la im . By c o n t r a s t , n o o n e is
c l a im in g th a t th e C B A r e q u i r e d N o r r i s ' s t e r m in a t io n . To
th e c o n t r a r y , a s n o t e d a b o v e , P e t i t i o n e r s c l a im t h a t
N o r r i s ' s t e r m i n a t i o n w a s " m i t i g a t e d " to a s u s p e n s io n .
M o re o v e r , t h e h e a r t o f N o r r i s ' s c la im is th a t P e t i t io n e r s
w e r e m o t i v a t e d b y a d e s i r e to p e n a l i z e h im fo r r e p o r t in g
v io la t io n s o f law , a fa c tu a l m a t t e r th a t c a n n o t b e " c o n
c lu s iv e ly r e s o l v e d " b y e v e n th e m o s t c o m p r e h e n s i v e
r e v ie w o f th e C BA . T h u s , L oren z is d i s t in g u i s h a b le f ro m
th is ca se , a n d th e d e c is io n b y th e F o u r th C i rc u i t n o t to
95
21
a p p l y L in g le to th e s i t u a t io n b e f o re it is in n o w a y i n c o n
s i s t e n t w i t h th e H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s d e c is io n . T h e
r e a s o n i n g in th e N o r r i s d e c is io n s u g g e s t s th a t th e H a w a i i
S u p r e m e C o u r t , fa c e d w i t h th e fac ts in L oren z , w o u l d
s im i l a r ly h a v e fo u n d th e d e f a m a t io n c la im p r e e m p t e d .
T h e S ix th C i rc u i t d e c is io n s c i te d in th e P e t i t io n a re
e v e n m o r e e a s i ly d i s t i n g u i s h e d th a n th e F o u r t h C i rc u i t
d e c is io n . P e t i t io n e r s m is c h a r a c te r iz e S m o la rek v. C h ry s le r
C orp ., 879 F.2d 1326 (6 th Cir. 1989), a s h o l d i n g th a t " L in g le
d o e s n o t a p p l y to RLA p r e e m p t io n a n a ly s i s . " P e t i t io n a t
14. In S m o la rek , th e c o u r t a p p l i e d th e th e n - r e c e n t L in g le
d e c is io n to h o ld c la im s o f h a n d i c a p d i s c r i m i n a t i o n n o t
p r e e m p t e d b y th e LM R A . S m o la rek d i d n o t a d d r e s s , m u c h
less d i s t i n g u i s h , RLA p r e e m p t io n . In a f o o tn o te , S m olarek
m a d e a p a s s i n g re fe re n c e to M cC a ll v. C h esa p ea k e & O h io
R a ilw a y C o., 844 F.2d 294 (6 th Cir.) , cert, d en ied , 488 U.S.
879 (1988), a c a se in w h ic h th e S ix th C i r c u i t h e ld t h a t th e
R L A p r e e m p t e d a s ta te c la im if r e s o lu t io n o f th e s t a t e
c l a im w o u l d re q u i r e th e s a m e fa c tu a l i n q u i r y a s w o u l d b e
m a d e b y a n a r b i t r a t i o n b o a r d . H o w e v e r , M c C a ll w a s
d e c id e d b e f o re L in g le ( a l t h o u g h a r e h e a r in g w a s d e n ie d
s h o r t l y a f te r th e d a t e of th e L in g le d e c is io n ) , a n d b e fo re
C o n ra il. In i ts fo o tn o te in S m olarek , th e S ix th C i rc u i t d id
n o t , a s P e t i t io n e r s c la im , c ite M cC a ll " a s a ca se in w h ic h
L in g le 's S e c t io n 301 p r e e m p t io n d id n o t a p p ly ." R a th e r ,
t h e S ix th C i r c u i t s i m p ly n o t e d t h a t M c C a ll " d i d n o t
in v o lv e th e q u e s t io n o f § 301 p r e e m p t io n . " 879 F.2d a t
1335 n.4. T h e S ix th C i rc u i t d id n o t ta k e it u p o n i t s e l f to
d i s c u s s w h e t h e r th e L M R A p r e e m p t io n a n a ly s i s in L in g le
a p p l i e d to th e RLA, as th e is su e w a s n o t b e fo re it a n d h a d
n o t b e e n a d d r e s s e d in M cC all. To re a d in to th e f o o tn o te a
96.
22
co n f l ic t w i t h th e a n a ly s i s in th e H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s
d e c is io n is to r e a d s o m e t h i n g th a t is ju s t n o t th e re .
F ina lly , P e t i t i o n e r s c la im th a t th e H a w a i i S u p r e m e
C o u r t is in c o n f l ic t w i t h N i n t h C i r c u i t d e c is io n s o n th e
s u b je c t o f R L A p r e e m p t io n . P e t i t io n e r s c ite tw o N in th
C i rc u i t ca ses : H u b b a rd v. U n ited A ir lin es , In c ., 927 F.2d
1094 (9 th Cir. 1991), a n d G rote v. Trans W orld A ir lin es , In c.,
905 F.2d 1307 (9 th Cir.) , cert, d en ied , 498 U.S. 958 (1990).
N e i t h e r c a se c r e a te s a con f lic t .
T h e e m p l o y e e in H u b b a rd a l l e g e d R IC O v io la t io n s
(m a il f r a u d a n d w i r e f r a u d ) r e la te d to w h a t sh e s a id w a s
th e d e f e n d a n t s ' d e f r a u d i n g o f h e r b y p a y i n g h e r less in
d i s a b i l i ty p a y m e n t s t h a n th e C B A r e q u i r e d . O b v io u s ly ,
h e r c la im r e q u i r e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the C BA , w h ic h se t
f o r th t h e a p p l i c a b le b e n e f i t s . T h u s , h e r c la im , u n l ik e
N o r r i s ' s , w a s n o t i n d e p e n d e n t o f th e CBA . P e t i t io n e r s can
g iv e n o r e a s o n fo r th is C o u r t to a s s u m e th a t , p r e s e n te d
w i t h th e fa c ts in H u b b a rd , th e H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t
w o u l d d e c id e th a t c a se d i f f e r e n t ly f ro m th e N i n t h C ircu i t .
M o re o v e r , th e N i n t h C i rc u i t , w h i l e n o t in g th a t LM RA
c a se s d i d n o t c o n t ro l b e c a u s e p r e e m p t io n w a s b r o a d e r
u n d e r th e R L A , e x p r e s s ly n o te d th a t it w o u l d re a c h the
s a m e r e s u l t u n d e r t in g l e a n d o th e r L M R A cases . T h e re is,
th e r e f o r e , n o r e a s o n to r e c o n c i le a n y a l l e g e d c o n f l ic t
b e t w e e n H u b b a rd a n d N orris.
G ro te c a n s im i l a r ly be r e c o n c i le d w i t h N orris . G rote
in v o lv e d a c la im t h a t a n a i r l in e h a d fo rc e d a p i lo t to
p e r ju r e h im s e l f in o r d e r to o b ta in m e d ic a l c e r t i f ic a t io n .
T h e a i r l i n e ' s C B A d e a l t w i t h th e a i r l i n e ' s " a b i l i t y to
r e q u i r e a n y o f i ts p i l o t s to m a i n t a i n a c u r r e n t m e d ic a l
c e r t i f i c a te . " 905 F.2d a t 1309. T h u s , th e p i l o t ' s c la im
97
23
d e p e n d e d o n w h e t h e r th e a i r l in e w a s a c t in g w i t h i n th e
s c o p e of its a u t h o r i t y a s s e t f o r th in th e C BA . B ec a u se th e
p i lo t ' s c la im c o u l d b e " c o n c lu s iv e ly r e s o lv e d " b y in t e r
p r e t in g th e C B A , it w a s d e e m e d p r e e m p t e d . T h e H a w a i i
S u p r e m e C o u r t h a s a g r e e d th a t c la im s th a t c a n b e " c o n
c lu s iv e ly r e s o lv e d " b y r e fe re n c e to a CBA a re i n d e e d
p r e e m p t e d , so t h a t t h e re is n o co n f l ic t b e t w e e n G rote a n d
N orris .
A d m i t t e d ly , G rote , in c o n t r a s t to th e H a w a i i S u p r e m e
C o u r t , re je c te d a p p l i c a t i o n o f L in g le to th e RLA c o n te x t .
H o w e v e r , b e c a u s e th e a n a ly s i s o f P e t i t i o n e r s ' a u th o r i t i e s
is in k e e p in g w i t h t h e a n a ly s i s in N o rr is , th i s C o u r t n e e d
n o t s t e p in to a d d r e s s t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f L in g le . It
a p p e a r s th a t th e f e d e ra l c i r c u i ts a n d s ta te a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s
a re fo l lo w in g th e s a m e a n a ly s i s , w h e t h e r p u r p o r t e d l y
f o l lo w in g o r re je c t in g L in g le .
A s th is b r i e f is p r e p a r e d , th is C o u r t is c o n s i d e r in g th e
c e r t io r a r i p e t i t i o n in D a v ies v. A m er ica n A ir lin es , In c ., 971
F.2d 463 (1 0 th Cir. 1992), p e t it io n f o r cert, f i l e d , 61 U.S.L.W .
3481 (U.S. D ec . 22, 1992) (N o . 92-1077). A l th o u g h th a t
c a se c o n t a i n e d a fo o tn o te re je c t in g th e s t a t e m e n t in G rote
th a t , a s th e T e n th C i r c u i t p u t it, " th e s t a tu to ry , a s o p p o s e d
to c o n t r a c tu a l , o r ig in o f th e R LA a f fec ts th e i n q u i r y in to
w h e t h e r a c la im r e q u i r e s C B A in t e r p r e t a t io n , " id. a t 467
n .5 , re je c t io n o f G ro te w a s n e i t h e r n e c e s s a r y n o r m a te r i a l
to th e r e s u l t in D av ies . D av ies c o u ld h a v e b e e n d e c id e d
e x c l u s i v e l y u n d e r C o n r a i l ' s " c o n c l u s i v e l y r e s o l v e d "
r e q u i r e m e n t w i t h th e s a m e re su l t .
T h e s a m e is t r u e o f M a h er v. N ew Je r s ey T ran sit R a il
O p era tio n s , In c ., 593 A .2 d 750 (N.J. 1991), w h i c h P e t i
t io n e r s c la im is in c o n f l ic t w i th fe d e ra l d e c is io n s . M a h er
%
24
a p p l i e d L in g le a n d re je c te d a p p l i c a t io n o f th e C o n ra il l a n
g u a g e p r o v i d i n g th a t a d i s p u t e is a " m i n o r " d i s p u t e
s u b je c t to th e g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e if it is " a r g u a b l y j u s t i
f ie d " b y a C BA . T h e c o u r t in M a h er a p p e a r s to h a v e
o v e r lo o k e d th e r e q u i r e m e n t in C o n ra il t h a t a d i s p u t e is a
" m i n o r " d i s p u t e o n ly if it c a n b e " c o n c lu s iv e ly r e s o lv e d "
b y in t e r p r e t a t i o n o f th e C BA . C o n ra il , 491 U.S. a t 305. If
th is " c o n c lu s iv e ly r e s o lv e d " r e q u i r e m e n t is n o t m e t , the
d i s p u t e is n o t a " m i n o r " d i s p u t e th a t m u s t b e r e s o lv e d
u n d e r th e g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e s se t fo r th in th e CBA.
E v e n if th e " c o n c lu s iv e ly r e s o lv e d " r e q u i r e m e n t is m e t , a
d i s p u t e m a y s t i l l fall o u t s id e th e c la s s o f " m i n o r " d i s
p u t e s u n le s s th e c o n d u c t in q u e s t io n is " a r g u a b l y j u s t i
f ied " b y th e C B A . B u t o n e n e e d n o t r e a c h th e " a r g u a b l y
ju s t i f ie d " i s s u e if th e " c o n c lu s iv e ly r e s o lv e d " r e q u i r e m e n t
is n o t m e t .
T h e c la im in M a h er w a s th a t a n e m p lo y e r h a d f i re d
th e p la in t i f f in v io l a t io n of s t a t e a n t i - d i s c r im in a t io n a n d
w h i s t l e - b l o w e r l a w s . B e c a u s e th e c la im c o u l d n o t b e
" c o n c lu s iv e ly r e s o lv e d " u n d e r th e C BA , it d i d n o t p r e s e n t
a " m i n o r " d i s p u t e , r e g a r d l e s s o f w h e th e r th e e m p l o y e r ' s
c o n d u c t w a s " a r g u a b l y ju s t i f i e d " b y th e CBA. T h e r e s u l t
in M a h er is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h th i s r e a d i n g of C o n ra il, w h i c h
m a k e s re l ia n c e o n L in g le u n n e c e s s a ry . U n le s s P e t i t io n e r s
a re a s k i n g th i s C o u r t to o v e r r u l e th e " c o n c l u s i v e l y
r e s o lv e d " r e q u i r e m e n t in C on ra il, th e a u th o r i t i e s P e t i
t io n e r s r e ly o n c a n be r e c o n c i le d w i t h N o rr is , D av ies , a n d
M aher, r e g a r d l e s s o f w h e t h e r L in g le a p p l i e s in th e RLA
c o n te x t o r n o t .
♦
99
25
CONCLUSION
A l t h o u g h N o r r i s s u b m i t s th a t L in g le is i n d e e d a p p l i
c a b le in th e R LA c o n te x t , n e i t h e r th e H a w a i i S u p r e m e
C o u r t ' s d e c is io n n o r a n y o t h e r d e c is io n th a t f in d s i n d e
p e n d e n t c l a im s n o t p r e e m p t e d b y th e RLA r e q u i r e s a p p l i
c a t io n o f L in g le . T h e H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s d e c is io n
m a y b e s u s t a i n e d u n d e r C o n ra il, w h ic h r e q u i r e s th a t , for
th e RLA to p r e e m p t a c la im c la s s i f ia b le as a " m i n o r "
d i s p u te , the c la im m u s t be c a p a b le o f b e in g " c o n c lu s iv e ly
r e s o lv e d " b y in t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a C BA . A p p l i c a t io n o f th is
" c o n c lu s iv e ly r e s o lv e d " r e q u i r e m e n t to N o rr is , to th e
a u th o r i t i e s N o rr is re l ie s o n , a n d to P e t i t i o n e r s ' a u t h o r i t i e s
r e n d e r s a ll o f th o s e a u t h o r i t i e s r e c o n c i la b le . P e t i t io n e r s
a re s t r a in in g to m a n u f a c t u r e a co n f l ic t n o t m a te r ia l o r
n e c e s s a r y to th e H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s d e c is io n .
A c c o rd in g ly , th e C o u r t s h o u l d d e n y th e P e t i t io n fo r a
W rit o f C e r t io ra r i .
J u n e 8, 1993
R e s p e c t f u l ly s u b m i t t e d ,
Edward deLappe Boyle1*'
Susan O ki M ollway
C ades Schutte Fleming & W right
1000 B ish o p S tre e t , S u i te 1000
H o n o l u l u , H a w a i i 96813
(808) 521-9200
A tto rn ey s f o r R esp o n d en t
*C o u n se l o f R ecord
100
No. 92-2058
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1993
--------------- »---------------
HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC.,
Petitioner,
v.
GRANT T. NORRIS,
Respondent.
AND
PAUL J. FINAZZO, HOWARD E. OGDEN and
HATSUO HONMA,
Petitioners,
GRANT T. NORRIS,
Respondent.
--------------- ♦---------------
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The Supreme Court For The State Of Hawaii
--------------- ♦---------------
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
--------------- ♦---------------
G oodsill Anderson Q uinn & Stifel
Kenneth B. H ipp*
M argaret C. Jenkins
Jennifer C. Clark
1099 Alakea Street
1800 Alii Place
H onolulu, Haw aii 96813
(808) 547-5600
Counsel for Petitioner
^Counsel of Record
101
i
I. T H E F E D E R A L Q U E S T I O N P R E S E N T E D IN
T H E P E T IT IO N F O R C E R T IO R A R I IS F IN A L
A N D P R O P E R L Y S U B JE C T T O R E V I E W .......... 1
II. R E S P O N D E N T 'S R E L IA N C E O N C O N R A I L IS
M IS P L A C E D .......................................................................... 4
I I I . F E D E R A L A N D S T A T E C O U R T S H A V E
R E A C H E D I N C O N S I S T E N T D E C IS IO N S O N
R L A P R E E M P T I O N A N D W O U L D C L E A R L Y
B E N E F IT F R O M G U I D A N C E A N D C L A R I
F IC A T IO N BY T H IS C O U R T .................................... 8
IV. C O N C L U S I O N ..................................................................... 10
T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S
P a g e
102
C ases
B e lk n a p , In c . v. H a le , 463 U .S . 491 ( 1 9 8 3 ) ................... 3
C o h e n v. B e n e f ic ia l I n d u s t r i a l L o a n C o r p . , 337
U.S. 541 ( 1 9 4 9 ) ...................................................................................3
C o n s o l i d a t e d R a i l C o r p . v. R a i l w a y L a b o r E x e c u
t iv e s ' A s s o c i a t i o n , 491 U .S . 299 (1989).............. 4, 5, 6, 7
C o n s t r u c t i o n & G e n e r a l L a b o r e r s ' U n i o n , L o ca l
N o . 438 v. C u r r y , 371 U.S. 542 ( 1 9 6 3 ) .......................... 2, 3
C o x B r o a d c a s t i n g C o r p o r a t i o n v. C o h n , 420 U.S.
469 ( 1 9 7 5 ) . . ........................ ................................................... 1, 3, 4
D a v ie s v. A m e r i c a n A i r l in e s , Inc . , 971 F.2d 463
(1 0 th C ir. 1992), c e r t , d e n i e d , 113 S. C t. 2439
( 1 9 9 3 ) ........................................................... ............................................ 6
E lg in , J o l ie t & E r ie Ry. v. B u r ley , 325 U .S . 711
( 1 9 4 5 ) ............. ... .......................................................................................6
Fe lt v. A t c h i s o n T o p e k a & S a n ta Fe Ry., Civ. N o .
92 -4217 (D .C . C . C a l i f . A u g u s t 18, 1 9 9 3 ) .............................8
G i l m e r v. I n t e r s t a t e / J o h n s o n L a n e C o r p . , I l l S.
C t. 1647 ( 1 9 9 1 ) .............. 8
G r o te v. T ra n s W o r ld A i r l in e s , Inc . , 905 F.2d 1307
(9 th C ir.) , c e r t , d e n i e d , 498 U .S . 958 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . . . 8, 9, 10
J a m e s W. G lo v e r , L td . v. F o n g , 42 H a w . 560 (1958) . . . . . 1
J a p a n A i r l i n e s v. I A M , 538 F ,2d 46 (2d Cir. 1 9 7 6 ) ......... 7
L in g le v. N o r g e D i v i s i o n o f M a g ic C h e f , Inc . , 486
U .S 399 ( 1 9 8 8 ) ............................................... ................................ 4, 9
L o r e n z v. CSX T ra n s p . In c . , 980 F.2d 263 (4 th Cir.
1 9 9 2 ) ............................................... 7
i i
T A B L E O F A U T H O R I T I E S
P a g e
103
i i i
M a h e r v. N e w J e r se y R a i l T r a n s i t O p e r a t i o n s , Inc .,
593 A .2 d 750 (1991) ........................................................... 5, 6, 9
M e r c h a n t i l e N a t i o n a l B a n k v. L a n g d e a u , 371 U.S.
555 ( 1 9 6 3 ) ................................................................................................. 2
N e w t o w n v. S o u t h e r n P a c i f ic T r a n s p o r t a t i o n C o .,
141 L .R .R .M . (B N A ) 2477 (W .D. Tex. 1992) ................... 8
N L R B v. W o r s te r Div. o f B o r g - W a r n e r C o r p . , 356
U .S. 342 ( 1 9 5 8 ) ..................................................................................... 7
N o r t h D a k o ta P h a r m a c y B o a r d v. S n y d e r ' s D r u g
S to re s , In c . , 414 U.S. 156 ( 1 9 7 3 ) . ........................ 2
U n i t e d A i r l in e s , Inc. v. M a h i n , 410 U.S. 623 ( 1 9 7 3 ) ......... 5
T A B L E O F A U T H O R I T I E S - C o n t i n u e d
P a g e
O ther A uthorities
28 U .S .C . § 1 2 5 7 ...................................................................1, 2, 3, 4
H .R . R e p . N o . 1944, 7 3 rd C o n g . 2 d Sess . 2-3 ( 1 9 3 4 ) ......... 5
104
I. THE FEDERAL Q U ESTIO N PRESENTED IN THE
PE T IT IO N FO R C ERTIO RARI IS FIN A L A N D
PROPERLY SUBJECT TO REVIEW
R e s p o n d e n t c o n te n d s th a t th is C o u r t lacks ju r i s d ic
t io n to g r a n t th e P e t i t io n " b e c a u s e th e H a w a i i S u p re m e
C o u r t 's j u d g m e n t s a r e n o t f in a l j u d g m e n t s o r d e c re e s as
r e q u i r e d b y 28 U.S.C . § 1257(a)." B rief in O p p o s i t io n at 1.
In C ox B ro ad castin g C orp ora tion v. C ohn ("C ox"), 420 U.S.
469, 477 (1975), th is C o u r t d i c t a t e d a f lexible a n d p r a g
m a t ic a p p r o a c h to th e " f in a l i ty " r e q u i r e m e n t of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257. U n d e r th a t a p p r o a c h , a s ta te c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t
m a y b e " f in a l" e v e n if p ro c e e d in g s in th e s ta te c o u r t a re
a n t i c ip a te d f o l lo w in g d i s p o s i t i o n o f th e p e t i t io n . U n d e r
C ox, t h e c a se s d i s c u s s e d th e re in , a n d its p ro g e n y , the
H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t s a re " f in a l" w i th in th e
m e a n in g of 20 U.S.C . § 1257.
U n d e r C ox , th e f in a l i ty r e q u i r e m e n t is m e t " w h e re
th e fe d e ra l c la im h a s b e e n f in a l ly d e c id e d , w i th fu r th e r
p r o c e e d in g s o n th e m e r i t s in th e s ta te c o u r ts to c o m e , b u t
in w h ic h l a te r r e v ie w of th e f e d e ra l is su e c a n n o t b e h ad ,
w h a te v e r th e u l t im a t e o u tc o m e of th e case ." 420 U.S. a t
481. T h e H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s d e c is io n is " f in a l"
u n d e r th is h o ld in g , fo r if r e v ie w of the p r e e m p t io n q u e s
t io n is n o t p e r m i t t e d o n th e p r e s e n t reco rd , th e is su e
w o u ld e v a d e fe d e ra l rev iew .
T h e P e t i t i o n h e r e p r e s e n t s th e o n ly m e a n i n g f u l
o p p o r t u n i t y for r e v ie w of th e H a w a i i c o u r t ' s d e c is io n on
p r e e m p t io n . If P e t i t io n e r s lo s t a t tr ia l , u n d e r s ta te law
th e y w o u l d n o t b e p e r m i t t e d to r e o p e n the p re e m p t io n
is su e in th e i r a p p e a l f ro m p r o c e e d in g s on th e m er i ts . S ee
Jam es W. G lover, L td . v. F on g , 42 H aw . 560 (1958) ( law of
th e c a se p r e v e n t s r e e x a m in a t io n of q u e s t io n s of law in
s u b s e q u e n t a p p e a l s b e t w e e n th e s a m e p a r t i e s a b s e n t
c o m p e l l in g c i r c u m s ta n c e s ) . In a s u b s e q u e n t a p p e a l the
1
105
2
H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t w o u l d d i s m is s a n a p p e a l o f th e
p r e e m p t i o n r u l i n g o n t h e b a s i s o f l a w o f th e c a s e a n d th u s
p o t e n t i a l l y c r e a t e a n i n d e p e n d e n t s t a t e g r o u n d f o r d e c i
s i o n p r e c l u d i n g f e d e r a l r e v ie w . S ee N o rth D a k o ta P h a rm a c y
B o a rd v. S n y d er 's D ru g S to r e s , In c ., 414 U .S . 156, 163-64
(1 9 7 3 ) ( f i n a l i t y f o u n d b e c a u s e s t a t e p r o c e e d i n g s o n
r e m a n d c o u l d r e s u l t in a n i n d e p e n d e n t s t a t e l a w g r o u n d
f o r j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t p e t i t io n e r ) .
C o x a l s o r e c o g n i z e d th e f in a l i ty r e q u i r e m e n t w o u l d
b e d e e m e d m e t w h e r e d e l a y w o u l d r e s u l t in s e r i o u s e r o
s io n o f f e d e r a l p o l i c y o r n e e d le s s a n d w a s t e f u l l i t ig a t io n .
420 U .S a t 482-83 . T h u s , in M erc h a n t ile N a t io n a l B a n k v.
L a n g d e a u , 371 U .S . 555 (1963), th e C o u r t f o u n d t h a t a s t a t e
c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n c o n s t r u i n g a v e n u e s t a t u t e to a l l o w s u i t
in i ts f o r u m w a s " f in a l " u n d e r S e c t io n 1257 b e c a u s e :
W e b e l i e v e t h a t it s e r v e s th e p o l i c y u n d e r l y i n g
t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f f in a l i ty in 28 U S C § 1257 to
d e t e r m i n e n o w in w h i c h s t a t e c o u r t a p p e l l a n t s
m a y b e t r i e d r a t h e r t h a n s u b je c t in g t h e m , a n d
a p p e l l e e to l o n g c o m p l e x l i t i g a t io n w h i c h m a y
a l l b e f o r n a u g h t if c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e p r e l i m i
n a r y q u e s t i o n is p o s t p o n e d u n t i l t h e c o n c lu s io n
o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g s .
371 U .S . a t 558.
S im i la r ly , in C o n s tru c t io n & G en era l L a b o rers ' U n ion ,
L o c a l N o . 4 3 8 v. C u rry , 371 U.S. 542 (1963), th i s C o u r t
p e r m i t t e d r e v i e w o f a s t a t e c o u r t ' s i s s u a n c e o f a p r e l i m i
n a r y i n j u n c t i o n to c o n s i d e r t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r t h e
m a t t e r a t i s s u e w a s c o m m i t t e d to t h e e x c lu s iv e j u r i s d i c
t i o n o f t h e N a t i o n a l L a b o r R e la t io n s B o a rd . T h e s t a t e
c o u r t j u d g m e n t w a s h e l d to fa ll
" in t h a t s m a l l c la s s w h i c h f i n a l l y d e t e r m i n e
c l a im s o f r i g h t s e p a r a b l e f r o m , a n d c o l l a t e r a l to ,
r i g h t s a s s e r t e d in t h e a c t io n , to o i m p o r t a n t to b e
d e n i e d r e v i e w a n d to o i n d e p e n d e n t o f th e c a u s e
i t s e l f to r e q u i r e t h a t a p p e l l a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n b e
d e f e r r e d u n t i l t h e w h o l e c a s e is a d j u d i c a t e d . "
106
3
371 U.S. a t 519 ( q u o t in g f ro m C ohen v. B en e fic ia l In d u str ia l
Loan C o rp ., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)). A p p ly in g C u rry , th is
C o u r t l a t e r h e ld th a t a s ta te d e c is io n o n th e i s s u e of
f e d e ra l p r e e m p t io n w a s f ina l a n d su b jec t to r e v ie w u n d e r
S ec tion 1257. B elkn ap , Inc. v. H a le , 463 U.S. 491, 497 n. 5
(1983).
R e s p o n d e n t c la im s B elkn ap d o e s n o t a p p ly b e c a u s e
re v e rsa l o f th e in s t a n t d e c is io n w o u ld n o t b r in g a n e n d to
all c la im s p e n d i n g in s ta te c o u r t . B rief in O p p o s i t i o n a t 3
n . l . H o w e v e r , it is c le a r th a t , fo r th is c a te g o ry of “ f in a l
i ty " to a p p ly , it is n o t n e c e s s a ry th a t th e e n t i r e s ta te
p ro c e e d in g b e b r o u g h t to a n e n d . C ox m a k e s c le a r th a t , in
o rd e r to f in d a d e c is io n f ina l u n d e r th is a p p r o a c h , it n e e d
o n ly b e d i s p o s i t i v e o f th e c la im s u n d e r rev iew , n o t the
en t i re su i t . S ee C ox , 420 U.S. a t 482-83 ( f ina li ty fo u n d in
th o se c a se s " w h e r e re v e rs a l o f th e s ta te c o u r t o n the
fe d e ra l i s s u e w o u l d b e p r e c lu s iv e of a n y f u r th e r l i t ig a t io n
on the re lev an t ca u se o f a c tion r a th e r th a n m e re ly c o n t ro l
l in g th e n a t u r e a n d c h a r a c te r of, o r d e t e r m i n i n g th e
a d m is s ib i l i ty o f e v id e n c e in, th e s ta te p r o c e e d in g s still to
c o m e " ) ( e m p h a s is s u p p l i e d ) .
U n d e r th i s C o u r t ' s ca se law , a n d in l ig h t o f th e p r a g
m a t ic c o n c e r n s a r t i c u la te d in C ox a n d its r e la t e d cases ,
th e d e c is io n o f th e H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t f in d in g no
p r e e m p t io n m e e t s th e r e q u i r e m e n t s for f in a l i ty u n d e r 28
U.S.C. § 1257. T h e P e t i t io n h e re p r o v id e s th e o n ly m e a n
in g fu l o p p o r t u n i t y fo r r e v ie w o f th e p r e e m p t io n f in d in g ,
s ince it w i l l n o t b e su b jec t to r e l i t ig a t io n in a n y s u b s e
q u e n t s t a t e p r o c e e d in g a n d fe d e ra l r e v ie w c o u ld th e r e
fore b e p r e c lu d e d . M o re o v e r , e v e n if p o s t - t r ia l r e v ie w
c o u ld b e a s s u r e d , it w o u ld b e e x t re m e ly w a s te fu l o f the
v e ry r e s o u rc e s th e R LA d i s p u t e r e s o lu t io n p r o c e d u r e s
a n d th e a c c o m p a n y in g RLA p re e m p t io n d o c t r in e w e re
d e s ig n e d to c o n s e rv e . R ev e rsa l o f th e H a w a i i d e c is io n by
107
4
t h i s C o u r t w o u l d p r e c l u d e f u r t h e r s t a t e l i t i g a t io n o n th e
r e l e v a n t c a u s e s o f a c t i o n a n d w o u l d p la c e th o s e c la im s
s q u a r e l y w i t h i n t h e a r b i t r a l f o r u m m a n d a t e d b y f e d e r a l
p r e e m p t i o n law . P e t i t i o n e r s , th e r e f o r e , r e s p e c t f u l l y s u b
m i t t h a t t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e f in a l i ty r e q u i r e m e n t o f
28 U .S .C . § 1257 in C o x a n d r e l a t e d c a s e s r e q u i r e s t h e
re je c t io n o f R e s p o n d e n t ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n a l a r g u m e n t a n d a
f i n d i n g t h a t th i s C o u r t d o e s h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n u n d e r 28
U .S .C . § 1257.
I I . R E S P O N D E N T ' S R E L I A N C E O N C O N R A I L IS
M I S P L A C E D .
R e s p o n d e n t u r g e s t h i s C o u r t to i g n o r e th e H a w a i i
C o u r t ' s a d o p t i o n a n d a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e p r e e m p t i o n te s t
f r o m t i n g l e v. N o rg e D iv is io n o f M a g ic C h e f, In c. (" L in g le'') ,
486 U .S . 399 (1988), to R L A p r e e m p t i o n a n d i n s t e a d to
r e w r i t e t h e H a w a i i c o u r t ' s d e c i s io n a p p l y i n g t h e " m a jo r
d i s p u t e / m i n o r d i s p u t e " t e s t s e t f o r th in C o n s o lid a te d R a il
C orp . v. R a ilw a y L a b o r E x ec u t iv e s ' A s s o c ia t io n (" C o n ra il") ,
491 U .S . 299 (1989). B r ie f i n O p p o s i t i o n a t 12-18 .1
T h e f i r s t p r o b l e m w i t h R e s p o n d e n t ' s C o n ra il a r g u
m e n t is t h a t th e C o n r a il t e s t w a s n o t th e t e s t t h e H a w a i i
S u p r e m e C o u r t a p p l i e d . T h o s e l o o k i n g to t h e H a w a i i
c o u r t f o r g u i d a n c e a n d a u t h o r i t y w i l l f in d Lingle'S p r e
e m p t i o n te s t , w h i c h f o c u s e s s o le ly o n th e n e e d fo r i n t e r
p r e t i n g a c o l l e c t iv e b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t in a s t a t e c o u r t
a c t i o n , w h e n C o n g r e s s c l e a r ly i n t e n d e d fo r d i s p u t e s a r i s
i n g o u t o f t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f s u c h a g r e e m e n t s in t h e
r a i l r o a d a n d a i r l i n e i n d u s t r i e s to b e c o n c lu s i v e ly s e t t l e d
1 In briefing before the Hawaii Supreme Court, Respondent
him self did not focus on C onrail and instead urged most strenu
ously that L ingle was the appropriate test.
108
5
b y a r b i t r a t i o n . 2 To a r g u e a g a i n s t c e r t i o r a r i r e v i e w o f a n
in c o r r e c t d e c i s i o n b e c a u s e it c o u ld h a v e b e e n d e c i d e d
c o r r e c t ly o n s o m e u n a r t i c u l a t e d g r o u n d s is to m i s s th e
i m p o r t a n c e o f t h i s C o u r t ' s g u i d a n c e o n m a t t e r s d e m a n d
in g c e r t i o r a r i r e v ie w . C f. U n ited A ir l in e s , In c. v. M a h in , 410
U.S. 623, 630-31 (1973) (p o s s ib i l i t y t h a t s t a t e c o u r t m i g h t
h a v e r e a c h e d t h e s a m e c o n c lu s i o n if it h a d d e c i d e d q u e s
t io n of s t a t e l a w d o e s n o t c r e a t e a n a d e q u a t e a n d i n d e
p e n d e n t s t a t e l a w g r o u n d r e l i e v i n g t h e C o u r t o f t h e
n e c e s s i ty o f r e v i e w w h e r e th e s t a t e c o u r t o p i n i o n d o e s in
fac t a d d r e s s a n d r e s o lv e a q u e s t i o n o f f e d e r a l law ) .
T h e s e c o n d p r o b l e m w i t h R e s p o n d e n t ' s r e l i a n c e o n
C o n ra il i s t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n d i d n o t a d d r e s s t h e s c o p e o f
R L A p r e e m p t i o n a n d is t h e r e f o r e i n a p p o s i t e to t h e i s s u e
p r e s e n t e d f o r r e v ie w . T h e i s s u e in C o n ra il w a s w h e t h e r a
p a r t i c u l a r d i s p u t e - i n d i s p u t a b l y w i t h i n R L A ju r i s d i c t i o n
- w a s " m a jo r " a n d t h u s r e q u i r e d th e m a i n t e n a n c e o f th e
s t a t u s q u o p e n d i n g b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e d u r e s , o r " m i n o r "
a n d h e n c e r e f e r a b l e to a r b i t r a t i o n . 491 U.S. a t 307. T h e r e
w a s n o i s s u e o f R L A p r e e m p t i o n b e c a u s e th e r e w a s n o
q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r t h e d i s p u t e w o u l d b e r e s o lv e d t h r o u g h
R L A p r o c e d u r e s . T h e l a n g u a g e a n d lo g ic o f C o n ra il w e r e
n o t i n t e n d e d b y t h i s c o u r t to a d d r e s s t h e q u e s t i o n of
w h e t h e r c o n g r e s s i o n a l i n t e n t r e q u i r e s p r e e m p t i o n o f s t a t e
l a w s a t t e m p t i n g to r e g u l a t e a i r l i n e o r r a i l r o a d e m p l o y
m e n t d i s p u t e s . I n d e e d , t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e N e w J e r s e y
S u p r e m e C o u r t in M a h e r v. N ew Je r s e y R a il T ran sit O p era
t io n s , In c . (" M a h e r " ) , 53 A .2 d 750 (N.J. 1991), u p o n w h i c h
2 S e e H.R. Rep. No. 1944, 73rd Cong. 2d Sess. 2-3 (1934)
(RLA intended to provide sufficient and effective means for the
settlement of minor disputes known as "grievances, which
develop from the interpretation an d /or application of the con
tracts between the labor unions and the carriers fixing wages
and working conditions").
109
6
t h e H a w a i i c o u r t so s t r o n g l y r e l i e d ( P e t i t i o n e r s ' A p p e n
d i x a t 2 3 a -2 6 a ) , e x p r e s s l y h e l d t h a t , s in c e C o n ra il's d i s c u s
s io n o f m i n o r d i s p u t e s w a s d e v e l o p e d in a n o t h e r c o n te x t ,
i t is n o t a p p r o p r i a t e to a p p l y t h e C o n ra il t e s t to r e s o lv e
R L A p r e e m p t i o n i s s u e s . 593 A .2 d a t 758.
R e s p o n d e n t ' s r e l i a n c e o n C o n ra il d o e s s e r v e to p o i n t
to a n o t h e r s p l i t in d e c i s io n s o f a s t a t e s u p r e m e c o u r t a n d
a f e d e r a l c i r c u i t c o u r t c o n c e r n i n g th e s c o p e o f R L A p r e
e m p t i o n . M a h e r e x p r e s s l y re je c ts C o n ra il a s t h e a p p r o p r i
a t e s t a n d a r d fo r R L A p r e e m p t i o n . Id . a t 758. O n t h e o t h e r
h a n d , D a v ie s v. A m er ica n A ir l in e s , In c ., 971 F.2d 463, 465-68
(1 0 th C ir . 1992), ce r t , d e n ied , 113 S. C t. 2439 (1993), a p p l i e s
t h e C o n r a il t e s t a n d a p p a r e n t l y h o l d s th a t o n ly t h o s e s t a t e
c l a im s f a l l i n g w i t h i n t h e " m i n o r d i s p u t e " t e s t o f C o n ra il
a r e p r e e m p t e d . A g r a n t o f th i s P e t i t i o n w o u l d p r o v i d e a n
a p p r o p r i a t e o p p o r t u n i t y fo r r e s o lv i n g th e d i s a g r e e m e n t
o v e r p r o p e r a p p l i c a t i o n o f th i s C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n in C o n
ra il.
T h e H a w a i i c o u r t p r i m a r i l y r e l i e d o n C o n r a il fo r th e
p u r p o s e o f i m p l i c i t l y r e j e c t i n g th e s o - c a l l e d " o m i t t e d
c a s e " d o c t r i n e a s a b a s i s fo r f i n d i n g p r e e m p t i o n . S ee
P e t i t i o n e r s ' A p p e n d i x a t 20 a ( c o u r t n o t e s t h a t R L A
" m i n o r d i s p u t e " r e s o lu t i o n p r o c e d u r e c o u ld b e r e a d to
i n c l u d e d i s p u t e s " a r i s i n g o u t s i d e a C B A " b u t h o l d s t h a t
C o n ra il r e je c t e d a n y s u c h r e a d i n g ) . T h e o m i t t e d c a s e d o c
t r i n e , f i r s t a r t i c u l a t e d in E lg in , Jo l ie t & E rie Ry. v. B u r ley
(" B u r le y " ) , 325 U .S . 711 (1945), h e ld th a t c e r t a i n m a t t e r s
n o t e x p r e s s l y s e t f o r th in a c o l le c t iv e b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e
m e n t m a y n o n e t h e l e s s b e h e l d c o m m i t t e d to a r b i t r a t i o n
a s " m i n o r d i s p u t e s " u n d e r t h e R L A . S in c e th e C o u r t in
B u r ley d i d n o t h o l d t h a t t h e o m i t t e d c a s e d o c t r i n e s e r v e d
to d e f i n e t h e s c o p e o f R L A p r e e m p t i o n th e H a w a i i c o u r t ' s
i m p l i c i t r e je c t io n o f th e d o c t r i n e in t h e c o n te x t o f R L A
p r e e m p t i o n is e r r o n e o u s . M o r e o v e r , a s t h e A i r T r a n s p o r t
110
7
A s s o c ia t io n a r g u e s , A m i c u s B r ie f a t 12-13, t h e H a w a i i
c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e o m i t t e d c a s e d o c t r i n e w a s
e l i m in a t e d b y C o tira il is c e r t a i n l y q u e s t i o n a b l e . M o r e o v e r ,
th i s a s p e c t o f t h e H a w a i i C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n is in s q u a r e
c o n f l ic t w i t h t h e U n i t e d S ta te s C o u r t o f A p p e a l s fo r th e
F o u r t h C i r c u i t ' s d e c i s i o n in L o ren z v. C S X T ran sp ., In c .,
980 F .2d 263 , 268 (4 th Cir. 1992), w h ic h re l ie s o n th e
o m i t t e d c a s e d o c t r i n e to f in d R L A p r e e m p t i o n .
A t i ts f o u n d a t i o n , N o r r i s ' a r g u m e n t th a t t h e w r o n g
fu l d i s c h a r g e c l a im s h e r e a r e n o t p r e e m p t e d b e c a u s e th e y
a r e n o t " m i n o r d i s p u t e s " u n d e r t h e C o n ra il t e s t is b a s e d
u p o n t h e f a u l t y p r e m i s e t h a t R L A p r e e m p t i o n a p p l i e s
o n l y to " m i n o r d i s p u t e s . " A s s u m i n g a r g u e n d o t h a t
N o r r i s ' w r o n g f u l d i s c h a r g e c l a im s a r e n o t g o v e r n e d b y
th e C B A , i t c a n h a r d l y b e g a i n s a i d t h a t t h e g r o u n d s fo r
t e r m i n a t i n g a n e m p l o y e e a r e " m a n d a t o r y " s u b je c t s o f
b a r g a i n i n g . S ee Ja p a n A ir lin e s v. I A M , 538 F.2d 46, 51-52
(2d Cir. 1976); N L R B v. W orster D iv . o f B o rg -W a rn er C o rp .,
356 U .S . 342 (1958). A c c o rd in g ly , if N o r r i s ' d i s c i p l in e w a s
n o t c o v e r e d b y t h e " m i n o r d i s p u t e " p r o c e d u r e s o f t h e
R L A , i t w o u l d c e r t a i n l y b e c o v e r e d b y t h e " m a jo r d i s
p u t e " p r o v i s i o n s , i n c l u d i n g th e r e s to r a t i o n o f t h e s t a tu s
q u o p e n d i n g b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e d u r e s . T h e r e f o r e , r e g a r d
le ss o f w h e t h e r N o r r i s ' t e r m i n a t i o n p r e s e n t e d a " m a jo r "
o r " m i n o r " d i s p u t e , t h e p r o c e d u r e s fo r r e s o lv i n g t h e d i s
p u t e a r e d i c t a t e d b y th e R L A , a n d s t a t e c l a im s a n d fo ra
c a n n o t s u p p l a n t t h o s e p r o c e d u r e s .
O f c o u r s e , t h e fa c ts o f t h e i n s t a n t c a s e s h o w c o n
c lu s iv e ly t h a t t h e C B A d o e s c o v e r t h e s u b je c t m a t t e r o f
N o r r i s ' c la im . A c c o rd in g ly , a l t h o u g h th i s P e t i t i o n c o u ld
p r o v i d e a n a p p r o p r i a t e o p p o r t u n i t y fo r th e C o u r t to c o n
s i d e r w h e t h e r t h e C o n ra il t e s t a n d th e o m i t t e d c a s e d o c
t r in e i m p a c t u p o n R L A p r e e m p t i o n , t h o s e q u e s t i o n s a re
n o t e s s e n t i a l to r e s o lu t i o n o f th i s c l a im , fo r t h e y n e v e r
111
8
w o u l d h a v e b e e n r e a c h e d i f R L A p r e e m p t i o n l a w h a d
b e e n p r o p e r l y a p p l i e d b y t h e H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t . T h e
c l a im s a t i s s u e h e r e c l e a r ly t u r n o n a n a p p l i c a t i o n o f th e
C B A , s in c e t h e a g r e e m e n t b y i ts e x p r e s s t e r m s p r o v i d e s
fo r s i g n i n g o ff o n w o r k r e c o r d s , a n d c o n v e r s e l y p r o v i d e s
t h a t a n e m p l o y e e m a y n o t b e d i s c i p l in e d fo r r e f u s i n g to
p e r f o r m w o r k in v i o l a t i o n o f h e a l t h a n d sa fe ty , C B A , A rt .
IV & A rt . XVII ( P e t i t i o n e r s ' A p p e n d i x a t 49a , 60a-61a).
T h e d i s p u t e a t h a n d w a s t h e r e f o r e e x p r e s s ly c o m m i t t e d
to t h e a r b i t r a l p r o c e s s u n d e r t h e R L A .3 * * &
III . F E D E R A L A N D STATE C O U R T S HAVE
REACHED INCONSISTENT DECISIONS ON
RLA PREEMPTION A ND WOULD CLEARLY
BENEFIT FROM GUIDANCE A N D CLARIFICA
TION BY THIS COURT.
R e s p o n d e n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e r e s u l t in t h e i n s t a n t c a s e s
c a n b e s q u a r e d w i t h th e d e c i s io n s in G ro te v. T rans W orld
A ir lin e s , In c ., 905 F .2d 1307 (9 th C ir .) , cer t , d en ied , 498 U.S.
958 (1990), a n d th e o t h e r c a s e s d i s c u s s e d in t h e P e t i t io n .
(B rie f in O p p o s i t i o n a t 19-23). In fac t, t h e d e c i s i o n s c i t e d
w i t h a p p r o v a l in t h e P e t i t i o n d e p a r t f r o m th e H a w a i i
3 Respondent claims it would be inappropriate to resolve
matters relating to public safety through arbitration. Brief in
Opposition at 16-17. However, Congress and the federal courts
have repeatedly signaled their approval of arbitral resolution of
important policy matters; for example, claims involving safety
issues or age, race or religious discrimination are subject to
mandatory arbitration where the parties have expressly com
mitted such matters to arbitration through collective bargaining
or contracts governed by federal law. See G ilm er v. In terstate/
Johnson Lane C orp., I l l S. Ct. 1647 (1991); Felt v. Atchison Topeka
& Santa Fe Ry„ Civ. No. 92-4217 (D.C. C. Calif. August 18,1993);
N ew tow n v. Southern P acific T ransportation C o., 141 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2477 (W.D. Tex. 1992).
112
9
c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n in N o rr is i n b o t h r e a s o n i n g a n d re s u l t .
T h e H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t h e l d t h a t L in g le w a s th e
p r o p e r t e s t f o r d e t e r m i n i n g th e s c o p e o f R L A p r e e m p t i o n ,
f o l lo w in g t h e N e w J e r s e y S u p r e m e C o u r t in M a h er v. N ew
J e r s e y R a il T ra n s it O p e r a t io n s , In c ., 593 A .2 d 750 ( N J .
1991), a n d n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g th e N i n t h C i r c u i t C o u r t of
A p p e a l ' s d e c i s i o n in G ro te v. T ran s W orld A ir lin e s , In c ., 905
F.2d 1307 (9 th C ir .) , c e r t , d en ie d , 498 U.S. 958 (1990), a n d
o t h e r c a s e s e x p r e s s l y h o l d i n g t h a t L in g le d o e s n o t a p p l y
to R L A p r e e m p t i o n .
R e s p o n d e n t d o e s n o t a t t e m p t to s q u a r e t h e r e a s o n i n g
a n d a n a ly s i s o f t h e H a w a i i d e c i s i o n w i t h G ro te ; in fac t, h e
c a n n o t d o so . H e i n s t e a d a t t e m p t s to d i s t i n g u i s h th e
H a w a i i d e c i s i o n f r o m G ro te o n i ts fac ts a lo n e . B r ie f in
O p p o s i t i o n a t 22-23. A r e v ie w o f th e c o m p l a i n t s f i led b y
N o r r i s in e a c h o f t h e U n d e r l y i n g s u i t s d e m o n s t r a t e s th a t
h e h a s f a i l e d a t e v e n th i s m o r e m o d e s t ta sk .
C o u n t I o f N o r r i s ' c o m p l a i n t s a g a in s t H a w a i i a n A i r
l in e s a n d th e I n d i v i d u a l D e f e n d a n t s w a s p r e m i s e d o n th e
d i s c i p l in e h e w a s s u b je c t to f o r f a i lu r e to s ig n a w o r k
r e c o r d a s r e q u i r e d b y A r t i c l e IV, f D .4 (a ) o f th e C B A . N o
m e n t i o n is m a d e in C o u n t I o f th e C o m p la in t s o f a n y
i n v o l v e m e n t b y N o r r i s w i t h t h e F A A o r a n y c la im b y
N o r r i s to h i s s u p e r v i s o r s t h a t t h e w o r k in v o lv e d v io l a t e d
f e d e r a l a v i a t i o n r e g u la t io n s . I n s t e a d th e c o m p l a i n t s t a t e d
a c o m m o n p l a c e w o r k d i s p u t e w i t h i n th e c le a r t e r m s of
t h e C B A : N o r r i s ' s u p e r v i s o r s d i r e c t e d N o r r i s to s ig n th e
w o r k r e c o r d f o r a t i r e r e p l a c e m e n t , b u t N o r r i s r e f u s e d
c l a im in g t h a t t h e a x le s l e e v e w a s u n s a f e a n d h e h a d n o t
p e r f o r m e d t h e w o r k c o v e r e d b y th e re c o rd .
I n G r o te t h e e m p l o y e e ' s c l a im a r o s e f ro m d i s c ip l in e
t h e e m p l o y e e r e c e i v e d fo r f a i l in g to c o m p l y w i t h a c o l le c
t i v e b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t s r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t h e
e m p l o y e e m a i n t a i n a m e d i c a l c e r t i f i c a t i o n , a n d t h e
113
10
e m p l o y e e c l a i m e d h e w a s t e r m i n a t e d fo r r e f u s i n g to g iv e
f a ls e m e d i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n to t h e FA A . G ro te is e n t i r e ly
a n a l o g o u s to N o r r i s ' c l a im s in C o u n t I o f t h e c o m p la in t s :
i n b o t h c a s e s t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t s
r e q u i r e d s p e c i f i c a c t i o n s b y th e e m p l o y e e w h i c h t h e
e m p l o y e e r e f u s e d o r f a i l e d to p e r f o r m b a s e d u p o n
a l l e g e d s a f e t y c o n c e r n s . T h e s p l i t b e t w e e n t h e N i n t h C i r
c u i t a n d t h e H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t is m a n i f e s t , a n d
N o r r i s ' a t t e m p t e d d i s t i n c t i o n o f G ro te o n l y s e r v e s to
h e i g h t e n t h e c o n f u s i o n w h i c h w i l l i n e v i t a b l y e x is t i f th e
H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n is a l l o w e d to s t a n d .
IV. CONCLUSION
F o r t h e r e a s o n s s e t f o r th h e r e in a n d in th e P e t i t i o n fo r
C e r t i o r a r i , th i s C o u r t s h o u l d g r a n t th e P e t i t i o n , s e t a s id e
t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e H a w a i i S u p r e m e C o u r t , a n d u p h o l d
th e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g d i s m i s s i n g C o u n t I o f t h e c o m
p l a i n t a g a i n s t H a w a i i a n A i r l i n e s a n d C o u n t s I a n d II o f
t h e c o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t P a u l F in a z z o , H o w a r d O g d e n a n d
H a t s u o H o n m a .
R e s p e c t f u l ly s u b m i t t e d ,
K enneth B. H ipp
M argaret C . Jenkins
J ennifer C . C lark
G oodsill A nderson Q uinn & S tifel
1099 A la k e a S t r e e t , 1800 A li i P la c e
H o n o l u l u , H a w a i i 96813
(808) 547-5600
C o u n s e l f o r P e t it io n e r
114
No. 92-2058
3n tlj? (Exmrt nf tljr latted States
O c t o b e r T e r m , 1993
H a w a iia n A i r l i n e s , I n c ., e t a l ., p e t i t i o n e r s
v.
G r a n t T . N o r r is
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF HAWAII
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE
D r e w S. D a y s , III
Solicitor General
F r a n k W . H u n g e r
A ssistant A ttorney General
E d w in S . K n e e d l e r
Deputy Solicitor General
J o h n F . M a n n in g
Assistant to the Solicitor General
W il l ia m K a n t e r
M arc R ic h m a n
Attorneys
Department of JvMice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 5lb-2217
115
QUESTION PRESENTED
W h e th e r r e s p o n d e n t ’s s ta te t o r t a c t io n a l leg in g t h a t h e
w as d ism issed f r o m e m p lo y m e n t as a n a i r l in e m e c h a n ic
b e c a u s e he r e p o r te d sa fe ty v io la t io n s is b a r r e d by 4 5
U .S .C . 153 F i r s t ( i ) a n d 1 8 4 , w h ich m a k e th e R a i lw a y
L a b o r A c t a r b i t r a t io n p r o c e d u r e s th e exc lus ive re m e d y
fo r c e r t a in e m p lo y m e n t d isp u te s .
115
( l )
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Statem ent............................................................................... 1
Discussion........ .................... 6
Conclusion............................................................................... 20
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Alexander V. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1974)......................................................................... 13
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202
(1985)...........................................................10,13,15
American Airlines, Inc. v. Davies, cert, denied, 113
S. Ct. 2439 (1993) ................................................. 18,19
Anderson V. American Airlines, Inc., 2 F.3d 590
(5th Cir. 1993) ................. 17
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557
(1987) 7,10,12
Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983)............ 6,7
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen V. Chicago R. & I.
R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957) ...................................... 7
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen V. Jacksonville
Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969)............ 7
Calvert V. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 959 F.2d 698
(8th Cir. 1992) ......................... 19
Capraro V. United Parcel Service Co., 993 F.2d 328
(3d Cir. 1993) ...... 19
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm’n v. Conti
nental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714 (1963) ....10,12,16
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Execu
tives’ Ass’n, 491 U.S. 299 (1989) ......... 5, 7, 8, 9,10,11,
12,16,18
Davies V. American Air Lines, Inc., 971 F.2d 463
(10th Cir. 1992), cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 2439
(1993)......................................... .....................16,17,18,19
Edelman V. Western Airlines, Inc., 892 F.2d 839
(9th Cir. 1989) 19
IV
Cases—Continued: Page
Elgin, J. & E. Ry. V. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945),
aff’d on rehearing, 327 U.S. 661 (1946).............. 7
Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1
(1987) ............................... -........................................ 13
Gilmer V. Interstate/Johnson Lane Cory., I l l
S. Ct. 1647 (1991) ................................................... 13
Grote V. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 905 F.2d 1307
(9th Cir.), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 958 (1990).... 17
Hubbard v. United Airlines, Inc., 927 F.2d 1094
(9th Cir. 1991)..................................... 16
International Ass’n of Machinists V. Central Air
lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682 (1963) ............................ 8
Lingle V. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486
U.S. 399 (1988)............. .....................................5, 6,14,15
Local 174, Teamsters V. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S.
95 (1962) .................................................................. 14
Lorenz V. CSX Transportation, Inc., 980 F.2d 263
(4th Cir. 1992) ........................................................ 16
Maher V. New Jersey Transit Rail 'Operations,
Inc., 593 A.2d 750 (N.J. 1991) ............................. 16,17
O’Brien V. Consolidated Rail Corp., 972 F.2d 1
(1st Cir. 1992), cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 980
(1993)......................................................................... 16
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)....... 7
Textile Workers Union V. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448 (1957) ................................................................ 14
United Steelworkers V. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ....................................... 12
Virginian Ry. V. System Federation No. 40, Rail
way Employees, 300 U.S. 515 (1937) .................. 18
Walker V. Southern Ry., 385 U.S. 196 (1966)....... 8
Statutes, regulation and rule:
Act of Apr. 10,1936, ch. 166, 49 Stat. 1189................ 8
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29
U.S.C. 141 et seq.:
§ 301,29 U.S.C. 185............................................ 5,14,19
§301 (a), 29 U.S.C. 1 8 5 (a ) .................................. 14
118
Statutes, regulation and rule—Continued: Page
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151 et seq. ........... ....... 3, 7
45U.S.C. 151a(5)................................................. 7
45 U.S.C. 152 T h ird ............................................... 18
45 U.S.C. 152 Fourth ..................... 18
45 U.S.C. 153 F irst ( i) ....... .... ................... 5, 7, 8,11, 19
45 U.S.C. 153 F irst (m ) ............... 8
45 U.S.C. 153 Second............................................. 8
45 U.S.C. 155.......................................................... 7
45 U.S.C. 156.......................................................... 7
45 U.S.C. 181-188.......... 8
45 U.S.C. 184..........................................................7, 8,19
28 U.S.C. 1257 (a) ......................................................... 6
Hawaii Whistleblower’s Protection Act, Haw. Rev.
Stat. §§378-61 to 378-69 (1988) ........................ 3
§ 378-62(1)......... 3
§378-63 ( a ) ............................ 3
14 C.F.R. 43.9(a) ................................... 2
Haw. R. Civ. P. 54 (b) ........... ....................................... 4
Miscellaneous:
H.R. Rep. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).... 7
V
119
3tt tljp (Emtrt rrf tljp Itttfeb §tatpa
O c t o b e r T e r m , 1 9 9 3
N o . 9 2 -2 0 5 8
H a w a i i a n A i r l i n e s , I n c ., e t a l ., p e t i t i o n e r s
v.
G r a n t T . N o r r i s
ON PETITION FOR A W RIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF H AW AII
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE
T h is b r ie f is su b m i t te d in r e s p o n s e to th e C o u r t ’s o rd e r
in v i t in g th e S o lic ito r G e n e r a l to e x p re ss t h e v iew s o f the
U n i te d S ta tes .
STATEMENT
1. P e t i t io n e r H a w a i i a n A ir l in e s , In c . ( H A L ) , e m
p lo y ed r e s p o n d e n t as a n a i r c r a f t m e c h a n ic . R e s p o n d e n t ’s
license , is su ed b y th e F e d e r a l A v ia t io n A d m in i s t r a t io n
( F A A ) , a u th o r iz e d h im to a p p r o v e a n a i r c r a f t f o r serv ice
a f te r m a k in g , sup erv is in g , o r in s p e c t in g r e p a i r s . H e w as
n o t a u th o r iz e d to a p p ro v e fo r se rv ice a n y a i r c r a f t w h o se
re p a i r s d id n o t c o n f o rm to a p p l ic a b le f e d e ra l re g u la t io n s .
A m e c h a n ic w h o m a k e s a f r a u d u le n t e n t ry in a n y re c o rd
o r r e p o r t r e q u i r e d by th o se r e g u la t io n s m a y h a v e h is
l icense su s p e n d e d o r re v o k e d b y th e F A A . P e t . A p p . 7a .
D u r in g a ro u t in e in s p e c t io n o n J u ly 15, 1 9 8 7 , r e s p o n d
e n t n o t ic e d th a t o n e o f th e t i res o n a n H A L D C -9 w as
w o rn . A f t e r re m o v in g th e t i re a n d b e a r in g , h e a n d th e
o th e r m e c h a n ic s n o t ic e d t h a t th e ax le sleeve , w h ic h is
120
(1 )
2
n o rm a l ly m ir ro r - s m o o th , w as s c a r re d a n d g ro o v e d . A l
th o u g h r e s p o n d e n t a n d th e o th e r m e c h a n ic s b e l iev e d th a t
th e ax le sleeve w a s th e re fo re u n s a fe a n d in n e e d o f r e
p la c e m e n t , r e s p o n d e n t 's su p e rv iso r , J u s t in C u la h a r a , o r
d e re d th e m e c h a n ic s to s a n d th e s leeve b y h a n d a n d p u t
a n ew b e a r in g a n d t i re ov e r it. A f te r th e spec if ied re p a i r s
w ere p e r fo rm e d , th e p la n e m a d e its s c h e d u le d flight. P et .
A p p . 7a .
A t th e e n d o f r e s p o n d e n t ’s sh ift , C u l a h a r a d i r e c te d h im
to sign th e m a in t e n a n c e re c o rd fo r th e in s ta l la t io n o f th e
tire. U n d e r a p p l ic a b le fe d e ra l re g u la t io n s ( 1 4 C .F .R .
4 3 . 9 ( a ) ) , t h a t r e c o rd se rved to c e r t i fy w h e th e r th e r e p a i r
w o rk h a d b e e n sa t is fa c to r i ly p e r fo rm e d . R e s p o n d e n t r e
fused to s ign th e fo rm on th e g r o u n d th a t th e s leeve r e
m a in e d u n sa fe . H e in d ic a te d t h a t h e w o u ld s ign th e fo rm
on ly if th e D C -9 m a n u a l in d ic a te d th a t th e ax le sleeve
w as in s a t i s fa c to ry c o n d i t io n . C u l a h a r a to ld r e s p o n d e n t
he w o u ld b e d is c h a rg e d if h e d id n o t s ign . W h e n re s p o n d
e n t p e r s is te d in his re fusa l , h e w a s im m e d ia te ly s u s p e n d e d
p en d in g a te rm in a t io n h e a r in g . R e s p o n d e n t r e tu r n e d h o m e
a n d r e p o r te d to th e F A A th a t th e re w a s a p r o b le m w i th
a n H A L a i r c r a f t t h a t h e h a d se rv iced . P e t . A p p . 7 a -8 a .
O n A u g u s t 3, 1 9 8 7 , r e s p o n d e n t w as t e r m in a te d fo r
i n s u b o rd in a t io n .1 R e s p o n d e n t in v o k e d th e g r ie v a n c e p r o
ce d u re s a v a i la b le u n d e r th e a p p l ic a b le co llec tiv e b a r g a in
ing a g re e m e n t . T h e a g re e m e n t p ro v id e s th a t a n e m p lo y e e
m ay b e d i s c h a r g e d o n ly fo r “ ju s t c a u s e ” a n d m a y n o t b e
d isc ip l in ed f o r re fu s in g to p e r fo rm w o rk in v io la t io n o f a
h e a l th o r sa fe ty law . P e t . A p p . 8a. T h e g r ie v a n c e p ro c ess
p ro c e e d e d to “S te p 3 ,” w h ic h e n ta i ls a h e a r in g b e fo re
th e h e a d o f th e d e p a r tm e n t in w h ich th e e m p lo y e e w o rk s .
1 After respondent was terminated, he gave the FAA details of
what had occurred on July 15, 1987. The FAA seized the axle
sleeve on August 4, 1987, and initiated an investigation to deter
mine how long the damaged sleeve had been on the plane. The
FAA later broadened its investigation to other planes in the HAL
fleet. Pet. App. 8a. On March 2, 1988, the FAA proposed a civil
penalty regarding the damaged sleeve. The FAA and HAL subse
quently settled the case. Pet. 4.
121
3
I d . a t 9 a & n .6 , 5 1 a . P r io r to th e h e a r in g , h o w e v e r ,
H A L o ffe red to r e d u c e the p u n i s h m e n t to su s p e n s io n w i th
o u t p a y fo r six w eeks. R e s p o n d e n t n e v e r re p l ie d to th e
offer. I d . a t 9a .
2. a. T h is c a s e is a c o n s o l id a t io n of tw o law su i ts r e
la t in g to r e s p o n d e n t ’s d is c h a rg e . O n D e c e m b e r 8, 19 8 7 ,
r e s p o n d e n t filed an a c t io n in s ta te c o u r t a g a in s t H A L .
N o r r is v. H a w a iia n A ir l in e s , I n c . , C iv . N o . 8 7 -3 9 8 4 -1 2
( H a w . C ir . C t . ) . H e a l leg e d th a t H A L d i s c h a r g e d h im
in v io la t io n of the p u b l ic p o l icy ex p re s se d in th e F e d e r a l
A v ia t io n A c t a n d im p le m e n t in g re g u la t io n s ( C o u n t I ) ;
th a t P IA L ’s a c t io n s v io la te d th e H a w a ii W h is t le b lo w e r ’s
P ro te c t io n A c t ( H W P A ) , H a w . R ev . S ta t . §§ 3 7 8 -6 1 to
3 7 8 -6 9 ( 1 9 8 8 ) ( C o u n t I I ) ; 2 th a t H A L in te n t io n a l ly in
flicted e m o t io n a l d is tre ss o n h im ( C o u n t H I ) ; th a t H A L
e n g a g e d in o u t r a g e o u s c o n d u c t , en t i t l in g r e s p o n d e n t to
p u n i t iv e d a m a g e s ( C o u n t I V ) ; a n d th a t H A L b re a c h e d
th e co l lec t iv e b a r g a in in g a g r e e m e n t ( C o u n t V ) . 1 2 /8 /8 7
C o m p la in t ^ 2 2 , 2 8 , 3 1 , 33 , 39.
H A L re m o v e d th e ca se to th e U n i te d S ta te s D is t r ic t
C o u r t f o r th e D is t r ic t o f H a w a i i . O n M a r c h 2 8 , 1 9 8 8 ,
the d is t r ic t c o u r t d ism isse d C o u n t V , h o ld in g th a t i t w a s
s u b je c t to t h e ex c lu s iv e a rb i t r a l p ro c e d u re s o f th e R a i l
w a y L a b o r A c t ( R L A ) , 45 U .S .C . 151 e t s e q . , a n d
th e re fo re p re e m p te d . 3 / 2 8 / 8 8 D is t . C t . O r d e r 14-15 .
T h e c o u r t r e m a n d e d th e r e m a in d e r o f th e c la im s to th e
s ta te t r ia l c o u r t . I d . a t 1 6 -17 ; P e t . A p p . 9 a n .7 .
2 The Hawaii Whistleblower’s Protection Act provides in perti
nent part that an employer “shall not discharge, threaten, or other
wise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee’s
compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employ
ment because * * * [t]he employee * * * reports or is about to
report to a public body * * * a violation or a suspected violation
of a law or rule adopted pursuant to law of this State, a political
subdivision of this State, or the United States, unless the em
ployee knows that the report is false.” Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-62(1)
(1988). The Act authorizes an employee to file a civil action seek
ing injunctive relief and actual damages. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-
63(a) (1988).
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O n D e c e m b e r 5, 1 9 9 0 , th e s ta te t r ia l c o u r t d ism isse d
C o u n t I o f th e c o m p la in t a g a in s t H A L , re a s o n in g t h a t i t
l a ck e d s u b je c t m a t t e r ju r i s d ic t io n b e c a u s e r e s p o n d e n t ’s
c la im w as p re e m p te d b y th e R L A . See P e t . A p p . 2 8 a ;
1 2 /5 /9 0 H a w . C ir . C t . O r d e r 2 . T h e c o u r t ce r t i f ied its
o rd e r as f inal u n d e r s ta te ru les o f civil p r o c e d u r e (H a w .
R . C iv. P . 5 4 ( b ) ) so th a t r e s p o n d e n t c o u ld t a k e a n im
m e d ia te a p p e a l . 1 2 / 5 / 9 0 H a w . C ir . C t . O r d e r 2 .3
b. O n S e p te m b e r 2 0 , 1 9 8 9 , r e s p o n d e n t f i led su it
ag a in s t p e t i t io n e rs P a u l J. F in a z z o , H o w a r d E . O g d e n ,
a n d H a ts u o H o n m a , a ll o f w h o m w h e re officers o f H A L
w h en re s p o n d e n t w as d is c h a rg e d . N o r r is v . F in a z z o , C iv.
N o . 8 9 -2 0 9 4 -0 9 ( H a w . C ir . C t . ) . R e s p o n d e n t a l leged
th a t th e in d iv id u a l p e t i t io n e rs d i re c te d , c o n f irm e d , o r r a t i
fied th e a l leged re ta l ia to r y d is c h a rg e . H e a g a in so u g h t
re lief on th eo r ie s o f d is c h a rg e in v io la t io n o f p u b l ic p o l icy
( C o u n t I ) ; v io la t io n o f th e H W P A ( C o u n t I I ) ; i n t e n
t iona l in flic tion of e m o t io n a l d is t re s s ( C o u n t I I I ) ; a n d
o u t ra g e o u s c o n d u c t e n t i t l in g h im to p u n i t iv e d a m a g e s
( C o u n t I V ) . 9 / 2 0 / 8 9 C o m p la in t 2 2 , 2 8 , 3 1 , 33 . O n
D e c e m b e r 5, 1 9 9 0 , th e s ta te t r ia l c o u r t d ism is se d C o u n ts
I a n d I I a n d ce r t if ied th e c a s e f o r im m e d ia te a p p e a l .
1 2 /5 /9 0 H a w . C ir . C t . O r d e r 2-3.
3. T h e S u p re m e C o u r t o f H a w a i i re v e rsed in b o th
cases. P e t . A p p . l a - 2 6 a { F in a z z o ) ' , id . a t 2 7 a - 2 9 a ( H a
w a iia n A ir l in e s , I n c . ) . T h e c o u r t first o b s e rv e d th a t r e
s p o n d e n t ’s r e ta l ia to r y d is c h a rg e c la im s a re su b je c t to th e
R L A ’s ex c lu s iv e a rb i t r a l m e c h a n i s m ( a n d a r e th e re fo re
p re e m p te d ) if th e y a r e “ m in o r d i s p u te s ” fo r p u rp o s e s of
th e R L A —- i . e . , if th e y a re d isp u te s “ g ro w in g o u t o f g r iev
ances o r o u t o f th e in te r p r e ta t io n o r a p p l ic a t io n o f agree-
3 Although the Hawaii Supreme Court vacated the initial state
trial court’s order because the district court’s remand order was
not part of the record (Pet. App, 9a n.7), the remand order was
subsequently made part of the record, the judgment of dismissal
was reinstated, and petitioner took a fresh appeal from that judg
ment. Id. a t 28a.
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m erits c o n c e rn in g ra te s o f p a y , ru les , o r w o rk in g cond i-
t io n s” ( 4 5 U .S .C . 153 F i r s t ( i ) ) . See P e t . A p p . 12a.
T h e c o u r t c o n c lu d e d t h a t r e s p o n d e n t ’s c la im s a re n o t
p r e e m p te d u n d e r th a t s t a n d a r d .
R e ly in g o n th is C o u r t ’s d ec is io n in C o n s o l id a t e d R a i l
C o r p . v. R a i lw a y L a b o r E x e c u t iv e s ’ A s s ’n , 4 9 1 U .S . 2 9 9 ,
3 0 5 ( 1 9 8 9 ) ( C o n m i l ) , th e s ta te s u p re m e c o u r t ex p la in e d
th a t “m in o r d i s p u te s ” a re “ th o s e th a t ‘m a y b e co n c lu s iv e ly
re so lv e d b y in te rp re t in g th e ex is t in g [c o lle c t iv e b a r g a in
ing] a g r e e m e n t . ’ ” P e t . A p p . 14a. I n th e c o u r t ’s view,
r e s p o n d e n t ’s r e ta l ia to r y d is c h a r g e c la im s c o u ld n o t be
re so lv ed in th a t w ay : “ [ R e s p o n d e n t ’s] r e ta l ia to r y d is
ch a rg e c la im is b a s e d o n h is a l le g a t io n th a t h e w a s te rm i
n a te d fo r r e p o r t in g a v io la t io n o f th e law , a n d [p e t i t io n
ers] d o n o t suggest th a t a r e ta l ia to r y d i s c h a r g e is s a n c
t io n ed o r justif ied b y a p ro v is io n in th e [co llec t iv e b a r
g a in in g ] a g r e e m e n t n o r d o th e y p o in t to a n y p a r t o f the
[ c o n tr a c t th a t ] d e m o n s t r a te s t h a t th e c a r r i e r a n d u n io n
h av e a g re e d o n s ta n d a r d s r e le v a n t to [ r e s p o n d e n t ’s] s i tu
a t io n .” P e t . A p p . 19a.
T h e c o u r t re je c te d p e t i t io n e r s ’ a r g u m e n t t h a t th e re ta l i
a to ry d is c h a rg e c la im s w e re p r e e m p te d b e c a u s e i t w as
n ecessa ry to c o n s t ru e th e c o l lec t iv e b a r g a in in g a g re e m e n t
to d e te r m in e w h e th e r H A L h a d t e r m in a t e d re s p o n d e n t
for in s u b o rd in a t io n , a n d th u s fo r “ ju s t c a u s e .” P e t . A p p .
1 8 a -1 9 a . T h e c o u r t e m p h a s iz e d t h a t in L in g le v . N o r g e
D iv is io n o f M a g ic C h e f , I n c . , 4 8 6 U .S . 3 9 9 ( 1 9 8 8 ) , a
c a se a r is in g u n d e r S ec t io n 3 0 1 o f th e L a b o r - M a n a g e m e n t
R e la t io n s A c t o f 19 4 7 ( L M R A ) , 2 9 U .S .C . 1 85 , th is
C o u r t h e ld t h a t a c la im o f w ro n g fu l t e r m in a t io n in r e ta l ia
t io n fo r filing a s ta te w o r k e r ’s c o m p e n s a t io n c la im d id n o t
r e q u ir e in te rp re ta t io n of a c o l lec t iv e b a r g a in in g a g re e
m e n t , b u t d e p e n d e d u p o n p u re ly f a c tu a l q u e s t io n s c o n
c e rn in g th e e m p lo y e e ’s c o n d u c t a n d th e e m p lo y e r ’s m o
tive. P e t . A p p . 1 5 a -1 6 a . T h e S u p re m e C o u r t o f H a w a i i
d e te rm in e d th a t , as in L in g le , th e c la im s in th is c a se do
n o t t u r n u p o n a n in t e r p r e t a t io n of th e l a b o r c o n t r a c t , b u t
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6
u p o n “p u re ly f a c tu a l q u e s t io n s [ th a t ] p e r ta in [ ] to the
c o n d u c t o f th e em p lo y e e a n d th e c o n d u c t a n d m o t iv a t io n
o f th e e m p lo y e r .” Pet. A p p . 19 a (quoting ; L in g le , 4 8 6
U.S. a t 4 0 7 ) .
DISCUSSION
In o u r v iew , th e c o u r t b e lo w c o r re c t ly h e ld th a t r e
s p o n d e n t ’s c la im s a r e n o t “m in o r d i s p u te s ” s u b je c t to
th e R L A ’s ex c lu s iv e sys tem o f a r b i t r a t io n . T h is C o u r t
h a s h e ld t h a t th e d is t in g u ish in g f e a tu re o f a m in o r d is
p u te is th a t i t m a y b e c o n c lu s iv e ly re so lv ed b y c o n s t ru in g
the co l lec t iv e b a r g a in in g a g re e m e n t . R e s p o n d e n t ’s c la im s
fo r r e ta l ia to r y d is c h a rg e t u r n o n p u re ly fa c tu a l q u es t io n s
c o n c e rn in g h is c o n d u c t a n d p e t i t io n e rs ’ m o t iv a t io n in
te rm in a t in g r e s p o n d e n t ’s e m p lo y m e n t ; th e c la im s d o n o t
re q u ir e r e s o lu t io n o f the issue w h e th e r th e a i r l in e h a d
ju s t c a u s e u n d e r th e co llec tive b a r g a in in g a g r e e m e n t to
d ism iss re s p o n d e n t . F o r th a t re a so n , r e s p o n d e n t w a s no t
re q u ir e d to r e s o r t to th e exc lus ive a rb i t r a l m e c h a n i s m of
the R L A , a n d the s ta te l a w p ro v id in g h im w i th a c a u se
o f ac t io n fo r r e ta l ia to r y d is c h a rg e is n o t p r e e m p te d by
the R L A .
T h e r e is, h o w e v e r , a conflic t a m o n g th e c i rc u i ts o n th e
q u e s t io n w h e th e r a s ta te to r t c la im o f r e ta l ia to r y d is
c h a rg e is p r e e m p te d w h e n th e e m p lo y e r a sse r ts th a t the
d isc h a rg e w a s jus t if ied b y a te rm of the co l lec t iv e b a r
g a in in g a g re e m e n t . F u r t h e r re v ie w is th e re fo re w a r r a n t e d
to re so lv e th a t i m p o r t a n t a n d r e c u r r in g issue .4
4 Respondent argues (Br. in Opp. 1-4) that the state supreme
court’s judgment in this case is not a “final judgment’’ within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1257(a). Although the state supreme court’s
judgment contemplates further proceedings in the trial court, it
nevertheless is final for purposes of Section 1257 (a) because “it
finally disposed of the federal preemption issue” as to the claims
brought before the state supreme court. Belknap, Inc. V. Hale, 463
U.S. 491, 497 n.5 (1983). Moreover, if the RLA requires the
claims at issue here to be determined through arbitration under
the Act, permitting the case to go forward in state court would
risk eroding the federal policy of the RLA. Id. at 497-498 n.5;
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7
1. T h e R a i lw a y L a b o r A c t , 45 U .S .C , 151 e t s e q . ,
w a s e n a c te d , in te r a l ia , to e s ta b l ish a m e c h a n i s m fo r “ th e
p r o m p t a n d o rd e r ly s e t t le m e n t o f all d i sp u te s g ro w in g o u t
o f g r ie v a n c e s o r o u t o f th e in te r p r e ta t io n o r a p p l ic a t io n
o f a g r e e m e n ts c o v e r in g ra te s o f p ay , ru le s , o r w o rk in g
c o n d i t io n s .” 4 5 U . S . C 151 a ( 5 ) ; see 4 5 U .S .C . 153 F i r s t
( i ) ( e s ta b l i s h in g a rb i t r a l m e c h a n i s m fo r s u c h d i s p u te s ) ;
4 5 U .S .C . 184 ( a r b i t r a l p ro v is io n fo r su c h d is p u te s in
a ir l in e i n d u s t r y ) / ' Tn re so lv in g th o s e so -ca lled “m in o r
d i s p u te s ” ( E lg in , J . <# E . R y . v . B u r le y , 3 2 5 U .S . 7 1 1 ,
7 2 3 ( 1 9 4 5 ) , a ff’d o n re h e a r in g , 3 2 7 U .S . 661 ( 1 9 4 6 ) ) . °
th e R L A first re q u ire s th e p a r t ie s to r e s o r t t o a c a r r i e r ’s
“ in te rn a l d i s p u te re so lu t io n p ro c e s se s .” A t c h is o n , T . <6
S .F . R y . v . B u e ll , 4 8 0 U .S . 5 5 7 , 5 6 3 ( 1 9 8 7 ) ; see 45
U .S .C . 153 F i r s t ( i ) , 184. If a d i s p u te c a n n o t b e re so lved
in te rn a l ly , e i th e r p a r ty m a y th e n re fe r it to “ a r b i t r a t io n * 5 * * 8
see also Southland Corp. V. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7 (1984). That
conclusion, moreover, is unaffected by the fact that this Court may
ultimately find that the state supreme court correctly determined
that petitioner’s claims are not preempted by the RLA. Belknap,
463 U.S. at 498 n.5 (the fact “ [t]ha t we affirm rather than reverse,
thereby holding that federal policy would not be subverted by the
[state court] proceedings, is not tantamount to a holding that we
are without power to render such a judgment” ).
5 Such disputes involve “controversies over the meaning of an
existing collective bargaining agreement in a particular fact situa
tion.” Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen V. Chicago R. & I. R.R., 353
U.S. 30, 33 (1957) ; see H.R. Rep. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3
(1934).
8 This Court adopted the "major/minor” dispute terminology
“from the vocabulary of rail management and rail labor.” Conrail,
491 U.S. a t 302. The term “major dispute” refers to “disputes over
the formation of collective agreements or efforts to secure them.”
Burley, 325 U.S. a t 723. In the case of a “major dispute,” the RLA
requires the parties “to undergo a lengthy process of bargaining
and mediation.” Conrail, 491 U.S. a t 302; see 45 U.S.C. 155, 156;
see generally Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Termi
nal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 378 (1969). Petitioners do not argue that
the claims in this case constitute "major disputes.”
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8
befo re th e N a t io n a l R a i l r o a d A d ju s tm e n t B o a r d * * *
o r b e fo re a n a d ju s tm e n t b o a r d e s ta b l i s h e d b y th e e m
p loyer a n d th e u n io n s r e p re s e n t in g th e e m p lo y e e s .” C o n -
ra il, 491 U .S . a t 3 0 3 -3 0 4 ; see 4 5 U .S .C . 153 F i r s t ( i ) ,
S econd .
T h e s u b m iss io n o f a d is p u te to a r b i t r a t io n is c o m p u l
sory a t th e r e q u e s t o f e i th e r p a r ty . 4 5 U .S .C . 153 F i r s t
( i ) , S eco n d ; see 4 5 U .S .C . 1 8 4 ; see a lso , e .g . , C o n r a i l ,
491 U .S . a t 3 0 3 ; W a lk e r v. S o u th e r n R y ., 3 8 5 U .S . 196,
198 ( 1 9 6 6 ) . T h e d ec is io n o f an a d ju s tm e n t b o a r d is
“ final a n d b in d in g .” 4 5 U .S .C . 153 F i r s t ( m ) , S eco n d ;
see C o n r a i l , 4 9 1 U .S . a t 3 0 3 2
2. P e t i t io n e r s a rg u e ( P e t . 1 3 -1 5 ) t h a t r e s p o n d e n t ’s
to r t c la im s o f r e ta l ia to r y d is c h a r g e sh o u ld n o t h a v e b ee n
a d ju d ic a te d o u ts id e th e a r b i t r a l p ro c ess . In o u r v iew , the
s ta te su p re m e c o u r t c o r re c t ly d e te r m in e d th a t r e s p o n d e n t ’s
c la im s—-a lleg ing th a t he h a d b e e n d is c h a rg e d in v io la t io n
o f th e p u b l ic p o l icy o f th e F e d e r a l A v ia t io n A c t a n d its
im p le m e n t in g re g u la t io n s a n d o f th e H W P A — a re n o t
m in o r d isp u te s s u b je c t to th e ex c lu s iv e a r b i t r a l m e c h a n
ism o f th e R L A .
a. T h e p r o p e r f r a m e w o r k fo r e v a lu a t in g th e ex is ten ce
of a m in o r d i s p u te is set f o r th in th is C o u r t ’s d ec is io n in
C o n r a il . I n th a t case , th e C o u r t a d d r e s s e d w h e th e r a
d isp u te a b o u t th e c a r r i e r ’s im p le m e n ta t io n o f a n em p lo y e e
d ru g tes t in g p r o g r a m w a s a “ m a jo r d i s p u te ” c o n c e rn in g 7
7 A similar scheme exists for the airline industry, to which Con
gress extended the RLA in 1936. Act of Apr. 10, 1936, ch. 166, 49
Stat. 1189; see 45 U.S.C. 181-188; International Ass’n of Ma
chinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682, 685 (1963) (the
purpose of the 1936 legislation was “to extend to air carriers and
their employees the same benefits and obligations available and
applicable in the railroad industry”). The principal difference,
which is not material here, is that no national adjustment board
has been established for airlines; hence, minor disputes are ad
judicated exclusively by system adjustment boards formed by the
airlines and the unions under 45 U.S.C. 184. See Conrail, 491 U.S.
at 304 n.4; Central Airlines, 372 U.S. at 686.
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9
a c h a n g e in th e c o llec tiv e b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t (w h ic h
is su b je c t to a R L A ’s b a rg a in in g a n d m e d ia t io n p ro v i
s io n s ) o r a “m in o r d is p u te ” (w h ic h is su b je c t to c o m p u l
so ry a r b i t r a t io n ) .
In h o ld in g th a t th e c o n tro v e rsy a t issu e w a s a m in o r
d isp u te , th e C o u r t in C o m a i l lo o k ed “ to w h e th e r a c la im
h as b e e n m a d e th a t th e te rm s o f an ex is tin g a g re e m e n t
e i th e r e s ta b lish o r re fu te th e p re se n c e o f a r ig h t to ta k e
th e d is p u te d a c tio n .” 491 U .S . a t 3 0 5 . A s th e C o u r t
e x p la in e d , “ [ t]h e d is tin g u ish in g fe a tu re o f su c h a case
[/.<?., a m in o r d isp u te ] is th a t th e d is p u te m a y b e c o n c lu
siv e ly re so lv e d b y in te rp re t in g th e ex is tin g [c o lle c tiv e
b a rg a in in g ] a g re e m e n t.” I b id . T h e C o u r t m a d e p la in ,
m o re o v e r, th a t a p a r ty m a y n o t tr ig g e r th e R L A ’s e x c lu
sive a rb it ra l f ra m e w o rk m ere ly b y a s se r tin g a c o n tra c tu a l
r ig h t b a se d o n “ in s u b s ta n tia l g ro u n d s .” Id . a t 3 0 6 . R a th e r ,
w h en “ an e m p lo y e r a sse rts a c o n tra c tu a l r ig h t to ta k e
[a ] c o n te s te d a c tio n , th e e n su in g d isp u te is m in o r [o n ly ]
if th e a c tio n is a rg u a b ly ju s tif ied b y th e te rm s o f th e
p a r tie s ’ c o lle c tiv e -b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t.” I d . a t 3 0 7 .
b . T h e s ta te su p re m e c o u r t ’s h o ld in g (P e t . A p p . 10a-
2 0 a ) th a t re s p o n d e n t’s to r t c la im s fo r r e ta l ia to ry d isc h a rg e
a re n o t m in o r d isp u te s is s u p p o r te d b y C o n r a i l , b e c a u se
th o se c la im s c a n n o t b e “co n c lu s iv e ly re so lv e d ” (4 9 1 U .S .
a t 3 0 5 ) b y in te rp re t in g th e co llec tiv e b a rg a in in g a g re e
m en t.
R e s p o n d e n t’s first c la im — alleg in g re ta l ia to ry d isc h a rg e
in v io la tio n o f p u b lic p o licy — re q u ire s p ro o f th a t th e
te rm in a tio n o f an em p lo y ee “ v io la te [d ] a c le a r m a n d a te
o f p u b lic p o lic y .” P e t. A p p . 2 0 a -2 1 a . A s th e S u p rem e
C o u r t o f H a w a ii e x p la in e d , if H A L d ism issed re s p o n d e n t
in o rd e r to p u n ish h im fo r try in g to re c tify a n a lleg ed
sa fe ty in f ra c tio n , th a t a c tio n w o u ld v io la te th e p o lic y “o f
th e F e d e ra l A v ia tio n A c t a n d [ im p le m e n tin g re g u la tio n s ]
to p ro te c t th e p u b lic fro m sh o d d y re p a ir a n d m a in te n a n c e
p ra c tic e s .” Id . a t 2 1 a . R e s p o n d e n t’s sec o n d c la im , w h ich
arise s u n d e r th e H W P A , a lso do es n o t d e p e n d on th e
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co llec tiv e b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t; it m e re ly re q u ire s p ro o f
th a t H A L d isc h a rg e d re s p o n d e n t b e c a u se h e re p o r te d th e
sa fe ty in f ra c tio n to th e F A A . I d . a t 21a~ 22a.
A c c o rd in g ly , as th e s ta te su p re m e c o u r t e x p la in e d , th e
to r t c la im in th is c a se tu rn e d o n a fa c tu a l d is p u te a b o u t
w h e th e r H A L te rm in a te d re s p o n d e n t b a s e d o n a n im
p erm issib le m o tiv e , i .e . , b e c a u se h e e n g a g e d in c o n d u c t
p ro te c te d b y s ta te to r t law in d e p e n d e n t o f a n y c o n tra c t
rig h ts o f re s p o n d e n t o r H A L . B e c a u se a c o lle c tiv e b a r
g a in in g a g re e m e n t c a n n o t e lim in a te s u b s ta n tiv e leg a l p ro
tec tio n s p ro v id e d to em p lo y ee s in d e p e n d e n t o f th e a g re e
m en t (se e B u e ll , 4 8 0 U .S . a t 5 6 3 -5 6 5 ; C o lo r a d o A n ti-
D is c r im in a t io n C o m m ’n v . C o n t in e n t a l A ir L in e s , I n c . ,
372 U .S . 7 1 4 , 7 2 4 ( 1 9 6 3 ) ; cf. A ll is - C h a lm e r s C o r p . v .
L u e c k , 471 U .S . 2 0 2 , 2 1 1 -2 1 2 ( 1 9 8 5 ) ( L M R A ) ) , th e
to r t c la im s in th is c a se c o u ld n o t b e re so lv e d b y a d ju d i
c a tin g th e d is tin c t leg a l q u e s tio n w h e th e r th e re w as “ju s t
c a u se” fo r r e s p o n d e n t’s d is c h a rg e u n d e r th e la b o r c o n
trac t. See P e t. A p p . 19a . R e s p o n d e n t c o u ld n o t p re v a il
on his to r t c la im s m ere ly b y p ro v in g th a t p e ti t io n e r la c k e d
ju s t c a u se to d ism iss h im u n d e r th e co llec tiv e b a rg a in in g
ag reem en t, b e c a u se th e to r ts a lleg e d re q u ire d p ro o f o f
u n law fu l p u rp o s e to p u n is h re s p o n d e n t fo r re p o r t in g sa fe ty
v io la tio n s to th e F A A .8 C o n v e rse ly , even if th e s ta te
co u r t w e re to find th a t re s p o n d e n t c o m m itte d in s u b o rd i
n a tio n u n d e r th e la b o r c o n tra c t by re fu s in g “ to sign w o rk
re c o rd s in c o n n e c tio n w ith th e w o rk he p e r fo rm s ” (P e t.
A p p . 4 9 a ( A r t . IV f D . 4 ( a ) ) , th a t fin d in g c o u ld n o t
“ a rg u a b ly j u s t i f y ] ” ( C o n r a d , 491 U .S . a t 3 0 7 ) a d is
8 Petitioners contend (Pet. 14) that the collective bargaining
agreement is implicated by those claims because it provides that
“ fa]n employee’s refusal to perform work which is in violation of
established health and safety rules, or any local, state, or federal
health and safety law shall not warrant disciplinary action.” Pet.
App. 60a-61a (Art. XVII ([ F ) . As we explain below, that claim is
not preempted merely because a similar claim could also have been
handled through the grievance mechanism of the RLA. See pp.
11-13, infra.
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c h a rg e m o tiv a te d b y th e d e s ire to p e n a liz e r e s p o n d e n t fo r
re p o r t in g a sa fe ty in f ra c tio n . I n o th e r w o rd s , as th e c o u r t
b e lo w c o n c lu d e d , th is c a se d o e s n o t p re s e n t a m in o r
d isp u te b e c a u se “ [ re s p o n d e n t’s] r e ta l ia to r y d is c h a rg e c la im
is b a s e d o n h is a lle g a tio n th a t h e w a s te rm in a te d fo r
re p o r t in g a v io la tio n o f th e la w , a n d [p e ti t io n e rs ] d o n o t
su g g est th a t a r e ta l ia to ry d is c h a rg e is s a n c tio n e d o r ju s t i
fied b y a p ro v is io n in th e a g re e m e n t .” P e t. A p p . 19a.
c. P e titio n e rs c o n te n d th a t th e s ta te s u p re m e c o u r t ’s
a n a ly s is is in su ffic ien tly p ro te c tiv e o f th e R L A ’s ex c lu s iv e
a rb itra l m e c h a n ism . B e c a u se th e “ m in o r d is p u te ” m e c h
an ism o f th e R L A ap p lie s to d isp u te s “g ro w in g o u t o f
g riev a n ces o r o u t o f th e in te rp re ta t io n o r a p p lic a tio n o f
ag re e m e n ts c o n c e rn in g ra te s o f p ay , ru le s , o r w o rk in g
c o n d it io n s ” (4 5 U .S .C . 153 F ir s t ( i ) ) , p e t i t io n e rs a rg u e ,
in effec t, th a t a c la im is p re e m p te d w h e n e v e r an em p lo y e r
d e sc rib e s th e fa c tu a l d is p u te in th e leg a l te rm s o f th e
c o llec tiv e b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t o r w h e n th e e m p lo y e r’s
c o n d u c t is o r c o u ld b e c o n te s te d th ro u g h th e g r ie v a n c e
m ech a n ism o f th e c o n tra c t . P e t. 1 3 -15 . T h a t a rg u m e n t
m isco n ce iv es th e s ta tu to ry sch em e .
i. P e ti t io n e r s ’ b ro a d in te rp re ta t io n o f th e R L A is in
c o n s is te n t w ith th is C o u r t ’s d e c is io n in C o m a i l . T h e re ,
th e C o u r t h e ld th a t a m in o r d is p u te is o n e th a t m a y b e
“co n c lu s iv e ly re so lv e d ” u n d e r th e c o lle c tiv e b a rg a in in g
a g re e m e n t. 4 9 1 U .S . a t 3 0 5 . T h e C o u r t s tre sse d , h o w
ev er, th a t a d isp u te m a y n o t b e su b je c t to a rb it ra t io n as
a m in o r d isp u te if th e c o n tr a c t c la im is in s u b s ta n tia l—
th a t is, if th e c o n d u c t is n o t ev e n “ a rg u a b ly ju s tif ie d ”
u n d e r th e c o n tra c t . I d . a t 3 0 6 -3 0 7 .
A lth o u g h p e tit io n e rs a rg u e th a t H A L ’s c o n d u c t w as
“ a rg u a b ly ju s tif ie d ” b y th e p ro v is io n o f th e co llec tiv e
b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t re q u ir in g m e c h a n ic s to s ig n off on
w o rk re c o rd s fo r c o m p le te d re p a ir s , re s p o n d e n t w o u ld
n o t b e re q u ire d to d is p u te th a t is su e in th is su it. A s se t
fo r th ab o v e (p p . 9 -1 0 , s u p r a ) , t h a t is su e u n d e r th e
co llec tiv e b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t c o u ld n o t “co n c lu s iv e ly
130
1 2
re so lv e ” re s p o n d e n ts ’ to r t c la im s, w h ich tu rn o n th e fa c tu a l
q u e s tio n o f w h e th e r H A L te rm in a te d re s p o n d e n t b e c a u se
he re p o r te d a sa fe ty v io la tio n to th e F A A .
ii. G iv en th e b re a d th o f th e su b je c t m a t te r co v e re d
by a ty p ic a l co llec tiv e b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t,0 p e ti t io n e rs ’
c o n s tru c tio n o f th e R L A w o u ld re s u lt in a n u n d u ly b ro a d
p re e m p tio n o f s ta te to r t law , in c o n tra v e n t io n o f th is
C o u r t ’s p re c e d e n ts . B eca u se “ th e te x t o f th e R L A does
n o t m e n tio n * * * to r t l ia b ility ” { B u e l l , 4 8 0 U .S . a t 5 6 2 ) ,
it d o es n o t p re e m p t S ta tes f ro m a d o p tin g m in im u m d u tie s
th ro u g h th e ir la w of to rts , ev en if th o se d u tie s r e la te to
e m p lo y m e n t re la tio n s h ip s c o v e red b y th e R L A . T h a t
c o n c lu s io n is m a d e c le a r b y th is C o u r t ’s d e c is io n in
C o lo r a d o A n t i-D is c r im in a t io n C o m m ’n v . C o n t in e n ta l
A ir L in e s , I n c . , s u p r a . T h e re , th e C o u r t re je c te d the
c o n te n tio n th a t th e R L A p re e m p te d a s ta te s ta tu te “p ro
te c tin g em p lo y ee s a g a in s t ra c ia l d is c r im in a tio n .” 3 7 2 U .S.
a t 7 2 4 . A s th is C o u r t em p h a s iz e d , “ [n ]o p ro v is io n in
th e [R L A ] ev en m e n tio n s d is c r im in a tio n in h ir in g ,” and
n o th in g in th e A c t “ su g g ests th a t [it] p la c e s u p o n a n air
c a r r ie r a d u ty to e n g a g e o n ly in f a ir n o n d isc r im in a to ry
h ir in g p ra c t ic e s .” I b id . B e c a u se th e R L A “h a s n ever
b e e n u sed fo r th a t p u rp o s e ,” th is C o u r t fo u n d th a t i t d id
n o t p re e m p t th e s ta te a n ti-d is c r im in a tio n s ta tu te a t issue .
I b id .
0 A collective bargaining agreement "is more than a contract; it
is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the drafts
men cannot wholly anticipate. The collective agreement covers the
whole employment relationship. It calls into being a new common
law—the common law of a particular industry or of a particular
plant.” United Steelworkers V. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 578-579 (1960) (citation omitted; emphsis added) ;
accord, Conrail, 491 U.S. at 311-312 (a collective bargaining agree
ment must “govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot
wholly anticipate,” and its express terms are necessarily supple
mented by “practice, usage and custom”). For that reason, a vast
array of injuries sustained by railroad workers could theoretically
be addressed by “the timely invocation of the grievance machinery.”
Buell, 480 U.S. a t 564.
131
1 3
In lig h t o f C o l o r a d o A n t i-D is c r im in a t io n C o m m ’rt, th e
c o m p u lso ry a r b it r a t io n p ro v is io n s o f th e R L A d o n o t
p re e m p t c la im s p re m ise d o n s ta te - la w d u tie s in a re a s o f
le g itim a te s ta te c o n c e rn th a t a re in d e p e n d e n t o f d u tie s
a s su m e d u n d e r th e c o lle c tiv e b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t. O th e r
w ise, e i th e r s ta te r e g u la t io n w o u ld b e su b s ta n tia l ly d is
p la c e d , o r a r b i t r a to r s w o u ld b e re q u ire d to a d ju d ic a te
issu es o f s ta te to r t law . N e ith e r re s u lt is c o n s is te n t w ith
th is C o u r t ’s c a se s g o v e rn in g th e re g u la t io n o f la b o r r e la
tio n s . See, e .g . , F o r t H a l i f a x P a c k in g C o . v . C o y n e , 4 8 2
U .S . 1, 2 1 , 2 3 ( 1 9 8 7 ) ( “p re -e m p tio n sh o u ld n o t b e
lig h tly in f e r r e d ,” b e c a u s e “ th e e s ta b lis h m e n t o f la b o r
s ta n d a rd s fa lls w ith in th e t r a d i t io n a l p o lice p o w e r o f th e
S ta te [s ]” a n d “ d o es n o t im p e rm iss ib ly in tru d e u p o n th e
c o lle c tiv e -b a rg a in in g p ro c e s s ” ) ; L u e c k , 4 7 1 U .S . a t 2 1 2
(a v o id in g c o n s tru c tio n o f la b o r s ta tu te th a t “ w o u ld d e le
g a te to u n io n s a n d u n io n iz e d em p lo y e rs th e p o w e r to
e x e m p t th em se lv es f ro m w h a te v e r s ta te la b o r s ta n d a rd s
th ey d is fa v o re d ” ) ; A le x a n d e r v . G a r d n e r -D e n v e r C o . , 4 1 5
U .S . 3 6 , 53 ( 1 9 7 4 ) ( a r b i t r a to r s ex c eed th e ir a u th o r i ty
if th ey p re m is e th e ir d e c is io n s o n a so u rc e o f law o u ts id e
th e co lle c tiv e b a rg a in in g a g r e e m e n t) .10
10 To be sure, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., I l l
S. Ct. 1647 (1991) (Pet. 13 n,4), this Court held.that an individual
may contract to submit certain statutory claims to binding arbitra
tion. However, even if the parties to the collective bargaining
agreement in this case had agreed to the arbitration of state tort
claims, Gilmer would not apply here. The Court in Gilmer em
phasized the difference between arbitration agreements in individ
ual contracts and those in collective bargaining agreements. As the
Court explained, where arbitration "occurfs] in the context of a
collective-bargaining agreement, the claimants [are] represented by
their unions in the arbitration proceedings,” and there is “tension
between collective representation and individual statutory rights.”
Id. at 1657. Gilmer therefore does not undercut the analysis of
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., supra, which held that the avail
ability of arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement did
not bar an individual employee from asserting personal statutory
rights in court.
132
14
3. P e ti tio n e rs c o n te n d (P e t . 8 -9 ) th a t th e S u p re m
C o u r t o f H a w a ii e r re d in re ly in g o n L in g le v . N o r g e D iv i
s io n o f M a g ic C h e f , I n c . , s u p r a , a c a se a r is in g u n d e
S ec tio n 3 0 1 ( a ) o f th e L M R A , 2 9 U .S .C . 1 8 5 ( a ) . Ii
o u r v iew , h o w e v e r, L in g le su p p lie s an a p p ro p r ia te a n a lo g
in th is case .
S ec tio n 3 0 1 ( a ) o f th e L M R A a u th o riz e s fe d e ra l ju rii
d ic tio n o f “ fs ju i ts fo r v io la tio n o f c o n tra c ts b e tw e e n a
em p lo y e r a n d a la b o r o rg a n iz a tio n re p re s e n tin g em p lo )
ees in an in d u s try a ffec tin g c o m m e rc e as d e fin ed in thi
[A c t] , o r b e tw e e n a n y su ch la b o r o rg a n iz a tio n s .” 2
U .S .C . 1 8 5 ( a ) . 11 T h e C o u r t in L in g le h e ld th a t S ectio
301 d id n o t p re e m p t a s ta te to r t su it b a se d o n a r e ta l ia to r
d isch a rg e fo r filing a w o rk e r ’s c o m p e n s a tio n c la im . N o
ing th a t th e e le m e n ts o f th e s ta te - la w c a u se o f a c tio n co i
s is ted o f ( 1 ) d ism issa l o f a n e m p lo y e e a n d ( 2 ) a m otiv
to d e te r o r in te r fe re w ith h is filing o f a w o rk e r ’s co m p e l
sa tio n c la im , th e C o u r t c o n c lu d e d :
E a c h o f th e se p u re ly f a c tu a l q u e s tio n s p e r ta in s f
th e c o n d u c t o f th e em p lo y e e a n d th e c o n d u c t an
m o tiv a tio n o f th e em p lo y e r . N e ith e r o f th e e lem e n
re q u ire s a c o u r t to in te rp re t a n y te rm o f a co llec tiv '
b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t. T o d e fe n d a g a in s t a re ta l ia to i
d is c h a rg e c la im , a n e m p lo y e r m u s t sh o w th a t i t ha
a n o n - re ta l ia to ry re a s o n fo r th e d is c h a rg e * * * ; th
p u re ly fa c tu a l in q u iry lik ew ise d o es n o t tu rn o n tf
m e a n in g o f a n y p ro v is io n o f a c o lle c tiv e -b a rg a in ir
a g re e m e n t.
11 Under this Court’s cases, disputes requiring the interpretath
of labor contracts covered by Section 301 are governed by feder
common law rules that preempt state rules of decision. See TexU
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957) ; hoc
174, Teamsters V. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962). :
Lingle, this Court addressed the extent to which preemption und
Section 301 extends to tort claims arising out of the employme
relationship.
133
15
4 8 6 U .S . a t 4 0 7 . T h u s , th e C o u r t fo u n d th a t th e s ta te
to r t w a s “ ‘in d e p e n d e n t’ o f th e c o lle c tiv e -b a rg a in in g a g re e
m e n t” b e c a u se its re s o lu tio n d id “ n o t r e q u ir e c o n s tru in g
[ th a t] * * * a g re e m e n t.” I b id , (e m p h a s is a d d e d ) .
T o b e su re , th e s ta n d a rd fo r p re e m p tio n u n d e r L in g le
(w h e th e r a s ta te la w c la im re q u ire s th e in te rp re ta t io n o f
a la b o r c o n tr a c t ) is a r t ic u la te d s o m e w h a t d iffe re n tly f ro m
th e s ta n d a rd fo r fin d in g a m in o r d isp u te u n d e r C o n r a i l
(w h e th e r a d isp u te m ay b e co n c lu s iv e ly re so lv e d b y in te r
p re tin g th e co lle c tiv e b a r g a in in g a g r e e m e n t) . I t is a lso
tru e th a t th e R L A , u n lik e th e L M R A , a ffirm a tiv e ly ca lls
fo r th e a r b it r a t io n o f c o n t r a c t c la im s w ith in its sw eep .12
N e v e rth e le ss , L in g le is in s tru c tiv e in th e R L A c o n te x t,
b e c a u se its an a ly s is a d d re sse s a q u e s t io n c o m m o n to b o th
s ta tu te s : h o w to a c c o m m o d a te th e fe d e ra l in te re s t in u n i
fo rm in te rp re ta t io n o f c o lle c tiv e b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n ts
a n d th e le g itim a te in te re s t o f th e S ta te s in a d o p tin g s ta n d
a rd s o f c o n d u c t fo r e m p lo y e rs s u b je c t to th e ir p o lic e
p o w e r. C o m p a re , e .g . , L in g l e , 4 8 6 U .S . a t 4 0 9 ( L M R A
“says n o th in g a b o u t th e s u b s ta n tiv e r ig h ts a S ta te m a y
p ro v id e to w o rk e rs w h e n a d ju d ic a tio n o f th o se r ig h ts d o es
n o t d e p e n d u p o n th e in te rp re ta t io n o f [c o lle c tiv e b a r g a in
ing ] a g re e m e n ts” ) , a n d L u e c k , 4 7 1 U .S . a t 2 1 2 (b e c a u s e
L M R A “ d o e s n o t g ra n t th e p a r tie s to a c o lle c tiv e
b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t th e a b ili ty to c o n tr a c t fo r w h a t is
illegal u n d e r s ta te la w ,” “ i t w o u ld b e in c o n s is te n t w ith
12 This distinction between the RLA and the LMRA should not
be overstated. In determining when a state to rt action is preempted
under Section 301, this Court confronted the need to “preservef]
the central role of arbitration in our ‘system of industrial self-
government.’ ” Lueck, 471 U.S. a t 219. The Court noted that the
“need to preserve the effectiveness of arbitration was one of the
central reasons that underlay the Court’s [preemption] holding in
Lucas Flour," and that the standard for preemption under Section
301 must protect the parties’ “federal right to decide who is to
resolve contract disputes.” 471 U.S. a t 219. Thus, although RLA
preemption protects a direct statutory right to arbitration, LMRA
preemption protects the important statutory right to contract for
an arbitral remedy.
134
16
c o n g re ss io n a l in te n t u n d e r [S e c tio n 3 0 1 ] to p re -e m p t s ta te
ru les th a t p ro sc r ib e c o n d u c t, o r e s ta b lish r ig h ts a n d o b lig a
tions, in d e p e n d e n t o f a la b o r c o n tr a c t” ) , w ith C o l o r a d o
A n ti-D is c r im in a t io n C o m m ’n , 3 7 2 U .S . a t 7 2 4 ( R L A does
n o t p re e m p t s ta te a n ti-d is c r im in a tio n la w ) . A c c o rd in g ly ,
w hile it is u n c le a r w h e th e r th e s ta n d a rd s se t fo r th in
L in g le a n d C e m a i l w o u ld lead to the sam e re s u lt in every
case , w e b e liev e th a t th e S u p re m e C o u r t o f H a w a ii p ro p
erly c o n su lte d th e p o lic ie s u n d e r ly in g L in g le in defin ing
th e lin e b e tw e e n fe d e ra l c o n tra c t c la im s a n d to r t c la im s
in th is case .
4 . A s p e ti t io n e rs p o in t o u t (P e t . 1 0 -1 2 , 1 5 -1 6 ) , there
is d isa g re e m e n t a m o n g th e fe d e ra l ( a n d s ta te ) c o u r ts ovei
w h e th e r L in g le sh o u ld b e a p p lie d in R L A c a s e s .13 C e r
t io ra r i w o u ld n o t n e c e ssa rily b e w a r ra n te d in th is c a se o r
th a t g ro u n d a lo n e . T h e s ta te su p re m e c o u r t’s d e c is io n was
c o rre c t u n d e r b o th L in g le a n d C o n r a i l , a n d th e C o u rt
th e re fo re c o u ld re so lv e th is c a se w ith o u t c o n s id e r in g the
p ra c tic a l d iffe ren c es ( i f a n y ) th a t m a y d is tin g u ish the
L in g le a n d C o n r a i l tests .
T h e re is, h o w e v e r, a lso a c o n flic t a m o n g th e c irc u its o r
th e sp ec ific q u e s tio n o f w h e th e r a c la im o f re ta l ia to r y d is
c h a rg e is p re e m p te d b y th e R L A . In th e a f te rm a th o:
L in g le a n d C o n r a i l , m o s t c o u r ts o f a p p e a ls a n d state
su p re m e c o u r ts th a t h a v e a d d re s se d th e is su e h a v e c o n
e lu d e d th a t s ta te to r t c la im s fo r r e ta l ia to ry d is c h a rg e are
n o t p re e m p te d b y th e R L A w h e n th e c la im s tu r n o n su b
s ta n tiv e r ig h ts in d e p e n d e n t o f th e c o lle c tiv e b a rg a in in g * V.
13 Compare, e.g., Anderson V. American Airlines, Inc., 2 F.3d 590
595 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying Lingle) ; Davies V. American At.
Lines, Inc., 971 F.2d 463, 466-467 (10th Cir. 1992) (same), cert
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2439 (1993) (see note 16, in fra ) ; O’Briei
V. Consolidated Rail Corp., 972 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1992) (same)
cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 980 (1993), and Maher V. New Jerse\
Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 593 A.2d 750, 758 (N.J. 1991]
(same), with Hubbard v. United Airlines, Inc., 927 F.2d 1094
1097 (9th Cir. 1991) (because RLA preemption is broader thai
LMRA preemption, Lingle does not govern in RLA cases); am
Lorenz v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 980 F.2d 263, 268 (4th Cii
1992) (same).
135
17
a g re e m e n t. See, e .g . , P e t. A p p . 1 4 a -2 4 a ; A n d e r s o n V.
A m e r ic a n A ir l in e s , I n c . , 2 F .3 d 5 9 0 , 5 9 4 -5 9 6 ( 5 th C ir.
1 9 9 3 ) (w ro n g fu l d is c h a rg e in r e ta l ia t io n fo r se e k in g re m
ed y u n d e r w o rk e rs ’ c o m p e n s a tio n s t a tu t e ) ; D a v ie s v .
A m e r ic a n A ir L in e s , I n c . , 9 7 1 F .2 d 4 6 3 , 4 6 5 -4 6 8 (1 0 th
C ir . 1 9 9 2 ) (w ro n g fu l d is c h a rg e in v io la t io n o f p u b lic
p o licy a g a in s t d ism issa l fo r u n io n o rg a n iz in g a c tiv i t ie s ) ,
c e rt, d e n ie d , 113 S. C t. 2 4 3 9 ( 1 9 9 3 ) ; M a h e r v . N e w
J e r s e y T r a n s it R a i l O p e r a t io n s , I n c . , 5 9 3 A .2 d 7 5 0 , 7 5 8
(N .J . 1 9 9 1 ) (d is c h a rg e fo r re p o r t in g sa fe ty v io la t io n s ) .
In G r o t e v . T r a n s W o r ld A ir l in e s , I n c . , 9 0 5 F .2 d 13 0 7
( 9 th C i r . ) , c e r t , d e n ie d , 4 9 8 U .S . 9 5 8 ( 1 9 9 0 ) , h o w e v e r,
th e c o u r t o f a p p e a ls r e a c h e d th e o p p o s ite r e s u lt in a ca se
in v o lv in g a c la im v e ry s im ila r to th e c la im s a t is su e h e re .
G ro te filed a s ta te la w to r t a c tio n a lle g in g th a t h is em
p lo y e r w ro n g fu lly d is c h a rg e d h im b e c a u s e h e re fu se d to
p e r ju re h im se lf to th e F e d e ra l A i r S u rg e o n w h e n seek in g
re c e r tif ic a tio n as a c o m m e rc ia l p ilo t. A l th o u g h th e w ro n g
fu l d is c h a rg e c la im a p p a re n t ly tu rn e d o n th e e m p lo y e r’s
m o tiv e in te rm in a tin g G ro te fo r re a so n s c o n tr a ry to p u b
lic p o lic y ( i . e . , re fu sa l to p e r ju r e h im se lf b e fo re fe d e ra l
lic en s in g a u th o r i t ie s ) , th e N in th C irc u it fo u n d th e c la im
p re e m p te d .14 N o tin g th a t a te rm o f th e c o lle c tiv e b a rg a in
in g a g re e m e n t g o v e rn e d th e a ir l in e ’s r ig h t to r e q u ire p ilo ts
to m a in ta in a c u r re n t m e d ic a l c e r tif ic a te , th e c o u r t o f
a p p e a ls c o n c lu d e d th a t “ th e su b je c t o f G ro te ’s c la im is a t
le a s t ‘a rg u a b ly g o v e rn e d ’ b y * * * th e a g re e m e n t.” I d . a t
1 3 0 9 .15
G r o t e co n flic ts w ith th e d e c is io n in th is c a se . In c o n
tra s t w ith th e N in th C irc u i t ’s a p p r o a c h in G r o t e , th e
s ta te su p re m e c o u r t h e re re fu s e d to fin d re s p o n d e n t’s to r t
14 The court of appeals also held that the ELA preempted Grote’s
claims of breach of a covenant of good faith and fa ir dealing,
breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
defamation, and fraud. Grote, 905 F.2d at 1308-1310.
15 Finding the wrongful discharge claim preempted under the
ELA, the court further held that the Lingle framework was of no
assistance to Grote because preemption under the ELA is broader
than preemption under the LMEA. Grote, 905 F.2d at 1309-1310.
136
18
c la im s p re e m p te d b e c a u se a te rm in th e co lle c tiv e b a r
g a in in g a g re e m e n t— re q u ir in g a n em p lo y ee to s ig n w o rk
re co rd s fo r c o m p le te d re p a ir s — a rg u a b ly a d d re s se d th e
sam e c irc u m s ta n c e s g iv in g r ise to th e to r t c la im s. P e t.
A p p . 1 8 a -1 9 a . A n d u n lik e th e N in th C irc u it in G r o te ,
th e s ta te su p re m e c o u r t re c o g n iz e d th a t an a lle g e d re ta l ia
to ry d isc h a rg e in v io la tio n o f p u b lic p o lic y c a n n o t “ a rg u
ab ly [b e ] ju s tif ie d ” ( C o n r a i l , 4 9 1 U .S . a t 3 0 7 ) b y an y
p ro v is io n o f a co llec tiv e b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t, a n d th a t
su ch to r t c la im s tu rn o n q u es tio n s o f th e e m p lo y e r’s c o n
d u c t a n d m o tiv a tio n , r a th e r th a n th e q u e s tio n o f ju s t
ca u se u n d e r th e la b o r c o n tra c t . P e t. A p p . 1 8 a -1 9 a .
B eca u se th e issu e o f R L A p re e m p tio n re c u rs f re q u e n tly
in cases in v o lv in g re ta l ia to ry d isc h a rg e — a n d b e c a u se th e
scope o f R L A p re e m p tio n d e te rm in e s n o t o n ly th e fo ru m
b u t th e sc o p e o f a v a ila b le re m e d ie s in su ch ca se s— th e
q u e s tio n p re s e n te d fo r rev iew in th is c a se is o f s u b s ta n tia l
im p o rta n c e in d e te rm in in g th e e x te n t to w h ic h S ta te s w ill
be ab le to b r in g th e ir p o lice p o w e r to b e a r o n em p lo y m e n t
re la tio n sh ip s co v e re d b y th e R L A . W e th e re fo re b e liev e
th a t c e r t io ra r i is w a r ra n te d to re so lv e th e c irc u it co n flic t
in r e ta l ia to ry d isc h a rg e ca ses .16 R ev iew m a y a lso p re s e n t
16 Last Term, we suggested that certiorari should not be granted
in American Airlines, Inc. V. Davies, cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 2439
(1993) (No. 92-1077), which presented the question whether the
RLA preempted a claim of retaliatory discharge for union organiz
ing. Because the plaintiff alleged retaliation for union organizing,
he had a judicially enforceable cause of action directly under the
provisions of the RLA that give employees the right to organize
and bargain collectively without employer interference. See 45
U.S.C. 152 Third and Fourth; Virginian Ry. v. System Federation
No. If.0, Railway Employees, 300 U.S. 515 (1937). In our view, that
claim could be maintained only under Section 152 Third and Fourth,
and not under state law. But because the airline had not raised
that distinct claim of preemption, there was no basis for inferring
that the Tenth Circuit would have allowed Davies’ state-law claims
to proceed if the employer had properly raised that distinct defense
in a timely manner. Thus, there was no occasion for this Court to
consider the extent to which the RLA’s arbitral mechanism under
137
19
th e C o u r t w ith a n o c c a s io n to a d d re s s th e p ro p r ie ty o f
re lia n c e o n L in g l e a n d p r in c ip le s d e v e lo p e d u n d e r S e c tio n
301 o f th e L M R A in re so lv in g p re e m p tio n issu es u n d e r
th e R L A ( a n is su e o n w h ic h th e lo w e r c o u r ts h av e ex
p re sse d d iffe rin g v iew s (s e e p . 16, s u p r a ) ) , a n d m a y sh ed
lig h t o n th e p ro p e r re s o lu tio n o f p re e m p tio n issu es u n d e r
th e R L A in c o n te x ts o th e r th a n th o se in v o lv in g a lle g a
tio n s o f r e ta l ia to ry d isc h a rg e s .17
45 U.S.C. 153 F irst (i) and 184 preempts retaliatory discharge
claims properly brought under state law. 92-1077 U.S. Br. 15-19.
The Court thereafter denied certiorari in Davies. See 113 S. Ct.
2439 (1993). Respondent’s claims in this case, by contrast, do not
arise directly under the RLA.
17 We note that the issue of RLA preemption arises frequently
in a variety of contexts. For example, a number of courts of
appeals have held that claims for intentional infliction of emotional
distress based on wrongful discharge are preempted because the
claim requires a determination of whether the employer’s action
was justified under the labor contract. See, e.g., Calvert v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 959 F.2d 698, 700 (8th Cir. 1992); Edelman
V. Western Airlines, Inc., 892 F.2d 839, 844-845 (9th Cir. 1989).
And in Capraro v. United Parcel Service Co., 993 F.2d 328, 332
(3d Cir. 1993), the court of appeals dismissed claims of fraudulent
discharge, outrageous conduct, and wrongful infliction of emotional
distress on the ground that “a state claim will be preempted in
any instance where resolution of the claim would involve determina
tion of an issue that an [arbitrator] might decide on the basis of
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, either be
cause the employee’s claim or the employer’s defense relies on the
agreement.” Although the claims at issue in this case are different,
the court’s approach in Capraro is inconsistent with the analysis
of the state supreme court in this case. This Court’s resolution of
respondent’s claims therefore may shed light on the proper approach
to claims of RLA preemption in various related contexts.
138
2 0
C O N C L U S IO N
T h e p e ti t io n fo r a w r it o f c e r t io ra r i sh o u ld b e g ra n te d .
R e sp e c tfu lly su b m itte d .
Drew S. Days, III
Solicitor General
Frank W. Hunger
Assistant Attorney General
Edwin S. Kneedler
Deputy Solicitor General
J ohn F. Manning
Assistant to the Solicitor General
William Kanter
Marc Richman
Attorneys
J anuary 1994 ■
139
No. 92-2058
In T he
S u p r e m e C o u r t o f t h e U n it e d S t a t e s
October Term , 1992
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc .,
Petitioners,
v.
Grant T. Norris,
Respondent.
BRIEF OF AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICA AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF HAWAII
*Charles A .S hanor
John J. Gallagher
Margaret H. Spurlin
Paul, Hastings, J anofsky &
Walker
1050 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
T welfth Floor
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 223-9000
F o r A m i c u s C u r i a e
T h e A i r T r a n s p o r t
A s s o c i a t i o n o f A m e r i c a
July 23, 1993 *C o u n s e l o f R e c o r d
141
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................. ii
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE........................ 1
I. PREEMPTION OF OVERLAPPING STATE LAW
IS ESSENTIAL TO PRESERVE THE
AUTHORITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF
ADJUSTMENT BOARDS UNDER THE RLA . . 3
II. TH IS C O U R T S H O U L D R E SO L V E
INCONSISTENT PREEMPTION STANDARDS
THAT ENCOURAGE LITIGATION AND
BURDEN RLA CARRIERS....................................... 6
A. Lower Courts Disagree On Whether
L in g le Applies To Railway
Labor Act C ases..................................................... 8
B. Lower Courts Disagree On Whether
RLA Arbitration Applies to
Grievances Not Explicitly
Covered by the Collective
Bargaining Agreement....................... 12
CONCLUSION ..................................................................... 13
i
142
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: Page(s)
A la s k a A ir l in e s , In c . a n d A ir L in e
P i lo t s 'A s s ’n , 88 AAR (Lab. Rel.
Press) 0108 (1 9 8 8 ).......................................................... 11
A n d re w s v. L o u is v i l le & N . R .R . ,
406 U.S. 320 (1 9 7 2 ).................................................... 4, 8
B R T v. C h ic a g o R . & I. R .R . ,
353 U.S. 30 (1957) ............................................................. 5
B a y Us v. M a r r io t t C o r p . , .906 F.2d 874
(2d Cir. 1990), c it in g w ith a p p r o v a l ,
B a ld ra c c i v. P ra tt & W h itn e y ,
814 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1987),
cert, d e n ie d , 486 U.S. 1054 (1988) ....................................9
B e a r d v. C a rro llto n R .R . , 893 F.2d 117
(6th Cir. 1989) ......................................................................9
C o n so lid a te d R a il C o rp . v. R L E A ,
491 U.S. 299 (1 9 8 9 )................................................. n , U
C ro sto n v. B u r lin g to n N .R .R . ,
U.S. App. LEXIS 15890
(9th Cir. 1993) . . .......................... 10
D a v ie s v. A m e r ic a n A ir l in e s , I n c . ,
971 F.2d 463 (10th Cir. 1992),
cert, d e n ie d , 113 S. Ct. 2439
(1993)............................. .. ............................ 4, 9, 12
E lg in , J . & E . R y v. B u r le y ,
325 U.S. 711 (1 9 4 5 )............................. .. 3, 11, 12
G ro te v. T ra n s W o r ld A ir l in e s , I n c . ,
905 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir.), cert, d e n ie d ,
498 U.S. 958 (1990) ............................................... 7, 9, 10
LA M v. C e n tra l A ir l in e s ,
372 U.S. 682 (1 9 6 3 ).......................... .. ................ 4 , 7
LAM v. S tr e e t, 367 U.S. 740 (1 9 6 1 )................................! 3
L in g le v. N o r g e D iv . o f M a g ic C h e fs , L n c .,
486 U.S. 399 (1 9 8 8 )........................................... .. 8
L o r e n z v. C S X T r a n s p ., I n c . , 980 F.2d 263
(4th Cir. 1992) ............................................... 7, 9, 10, 12
M a g n u s o n v. B u r lin g to n N . , I n c . ,
576 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.), cert, d e n ie d ,
439 U.S. 930 (1978) : ................................ .. .............. 7 , 9
ii
143
M a h e r v. N e w J e r s e y T ra n s it R a il
O p e r a tio n s , I n c . , 593 A .2d 750
(N.J. 1991) ............................................................... 10, 11
M a jo r s v. U .S . A ir , I n c . , 525 F. Supp. 853
(D. Md. 1981) .....................................................................7
M a y o n v. S o u th e r n P a c if ic T r a n s p o r t C o .,
805 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1986)..........................................4
M c C a ll v. C h e s a p e a k e & O h io R y . ,
844 F.2d 294 (6th Cir.) cert, d e n ie d ,
488 U.S. 879 (1988) ...................................................... 9, 10
M c C a n n v. A la s k a A ir l in e s , I n c . ,
758 F. Supp. 559 (N.D. Cal. 1991) .............................. 7
M e r o la v. N a t io n a l R .R . P a s s e n g e r C o r p . ,
683 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1 988)................................. 7
N L R B v. T ra n s p o r ta t io n M a n a g e m e n t C o r p . ,
462 U.S. 393 (1 9 8 3 )......................................................... 10
N o r r is v. H a w a i ia n A ir l in e s , 842 P.2d 634
(Haw. 1 9 9 2 )............................................................................. 9
P e te r s o n v. A L P A , 759 F.2d 1161 (4th Cir.),
c e r t, d e n ie d , 474 U.S. 946 (1 9 8 5 ) ................................. 9
S lo c u m v. D e la w a r e , L & W R .R . ,
339 U.S. 239 (1 9 5 0 )............................................................5
S m o la r e k v. C h r y s le r C o r p ., 879 F,2d 1326
(6th Cir.), cert, d e n ie d , 493 U.S. 992
(1989)..................................................... 10
S te p h e n s v. N o r fo lk <£ W. R y . , 792 F.2d 576
(6th Cir.), a m e n d e d , 811 F.2d 286
(6th Cir. 1984) ........................................................................9
S u m m it A ir l in e s , In c . v. T e a m s te r s L o c a l 2 9 5 ,
628 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1 9 8 0 )...................... 7
S w i t c h m e n ’s U n io n v. N a tio n a l M e d ia t io n B o a r d ,
135 F.2d 785 (App. D.C.), r e v ’d o n o th e r
g r o u n d s , 320 U.S. 297 (1 9 4 3 ) ................. 7
U n io n P a c if ic R .R . v. P r ic e ,
360 U.S. 601 (1 9 5 9 )......................................................... . 4
U n io n P a c if ic R .R . v. S h e e fm n ,
439 U.S. 89 (1978) ................. 3
Ill
P a g e (s )
144
No. 92-2058
In T he
Su prem e C ourt o f th e U nited States
O ctober T e r m , 1992
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.,
Petitioners,
v.
Grant T. Norris,
Respondent.
BRIEF OF AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICA AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF HAW AH
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
The Air Transport Association of America ("ATA"),
is a non-profit unincorporated trade association of United
States federally certificated air carriers. ATA was founded in
1936 to facilitate the exchange of ideas and information
concerning matters that affect the airline industry, and to
represent the member carriers in legislative, judicial and
administrative matters.' ATA has filed numerous a m ic u s
briefs in federal and state court proceedings concerning a 1
1 The operator members include Alaska Airlines, Aloha Airlines, American
Airlines, American Trans Air, Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, DHL
Airways, Evergreen International, Federal Express Corp., Hawaiian Airlines,
Northwest Airlines, Reeve Aleutian Airways, Southwest Airlines, Trans World
Airlines, United Airlines, United Parcel Service, and USAir. Associate members
are Air Canada and Canadian Airlines International.
145
2
broad variety of issues of concern to its members. ATA also
works closely with the various Federal agencies that regulate
the airline industry such as the Federal Aviation
Administration and the Department o f Transportation. A TA ’s
members account for more than 97% of the domestic
passenger and cargo traffic flown annually by U .S. carriers.
They employ over half a million people, and perform a vital
function in the economy as a whole, transporting 452 million
passengers over 447 billion miles in 1991.
Congress recognized the important role of air
carriers in interstate commerce when it enacted the Federal
Aviation Act and when, in 1936, it added air carriers to the
coverage of the Railway Labor Act ("RLA "), 45 U .S .C .
§ 151 et seq . Congress recently reemphasized the economic
importance of the airline industry when it enacted legislation
creating the National Commission to Ensure a Strong
Competitive Airline Industry. PL 103-13, 107 Stat. 43.
All air carrier members o f ATA are subject to the
RLA and are vitally affected by state court decisions, such as
the one below, that undermine the R LA ’s comprehensive
procedures for resolution o f employment disputes. These RLA
procedures are designed to facilitate the peaceful and
expeditious resolution of such disputes and to avoid
interruptions to commerce. These procedures will be
undermined if state and federal courts, like the Hawaii
Supreme Court in this case, allow state law causes o f action
which overlap RLA remedies to escape preemption by the
RLA. M oreover, in an era when airline losses approximate
$4 billion per year, airlines are vitally concerned with
effective management of operations which cross many state
lines. These operations cannot be administered efficiently
when varied local laws and remedies affecting employment
relationships are held to be permitted, rather than preempted
by the RLA.
146
3
I. PREEMPTION OF OVERLAPPING STATE LAW
IS ESSENTIAL TO PRESERVE THE AUTHORITY
AND EFFECTIVENESS OF ADJUSTMENT
BOARDS UNDER THE RLA
In order to avoid interruptions to interstate
commerce in the vital transportation industry, the RLA
established exclusive and mandatory dispute-resolution
processes "to provide for the prom pt and orderly settlement
of all disputes growing out of grievances or out of the
interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of
pay, rules, or working conditions" 45 U .S .C . § 151(a)(5).
These dispute resolution processes allow no room for judicial
intervention.2 The RLA establishes detailed procedures for
selection of employee representatives, for bargaining about
contract formation (so-called "major disputes"), and for
arbitration of a wide range of grievances and contract
interpretation issues by Adjustment Boards (so-called "minor"
disputes). Elgin, Jo l ie t & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U .S. 711,
725-27 (1945). Because the RLA procedures are exclusive
2 The railroad industry was seen as a "state within a state" that evolved its
own adjustment mechanisms, in which courts were to have no role:
It is fair to say that every stage in the evolution of this
railroad labor code was progressively infused with the
purpose of securing self-adjustment between the
effectively organized railroads and the equally effective
railroad unions and, to that end, of establishing facilities
for such self adjustment by the railroad community of its
own industrial controversies. These were certainly not
expected to be solved by ill adapted judicial
interferences, escape from which was indeed one of the
driving motives in establishing specialized machinery of
mediation and arbitration.
Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 752 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.
dissenting); JAM v. Sir eel, 367 U.S. 740, 760 (1961) (quoting above language with
approval); see also Union Pacific R.R. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89 (1978) (Court
may not overturn Adjustment Board’s decision on legal issue regarding tolling of
statute of limitations).
147
4
and mandatory, the RLA has long been held to preem pt state
law which would otherw ise apply to the em ploym ent
relationship.3 The rights o f air carriers and their employees
under these RLA procedures are subject to federal common
law because the "needs o f the subject m atter manifestly call
for uniform ity." 1AM v. C entral A irlines, 372 U .S. 682, 692
(1963).
As interpreted and applied below, this salutary
preemption doctrine is eviscerated by application o f newly
emerging state law causes o f action to the airline industry.
The decision below allows a grievant to have two proceedings
in which to challenge an adverse employment decision, and
two remedies for that grievance. Under the result below, a
grievant who unsuccessfully contested his discharge "for
cause" in arbitration could nonetheless secure a ju ry trial of
the same facts under State law. E .g ., D avies v. A m erican
A irlines, In c ., 971 F .2d 463 (10th Cir. 1992), cert, d en ied ,
113 S. Ct. 2439 (1993) (discharged employee loses in
arbitration but is successful in state action for wrongful
discharge). Even a grievant successful in arbitration may seek
additional relief not contemplated under the collective
bargaining agreem ent. E .g ., M ayon v. Southern P ac ific
Transport C o ., 805 F .2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1986) (discharged
employee obtained reinstatement and backpay in arbitration,
3 Union Pacific R.R. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601,617 (1959) (employee who fails
to obtain reinstatement through Adjustment Board may not thereafter bring
common law action for damages for wrongful discharge; "To say that the
discharged employee may litigate the validity of his discharge in a common-law
action for damages after failing to sustain his grievance before the Board is to say
that Congress planned that the Board should function only to render advisory
opinions, and intended the Act’s entire scheme for the settlement of grievances to
be regarded ’as wholly conciliatory in character, involving no element of legal
effectiveness, with the consequence that the parties are entirely free to accept or
ignore the Board’s decision * * * [a contention] inconsistent with the Act’s terms,
purposes and legislative history.’"). Accord Andrews v. Louisville & N. R.R.t 406
U.S. 320 (1972) (rejecting doctrine that discharged employee’s resort to
Adjustment Board was optional, and that he had alternative damages remedy under
state law).
5
then filed additional state law claims for emotional distress;
state law held to be preempted). Such dual processes are
inherently destructive of the process which Congress has
established. The prospect o f inconsistent factual findings and
remedies on the same evidence between an arbitrator and a
state court is sure to undermine the credibility and finality of
the RLA arbitration process. RLA Adjustment Boards will
become "backup" remedies, or may delay their proceedings
to avoid inconsistent results. The essential purpose of
mandatory arbitration under the RLA, "the prom pt and
orderly settlement o f all disputes," is fatally underm ined.4
This case, in fact, well illustrates the dysfunctional
results of abandoning RLA preemption of state law claims.
When Respondent refused to sign a work record (a task
required o f mechanics by Article IV, D .4a of the collective
bargaining agreement), he was held out o f service pending
investigation (a process established by Art. XV, F. 1 o f the
collective bargaining agreement), and the normal grievance
processes were followed to determine whether he should be
disciplined for violation of the work rule. Respondent
defended his refusal to sign a work record attesting that he
had changed a tire on the ground that another part o f the tire
assembly was unsafe. Respondent relied on a provision o f the
collective bargaining agreement which said that ”[a]n * 1
4 Keeping disputes within the RLA framework of dispute resolution enhances
the value and effectiveness of the Adjustment Boards and the collective bargaining
process as a whole by allowing RLA conciliation procedures to work on a broad
range of controversies and promotes industrial peace. See BRT v. Chicago R. A
1. R.R.f 353 U.S. 30, 34 (1957) (rejecting the view that parties may voluntarily
use Adjustment Board but may resort to economic duress, if that seems more
desirable). The Adjustment Board is an extension of the collective bargaining
process; what is done there is incorporated into the labor contract for the benefit
of all the employees in that craft throughout the system. See Slocum v. Delaware,
L. W. R.R., 339 U.S. 239, 242 (1950) (settlement of dispute interpreting RLA
labor contract "would have prospective as well as retrospective importance to both
the railroad and its employees, since the interpretation accepted would govern
future relations of those parties").
149
6
em ployee’s refusal to perform work which is in violation of
established health and safety rules, or any local, state or
federal health and safety law shall not warrant disciplinary
action." Art. XVII, F.
W hen Respondent lost the first step o f the grievance
process, he appealed to the next step. Soon thereafter, he
abandoned the established grievance processes and filed suit
in state court, claiming that the discipline imposed on him (a
discharge reduced to a six week suspension) violated public
policy. The public policy violation alleged was airline safety
— the very issue specifically addressed in Art. XVII, F. The
holding below thus permits Respondent to take this claim
before a ju ry and to completely bypass the grievance
mechanism and the expertise o f an arbitrator knowledgeable
in industry practices as to matters explicitly covered by the
collective bargaining agreement. Thus, the R LA ’s carefully
tailored system of rights, processes and remedies is rendered
irrelevant by the decision below .5
n. THIS COURT SHOULD RESOLVE INCONSISTENT
PREEMPTION STANDARDS THAT ENCOURAGE
LITIGATION AND BURDEN RLA CARRIERS
State and federal courts currently employ a variety
of contradictory tests in determining RLA preem ption. As a
result, interstate air carriers cannot be sure which employment
matters are subject exclusively to arbitration and which are
subject to varying State laws.
Unlike the Labor M anagement Relations Act
("LM RA” or "NLRA"), the RLA requires representation and
5 Comprehensive RLA preemption does not eliminate all substantive rights
available under state law.' In the typical discharge case, for example, an employee
is free to argue to an arbitrator that an unlawful motive, rather than just cause, was
the real reason for his discharge. The parties are free, moreover, to expressly
incorporate state law protection in the collective bargaining agreement if that is
their desire.
150
7
collective bargaining at rail and air carriers to be
"system -wide."6 As a result, a single collective bargaining
agreement generally applies to all o f an airline’s employees in
one craft, throughout the United States. This Court has
recognized that the needs o f the subject matter manifestly call
for uniform ity, IAM v. Central A irlines, 372 U .S. at 691.
Consistency and uniformity in administration of such
collective bargaining agreements are greatly undermined,
however, when airlines are confronted with varying standards
of preemption in different state and federal courts. For
example, state law claims based upon conduct similar to that
alleged in this case — discharge after the employee allegedly
refused to lie regarding an FA A requirement — have been
found to be preempted by the Ninth Circuit. G rate v. Trans
W orld A irlines, In c ., 905 F .2d 1307 (9th C ir.), cert, den ied ,
498 U .S. 958 (1990). Courts have reached inconsistent
results on RLA preemption of other employment issues as
well.7
To demonstrate the extent o f the problem, and the
tremendous uncertainties which it creates for RLA carriers,
their unions, and their employees, ATA summarizes below
6 Switchmen’s Union v. National Mediation Bd., 135 F.2d 785, 793-95 (App.
D.C.), rev’d on other grounds, 320 U.S. 297 (1943) (RLA bargaining
encompasses all employees in craft without geographic limit); Summit Airlines,
Inc. v. Teamsters Local 295, 628 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1980) (representation under
the RLA is system-wide).
7 Compare Lorenz v. CSX Transp., Inc., 980 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1992)
(defamation action arising out of investigation of suspected theft is preempted
because it inextricably involves RLA grievance procedures); Magnuson v.
Burlington N., Inc., 576 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978)
(claim of infliction of emotional distress based on alleged abuse of investigation
into employee's responsibility for train accident is preempted); Majors v. U.S. Air,
Inc., 525 F. Supp. 853 (D. Md. 1981) (false imprisonment and theft claims are
preempted because part of RLA grievance procedure), with McCann v. Alaska
Airlines, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 559, 564-65 (N.D. Cal. 1991).(torts arising out of
investigation of suspected employee misconduct are not inextricably intertwined
with grievance procedure, no preemption found); Merola v. National R.R.
Passenger Corp., 683 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y 1988) (same).
151
8
the various areas o f conflict regarding the RLA preem ption
doctrine.
A. Lower Courts Disagree On Whether Lingle
Applies To Railway Labor Act Cases
The Hawaii Supreme Court below applied the
preemption standard articulated by this Court in L in g le v.
N orge Div. o f M agic C hefs, In c ., 486 U .S. 399 (1988), a case
arising under the LMRA. The plaintiff in L in g le alleged that
the em ployer had unlawfully discharged her because she filed
a w orkers’ compensation claim. The Seventh Circuit held
that L in g le ’s action for retaliatory discharge was preempted
because it was "inextricably intertwined" with her grievance
under the collective bargaining agreement, which required just
cause for discharge. This Court reversed, holding that the
origin o f the claim, not factual parallelism, determines
preemption under Section 301 of the LM RA, i .e . where the
claim is premised in the terms of the contract, preem ption is
established under Section 301.
Because RLA grievance resolution is mandatory
rather than voluntary,8 this Court has stated that RLA
preemption is "stronger" than preemption under the LMRA.
Andrews v. L ou isville & N ashville R .R ., 406 U .S. 320, 323
(1972) ( ”[S]ince the compulsory character o f the
administrative remedy provided by the Railway Labor Act for
disputes . . . stems not from any contractual undertaking
between the parties but from the Act itself, the case for
insisting on resort to those remedies is if anything stronger in
8 Compare 45 U.S.C. § 153, 184 (under RLA all "grievances” and disputes
under "agreements" referred to Adjustment) with 29 U.S.C. § 185 (under LMRA
federal courts may resolve disputes arising out of labor contracts).
152
9
cases arising under that Act than it is in cases arising under
§ 301 o f the LM R A ").9
M any courts have applied in RLA cases the
preemption standard that a state law claim "inextricably
intertwined" with collective bargaining and the grievance
machinery is preempted. L oren z v. CSX Tram p. In c ., 980
F .2d 263 (4th Cir. 1992) (defamation claim "inextricably
intertwined" with grievance procedures); S tep h em v. N orfolk
& W. R y ., 192 F .2d 576, 580 (6th C ir.), am en ded , 811 F .2d
286 (6th Cir. 1984) ("inextricably intertwined" test);
M agnuson v. Burlington N., In c ., 576 F .2d 1367 (9th C ir.),
cert, d en ied , 439 U .S. 930 (1978) (employee’s emotional
distress claim, arising from discharge after causing train
crash, is preempted because inextricably intertwined with
minor dispute process).
Other courts, including the Hawaii Supreme Court
in this case, have refused to find RLA preemption o f state
wrongful discharge claims by applying the less preemptive
L in gle standard.10 Although the Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth
9 Accord, Grote v. Trans World Airlines, 905 F.2d 1307, 1309 (9th Cir.),
cert, denied, 498 U.S. 958 (1990) ("Congress made clear its interest in keeping
railroad labor disputes simple and out of the reach of the often lengthy court
process"); Baylis v. Marriott Corp., 906 F.2d 874, 878 (2d Cir. 1990), citing with
approval, Baldracci v. Pratt A Whitney, 814 F.2d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 1987), cert,
denied, 486 U.S. 1054 (1988) ("RLA likely has greater preemptive reach than
LMRA"); McCall v. Chesapeake A Ohio Ry., 844 F.2d 294 (6th Cir.), cert,
denied, 488 U.S. 879 (1988) (exercise of state power over an area of activity
specifically relegated to Adjustment Boards causes a danger of conflict with
national laborpolicy great enough to mandate preemption); Peterson v. ALPA, 759
F,2d 1161,1169 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985) ("unlike preemption
under the NLRA, the preemption of state law claims under the RLA has been
more complete."); Beard v. Carrollton R.R., 893 F.2d 117, 122 (6th Cir. 1989)
(”[t]he standards under the two statutes may not be identical. . . . more likely that
a state claim will interfere with federal interests in the context of the RLA.”)
10 Davies v. American Airlines, Inc., 971 F.2d 463 (10th Cir. 1992), cert,
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2439 (1993); Norris v. Hawaiian Airlines, 842 P.2d 634 (Haw.
(continued...)
153
10
Circuits have explicitly rejected application o f L in gle under
the R L A ," other courts, including the Tenth Circuit, have
found L in g le applicable.10 11 12
If the Hawaii Supreme Court had applied the
"inextricably intertwined" test, preemption would have been
found, for at least two reasons. First, the agreement required
Norris to sign o ff on work he had performed. If the inquiry
under Hawaii law concerned Hawaiian A irlines’ motive in
disciplining N orris, the em ployer’s defense that it had "just
cause" under the collective bargaining agreement to discipline
an employee who refused to sign o ff on work meant that the
defense was "inextricably intertwined" with the CBA and
RLA processes.13
10 (...continued)
1992) ; Maher v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 593 A.2d 750, 759
(N.J. 1991).
11 Croston v. Burlington N.R.R., 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 15890 n.3 (9th Cir.
1993) ("preemption sweeps even broader under the RLA than under the NLRA");
Lorenz, 980 F.2d at 268 (4th Cir. 1992) ("The circuit courts that have considered
Lingle in light of the RLA declined to extend its analysis beyond the NLRA
context"); Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp., 879 F.2d 1326, 1334 n.4 (6th Cir.), cert,
denied, 493 U.S. 992 (1989) ("McCall did not involve the question of § 301
preemption"); McCall v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 844 F.2d 294, 300 (6th
Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 879 (1988) (because of strong similarity between
inquiry made by arbitration board and jury in state cause of action, the latter is
"inextricably intertwined" with the grievance machinery of the collective
bargaining agreement and the RLA and is preempted); Grote v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 905 F.2d 1307, 1309 (9th Cir.) ("Lingle is inapposite because it
deals with preemption under § 301 of the LMRA . . ."), cert, denied, 498 U.S.
958 (1990).
12 Davies v. American Airlines, 971 F.2d at 466 ("test articulated by Lingle
. . . just as valid under the RLA as it is under the LMRA").
13 The "mixed motive” test is well established in all areas'of labor law.
Where motive is in issue, if the employer can prove its actions would have
occurred in the absence of the protected conduct, no violation is found. NLRB v.
Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983) (applying mixed motive
test under LMRA).
1 !
Second, the Hawaiian Airlines labor agreem ent
expressly stated that "[a]n em ployee’s refusal to perform work
which is in violation o f . . . any local, state or federal health
and safety law shall not warrant disciplinary ac tion ." '4 Pet.
App. 112a, CBA, Art. XVIII tF . The Hawaii Supreme Court
interpreted this provision to refer only to safety issues in the
workplace itself, not to public safety issues such as FAA
regulations. In doing so, that court intruded upon the
authority o f the specialized tribunal that alone may interpret
RLA contracts. It is certainly "arguable" that this provision
would have protected Norris had the dispute gone through
Adjustment Board procedures. E .g. A laska A irlines, Inc. an d
Air L in e P ilots A ss ’n, 88 AAR (Lab. Rel. Press) 0108 (1988)
(Sinicropi, Arb.) (pilot who refuses to fly aircraft on grounds
defect in windshield rendered it nonairworthy has discipline
mitigated by Adjustment Board). Clearly, the claim of
wrongful discharge under state law was inextricably
intertwined with interpretation o f this clause. In sum, the
"inextricably intertwined" test for preemption is the
appropriate test to prevent either state or federal courts from
usurping the unique role the Adjustment Boards play under
the R L A .14 15
14 The Hawaii Supreme court stated that Hawaiian Airlines had not "pointed]
to any part of the CBA which demonstrates that the carrier and union have agreed
on standards relevant to Norris’ situation.” Given the quoted language, this
conclusion is clearly erroneous.
15 The existence of an arbitrable minor dispute under the RLA turns on
whether a contract "arguably governs" the dispute or whether the carrier’s contract
justification for its actions is not "obviously insubstantial.” Consolidated Rail
Corp. v. RLEA, 491 U.S. 299, 307 (1989). This definition was developed to
distinguish arbitrable minor disputes from "major" disputes of contract formation,
Elgin, 325 U.S. 711 (1945). Nonetheless, courts deciding preemption issues
frequently reason that, if a dispute is "arguably governed" by a collective
bargaining agreement, it is a minor dispute for an Adjustment Board and therefore
the RLA preempts state law claims. Other courts have reasoned that the minor
dispute test was developed for another purpose, and should not be utilized to
determine preemption. Maher v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 593
A.2d 750, 758 (N.J. 1991).
155
12
B. Lower Courts Disagree On Whether RLA
Arbitration Applies To Grievances Not Explicitly
Covered by the Collective Bargaining Agreement
This Court stated in Elgin , J o l ie t & E. Ry. v.
Burley, 325 U .S. 711 (1945), that minor disputes encompass
not only grievances interpreting or applying the collective
bargaining agreem ent, but also those "founded upon some
incident o f the employment relation, or asserted one,
independent of those covered by the collective agreement,
e .g . , claims on account of personal injuries." Id . at 7 2 3 .16
The statute itself extends arbitration to "grievances” as well
as disputes arising from the interpretation o f contracts. 45
U .S. §§ 151(a)(5), 153 First (i), 184. This "omitted case"
situation recognized in Elgin clearly is inconsistent with the
NLRA preemption test o f L in g le, because it expands
mandatory arbitration beyond those claims that "arise under"
a labor contract, to encompass claims that could be said to
arise under state law or common law. Recently, the Fourth
Circuit relied upon Elgin , and its so-called "omitted case"
doctrine, to Find preemption of certain state law claims against
an RLA carrier. Lorenz v. CSX Transp. In c ., 980 F .2d 263,
268 (4th Cir. 1992).
Conversely, to avoid the import o f Elgin, the Hawaii
Supreme Court held that the Court in C on solidated R ail Corp.
v. RLEA, 491 U .S. 299 (1989) ("C on rail" ), implicitly
abandoned the "omitted case” doctrine and more narrowly
deFned the matters that comprise minor disputes.17 It is
difficult to credit the proposition that C onrail narrowed Elgin
16 Claims based on personal injuries, of course, usually arise under state law.
17 While acknowledging that "the term 'grievances’ as used in the mandatory
arbitration provision of the RLA . . . may be literally read to include disputes
outside a collective bargaining agreement," the Hawaii Supreme Court nonetheless
concluded that "Congress intended to affect only those disputes involving
contractually defined rights." Pet. App. at 244. Accord Davies v. American
Airlines, Inc., 971 F.2d at 467.
155
13
in this respect, because C onrail itself was an "omitted case"
dispute (neither management nor the union contended that any
portion o f the collective bargaining agreement covered the
drug testing at issue there), and the Court did not cite or
discuss Elgin or mention the "omitted case" doctrine.
CO N C LU SIO N
The petition for a writ o f certiorari should be
granted, to resolve the conflict in the lower courts on the
applicability o f the L ingle preemption doctrine under the
Railway Labor Act. This C ourt’s determination o f the
applicability o f L in gle under the RLA would also resolve the
split in the lower courts concerning whether Elgin has been
implicitly narrowed or overruled by C onrail.
Respectfully submitted
‘ Charles A. Shanor
John J. Gallagher
M argaret H. Spurlin
PAUL, HASTINGS, JANOFSKY
& WALKER
1050 Connecticut Avenue, N .W .
Twelfth Floor
Washington, D .C. 20036
F o r Amicus Curiae
The A ir Transport A ssociation
o f A m erica
*C ou n sel o f R ecord
July 23, 1993
157
No. 92-2058
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1993
---------------«---------------
HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC.,
Petitioner,
GRANT T. NORRIS,
Respondent,
and
PAUL J. FINAZZO, HOWARD E. OGDEN and
HATSUO HONMA,
Petitioners,
v.
GRANT T. NORRIS,
Respondent.
-------------- -----------------
On Writ Of Certiorari
To The Supreme Court For The State of Hawaii
------------------------------- — ♦ -------------------------------------
OPENING BRIEF OF PETITIONERS
— ---------- — ♦ --------------
Goodsill A nderson Q uinn &
Stifel
Kenneth B. H ipp*
David J. D ezzani
M argaret C. Jenkins
Lisa Von D er M ehden
1099 Alakea Street
1800 Alii Place
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813
(808) 547-5600
Counsel for Petitioners
^Counsel of Record
159
!
Q UESTIO N PRESENTED
W h e th e r the H aw aii S u p rem e C o u rt e rred in co n c lu d in g
th a t re sp o n d e n t’s s ta te law w ro n g fu l d isch arg e c la im s w ere
no t p reem p ted by the R ailw ay L ab o r A ct, 45 U .S .C . S ection
151 e t s e q .
160
11
A ll p a rtie s to the d ec is io n s below are co n ta in ed in the
cap tion o f th is case. P e titio n e r H aw aiian A irlin es , Inc., a
H aw aii co rp o ra tio n , is a w holly ow ned subsid ia ry o f H A L,
Inc., a p u b lic ly traded H aw aii co rp o ra tio n . H A L, Inc. is also
the p aren t co rp o ra tio n o f W est M aui A irpo rt, Inc.
LIST OF PARTIES
161
Ill
Q U E S T IO N P R E S E N T E D .............................. i
L IS T O F P A R T I E S .......................................... ii
T A B LE O F C O N T E N T S ............ ......................................... iii
T A B LE O F A U T H O R I T I E S ............ ............................................ vi
O P IN IO N S B E L O W ................................................... i
J U R I S D I C T I O N .................................................................................. 1
C O N S T IT U T IO N A L A N D STATUTORY P R O V IS IO N S
IN V O L V E D ......... ................................................................... l
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E C A S E .................................................... 1
S U M M A R Y O F A R G U M E N T ................................................ 5
A R G U M E N T . . ..................................................................................... 8
I. S T A T E L A W “ W R O N G F U L D I S C H A R G E ”
C L A IM S A R E P R E E M P T E D BY T H E R L A . . . . . 8
A. C O N G R E S S IN T E N D E D FO R D IS C H A R G E
A N D D IS C IP L IN E D IS P U T E S IN T H E R A IL
A N D A I R L I N E I N D U S T R I E S T O B E
R E SO L V E D T H R O U G H T H E R L A ’S P R O
C E D U R E S ......................... 9
1. T h e S t a t u t o r y S c h e m e C o n t e m p l a t e s
A d jus tm en t B oard R eso lu tion o f “W rong
ful D isch a rg e” C l a i m s ...................................... 9
a) T he R L A ’s Plain L anguage E n co m
passes D isputes O uts ide of the B ar
gain ing A g re e m e n t ................ 9
T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S
P a g e
162
IV
b ) C o n g r e s s E x p r e s s l y C o m m i t t e d
“ W h i s t l e b l o w e r ” C la im s to R L A
Jurisd ic t ion .................................................... 12
2, T he L e g is la t iv e H is to ry U n d e r ly in g the
R L A L ik ew ise D em o n s tra te s C o n g re s s ’
In te n t F o r C la im s o f “W ro n g fu l D is
c h a rg e ” to Be R eso lv ed By R L A P ro
cedu res .................. 15
3. A llow ing N orr is to B ypass The R L A D is
p u te R eso lu t io n P rocess and C h a l len g e
H is D isc ip l ine In S ta te Court W ould F ru s
tra te The R LA S c h e m e ................................... 19
B. T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T ’S IN T E R P R E T A
T IO N O F T H E R L A S C H E M E SU PPO R TS
P R E E M P T I O N O F STA TE “W R O N G F U L
D IS C H A R G E ” C L A I M S .......................................... 23
1. T h is C ourt Has R ecogn ized T hat A d ju s t
m en t B oard Ju risd ic tion Extends to D is
pu tes T hat A rise O utside the Terms o f a
C o llec t iv e B arga in ing A g r e e m e n t ................. 23
2. A n d rew s D eclares T hat the R LA A d ju s t
m en t B oard is the Exclusive F orum for
“W rongfu l D ischarge” C la im s ........................ 27
II. T H E R L A P R E E M P T S N O R R IS ’ “W R O N G F U L
D IS C H A R G E ” C L A IM S ..................................................... 31 III.
III. T H E C A S E S R E L IE D O N BY N O R R IS , T H E
HAW AII S U P R E M E C O U R T A N D T H E S O L IC I
T O R G E N E R A L TO N A R R O W TH E S C O PE O F
R L A P R E E M P T IO N D O N O T D E T E R M IN E TH E
S C O P E O F A D JU S T M E N T B O A R D JU R IS D IC
T I O N .......................................... 36
T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S - C o n t in u e d
P a g e
153
V
T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S - C o n t in u e d
P a g e
A. T H E HAW AII C O U R T ’S R E L IA N C E O N U N
C L E IS M IS P L A C E D ................................................. 37
1. L o w e r C ourts B roadly A pplied A n d rew s to
T o r t -B a se d C la im s fo r “W ro n g fu l D is
c h a rg e ” U n ti l T h is C o u r t ’s D e c is io n in
L i n g l e ....................... 37
2. L in g le is Inapp licab le to P reem ption U nder
the R L A ......................... 39
3. N o r r i s ’ “W rongfu l D isch a rg e” C la im s are
P ree m p te d by the R LA Even if the L in g le
S tandard is U sed .................................................. 43
B. A LE X A N D E R V. G A R D N E R -D E N V E R D O ES
N O T W E IG H A G A IN S T S Y S T E M B O A R D
R E S O L U T IO N O F C L A IM S ................................... 46
C. C O L O R A D O A N T I-D IS C R IM IN A T IO N C O M
M IS S IO N IS I N A P P O S I T E ..................................... 47
D. CO N RA 1U S M IN O R D IS P U T E T E S T IS N O T
A P P R O P R IA T E F O R D E T E R M IN IN G T H E
S C O P E O F R L A P R E E M P T IO N , A N D IS
S A T IS F IE D IN A N Y E V E N T ................................. 48
C O N C L U S IO N 50
VI
C ases
A le x a n d e r v. G a r d n e r - D e n v e r C o . , 415 U .S . 36
( 1 9 7 4 ) ....................................................................................36, 46, 47
A llis -C h a lm e r s C o rp . v. L u e c k , 471 U.S. 202 ( 1 9 8 5 ) . . . . . 9
A n d erson v. A m e r ic a n A ir lin es , In c ., 2 F.3d 590 (5th
Cir. 1 9 9 3 ) ............ .................... ......................................................... 38
A n drew s v. L o u is v i l l e & N a sh v ille R a i lr o a d C o ., 406
U.S. 320 ( 1 9 7 2 ) ................................................ ....................p a s s im
A tch ison , T. & S.F. Ry. C o . v. B u e ll , 480 U.S. 557
( 1 9 8 7 ) . ........................' . ........................ ............................................. 46
B a ld r a c c h i v. P ra tt & W hitney A irc ra ft D iv., 814 F.2d
102 (2d Cir. 1987) ........................................................................ 38
B e e r s v. S o u th ern P a c . T ran sp . C o ., 703 F.2d 425 (9th
Cir. 1983) ........................................................................................... 38
B r o th e r h o o d o f R a i lr o a d T ra in m en v. C h ic a g o R. &
I.R .R ., 353 U.S. 30 ( 1 9 5 7 ) ....................... .........................16, 28
B row n v. M is s o u r i P a c . R .R ., 720 S.W .2d 357 (M o.),
cer t, d e n ie d , 481 U.S. 1049 ( 1 9 8 6 ) ....................... ............. 39
C a lv er t v. T ran s W orld A ir lin es , In c ., 959 F.2d 698
(8 th Cir. 1 9 9 2 ) ............ ........................... ........................................ 39
C a m p b e ll v. P an A m er ica n W orld A irw ay s, 6 6 8 F.
Supp. 139 (E.D.N.Y. 1 9 8 7 ) ....................................... ............... 37
C a p ra ro v. U n ited P a r c e l S e r v ic e C o ., 993 F.2d 328
(3rd Cir. 1 9 9 3 ) ................ ...................... ..................................42, 43
T A B L E O F A U T H O R I T I E S
P a g e
C o l o r a d o A n t i - D i s c r i m i n a t i o n C o m m ’n v. C o n t i n e n t a l
A i r l i n e s , I n c . , 3 7 2 U .S . 7 1 4 ( 1 9 6 3 ) ................................ 36 , 47
165
Vll
C o n s o l id a t e d R a i l v. L a b o r E x e c u t iv e s ’ A s s ’n, 491
U .S. 299 ( 1 9 8 9 ) ................................................. p a s s im
C ro s to n v. B u r lin g to n N .R .R ., 999 F.2d 381 (9th Cir,
1 9 9 3 ) ........................................ . . . . . 3 9
D a v ie s v. A m e r ic a n A ir lin es , In c ., 971 F,2d 463 (10th
Cir. 1992), c e r t , d e n ie d , 113 S. Ct. 2439 ( 1 9 9 3 ) . . 2 1 , 38
E d e lm a n v. W estern A ir lin es , In c ., 892 F.2d 839 (9th
Cir. 1989) ................ 3 9
E lg in , J . & E. Ry. C o . v. B u rley , 325 U.S. 711 (1945) p a s s im
F e ld le i t v. L o n g Is. R .R ., 723 F. Supp. 892 (E.D.N.Y.
1 9 8 9 ) ........................................................................ 39
G ib b o n s v. O g d en , 22 U.S. (9 W heat .) 5 (1 8 2 4 ) ...................8
G ilm e r v. In t e r s ta t e / J o h n s o n L a n e C o rp ., 500 U.S. 20,
114 L .Ed. 2d 26 ( 1 9 9 1 ) ........................................ 7, 35, 46, 48
G r a f v. E lg in , J . & E. Ry., 790 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir.
1 9 8 6 ) ......................................................................................................... 3 7
G r o te v. T ran s W orld A ir lin es , In c ., 905 F.2d 1307
(9th Cir.) , ce r t , d e n ie d , 498 U.S. 958 (1990) . ............ . 3 8
G r o v e s v. R in g S crew W orks, 498 U.S. 168 ( 1 9 9 0 ) ___ . 4 0
T A B L E O F A U T H O R I T I E S - C o n t in u e d
P a g e
H o d g e s v. A t c h i s o n , T. & S .F . R y . , 7 2 8 F.2d 4 1 4 (1 0 th
C ir . ) , c e r t , d e n i e d , 4 6 9 U .S . 8 2 2 ( 1 9 8 4 ) ............................. 37
166
Vlll
H u b b a rd v. U n ited A ir lin es , In c ., 927 F.2d 1094 (9th
Cir. 1 9 9 1 ) ................................................................... 38
1AM v. N o rth w es t A ir lin es , 858 F.2d 427 ( 8 th Cir.
1 9 8 8 ) . . . . ..................................... 13
In d ep en d en t U nion o f F lig h t A tten d an ts v. P an A m er i
can W orld A irw ay s, In c ., 789 F.2d 139 (2d Cir.
1986)............................................... 35
I n t e r n a t i o n a l A s s ’n o f M a c h in i s t s & A e r o s p a c e
W orkers v. A lle g is C o r p ., 545 N.Y.S.2d 638 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1989) ..................... 38
In te r n a t io n a l A ss'n o f M a ch in is ts v. C en tra l A ir lin es ,
In c ., 372 U.S. 682 ( 1 9 6 3 ) ...................................................19, 21
In te r n a t io n a l A s s ’n o f M a ch in is ts v. S treet, 367 U.S.
740 ( 1 9 6 1 ) ....................................................................................14, 22
J a c k s o n v. C o n s o l id a t e d R a il C o r p ., 717 F.2d 1045
(7th Cir. 1983), cer t , d e n ie d , 465 U.S. 1007 (1984) . . . . 37
J o n e s v. R a th P a c k in g C o ., 4 3 0 U.S. 519 ( 1 9 7 7 ) ................ 8
L in g le v. N o rg e Div. o f M a g ic C h e f, In c ., 486 U.S. 399
( 1 9 8 8 ) ................ p a s s im
L oren z v. C SX T ran s., In c ., 980 F.2d 263 (4th Cir.
1 9 9 2 ) . . . . . . ........................................................................ . . . 3 8
T A B L E O F A U T H O R I T I E S - C o n t in u e d
P a g e
M a g n u s o n v. B u r l i n g t o n N . I n c . , 5 7 6 F .2d 1367 (9 th
C ir .) , c e r t , d e n i e d , 4 3 9 U .S . 9 3 0 ( 1 9 7 8 ) ............................ 38
167
IX
T A B L E O F A U T H O R I T I E S - C o n t in u e d
P a g e
M a h e r v. N ew J e r s e y T ran sit R a il O p era t io n s , In c .,
125 N.J. 455, 593 A. 2d 750 (1 9 9 1 ) .........................4, 5, 38
M a lo n e v. W hite M o to r C o r p ., 435 U.S. 497 (1 9 7 8 ) .........9
M ayon v. S o u th ern P a c . T ran sp . C o ., 805 F.2d 1250
(5 th C ir. 1986), c e r t , d e n i e d , 488 U .S . 925
(1 9 8 8 ) ................................................................................. 21, 34, 37
M c C a ll v. C h e s a p e a k e & O. Ry., 844 F.2d 294 (6th
Cir.), c e r t , d e n ie d , 488 U.S. 879 (1 9 8 8 ) ........................... 37
M ela n so n v. U n ited A ir lin es , In c ., 931 F.2d 558 (9th
Cir. 1 9 9 1 ) ................................................................................. 30
M in e h a r t v. L o u is v i l le & N. R .R ., 731 F.2d 342 (6th
Cir. 1 9 8 4 ) ........................................ .............................................. 37
M is s o u r i- K a n s a s T ex as R. v. B r o t h e r h o o d o f R .R .
T ra in m en , 342 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1 9 6 5 ) ....................... 35-36
M o o re v. I l l in o is C ent. R .R ., 312 U.S. 630 (1 9 4 1 ) .. .2 7 , 29
N elso n v. P ied m o n t, 750 F.2d 1234 (4th Cir.), cer t .
d e n ie d , 471 U.S. 1116 ( 1 9 8 5 ) .......................... 47
N o rr is v. F in a z z o , 74 Haw. 235, 842 P.2d 634 (Haw.
1992)............................. .......................................................................1
N o r r i s v. H a w a i i a n A i r l i n e s , I n c . , C iv il N o.
87-3894-12 ..................... .................................................................... 1
O ’B r ien v. C o n s o l id a t e d R a il C o r p ., 972 F.2d 1 (1st
Cir. 1992), cer t, d e n ie d , 122 L.Ed. 2d 134 ( 1 9 9 3 ) . . . . 38
168
X
O rd er o f Ry. C o n d u c to r s v. P itn ey , 326 U.S. 561
( 1 9 4 6 ) . . .......................... .................................................................... 18
P a p e r w o r k e r s v. M isco , 484 U.S. 29 (1 9 8 7 ) .......................... 4 3
P en n sy lv a n ia R .R . v. D ay , 360 U.S. 548 ( 1 9 5 9 ) ......... 19, 21
P e te r so n v. A ir L in e P ilo ts A s s ’n, 759 F.2d 1161 (4th
Cir. 1 9 8 5 ) .......................................................................................... 3 7
P u ch er t v. A g sa lu d , 67 Haw. 25, 677 P.2d 449 (1984),
a p p e a l d is m is s e d f o r w an t o f s u b s ta n t ia l f e d e r a l
q u e s t io n , 472 U.S. 1001 (1 9 8 5 ) .............................................. 3 7
R a y n er v. S m irl, 873 F.2d 60 (4th Cir.) , c e r t , d e n ie d ,
493 U.S. 876 ( 1 9 8 9 ) . . . . ................ .................................... .. 14
R ep u b lic S t e e l C o rp . v. M a d d o x , 379 U.S. 650 (1965) 24, 25
R eta il C le r k s In te r n a t io n a l A s s ’n v. S ch e r m e r h o r n ,
375 U.S. 96 ( 1 9 6 3 ) .............................. 8
St. M a r y ’s H o n o r Ctr. v. H ick s , 125 L .Ed. 2d 407
( 1 9 9 3 ) .......................... ...................... ................................................4 4
S c h r o e d e r v. T ran s W orld A ir lin es , In c ., 702 F.2 d 189
(9th Cir. 1 9 8 3 ) ........................... 3 8
S la g ley v. I l l in o is C ent. R .R ., 397 F.2d 546 (7th Cir.
1 9 6 8 ) ................................................................................. 4 2
S locu m v. D e la w a r e L. & W. R .R ., 339 U.S. 239
( 195° ) .............................. ................................ ............................. 28, 29
T A B L E O F A U T H O R I T I E S - C o n t in u e d
P a g e
S m o l a r e k v. C h r y s l e r C o r p . , 8 7 9 F .2d 1326 (6 th C ir .) ,
c e r t , d e n i e d , 4 9 3 U .S . 9 9 2 ( 1 9 8 9 ) ............... 39
169
XI
T A B L E O F A U T H O R I T I E S - C o n t in u e d
P a g e
T ea m sters v. L u c a s F lo u r C o ., 369 U.S. 95 ( 1 9 6 2 ) ......... 41
T ex as D ep t, o f C om m . A ffa ir s v. B u rd in e , 450 U.S,
248 (1981) . .................................................................................... .. . 44
T ra n sc o n tin en ta l & VP. Air, Inc. v. K o p p a l , 345 U.S.
653 ( 1 9 5 3 ) ...................................................................... 27
U n d erw o o d v. V en an g o R iv er C o r p ., 995 F.2d 677 (7th
Cir. 1 9 9 3 ) ............................................................................................ 39
U nion P a c . R.R. v. P r ic e , 360 U.S. 601 (1959) . . . . . 1 7 , 19
U nion P a c . R.R. v. S h e e h a n , 439 U.S. 89 ( 1 9 7 8 ) . . . . . . . 17
U n ited T ran sp . U nion v. S p r in g fie ld T erm in a l C o .,
767 F. Supp. 333 (D. Me. 1 9 9 1 ) .............................................14
V aca v. S ip e s , 386 U.S. 171 ( 1 9 6 7 ) .......................................... 25
W alker v. S o u th ern R.R., 385 U.S. 196 (1 9 6 6 ) ......................... 28
Z im m erm an v. A tch ison , T. & S.F. Ry., 8 8 8 F.2d 660
(10th Cir. 1 9 8 9 ) ............................................................................... 39
A dministrative C ases
NR A B S econd D iv is ion Award No. 12148 (Sept. 25,
1 9 9 1 ) ......................................................................................................... 36
N R AB First D iv is ion Award No. 24059 (Feb. 6 , 1991) . . . . 36
NR A B Third D iv is ion Award No. 27505 (Sept. 22,
1 9 8 8 ) ......................................' . ..................................................... 36
170
XII
NRAB T h ird D iv is ion Award No. 23151 (Jan. 30,
1 9 8 1 ) ......................................................................................................... 36
Public L aw B oard No. 3399, Award No. 4 (Mar. 11,
1 9 8 5 ) .................................................................................... 36
U nited States C onstitution
S uprem acy C lause , A rtic le VI, c lause 2 o f the C o n s ti
tu t io n ...................................................... 1 , 8
F ederal S tatutes
28 U .S.C . § 1 2 5 7 ( a ) ............ .................................. ...................... . . I
Age D isc r im in a t io n in E m p lo y m en t Act o f 1967, 29
U .S.C . § 621 et s e q ...................................................................... . . 3 5
Federal A rb itra tion Act, 9 U .S.C . § 1 et s e q ........................35
Federal A via tion Act, 49 U .S.C . § 1301 e t s e q ......................4
Federal R ail Safe ty A ct o f 1970, 45 U.S.C. § 421 e t
s e q . . . . . . . . . ....... .. .............. ........................................................... 12
§ 205, 45 U .S .C . § 4 3 4 . .............................................................. . . . 1 4
§ 212, 45 U .S.C . § 4 4 1 .............. .................... .........................13, 14
The N a tiona l L ab o r R elations Act, 29 U.S.C . § 151 e t
....... ................................................................................................... 12
§ 8 (a)(4), 29 U .S .C . § 1 5 8 (a ) (4 ) .............................. 12
R ailway L ab o r A ct, 45 U.S.C . § 151 et s e q ..............p a s s im
§ 1, 45 U .S .C . § 1 5 1 ................................ 47
§ 2, 45 U .S .C . § 1 5 1 a ....... 10
§ 2, 45 U .S .C . § 1 5 2 .......................................... ..................10, 31
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
171
XUl
§ 3, 45 U .S .C . § 1 5 3 .......... p a s s im
§ 4, 45 U .S .C . § 1 5 4 .............................................. u
§ 5, 45 U .S .C . § 1 5 5 ............................................... ............. U , 26
§ 201, 45 U .S .C . § 1 8 1 ....................... ............. .................. 11, 47
§ 203, 45 U .S .C . § 1 8 3 ........................ 11
§ 204, 45 U .S .C . § 1 8 4 ...................................... p a s s im
§ 205, 45 U .S .C . § 1 8 5 . . . . .................................... 11
S ec tion 301 o f the L abor M an ag em en t R ela t ions Act,
29 U .S .C . § 185 .......................................... ........................... p a s s im
H awaii S tatutes
H a w a i i W h i s t l e b l o w e r s ’ P r o t e c t io n A c t , H .R .S .
§ 378-61 e t s e q ............. ....................................................................... 4
L egislative M aterials
S. 48, 101st C ong ., 1st Sess. ( 1 9 8 9 ) ............................... . . . 3 1
H.R. 4023 , 100th C ong ., 2d Sess. ( 1 9 8 8 ) . 31
H.R. 4113 , 100th C ong ., 2d Sess. ( 1 9 8 8 ) .......... 31
H.R. 5073 , 100th Cong. 2d Sess. ( 1 9 8 8 ) ................ 31
H.R. Rep. N o. 1025, 96th C ong ., 2d Sess. ( 1 9 8 0 ) ............. 13
H.R. Rep. No. 2811 , 81st C ong., 2d Sess. ( 1 9 5 0 ) ............. 20
H.R. Rep. No. 2243 , 74th C ong., 2d Sess. ( 1 9 3 6 ) ............. 18
H e a r in g s b e fo r e th e H o u se C o m m ittee on In te r s ta te
a n d F o r e ig n C o m m erc e on H R 7650 , 73rd C ong .,
2d Sess . ( 1 9 3 4 ) ................................................................................J7
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
172
XIV
H earings b e fo r e the S en ate C om m ittee on Interstate C om
m erce on S. 3266, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1 9 3 4 ) ............ 17, 19
To A m en d th e R a ilw a y L a b o r A ct to C o v e r E v ery
C o m m o n C a r r i e r by A ir E n g a g e d in In t e r s ta t e
C o m m erce , H e a r in g s on S. 2 4 9 6 B e fo r e a S u b c o m
m itte e o f th e C o m m itte e on In te r s ta te C o m m e r c e ,
74th C ong ., 1st Sess. ( 1 9 3 5 ) .................................................. 18
96 Cong. Rec. 16,261 (1950) (s ta tem ent o f Sen. Hill) . . . . 20
67 Cong. R ec. 8807 (1926) (s ta tem ent o f Sen. W at
son) ............................................................................................................15
67 Cong. Rec. 4670 (1926) (s ta tem en t o f Rep. A r e n t z ) ___ 15
67 Cong. R ec. 4666 (1926) (s ta tem ent o f Rep. N. C.
L a u g h l i n ) ............................................ 22
67 C o n g . R e c . 4 6 6 5 (1 9 2 6 ) ( s t a t e m e n t o f R ep .
C r a s s e r ) .................................................................................................. 16
67 Cong. Rec. 46 5 0 (1926) (s ta tem en t o f Rep. Jacob-
s te in ) • • • • • • • • • ...........................................................................22, 23
67 Cong. Rec. 4517 (1926) (s ta tem ent o f Rep. B ar
c lay ) ................ 15
A dministrative R egulations
Federal A via tion R egu la t ions , 14 C.F.R. § 21 e t s e q ............ 4
P eriodicals and P ublications
1 N LRB, L eg is la t iv e H istory o f the L abor M an a g e
m ent R ela t ions Act, 1947 (1 9 4 8 ) ................................... 12
2 N LRB, L eg is la t ive H is to ry o f the N ational L abor
R ela tions A ct o f 1935 (1 9 3 5 ) ................ 12
Garrison, T h e N a t io n a l R a i lr o a d A d ju stm en t B o a r d : A
U n iqu e A d m in is tra t iv e A gen cy , 46 Yale L.J. 567
0 9 3 7 ) .................................................................................................... 16
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
173
O P I N I O N S B E L O W
T he d ec is ion o f the S u p rem e C ourt fo r the S ta te o f
H aw aii in N o r r is v. F in a z z o , e t a l . ( “F in a z z o "), C iv il No.
89 -2904-09 , is repo rted at 74 Haw. 235, 842 P.2d 634 (Haw.
1992) (Pet. A pp. l a ) . 1 T h e co m pan ion dec is ion in N o r r is v.
H a w a iia n A ir l in e s , In c . ( “H a w a iia n A ir l in e s ”), C iv il No.
87 -3894-12 , is no t reported (Pet. App. 27a-29a). The orders
o f the C ircu i t C o u r t o f the F irs t C ircu it , S ta te o f Haw aii
w hich w ere the sub jec t o f the appeal are not reported .
J U R I S D I C T I O N
T h e ju d g m e n t s o f the H a w a i i S u p re m e C o u r t w ere
en tered F eb rua ry 16, 1993 (Pet. App. 30a-38a). The petit ion
for a writ o f ce rt io ra ri was f i led on June 25, 1993, and was
gran ted on Jan u a ry 21, 1994. T h is C ourt has ju r isd ic t io n
pu rsuan t to 28 U .S .C . § 1257(a).
C O N S T I T U T I O N A L A N D S T A T U T O R Y
P R O V I S I O N S IN V O L V E D
The S u p rem acy C lause , A rtic le VI, c lause 2 o f the C o n
s t i tu tion , p ro v id es in re levan t part:
Th is C ons ti tu t io n , and the Law s o f the U nited S ta tes
w hich shall be m ade in P u rsuance th e reo f . . . shall
be the sup rem e L aw o f the Land . . . .
P e r t inen t sec tions o f the R ailw ay L abor Act, 45 U.S.C.
§ 151 e t s e q . , are rep roduced at Pet. App. 42a-45a.
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E C A S E
On F eb rua ry 2, 1987, P e t i t io n e r H aw aiian A irlines , Inc.
( “H aw aiian A ir l in e s” ) em ployed G ran t T. N orris ( “N o rr is ”) as
an a irl ine m ech an ic (Pet. App. 7a). The term s and conditions
1 “P et. A p p .” re fe rs to the A p p en d ix to th e P e titio n fo r a W rit o f
C e rtio ra ri, Jt. A pp . re fers to th e Jo in t A p p en d ix . R eco rd c ites to the
reco rd filed in th e H aw aii S u p rem e C o u rt in Finazzo and Hawaiian
Airlines w ill b e (“R .” “ V olum e N u m b e r:” “p ag e (s )” ).
174
2
of N o rr is ’ em p lo y m en t w ere governed by a co llec tive b a r
gain ing a g re e m e n t ( “C B A ” ) n eg o t ia ted b e tw een H aw aiian
Airlines and the In te rna tiona l A ssoc ia tion of M ach in is ts and
A erospace W orkers (A F L -C IO ) (“ IA M ” or “ the U n io n ”) pu r
suant to the p rov is ions o f the R ailw ay L abor Act (“R L A ”), 45
U.S.C. § 151 e t s e q . (Pet. App. 46a-62a).
On Ju ly 15, 1987, N orris was involved in a d ispu te with
his su p erv iso r co ncern ing a tire change on an H aw aiian A ir
lines’ je t a irc raf t (Jt. App. 4). N orris expressed concerns
regarding the a irw orth iness o f the “axle s leeve” portion o f the
tire assem bly, but an H aw aiian A ir l in e s ’ inspecto r found the
axle sleeve to be a irw orthy and d irec ted that the tire change
be com ple ted {Id . at 5).
N orris was asked to sign a w ork record re flec t ing the tire
change, p u rsuan t to A rtic le IV .D.4(a) o f the C BA , which
provides in re le v an t part: “ An a ir l ine m echan ic m ay be
required to sign w ork records in connection with the w ork he
perform s.” (Pet. App. 49a). N orr is refused to sign the record ,
citing his concern regard ing the safety o f the axle s leeve, and
claiming that he h im se l f had not perfo rm ed the w ork in
question (Jt. App. 6). N o rr is ’ superv iso r told N orr is that the
supervisor and the in spec to r had signed a work record re g a rd
ing the co nd it ion of the axle s leeve and that N o rr is ’ s ignature
for the t ire change was not an endorsem en t of the cond it ion o f
the sleeve {Id . at 82). N everthe less , N orr is w ould not change
his position {Id . at 6). A fte r N orris refused to sign the w ork
record, he was held out o f serv ice pending an investiga tion
into his cond u c t in acco rdance with the CBA (Jt. App. 6).
Artic les X V and X V I o f the C B A set forth detailed
p ro c e d u re s fo r th e a d ju s tm e n t o f g r ie v a n c e s an d o th e r
em ploym ent d ispu tes and es tab lish an arbitra l panel, a System
Board o f A d ju s tm en t ( “S ystem B o a rd ” ), for final and b ind ing
resolution o f c la im s th rough arb itra tion (Pet. A pp. 54a-55a).
Article X V I.C o f the C B A prov ides that the S ystem Board
shall have ex c lu s iv e ju r isd ic t io n over d isputes betw een any
em ployee covered by this A greem en t and the C om pany and
between the C om p an y and the U nion , g row ing out o f g r iev
ances concern ing d isc ip l ina ry ac tion , rules, rates o f pay, or
working cond it ions covered by [the CBA] . . . o r out o f the
175
in te rp re ta t ion or app lica tion o f any term s o f [the C B A ]. . . . ”
(Pet. App. 55a).
T he C B A g rievance p rocess regard ing N orris co m m en ced
on July 15, 1987, w hen a step 1 g r ievance hearing was
schedu led for Ju ly 31, 1987 (Jt. A pp. 214). T he g rievance
p roceed ing focused on w he the r N o r r i s ’ fa ilu re to sign the
w o rk re c o rd p ro v id e d ju s t c a u s e fo r d i s c ip l in a ry ac t io n
aga ins t h im in light o f the C B A ’s req u irem en t tha t m echan ics
sign o ff fo r w ork perfo rm ed (Jt. App. 214-15) . N orr is took the
p o s i t io n th a t his re fusa l to c o m p le te the re q u es ted w ork
record w as ju s t if ie d by his q ues t ions abou t the safety o f the
ax le s leeve (Id . at 213). A rt ic le X V II .F o f the C B A provides
tha t “ [a]n e m p lo y e e ’s refusal to p e rfo rm w ork w hich is in
v io lation of es tab lished health and safety ru les, o r any local,
s tate o r federa l health and safety law shall not w a rran t d isc i
p linary ac t io n ” (Pet. App. 60a).
N orr is had an opportun ity to p resen t his a rgum ent at the
step 1 g riev an ce hearing on Ju ly 31, 1987 (Pet. App. 63a).
N orr is was p resen t and rep resen ted at the hearing by his union
rep resen ta tive (Pet. App. 63a; Jt. App. 212). On A ugust 3,
1987, the hea r ing o ff icer issued a step 1 report f ind ing N o rr is ’
refusal to sign to be in subord ina tion and reco m m en d in g his
te rm ina tion (Pet. App. 63a). At som e tim e betw een July 15
and A ugust 3, 1987, N orris co n tac ted the F edera l Aviation
A uthority (“FA A ” ) and repo rted that the axle s leeve he had
observed was not a irw orthy (R. XVII: D eposit ion o f Grant
N orr is , Vol. 4, Feb. 10, 1990, at 709-10). On A ugust 4, 1987,
af te r the step 1 de te rm in a tio n had been made, the FAA con
tac ted H aw aiian A irlines , in spec ted the axle s leeve and had it
rem oved from the a irc raf t (Pet. App. 8a).
Pu rsuan t to the C BA , N orr is , th rough the IA M , filed an
appeal to the step 3 g riev an ce level regard ing the step 1
d e te rm ina tion (Jt. App. 208). P r io r to the step 3 hearing,
H aw aiian A irlines reduced N o r r i s ’ d isc ip l ine from a term ina
tion to a suspension w ithou t pay for the per iod from A ugust 3,
1987 to S ep tem ber 15, 1987, and o rdered h im reinstated
effec tive tha t latter date (Pet. App. 66a).
N orr is d id not re turn to w ork on S ep tem b er 15, 1987, and
he took no fu r ther steps to p u rsue his g r ievance through the
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3
4
System B oard p rocedure s m andated by the C B A (Pet. App.
9a). On D e cem b er 8, 1987, N orr is f iled suit aga ins t H aw aiian
Airlines in the F irs t C ircu it C ourt fo r the State o f H aw aii (Jt.
App. 3). In C ou n t I, N orr is a l leged a com m on law tort c laim
that he was w rongfu lly te rm ina ted in v io lation o f public
policies em b o d ied w ith in the F edera l Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C .
§ 1301 e t s e q . and the F edera l Aviation R egu la t ions , 14
C.F.R. § 21 e t s e q . (co llec t ive ly “ the Federal Aviation law s”),
due to his re fusal to com ple te w ork records regard ing the tire
change (Jt. App. 7). On S ep tem b er 20, 1989, N orris filed a
second su i t a g a in s t th ree H a w a i ia n A i r l in e s ’ m an ag e r ia l
em ployees - Paul J. F inazzo , H ow ard E. O gden and Hatsuo
H onm a ( “ the I nd i v i dua l D e f e n d a n t s ” ) (Jt. A pp . 12).2 In
Counts I and II o f the C om pla in t , N orr is alleged com m on law
tort c la im s tha t the Ind iv idual D efendan ts had ra tified H aw ai
ian A ir l in e s ’ w rongfu l te rm ina tion of him in v io la tion o f the
public po lic ies em bod ied in the Federa l Aviation law s (Count
I), and in v io la t ion o f the public po lic ies em bod ied in the
Hawaii W h is t le b lo w e rs ’ P ro tec t ion Act, H .R.S. § 378-61 et
s eq . (C oun t II) (Jt. App. 16, 17). The suit aga inst the Ind iv id
ual D efendan ts was conso lida ted with the H a w a iia n A ir lin es
suit.
U pon m otion by the D efendan ts , the state c ircu it court
dism issed C oun t I o f the suit aga ins t H aw aiian A irlines and
Counts I and II o f the suit aga ins t the Ind iv idual D efendants ,
finding those c la im s to be p reem pted by the R L A (Pet. App.
10a). On appeal, the H aw aii Sup rem e C ourt reversed the
circuit court. In re jec t ing the R L A preem ption defense, the
Hawaii S u p rem e C ourt applied a p reem ption test der ived from
Section 301 ( “Section 3 0 1 ”) o f the L abor M anagem en t R ela
tions Act (“L M R A ”), 29 U .S .C . § 185, as exp lica ted in L in g le
v. N org e Div. o f M a g ic C h ef, In c . (“L in g le ” ), 486 U.S. 399
(1988), and M a h e r v. N ew J e r s e y T ran sit R a il O p era tio n s ,
In c., 125 N.J. 455, 593 A .2d 750 (1991) (Pet. App. 16a-17a).
The L in g le case held tha t S ection 301 preem pts only those
2 O n D e c e m b e r 2 7 , 1993, th e c irc u it co u rt g ran ted P au l I . F in a z z o ’s
Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed the claims against him.
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5
sta te law c la im s in w hich “ the app lica tion [o f s ta te law]
req u ires the in te rp re ta t ion o f a co llec tive barg a in in g ag ree
m en t .” 4 8 6 U.S. at 407. In M a h e r , the N ew Jersey Suprem e
C o u r t ex ten d ed the ho ld ing o f L in g le to govern R L A p re e m p
tion. 593 A .2d at 758. T he H aw aii cou r t conc luded that, u n d er
the L in g le s tandard , N o rr is ’ c la im s w ere not p reem p ted s ince
re so lv in g th o se c la im s, in the c o u r t ’s view, w ould not require
any in te rp re ta t io n o f the C B A (Pet. A pp. 20a). T he H aw aii
cou r t a lso co n c lu d ed , re ly ing on its u n d e rs ta n d in g o f this
C o u r t ’s h o ld ing in C o n s o l id a t e d R a il v. L a b o r E x e c u t iv e s ’
A s s ’n. (“ C o n r a i l” ), 499 U.S. 299 (1989), tha t R LA ad jus tm en t
board ju r isd ic t io n does not ex tend to “d ispu tes ar is ing ou ts ide
a C B A ” (Pet. App. 14a).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case p resen ts the ques tion o f w h e th e r C ongress
in tended for the R ailw ay L ab o r A ct (“ R L A ”), 45 U .S .C . § 151
e t s e q . , to p reem p t sta te law c la im s for w rongfu l d ischarge for
em p lo y ees sub jec t to the A c t’s m andato ry d ispu te reso lu tion
p rov is ions . P e ti t ioners subm it that, in enac t in g the RLA,
C ongress in tended for R L A ad jus tm en t boards to resolve
em p lo y m en t d ispu tes co ncern ing d isc ip l ine and d ischarge that
g row ou t o f g r ievances genera l ly or out o f the app lica tion or
in te rp re ta t ion o f co llec tive barga in ing ag reem en ts in the rail
and air l ine industr ies . The H aw aii S up rem e C o u r t ’s decision,
w hich a llow s an em ployee to bypass R L A fora by asserting
tha t a d isch a rg e is aga ins t “public p o l ic y ” and does not
requ ire in te rp re ta t ion o f a co llec tive b arga in ing ag reem en t, is
in cons is ten t with the language , h is to ry and pu rposes o f the
R LA and m ust be reversed.
1. In Part I we show that the RLA by its p la in language
g ran ts ex c lu s iv e ju r isd ic t io n to R LA ad ju s tm en t boards to
re so lve d ispu tes grow ing out o f g r ievances , inc lud ing whis
t leb lo w er d ischarge c la im s based on sta te law v io la t ions inde
pend en t o f a b a rga in ing agreem ent. T h e leg is la t iv e h is tory of
the R L A supports this construc tion and fu r the r establishes
tha t su b m iss ion o f such d isputes to ad ju s tm en t boards is
m an d a to ry and subject to only very l im ited ju d ic ia l review.
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6
Congress so u g h t in the R L A to p rom ote s tab ility and co n t in u
ity of se rv ice in the ra il and airl ine industr ies by es tab lish ing
a system for u n ifo rm , exped it ious , and final d ispu te reso lu tion
by ad jus tm en t b o a rd s com posed o f ind iv idua ls k n o w led g eab le
in the co m p lex i t ie s o f those fundam en ta l in te rs ta te industr ies .
Those goals w ould be frustra ted if ca rr iers and em ployees
were free - indeed requ ired - to bypass the R L A procedures
and a ttack one an o th e r in state courts o f the ir choosing .
Finally, the co n s tru c tio n urged here in is supported by, and is a
logical ou tg ro w th of, this C o u r t ’s dec is ions in E lg in , J . & E.
Ry. C o. v. B u r le y ( “B u r ley " ) , 325 U .S . 711 (1 9 4 5 ) , and
A ndrew s v. L o u is v i l l e & N a sh v ille R a i lr o a d C o. (“A n d rew s" ),
406 U.S. 320 (1972) . Taken together , those cases recogn ize
that the R L A preem pts a state law “w rongfu l d isc h a rg e ” tort
claim even w here pled as an “ in d ep en d e n t” sta te law v io la
tion.
2. In P a r t II, we d em ons tra te tha t N o rr is ’ c la im s are
exactly the k inds o f d ispu tes C ongress in tended to be p re
empted by the RLA . T h o se c la im s are com m on law tort
actions for “ w rongfu l d isch a rg e” re la ted to safety and w h is
tleblowing. T he c la im s grow out o f g rievances or ou t o f the
in terpretation or app lica tion o f the C BA . T herefo re , they are
within the m an d a to ry ju r isd ic t io n o f the S ystem B oard pur
suant to R L A S ec tion 204 for all the reasons d iscu ssed in Part
I o f this brief.
In add it ion , the C B A here c lar if ies any am b ig u i ty that
might ex is t u n d e r the R L A as to the poss ib il i ty that N o rr is ’
claims m ig h t be v iab le in sta te court. Section X V I.C o f the
CBA spec if ica l ly g ran ts “exc lus ive ju r isd ic t io n ” to the S y s
tem Board to de te rm in e em p lo y m en t d isputes “g ro w ing ou t of
grievances co n cern in g d isc ip l ina ry ac tion” (Pet. App. 55a).
Furtherm ore , A rt ic le X V II .F o f the C B A w ould requ ire the
System B oard to co n s id e r ex ternal law in rev iew ing N o r r i s ’
“wrongful d isc h a rg e ” c la im s because tha t p rov is ion m andates
that “ [a]n e m p lo y e e ’s refusal to perfo rm w ork w hich is in
violation o f . . . any local, state o r federal hea lth and safety
law sh a l l n o t w a r r a n t d i s c i p l in a r y a c t i o n ” (P e t . A p p .
60a-61a). F inally , N o rr is ’ c la im s involve d ispu tes “g row ing
out of , . . the in te rp re ta t ion or ap p l ica t io n ” o f the C B A under
179
7
A rtic le X V I .C (Pet. A pp. 55a) becau se (1) the ag reem en t m us t
be in te rp re ted to d e te rm in e w h e th e r N orr is was “d isch a rg ed ”
and (2) N o r r i s ’ d isc ip l in e grew ou t o f an app l ica tio n of
A rt ic le IV .D .4(a) o f the C B A , w hich p rov ides th a t “ [a]n
a irc ra f t m ech a n ic m ay be requ ired to sign w ork reco rds in
co nnec tion w ith the w ork he p e r fo rm e d ” (Pet. A pp. 49a).
G iven the b read th o f S ys tem B oard ju r isd ic t io n u n d er the
C B A ’s term s and the federa l s ta tu to ry au th o riza t io n u n d e r the
R L A for tha t co n trac tua l ju r isd ic t io n , N orr is was requ ired to
p resen t th o se c la im s to the S ys tem Board. T h is C o u r t ’s d ec i
sion in G ilm e r v. In t e r s t a t e / J o h n s o n L a n e C o r p ., 500 U.S. 20
(1991), supports P e t i t io n e rs ’ v iew that a rb itra t ion agreem ents
en te red in to w ith in the scope o f federal s ta tu to ry au th o r iz a
tion can p roperly requ ire a rb itra t ion of no n -co n trac t-b ased
em p lo y m en t c la im s. Indeed , the sub ject m atte r o f N o r r i s ’
c la im s - an a l leged d ischarge for ra is ing safety concerns and
w h is t leb lo w in g - is one that is f requen tly dea lt with in a rb i
tration.
3. In P a r t II I , we p r im a r i ly a d d re s s th e is su es o f
w h e th e r the p re e m p t io n s tan d a rd for L M R A S ec t io n 301
u n d er L in g le , 486 U.S. 399 (1988) , should be app lied to
d e te rm ine R L A p reem p tio n and w he the r the tes t dev e lo p ed in
C o n r a i l , 491 U.S. 299 (1989) , fo r d is t ingu ish ing “ m ajo r” and
“m in o r” d ispu tes u n d e r the R L A should be de te rm in a tiv e of
the scope o f R L A p reem ption .
The L in g le p reem p tio n tes t tu rns on w he the r a collec tive
b arga in ing ag reem en t m us t be in terp re ted to re so lve a state
cla im . T h a t test was d eve loped to m eet the C ongress ional
ob jec tives u n d er ly in g L M R A S ection 301 - nam ely , assuring
un ifo rm federa l com m on law in te rp re ta t ion o f co llec tive bar
gain ing ag reem en ts . Section 301 by its te rm s s im ply provides
for federa l cou r t ju r isd ic t io n o ver c la im s a l leg ing breach o f a
barga in ing ag reem en t. C o n g ress had m uch b ro ad er purposes
in m ind in the R L A in m an d a t in g a rb itra t ion by industry
ad ju s tm en t boards o f a b road range o f d ispu tes , including
no n -co n trac t-b ased d ispu tes . Indeed , R L A Section 204 by
p lain language com m its to ad ju s tm en t boards in the airline
industry ju r isd ic t io n over d ispu tes g row ing out o f grievances
or out o f con trac t app lica tion in addition to d ispu tes growing
8
out o f co n trac t in te rp re ta t ion . To apply L in g le 's na rrow p re
emption tes t to R L A preem ption w ould dep r ive ad jus tm en t
boards o f m an d a to ry ju r isd ic t io n over a b road range o f d is
putes Which C o n g ress p lain ly in tended the boards to resolve.
In C o n r a i l , th is C o u r t w as p re sen ted w ith a d ispu te
clearly w ith in the ju r isd ic t io n of the R LA d ispu te reso lu tion
m echan ism s and was requ ired to dete rm ine w h e th e r the d i s
pute had to be re so lved th rough the nego tia tion and m edia tion
procedures for “ m a jo r” d ispu tes or the ad jus tm en t board p ro
cedures for “m in o r” d isputes . T he C ourt d id not address R LA
preem ption and cer ta in ly did not overru le the “om itted ca se”
holding o f B u r ley , 324 U.S. 711 (1945), which con tem pla tes
adjustm ent board ju r isd ic t io n over n o n -con trac t-based d is
putes such as those p resen ted by N o rr is ’ c la im s. Indeed ,
C o n ra il q uo tes the “om itted ca se” ho ld ing o f B u r ley with
approval. C o n r a i l is there fo re en tire ly cons is ten t with the
position adv an ced by P e ti t ioners in Part I, and the facts
related to N o r r i s ’ c la im s show that those c la im s are classic
examples o f “ m in o r” d ispu tes com m itted to ad ju s tm en t board
ju risd ic tion .
ARGUMENT
I. STATE LAW “ W R O N G FU L D IS C H A R G E ”
CLAIMS ARE PREEMPTED BY THE RLA.
A rtic le VI o f the C onsti tu t ion o f the U nited S ta tes , in
com m anding that “the Law s o f the United S tates . . . shall be
the sup rem e Law o f the L an d ,” g ives C ongress the pow er to
preem pt s ta te ac tions in areas in w hich it has the pow er to
legislate. G ib b o n s v. O g d en , 22 U.S. (9 W heat .) 5 (1824). The
p reem ptive scope o f a federa l law is de term ined by an inquiry
in w hich “ ft]he purpose of C ongress is the u l t im ate to u
chstone.” R e ta i l C le r k s In te r n a t io n a l A s s ’n v. S c h e r m e r h o r n ,
375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963). C ongress iona l in ten t to exercise
preem ptive p ow er m ay be “exp lic i t ly stated in the s ta tu te ’s
language o r im p lic i t ly con ta ined in its s tructure and pu rp o se .”
J o n e s v. R ath P a c k in g C o ., 4 3 0 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). Even in
the absence o f specif ic p reem ptive language, s ta te action is
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9
p reem pted w h e re “ ‘it conflic ts with federa l law o r w ould
fru stra te th e federa l s c h e m e ,’ ” o r w here “ ‘the cou r ts d iscern
from the to ta l i ty o f the c ircum stances that C o n g ress so u g h t to
occupy th e f ie ld to the exc lus ion o f the S ta te s . ’ ” A llis -
C h a lm e r s C o rp . v. L u e c k , 471 U.S. 202, 209 (1985) (quo ting
M a lo n e v. W hite M o to r C o r p ., 435 U.S. 497 , 504 (1978)).
N orr is m us t concede , as the Haw aii S up rem e C o u r t in the
dec is ion b e lo w ackn o w led g ed , that C ongress in tended the
R L A to p re e m p t som e sta te law “ wrongfu l d isch a rg e” claim s
b ro u g h t by rail o r a irl ine industry em ployees aga ins t their
em p lo y ers (Pet. A pp. 13a & n. 10). H ow ever, e rroneously
re ly ing on th is C o u r t ’s L in g le dec is ion , N orr is and the Hawaii
cou r t c la im tha t the R L A does not p reem pt sta te law wrongfu l
d ischarge tort ac tions that do not require in te rp re ta t ion o f a
co l le c t iv e b a rg a in in g ag reem en t (Pet. App. 16a-17a). As
e x p la in e d be low , re l ia n ce on L in g le , an L M R A case , is
u n fo u n d ed in the co n tex t o f the RLA. The plain language and
leg is la t iv e h is tory o f the R LA dem onstra te tha t Congress
in tended for R L A ad jus tm en t boards to re so lve em ploym en t
d ispu tes g ro w in g out o f the d isc ip l ine or d ischarge o f an
em ployee , in c lud ing d isputes based on a lleged v io la t ions of
s ta te law s in d ependen t o f a bargain ing agreem ent.
A, CONGRESS INTENDED FOR DISCHARGE
AND DISCIPLINE DISPUTES IN THE RAIL
A N D A I R L I N E I N D U S T R I E S TO BE
RESOLVED THROUGH THE RLA’S PRO
CEDURES.
1. The Statutory Scheme Contemplates Adjust
ment Board Resolution of “Wrongful Dis
charge” Claims.
a) The RLA’s Plain Language Encompasses
D isputes Outside of the Bargaining
Agreement.
By plain language which has remained unchanged since
the RLA’s enactment in 1926, Congress made clear that RLA
lg2 adjustment board procedures should be used to resolve
10
em ploym ent d isp u tes beyond those w here a b reach o f A c o l
lective barg a in in g ag reem en t is c la im ed . The R L A ’s s ta tem ent
of general p u rp o se s inc ludes the fo llow ing broad desc r ip tion
of the d ispu tes C o n g ress in tended to be settled th rough RLA
procedures:
The pu rp o ses o f the ch ap te r are: . . . (4) to p rov ide
for the p ro m p t and orderly se t t lem ent o f all d ispu tes
co ncern ing ra tes o f pay, ru les, o r w ork ing c o n d i
tions; (5) to p rov ide for the prom pt and o rderly
se t t lem en t o f all disputes growing out of griev
ances or out of the interpretation or application
of agreements c o v e r in g ra tes o f pay, ru les , or
w ork ing cond it ions .
45 U.S.C . § 151a (4)-(5) (em phasis added).
T hat C o n g ress expec ted n o n -con trac t-based em p lo y m en t
disputes to be re so lved th rough the R L A ’s p rocesses is also
dem onstrated by the p lain language o f Section 2 F irst o f the
RLA, which desc r ib es the genera l duties o f the par ties under
the Act:
It shall be the duty o f all ca rr iers , their off icers ,
agents , and em ployees to exe rt every reasonab le
effort to m ake and m ain ta in agreem ents concern ing
rates o f pay, ru les , and w ork ing cond it ions , and to
settle all disputes, whether arising out of the
application of such agreements or otherwise, in
o rder to avoid any in terrup tion to com m erce o r to
the opera t ion o f any ca rr ie r g row ing out o f any
d isp u te b e tw e e n the c a r r i e r and the e m p lo y e e s
thereof.
45 U.S.C. § 152 F irs t (em phasis added).
C ongress used s im ilar ly broad language to desc r ibe the
scope o f d isp u tes c o m m itte d to rail industry ad ju s tm en t
boards: in S ec tion 3 F irs t (i) and Section 3 Second o f the
RLA, 45 U .S .C . §§ 153 First (i) and 153 Second, ad jus tm en t
boards are iden tif ied as the m andato ry fora for re so lu tion of
[t]he d ispu tes be tw een an em ployee or group o f em ployees
and a carr ie r o r ca rr iers g row ing out o f g rievances or out o f
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the in te rp re ta t io n o r ap p l ica t io n o f ag reem en ts . . . . ” 3 R L A
S ection 3 F irs t (i), 45 U .S .C . § 153 F irs t (i). Such c la im s are
r e f e r a b l e to t h e N a t i o n a l R a i l r o a d A d j u s t m e n t B o a r d
(“N R A B ”), a p e rm a n en t in d u s try -w id e ad ju s tm en t board c re
ated u n d e r R L A S ec t io n 3 F irs t, o r to a l te rna tive ad jus tm en t
boards e s tab l ish ed u n d e r R L A S ection 3 S econd . T h e ad ju s t
m en t board m ust ren d er a final dec is ion b ind ing on all parties
to the d ispu te , and tha t d ec is io n is sub jec t to only l im ited
ju d ic ia l rev iew . R L A S ection 3 F irs t (p) and (q), 45 U .S .C .
§ 153 F irs t (p) and (q).
W hen C o n g ress app lied the R L A to the a ir l ine industry in
1936, it u sed s im ila r ly b road language to desc r ibe the scope
o f d ispu tes to be reso lved , the du ties o f the par ties, and the
m ethods for d ispu te reso lu tion . S e e R L A S ec tions 201-205 ,
45 U .S .C . §§ 181-185. A d ju s tm en t B oards with ju risd ic t io n
and d u t ie s v ir tu a l ly id en t ica l to those o f the N R A B are
em p o w ered to re so lv e “ [t]he d ispu tes be tw een an em p lo y ee or
g roup of em p lo y ees and a ca rr ie r or ca rr iers by air grow ing
ou t o f g r iev an ces or ou t o f the in te rp re ta t ion or app lica tion of
ag reem en ts co n ce rn in g ra tes o f pay, ru les, or w ork ing co n d i
tions. . . . ” R LA S ec tion 204 , 45 U .S.C . § 184. A c c o r d RLA
Section 205 , 45 U .S .C . § 185.
3 R L A S ectio n 4 ,4 5 U .S .C . § 154 es tab lish es the N a tio n a l M ed ia tion
B o ard (“N M B ” ) as a m ed ia tin g body in the ra il an d a ir lin e in d u s trie s , and
R L A S ec tio n 5 F irs t and 203 , 45 U .S .C . §§ 155 F irs t and 183, g ran t the
N M B ju r isd ic tio n to deal w ith “d isp u te [s ] co n ce rn in g ch an g es in ra tes o f
pay , ru les , o r w o rk in g co n d itio n s n o t ad ju s ted by th e p a rtie s in co n feren ce
[and] any o th e r d isp u te n o t re fe rab le to [ad ju stm en t board s] and not
ad ju s ted in co n fe ren ce b e tw een th e p a rtie s , o r w h ere co n fe ren ces are
re fu sed .” Id. T h o se k inds o f d isp u te s , te rm ed “m a jo r” d isp u tes , a re no t at
issu e in th e Norris case . In s tead , the q u estio n p re se n te d h e re is w hether
N o rr is ’ w ro n g fu l d isch a rg e c la im s p re se n t a d isp u te “ g ro w in g o u t o f
g riev an ces o r o u t o f th e in te rp re ta tio n o r ap p lica tio n o f a g reem en ts” falling
w ith in the sco p e o f S ec tio n 2 0 4 o f th e R L A , 45 U .S .C . § 184.
184
12
b) Congress Expressly Committed “Whis
tleblower” Claims to RLA Jurisdiction.
O ne p ro v is io n o f the R LA , Section 204, m akes it crysta l
clear tha t C o n g ress in tended for ad justm ent boards in the
airline industry to re so lve d ischarge and d isc ip l ine c la im s
even if th o se c la im s are based on non-con trac tua l , public
policy grounds: in S ection 204, C ongress explic it ly included
within the set o f d ispu tes covered by the R L A ’s d ispute
resolution p ro c ed u re s “cases pend ing and unad jus ted on April
10, 1936 b e fo re the N a tiona l L abor Relations B o ard .” 45
U.S.C. § 184. T he N a tiona l L ab o r R ela tions A ct, 29 U.S.C .
§ 151 et s e q . ( “N L R A ” ), had been passed by C ongress on July
5, 1935, and co n ta in ed a specif ic p rovis ion - S ection 8(4) -
making it u n law fu l for an em p lo y er “ to d ischarge or o th e r
wise d isc r im in a te aga ins t an em p lo y ee because he has filed
charges o r g iven te s t im ony u n d e r [the N L R A ].” See 2 N L R B ,
Legislative H is to ry o f the N a tiona l L abor R ela tions A ct o f
1935, at 3270 , 3 2 7 3-74 (1935) . Section 8(4) was recod ified
w ithou t c h a n g e as S e c t io n 8 (a ) (4 ) , 29 U .S .C . S e c t io n
158(a)(4), in 1947. See 1 N L R B , L eg is la t ive H istory o f the
Labor M an a g em en t R ela t ions Act, 1947, at 6, 178, 237-239
(1948). N L R A S ec tion 8(4) was an early exam ple o f a “w h is
tleblower” p ro tec t ion s ta tu te ,4 and Congress there fo re de te r
mined by the p assag e o f Section 204 o f the R L A that the
resolution o f any pend ing c la im by an N L R A w his t leb low er
would be dec id ed exc lu s iv e ly th rough RLA d ispu te reso lu tion
procedures.
A “w h is t le b lo w e r” s ta tu te con ta ined in the F edera l Rail
Safety Act o f 1970 (“F R S A ”), 45 U.S.C . § 421 e t s e q ., also
strongly supports the P e t i t io n e rs ’ view that C ongress in tended
4 S ection 8 (3 ) o f th e N L R A also p ro tec ted em p lo y ees ag a in s t re ta lia
tion and d isc rim in a tio n b ased on p a rtic ip a tio n in o th e r p ro tec ted ac tiv ities ,
such as u n io n in v o lv em en t. S ee 2 N L R B , L eg isla tiv e H isto ry o f the
N ational L ab o r R e la tio n s A c t o f 1935, a t 3270 , 327 3 -7 4 (1935). T h e
legislative h is to ry o f R L A S ec tio n 2 0 4 con ta in s sp ec ific ex am p les o f
statutory d isch arg e c la im s th a t w ere b e in g tran sferred to the R L A 's d isp u te
resolution p ro ced u res. See infra p. 18.
185
13
for the R L A a d ju s tm en t board p rocedure s to be fo l low ed in
re so lv ing c la im s such as those ra ised by Norris . S ection 212
o f the F R S A con ta in s a w h is t leb lo w er p ro tec t ion prov is ion
w hich p rev en ts a co m m o n c a rr ie r from “d i s c h a r g in g ] or in
any m an n er d i s c r im in a t in g ] ag a in s t any e m p lo y e e ” for filing
a co m p la in t o r in s t i tu t ing a p ro ceed in g re la ted to en fo rcem en t
o f the F R S A . S e e 45 U .S .C . § 441. C ongress ex p lic i t ly c o m
m itted the e n fo rce m e n t o f S ec tion 212 to the ad justm ent
board p ro c ed u re s u n d e r the R L A . S e e 45 U .S.C . §§ 441(c),
153. T he N R A B is g iven full au thority to reso lve those
d ispu tes and to im pose ap p ro p ria te rem edies , inc lud ing pun i
tive d a m a g e s .5
S ign if ican tly , C o n g ress m ade it c lear that in enac ting the
F R S A w h is t leb lo w er p rov is ion , it was m ere ly p reserv ing the
p ro tec t ions and rem ed ies a lready ava ilab le u n d e r the RLA.
The C o m m ittee R ep o rt s ta tes tha t the intent was s im ply to
codify the ex is t ing system :
T he C o m m it te e u n d e rs ta n d s tha t ra il em p lo y ees
a lready rece ive s im ila r p ro tec t ion , a long with b a c k
pay, th rough the g riev an ce p rocedure . T he C o m m it
tee does not in tend to a l te r the ex is t ing p ro tec tion ,
bu t ra th e r to put the p ro h ib it ion o f d isc r im ina tion
into s ta tu to ry form . . . . Subsec tion (c)(1) p rov ides
that any d ispu te , g riev an ce , o r c la im arising under
this sec tion shall be sub jec t to reso lu tion in acco r
dance with the p ro ced u re s in Section 3 o f the R ail
way L ab o r Act. T he C o m m ittee in tends this to be
the ex c lu s iv e m eans for en fo rc ing this sec tion .
H.R. Rep. No. 1025, 96th C ong ., 2d Sess. 8 (1980). Thus,
C o n g ress c lea r ly re co g n ized th a t the ex is t in g ad justm ent
3 T h e re c o rd b e fo re th e H aw aii S u p rem e C o u rt, and b e fo re th is Court,
co n ta in s d ep o s itio n te s tim o n y by an a rb itra to r w ith 25 years o f experience
a rb itra tin g c la im s in th e a ir lin e in d u s try d esc r ib in g (1 ) th e full status quo
ante rem ed ie s th a t w ou ld h a v e been av a ilab le to N o rris i f he had prevailed
b e fo re th e sy s tem b o ard o f ad ju s tm en t an d (2 ) the p o ss ib le ava ilab ility of
p u n itiv e d am a g e s and a cea se and d e s is t o rd e r (Jt. A pp . 30 5 -3 1 9 ). See also
1AM v. Northwest Airlines, 858 F.2d 4 2 7 , 4 3 2 n .4 (8 th C ir. 1988) (“penalty
lggaw ards a re g en era lly en fo rceab le u n d e r the R a ilw ay L a b o r A c t” ).
14
board p ro c ed u re s u n d e r the R L A provide re l ie f for c la im s o f
w h is t leb low er d isc ip l in e or d isch a rg e .6
In sum , the lan g u ag e o f the R L A m akes c lea r C o n g re s s ’
intent to ex ten d R L A ju r isd ic t io n beyond d ispu tes o ver the
in te rp re ta t ion or ap p l ica t io n o f b a rg a in in g a g reem en ts to
reach n o n -c o n tr a c tu a l c la im s , in c lud ing co m m o n law to r t
“wrongful d is c h a rg e ” c la im s based on “w h is t leb lo w in g .” 7 The
RLA stands a lo n e am ong em p lo y m en t sta tu tes in the bread th
of its re liance on non-jud ic ia l d ispu te reso lu tion p rocedures to
resolve exac tly the k ind of “w rongfu l d isch a rg e” c la im s p re
sented by N orr is to the H aw aii c o u r t . 8
6 See United Transp. Union v. Springfield Terminal Co., 7 6 7 F. S upp.
333 (D . M e. 1991) (w h is tleb lo w er p ro v isio n co d ified ex is tin g d isp u te
reso lu tio n m e c h a n ism s o f th e R L A ). F u rth e rm o re , th e F R S A ’s w h is
tleb low er p ro v is io n h as b een h e ld to p reem p t sta te w ro n g fu l d isch arg e
claim s id en tica l to th o se ra ised by N o rris . See Rayner v. Smirl, 873 F.2d 60
(4th C ir.) (S ec tio n 441 and th e “co m p reh en siv e rem ed ia l p ro v is io n s” o f the
RLA in co rp o ra ted th e re in a re the ra ilro a d e m p lo y ee ’s e x c lu s iv e rem edy,
and th e re fo re s ta te la w c la im s fo r w ro n g fu l d isch arg e are p reem p ted ), cert,
denied, 4 9 3 U .S . 876 (1 9 8 9 ). A lth o u g h th e Rayner co u rt re lied in p a rt on
the ex p lic it p reem p tio n p ro v isio n o f th e F R S A , see 45 U .S .C . § 4 3 4 , th e
co u rt’s d ec is io n re s ted h eav ily on th e fac t th a t th e s ta te w ro n g fu l d isch arg e
statute w as in co m p a tib le w ith the “d e ta iled rem ed ia l sch em e” o f § 153 o f
the R L A . Rayner v. Smirl, 873 F.2d a t 66.
7 In co n tra s t, L M R A S ectio n 301 , the p rov ision upo n w h ich Lingle
preem ption is b a sed , is lim ited to c la im s “ fo r v io la tio n o f c o n trac ts .” 29
U .S.C. § 185(a).
8 A s th is C o u rt has reco g n ized , the d isp u te reso lu tio n fram ew o rk set
forth in th e R L A is “ th e p ro d u c t o f a lo n g leg is la tiv e ev o lu tio n ” w h ich “has
no sta tu to ry p a ra lle l in o th e r in d u stry .” International Ass’n of Machinists v.
Street, 367 U :S . 740 , 7 5 4 (1961). F o r an o verv iew o f th e u n iq u e early
history o f co n g re ss io n a l in v o lv em en t in ra il lab o r d isp u tes , see id. a t 356
nn. 11-12 (d iscu ss in g leg is la tio n from 1888 to 1920).
187
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2. The Legislative History Underlying the RLA
Likewise Demonstrates Congress’ Intent For
Claims of “Wrongful D ischarge” to Be
Resolved By RLA Procedures.
T he leg is la t iv e h is tory o f the R L A from the t im e o f its
incep tion co n f irm s that C o n g ress in tended for R L A ad ju s t
m ent boards to re so lve c la im s ar is ing from r igh ts or o b l ig a
tions ou ts ide the term s o f a co llec tive b a rga in ing agreem ent.
In the 1926 f loo r deba tes lead ing to the e n a c tm en t o f the
RLA, S en a to r W atson desc ribed the types o f m atte rs co m m it
ted to ad ju s tm en t boards:
there are tw o c lasses o f d ispu tes that arise in c o n
nec tion with the opera t ion o f ra ilroads. O ne c lass is
w hat are o rd inar ily ca lled grievances . They m ay be
o f a p ersona l na ture ; they m ay involve a great m any
em p lo y ees ; they m ay invo lve a few em ployees ; they
m ay invo lve but one em ployee . O f this c lass , also,
are d ispu tes r is ing out o f the in te rp re ta t ion and
ap p l ica t io n o f ex is t in g a g reem en ts as to w ages ,
hours o f labor, or w ork ing conditions.
67 Cong. Rec. 8807 (1926) (s ta tem en t o f Sen. W atson). S e n a
to r W a tso n ’s s ta tem en t c learly signals C o n g re s s ’ u n d e rs ta n d
ing that the term “g r iev a n ces” as u sed in Section 3 F irs t (i) o f
the R LA , and la ter ca rr ied o v e r to Section 204, was in tended
to apply b road iy to n o n -c o n trac t based “p e rso n a l” c la im s of
em ployees .
C la im s re la ted to d isc ip l ine were a lso iden tif ied in the
leg is la t ive h is tory o f the R L A as in tended to fall within
ad ju s tm en t board ju r isd ic t io n , even if those c la im s did not
invo lve in te rp re ta t io n or a p p l ica t io n o f b a rg a in in g ag ree
m ents. T hus , in 1926 R ep re sen ta t iv e B ark ley d esc r ibed the
func tion o f the ad jus tm en t board as “not to co n s id e r questions
of w ages, b u t d isag reem en ts o v e r g rievances , in terpre tations,
d isc ip l ine and o the r techn ica lit ies that arise from tim e to time
in the w o rkshop and out on the tracks in the opera t ion o f the
ro a d s .” 67 Cong. Rec. 4517 (1926) . S e e a l s o 67 Cong. Rec.
4670 (1926) (s ta tem en t o f Rep. A rentz) (“M in o r disputes
188
1 6
involve d isc ip l ine , g r ievances and d isputes o ver the ap p l ica
tion and m ean in g o f an ag re e m e n t”) .9
In the 1926 H o u se D ebates , R ep resen ta t ive G rosser s im
ilarly desc r ibed the scope o f inquiry to be conduc ted by R LA
fora in m ost ex p a n s iv e term s: “T hese boards serve in a m an
ner as courts to de te rm in e w ho is r ight and who is wrong,
what is ju s t and w ha t is un just, in d ispu tes betw een ra ilroads
and their e m p lo y e e s .” 67 Cong. Rec. 4665 (1926).
The h is tory o f the R LA af te r its en ac tm en t in 1926
likewise m akes c lea r tha t C o n g ress in tended for RLA ad jus t
ment boards to re so lve non -co n trac tu a l c la im s invo lv ing d is
cipline and d ischarge . F o llow ing enac tm en t o f the RLA, the
newly c rea ted N R A B did address c la im s re la ting to d isc ip line
and d ischarge . S e e G arr ison , T h e N a t io n a l R a i lr o a d A d ju st
ment B o a r d : A U n iqu e A d m in is tra tiv e A g en cy , 46 Yale L.J.
567, 586 (1937) . W h ile there w ere many d iff icu lties with the
enforcem ent p ro ced u re o f the 1926 A ct - and those d iff i
culties led to am en d m en ts in 1934 and la ter - the scope of
claims regard ing d isc ip l in e and d ischarge com m itted to the
ad justm ent board p ro c ess w as appa ren tly u n o b jec t io n ab le
because the scope o f d ispu tes covered by R LA Section 3 F irst
(i) ad justm ent board p rocedure s has rem ained unchanged for
almost seven ty years.
The R L A was am ended in several im portan t respects in
1934 in order to ren d er its ad jus tm en t board procedures m ore
e f fec tive .10 T h o se am en d m en ts co n tinued to re flect C o n g re s s ’
clear and s trong co m m itm e n t to a broad R LA d ispu te re so lu
tion process. The p ar tic ipan ts in the deba tes that led to the
1934 am endm en ts u n d ers to o d that ad jus tm ent board ju r isd ic
tion was qu ite b road , but they - and C ongress — chose to leave
9 An early and respected authority on the Railway Labor Act sim
ilarly expressed his view that “questions of discipline or refusal to promote
(constituting ‘grievances’) are reviewable by the board.. . . ” Garrison, The
National Railroad Adjustment Board: A Unique Administrative Agency, 46
Yale L.J. 567, 586 (1937).
10 This Court has addressed the 1934 amendment's and their history at
length in numerous decisions. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
v. Chicago R. & 1. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957); Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945).
189
17
tha t b ro ad ju r isd ic t io n unch an g ed . T h is C ourt has concluded
from c o m m en ts by o rgan ized labo r du ring the deba tes on the
1934 am en d m e n ts tha t “ [t]he em p lo y ees w ere w ill ing to give
up th e ir rem ed ies ou ts ide o f the s ta tu te” in o rde r to achieve
final b in d in g ad ju s tm en t o f g r iev an ces th rough an adjustment
board . U nion P a c . R .R . v. P r ic e , 360 U.S. 601, 613 (1959).
T hose un ions support ing the am en d m en ts unders tood that
the ir m em bers w ere m ak ing an im portan t but worthwhile
concess ion :
T h e s e ra i lw a y lab o r o rg a n iz a t io n s h av e a lw a y s
opp o sed com p u lso ry d e te rm ina tion o f th e ir co n tro
versies . . . . [W ]e are now ready to concede that we
can risk hav ing our g r ievances go to a board and get
them de te rm in ed and that it is a con tr ibu tion that
these o rgan iza t ions are w ill ing to make.
H e a r in g s b e f o r e th e S e n a te C o m m itte e on In te r s ta te C om
m e r c e on S. 3 2 6 6 , 73rd C ong ., 2d Sess. 33, 35 (1934).
T h o se labo r o rgan iza t ions that opposed the amendments
s im ila r ly u n d e rs to o d th a t the a m en d m e n ts w o u ld require
“com pu lso ry a rb it ra t io n ,” and they c la im ed the enac tm ent of
the am en d m en ts w ould es tab lish a dangerous p receden t which
w ould be u n iq u e in the h is tory o f the U nited S ta tes Congress.
H ea r in g s b e fo r e th e H o u se C o m m itte e on In te r s ta t e a n d F o r
e ig n C o m m e r c e on HR 7 6 5 0 , 73rd C ong., 2d Sess. 118 (1934).
N everthe less , the am en d m en ts w ere passed , and no mention
was m ade during the deba tes or hearings lead ing up to the
am endm en ts o f any s ta te law c la im s that would surv ive the
1934 a m e n d m e n ts ’ enac tm ent.
A n o th e r face t o f the 1934 am endm en ts demonstrating
C o n g re s s ’ broad co m m itm e n t to ad jus tm en t boards is the
ex trao rd ina r i ly l im ited ju d ic ia l rev iew o f ad jus tm en t board
p ro c e e d in g s p ro v id ed by th e am en d m e n ts . T h e scope of
review p rov ided in Section 3 F irs t (p) and (q), 45 U.S.C.
§ 153 F irs t (p) and (q), is “ am ong the n a rrow es t know n to the
law.” U n ion P a c . R.R . v. S h e e h a n , 439 U.S. 89, 91 (1978)
(c ita tions om itted ) . “N ot only has the C ongress thus desig
nated an agency pecu lia rly com p e ten t to h a n d le ” workplace
190
18
disputes, “ it a lso in tended to leave a m in im um o f re sp o n
sibility to the c o u r ts .” O rd er o f Ry. C o n d u c to r s v. P itn ey , 326
U.S. 561, 566 (1946) .
The leg is la t iv e h is to ry under ly in g the 1936 am endm en ts
to the R L A ex ten d in g the R LA ’s d ispu te reso lu tion p rocedures
to air ca rr ie rs a lso dem o n s tra te s that non-con trac t based,
public p o l icy d is c h a rg e cases w ere sp ec if ica l ly inc lu d ed
among the types o f cases C ongress was told w ould be t ran s
ferred from the N L R A setting to the RLA d ispu te resolution
procedures. F or exam ple , C ap ta in E .G . H am ilton o f the A ir
Line P ilo ts A sso c ia tio n iden tif ied a wrongfu l d ischarge case
by pilots w ho had been te rm ina ted for a ttem pting to bargain
collectively and a case a lleg ing d isc r im ina tion aga ins t a p ilo t
as exam ples o f cases tha t w ould be decided by R L A p ro
cedures. To A m en d th e R a ilw a y L a b o r A ct to C o v e r E v ery
C om m on C a r r i e r by A ir E n g a g e d in In te r s ta te C o m m erce ,
H earin g s on S. 2 4 9 6 B e fo r e a S u b c o m m itte e o f th e C o m m itte e
on In te r s ta te C o m m e r c e , 74th C ong., 1st Sess. 5 (1935).
Similar v iew s w ere exp ressed by a rep resen ta tive o f the
International A sso c ia tio n o f M ach in is ts w hich represen ted
many a irl ine m echan ics : “n u m erous com plain ts for the m en of
discrim ination, [were] b rough t . . . before the reg iona l labor
boards, w hich are subsid ia ry to the N ationa l L abor R ela tions
Board, and in som e cases we got them adjusted and in others
we did n o t .” Id . at 20 (s ta tem en t o f D. K aplan, R esearch
Director, In te rn a t io n a l A ssoc ia tion o f M achin is ts) .
Finally , C o n g re s s ’ dec is ion in 1936 to require ad jus tm ent
boards to beg in re so lv ing em p lo y m en t d ispu tes in the a irl ine
industry b e fo r e co l lec t iv e b a rga in ing agreem ents had been
reached s trong ly supports P e t i t io n e rs ’ con ten tion that C o n
gress in tended for the R L A to reach beyond con trac t d isputes.
Thus, the 1936 am en d m en ts p rov ided for creation o f system
boards o f ad ju s tm en t “ to se tt le ind iv idual d isp u tes” even
though C ongress recogn ized that “ there are no such [airline
collective b a rg a in in g agreem ents] in operation now .” H.R.
Rep, No. 2243 , 74th C ong., 2d Sess. 1 (1936). G iven the
foregoing leg is la t iv e history, it is c lear that C ongress in tended
for ad ju s tm en t b o a rd s to have m an d a to ry ju r i s d ic t io n to
191
19
reso lve w rongfu l d isch a rg e c la im s even if those c la im s arose
ou ts ide the te rm s o f a co l lec t iv e barga in ing ag reem en t.
3. Allowing Norris to Bypass the RLA Dispute
Resolution Process and Challenge His Disci
pline in State Court Would Frustrate the
RLA Scheme.
“T h e p u rp o se o f the R ailw ay A ct was to p rov ide a f ram e
work for peacefu l s e t t lem en t o f labor d ispu tes be tw een car
riers and th e ir em p lo y ees . . . . ” U nion P a c . R.R . v. P r ic e , 360
U.S. 601, 609 (1959) . As th is C ourt has recogn ized , the RLA
is “a p roduc t o f m any years o f thought, study, conferences ,
d i s c u s s io n s and e x p e r im e n t s . ” P e n n s y lv a n ia R .R . v. D ay
("D ay"), 360 U.S. 548, 555 (1959). B ased on that long experi
ence, C o n g ress c o n c lu d e d tha t industr ia l peace in the vital
transpo r ta t ion industry w ould be fostered by a d ispu te reso lu
tion sys tem bu il t on the p r inc ip les o f u n ifo rm app lica tion of
rules and co o p e ra t iv e and au to n o m o u s dec is ion m aking by
ind iv idua ls k n o w led g e ab le in the co m plex it ies o f the rail and
airline industr ies . P erm it t in g sta te c la im s for w rongfu l dis
cha rge w ou ld c lea r ly f ru s t ra te the goals w h ich Congress
sought to ach ieve th rough the R LA ’s enactm ent.
C ongress re co g n ized du rin g considera t ion o f the 1934
am endm en ts tha t u n ifo rm ity in d ispu te reso lu tion was impor
tant in par t becau se co n s is ten t app lica tion of ru les re la ting to
g rievances w ould lessen the frequency o f d ispu tes and unrest.
S e e H e a r in g s b e fo r e th e S e n a te C o m m ittee on In te r s ta te C om
m e r c e on S. 3 2 6 6 , 73rd C ong ., 2d Sess. 17 (A pril 10, 1934)
(s ta tem en t o f C o m m iss io n e r E as tm an , p rinc ipa l draftsperson
o f the 1934 am en d m e n ts ) ( “ if som e g rea te r degree o f unifor
mity can be a t ta ined by n a tiona l considera t ion , the tendency
will g radua lly be to reduce the nu m b er o f deba tab le disputes.
P receden ts will m ean som eth ing , w hereas they now often
m ean li t t le o r n o th in g ”). In add ition , d ispari ty o f treatment
am ong s im ila r ly s itua ted w orkers was a lead ing cause of
unhapp iness am ong em ployees . D ay , 360 U.S. at 553; see
a l s o In te r n a t io n a l A s s ’n o f M a ch in is ts v. C en tra l A irlines,
Inc. ( “C e n tr a l A ir l in e s " ) , 372 U.S. 682, 691-92 (1963) (RLA
2 0
cdnnot be co n s tru ed to perm it in cons is ten t dec is io n s by State
tribunals: “T h e needs o f the sub jec t m atte r m an ifest ly ca ll for
un iform ity” ) . 11
As th is C ourt has recogn ized , the R L A ’s goal o f u n i fo r
mity would be underm in ed if s ta te courts were p e rm itted to
encroach on the ad jus tm en t b o a rd ’s authority :
We can take ju d ic ia l no tice o f the fact that p ro v i
sions in ra ilroad co llec tive bargain ing ag reem en ts
are o f a spec ia l ized , techn ical na tu re ca lling for
sp e c ia l iz e d te c h n ic a l k n o w le d g e in a s c e r ta in in g
their m ean in g and app lica tion . W holly apa rt from
the ad ap tab ili ty o f ju d g e s and ju r ie s to m ake such
d e te rm ina tions , vary ing ju ry verd ic ts w ould im bed
into such ju d g m e n ts vary ing cons truc tions not su b
jec t to rev iew to secure un iform ity . N ot only w ould
this en g e n d e r d ivers i ty o f p roceed ings but d ivers i ty
through ju d ic ia l construc tion and th rough the c o n
struction o f the ad jus tm en t board . S ince no th ing is a
g rea te r spur to conflic ts , and even tua lly conflic ts
resu lting in s trikes , than d iffe ren t pay for the sam e
work o r un fa ir d iffe ren tia ls , not to respect the ce n
tra lized d e te rm ina tion o f these ques t ions th rough 11
11 Congress has recognized that there is a more compelling need for
uniformity of treatment for transportation industry employees than exists in
other industries: “Railroads and airlines are direct instrumentalities of
interstate commerce . . . the duties of many employees require the constant
crossing of State lines; many seniority districts under labor agreements. . .
extend across State lines, and . . . employees are frequently required to
move from one State to another.” H.R. Rep. 2811, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1950) (amendments adding union security agreements to RLA and reject
ing language whereby an employee could “opt out” of unionization under
state right to work laws). See also 96 Cong. Rec. 16,261 (1950) (statement
of Sen. Hill) (“When we pick up a telephone in Washington to make a call
to Florida it does not involve any personnel moving out of the District of
Columbia and going to Florida or to any other State. .. . However, when a
railroad train moves out of Washington on the way to Florida, personnel
does cross State lines.”).
193
21
the A d ju s tm en t B oard w ou ld ham per, i f not defeat ,
the cen tra l p u rp o se o f R ai lw ay L abor Act.
D ay , 360 U .S . at 553. T h is C ourt has s im ilar ly recognized
that w hen the R L A w as ex ten d ed to a ir ca rr ie rs in 1936
C ongress “ ‘cou ld not . . . h av e though t that s tab ility and
con tinu ity to in te rs ta te a ir com m erce w ould com e from the
undu la t ing po lic ies . . . o f the leg is la tu res and courts (o r both)
o f the [50] s ta te s . ’ ” C e n tr a l A ir l in e s , 372 U.S. at 691 n. 15
(c ita tions om itted ) .
F orum sh o p p in g is an ti the t ica l to the goal o f promoting
un iform ity in d isp u te re so lu t io n in the t ranspo r ta t ion industry.
If c la im s such as N o r r i s ’ w ere perm itted to go fo rw ard in the
m ulti tude o f av a ilab le sta te cou r ts , a c l im ate o f d isco rd and
d ispute co u ld be ex pec ted as em p lo y ees or ca rr ie rs disap
pointed with a g iven ru ling by an ad jus tm en t board ignored
that ru l ing and w en t to an o th e r tr ibunal look ing for a more
favorab le r e s u l t .12 As a c razy -q u il t o f s ta te dec is ions fell into
place, w orkers th ro u g h o u t the industry w ould undoubtedly
feel the stab o f d ispa ra te trea tm en t, the very re su lt Congress
sought to avoid by m anda ting ad ju s tm en t board reso lu tion of
claims.
194
12 It is important to recognize that the Hawaii court’s decision would
probably do more than simply provide an employee with an election of fora
for wrongful discharge or other non-contractual grievances. It could lead
employees to commence RLA procedures and then resort to state actions if
disappointed with the RLA’s result. See Davies v. American Airlines, Inc.,
971 F.2d 463 (10th Cir. 1992), cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 2439 (1993). It could
also encourage an employee who has prevailed before the RLA to pursue
an action in state court to recover damages not available through RLA
procedures. E.g., Mayon v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 805 F.2d 1250 (5th
Cir. 1986) (discharged employee recovered back pay through RLA griev
ance procedures then filed state court suit to recover for emotional distress
as a result of his firing), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 925 (1988). Finally, a
litigant frustrated with the law in, or result obtained from, one state tribunal
might file a new action in another state with sufficient contacts to the
employment relationship where substantive laws were more hospitable to
his claim and also distinct enough to avoid the preclusive effect of an
adverse judgment in the first state forum.
22
A nother m eans by w hich C ongress in tended to fo s te r
harmony w ith in the transpo r ta t ion industry w as th ro u g h the
significant industry au tonom y p laced in the R L A ’s d ispu te
resolution p rocedures . In a departu re from its p r io r leg is la t ion
in the a r e a ,13 C o n g ress took the app roach that re p o s in g d ec i
sionmaking au thori ty with those l ikely to be a ffec ted by the
decisions w ou ld fo s te r peace w ith in the industry and p rom ote
conciliation o f d isputes:
The p ro v is ions of this m easure will add to the
eff ic iency o f the t ranspor ta t ion system by affo rd ing
a sane and p ractica l m ethod for the se t t lem en t o f
d isputes be tw een the opera to rs and the em ployees .
By p ro v id ing in this m anner for a be t te r u n d e rs ta n d
ing be tw een those concerned and for an ef fec tive
se t t lem en t o f po in ts o f d ispu te increased eff ic iency
will fo l low in the t ransporta t ion service.
67 C ong . R ec . 4 6 6 6 (1 9 2 6 ) ( s t a t e m e n t o f R ep . N. C.
Laughlin). It was s im ilarly observed in the H ouse o f R ep re
sentatives tha t “ the m ore re sponsib il i ty and p ow er you throw
at the em p lo y er and the em ployees the m ore l ikely you are to
get peace. . . . ” 67 Cong. Rec. 4650 (1926) (s ta tem en t o f Rep.
Jacobstein).
C ongress a lso v iew ed au tonom y as an im portan t o b jec
tive becau se o f the p a r t ic u la r c o m p e te n ce o f a d ju s tm en t
boards to dec id e d ispu tes w ith in the affected industr ies . It has
been observed that the rail industry is “a state w ith in a s ta te”
with its own laws and p a r ticu la r cus tom s. C ongress conc luded
that “disputes should be settled by p ractica l m en o f affairs in
close con tac t with the situation and with an u n d ers tan d in g o f
13 Prior to enactment of the RLA, the Transportation Act of 1920
provided for mandatory resolution of rail industry disputes by a federally-
created Rail Labor Board. As this Court has recognized: “The experiment
was unsuccessful.” In te rn a tio n a l A s s ’n o f M a ch in is ts v. S tree t, 367 U.S.
740, 756 (1961). “Congress has since that time consistently adhered to a
regulatory policy which places the responsibility squarely upon the carriers
and the unions mutually to work out settlements of all aspects of the labor
relationship.” Id. at 757.
195
23
A llow ing N orr is to b r ing his w rongfu l d isch a rg e c la im s
in sta te co u r t w ould u n d e rm in e the goal o f u n ifo rm , au to n o
m ous, k n o w led g e ab le , ex p ed it io u s , and final d ec is io n m ak in g
em bod ied in the R LA . The fac ts su rround ing N o r r i s ’ censure
ra ise m yriad issues ca ll ing fo r k n o w led g e of, expert ise in, and
sens i t iv ity to a ir l in e industry c o n c e rn s .14 A ff irm ance o f the
H aw aii c o u r t ’s dec is ion w ould there fo re un d erm in e C o n g re s s ’
goals in en a c t in g the R L A and p re v en t d ispu te re so lu tion by
the d ec is io n m ak e r - the sys tem board o f ad jus tm en t - that
C ongress ch o se to re so lve d isch a rg e and d isc ip l ine d is p u te s .15
B. THE SUPREME COURT’S INTERPRETATION
OF THE RLA SCHEME SUPPORTS PREEMP
TION OF STATE “WRONGFUL DISCHARGE”
CLAIMS.
1. This Court Has Recognized That Adjustment
Board Jurisdiction Extends to Disputes That
Arise Outside the Terms of a Collective Bar
gaining Agreement.
In E lg in , J . & E. Ry. C o . v. B u r ley ( “B u r le y ” ), 325 U.S.
711 (1945), th is C o u rt co n d u c ted an ex tens ive rev iew o f the
language and leg is la t ive h is to ry o f the R LA and found that
th e p s y c h o lo g y o f th e p a r t ie s .” 67 C o n g . R e c . 4 6 5 0 (1 9 2 6 )
(s ta te m e n t o f R e p . J a c o b s te in ) .
14 For example, one issue demanding adjustment board input is
determining whether the actions taken against Norris after he refused to
sign the work record amounted to a “discharge.” See infra pp. 34-35.
15 Since the Hawaii court held Norris’ wrongful discharge claim was
not a “minor” dispute, the court’s holding could result in removing similar
claims from adjustment board jurisdiction even for those employees desir
ing to resolve their wrongful discharge disputes in that forum. The Hawaii
court’s decision may also preclude workers covered by Norris’ CBA from
claiming that the express provisions of Art. XVII.F of the CBA protect
them from being discharged for refusing to perform work in violation of
federal or state safety laws other than workplace safety laws (See Pet. App.
196^°a)-
2 4
the s ta tu to ry p ro v is ions for ad jus tm en t o f d ispu tes en c o m
passed d ispu tes o ver r igh ts and in terests ex is ting independen t
o f a co l lec t iv e barg a in in g agreem ent. T he B u r ley C ourt reco g
nized that C o n g ress in tended for R L A ad jus tm ent board ju r i s
d ic t io n to e x te n d n o t on ly to c o n tra c t in te rp re ta t io n or
applica tion issues bu t also to the so-called “om itted ca se”
w here “ the c la im is fo u n d e d upon som e inc iden t o f the
em p lo y m en t re la t ionsh ip , o r asserted one, independen t o f
those co v e red by the co llec tive bargain ing agreem ent, e .g .,
claim s on accoun t o f personal in ju r ies .” 325 U.S. at 723. As
shown below, that conclusion was essential to the Court’s holding
in B urley and has not been overturned by later decisions.
B u r ley ad d ressed the ques t ion of w hether and to what
extent an agg r ieved em p lo y ee had a righ t to par tic ipa te in the
p rosecution and se t t lem en t o f d isputes before an ad jus tm ent
board u n d e r S ec tion 3 o f the RLA. The carrier there had
settled a n u m b er o f ind iv idua l em p loyee grievances by ag ree
ment with the e m p lo y e e s ’ barga in ing represen ta tive but had
not o b ta ined the co n sen t o f involved em ployees to som e o f
the se t t lem en ts . The ca rr ie r argued that the bargain ing re p re
sen ta t ive had the p o w e r to se t t le the g r iev an ces on the
em p lo y ee s ’ beha lf . 325 U.S. at 733. The Court re jec ted that
view:
We th ink that such a view o f the s ta tu te ’s effec ts ,
in so fa r as it w ould d ep r ive the aggrieved em ployee
o f e f fec tive vo ice in any se t t lem ent and o f ind iv id
ual hea r ing b e fo re the B oard , would be contra ry to
the c lea r im port o f its p rov is ions and to its policy.
325 U.S. a t 7 3 3 .16
16 The RLA as interpreted in B u r le y is thus clearly distinguishable
from the LMRA, under which an employee has no independent right to go
to arbitration. R e p u b lic S te e l C orp. v. M a d d o x (“M addox”), 379 U.S. 650,
653 (1965) (for arbitration of contract grievances under LMRA § 301,
“unless the contract provides otherwise there can be no doubt that the
employee must afford the union the opportunity to act on his behalf’).
Under the LMRA the employee’s recourse if the union refuses to process
his grievance is to sue the union for breaching its duty of fair representa
197
25
T h e C o u rt held tha t “ [ a c c e p ta n c e o f th is v iew w ould
requ ire the c lea res t ex p ress io n o f p u rp o se ” s ince exc lus ive
u n io n r e p r e s e n ta t i o n w o u ld w o rk a s e v e re h a r d s h ip on
ag g r ieved em p lo y ees . Id . T h e co n s tru c tio n urged by the ca r
r ier was v iew ed as severe p rec ise ly because o f the ex tens ive
reach o f R L A ju r isd ic t io n :
It w o u ld be d i f f ic u l t to b e l ie v e th a t C o n g re s s
in tended , by the 1934 am endm en ts , to subm erge
w holly the ind iv idua l and m inori ty in terests , with
all p o w e r to act co n ce rn in g them , in the co llec tive
in terest and agency, no t only in fo rm ing the c o n
tracts w h ich govern th e ir em p lo y m en t re la t ion , but
a lso in g iv ing effec t to th em a n d to a l l o t h e r in c i
d en ts o f th a t r e la t io n . . . . [T jh is w ould m ean that
C o n g ress had n u l l if ie d a l l p r e e x is t in g r ig h ts o f
w o r k e r s to a c t in r e la t io n to th e ir em p lo y m en t. . . .
325 U.S. at 733-34 (em phasis added).
T he C o u rt a lso recogn ized that exc lus ive un ion rep resen
ta tion w ould not in all ins tances g uaran tee adequa te p rosecu
tion o f c la im s on b eh a lf o f the ind iv idua l em ployee . The
un ion was l ike ly to be less than zealous in p rosecu ting d is
pu tes “w h e re the g r iev a n ce a r ise s from in c id en ts o f the
em p lo y m en t no t covered by a co llec tiv e agreem en t, in which
p resum ably the co llec tive in terest w ould be affec ted only
rem otely , i f at all. . . . ” 325 C ° . at 7 3 4 .17
T hat the s ta tu te does uscrimina'-;
be tw een these and othe ip-
port fo r b e l iev ing its p i p o se was not to vest final
tion. See Vaca v. S ip es , 386 U.S. 171 (1967). The RLA grievant, by
contrast, is free to pursue his or her own grievance as an individual through
the adjustment board.
17 Cf. M a d d o x , 379 U.S. at 653: “Union interest in prosecuting
employee grievances [in the LMRA setting] is clear.” The different
approaches under the RLA and LMRA are attributable in large part to the
fact that RLA jurisdiction extends beyond contract disputes, while LMRA
jurisdiction does not.
and ex c lu s iv e p o w e r o f se t t lem ent in the co llec tive
agent.
325 U .S . at 734.
E ven th ough the c la im s o f the aggrieved em ployees in
B u r ley in v o lv ed the c o l lec t iv e b a rg a in in g ag reem en t , the
C o u r t ’s f ind ing that n on -con trac tua l c la im s fell w ith in the
ad jus tm ent board ju r isd ic t io n was clearly an in tegra l part o f
the B u r ley dec is ion . W hile the question p resen ted in the
instant case is d iffe ren t , the B u r ley C o u r t ’s careful and de l ib
erate f ind ing shou ld be deem ed con tro ll ing on the ques tion of
the reach o f R L A ju r isd ic t io n .
T he H aw aii S up rem e C ourt in the decis ion below found
im plicitly tha t the so -called “om itted ca se” find ing o f B u rley
was ov erru led by this C o u r t ’s recen t dec is ion in C o n s o l id a t e d
R ail v. L a b o r E x e c u t iv e s ’ A s s ’n ( " C o n r a i l”), 491 U.S. 299
(1989):
T he C o u rt sta ted that “m in o r” disputes, to which
§ 153 F irs t (i) applies , are those that “may be
co n c lu s iv e ly re so lved by in terpre ting the ex is ting
[co llec t ive bargain ing] ag reem en t .” 491 U.S. at 305
(c i ta t io n s o m i t te d ) . T h e C o u r t a lso s ta ted th a t
“ [w ]here an em p lo y e r asserts a contrac tual r ight to
take the co n tes ted ac tion , the ensu ing d ispute is
m ino r if the ac tion is arguab ly ju s t if ied by the terms
of the p a r t ie s ’ co l lec tive -ba rga in ing ag reem en t.” Id .
at 307. T h e S u p rem e C o u r t ’s in te rp r e ta t io n o f th e
R L A ’s m a n d a t o r y a r b i t r a t i o n p r o v i s i o n d e m o n
s t r a t e s its b e l i e f th a t C o n g re s s in ten d ed to a f f e c t
on ly th o s e d is p u te s in v o lv in g c o n tr a c tu a lly d e f in e d
r ig h ts .
(Pet. A pp. 14a) (em phas is added).
P e t i t io n e rs re spec tfu l ly subm it that the H aw aii c o u r t ’s
conclusion that C o n r a i l som ehow overru led B u r le y ’s “om itted
case” h o ld ing is e r roneous . The question presen ted in C o n r a il
- w hether a c a r r i e r ’s asse r ted righ t to conduc t drug tes ting of
em ployees should be re so lved th rough NM B m edia tion pro
cedures u n d e r R L A S ection 5 or ad jus tm ent board arb itra tion
under R L A S ection 3 F irs t (i) - had nothing w ha tsoever to do
26
199
27
with d e te rm in in g w hich d ispu tes feil ou ts ide R L A d ispu te
r e s o lu t io n p ro c e d u re s . T h e C o n r a i l C o u r t d e s c r ib e d the
“ m a jo r /m in o r t e r m i n o l o g y ” as " a s h o r th a n d m e th o d o f
desc r ib in g tw o c lasses o f con tro v e rsy C o n g ress had d is t in
gu ished in the R L A .” 491 U.S. at 302. N o w h ere d o es the
C o n r a i l C o u r t d e sc r ib e its d iscuss ion o f the m a jo r and m ino r
ca teg o r ie s as ex h a u s tiv e o f R L A ju risd ic t io n . T h e re was no
reason fo r the C o n r a i l C ourt to reach B u r ley , s ince the ea r l ie r
ho ld ing w as no t d e te rm in a tiv e o f the issues befo re it. T h e re
fore, there is no reason to be lieve the C o n r a il C o u rt in tended
to d is tu rb the ea r l ie r f ind ing in B u r ley that the R L A d ispu te
re so lu tion p ro c ed u re s ex tend to n on -con trac tua l c la im s. In
fact, there is m uch in the C o u r t ’s dec is ion in C o n r a i l sug g es t
ing tha t the “ om itted c a se ” rem a in s an accep ted ca tego ry of
R L A ju r isd ic t io n to be com m itted to ad jus tm en t board p ro
cedures , as C o n r a i l quo tes B u r l e y ’s “om itted c a se ” d iscu s
sion, 491 U.S. at 3 0 3 ,18 with apparen t approval.
2. Andrews Declares That the RLA Adjustment
Board Is the Exclusive Forum for “Wrongful
Discharge” Claims.
A n d rew s v. L o u is v i l le & N a s h v il le R.R. {" A n d rew s" ), 406
U.S. 320 (1972) , holds tha t an em ployee m ay not avail h im
se lf o f a s ta te law fo rum and rem edy to ch a llenge an alleged
w rongfu l te rm ina tion . A n d rew s f inally and def in itive ly ov er
ru led a l in e o f ca ses w h ich had held tha t a te rm in a ted
em p lo y ee co u ld e lec t to assert a c la im of w rongfu l d ischarge
in sta te court: M o o r e v. I l l in o is C ent. R .R ., 312 U.S. 630
(1941); T r a n s c o n t in e n ta l & W. Air, In c . v. K o p p a l , 345 U.S.
653 (1953) . T he reach o f M o o r e and K o p p a l had been eroded
o ver the yea rs , as dec is ion a f te r dec is ion co ns tru ing the RLA
endeav o red to d is t ingu ish or l im it the ir ho ld ings. S ee , e .g .,
B u r ley , 325 U .S . at 720-21 . In A n d rew s the C ourt finally
p la in ly ac k n o w led g ed tha t “ the notion that the g r ievance and
18 The Hawaii court quotes from C o n ra il’s quotation of B u rley , but
significantly the Hawaii court’s quotation omits the portion of the C onrail
quote describing the “omitted case” rule (Pet. Ann 12a)
200
28
arb itra tion p ro ced u re s p rov ided for m ino r d isputes in the
Railway L ab o r A ct are op tiona l , to be availed o f as the
em ployee or the c a rr ie r chooses , was never good h is tory and
is no lo n g e r good law .” 406 U .S . at 322.
In re jec t in g the re ason ing of M o o re and K o p p a l th a t R LA
d ispu te re so lu t io n p ro c ed u re s w ere m ere ly vo lun tary , the
A n drew s cou r t observed ,
L a te r cases from th is C o u rt have repudia ted the
re a so n in g ad v an ced . . . . F if teen years ago, in
B r o t h e r h o o d o f R a i lr o a d T ra in m en v. C h ic a g o R. &
I.R . C o ., 353 U.S. 30, 39 (1957) , this C ourt c a n
vassed the re levan t leg is la t ive history and said:
“T h is record is conv in c in g that there was g en
eral u n d ers tan d in g be tw een both the supporters
and the opponen ts o f the 1934 am endm ent that
th e p ro v is io n s d ea l in g with the A d ju s tm en t
B o ard w ere to be cons idered as com pulsory
a rb itra t ion in this l im ited f ie ld .”
406 U.S. at 322. T he C o u rt a lso cited its observation in
W alker v. S o u th ern R .R ., 385 U.S. 196, 198 (1966): “ ‘P rov i
sion for a rb itra t ion o f a d isch a rg e grievance , a m inor d ispute,
is not a m a tte r o f vo lun ta ry ag reem en t under the Railw ay
Labor Act; the A ct com pels the parties to arb itra te m inor
disputes. . . . ’ ” 406 U.S. at 322 (quoting W alker).
A n d rew s goes qu ite far to w ard reso lv ing the issues before
the C ourt on the ins tan t pe t i t ion . In A n drew s the em ployee
similarly c la im ed his d isch a rg e was “w rongfu l” and in v io la
tion o f s ta te law. The em p lo y ee had pled his c la im as a breach
of con trac t u n d er s tate law and had refused to go th rough the
ad justm ent board p rocedures . In ho ld ing the c laim preem pted
in spite o f its cha rac te r iza t io n as a breach o f state law, the
Court m ade c lea r that a d ischa rged em ployee canno t avoid the
strictures o f the R L A th rough artfu l p lead ing . U nder s im ilar
facts in M o o r e , the em p lo y ee was held entit led to pursue a
state law c la im bec au se he “chose to accept the ra i l ro a d ’s
action in d ischa rg ing h im as final, thereby ceasing to be an
em ployee. . . . ” S lo cu m v. D e la w a r e , L. & W. R .R ., 339 U.S.
239 (1950). A n d rew s fla tly re jec ted that approach: “The fact
that p e t i t ione r cha rac te r izes his c la im as one for ‘w rongful
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29
d is c h a rg e ’ d o es no t save it f ro m the A c t ’s m andato ry p ro v i
sions fo r p ro c ess in g o f g r ie v a n c e s .” 406 U .S . at 323-24 .
A n d rew s a lso s tands fo r the p ropo s i t io n tha t R L A p re
em p tio n ap p l ie s even if the re l ie f ava ilab le f rom the ad ju s t
m en t b o a rd does no t m atch s ta te law ac tions or rem edies .
J u s t i c e D o u g l a s , d i s s e n t i n g in A n d r e w s , d i s c u s s e d th e
rem ed ies a v a i la b le to the d isch a rg ed em p lo y ee u n d er G eorg ia
law and c i ted the ra tiona le o f M o o r e and its p rogeny : “ 'A
co tn m on la w o r s ta tu to ry c a u s e o f a c t io n f o r w ro n g fu l d i s
c h a r g e d i f f e r s f r o m an y r em ed y w h ic h th e B o a r d h a s the
p o w e r to p r o v id e .' ” 406 U .S . a t 329 (D oug las , J., d issen ting)
(quo ting S lo c u m , 339 U .S . at 244) (em p h as is in d issen ting
o p i n i o n ) . J u s t i c e D o u g l a s a r g u e d t h a t r e f e r r i n g th e
e m p lo y e e ’s c la im s to the R L A “ is to rem it h im to an agency
that has no p o w e r to act on th is c la im .” A n d rew s, 406 U.S. at
328. T he d is se n t a lso co m p la in ed that “ an em p lo y ee seeking
dam ages fo r re in s ta te m e n t is no rm ally en tit led to a ju ry trial;
and no d iv is io n o f the A d ju s tm en t B oard ev e r p re tends to
serve in th a t ro le .” Id . at 3 2 9 .19
The A n d rew s m ajo ri ty d id no t re spond po in t by po in t to
the d issen t in g J u s t ic e ’s a rgum en t, bu t it was fo r th r igh t in
ac k n o w led g in g that R L A p re em p tio n cou ld p rec lude resort to
rem ed ies o th e rw ise ava ilab le in a sta te court:
T he te rm “exhau s tio n o f adm in is tra t iv e re m e d ie s”
in its b ro a d e r sense m ay be an en tire ly appropria te
d esc r ip t io n o f the ob l ig a t io n o f both the em ployee
19 Justice Douglas also observed: “[T]he body of law governing the
discharge of employees who do not want or seek reinstatement is not found
in customs of the shop or in the collective agreement but in the law of the
place Where the employee works. The Adjustment Board is not competent
to apply that law.” 406 U.S. at 329.
The objections raised by Justice Douglas in A n d rew s were similar to
those raised in dissent by Justice Reed in S lo cu m , 339 U.S. at 245, a case
holding that employees could not resort to state court to enforce the terms
of their collective bargaining agreements. Justice Reed complained that
“the Court says that Congress has forced the parties into a forum that has
few of the attributes of a court, but which may be the final judge of the
rights of individuals.” 339 U.S. at 252-53.
202
30
and c a rr ie r u n d er the R ailw ay L abor A ct to reso rt to
d ispu te se t t lem en t p rocedures p rov ided by that Act.
It is clear, how ever, that in at least som e s i tua t ions
the A c t m akes the federa l adm in is tra t ive rem edy
exc lus ive , ra the r than m ere ly requ ir ing exhaustion
o f r e m e d ie s in o n e fo r u m b e f o re r e s o r t in g to
another.
406 U.S. a t 325.
In sum , A n d rew s holds that the R LA d ispu te m echan ism
p ro ced u re s are m an d a to ry an d ex c lu s iv e for all d ispu tes
within the R L A ’s scope, even i f that m eans that s ta te law
rights and rem ed ies will be lost. F rom the sta tu tory language
and leg is la t ive h is tory o f the R L A , it is c lea r tha t R LA
ju r isd ic t io n e x ten d s to d isp u tes invo lv in g n o n -c o n trac tu a l
cha llenges to d isc ip l ine and d ischarge . B u r ley conf irm s that
RLA ju r isd ic t io n ex tends to d ispu tes over d isc ip l ine and d is
charge “ w here the g r ievance ar ises from incidents o f the
em ploym en t no t covered by a co llec tiv e ag reem en t ,” and that
“the s ta tu te does no t pu rpo r t to d is t in g u ish ” be tw een such
“om itted c a s e s ” and those c la im s invo lv ing spec if ic con trac t
provisions. B u r le y , 325 U.S. at 736. In v iew o f the c lea r reach
of the R L A to n on -con trac tua l d isc ip l ine and d ischarge d is
putes, the h o ld ing in A n d rew s, w hen read with the ho ld ing in
B u rley , m eans tha t all s ta te law w rongfu l d ischarge c la im s are
preem pted w h e th e r they are p ied as b reaches o f s ta te contract
laws or v io la t ions o f state tort law s .20
20 Of course, the preempted claim in A n d rew s was founded upon a
breach of a collective bargaining agreement. S ee A n d rew s, 406 U.S. at 324
(“the only source of petitioner’s right not to be discharged, and therefore to
treat an alleged discharge as a ’wrongful’ one that entitles him to damages,
is the collective bargaining agreement. . . . ”). However, the decision does
not purport to limit the scope of RLA preemption to contract-based claims.
Indeed, the employee in A n d rew s could have easily pled his “wrongful
discharge” claim as a tort or statutory disability discrimination claim
because “the company refused to allow him to go to work on the ground he
had not recovered sufficiently [from an injury] to perform his former
duties.” 406 U.S. at 327 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See generally, Melanson
v. U nited A ir L ines, Inc ., 931 F.2d 558, 561 n.l (9th Cir. 1991) (“Nearly any
203
31
II. THE RLA PREEMPTS NORRIS’ “WRONGFUL DIS
CHARGE” CLAIMS
N orris’ “wrongful discharge” tort claim s in Count 1
against Hawaiian and Counts I and II against the Individual
Defendants are preempted by the RLA because those claims
“grow[] out of grievances, or out of the interpretation or
application of [an] agreement concerning rates of pay, rules,
or working conditions. . . . ” RLA Section 204, 45 U.S.C
§ 184. In Count I of each complaint Norris states a common
law tort claim that he was wrongfully discharged in violation
of public policies embodied in the Federal Aviation laws
because he refused to sign o ff on a work report due to his
concerns about the airw orthiness o f an axle sleeve he
observed during a tire change on a DC-9 aircraft (Jt. App.
7).21 Similarly, in Count II of his complaint against the
Individual Defendants, Norris states a common law tort claim
that he was wrongfully discharged in violation of public
p o lic ies within the state w h istleb low er act because he
reported an unsafe axle sleeve to the Federal Aviation Author
ity (Jt. App. 17).
Norris’ common law claims are exactly the kinds of
disputes Congress directed both em ployees and carriers, as
well as carriers' officers, to resolve through the dispute reso
lution procedures of the RLA. S e e RLA Section 2 First, 45
contract claim can be restated as a tort claim. The RLA’s grievance
procedure would become obsolete if it could be circumscribed by artful
pleadings”).
21 It should be noted that Congress itself has never expressly included
a “whistleblower” protection provision in the Federal Aviation Act despite
bills being introduced to enact such legislation. See S. 48, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989); H.R. 4023, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); H.R. 4113, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); H.R. 5073, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). While the
reasons the legislation has failed cannot, be determined, it is certainly
possible that Congress was aware that employees in the airline industry are
already protected from termination for whistleblowing under the manda
tory arbitration procedures of Section 204 of the RLA. See discussion of
FRSA supra pp. 12-14.
32
U .S .C . § 152 F irs t ( “ca rr ie rs , th e ir o ff icers , ag en ts , and
Em ployees” have a duty “ to se t t le all d ispu tes , w h e th e r aris ing
out o f the app lica tion o f [co llec t ive bargain ing] ag reem en ts or
o therw ise . . . . ”). T hose c la im s are covered by the exp lic it
desc rip tion o f the ju r isd ic t io n o f the S ystem B oard o f A d ju s t
ment in R L A Section 204, 45 U .S.C . § 184. F u rtherm ore , such
w h is t leb low er or public po licy c la im s have long been reco g
nized by C o n g ress to be am enab le to re so lu tion through
ad jus tm en t board p rocedures . S e e d iscuss ion o f N L R A and
FR SA s u p r a pp. 12-14. The leg is la tive h is tory o f the R LA
likew ise dem o n s tra te s , as this C ourt held in A n d rew s, tha t the
ad jus tm en t board fo rum is m andato ry for w rongfu l d ischarge
cla im s w ith in the R L A ’s ju r isd ic t io n . F inally, B u r ley m akes it
plain tha t em p lo y ee c la im s based on substan tive law external
to a co l lec t iv e bargain ing ag reem en t are w ith in ad jus tm en t
board ju r isd ic t io n , at least w here the par ticu la r c la im has been
iden tified by C o n g ress - as d isc ip l ine and d ischarge cla im s
repeated ly w ere - as a d ispu te to be reso lved th rough the
RLA. N o r r i s ’ c la im s the re fo re fall squarely w ith in the R LA
dispute re so lu tion schem e and m ust be preem pted .
To the ex ten t th a t any am b ig u i ty m igh t ex is t as to
w hether N o r r i s ’ c la im s are com m itted exc lus ive ly to ad jus t
ment board ju r isd ic t io n , that am bigu ity has been rem oved by
the term s o f the C B A cove ring N o r r i s ’ em ploym ent. U nder
A rticle X V I o f tha t ag reem en t, a S ystem Board o f A djus tm ent
is es tab lished “ [i]n com p lian ce with Section 204, T itle II, o f
the R ailw ay L ab o r A c t” (Pet. App. 54a) and is g iven, in
Article X V I.C , “exc lus ive ju r isd ic t io n over d ispu tes betw een
any em p lo y ee covered by th is A greem en t and the C o m p a
ny . . . g ro w in g out o f g r ievances concern ing d isc ip linary
action, ru les , ra tes o f pay, o r w ork ing cond itions covered by
this A g re em en t . . . or out o f the in terp re ta tion or applica tion
of any term s o f this A greem en t. . . . ” (Pet. App. 55a). S ince
the fo reg o in g c o n tra c tu a l lan g u ag e tracks the ad ju s tm en t
board ju r isd ic t io n a l language o f R L A Section 204, it is c lear
that N o rr is ’ no n -co n trac t-b ased w rongfu l d ischarge c la im s are
within the ad ju s tm en t b o a rd ’s ju risd ic t io n . S e e d iscussion
su pra P art I. Indeed , by inc lud ing grievances “concern ing
d iscip linary ac t io n ” w ith in the “exc lus ive ju r isd ic t io n ” o f the
205
33
ad ju s tm en t board , A rtic le X V I.C is, i f an y th in g , c lea re r than
R LA S ec tion 204 in en c o m p a ss in g N o rr is ’ c la im s.
F u r th e rm o re , the CBA requ ires the ad ju s tm en t board to
eva lua te w h e th e r the d isc ip l ine o f an em p lo y ee in N o rr is ’
s i tuation w ould v io late public po lic ies em b o d ied in the F ed
eral A viation laws. A rticle X V II .F o f the C B A p rov ides that
“ [a]n e m p lo y e e ’s refusal to perfo rm w ork w hich is in v io la
tion of e s tab l ish ed health and safety ru les, o r any local, state
or federal safe ty law shall not w a rran t d isc ip l in a ry ac tion"
(Pet. App. 6 0 a -6 1 a ) .22 The C B A there fo re m akes exp lic i t in
A rtic les X V I.C and X V II.F what we have p rev iously shown
C ongress und ers to o d to be en co m p assed by the m andatory
ju r isd ic t io n of ad jus tm en t boards - nam ely , reso lu tion of
d is c ip l in a ry “ g r ie v a n c e s ,” in c lu d in g w h is t le b lo w e r c la im s
such as N o r r i s ’, even when those c la im s are non-con trac t
based.
M an d a to ry ad ju s tm en t board ju r i s d ic t io n is in d e p e n
dently es tab l ish ed by the fact tha t N o r r i s ’ c la im s “g row out
o f . . . the in te rp re ta t ion or app lica tion o f . . . te rm s o f [the
C B A ]” (C B A A rtic le X V I.C , Pet. App. 55a). S e e a l s o RLA
22 While the Hawaii court conducted its own analysis of Article
XVII.F and found that that provision did not protect a mechanic who
refused to sign off on work records or who refused to perform work out of
safety concerns regarding the airworthiness of an aircraft (Pet. App.
19a-20a), a System Board with knowledge of the industry practices and
working conditions might well disagree with the court’s narrow construc
tion, thereby affording additional substantive protections to covered
employees and, by extension, to the flying public. Indeed, an arbitrator
with 32 years of experience interpreting collective bargaining agreements
in many industries, including 25 years in the airline industry (see Jt. App.
317, 325-26), reviewed the protection given to employees by Article
XVII.F and testified without contradiction that “this agreement, in an
unusual fashion, does cover the so-called whistleblower incident . . . ex
ception to insubordination, very specifically in the contract.” (Jt. App. 316
(Testimony of Ted Tsukiyama, Esq.); see a lso Jt. App. 307-08, 313 (“this
contract is unusual in that it does have provisions which, I think, protect an
employee in Mr. Norris’ position with regard to refusing to sign off or
complaining about what he believes to be unsafe work . . . or unsafe
practices.”), and Jt. App. 314-18).
34
S ection 204 , 45 U .S .C . § 184. W h e n the d isp u te arose
betw een N o rr is and his superv iso r about his re fusal to Sign
the w ork record fo r the t ire change , the two d isag reed about
w he the r the s ig n a tu re on the w ork record m ean t tha t N orris
was s ign ing for the cond it ion o f the axle s leeve . S ince the
CBA p ro v id es that “ [a]n airl ine m echan ic m ay be requ ired to
sign w ork records in connec tion with the w ork he p e rfo rm s ,”
N o rr is ’ d isc ip l in e for re fusing to sign the w ork record c learly
“grew ou t o f ’ an app lica tion o f the CBA . (C B A , A rtic le
IV.D.4(a), Pet. App. 48a). See d iscuss ion in fra pp. 44-45.
F inally , an e ssen tia l e lem en t o f N o rr is ’ c la im s is a “d is
ch a rg e ,” and p ro v in g tha t will req u ire in te rp re ta t io n a n d
app lica tion o f the C B A a n d o f the g rievance p rocess itself. In
N o rr is ’ case , the hearing off icer at the step 1 level re co m
m ended N o r r i s ’ te rm ina tion , bu t w hile the g rievance was
pending at the step 3 level, the step 3 hearing o ff icer reduced
the d isc ip l in e to a suspension . N orr is never re tu rned to work
or a t tem p ted to have his su spension overturned . Instead, sev
eral m o n th s a f te r his re in s ta tem en t, he filed suit in sta te court
c la im ing he had been d ischarged .
T he na tu re and c lass if ica t ion o f the d isc ip linary action
taken ag a in s t N orr is is a m a tte r w ith in the expert ise o f the
ad jus tm ent board , and it is a m a tte r requir ing un ifo rm ity of
t rea tm ent th ro u g h o u t the a irl ine and ra ilroad industries . C er
tainly that is one reason why C ongress com m itted resolution
of such d ispu tes to the R LA arbitra l process. Cf. M ayon v.
S ou th ern P a c . T ran sp . C o ., 805 F.2d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir.
1986) (w o rk e r who won re in s ta tem en t through the R L A g riev
ance p ro ceed in g canno t subsequen tly sue for “w rongfu l d is
charge” u n d e r s ta te law), cer t , d e n ie d , 488 U.S. 925 (1988) .23
23 Despite this fundamental purpose of the RLA, the Hawaii Supreme
Court completely ignored Hawaiian Airlines’ argument that the RLA
precluded a state court from deciding the nature of Norris’ discipline since
that determination is part and parcel of the grievance process. If allowed to
stand, the court’s decision will require a state court jury to interpret the
CBA and its application and the CBA’s grievance procedure to determine if
207
35
T h e m an d a to ry ju r isd ic t io n o f the S y s tem B oard over
N o r r i s ’ c la im s u n d e r the ag reem en t here is a lso su p p o rted by
th is C o u r t ’s d ec is io n in G ilm e r v. I n t e r s t a t e / J o h n s o n L a n e
C o r p ., 5 0 0 U .S . 20, 114 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1991). G ilm e r held that
the te rm s o f an a rb itra t ion ag reem en t co v e red by the F edera l
A rb i t ra t io n A c t, 9 U .S .C . S ection 1 et s e q . , cou ld requ ire
Arbitration o f a d isc r im in a to ry d ischarge c la im u n d e r the Age
D isc r im in a t io n in E m p lo y m en t A ct o f 1967, 29 U .S .C . Section
621 e t s e q . , w here the a rb itra tion ag reem en t was co v e red by
the FA A and the language of the ag reem en t w as b road enough
to en co m p a ss the A D E A claim . 500 U.S. a t ___ , 114 L. Ed. 2d
at 35. T h e issue befo re the C o u rt here - nam ely , the scope of
R L A p re em p tio n o f s ta te law w rongfu l d isch a rg e c la im s - is
d if fe ren t than the issue in G ilm er , w hich ad d ressed w he the r
a rb itra t ion can be a m andato ry fo rum for federa l d isc r im in a
tion c la im s. H ow ever, the ho ld ing in G ilm e r tha t an a rb itra
t io n a g r e e m e n t th a t is s a n c t io n e d by f e d e ra l law , and
su ff ic ien tly b road in its desc r ip tion o f arb itra l ju risd ic t io n ,
can fo rm the basis for m andato ry a rb itra t ion o f a n o n -c o n
trac t-b ased d isch a rg e c la im supports ou r v iew tha t the RLA-
sanc tioned C B A here by the b road ju r isd ic t io n te rm s o f A rti
c le X V l .C p roperly gran ted “exc lus ive ju r i s d ic t io n ” to the
ad ju s tm en t board to co n s id e r N o r r i s ’ s ta te - law w rongfu l d is
cha rge cla im s.
F ina lly , p reem ption o f N o rr is ’ c la im s by the R L A is
supported by the fact that the sub jec t m atte r o f the c la im s -
d isc ip l in e re la ted to safety m atters and even w h is t leb low ing —
are f requen tly re so lved by a rb itra tion . S e e , e .g . , In d ep en d en t
U nion o f F l ig h t A tten d an ts v. P an A m er ic a n W orld A irw ays,
In c ., 789 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1986) (d ischa rge o f f l igh t atten
dan t w ho co m p la in ed o f v io la tion o f f l igh t and duty t im e rules
p re se n ts a m in o r d isp u te fo r the R L A ); M is s o u r i-K a n s a s
Norris was discharged; for Norris cannot prevail in his wrongful discharge
claims if he was merely suspended.
36
T exas R. v. B r o t h e r h o o d o f R .R . T ra in m en , 342 F.2d 298, 300
(5th Cir. 1965) (p r io r to en ac tm en t o f F R S A rail em ployees
werd req u ired to subm it w h is t leb low er g r ievances to N ational
R ailw ay A d ju s tm en t B oard for ad ju s tm en t) .24
HI. THE CASES RELIED ON BY NORRIS, THE
HAWAII SUPREME COURT AND THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL TO NARROW THE SCOPE OF RLA
PREEMPTION DO NOT DETERMINE THE SCOPE
OF ADJUSTMENT BOARD JURISDICTION
In s tead o f app ly ing the d irec t ive o f this C o u r t ’s ru lings in
the A n d r e w s a n d B u r le y d e c is io n s , N o r r i s , th e H a w a i i
Suprem e C o u r t and the S o lic ito r G enera l o f the U nited States
urge tha t fou r o ther dec is ions by this C ourt - L in g le , C o n r a il ,
C o lo r a d o A n t i-D is c r im in a t io n C o m m ’n v. C o n tin e n ta l A ir
L in es, In c ., 372 U.S. 714 (1963) , and A le x a n d e r v. G a rd n er-
D en v er C o ., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) - require the resu lt reached
by the H aw aii S up rem e C ourt. As set forth below, the cases
relied upon are c learly d is t ingu ishab le both legally and fac tu
ally from the N o rr is case . To apply them to the R L A p reem p
tion is s u e h e re w o u ld be w h o l ly in c o n s i s t e n t w ith the
language, h is to ry , and pu rposes o f the RLA. N one o f those
cases p ro v id e a bas is fo r depart ing from C o n g ress ’ c lear
intent tha t d ispu tes invo lv ing d isc ip l ine and d ischarge - even
those in v o lv in g m atters ou ts ide o f a co llec tive bargain ing
24 Numerous reported decisions of the NRAB similarly address
wrongful discharge and whistleblower issues. NRAB Third Division
Award No. 23151 (Jan. 30, 1981) at 1, 7 (addressing grievance that
employee had been dismissed in retaliation for “disloyalty” to the railroad);
NRAB Third Division Award No. 27505 (Sept. 22, 1988) (addressing
claim of “constructive discharge” arising from employee’s refusal to follow
criminal directives); NRAB First Division Award No. 24059 (Feb. 6, 1991)
at 1-2 (employee allegedly discharged for complaining of safety pro
cedures); NRAB Second Division Award No. 12148 (Sept. 25, 1991) at 2
(claimed discharge of employee for public statements regarding safety
matters); Public Law Board No. 3399, Award No. 4 (Mar. 11, 1985) at 6
(awarding damages for termination held retaliatory).
209
37
a g re e m e n t an d sp e c if ic a l ly th o se in v o lv in g w h is t le b lo w e r
c la im s - s h o u ld be c o n c lu s iv e ly re so lv e d by a d ju s tm en t
boards.
A. THE HAWAII COURT’S RELIANCE ON LIN
GLE IS MISPLACED
1. Lower Courts Broadly Applied Andrews to Tort-
Based Claims for “Wrongful Discharge” Until
This Court’s Decision in Lingle.
As d iscu ssed above , this C ourt held in A n d rew s tha t the
R L A p re em p ts an e m p lo y e e ’s sta te law w rongfu l d ischarge
c la im . P r io r to the L in g le d ec is ion , courts b road ly applied
A n d rew s to ho ld tha t the R L A preem pts c la im s fo r wrongfu l
d ischarge tha t sound in tort as well as con trac t . In fact, with
one ex cep t io n , eve ry p re - L in g le court co n s id e r in g the p re
em ptive e f fec t o f the R L A ov er s ta te law w rongfu l d ischarge
c la im s ru led in fav o r o f p reem ption . S e e M ay on v. S ou th ern
P a c . T ran sp . C o ., 805 F.2d 1250, 1252 (5th Cir. 1986), cer t,
d e n ie d , 488 U .S . 925 (1988); M in eh a r t v. L o u is v i l l e & N.
R .R ., 731 F.2d 342, 345 (6th Cir. 1984); G r a f v. E lg in , J . & E.
Ry., 790 F.2d 1341, 1348 (7th Cir. 1986); J a c k s o n v. C o n s o l i
d a t e d R a i l C o r p . , 717 F.2d 1045, 1048-51 (7th Cir. 1983),
cer t , d e n ie d , 465 U .S . 1007 (1984); P e te r s o n v. A ir L in e
P ilo ts A s s ’n , 759 F.2d 1161, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985); C a m p b e ll
v. P an A m e r ic a n W orld A irw ay s, In c ., 668 F. S upp 139, 145
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (b ro ad e r p reem ption under R LA than under
N L R A ); B a ld r a c c h i v. P ra tt & W hitney A ir c ra ft D iv ., 814 F,2d
102, 106 (2nd Cir. 1987) ( “ s tro n g er app lica tion o f the p re
em ption d o c t r in e is a co ro lla ry to the R LA ’s un iq u e dispute-
re so lu tion f r a m e w o rk ”); H o d g e s v. A tch ison , T. & S.F. Ry.,
728 F.2d 414 , 417 (10th Cir.), c er t , d e n ie d , 469 U.S. 822
(1984). B u t s e e P u c h e r t v. A g sa lu d , 67 Haw. 25, 29, 677 P.2d
449 , 456 (1984) , a p p e a l d is m is s e d f o r w an t o f su b s ta n tia l
f e d e r a l q u e s t io n , 472 U.S. 1001 (1985).
P re - L in g le co u r ts also un ifo rm ly found o ther k inds of
torts ar is ing ou t o f o r re la ted to w rongfu l d ischarge cla im s to
be p reem p ted . M c C a ll v. C h e s a p e a k e & O. Ry., 844 F 2 d 294
210
38
303 (6 th C ir.) (R L A preem pts d isc r im ina tion c la im by d ia
betic w ho was te rm in a ted ) , c e r t , d e n ie d , 488 U .S . 879 (1988);
M ag n u son v. B u r lin g to n N. In c ., 576 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th
Cir.) (R L A p reem p ts c la im o f em otiona l d is tress fo l low ing
a lleged w ro n g fu l d isch a rg e ) , c e r t , d e n ie d , 439 U .S . 930
(1978); B e e r s v. S o u th ern P a c . T ran sp . C o ., 703 F.2d 425 , 429
(9th Cir. 1983) (R L A preem pts c la im o f in ten tiona l in flic tion
of em o tio n a l d is tress resu lt ing from h arassm en t re la t ing to
work co n d i t io n s and d isc ip l inary p rocedures) ; S c h r o e d e r v.
T rans W orld A ir lin es , In c ., 702 F.2d 189, 192 (9th Cir. 1983)
(RLA p re em p ts w rongfu l dem otion claim ).
T he fo rego ing pattern o f ho ld ings was d is rup ted in the
wake o f th is C o u r t ’s ru ling in L in g le v. N o rg e Div. o f M a g ic
C hef, In c . ( “L ingle'"), 486 U.S. 399 (1988), in w hich this
Court fa sh io n e d a s tandard to address preem ption u n d e r S ec
tion 301 o f the L ab o r M an ag em en t R ela tions Act ( “L M R A ”),
29 U.S.C . § 185. In the years fo l low ing the L in g le dec is ion , a
m inority o f lo w er courts has applied the L in g le p reem ption
s tandard to R L A cases .25
In the m ajo r i ty o f cases, how ever, courts have recogn ized
that cr it ica l d if fe ren ces betw een the L M R A and the RLA
m ake the L in g le s tandard inapp licab le in the R LA context.
S ee G ro te v. T ran s W orld A ir lin es , In c ., 905 F.2d 1307, 1309
(9th Cir.) , c e r t , d e n ie d , 498 U.S. 958 (1990); H u b b a r d v.
U n ited A ir lin e s , In c ., 927 F.2d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1991)
(cases u n d e r the L M R A not con tro ll ing because p reem ption
under R L A is b ro ad er than u n d er § 301); L o ren z v. CSX
Trans., In c ., 980 F.2d 263, 268 (4th Cir. 1992) (L in g le in ap
p l i c a b le b e c a u s e R L A p re e m p t io n is m o re p e r v a s iv e ) ;
25 A n d e rso n v. A m er ica n A irlin es , Inc ., 2 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir.
1993); D a v ie s v>. A m er ica n A irlines , In c ., 971 F.2d 463, 466-67 (10th Cir.
1992), cert, d en ied , 113 S. Ct. 2439 (1993); In tern a tio n a l A s s ’n o f M a ch i
nists & A ero sp a ce W orkers v. A lleg is C orp ., 545 N.Y.S.2d 638 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1989); M a h e r v. N ew J e rse y T ransit R a il O pera tions, Inc ., 125 NJ. 455,
593 A.2d 750, 758 (1991); O ’B rien v. C o n so lid a ted R a il C orp ., 972 F.2d 1
(1st Cir. 1992) (applying L in g le but finding preemption), cert, d en ied , 122
L. Ed. 2d 134 (1993).
211
39
S m o la r e k v. C h r y s le r C o r p ., 879 F.2d 1326, 1334 n .4 (6th
Cir.) , c e r t , d e n ie d , 493 U .S . 992 (1989); B row n v. M isso u r i
P a c . R .R ., 720 S .W .2d 357 , 359 n.5 (M o.), c e r t , d e n ie d , 481
U.S. 1049 (1986) (N L R A is m uch less im pac t in g than R LA );
F e ld le i t v. L o n g Is . R .R ., 723 F. S upp . 892, 899 (E.D.N.Y.
1989) (“ ( t]here is b ro a d e r p reem p tio n u n d er the R L A than
u n d er o the r federa l labo r law s” ); U n d e r w o o d v. V en an g o R iv er
C o rp ., 995 F.2d 677 , 682 (7th Cir. 1993) (L in g le and A n d rew s
support the po s i t io n tha t R L A p reem p tio n is b ro a d e r than
p reem ption u n d e r the L M R A ); C ro s to n v. B u rlin g to n N .R .R .,
999 F.2d 381 (9 th Cir. 1993).
Indeed , m any p o s t -L in g le dec is io n s recogn ize the broad
p reem ptive p o w e r o f the R L A w ithou t even re fe rr ing to L in
g le . S e e , E d e lm a n v. W estern A ir lin es , In c ., 892 F.2d 839, 845
(9th Cir. 1989) (p o s t -L in g le dec is ion ho ld ing w rongfu l d is
charge c la im s p re em p ted by R L A ); Z im m erm an v. A tch iso n , T.
& S.F. Ry., 888 F.2d 660, 662 (10 th Cir. 1989); C a lv e r t v.
T ran s W orld A ir lin e s , In c ., 9 5 9 F.2d 698, 700 (8th Cir. 1992).
In N o rr is , the H aw aii court jo in e d the m inori ty o f cou r ts and
applied the le s s -p reem p tiv e L in g le s tandard to R L A p reem p
tion. A s ex p la in e d below , the L in g le s tandard is inapplicab le
to p reem p tio n u n d e r the RLA.
2. L in g le is Inapplicable to Preemption Under
the RLA.
The L in g le te s t is in ap p l icab le here becau se it addresses
p reem ption u n d e r the L M R A , a s ta tu te s ign if ican tly different
from the R L A in its language , history, and purposes . The
p la in t if f in L in g le had been d isch a rg ed by h e r em p lo y er on
g rounds tha t she had f i led a fa lse w o rk e rs ’ com pensation
claim . 486 U.S. at 401 . P u rsu an t to the a rb itra t ion provision
o f a co llec tiv e barg a in in g ag reem en t, the un ion filed a griev
ance on the e m p lo y e e ’s behalf . Id . at 401. S u b seq u en t to the
filing o f the g r ievance , the em p lo y ee also filed a state court
action ag a in s t her em p lo y e r a lleg ing w rongfu l d ischarge . Id.
at 402. T h e issue in L in g le w as w he the r the p la in t i f f ’s state
law ac tion was p reem p ted by Section 301 o f the LM&A,
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4 0
w hich p ro v id es oniy that su its fo r b reach o f co llec tive b a r
gain ing ag reem en ts m ay be b rough t in federal court. S e e 29
U.S.C . § 185. T h is C o u rt ru led tha t Section 301 p reem pts a
state taw ac tion only if “ reso lu tion o f [that cla im ] depends
upon the m ean in g o f a co llec tive-barga in ing agreem ent. . . . ”
486 U.S. a t 405-06 .
The L in g le p reem ption ho ld ing was carefully lim ited to
the C o n g ress io n a l in tent under ly in g Section 301. Indeed, the
opinion c lea r ly ca u tioned that it would be inapp rop r ia te to
extend the L in g le test into o ther areas o f p reem ption under
other federa l labo r laws. 486 U.S. at 409 n.8 (“ it is im portan t
to re m e m b er tha t o ther federal labor law princip les m ay p re
em pt s ta te la w ”). A com par ison o f the s ta tu tory language ,
leg is la tive h istory , and C ongress iona l purposes o f the RLA
with the lang u ag e , history, and purposes of Section 301 e s tab
lishes tha t the L in g le p reem ption standard is inappropria te for
de term in ing R L A preem ption .
S ec tion 301 does not com pel or m andate a rb itra tion o f
w orkplace d ispu tes . N e ith e r the text nor the leg is la tive h is tory
of Section 301 even m en tions arbitra tion . Instead, arb itra tion
under the L M R A is a m a tte r o f co n trac tua l u n d e r ta k in g
between the par tie s and is pure ly voluntary. Thus, this C ourt
recently held tha t u n d e r Section 301 an em ployee could file
suit d irec t ly in federa l court w here the pa r t ie s ’ co llec tive
bargaining a g reem en t d id not specif ically com m it reso lu tion
of a d ispu te to a rb itra t ion . S e e G ro v es v. R ing S crew W orks,
498 U.S. 168 (1990).
The s i lence o f the L M R A concern ing arb itra tion d iffers
markedly fro m the R LA , which m andates arb itra tion th rough
adjustm ent boards . 45 U .S .C . §§ 153 First (i), 184. M oreover,
while the L M R A does not purport to d ictate the types of
d isputes to be su b m itted to a rb itra t ion u n d e r b a rg a in in g
agreem ents, the R L A prov ides that certa in types o f c laim s
m ust be re s o lv e d by an a d ju s tm e n t bo a rd re g a rd le s s o f
whether the par ties ag ree to do so. Id . Finally, the R L A by its
terms and its leg is la t iv e h is tory com m its non-contractua! d is
putes co n cern in g d ischarge and d isc ip line to the ad justm ent
213
b o a rd p ro c ess , w h ile S ec tion 301 is l im ited to co n trac t d is
pu tes . S e e P a r t I s u p r a .
Perhaps the bes t p ro o f o f the inapp licab il i ty o f the L in g le
s tandard to R L A p re em p tio n lies in the plain lan g u ag e o f
R L A SectiohS 3 F irs t (i) and 204 , 45 U .S.C . §§ 153 F irs t (i)
and 184, w h ich deta i l ad ju s tm en t board ju r isd ic t io n . T hose
p ro v is io n s req u ire a rb itra t ion o f all d ispu tes g ro w in g out o f
g r iev a n ces o r out o f co n trac t ap p lica tion in add it ion to all
d isp u tes g ro w in g ou t o f co n trac t in te rp re ta t ion . S ince the
L in g le te s t fo cu ses solely on co n trac t in te rp re ta t ion , it cannot
be app lied to R L A p reem ption bec au se to do so w ould fa il to
p ro tec t the s ta tu to r i ly ex p lic i t ad ju s tm en t board ju r isd ic t io n
o ver d isp u tes g ro w ing out o f g r iev an ces or out o f con trac t
ap p lica tion .
In add i t io n , S ec t io n 301 and the R L A have m arked ly
d iffe ren t p u rp o se s w hich can n o t be sa tisf ied by app ly ing the
sam e p re em p tio n test. In en ac t in g Section 301, C ongress was
seek ing to assu re un ifo rm ity in the in te rp re ta t ion o f co llec tive
barg a in in g ag reem en ts . S e e T ea m sters v. L u c a s F lo u r C o ., 369
U .S . 95 , 103-104 (1962) . G iven that ob jec t ive , it m akes sense
tha t the p reem p tio n tes t u n d er 301 should focus on the narrow
issue o f w h e th e r a s ta te c la im will requ ire in te rp re ta t ion o f a
co l lec t iv e barg a in in g ag reem ent.
C o n g ress ex p ressed a m uch b ro ad er pu rpose in enacting
the RLA . As d iscu ssed in P ar t I, s u p r a , C o n g ress sought to
a ssu re u n ifo rm , exped it ious , and final re so lu tion o f d isputes
by boards co m p o sed o f k n o w led g e ab le ind iv idua ls dealing
w ith co m p lex , techn ica l issues in the t ranspo r ta t ion industry.
C o n g ress w an ted to keep em p lo y m en t d ispu tes in the trans
po rta t ion industry out o f the courts . Indeed , C ongress has for
a lm o s t s ev en ty years m a in ta ined its v ision o f industry ad jus t
m en t b o a rd s re so lv in g a broad range o f con trac tua l and non
co n trac tu a l c la im s as the best way to m eet the m any co m p e t
ing in te re s ts o f em p loyers and em p lo y ees in ra il and airline
industr ies .
F inally , the L in g le s tandard - by a l low ing individual
em p lo y ees s ig n if ican t access to s tate courts - serves the
41
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42
p u rp o s e in th e L M R A s e t t in g o f p ro te c t in g in d iv id u a l
em p loyee no n -co n trac t rights. By con trast, C ongress in the
RLA - as th is C o u rt held in Burley - carefu lly assured that an
ind iv idual e m p lo y e e ’s no n -co n trac t c la im s w ould be c o n s id
ered in the ad ju s tm en t board forum . In the L M R A setting , an
em ployee has no r igh t to p a r tic ipa te in or even requ ire arb i
tration o f his o r her ind iv idua l c la im : that righ t rests ex c lu
sively with the e m p lo y e e ’s barga in ing represen ta tive , subject
to the du ty o f fa ir rep resen ta tion . See supra note 12. T h e re
fore p reem p tio n o f an e m p lo y e e ’s n on -con trac t “wrongful
d ischarge” c la im u n d e r the L M R A schem e could m ean that
the em p lo y ee w ould have no fo ru m at all to have the claim
resolved.
U nde r the R L A the em p lo y ee is guaran teed a forum for
resolution o f a “w rongfu l d isch a rg e” claim because (1) C o n
gress has requ ired ca rr ie rs to e s tab lish ad jus tm ent boards; (2)
Congress has requ ired those ad jus tm en t boards to resolve
disputes “g ro w in g out o f g r iev a n ces ,” inc lud ing non-con trac t
claims (see d iscuss ion in Part I, supra)-, and (3) C ongress has
guaran teed ind iv idua l em p loyees the right to pursue those
claims for th em se lv es , with the ir own counse l, befo re the
ad justm ent board (see d iscuss ion o f Burley supra pp. 23-27).
U nlike the co l lec t iv e barga in ing sett ing o f the L M R A , a
union and an em p lo y e r co v e red by the R LA cannot lawfully
reach an ag reem en t ex t in g u ish in g the individual em p lo y ee ’s
access to the ad ju s tm en t board for reso lu tion o f individual
claims, and the re fo re em ployees with such cla im s will always
have a fo rum in the ad ju s tm en t board . See generally, Burley,
325 U.S. at 740 n .39; Capraro v. United Parcel Service Co.,
993 F.2d 328, 336 (3rd Cir. 1993) (p roba tiona ry em ployee
could not be d en ied access to ad ju s tm en t board for reso lu tion
of his ind iv idua l “w rongfu l d isch a rg e” c la im even though the
collective barg a in in g ag reem en t p rov ided that it was inapp li
cable to p ro b a tio n a ry em p lo y ees) ; Slagley v. Illinois Cent.
R.R., 397 F.2d 546 , 551 (7th Cir. 1968) (em p lo y e e ’s right to
have c la im reso lved by ad jus tm en t board is “s ta tu tory and
215
ca n n o t be n u l l if ie d by a g reem en t be tw een the c a rr ie r and the
u n io n ”).
Any a t tem p t by the ad ju s tm en t board , the e m p lo y e r or the
un io n to d en y the in d iv idua l em p lo y ee access to the ad ju s t
m en t b o a rd c o u ld be m et w ith a ju d ic ia l o rd e r co m pe ll ing
a rb itra t ion . S e e C a p r a r o , 993 F.2d at 337. F u r th e rm o re , a
fa ilu re o f an a d ju s tm en t bo a rd to co n s id e r an e m p lo y e e ’s n o n
co n tra c t b a se d c la im inv o lv in g s ig n if ican t p ub lic po lic ies
cou ld be a bas is fo r o v e r tu rn in g the a d ju s tm en t b o a rd ’s d ec i
sion. See P a p e r w o r k e r s v. M is c o , 484 U .S . 29, 43 (1987)
(a rb itra l d ec is io n con tra ry to pub lic po licy m ay be set aside).
T h a t w o u ld ce r ta in ly be the case if an ad ju s tm en t board were
to re fuse to c o n s id e r N o r r i s ’ c la im s here , fo r the C B A i tse lf in
A rtic le X V I I .F m an d a te s co n s id e ra t io n o f the p ub lic polic ies
u n d e r ly in g federa l and sta te safety laws. S e e d iscuss ion su p ra
p. 33. S in ce in d iv idua l em p lo y ee s - and N orr is , in p a r t icu la r -
are g u a ran teed the r igh t u n d e r the R L A to hav e the ir n o n
co n trac t ‘‘w ro n g fu l d is c h a rg e ” c la im s co n s id e red by an ad ju s t
m en t b o a rd , R L A p re em p tio n is p roperly m uch b ro ad er than
L M R A preem p tio n .
3. Norris’ “Wrongful Discharge” Claims are
Preempted by the RLA Even if the Lingle
Standard is Used.
As d iscu ssed above , the L in g le s tandard is inappropria te
for R L A p re em p tio n g iven the c lea r and obv io u s d ifferences
betw een the tw o leg is la t iv e schem es. H ow ever, even if L in g le
does apply, N o r r i s ’ w rongfu l d ischarge c la im s are still pre
em pted b e c a u se they requ ire in te rp re ta t ion o f the CBA .
T h e C B A w o u ld have to be in te rp re ted to determ ine
w h e th e r N o rr is w as in fa c t d ischarged , s ince “d isch a rg e” is an
e ssen tia l e lem e n t o f a w rongfu l d ischarge c la im . Here, it was
only at s tep 1 o f the g r iev a n ce p ro ced u re tha t a hearing
o ff icer re co m m e n d e d tha t N o rr is be te rm ina ted (Pet. App.
63a). L ate r , a s tep 3 hea r in g o ff icer reduced the d isc ip l ine to a
su spens ion (Pet. A pp. 66a). A cco rd in g to the deposit ion testi
m ony o f a rb it ra to r Ted T. T suk iyam a, the d isc ip l in e tha t had
43
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44
been m eted ou t to N orr is at the t im e N orr is f i led su it was a
suspension u n d e r the prov is ions o f the C B A (Jt. A pp . 306).
Thus, in o rd e r to d e te rm ine if N orr is was d ischarged , it will
be n ec essa ry to co n s tru e the C B A and its app lica tion and
in te rp re ta t ion , as well as the C B A ’s g rievance p rocedure .
L in g le a lso holds that there is p reem ption w here in te r
p re ta tion o f the bargain ing ag reem en t is required to reso lve a
defense p re sen ted in the case. 486 U.S. at 4 0 7 .26 T h e tr ie r o f
fact in N o r r i s ’ case will no doub t be ca lled upon to in terp re t
the C B A in eva lu a t in g P e t i t io n e rs ’ defense to his w rongfu l
d ischarge c la im s. P e t i t io n e rs ’ basis for d isc ip l in ing Norris
was his re fu sa l to sign off on a work record for w ork he
cla im ed in vo lved an unsafe a ircraft part (Jt. App. 213). A rti
cle IV o f the C B A spec if ica lly prov ides tha t an a ircraft
m echanic “ m ay be required to sign w ork reco rds in co n n e c
tion with the w ork he p e rfo rm s” (Pet. App. 49a). T h a t p ro v i
sion o f the C B A w ould have to be in terpre ted in order to
26 T h e S o lic ito r G en era l p ro p o ses a test for p reem p tio n th a t w ould
ignore all b u t th e a ff irm ativ e p ro o f o ffe red by a p la in tif f in d e te rm in in g
w hether th e c o lle c tiv e b a rg a in in g ag reem en t is a t issue. B r ie f o f th e U n ited
S tates as A m ic u s C u ria e (“B r.” ) 11-12. T h is is n o t w h at Lingle suggests,
and it is n o t w o rk ab le o r log ical w ith in the fram ew o rk in w h ich m atte rs o f
fact are e s ta b lish e d a t tria l o r h earin g . T h e c la im o f im p ro p er m o tiv e
cannot, as th e S o lic ito r G en era l sug g ests , b e dec id ed in a vacu u m . P ro o f o f
im p ro p er m o tiv e w ill re q u ire e v id e n c e to d isp ro v e th a t th e d ec la red
“p ro p er” m o tiv e w as in fac t the b asis fo r the d isch arg e d ec is io n . Cf. St.
Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 125 L. E d .2 d 4 0 7 (1 9 9 3 ) (d e fen d an t in T itle
VH su it h a s th e b u rd en o f p ro d u c in g ev id en ce o f n o n -d isc rim in a to ry
m otive o n ce a p rim a fac ie case o f d isc rim in a tio n is sh o w n , b u t p la in tif f ’s
u ltim ate b u rd en o f p e rsu asio n in c lu d es th e b u rden o f d isp ro v in g tha t
p roffered m o tiv e ap p lies) (re ly in g upon Texas Dept, of Comm. Affairs v.
Burdine, 4 5 0 U .S . 2 48 , 2 53-55 (1 9 8 1 )). C erta in ly , ev id en c e o f con trac tu a l
p rov isions and th e h is to rica l app lica tion o f those p ro v is io n s by the parties
as to g ro u n d s fo r d isch a rg e and d isc ip lin e w ill be co n sid e red in reso lv in g
the m o tiv e q u estio n . A s th e C o u rt in Lingle reco g n ized , co n stru c tio n o f a
bargain ing a g re e m e n t m ay b e ju s t as m uch at issue in th e re fu ta tio n o f a
claim as in its p ro secu tio n .
217
45
re so lve N o r r i s ’ w ro n g fu l d isch a rg e c la im s becau se the p ro v i
sion w ould ju s t i fy H aw aiian A ir l in e s ’ d isc ip l in e o f N o rr is i f
the w ork reco rd he w as asked to sign did no t c o v e r the
a lleged ly d e fec t iv e ax le s leev e .27
Finally , the H aw aii cou r t has a lready d em o n s tra te d in its
decisiort th a t L in g le p reem p tio n shou ld apply b ec au se the
cou r t c o n d u c te d its ow n an a ly s is o f one su b s tan t iv e and one
rem ed ia l p ro v is io n o f the C B A and lim ited the b read th of
those p ro v is io n s w ith o u t the b en e fi t o f an a d ju s tm en t board
d e te rm in a tio n . In par ticu la r , the cou r t l im ited the scope of
A rt ic le X V lI .F , w hich pro tec ts em p lo y ees from d isc ip l in e for
re fusal to w o rk in v io la t ion o f s ta te o r federa l sa fe ty law s { s e e
d iscuss ion s u p r a p. 33 & n .22), and the cou r t a lso found that
nO p un it ive d am ag e s w ere av a ilab le to em p lo y ees Under the
C B A { s e e s u p r a no te 5) (Pet. A pp. l9 a -2 0 a , 24a). By in d ep en
den tly in te rp re t in g and sh a rp ly c u r ta i l in g the r ig h ts and
rem ed ies av a ilab le to em p lo y ee s u n d er the C B A , the Hawaii
State co u r t has a lready done w hat the L in g le s tandard was
d es ig n e d to p re v e n t - in te rp re t the c o l le c t iv e b arga in ing
agreem ent.
In sum , s ince e ssen tia l e lem e n ts o f N o r r i s ’ c la im s and the
D e fe n d a n ts ’ d e fen se will req u ire in te rp re ta t ion o f the CBA,
N o rr is ’ w rongfu l d ischarge c la im s w ould be p reem p ted even
if the n a r ro w er L in g le s tandard w ere to be applied .
27 N o rr is ’ su p erv iso r, Ju s tin C u lah a ra , h a s te s tified d u rin g deposition
th a t h e to ld N o rris , a t the tim e h e ask ed h im to s ign th e w o rk reco rd , tha t he
w as n o t a sk in g h im to s ign fo r th e c o n d itio n o f the ax le s leev e because
C u lah a ra h im se lf and in sp ec to r H en ry W ong had a lread y sig n ed a separate
w ork reco rd re g a rd in g th e ax le s leev e . C u lah a ra in s tead ask ed N o rris to
sign o f f fo r th e tire ch an g e , in w h ich N o rris had p a rtic ip a ted (J t. A p p . 82).
C u la h a ra ’s su p e rv iso r h as a lso te s tified th a t N o rris w as free to p lace a note
on the w o rk re c o rd h e w as ask ed to s ign in d ica tin g th a t he , N orris,
co n sid e red th e ax le s leev e to be u n a irw o rth y (Jt. A pp . 80).
218
4 6
B. ALEXANDER V. GARDNER-DENVER DOES
NOT WEIGH AGAINST SYSTEM BOARD
RESOLUTION OF CLAIMS
T he S o lic i to r G enera l c ites (Br. 13 n .10) A le x a n d e r v.
G a r d n e r -D e n v e r C o ., 415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974), for the p ro p o s i
tion that a rb i t ra to rs exceed the ir au thority when they rely
upon sou rces o f law ou ts ide o f the co llec tive bargain ing
agreem ent. T h a t is an er roneous read ing of the dec is ion . The
A lex a n d er ca se held that an e m p lo y e e ’s subm iss ion o f a
d ischarge c la im to a rb it ra t io n u n d e r a no n d isc r im in a t io n
clause o f a co l lec t iv e b a rga in ing ag reem ent did not preclude
him from b rin g in g a T itle VII ac tion in federal court. Id . at
59-60. T he d ec is ion lends no support w ha tsoever to the idea
that a rb itra to rs m ay no t de te rm in e m atters o f ex ternal law .28
Indeed, th is C o u r t ’s dec is ion in G ilm er v. In t e r s ta t e /]o h n s o n
L a n e C o r p ., 500 U .S . 20, 114 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1991), co n
clusively d em o n s t ra te s that s ta tu tory claim s such as those
under T itle V II m ay be subm itted to b inding arb itra tion .
To the ex ten t tha t the A le x a n d e r Court was concerned
with an in d iv idua l e m p lo y e e ’s ab ili ty to have his o r her c la im
fairly p ro cessed by a un ion th rough arbitra tion , tha t concern
is not p re sen t w h e re there is an R L A ad justm ent board . As
previously d iscu ssed , the R LA allow s em ployees to proceed
independen tly , w ith co u n se l o f the ir cho ice , th rough the
adjustm ent bo a rd p rocess . 45 U .S .C . § 153 First (i) and (j).
An em p lo y ee co v e red u n d er the RLA possesses substan tive
individual r igh ts , and the un ion m ay not settle a c la im that
those rights have been v io lated w ithou t the em p lo y ee’s active
partic ipation and app rova l . E lg in , J . E. Ry. v. B u r ley , 325
U.S. 711, 740 , n .39 (1945).
28 In a d d itio n , th e Alexander d ec is io n has no bearin g on p reem p tio n
analysis h ere b e c a u se it in v o lv ed the acco m m o d atio n o f federal law s, an
issue far rem o v ed fro m the p reem p tio n doctrine , w hich co n cern s the
prim acy o f fed era l law s o v e r co m p e tin g o r re la ted state law s. See also
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Buell, 4 8 0 U .S . 557 , 5 66-67 (1987).
219
4 7
M oreover , even i f there w ere opportu n i t ie s for con f lic ts
w ith in th e b a rg a in in g u n i t in R L A cases , th e se co n f l ic ts
shou ld no t be p re su m ed to ex is t in the ab se n ce o f som e
sh o w in g tha t the un ion w ould be less than v ig i lan t in pursu ing
an e m p lo y e e ’s ex te rna l law c la im s in a rb itra t ion . T h e facts o f
the p re sen t case show v igo rous pursu it , and success , by the
un ion in d ea lin g w ith N o r r i s ’ c la im s p r io r to N orr is d ropp ing
ou t o f th e ad ju s tm en t board p rocess (Pet. App. 63a-66a). In
sum , the S o l ic i to r G e n e ra l ’s re lian ce on the A le x a n d e r d ec i
sion is m isp laced .
C. COLORADO ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COM
MISSION IS INAPPOSITE
T his C o u r t ’s dec is ion in C o lo r a d o A n ti-D iscr im in a tio n
C o m m ’n V. C o n tin en ta l A ir L in e s , In c ., 372 U.S. 714 (1963),
re lied u p o n by the S o lic i to r G enera l (Br. 12-13), is likew ise
in ap p o s i te to th is ca se . In C o lo r a d o A n t i-D is c r im in a t io n
C o m m iss io n , th is C ourt held that the R L A did not p reem pt a
c la im u n d e r a s ta te law p ro h ib i t in g racial d isc r im in a t io n in
h iring . S ince the p la in t if f there had no t been h ired by the
com pany , th e re was no way for him to p rocess a grievance
u n d e r the R L A d isp u te re so lu t io n p rocedures . See 45 USC
§§ 151 F if th and 181 (de f in ing “em p lo y ee” for pu rposes of
the R L A ) and 45 U .S .C . §§ 153 F irs t (i), 184 (limiting
a d ju s tm en t board ju r isd ic t io n to d ispu tes invo lv ing one or
m ore “e m p lo y e e s” ). S e e a l s o . N e lso n v. P ied m o n t, 750 F.2d
1234, 1237 (4 th Cir.) (a pp lican t is no t an “em p lo y e e ” under
the R L A ), c e r t , d e n ie d , 471 U.S. 11 16 (1985). Therefore,
s ince thd p la in t i f f in C o lo r a d o A n ti-D isc r im in a t io n C om m is
s io n cou ld no t h av e tu rned to an R L A ad ju s tm en t board for
re so lu tion o f his d ispu te , the C ourt p roperly found that his
c la im w as not p reem pted .
M oreover , the a rgum en ts ra ised by the S o lic ito r General
regard ing the C o lo r a d o A n ti-D iscr im in a tio n C o m m iss io n case
are spurious . F irs t, the S o lic i to r G e n e ra l ’s concern that RLA
p reem ption w o u ld “ subs tan tia l ly d isp lace s ta te regula tion”
(Br. 13) is i l l- founded . D isp lacem en t o f s ta te law lies at the
220
48
very hea rt o f the p reem ption doctrine . S ince d isp lacem en t o f
state law is the in tended resu lt o f broad federal leg is la tion , it
is hard ly g ro u n d s for ob jec t ion in a p reem ption case. In any
event, e m p lo y e e s ’ non -co n trac t-b ased sta te cla im s are given
considera t ion u n d e r the R L A ad jus tm en t board schem e. S ee
discussion s u p r a P art I.
T he S o lic i to r G e n e ra l ’s fear (Br. 13) that arb itra tors will
be requ ired to ad ju d ica te issues o f state tort law is equally
unw arran ted . As the S o lic ito r G enera l concedes, this C ourt
has a lready held in G ilm e r tha t arb itra tors may ad judica te
statutory c la im s . T he S o lic ito r G enera l attem pts to d is tinguish
G ilm er by em p h as iz in g that G ilm e r involved an individual
em p loym en t co n tra c t as opposed to a co llec tive bargain ing
agreem ent, and th e re fo re there was no “ tension betw een co l
lective rep re sen ta t io n and ind iv idua l s tatu tory r igh ts .” S o lic i
tor G e n e ra l ’s Br. at 13, n .10, c i t ing G ilm e r , 111 S, Ct. 1547,
1657 (1991) . T h e S o lic ito r G e n e ra l ’s argum ent is erroneous
because u n d e r the R L A em p lo y ees are free to ' pursue their
claims in dependen tly . T herefo re , an R LA claim ant is as free
from the ten s io n s o f co llec tiv e represen ta tion as the p la in tif f
in G ilm er .
D. C O N R A IL 'S MINOR DISPUTE TEST IS NOT
APPROPRIATE FOR DETERMINING THE
SCOPE OF RLA PREEMPTION, AND IS SAT
ISFIED IN ANY EVENT.
The S o lic i to r G enera l u rges (Br. 8-11) that the standard
for reco g n iz in g a “m in o r” d ispu te articula ted in C o n r a il , 491
U.S. 299 (1989) , should be used as the test to determ ine
whether a g iven sta te law d ispu te is p reem pted. There is no
valid reason fo r ex ten d in g C o n r a i l into the preem ption area.
The issue in C o n r a i l was w he the r a par ticu la r d ispu te -
indisputably w ith in R L A ju r isd ic t io n - was “m ajo r” and thus
required the m a in ten an ce o f the sta tus quo pending bargain ing
procedures, or “ m in o r” and hence referable to arb itra tion . 491
U.S. at 307. T h ere was no issue o f RLA preem ption because
221
there w as no ques t io n w he the r the d ispu te w ould be reso lved
th ro u g h R L A p rocedures .
T he lan g u ag e and logic o f C o n r a i l m ake c lea r tha t it was
no t in ten d ed by th is C ourt to add ress the ques t ion o f p re e m p
tion o f s ta te law c la im s a r is in g from a ir l in e or ra ilroad
em p lo y m e n t d ispu tes . I f this C o u rt had in tended to hold that
only those d isp u tes arguab ly governed by a b arga in ing ag ree
m en t are c o g n iza b le by R L A ad jus tm en t boards, it no doub t
Would h av e an a lyzed the s ta tu to ry language w hich by its
te rm s ex tends ad ju s tm en t board ju r isd ic t io n to non-con trac-
tual c la im s. T he C ourt also w ould have ex p la ined why its
h o ld ing in B u r le y re cogn iz ing the “om itted c a se ” had been
o v erru led . In s tead , the C o n r a i l C ourt is s i len t abou t the reach
o f the p la in language o f the R L A and ac tua lly quotes B u r ley -
in c lud ing the “ om itted c a se” d iscuss ion - with approval . S ee
C o n r a il , 491 U.S. at 303. T he C o n r a i l C o u r t ’s fa ilu re to
address these m atters suggests it had no in ten tion o f p rov id ing
a s tandard for R L A p reem ption o f s ta te law cla im s.
M o reo v er , even i f C o n r a i l does p rov ide the s tandard for
d e te rm in in g w hen sta te law c la im s are p reem pted by the RLA,
tha t s tandard is sa tisf ied here. The term s o f the C B A could
“co n c lu s iv e ly re so lv e” ( C o n r a i l , 491 U.S. at 305) N o rr is ’
c la im s. F o r exam ple , as the S o lic ito r G enera l adm its (Br.
10-11, 14), N orr is will have to show that he was in fact
d i s c h a rg e d . T h e re is c e r ta in ly a q u e s t io n on the reco rd
w h e th e r N o rr is was te rm ina ted , s ince the em p lo y er m itigated
his p u n ish m e n t to a su spension du ring the g riev an ce p ro c eed
ings b e fo re N orr is f iled suit. S im ilarly , there is a leg itim ate
ques t ion w h e th e r N o r r i s ’ d isc ip l in e was “arguab ly ju s t i f ie d ”
( C o n r a i l , 491 U.S. at 307) by the C B A as “ for c a u se” (CBA
Art. IX .1,5, Pet. A pp. 50a). F inally , s ince the C B A by its
exp ress te rm s perm its the com pany to requ ire an em p lo y ee to
sign o ff on w ork records (C B A , Art. IV .D.4(a), Pet. App.
49a), and conv e rse ly p rov ides tha t an em p lo y ee m ay not be
d isc ip l ined for re fus ing to p e rfo rm w ork in v io la tion o f fed
era l or s ta te health and safety laws (C B A , Art. XVII.F , Pet.
App. 6 0 a -6 1 a) , N o r r i s ’ c la im s certa in ly w ould have been
222
49
5 0
co n c lu s iv e ly reso lved by the ad jus tm en t board if N orr is had
not ab an d o n ed the C B A ’s g rievance process. See d iscussion
su p ra pp. 43-45 .
CONCLUSION
F or the reasons set forth herein , Peti tioners urge that the
H aw aii S u p rem e C o u r t ’s dec is ion should be reversed and
rem anded with ins truc tions to re ins ta te the c ircu it co u r t ’s
ru l ings d ism is s in g C o u n t I o f N o r r i s ’ co m p la in t aga ins t
H aw aiian A irlines and C ounts I and II aga inst the Ind iv idual
D efendan ts on p reem ption grounds.
R espec tfu l ly subm itted ,
K enneth B. H ipp*
D avid J. D ezzani
M argaret C. J enkins
L isa V on D er M ehden
G oodsill A nderson Q uinn & Stifel
1099 A lakea S treet, 1800 Alii P lace
H onolu lu , H aw aii 96813
(808) 547-5600
Counsel fo r Petitioners
*Counsel o f Record
223
No. 92-2058
In The
l&uprcntp (Emtrt nf ti?̂ In ittft States
October T erm , 1993
HAWAnAN A i r l i n e s , I n c ., e t a h ,
P e t it io n e r s ,
Grant T. Norris,
___________ R e s p o n d e n t .
On W r i t of C e r t io ra r i to th e Suprem e C o u r t
fo r th e S ta te of H aw aii
R E S P O N D E N T ’S B R IE F O N T H E M E R IT S
O f C ou n sel:
Marsha S. Berzon
177 Post Street, Suite 300
San Francisco, CA 94108
Mark Schneider
9000 Machinists Place
Upper Marlboro, MD 20772
Laurence Gold
815 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
E dward DeLappe Boyle
Susan Ok i Moll way *
Cades Schutte F lem ing &
W right
1000 Bishop Street, 10th Floor
Honolulu, HI 96813
(808) 521-9200
C ounsel f o r R espon den t
* Counsel of Record
225
STATEM ENT OF TH E CASE .......................................... 1
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUM ENT.. 5
ARGUM ENT............................................................................... 7
I. TH E RAILW AY LABOR ACT DOES NOT
DISPLACE LEGAL RULES PROVIDING
SUBSTANTIVE PROTECTION FOR EM
PLOYEES ............. 7
II. TH E RLA DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT
EXTRACONTRACTUAL CAUSES OF AC
TION BE HEARD BY A D JU STM EN T
BOARDS............................................. 15
III. TH E LINGLE DECISION PROVIDES TH E
A PPRO PRIA TE ANALOGY FOR TH E RULE
OF DECISION IN TH IS C A SE ............................. 40
CONCLUSION ........................................................................... 50
T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S
P a g e
226
ii
A d a m s v . F e d e r a l E x p r e s s C o ., 654 F.2d 452 (6th
Cir. 1981) ...................................................................... 29
A l l i s - C h a l m e r s C o r p . v . L u e c k , 471 U.S. 202
(1985) ....................................41, 42, 43, 46
A n d r e i v s v . L o u is v i l l e & N a s h v i l l e R a i l r o a d , 406
U.S. 320 (1972) ..................................................6, 13,44-47
A t c h i s o n , T o p e k a & S a n t a F e R a i l w a y C o . v . B u e l l ,
480 U.S. 557 (1987).................................................. 5,14-15
B r o th e r h o o d o f L o c o m o t iv e E n g i n e e r s v . C h ic a g o ,
R . I . & P . R . C o ., 382 U.S. 423 (1966) ................... 12, 39
B r o th e r h o o d , o f R .R . T r a i n m e n v . H o w a r d , 343
U.S. 768 (1952) .......................................................... 10,39
C S X T r a n s p o r t a t i o n , I n c . v . E a s t c r w o o d , 113 S. Ct.
1732 (1993) .................................................................. 10
C a te r p i l l a r I n c . v . W i l l ia m s , 482 U.S. 386 (1987).... 42, 50
C ip o l lo n e v . L i g g e t t G r o u p , I n c . , 112 S. Ct. 2608
(1992) ............................................................................. 10
C o n r a d v . D e l ta A i r L in e s , I n c . , 494 F.2d 914 (7th
Cir. 1974) ....................................................................... 29
C o n s o l id a te d R a i l C o r p . v . R a i l w a y L a b o r E x e c u
t i v e s A s s o c i a t i o n , 491 U.S. 299 (1989)...........7 ,2 1 ,3 6 ,3 9
D e B a r to lo C o r p . v . F lo r i d a G u l f C o a s t B ld g . &
C o n s t r . T r a d e s C o u n c il , 485 U.S. 568 (1988)........ 33
D e t r o i t & T o le d o S h o r e L i n e R .R . v . U n i te d T r a n s
p o r t a t i o n U n io n , 396 U.S. 142 (1969) ..................... 36
E a r l y v . D o e , 16 How. 610 (1853) ........... ................ 18
E l g i n , J o l i e t & E a s t e r n R a ih v a y C o . v . B u r l e y , 325
U.S. 711 (1945) ......................................... 6,35-39
F o r t H a l i f a x P a c k in g C o . v . C o y n e , 482 U.S. 1
(1987)..................................... ........................................ 11
G i lm e r v . I n t e r s t a t e / J o h n s o n L a n e C o r p ., I l l
S. Ct. 1647 (1991) .................................................... 17
G r a n f in a n c ie r a , S.A. v . N o r d b e r g , 492 U.S. 33
(1 9 8 9 )......................................................... ................... 33, 34
G u n t h e r v . S a n D ie g o & A r i z o n a E a s t e r n R y . , 382
U.S. 257 (1 9 6 5 )........................................................... 39
H il l s b o r o u g h C o u n ty F la . v . A u t o m a t e d M e d ic a l
L a b o r a t o r i e s , I n c . , 471 U.S. 707 (1985) ............... 9
I A M v . C e n t r a l A i r l i n e s , I? ic ., 372 U.S. 682 (1963).. 23, 43
T A B L E O F A U T H O R IT IE S
F E D E R A L C A S E S P a g e
227
I l l i n o i s v . G a te s , 462 U.S. 213 (1983) ........... ............ 33
K i n g v . S t . V i n c e n t ’s H o s p i t a l , 112 S.Ct. 570
(1991).............................................................................. 19
L i v g l e v . N o r g e D i v i s i o n o f M a g ic C h e f , I n c . , 486
U.S. 399 (1988) ........................................................... 40-50
L o c a l N o . 8 2 , F u r n i t u r e & P ia n o M o v . v . C r o w le y ,
467 U.S. 526 (1 9 8 4 )................................................... 20
M c K i n n e y v . M i s s o u r i - K a n s a s - T e x a s R .R . 357 U.S.
265 (1958) .................................................................... 48-49
M e t r o p o l i t a n L i f e I n s u r a n c e C o . v . M a s s a c h u s e t t s ,
471 U.S. 724 (1 9 8 5 )................................................... 10,11
M i s s o u r i P a c i f ic R a i l r o a d C o . v . N o r w o o d , 283 U.S.
249 (1931) ................................................................. 5 ,11
M o o r e v . I l l i n o i s C e n t . R .R . , 312 U.S. 630 (1941).. 37-39
N L R B v . C & C P ly w o o d , 385 U.S. 421 (1967)........... 22
O r d e r o f R a i l w a y C o n d u c to r s v . P i t n e y , 326 U.S.
561 (1946) .....................................................-.............. 17,38
P e n n s y l v a n i a R . R . v . D a y , 360 U.S. 548 (1959).... 19,20,
32, 34
P u e r to R ic o D e p t , o f C o n s u m e r A f f a i r s v . I s l a
P e t r o l e u m C o r p . , 485 U.S. 495 (1988)................... 9 ,10
R a i l w a y E m p l o y e e s ’ D e p t . v . H a n s o n , 351 U.S. 225
(1956) ................................................ 19
S lo c u m v . D e la w a r e , L a c lc a iu a n a & W .R .R . , 339
U.S. 239 (1950) .................................................. 38-39
S t e e l w o r k e r s v. W a r r i o r & G u l f N a v i g a t i o n C o .,
363 U.S. 574 (1 9 6 0 )................................................... 21
T e a m s t e r s v . L u c a s F lo u r C o ., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).. 41
T e r m i n a l R .R . A s s o c i a t i o n o f S t . L o u is v . B r o t h e r
h o o d o f R .R . T r a i n m e n , 318 U.S. 1 (1943) ........ 12-14
T e x t i l e W o r k e r s U n io n v . L in c o l n M i l l s , 353 U.S.
448 (1957) ................................................................... 41
T r a i n m e n v . C h ic a g o R i v e r & I n d . R .R . , 353 U.S.
30 (1957) ..................................................................... 18,22
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n C o m m u n ic a t io n E m p l o y e e s U n io n
v . U n io n P a c i f ic R „ 385 U.S. 157 (1966) ............ 21, 26
U n io n P a c i f ic R y . v . P r ic e , 360 U.S. 601 (1959).... 22, 39
V i r g i n i a n R y . v . S y s t e m F e d e r a t i o n , 300 U.S. 515
(1937) .................. 29
I l l
T A B L E O F A U T H O R IT IE S — C on tin u ed
P a g e
228
W isconsi?i P u b lic In te rv en o r v. M ortier , 111 S. Ct.
2476 (1991) .................................................................. 10
Y ee v. E scon d id o , 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1 9 9 2 )................. 33
STATE CASES
P a m a r v. A m er ica n a H otels , In c ., 652 P.2d 625
(Haw. 1 9 8 2 )......................... 3
P u ch er t v. A gsa lu d , 67 Haw. 25, 677 P.2d 449
(1984), a p p e a l d ism issed for want of substan
tial federal question, 472 U.S. 1001 (1985)........ 47
ADJUSTMENT BOARD DECISIONS
A ir lin e S y s tem s B o a rd s
N o rth iv es t A ir lin e s /A ir lin e P ilo ts A ssoc ia tion , In
te rn a t io n a l S y stem B o a r d o f A d ju stm en t, Deci
sion of June 28, 1972 ..................................... 32
U n ited A ir lin es , In c., 48 LA 727 (BNA) (1967).... 32
N a tio n a l R a ilr o a d A d ju stm en t B o a r d
First Div. Award No. 21459 (1968)............................. 31
Third Div. Award No. 18123 (1970)............................ 31
Third Div. Award No. 18352 (1970)............................ 31
Second Div. Award No. 6462 (1973)............................ 31
Third Div. Award No. 19950 (1973)............................ 31
Third Div. Award No. 20048 (1973)............................ 31
Fourth Div. Award No. 2967 (1 9 7 3 )........................... 31
Third Div. Award No. 20565 (1974)............................. 31
Third Div. Award No. 21926 (1978)............................ 31
Third Div. Award No. 22318 (1979)............................ 31
Second Div. Award No. 8131 (1 9 7 9 )........................... 31
Third Div. Award No, 22707 (1980)....... 31
Second Div. Award No. 9405 (1983)............................ 31
Third Div. Award No. 24348 (1983)............................ 31
Third Div. Award No. 25554 (1985)......... 31
Fourth Div. Award No. 4500 (1986)............................ 31
Fourth Div. Award No. 4548 (1987)..................... 31
Third Div. Award No. 27650 (1988)............................ 31
Fourth Div. Award No. 4674 (1989)............................ 31
Second Div. Award No. 11768 (1989).......................... 31
First Div. Award No. 23909 (1989)..... .'..................... 31
Second Div. Award No. 11768 (1994).......................... 31
iv
T A B L E O F A U T H O R IT IE S — C on tin u ed
P a g e
229
V
FEDERAL STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
29 C.F.R. § 301.1............................................................. 16
5 U.S.C. § 1 .......................................................................... 16
Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151
e t s e q ................................... 14-15
National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. § 151, e t s e q ............................................ 20
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5 ) .................................. ....... . 22
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4)............................................. 20
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 e t s e q . ............ p a s s im
Federal Rail Safety Act,
45 U.S.C. § 421, e t s e q ......... ..................................... 29, 30
48 Stat. 1185, Tub. L. 73-442 (1934) ............................ 28
LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS
H.R. Rep. No. 328, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926).... 25
H.R. Rep. No. 1044, 73rd Cong. 2d Sess. (1934)....... 28
H.R. Rep. No. 2243, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. (1936)...... 29
H.R. Rep. No. 1114, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. (1965)...... 29
S. Rep. No. 606, 69th Cong. 1st Sess. (1926) .......... 25
S. Rep. No. 1065, 73rd Cong. 2d Sess. (1 9 3 4 )............ 28
The Railway Labor Act of 1926: A Legislative His
tory (Michael II. Campbell & Edward G. Bremer
III, eds. 1988).... .............................................................p a s s im
MISCELLANEOUS:
Cox, R e f l e c t i o n s U p o n L a b o r A r b i t r a t i o n , 72 Harv.
L. Rev. 1493-1500 (1959) ............................................ 21
Feller, A G e n e r a l T h e o r y o f t h e C o l le c t i v e B a r g a i n
in g A g r e e m e n t , 61 Cal. L. Rev., 663, 680-81
(1971) ............ 38
National Mediation Board, S e c o n d A n n u a l R e p o r t
(1936)................................. ............................................ 23,32
National Mediation Board, F o u r t h A n n u a l R e p o r t
(1938).............................. .. ............................................. 32
National Mediation Board, T h i r t y - f i r s t A n n u a l R e
p o r t (1965)....... 32
Sutherland, S t a t u t o r y C o n s t r u c t i o n § 46.05 ............ 19
T A B L E O F A U T H O R IT IE S — C ontinued
P a g e
230
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A, F a d s . G ra n t T . N orr is w as a licensed a irc ra f t
m echan ic h ired by P e t i t io n e r H a w a i ia n A irlines, Inc.
( “H A L ” ) on F e b ru a ry 2, 1987 . Jo in t A p p end ix ( “ Jt.
A p p .” ) 21 , N o rr is ' l icense from the F A A au th o rized h im
to ap p ro v e a n d re tu rn to service an a irc ra f t a f te r m ak ing ,
supervising, o r inspecting ce r ta in repairs . Jt . A pp . 20-21 .
S ee a ls o 14 C .F .R . §§ 65 .85 , 65 .87 . A m ech an ic a p
proves an a irc ra f t by signing the m a in ten an c e record .
14 C .F .R . § 4 3 . 9 ( a ) ( 4 ) . T h e m echan ic m ay no t a p
prove for service an y a irc ra f t o r p a r t if the rep a ir is no t
in ac co rd a n c e with the m a n u fa c tu re r 's ins tructions or
specifications o r if (he repa ir does no t con fo rm to the
F edera l A v ia t ion R eg u la t io n s ( “ F A R ’s " ) . 14 C .F .R .
§§ 4 3 .9 , 4 3 .1 3 . If a m ech a n ic m akes a f rau d u len t o r
in ten tiona lly false en try in a re co rd o r report requ ired
by the F A R 's , the F A A m ay suspend o r revoke the
m ech a n ic ’s license o r assess a fine. 49 LT.S.C. §§ 1429,
1471; 14 C .F .R . § 43 .12 .
O n a ro u t in e preflight inspection of one o f H A L ’s
DC-9 a irc ra f t , A irc ra f t 70 , in the early m o rn in g of Ju ly
15, 1987, N o rr is no ticed th a t one of the m a in land ing
gear tires was w orn . Jt. A pp . 21. T h e tire and bea r in g
were rem oved , an d N o rr is a n d the o th e r m echan ics pres
ent saw th a t the axle sleeve u n d ern ea th , w hich norm ally
has a m irrm -sm o o th su rface , was scarred an d grooved,
with gouges a n d b u rn m a rk s c learly visible. Jt. A pp . 21.
N o rr is a n d o th e r m ech an ics w ho saw the sleeve th ough t
it was unsafe an d n eeded to be changed . Jt. A p p . 22 .
However, their superv iso r , Ju s t in C u lah a ra , o rd e red them
to h an d sand the sleeve an d p u t a new bea r ing an d tire
over it. .Tt. A pp . 22-23 , 181-86. C u la h a ra then o rdered
N orris to “sign off” on the m a in ten an c e reco rd for in
stallation of the tire. J t . A pp . 23. A m ech a n ic ’s s igna
ture on a m a in te n a n c e record is a certification th a t a re
pair has been p e r fo rm ed satisfac torily . 14 C .F .R . § 43 .9
( a ) ( 4 ) . N o rr is refused to sign, saying tha t he h a d not
231
2
ac tu a l ly p e r fo rm e d th e tire in s ta l la t ion . .Tt. A p p . 2 3 . U l
t im ate ly , th e m a in te n a n c e reco rd , b e a r in g iden tif ica t ion
n u m b e rs o f m ech a n ic s o th e r th a n N o rr is , p ro n o u n c e d th a t
th e t i re assem bly h a d been re p la ced a n d th a t the b rakes
w e re sa t is fac to ry . R e c o r d in C ivil N o . 8 7 -3 8 9 4 -1 2 ( “R ” ),
vol. 17 (D e p o s i t io n o f Ju s t ice C u la h a ra , vol. 1, J u n e 28 ,
1989 , a t 120-25 a n d E x h ib i t 6 ) .
C u la h a ra su sp en d e d N orr is on th e spot, p e n d in g a te r
m in a t io n hea r ing . J t . A p p . 23 . A irc ra f t 7 0 ca rr ied
passengers o n n u m e ro u s flights w ith the d a m a g e d axle
sleeve in p lace . J t . A p p . 120-22 .
O n Ju ly 15, 1987 , N o rr is c o n tac ted the F A A to say
th a t th e re w as a p ro b le m with the H A L a irc ra f t th a t he
h a d serviced. J t . A p p . 23 . N o rr is then m e t w ith N o r
m a n M a tsu z a k i , C u la h a r a ’s super io r , to tell h im w h a t h ad
h a p p e n e d . N o rr is m en t io n ed his co n ta c t w ith the F A A .
M a ts u z a k i c h a sed N o rr is from his office, a ssu r ing N o rr is
th a t N o rr is w as “g o n e .” J t . A p p . 24.
N o rr is in v o k ed the g r ievance p ro c e d u re o u t l in e d in the
co llective b a rg a in in g ag reem en t b e tw een the In te rn a t io n a l
A sso c ia t io n of M ac h in is ts a n d H A L . J t . A p p . 96 . T h e
ag reem en t s ta ted th a t an a irc ra f t m ech a n ic “m a y be r e
q u ired to sign w o rk reco rds in c o n n e c t io n w ith the w ork
h e p e r fo rm s .” T h e ag reem en t also re q u ire d suspensions
o r d ischarges to b e “justif ied .” A p p e n d ix F a t 4 9 a , 53a-
5 4 a of A p p e n d ix to the P e t i t io n for a W r i t o f C ert io ra r i
( “P et . A p p .” ) . N o r r i s ’ te rm in a t io n h e a r in g w as he ld on
Ju ly 31 , 1987 . M a ts u z a k i p re s id e d o ver the h e a r in g and
te rm in a te d N o rr is fo r “ in s u b o rd in a t io n .” 1 J t . A p p . 97-
99. B efo re the nex t s tep o f the g r ievance p rocess , H A L ’s
V ice P re s id e n t o f M a in te n a n c e a n d E n g in ee r in g , H o w a rd
E . O g d e n , offered to “m itig a te” N o r r i s ’ p u n ish m e n t to
suspension w ith o u t pay. O g d e n explic itly w a rn e d tha t
“ any fu r th e r in s tan ce of fa ilu re to p e r fo rm y o u r du ties in
1 Petitioners’ brief suggests that, rather than being “terminated,”
Norris was only "recommended” for termination. Brief for Peti
tioners (“Pet. Brief”) 34, 43. Yet, Norris was given a document
that stated, “Mr. Grant Norris t e r m i n a t e d as of this day, August 3,
1987, for insubordination.” Jt. App. 214 (emphasis added).
232
3
a re sponsib le m a n n e r” cou ld b e p u n ished by d ischarge.
H A L w ro te to N o rr is ’ un io n rep resen ta t iv e an d s ta ted th a t
H A L ’s ac tio n “ nega tes the n e e d ” for an y fu r th e r hea ring .
Jt. A p p . 100-01, 2 0 7 -1 2 , 2 6 1 -1 9 . N o rr is re fused to ac
cept the re in s ta te m e n t offer u n d e r the c ircum stances . H e
filed suit ag a in s t H A L in s ta te c o u r t on D e c e m b e r 8,
1987. Jt. A p p . 3-11.
A s a re su lt o f in fo rm a t io n p ro v id ed by N o rr is , the
F A A seized the ax le sleeve on A u g u s t 4, 1987 , a n d b e
gan a co m p reh en s iv e inves t iga t ion of the m a tte r . J t . A p p .
120-31. S e e a ls o R ., vol. 17 (D e p o s i t io n of R ic h a rd S.
Teixeira , R eco rd s of F e d e ra l A v ia t io n A d m in is ta t io n ,
Dec. 6, 1 9 8 9 ) . O n M a rc h 2, 1988 , the F A A p ro p o se d a
civil p en a lty of $ 9 6 4 ,0 0 0 .0 0 ag a in s t H A L o n th e basis
of 958 flights A irc ra f t 7 0 h a d m a d e w ith the d am a g e d
sleeve. Jt. A p p . 120-22. T h e F A A in sp ec to r w h o seized
the sleeve fo u n d it to be d a m a g e d b ey o n d a l low ab le r e
pair limits. Jt . A pp . 121-22. T h e F A A p ro p o se d to r e
voke the F A A license of C u la h a ra , the superv iso r w h o
had susp en d ed N orr is . Jt . A p p . 125-28.
In S ep tem b er 1987 , the F A A notified H A L th a t i t in
tended to in spec t the axle sleeves of tw o o th e r a i rc ra f t
in H A L ’s fleet. B efore the inspection cou ld ta k e place ,
however. H A L rep laced the sleeves o n those a irc raf t . T h e
F A A d em a n d e d th a t the sleeves tha t h ad been rem oved
be tu rn ed over, b u t H A L said th a t it h a d “m isp laced ” or
“lost” at least six of the e ight rep laced sleeves.2
B. P r o c e e d in g s . N o rr is ’ su it aga ins t H A L alleges th a t
his d ischarge v io la ted p ub lic policies a r t ic u la te d in the
Federa l A v ia t io n A c t a n d the F A R ’s. Jt. A p p . 3-7. C o u n t
I of the C o m p la in t w as b ase d on P a r n a r v. A m e r ic a n a
H otels, In c ., 652 P .2 d 625 (H a w . 1 9 8 2 ) . w hich h e ld th a t
it was aga ins t the public policy of H aw aii fo r an em p lo y er
to fire an em ployee for re p o r t in g v io la tions of law. H A L
2 The FAA issued a report finding evidence that HAL employees
had intentionally “lost” the sleeves. Jt. App. 62, 64 n.37. Even
tually, HAL settled all pending FAA charges for a substantial fine.
Jt. App. 292-94.
233
4
rem oved th e en tire case to federa l d is tr ic t c o u r t (R . , vol.
1, a t 4 8 - 9 1 ) , w h e re the q u es t io n o f w h e th e r fe d e ra l lab o r
law p re e m p te d the ca se w as l i tiga ted . T h e federa l c o u r t
r e m a n d e d the p u b l ic p o licy d isch a rg e c la im , am o n g others .
Jt. A p p . 3 31 -45 . H A L m o v e d for reco n s id e ra t io n , w hich
the federa l d is tr ic t c o u r t d en ied , c i t ing L in g le v. N o r g e
D iv is ion o f M a g ic C h e f , In c . , 4 8 6 U.S. 3 9 9 ( 1 9 8 8 ) . Jt.
A pp . 346-67 .
In s ta te cou r t , H A L m o v e d to d ismiss N o r r i s ’ cla im s
o n the g ro u n d th a t the s ta te c o u r t lacked su b jec t m a t te r
ju risd ic t ion . R ., vol. 5 , a t 1-136. T h e s ta te tr ia l co u r t
g ra n te d th a t m o t io n as to C o u n t 1 b u t n o t as to o th e r
coun ts , then certified its o rd e r as final u n d e r H a w . R . Civ.
P. 5 4 ( b ) , leav ing fo r t r ia l N o r r i s ’ o th e r c la im s. R . , vol.
29 , a t 105-08 . N o rr is a p p e a le d f ro m the ju d g m e n t dis
m issing C o u n t I ag a in s t H A L a n d also f ro m ru lings in
favo r o f P a u l J. F in a zzo , H o w a rd E . O g d en , a n d H a tsu o
H o n m a , (R . , vol. 29 , a t 1 1 7 -2 6 ) , w ho w ere d e fen d an ts in
Civil N o . 8 9 -2904-09 , w i th w hich N o rr is ’ ca se aga ins t
H A L h a d b ee n co n so l id a ted . R . , vol. 18, a t 4 0 7 -0 8 . T h e
ru lings in fav o r of the th ree ind iv idua ls h a d dism issed
C o u n ts I a n d II , b o th of w h ich alleged v io la t ions o f public
po licy .3
T h e H a w a ii S u p rem e C o u r t reversed the s ta te trial
c o u r t ’s ju d g m e n t in N o r r is v. F in a z z o a n d in N o r r is v.
H A L . S e e 842 P .2 d 6 3 4 ( 1 9 9 2 ) , a n d Pet. A p p en d ices
B & C. T h is C o u r t g ra n te d the ce r t io ra r i pe t i t ion filed by
H A L a n d th e ind iv id u a l d e fen d a n ts .4
3 Count II of the Complaint against HAL alleged statutory viola
tions of the Hawaii Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, Haw. Rev.
Stat. §§ 378-61 to 378-69. Jt. App. 7-8. Count .II of the Complaint
against the individual defendants, by contrast, stated a common
law claim based on an alleged violation of the public policy evi
denced in the Hawaii Whistleblowers’ Protection Act. The statutory
claim asserted against HAL has never been part of any appeal; no
appealable ruling on that claim ever issued. R., vol. 6, at 317-18;
vol. 29, at 1-3.
4 HAL has gone into bankruptcy; the parties have stipulated in
the bankruptcy court to the processing of the present appeal.
234
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
T h e q u e s t io n in this case is w h e th e r an a ir l ine em
ployee is p re c lu d e d by the R a i lw ay L a b o r A c t ( “R L A ” )
from seek ing relief u n d e r a s ta te co m m o n law cau se of
ac tion fo r re ta l ia to ry d ischarge.
I. A s w e show in P a r t I, in fr a , the suggest ion th a t
C ongress, in en a c t in g the R L A , in ten d ed substan tive ly to
d isplace s ta te law m in im u m em p lo y m en t s ta n d a rd s is n o t
only in su p p o r ta b le o n the m o s t bas ic of p re em p t io n p r in
ciples b u t is flatly co n tra ry to a long line of cases in this
C ourt . F r o m M isso u r i P a c if ic R a i lr o a d v. N o r w o o d , 2 8 3
U.S. 2 4 9 ( 1 9 3 1 ) , to A tc h is o n T o p e k a & S a n ta F e R a i l
w ay v. B u e ll , 4 8 0 U.S. 557 ( 1 9 8 7 ) , this C o u r t has
consis ten tly m a in ta in e d th a t the R L A does no t speak
at all to su b s tan t iv e em ployee p ro tec t ions , a n d does no t
d isplace p u b l ic law princip les p ro v id ing such p ro tec t ions
to em ployees.
II . P e t i t io n e rs a l te rna te ly a rg u e th a t C ongress , in the
R L A ’s “m in o r d isp u te” provis ions, d irec ted th a t all em
p loym ent-re la ted d isputes, inc lud ing those governed by law
external to co llec tive b a rg a in in g agreem ents be su b m itted
to R L A a d ju s tm en t boards . A s we show in P a r t II , in fra ,
the requ is i te ev idence of such an in ten t is sorely lacking.
N one of th e cases re jec t ing substan tive p re em p tio n so
m uch as h in ts th a t the surviving cla im s shou ld b e re
solved by a d ju s tm en t boards . T h e lan g u ag e o f th e R L A
does no t , as p e t i t ione rs m a in ta in , ind icate , th ro u g h the
use of th e te rm “grievance ,” th a t n o n co n tra c tu a l causes
of ac tion w ere in ten d ed to be subm itted to R L A ad ju s t
m ent b o a rd s . T h is read in g of the s ta tu te is confirm ed,
m oreover, b y th e legislative h is tory o f the R L A . A n d the
agency d es igna ted b y C ongress to adm in is te r the R L A
dispute re so lu tion m echan ism , the N a tio n a l R a i l ro a d A d
justm ent B o a rd , has over the years repea ted ly s ta ted its
u n d ers tand ing th a t its ju r isd ic tion ex tends only to co n
tract-based cla im s. F u r th e r , an y doub ts re g a rd in g the
Meanwhile, Finazzo and Honma were recently granted summary
judgment by the state court on claims not before this Court.
5
235
R L A ’s m e a n in g m u st b e re so lved aga ins t p e t i t io n e rs ’ ver
sion, s ince th a t co n s tru c tio n w o u ld c r e a te ser ious cons ti
tu t io n a l issues u n d e r the S even th A m e n d m en t .
P e t i t io n e rs m a in ta in , how ever , th a t in E lg in , J o l i e t &
E a s te r n R a ilw a y v. B u r ley , 325 U.S. 711 ( 1 9 4 5 ) , this
C o u r t h a s co n c lu d e d o therw ise . B u r ley does indeed
co n ta in som e lang u ag e , a lbeit in d ic ta , th a t c an be re a d
to suggest th a t a d ju s tm en t b o a rd s have ju r isd ic t io n to c o n
s ider n o n co n tra c t -b ase d issues. B u t the m e a n in g of th a t
d ic ta is n o t c lear , an d has never been fo llow ed in any
case of this C o u r t 's . A n d B u r ley was p rem ised u p o n the
assum ption , o v erru led by this C o u r t in a line o f cases cu l
m in a t in g in A n d r e w s v. L o u is v i l le & N a s h v il le R a i lr o a d ,
4 0 6 U.S. 3 2 0 ( 1 9 7 2 ) , th a t use of the R L A m in o r d ispu te
re so lu tion m ech a n ism is d isc re tiona ry , n o t m a n d a to ry ;
thus, the d ic t a in B u r ley , in con tex t , does n o t su p p o r t
an y p re em p tiv e conc lus ion . M o reo v er , the line o f cases
cu lm in a t in g in A n d r e w s m ak es c lea r th a t the R L A d is
p u te re so lu tion m ech an ism s a re exclusive on ly w ith re
spec t to c o n t r a c t - b a s e d claims.
I I I . P e t i t io n e rs also suggest tha t, even if th e ir b ro a d
subm ission is inco rrec t , th e re is som e basis fo r R L A p re
em p tio n o f a case th a t is no t co n tra c t-d ep e n d en t , if a
paralle l case cou ld have been b ro u g h t , on the sam e facts,
u n d e r th e collec tive b a rg a in in g ag reem en t a n d its g riev
ance p rocedure s . T h is is n o t the ru le u n d e r the N L R A ;
L in g le m ak es c lea r th a t § 301 o f the L ab o r- M a n a g e m e n t
R e la t io n s A c t ( “L M R A ” ) does not d isp lace s ta te causes
of ac tion th a t s im ply para l le l co n tra c tu a l causes of ac
tion b u t d o no t d ep en d on the ag reem en t for resolution.
A s we show in P a r t III , in fr a , there is no basis fo r any
o th e r ru le u n d e r the R L A . B ecause N o rr is ’ causes of
ac tio n are no t co n trac t-d ep en d en t , the judgm en t below
shou ld be upheld .
6
236
ARGUMENT
I. THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT DOES NOT DISPLACE
STATE LEGAL RULES PROVIDING SUBSTAN
TIVE PROTECTION FOR EMPLOYEES.
T h e ques t ion p resen ted in this case is w h e th e r the
Haw aii S up rem e C o u r t e rred in conc lu d in g th a t its s ta te
law of re ta l ia to ry d ischarge is n ot p reem pted by the R a i l
w ay L a b o r A c t ( “ R L A ” ). P e t i t io n e rs ’ essential subm is
sion is tha t the s ta te law is p reem p ted . A cco rd in g to
peti t ione rs the R L A p rec ludes s ta tes from app ly ing their
s ta tu to ry o r co m m o n law m in im u m lab o r s tan d a rd s to em
ployees sub ject to an R L A collec tive b a rg a in in g agree
m ent, a n d from prov id ing fo r s ta te co u r t ju risd ic t ion over
a suit by an R L A -c o v e re d em ployee w ho b rings an y
em ploym en t-re la ted c la im — in c lu d in g a c la im u n d e r such
sta te law. T h is is so, pe t i t ioners assert, even if the state
law claim asserted does no t rest in any w ay on the govern
ing lab o r ag reem ent. S ee , c .g ., Pet. Br. 1 4 -1 5 /’
P e ti t ioners ' a rg u m e n t is g ro u n d e d on a p ro fo u n d m is
u n d e rs ta n d in g o f the R L A ’s lan g u ag e an d purpose , and
of this C o u r t 's R L A ju risp ru d en ce . T h e R L A is co n
cerned in its en tire ty w ith the fo rm a tio n and the func
tioning o f co llec tive b a rg a in in g re la tionsh ips in the ra il
ro a d an d airline industries . T h e s ta tu te con ta in s prov i
sions gov ern in g the selection o f collective b a rg a in in g rep
resen tatives (4 5 U .S.C . § 1 5 2 , T h i rd & N in th ) ; p ro
tecting un io n o rgan iz ing an d indep en d en ce (§ 152, F o u r th
& F i f th ) ; and . m ost p rom inen tly , regu la t ing the process
of collective b a rg a in in g a n d the sett lem ent o f disputes
con cern in g barg a in in g an d the resu lt ing collective agree
m ent. (§ § 152, S ixth & Seventh , §§ 155, 156, 157, 158,
159, 1 6 0 ) . In the last regard , the R L A requ ires th a t “dis
putes g row ing ou t o f g rievances o r o u t o f the in terpre ta- 5
7
5 Thus petitioners maintain that “the RLA scheme supports
preemption of state ‘wrongful discharge claims,’ ” not just adjudica
tion of those claims by RLA adjustment boards. And they so
maintain “. . . even if that means that state law rights and remedies
will be lost.’’ Pet. Rr. 30. See ahtn id. at 34.
237
8
t ion or ap p l ica t io n of ag reem en ts cove ring ra te s o f p ay
rules, o r w o rk in g c o n d i t io n s” (c o m m o n ly ca lled “m in o r
d ispu tes” ) , 0 b e reso lved th ro u g h co n fe re n ces b e tw e en
the c a rr ie r a n d the “ re p resen ta t iv e o r re p re sen ta t iv e s . . .
of [ the] em ployees ,” § 152, S ixth; s e e a ls o § 153, F ir s t
( i ) ; § 184; an d , if th a t m e th o d fails, by an ad ju s tm e n t
b o a rd c o m p o sed of re p resen ta tive s of the c a rr ie rs an d u n
ions, § 153, F irs t ( i ) , Second ; § 184 .6 7
N o th in g in the R L A trea ts w ith , m u c h less de te rm ines ,
the subs tan tive ru les th a t will govern m a t te rs such as
em ployee safety, reco m p en se for w o rk p la ce in juries , em
p loym en t d isc r im in a t io n a n d h a rassm en t , m in im u m w ages
an d the ir p a y m e n t or-— m ost p e r t in e n t to th is ca se— re
course aga ins t re ta l ia to ry d ischarges (o th e r th a n d ischarges
in re ta l ia t io n for exercise o f those r igh ts c re a te d by the
R L A itself, s e e § 152, T h i r d ) .
W hile as a genera l p rop o s i t io n all these m a t te rs are
governed by s ta tu to ry an d c o m m o n law m in im u m labo r
s tan d a rd s norm s, pe t i t ione rs c la im th a t in e n a c t in g the
R L A over sixty years ago, C o n g ress d isp laced all such
ind iv idua l em p loyee legal p ro tec t io n s for ra il a n d airline
em ployees covered b y collec tive b a rg a in in g agreem ents .
A . E v e n as an in i t ia l p ropo s i t io n , p e t i t io n e rs ’ sw eep
ing p re em p t io n a rg u m e n t necessarily fails the m o s t basic
govern ing s tan d ard s . F ed era l ism p r inc ip les co u n se l that,
in p reem p tio n cases genera lly , “ ‘we s ta r t w ith the a ssu m p
tio n th a t the h is toric po lice pow ers o f the S ta tes w ere no t
to be superseded b y the F e d e ra l A c t unless th a t w as the
6 See, e .g . , C o n s o l i d a t e d R a i l C o r p . v . R a i l w a y L a b o r E x e c u t i v e s ’
A s s ' n ( " C o n r a i l ” ) , 491 U.S. 299, 301-04 (1989).
7 There is a difference, not here material, between the railroad
and airline industries. Railroad disputes are ordinarily directed by
the union and employer to the National Railroad Adjustment Board
created by the statute (although alternative adjustment boards are
allowed). Since no such national board has ever been created for
the airlines, separate system adjustment boards created by the air
lines and the unions through collective bargaining resolve airline
disputes. S e e 45 U.S.C. §§ 153, 184; sen a lso C o n r a i l 491 US at
301-04.
238
9
c lear a n d m an ife s t p u rp o se of C o n g ress .’ ” H ills b o r o u g h
C o u n ty F la . v. A u to m a te d M e d ic a l L a b o r a t o r i e s , In c .,
471 U.S. 7 0 7 , 715 ( 1 9 8 5 ) (q u o t in g J o n e s v. R a th P a c k
ing C o ., 4 3 0 U.S. 519 , 525 ( 1 9 7 7 ) ) . As the C o u r t said
in P u e r to R ic o D ep t , o f C o n s u m e r A ffa ir s v. Is la P e tr o l
eu m C o r p ., 4 8 5 U.S. 495 , 5 0 0 ( 1 9 8 8 ) , “ to say th a t
[pervasive p re e m p t io n ] can be c rea ted is not to say it can
be c rea ted su b tly .”
C ongress h as never m ad e “c lear an d m an ife s t” any in
ten tion to p re e m p t s ta te m in im um lab o r s ta n d a rd s laws
generally , o r s ta te w rongfu l d ischarge laws in p a r ticu la r .
N o th in g in the “ p lain lan g u a g e ” of the R L A restric ts
s ta tes f ro m ac tin g affirmatively to p ro tec t em ployees in
the industr ies covered by the s ta tu te . T h e R L A is qu ite
d is tinc t f ro m federa l su b s ta n tiv e lab o r s tan d a rd s laws in
this p a r t ic u la r .” A n d , while petit ioners p o in t repea ted ly
to p o r t io n s of the R L A legislative h is tory tha t , in their
view, in d ica te th a t C ongress w as co n cern ed a b o u t un ifo r
mity in the reg u la t io n of the airlines and ra ilroads , such
generalized concerns , s tand ing alone, are no t sufficient to
p rov ide the requis ite c lear ind ica t ion of p reem p tiv e in
tent:
W hile we h av e frequen tly said th a t p re -em ption
ana lysis requ ires ascer ta in ing congress ional in ten t,
s e e , e .g ., L o u is ia n a P u b lic S e rv ic e C o m m a , [4 7 6
U.S. 355 , 369 ( 1 9 8 6 ) ] w e have never m e a n t th a t to
signify congress ional in ten t in a v ac u u m , unre la ted
to th e giving of m ean in g to an enac ted s ta tu to ry text.
T h e re is no text here . . . tha t m ight p laus ib ly be
th o u g h t to im ply exclusivity— to which expressions
of p re-em ptive in ten t in legislative h is to ry m igh t at- 8
8 S e e , e .g . , 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (Employment Retirement Income
Security Act preemption); 29 U.S.C. § 667 (Occupational Safety &
Health Act preemption); 45 U.S.C. § 484 (Federal Rail Safety Act
preemption).
We note that such federal minimum employment standards stat
utes may, in fact, preempt some state causes of action for retalia
tory discharge. S e e , e.g . , I n g r r s n l l - R a n d Co. v. M c C le n d o n , 498 U.S.
133 (1990).
239
10
tach. . . . [U ]n e n a c te d app rova ls , beliefs, an d desires
are no t laws. W ith o u t a tex t th a t can , in l ight of
those s ta tem en ts , p laus ib ly be in te rp re te d as p r e
s c r ib in g federa l p re -em ption it is im possib le to find
[p reem p tio n of s ta te em ployee-p ro tec tive r ights].
[P u er to R ic o D ep t , o f C o n s u m e r A ffa ir s , 4 8 5 U.S.
at 501 (e m p h a s is in o r ig in a l ) . ]
S e e a ls o C S X T r a n s p o r ta t io n , In c . v. E a s t e n v o o d , 113
S. C t. 1732, 1737 ( 1 9 9 3 ) ; C ip o l lo n e v. L ig g e t t G ro u p ,
In c ., 112 S. C t. , 2 6 0 8 , 2 6 1 8 ( 1 9 9 2 ) ; W isco n s in P u b lic
In te r v e n o r v. M o r d e r , 111 S. C t. 2 4 7 6 . 2 4 8 1 -8 3 ( 1 9 9 1 ) .
N o r is there any possible a rg u m e n t th a t C ongress , in
enac t in g the R L A , has “ so th o ro u g h ly o ccu p ie fd the] leg
islative field” of em ployee p ro tec t ive rules in the ra i l ro a d
an d a irl ine industr ies “ ‘as to m a k e re aso n ab le the in fe r
ence th a t C ongress left no ro o m for the S ta tes to su p
p la n t i t . ’ ” C ip o l lo n e , 112 S. Ct. a t 2 6 1 7 (q u o t in g
F id e lity F e d e r a l S a v in g s & L o a n v. D e la C u e s ta , 458
U.S. 141, 153 ( 1 9 8 2 ) ) . T o the co n tra ry , w hile the R L A
regu la t ion of the fo rm a tio n a n d the fu n c tio n in g of the
collective b a rg a in in g system is pervas ive— an d the R L A
is there fo re b ro a d ly p reem p tiv e w ith reg a rd to m a t te rs
co n ce rn in g un ion o rg an iza t io n , co llec tive b a rg a in in g , an d
the pa r t ie s ’ use of eco n o m ic w e a p o n s n— the R L A does
not, as we s ta ted a t the ou tse t , address the sub ject o f in
d ividual em ployee p ro tec t io n s a t all.
B. P u t t in g th a t th resh o ld p o in t to the side, the p a r
ticu la r p re em p t io n ques t io n here— w h e th e r o r n o t the
R L A disp laces all s ta te em ployee p ro tec t iv e causes o f ac
t ion— is n o t new to this C o u r t . T o the co n tra ry , by the
time this C o u r t , in M e tr o p o l it a n L i f e In s u r a n c e C o . v.
M a ssa ch u se tts , 471 U.S. 7 2 4 ( 1 9 8 5 ) , u n an im o u s ly r e
j e c t e d the a rg u m e n t th a t the N a t io n a l L a b o r R e la t io n s
A c t ( “N L R A ” ) schem e of free collective b a rg a in in g p re
em pts all s ta te m in im u m lab o r s tan d a rd laws, the C o u r t ’s 9
9 S e e , e.g . , B r o t h e r h o o d o f R.Tt. T r a i n m e n v . J a c k s o n v i l l e T e r m i
n a l Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969).
240
decisions h a d a lread y rep ea ted ly re jected th a t sam e a r
gu m en t in the R L A contex t.
M e tr o p o l it a n L i f e ru led th a t the federal schem e of co l
lective b a rg a in in g is by design in ters ti tia l and m e a n t to
su p p lem en t r a th e r than to d isp lace s ta te a n d federa l m in
im um lab o r s ta n d a rd p ro tec t io n laws. T h e collective b a r
gain ing laws, said the C o u r t , were “deve loped . . . w ith in
the la rge r body of s ta te law p ro m o t in g public hea lth and
safe ty .” 471 U.S. a t 756 . “ [N lo incom patib i li ty exists,
there fore , be tw een federa l ru les designed to [p ro tec t col
lective b a rg a in in g ] an d s ta te o r fcdcial legislation that
im poses m in im a l subs tan tive req u irem en ts on co n tra c t
te rm s.” Id . a t 7 5 4 ; s e e a ls o F o r t H a li fa x P a c k in g C o . v.
C o y n e , 4 8 2 U.S. 1, 21 ( 1 9 8 7 ) .
T h e M e tr o p o l ita n L i f e C o u r t recognized tha t its c o n
clusion o n the in te rp lay be tw een the N L R A and s ta te m in i
m u m lab o r s ta n d a rd laws ap p lied an d reaffirmed the iden
tical conc lus ion prev iously reach ed in the R L A setting.
471 U.S. a t 7 5 7 , n .32 . T h e first of these cases was
M isso u r i P a c if ic R a i lr o a d v. N o r w o o d , 283 U.S. 249
( 1 9 3 1 ) . T h e re , one of the em ployer 's a rgum en ts aga inst
ap p lica tion of a s ta te law re gu la t ing the n u m b er of em
ployees req u ired to o p e ra te ce r ta in ra ilroad equ ipm en t
was tha t, by en a c t in g the R L A , C ongress c rea ted a fed
eral fo ru m to resolve “d ispu tes betw een a ca rr ie r and its
em ployees ar is ing ou t o f grievances o r ou t o f the in te rp re
ta tion o r ap p l ica t io n of ag reem en ts co n ce rn in g rates of
pay, ru le s o r w o r k in g c o n d it io n s .” N o r w o o d , A ppe llan t 's
Brief a t 73 (q u o t in g the R L A , em phasis in o r ig in a l) .
T h e ra i l ro a d a rg u ed th a t C ongress ' decision to have a
federally c rea ted a n d san c tio n ed b o a rd resolve such dis
putes necessarily deprived the s tates o f any au tho ri ty to
enact o r en fo rce any legal rules w ha tsoever govern ing the
ra ilroad em p lo y m en t re la t ionsh ip . Id . a t 74-76. T he
C o u rt d e te rm in e d th a t this a rg u m e n t— sim ilar in form to
the a rg u m e n t m ad e by peti t ione rs here— m erited the fo l
lowing response ; “N o analysis o r discussion o f the p ro
visions o f the R a i lw ay L a b o r A c t o f 1926 is necessarv
to show th a t it does n o t conflic t w ith the A rk a n sa s s ta t
11
241
12
u tes u n d e r c o n s id e ra t io n .” 2 8 3 U.S. a t 2 5 8 . S e e a ls o
B r o t h e r h o o d o f L o c o m o t iv e E n g in e e r s v, C h ic a g o , R . 1.
& P . R . C o ., 382 U.S. 4 2 3 ( 1 9 6 6 ) .
T h e n ex t case in this line is o n all fou rs w ith the case
c u r ren t ly b e fo re the C o u rt . In T e r m in a l R a i l r o a d A s s o
c ia t io n o f S t. L o u is v. B r o t h e r h o o d o f R a i l r o a d T r a in
m en , 318 U.S. 1 ( 1 9 4 3 ) , ra il em ployees co v e red by the
R L A eschew ed rem edies ava ilab le th ro u g h the R L A N a
t iona l R a i l ro a d A d ju s tm e n t B o a rd ( “N R A B ” ) and , in
s tead , b ro u g h t a c la im befo re the Illinois C o m m e rc e C o m
m ission cha lleng ing th e ir em p loyer 's fa ilu re to p rov ide
cab o o ses o n all o f its t ra in s o p e ra t in g w ith in the state.
T h e C om m iss ion o rde red the ra i l ro a d to p ro v id e the c a
booses, a n d the S ta te S u p rem e C o u r t affirmed the o rder.
Id . a t 3.
B efo re th is C o u r t , the ra i l ro a d a rg u ed th a t the g o v ern
in g la b o r ag reem en t req u ired cabooses on ly on som e of
the tra ins, a n d th a t the d ispu te shou ld hav e been resolved
b y the N R A B . T h e C o u r t f ram ed the issue p resen ted ,
a n d reso lved th a t issue, as follows:
W e assum e, w ith o u t deciding, th a t the d e m a n d for
add it io n a l caboose service an d its re fusal co n s t i tu te a
d ispu te a b o u t w ork in g cond it ions , a n d th a t the N a
tional R a i l ro a d A d ju s tm e n t B o a rd w o u ld h a v e ju r is
d ic tion of it on petit ion of the em ployees o r their
re p resen ta tive an d m igh t hav e m ad e an aw a rd such
as the o rd e r in ques t ion o r som e m odifica t ion of it.
T h e question is w h e th e r the R a i lw a y L a b o r A c t, so
in te rp re ted , occup ied the field to the exc lus ion of
the s ta te ac tion u n d e r review. W e co n c lu d e th a t it
does n o t ------ [3 1 8 U.S. a t 6.]
In reach in g its conc lusion , the C o u r t recogn ized that
ra i l ro a d o p era t io n s are inev itab ly in te rs ta te in n a tu re , and
tha t , in the absence of y a rd facilities a t the s ta te border,
the result o f its decision w ou ld be th a t the ra i l ro a d w ould
have to o p e ra te cabooses even ou ts ide of the s ta te ’s
b oundar ie s . 318 U.S. at 8. B u t the C o u r t nevertheless
conc luded as follows:
242
13
T h e R a i lw a y L a b o r A c t, like the N a t io n a l L a b o r
R e la t io n s A c t, does no t u n d e r ta k e gov ern m en ta l
reg u la t io n of w ages, hours , o r w ork in g conditions.
In s tead it seeks to p rov ide a m eans by w hich agree
m en t m ay be reached w ith respect to them . T h e
n a t io n a l in te rest expressed by those A c ts is no t p r i
m ari ly in the w o rk ing cond it ions as such. So fa r as
th e A c t itself is conce rned these cond it ions m ay be
as b ad as the em ployees will to lera te o r be m ad e as
good as they can b a rg a in for. T h e A c t does no t fix
a n d does n o t au tho rize an y o n e to fix generally app li
cab le s ta n d a rd s for w o rk in g conditions. . . .
S ta te laws have long regu la ted a g rea t varie ty of
co n d it ions in t ran sp o r ta t io n an d industry , such as
san i ta ry facilities an d cond it ions , safety devices and
p ro tec t io n s , pu r i ty of w a te r supply , fire p ro tec t ion ,
an d in n u m e ra b le o thers . A n y of these m atte rs m ight,
w e suppose , be the sub ject of a d em an d by w o rkm en
fo r b e t te r p ro tec t ion and u p o n refusal m igh t be the
sub jec t of a lab o r d ispu te w hich w ould have such
effect on in te rs ta te co m m erce th a t federal agencies
m igh t be invoked to dea l with som e phase of it. B u t
we w ou ld h a rd ly be expected to hold th a t the price
of the federa l effort to p ro te c t the p eace and co n
t inu ity of com m erce has been to s trike dow n sta te
s an i ta ry codes, hea lth regu la t ions , fac to ry inspec
tions, an d safety provis ions for industry and t ra n s
p o r ta t io n . . . . [ I ] t c a n n o t be th a t the m in im u m re
q u irem en ts laid dow n by s ta te au th o r i ty are all set
aside. W e h o ld th a t the e n a c tm en t b y C ongress of
the R a i lw ay L a b o r A c t was no t a p reem ption of the
field of re g u la t ing w ork ing cond itions themselves. . . .
[3 1 S U.S. a t 6-7 (c i ta t io n o m i t te d ) . ] 10
10 T e r m i n a l R a i l r o a d was decided prior to this Court’s decision
in A n d r e w s v . L o u i s v i l l e & N a s h v i l l e R a i l r o a d , 406 U.S. 320 (1972),
making clear that adjustment, board jurisdiction over minor dis
putes is exclusive. S e e i n f r a pp. 37-39. As the quotation in text
makes clear, however, and as the reliance on T e r m i n a l R a i l r o a d
in M e t r o p o l i t a n L i f e confirms. T e r m i n a l R a i l r o a d ’s holding did
not at all depend upon an understanding that 'he Board and the
courts had concurrent jurisdiction over minor disputes.
243
1 4
W e su b m it th a t N on\ >ood, T e r m in a l R a i l r o a d an d
M e tr o p o lita n L i f e re q u ire re jec t io n of p e t i t io n e rs ’ R L A
p reem p tio n a rg u m e n t a n d a re thus d ispositive here . I t
is telling in this r e g a rd th a t p e t i t ione rs fail en tire ly to d o
business w ith these p receden ts .
C. N o tw i th s ta n d in g the fo rego ing , we w o u ld be de
re lic t if we d id n o t a d d th a t the C o u r t has recen tly r e
jected the a rg u m e n t for R L A subs tan tive su p re m a c y over
a f e d e r a l la b o r s ta n d a rd s s ta tu te . In A tc h is o n , T o p e k a
a n d S a n ta F e R a i lw a y v. B u e l l , 4 8 0 U.S. 557 ( 1 9 8 7 ) ,
the em ployer a rg u ed th a t the R L A p rec luded the re so lu
tion th ro u g h a c o u r t tr ial o f an em ployee 's p e rso n a l in ju ry
cla im b ro u g h t u n d e r the F ed e ra l E m p lo y e rs ’ L iab i l i ty A c t
( F E L A ) , 4 5 U .S .C . §§ 151-60 . B ecause the d ispu te be
tw een the em p lo y e r a n d em ployee in q ues t ion c o u ld have
been reso lved by the re levan t ad ju s tm e n t b o a r d as “ a
lab o r g rievance u n d e r the R L A . ” id . a t 5 5 9 , sa id the
em ployer , “ an F E L A ac tion fo r d am ag e s is b a r r e d ,” id.
a t 564 . T h e em ployee , on the o th e r h and , a rg u ed tha t
n o th ing in the R L A lim ited ra i l ro a d em ployees’ F E L A
rights.
T h e B u e ll C o u r t re jec ted the em ployer 's R L A su p re m
acy a rg u m en t , re i te ra t in g the consis ten t co n c lu s io n of
N o r w o o d , T e r m in a l R a i l r o a d an d M e tr o p o lita n L i f e tha t
r ights th a t der ive f ro m sources o th e r than a l a b o r agree
m en t a re in no w ay c o m p ro m ised by the R L A :
T h e fac t th a t an in ju ry o therw ise co m p en sa b le under
the F E L A w as cau sed by co n d u c t th a t m a y have
b ee n su b jec t to a rb i t ra t io n u n d e r the R L A does not
deprive an em ployee of his o p p o r tu n i ty to b r ing an
F E L A ac tio n fo r d am ag es . . . . T h e F E L A no t only
p rov ides ra i l ro a d w o rk e rs with subs tan tive p ro tec t ion
aga ins t neg ligen t co n d u c t th a t is in d ep en d e n t o f the
em ployer 's ob liga tions u n d e r its co llec tive-bargain ing
agreem en t, b u t a lso affords in ju red w orke rs a remedy
suited to th e ir needs, u n like the lim ited re lief that
seems to be ava ilab le th ro u g h the A d ju s tm en t Board.
I f is inco n ce iv ab le th a t C ongress in tended th a t a
w o rk e r w ho suffered a d isab ling in ju ry w ould be
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15
denied recovery u n d e r th e F E L A sim ply bec au se he
m igh t also be ab le to process a n a r ro w lab o r griev
an ce u n d e r the R L A to a successful conclusion .
[4 8 0 U.S. a t 564-65 .]
S ince, as this C o u r t has held in M e tr o p o lita n L i f e ,
there is “ no re aso n to believe th a t fo r this p u rp o se C o n
gress in ten d ed s ta te m in im u m lab o r s tan d a rd s to be trea ted
differently from m in im u m federa l s ta n d a rd s , '’ 471 U.S. at
755 . B u e ll p rov ides still fu r th e r su p p o r t fo r the p ro p o s i
tion th a t the R L A docs no t op e ra te to strip ra i l ro ad and
airline em ployees covered by an R L A collective b a rg a in
ing ag reem en t of rights o therw ise ava ilab le to em ployees
generally .
II. THE RLA DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT
EXTRACONTRACTUAL CAUSES OF ACTION BE
HEARD BY ADJUSTMENT BOARDS.
In a v a r ia t io n on the them e th a t the R L A substan tively
p reem pts s ta te lab o r s tan d a rd s laws, pe tit ioners a rg u e that
even if the R L A does no t e lim ina te a ra i l ro a d o r airline
em ployee’s s ta te lab o r s tan d a rd s laws cause of ac tion , the
R L A does hav e a p reem ptive force tha t re legates all such
cases to a rb i t ra t io n w ith in the R L A m in o r d ispu te reso lu
tion sys tem .11 G iven pe ti t ione rs ' em phasis on this “ju r is
d ic tional” p re em p tio n claim , we consider the p o in t in
detail. So th a t we are no t m isunders tood , how ever, we
sta te a t the ou tse t th a t the p reem p tio n a rgum en ts re jec ted
in T e r m in a l R a i l r o a d an d B u e ll w ere in fac t „ p rem ised
on a s im ilar theo ry and tha t those p receden ts govern this
phase of the in s tan t case and requ ire re jection of pe t i
t ioners’ position .
A . I t facil ita tes analysis to have firmly in m in d the
ad ju d ica to ry system to w hich, pe tit ioners w o u ld have it,
11 As we point, out later, however, the NRAB and the airlines
system boards o f adjustment have always refused to hear issues
based upon law external- to the contract. S e e pp. 30-32, i n f r a .
Therefore, petitioners’ apparently jurisdictional argument will have
the actual substantive effect of stripping RLA employees of their
noncontractual rights, contrary to this Court’s cases just discussed.
245
1 6
the R L A alloca tes th e d e te rm in a t io n of all c o m m o n law
a n d s ta tu to ry e m p lo y m en t- re la ted causes of ac tion .
As the [N a t io n a l R a i l ro a d A d ju s tm e n t] B o a rd has
o p era ted in p rac t ice , th e p ro c ed u re s fo l low ed in h o ld
ing hearings have been qu ite in fo rm al an d h av e dif
fered from the tria l-type hea r ings c o n d u c te d by o th e r
agencies. . . . D ispu tes a re re fe rred to th e A d ju s tm e n t
B o a rd b y the filing of w ri t ten subm issions. . . . I t
w ou ld be m ost e x t ra o rd in a ry fo r live te s t im o n y to
be g iven by witnesses. T h e r e is no re q u ir e m e n t th a t
a fac tua l subm ission o r o th e r w ri t ten s ta te m e n t be
sw orn . T h e re is n o c ross-exam ina tion o f w itnesses
an d no record of the t ran sc r ip t of p roceed ings . T h e r e
is n o p rov is ion fo r is suance of su b p o en a s o r c o m
pu lso ry a t ten d a n ce of witnesses. [H ear in g s on H .R .
7 0 6 b e fo re the S u b co m m it tee on L a b o r o f the S ena te
C o m m it tee on L a b o r an d Pub lic W elfare , 8 9 th C ong.,
2 d Sess., 4 9 ( 1 9 6 6 ) , r e p r in te d in IV T h e R ai lw ay
A c t of 1926: A Leg is la t ive H is to ry (M ic h a e l H.
C am p b e l l & E d w a rd C. B re m e r I I I , eds., 1 9 8 8 )
( “Leg. H is t .” ) . ] 12
S e e a ls o id . ( N R A B ex em p ted from the A d m in is tra t iv e
P rocedures A ct, 5 U .S .C . §§ 5 0 0 e t s e q . ) : 2 9 C .F .R .
§ 301 .1 .
A s this C o u r t has rep ea ted ly in d ica ted , these exceed
ingly in fo rm a l p ro c ed u re s are su itab le to the p u rp o se of
d e te rm in ing the app lica tion o f the lab o r ag reem en ts in the
a irline an d ra i l ro a d industr ies to p a r t ic u la r fac tua l s i tua
tions. G iven the n a tu re of the f o r a , how ever, it would
be odd indeed if C o n g ress h ad m a n d a te d th a t n o n c o n
trac tu a l , ind iv idual co m m o n law a n d s ta tu to ry causes of
ac tion be tried befo re the N R A B an d the o th e r R L A a d
12 As noted previously, airline cases are heard not by the NRAB
but by system boards of adjustment created by the parties to col
lective bargaining agreements. While such boards may have more
forma! procedures, the statutory intent argument must be evaluated
with regard to the NRAB, since that is the adjudicatory body Con
gress had in mind in 1934 when it mandated use of the adjustment
board procedure.
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17
ju s tm en t b o a rd s .1,1 A s we n o w show, the s ta tu to ry lan
guage, h is to ry a n d s truc tu re , as well as its adm in is tra t iv e
in te rp re ta t io n a n d its in te rp re ta t io n in this C o u r t , all d em
o n s tra te th a t C ongress has n o t d o n e so.
B. P e t i t io n e rs a n d the ir a m ic i base the ir ju r isd ic t iona l
a rg u m e n t on the R L A ’s desc r ip tion of the m in o r d ispu te
reso lu tion m ech an ism as on e tha t covers con troversies
“g row ing ou t of g rievances o r o u t o f the in te rp re ta t io n or
ap p lica tion of ag reem en ts . ’’ 45 U .S .C . § 153, F irs t ( i )
(em phas is a d d e d ) . Pet. Br. 9 - 11.13 14 T h e p la in m ean in g
of this ph ra se , it is insisted, requires th a t the te rm
“grievances” m u st m ean som eth in g o th e r th an a type of
co n tra c tu a l d isp u te— indeed , m u s t inc lude a l l d isputes
that m igh t arise in the w o rkp lace , inc lud ing the d ispu te
a t issue here.
( i ) Peti t ioners ' a rg u m e n t th a t the p lain m ean in g of
“g r ievances” d eno tes ex tra c o n tra c tu a l cla im s Hies in the
face o f w h a t has b ee n the un iversa l p rev ious u n d e r s ta n d
ing of th a t te rm . T h is C o u r t 's R L A / N L R A decisions, in
a var ie ty of con tex ts , rou tine ly use the term “g riev an ce ,”
and on every occas ion of w h ich we are aw are , the w o rd
has been used to re fe r u n ique ly to d isputes over the
m ean ing o r ap p l ica t io n of la b o r agreem ents . F o r exam ple ,
in P a p e r w o r k c r s v. M isco , In c ., 4 8 4 U.S. 29 ( 1 9 8 8 ) , the
C o u r t observed th a t “ fc jo llec tive -barga in ing agreem ents
13 G i l m e r v. Interstate/Johnson L a n e C a ry . , I l l S. Ct. 1647
(1991), and other cases concerning v o l u n t a r y arbitration agree
ments do not detract from the conclusion that m a n d a t a r y relin
quishment of ordinary procedural protections for the determi
nation of individual, governmentally created rights is an intention
not lightly ascribed to Congress.
14 Petitioners also mention that § 152, First provides generally
for a duty “to settle all disputes, whether arising out of the appli
cation of such agreements or otherwise.” The obvious reference
of the “or otherwise” in that provision, however, is to the obliga
tion to negotiate concerning major disputes, which involve the
formation or modification of other contracts rather than- their
application. S e p 45 TT.S.C. § 152. Seventh; C n n r a i l , 491 U.S. at
302-04.
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18
co m m o n ly p ro v id e g r ievance p rocedure s to settle d ispu tes
be tw een the un io n a n d em p lo y er with respect to th e in te r
p re ta t io n a n d ap p l ica t io n o f the a g reem en t a n d requ ire
b in d in g a rb i t r a t io n for unse tt led g r ievances .” Id . a t 36.
P ar t icu la r ly , the C o u r t has a d o p ted this sam e u n d e r s ta n d
ing of “g r iev a n ce” as the term is used in th e R L A :
T h e g r ievances for w hich redress is so u g h t . . . a re
ad m it te d ly “m in o r d isp u tes” as th a t p h ra s e is k n o w n
in the p a r la n c e of the R a i lw ay L a b o r A c t. T h e s e are.
c o n tr o v e r s ie s o v e r th e m e a n in g o f an ex is t in g c o l l e c
tiv e b a rg a in in g a g r e e m e n t in a p a r t ic u la r f a c t s itu a
t io n , g e n e r a lly in v o lv in g o n e e m p lo y e e . [B r o t h e r h o o d
o f T ra in m en v. C h ic a g o R iv e r & h id . R .R . , 353 U.S.
30 , 33 ( 1 9 5 7 ) (em p h as is a d d e d . ) ]
If th is w ere no t enough , p e t i t ione rs ’ a rg u m e n t ab o u t
the “p la in m e a n in g ” of the w ord “g r iev a n ce” is wholly
a t odds w ith the w ay th a t w o rd is used in its o w n co llec
tive b a rg a in in g ag reem en t es tab lish ing the system b o a rd
o f ad ju s tm e n t to w h ich peti t ione rs w ould re m it N o rr is ’
cause of ac tion . F o r in th a t ag reem en t it is specif ied tha t
a rb i t ra t io n is ava ilab le only fo r “g rievances w h ich m av
arise u n d e r the term s of this ag reem en t ,” Pet. A pp.
51a . S e e a ls o Pet. A pp . 5 4 a (p a r t ie s ’ u n d e rs ta n d in g tha t
a system b o a rd so lim ited is in co m p lian ce w ith R L A ) ;
id . 5 5 a ( T h e B o a rd shall n o t have ju r isd ic t ion o r pow er
to ad d o r su b t ra c t from this a g reem en t” ).
( i i ) N o tw i th s ta n d in g all of this, pe t i t ione rs insist
th a t to give full m e a n in g to the d is junctive “o r ” in
§ 153 F irs t, “g r iev an ce” m u s t m ean all em p lo y m en t-
re la ted d isputes, inc lud ing d isputes based on the assertion
o f a s ta tu to ry o r co m m o n law right. T h is “p la in m e a n in g ”
a rg u m e n t is g ro u n d e d on tw o assum ptions , n e i th e r of
w hich has m er i t e i ther as a genera l m a t te r , o r in this
p a r t ic u la r case. T h e first assum ption is based upon the
c a n o n of s ta tu to ry co n s tru c tio n th a t “ the con s tru c tio n of
a s ta tu te is p re fe rred which gives to all w ords in it an
opera t ive m e a n in g .” E a r ly v. D o e , 16 H ow . 610 , 617
( 1 8 5 3 ) . Relyimr on that m ax im , pe ti t ione rs a rg u e that
the lan g u ag e on e i ther side of the d is junctive “o r” m ust
19
refer to d ifferen t k inds of claim s. B u t it is eq ua lly a
m ax im of s ta tu to ry in te rp re ta t io n th a t a s ta tu te is to be
re ad as a w hole , s ince the m e a n in g of all s ta tu to ry l a n
guage can only be u n d e rs to o d in con tex t. S ee , e .g ., K in g
v. St. V in cen t's H o sp ita l, 112 S. C l. 5 70 , 5 7 4 ( 1 9 9 1 ) .
T h e assum ption th a t C ongress necessarily in te n d e d differ
en t w o rd s to c o n n o te w holly d ifferent concep ts , w ith o u t
regard to the overall co n tex t in w hich the w o rd s appear ,
is no t a so u n d one, an d cer ta in ly is no t o n e the C o u r t has
accep ted w hen it has u n d e r ta k en to in te rp re t fed e ra l lab o r
legislation. S e e P ip e fit te r s v. U n ited S ta te s , 4 0 7 U.S. 385 ,
421-22 ( 1 9 7 2 ) . S ec a ls o S u th e r lan d , S ta tu to ry C o n
s tru ctio n § 4 6 .0 5 ( “co u r ts shou ld not re ly too heav ily
upon cha rac te r iza t io n s such as ‘d is junc tive’ o r ‘c o n ju n c
tive’ form s to resolve difficult issues, b u t sh o u ld look to
all p a r ts o f the s ta tu te -’).
T h e need to consider the co n tex t is especia lly re levan t
w hen consider ing the lan g u ag e o f the R L A . A s the C o u r t
has recogn ized :
[T jh e R a i lw ay L a b o r A c t o f 1926 ca m e on the
s ta tu te b o o k s th ro u g h ag reem en t be tw een the ra il
roads an d the ra i l ro a d un ions on the need fo r such
legislation. It is a c cu ra te to say th a t the ra ilroads
a n d the ra ilroad un ions betw een them w ro te the R a i l
w ay L a b o r A c t of 1926 a n d C ongress fo rm a lly en
ac ted their ag reem ent, fR a ilw a y E m p lo y e e s ’ D ep t. v.
H a n so n , 351 U.S. 2 25 , 2 4 0 ( 1 9 5 6 ) (F ra n k fu r te r ,
J., c o n c u r r in g .) ] 15
This origin is significant in consider ing the p e r t in e n t la n
guage for tw o reasons. First, as a n ego tia ted s ta tu te , the
R L A is likely to be ch a rac te r ized by p ro tec t ive dra fting ,
where on e side insists on ce r ta in lan g u ag e s im ply to as
sure ag a in s t a restric tive in te rp re ta t io n of o ther, a rg u ab ly
synonym ous o r b ro ad ly over lap p in g language . C f. P en n
15 S e e a lso statements of participants in the drafting- process in
Hearings before the Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 2306
(69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1926) 9-10 (Statement of A.P. Thom).
r e p r i n t e d i n II Log Hist.; id . at 21-22 (Statement of Donald
Richberg).
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20
s y lv a n ia R .R . v. D ay , 3 6 0 U.S. 5 4 8 , 5 5 0 ( 1 9 5 9 ) ( “T h e
c lash o f ec o n o m ic forces w h ich led to the p assa g e o f the
[R L A , an d ] the h is to ry o f its e n a c tm e n t . , . g u id e [its]
jud ic ia l in te rp re ta t io n .” ) . 10 Second , th e re c a n be n o d o u b t
th a t the d ra f te rs w ere fa m il ia r w ith th e la n g u a g e o f ra il
ro a d indus tr ia l d isputes, a n d w o u ld ten d to use te rm s as
und ers to o d w ith in th a t in d u s tr ia l c o m m u n ity , r a th e r than
in m o re generic sense. S e e , e .g ., M c D e r m o tt In te r n a t io n a l
In c . v. W ila n d er , 4 9 8 U.S. 3 3 7 , 342 ( 1 9 9 1 ) . P e t i t io n e rs ’
“d is junctive ‘o r ’ ” a rg u m e n t takes a c co u n t o f n e i th e r of
these considera t ions .
F u r th e r , pe t i t io n e rs ’ re ad in g of the s ta tu te is no t in anv
w a y fa ith fu l to the m ax im f ro m w hich it is derived.
I f the term “g riev an ce” is ta k e n b ro a d ly to re fer to all em
p loym ent-re la ted d isputes or com pla in ts , th en “g r iev an ce”
w ould encom pass c o n tra c t-b ase d d ispu tes as well as
o thers . T h e s ta tu to ry lan g u a g e w o u ld then still b e repe ti
tious, th is t im e with the p h ra se on the o th e r side of the
d is junctive b e ing m ere su rp lusage . O n the o th e r hand ,
to suggest th a t the te rm “g r iev a n ce” does no t a t least
in c lu d e c o n t ra c t c la im s w o u ld fly in the face o f the gen
era l u n d e rs ta n d in g of the term , d iscussed above.
E v en if p e t i t io n e rs ’ first a s su m p tio n h a d m erit , it in
tu rn rests on the ad d i t io n a l assu m p tio n th a t the phrase
“disputes over the in te rp re ta t io n o r ap p l ica t io n of agree
m ents ’ w as in tended by its d ra f te rs to en c o m p a ss the *
18 This kind of language is common in labor statutes even when
the opposing parties do not themselves draft the language. S e e
L o c a l N o . 82 , F u r n i t u r e & P i a n o M o v . v . C r o w l e y , 467 U.S. 526,
541-42 & n.17 (1984) (“[M]uch federal labor legislation [is] . . .
the product of conflict and compromise between strongly held and
opposed view’s, and its proper construction requires consideration
of its wording against the background of its legislative history
and in light of the general objectives Congress sought to achieve.”).
For example, the National Labor Relations Act, in forbidding
secondary boycotts, forbids unions to “threaten, coerce, or restrain
■any person,” where an object is “forcing or requiring certain
persons to do certain acts. § 8(b) (4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4). It
is not immediately evident why “coerce” does not i n c l u d e “threaten”
or "restrain” in normal parlance.
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21
entire w orld of d ispu tes ar is ing ou t o f norm s es tab lished
by the par tie s , such tha t the w ord “gr ievances ,” o n the
o ther side of the d is junctive , m us t have been in tended to
refer to so m eth in g o t h e r th an such disputes. B ut it is, a t
the least, ju s t as likely th a t the d ra f te rs of this p rov is ion
were co n c e rn e d th a t the “ in te rp re ta t io n an d a p p l ica t io n ”
phrase w ould be co n s tru e d n ot to include two im p o r tan t
classes of d ispu tes now recogn ized as co n tra c tu a l .
First, the d ra f te rs cou ld well have been co n c e rn e d tha t
“d isputes over the in te rp re ta t io n o r app lica tion of ag ree
m en ts” w ould be u n d e rs to o d to include only d isputes over
ex p ress term s of an agreem en t, an d tha t the te rm “griev
ance” was needed to assure th a t af te r the R L A was e n
acted, em ployees cou ld also b r in g to the ad ju s tm e n t b o a rd s
claims based upon im plic it u n d e rs ta n d in g s g ro u n d ed in
“the p a r t ie s ’ ‘p rac t ice , usage an d cu s to m .’ ” C o n ra il , 4 9 !
U.S. at 311, q u o tin g T r a n s p o r ta t io n C o m m u n ic a t io n E m
p lo y e e s U n ion v. U n ion P a c . R .R . , 385 U.S. 157, 161
( 1 9 6 6 ) . W hile it is now well u n d ers to o d th a t the lab o r
ag reem ent “ is a genera l ized code to govern a m y r ia d of
cases w hich the d ra f tsm en ca n n o t wholly an t ic ip a te ,”
T ra n sp o r ta t io n U n ion , 385 U.S. a t 160-61. q u o t in g S te e l
w o rk e r s v. W a rr io r & G u lf N a v ig a t io n C o ., 363 U.S.
574, 5 78 -79 ( 1 9 6 0 ) , the d ra f te rs w ork ing in 1926,
before the p resen t expansive u n d e rs ta n d in g of the reach
of labo r ag reem en ts was es tab lished , could well have
taken pains to assu re tha t § 153 F ir s t ’s language was no t
taken to sta te the com m erc ia l co n trac t ru le th a t the
“ag reem en t” is lim ited to the u n d ers ta n d in g s th a t have
been reduced to express w rit ten te rm s .17
T he d ra f te rs m igh t also eq ua lly have been concerned
that “disputes over the ap p lica tion o r in te rp re ta t ion of
ag reem ents” w ould be restr ic tively read to encom pass
only claims seek ing p rospective c larification of the m e a n
ing of a co n tra c t term , and no t to include an in d iv idua l’s
17 S e e Cox, R e f l e c t i o n s U p o n L a b o r A r b i t r a l ion , 72 Harv. L. Rev.
1403-1500 (1050) (developing a theory of the differing- treatment
of implied contract terms in labor and commercial contracts).
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22
( o r g ro u p o f in d iv id u a ls ’) re tro spec tive c la im s th a t the ir
c o n t ra c tu a l r igh ts w ere v io la ted in a specific ins tance .
T h e la t te r is the sense of the te rm “g r iev a n ce” th a t an i
m a te s the C o u r t ’s decis ion in C h ic a g o R iv e r , 353 U.S. a t
33. S e e a l s o U n ion P a c . R .R . v. P r ic e , 3 6 0 U.S. 601
613 ( 1 9 5 9 ) .
In sum , the like lihood is th a t the d ra f te rs u sed the te r
m ino logy they d id s im ply to assure aga ins t re s tr ic tive in
te rp re ta t io n s of on e or a n o th e r of the te rm s used , so as
to m a k e c lea r th a t ev e ry k ind of d ispu te g ro u n d e d in
w o r k p la c e n o r m s e s ta b l is h e d b y th e p a r t ie s is sub jec t
to the R L A m in o r d ispu te reso lu tion p rocedures .
( i i i ) P e ti t ioners also m en tion , as p a r t of the ir ju r isd ic
t iona l a rg u m e n t , the fact th a t the 1936 a ir l ine a m e n d
m en ts to the R L A p rov ided for the t ran s fe r o f so m e cases
then p en d in g befo re the N a tio n a l L a b o r R e la t io n s B o a rd
to the R L A g r iev a n ce /a rb i t r a t io n p ro ced u re . P e t B r 12
c i t ing R L A § 2 04 . 45 U .S .C . § 1 8 4 . B u t the 1936
a m e n d m e n ts p ro v id e on ly th a t cases “g ro w in g o u t of
grievances, o r ou t o f the in te rp re ta t io n o r ap p l ica t io n of
ag reem en ts conce rn in g ra te s of pay , rules, o r w ork ing
cond it ions , inc lud ing cases p e n d i n g ’an d u n ad ju s te d . . t
befo re the N a t io n a l L a b o r R e la t ions B o a r d ” sh o u ld be
t ran sfe rred . In o th e r w ords, n o t all cases p en d in g before
the N L R B , b u t only those m ee ting the o therw ise app li
cab le s ta tu to ry m in o r d ispu te cr ite r ia , w ere to b e t ran s
fe rred . W hile the N L R A prov ides s ta tu to ry pro tec tions,
in d e p e n d e n t o f an y co n trac t , aga ins t d ischarges , th e re is
n o in d ica t io n th a t C ongress in tended to t ran s fe r th o se
cases to the R L A ad ju s tm en t p ro c ed u re .18
In d e ed , C ongress specifically recogn ized th a t airline
cases p e n d in g before the N L R B on the effective d a te of
the 1936 a m en d m e n ts w ould n ot as a g enera l m atte r
m eet the s ta tu to ry m in o r d isputes cr ite r ia , an d provided
18 Certain cases arising under § 8(a) (5), involving unilateral
changes by a carrier while a collective bargaining agreement is in
place, meet the statutory minor dispute criteria. S e e , e .g . , N L R B
v. C & C P l y w o o d C o rp . , 885 U.S. 421 (1967).
23
otherw ise for the ir d isposition . Section 2 0 6 of the a ir
ca rr ier am e n d m e n ts p rov ided th a t :
A ll cases re fe rred to the N a t io n a l L a b o r R e la t io n s
B o ard , o r ov e r w hich the N a t io n a l L a b o r R e la t io n s
B o a rd shall h av e ta k e n ju risd ic t ion , involv ing a n y
d is p u te a r is in g fr o m an y c a u s e be tw een a n y co m m o n
ca rr ie r by a ir . . . an d em ployees of such c a rr ie r o r
ca rr iers , and unsettled on the d a te of ap p ro v a l of
this A c t. shall be h an d led to conc lus ion by the M e d i
a t io n B o a r d . [A ct of A pril 10, 1936. § 2 0 6 , 49
S tat. 1191 (e m p h a s is a d d e d ) . ] ’0
In sho rt , there is no basis in the lan g u ag e of the R L A
for co n c lu d in g th a t C ongress in ten d ed to ro u te ex tracon-
trac tua l co m m o n law and s ta tu to ry causes o f ac tion of
any k ind th rough the R L A ad ju s tm en t boards .
C. T h e lan g u ag e o f the s ta tu te aside, the “ tru e signifi
cance” of the m in o r d ispu te reso lu tion p rovis ions of the
R L A “m u st be d ra w n from [their] co n tex t as p a r t o f the
[R L A ] w hich itself d raw s its m e a n in g fro m h is to ry .”
I A M v. C e n tr a l A ir lin es . 372 U.S. 682 ( 1 9 6 3 ) . A n d the
legislative h is to ry of the p resen t A ct. sp an n in g fo u r differ
ent s ta tu tes o ver a forty-year t im e per iod , u n ifo rm ly c o n
firms th a t C o n g ress in ten d ed to confine the R L A “m in o r
disputes” re so lu tion system to con troveries aris ing from
or d ep e n d en t on collective b a rg a in in g agreem ents .
( i ) A lthough federa l legislation co n cern in g re so lu tion
of ra ilw ay lab o r d isputes h a d existed, in o n e fo rm o r
!0 It is hard to see how § 206, providing for the transfer of "any
dispute arising from any cause" to the National Mediation Board,
can be reconciled with the indication in § 204 that s o m e disputes
should be handled through the grievance/arbitration procedures for
minor disputes. This redundancy not only confirms that the RLA
generally is characterized by far from precise drafting but, addi
tionally, suggests at least that the categories of NLRB cases ex
pected to come within § 204 w'ere quite limited.
We note as well that there were exactly two cases transferred
from the NLRB and that both “were subsequently withdrawn by
the petitioners without prejudice to their right to resubmit the
cases in accordance with the RLA.” S e e S e c o n d A n n u a l R e p o r t o f
th e N a t i o n a l M e d i a t i o n B o a r d (193G) at 4.
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2 4
ano th e r , s ince 1888, the “m in o r d isp u tes" c o n c e p t h a d its
orig in in the H ow ell-B ark ley bill of 1924 , s u p p o r te d by
the un ions b u t o p p o sed by the r a i l ro a d s . '0 T h a t bill p ro
v ided for the ad ju d ica t io n o f “ a n y d ispu te ar is ing only
o u t o f g rievances o r the ap p l ica t io n of ag reem en ts c o n
ce rn in g ra tes of pay , rules, o r w o rk in g c o n d i t io n s” before
m an d a to ry , n a t io n a l ad ju s tm e n t boards . S. 2 5 4 6 , 68th
C ong ., 1st Sess. ( 1 9 2 4 ) , § 4 ; s e e a ls o id . §§ i, 3, 5 ( B ) .
In exp lica ting this lang u ag e , the p r im a ry p ro p o n e n t at
the H earings of the s ta tu te , D o n a ld R ichberg , C ounse l for
the O rg an ized R a i lw ay E m p lo y ees— w ho in 1926 was
also a key p a r t ic ip a n t in the la b o r -m a n ag em e n t nego tia
tions th a t resu lted in the R L A as finally en a c te d — stated
repea ted ly a n d consis ten tly th a t the te rm “g r iev a n ce” is
to be given its indus tr ia l re la t io n s m ean ing , co n n o t in g a
d ispu te g row ing o u t o f a n d c o n c e rn in g ex is ting agree
m ents . M r. R ich b e rg ex p la ined at the 1924^ Senate
H earings :
[C jo n tro v ers ie s over [ c o l le c t iv e b a r g a in in g j a g r e e
m en ts th a t th rea ten the in te r ru p t io n o f service arise
in tw o ways an d an a p p ro p r ia te m a c h in e ry is pro
v ided [in the bill] fo r se tt l ing p ea cea b ly each class of
d isputes. . . . N o w , tak in g up th e g r ievance disputes
. . . d isp u te s o v e r th e a p p l ic a t io n o f ex is t in g a g r e e
m en ts , c o m m o n ly c a l l e d “g r ie v a n c e s ." [1 9 2 4 H ear
ings a t 17-18 ( r e m a rk s by D o n a ld R ich b e rg , Counsel
fo r the O rg an ized R a i lw a y E m p lo y ees ) (em phasis
a d d e d ) ] .
S e e alsO' id . a t 27 (n a t io n a l ad ju s tm e n t b o a rd s will de
cide grievances u n d e r the ap p lica tion of the ag reem en t”
w hich are “ in a la rge n u m b e r o f in s tances of a petty
c h a rac te r an d involve “ [w ]h a t is good p rac t ice under
this ag reem en t a n d w h a t is the fa ir ap p l ica t io n of i t” );
id . a t 2 0 0 ( “each an d every p rovis ion . . . has been put
in to the bill solely for the p u rp o se of p reserv ing the rights
20 1924 bill is particularly pertinent in construing the present
Act as amended, because its provision for a national mandatory
adjustment board was adopted in the 1934 amendments 45 U S C.
§ 153.
254
25
of em ployees to h ones t rep re sen ta t io n in m ak in g ag ree
ments a n d h o n e s t en fo rce m e n t of the term s of the ag ree
m ents” ) ; id . a t 2 0 2 ( “N ow , co m in g to the qu es t io n of
ad jus tm ent o f g r ievances w hen a d ispu te arises o ver the
applica tion o f an a g reem en t” ) ; id . a t 203 .
( i i ) W ith sligh t ch an g es (p r inc ipa lly , rep lac ing “ ap
plication of a g reem en ts” with “ in te rp re ta t ion o r ap p l ica
tion of a g reem en ts” ) , the lan g u ag e of the 1924 bill de
scribing m in o r d ispu tes w as used aga in for s im ilar p u r
poses in §§ 2, F o u r th an d 3, F irs t o f the 1926 version
of the R a i lw ay L a b o r A ct. I Leg. Hist, a t 4-5. T h e
references to the m in o r d ispu tes provisions in the 1926
com m ittee re p o r ts bas ica lly rep ea t the s ta tu to ry l a n
guage. H .R . R ep . N o. 328 , 6 9 th C ong ., 1st Sess.; I
Leg. Hist, a t 3; S. R ep . N o. 6 06 , 69 th C ong ., 1st Sess.;
1 Leg. Hist, a t 100-01. B u t the com m en ts m a d e on the
floor by p ro p o n e n ts of the bill a re m o re in fo rm ative an d
m ake c lear th a t th e “g r ievances” covered by the s ta tu to ry
com m and to a rb i t ra te w ere n o t a n y a n d a ll e m p lo y e e -
em p lo y e r d isp u tes , b u t on ly those g row ing o u t o f the
norms s ta ted o r o therw ise in c o rp o ra te d in the la b o r agree
ments nego t ia ted u n d e r the A ct.
F o r exam ple , R e p re sen ta t iv e B ark ley , a lead ing p ro
ponent of the bill and a m e m b e r of the C o m m it tee th a t
reported it, tw ice ex p la ined tha t , in ra i l ro a d p a r lan ce ,
incorpora ted in the bill, a “g r iev a n ce” is a var ie ty of c o n
trac tual d ispu te :
T here a re tw7o sorts o f d isputes th a t arise on ra il
roads. O n e k in d is a d ispu te g row ing o u t of the
in te rp re ta t io n of ag reem en ts as to w age scales or
w ork ing cond it ions th a t a l read y exist. T lte s e d isp u te s
m ig h t b e t e r m e d g riev an ces', they m ig h t affect a large
n u m b e r o f m en in som e w ay and they m ig h t affect
only a sm all n u m b e r of m en , o r they m ig h t affect a
single ind iv idua l. . . . [T h e ad ju s tm en t b o a rd s e s tab
lished d u r in g g o v e rn m e n t op e ra t io n of the ra ilroads ,
after w h ich the R L A b o ard s w ere m odeled] W'ere to
settle g r ie v a n c e s o f e v e r y k in d a n d c h a r a c t e r g ro w in g
ou t o f d isp u te s th a t a r o s e o v e r th e in te rp r e ta t io n o f
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2 6
ex is t in g a g r e e m e n ts a s to s c a le s o f w a g e s a r id c o n d i
t io n s o f s e r v ic e . [I L eg . H ist , a t 192 ( r e m a rk s of
R ep . B ark ley , 6 9 th C o n g ., 1st Sess., F e b . 2 4 , 1 9 2 6 )
(e m p h a s is a d d e d ) . ]
A s R ep re se n ta t iv e B ark ley la te r ad d e d :
Y o u see, th e re are tw o types o f d ispu tes recogn ized
o n ra i l ro ad s . O ne is the in te rp re ta t io n of ag reem en ts
a l re ad y in existence, ap p ly ing to d isc ip line a n d sm all
g rievances th a t m a y no t on ly com e up w ith re fe rence
to g ro u p s of m en b u t m a y arise w ith re fe re n ce to a
single m an . T hese a re all techn ica l . T h e y h av e n o th
ing to d o with wages received , b u t they h av e to do
w ith the techn ica l in te rp re ta t io n of ag reem en ts tha t
exist a n d the exercise of d iscip line b e tw een the m a n
ag e m e n t a n d em ployees. \ld. a t 2 0 5 .]
T h e e x p lan a t io n offered on the Sena te side b y S ena to r
W a tso n , the C h a i rm a n of the re p o r t in g com m ittee , was
sim ilar. B eg inning , as h a d R ep re sen ta t iv e B ark ley , with
a h is to rica l survey covering th e per iod of go v ern m en ta l
o p e ra t io n o f the ra ilroads , S e n a to r W a tso n s ta ted :
D u r in g th a t per iod m a n y cases w ere re fe r red to these
b o a rd s o f ad ju s tm en t; b u t the b o a rd s of ad ju s tm en t
in th a t case, as in this bill p rov ided , h a d to do only
w ith g r ie v a n c e s — -that' is to sa y , w ith th e in te r p r e ta
tio n a n d th e a p p l ic a t io n o f ex is t in g a g r e e m e n ts a s to
w a g es , h o u r s o f la b o r , a n d c o n d it io n s o f s e r v ic e . . . .
T h e p ro b lem s a re all o f a techn ica l n a tu re a n d there
fore ra i l ro a d m en a re requ ired to dec ide them . So
th a t . . . in the m easu re b e fo re us, w e p r o v id e fo r
b o a r d s o f a d ju s tm en t to s e t t le th o s e t e c h n ic a l q u e s
t io n s th a t a r is e g ro w in g o u t o f th e in te r p r e ta t io n an d
th e a p p l ic a t io n o f ex is t in g a g r e e m e n ts a s to w ages,
h o u r s o f la b o r , a n d c o n d it io n s o f s e r v ic e . . . . [Leg.
Hist, a t 4 8 0 (R e m a rk s o f Sen. W a tso n . 6 9 th Cong",
1st Sess., M a y 6, 1 9 2 6 ) (e m p h a s is a d d e d ) . ] 21
21 Without quoting the statements directly in point which we
have reproduced in the text, petitioners rely primarily upon two
other statements, also by Representative Barkley .and Senator
Watson, as demonstrating an intent to provide for mandatory
arbitration of extracontractual disputes. S e e Pet. Br. 15-16 Par-
256
2 7
F ro m these exp lana tions , it a p p e a rs tha t th e lan g u ag e
of the m in o r d ispu tes p rovis ions of the R L A w as chosen
to m ak e abso lu te ly c lea r th a t all varie ties of c o n tra c tu a l
disputes— those aris ing from the co m pla in ts of ind iv idua ls
or g ro u p s of ind iv idua ls , as well as those p re c ip i ta te d by
u n io n -m anagem en t discussions o r d isputes, re g a rd in g the
ticularly when read in conjunction with the other, unambiguous
remarks by the same individuals we have quoted, the statements
quoted in petitioners’ brief are entirely consistent with our posi
tion on the question. Thus, the entire paragraph by Senator Watson
relied upon by petitioners reads:
Let me say, Senators—and this is essentia! in the consideration
of the question—that there are two classes of disputes that
arise in connection with the operation of railroads. One class
is what are ordinarily called grievances. They may be of a
personal nature; they may involve a great many employees;
they may involve a few employees; they may involve but one
employee. O f t h i s elans, a lso , are disputes arising out of the
interpretation and application of existing agreements as to
wages, hours of labor, or working conditions. [I Leg. Hist, at
477 (remarks of Sen. Watson, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., May 6,
1926 (emphasis added).]
Since Senator Watson treated as part of the class “ordinarily called
grievances” those disputes arising out of the interpretation and
application of agreements, his statement s u p p o r t s our understand
ing that the term “grievances” does not exclude, as an entirely
d i f f e r e n t class of disputes, contractual controversies.
Representative Barkley’s statement that adjustment boards will
discuss “disagreements over grievances, interpretations, discipline,
and other technicalities that arise from time to time in the workshop
and out on the tracks” appears to be simply an indistinct summary
of the same Representative's more precise remarks quoted in our
text. That statement surely does not support petitioners’ position,
since it indicates that a “grievance” is n o t a “disagreement[] . . .
over discipline.”
Of the two other remarks petitioners present in support of their
position (Pet. Br. 9 n.8), the one by Rep. Arentz (referring to
grievances, discipline and disputes over the application and mean
ing of an agreement”) for the same reason does not support the
petitioners’ position. And the statement by Rep. Crosser—that the
adjustment board serves “to determine who is right and who is
wrong, what is just and what is unjust”—is entirely too general
and vague to throw any light at all upon whether those judgments
are to be made with reference to an existing agreement or otherwise.
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28
c o n tra c t— w ere to be covered . T h e r e w as n o in tent,
however, to re ach b e y o n d c o n tra c t - re la te d m atte rs .
T h is conc lus ion is decis ively confirm ed b y th e legisla
tive h is to ry of the 1934 a m e n d m e n ts to the A c t. T h o se
am en d m e n ts en tire ly rev ised th e m in o r d ispu tes p rovis ions
of the A c t, es tab lish ing a m a n d a to r y ra th e r th a n vo lu n
ta ry a d ju s tm en t b o a rd . P u b . L . 7 3 -4 4 2 , 4 8 S tat. 1185
( 1 9 3 4 ) ; w e I L eg . H ist., a t 8 2 0 (S . R ep . N o . 1065, 73d
C ong ., 2 d Sess. ( 1 9 3 4 ) ) , id . a t 9 1 8 ( H .R . R ep . No.
1044, 7 3 d C ong ., 2 d Sess. ( 1 9 3 4 ) ) . T h e ju r isd ic t io n of
the new ad ju s tm en t p ro c ed u re s w as desc r ibed w ith the
sam e lan g u ag e used p rev iously— “disputes . . . g row ing
o u t o f grievances o r o u t o f th e in te rp re ta t io n a n d ap p l ica
tion of ag reem en ts .” S ection 3, F irs t , ( i ) , 45 U.S.C .
§ 153, F irs t ( i ) . T h is t im e the H ouse C o m m it te e R e p o r t
m ad e it c lea r th a t the te rm “g riev an ces” w as n o t used to
designate a g ro u p of d ispu tes d is t inc t from c o n tra c tu a l
d isputes; ra the r, the new N a t io n a l R a i l ro a d A d ju s tm en t
B o a rd was described as h av in g au th o r i ty over
m in o r d ispu tes k n o w n as “ g r ievances ,” w h ich develop
from the in te rp re ta t io n a n d /o r ap p l ica t io n of the con
trac ts be tw een the la b o r un ions an d the carriers.
[H .R . R ep . N o. 1044 , 7 3 d C ong ., 2 d Sess. ( 1 9 3 4 ) ,
r e p r in te d in I Leg. Hist, a t 9 1 9 -9 2 0 .]
F inally , the C ongresses th a t am en d e d th e A c t in o ther
ways in la te r years a lso p la in ly ac ted on the u n d e rs ta n d
ing th a t the rea lm of a d ju s tm en t b o a rd ac tiv ity w as limited
to co n tra c tu a l d isputes. F o r exam ple , w hen , in 1936, the
A ct w as am en d ed to cover th e new ly d eve lop ing airlines,
the decision w as m a d e to de lay es tab lish ing an ad jus t
m en t b o a rd fo r the airlines. T h e ex p lan a t io n offered for
the delay was as follows:
T h is [N a t io n a l A ir T ra n s p o r t A d ju s tm e n t B oard]
will be c rea ted a n d will fu n c tio n in the sam e m anner
as the ra ilw ay b o a rd , excep ting th a t it need no t be
estab lished im m ed ia te ly . . . . T h e re aso n for this
permissive de lay in its fo rm a tio n is th a t th e r e is n o th
ing f o r su ch a h o a r d to d o u n til e m p lo y m e n t co n
tracts h a v e b e e n c o m p le t e d , an d there are n o such
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2 9
c o n tra c ts in o p e ra t io n now . [I L e g . H ist, a t 1050
(H .R . R ep . N o . 2 2 4 3 , 7 4 th C ong ., 2 d Sess. ( 1 9 3 6 )
(e m p h a s is su p p l ie d ) . ]
A nd the 1966 C ongress , w hich once aga in revised the
m ino r d ispu te provisions, expressed repea ted ly the u n d e r
s tand ing th a t those p rovis ions applied to m a tte rs o f c o n
trac t in te rp re ta t io n . S e e H .R . R ep . N o. 1114, 89 th
C ong., 1st Sess. ( 1 9 6 5 ) , I Leg. Hist, at 1309 ( th e m in o r
disputes m ech an ism s app ly to “g rievances arising u n d e r
collective b a rg a in in g ag reem en ts” ) ; id . a t 1352 ( r e m a rk s
of R ep re sen ta t iv e S taggers, 8 9 th C ong ., 2 d Sess., F eb . 9,
1 9 6 6 ) ; id . a t 1363 ( r e m a rk s o f R ep re sen ta t iv e T h o m p
so n ) ; id . a t 1371 ( r e m a rk s of R ep re sen ta t iv e H o r to n ) .
( i i i ) W e believe this h istory , fa irly construed , supports
the en tire ly co m m o n sen se u n d e rs ta n d in g th a t “g r ievance”
was in te n d e d to d en o te a p a r t ic u la r k in d of d ispu te based
upon w o rk p lace no rm s deve loped by the par tie s th em
selves. T h e t re a tm e n t of c la im s th a t the R L A i t s e l f has
been v io lated lends fu r th e r su p p o r t to this view: T h e
R L A assigns to the courts , no t to the ad ju s tm en t boards,
the R L A s ta tu to ry cause of ac tion for re ta l ia to ry dis
charges, on the basis o f un io n activity, ind ica t in g an u n
d e rs tand ing th a t such n o n -c o n trac tu a l causes of ac tion
are n o t “g r ievances .” S ee , e .g ., C o n r a d v. D elta A ir
L in es , In c ., 4 9 4 F .2 d 9 1 4 (7 th Cir. 1 9 7 4 ) ; A d a m s v.
F e d e r a l E x p r e s s C o ., 6 5 4 F .2 d 4 5 2 (6 th C ir. 1 9 8 1 ) .
S ee g e n e r a lly V irg in ian R v . v. S y stem F e d e r a t io n , 3 0 0
U.S. 515 , 545-53 ( 1 9 3 7 ) .
In co n tra s t , pe t i t ione rs ' subm iss ions to the c o n tra ry n o t
w ithstanding , th e re is n o th in g in the F ed era l R a i lw ay
Safety A c t ( “F R S A ” ) , 45 U .S .C . §§ 421 -4 4 7 , o r its his
tory ind ica t ing th a t C ongress in tended a l l re ta l ia to ry dis
charge cases to be a d ju d ica te d acco rd ing to the R L A ’s
m inor d ispu te provis ion , even w hen based on ex tracon-
trac tua l s ta tu to ry o r co m m o n law. T h e F R S A am en d
ments o f 1980 ex tended , to ra i l ro a d em ployees only, p ro
tection aga ins t re ta l ia to ry d ischarge b ased on repo rt ing
s ta tu tory v io la t ions o r refusal to w ork for safety reasons.
Any claim s aris ing u n d e r e i ther p rov is ion w ere m ad e
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“sub ject to re so lu t io n ” by th e R L A a d ju s tm e n t b o a rd
p rocedures . 4 5 U .S.C . § 441 ( c ) ( 1 ) .
P e t i t io n e rs c la im th a t C ongress ' decision to assign ad
ju d ica t ion o f this p a r t ic u la r s ta tu to ry re ta l ia to ry d ischarge
cause of ac t io n to the R L A ad ju s tm en t b o a r d processes
d em o n s tra te s an in ten t io n th a t a l l n o n c o n t ra c tu a l w ro n g
ful te rm in a t io n cases be dec ided th ro u g h those processes.
Even if the ac tions of a m uch-la te r C o n g ress w e re in any
w ay per t in en t , the logical in fe rence w o u ld be qu i te the
opposite : If C ongress th o u g h t th a t all such causes of
ac tion were a lready sub ject to the R L A ad ju s tm e n t board
p rocedures , there w o u ld hav e been no re aso n to single
o u t these p a r t ic u la r causes o f ac tion for a d ju s tm en t board
coverage by explicitly so s tating .
M o reo v er , the very section u p o n w h ich p e t i t io n e rs rely
fo r a c o n tra ry in fe rence explicitly reserves to ra ilroad
em ployees th e op t io n of pursu ing , o u ts ide o f the R L A
m in o r d ispu te p rocedures , c la im s based u p o n conduct
v io lative of the F R S A a n d o f a n o th e r p rov is ion of law.
Section 4 4 1 ( d ) p rovides:
W h e n ev e r any em ployee of a ra i l ro a d is afforded
p ro tec t io n u n d e r this sec tion a n d u n d e r a n y other
p rovision of law in con n ec t io n w ith th e sa m e alleg
edly un law fu l ac t of an em ployer , if such employee
seeks p ro tec t io n he m u st elect e i ther to seek relief
p u rsu a n t to this sec tion o r p u rs u a n t to such other
p rov is ion of law.
If, as pe t i t io n e rs argue, C ongress in tended § 441 “simply
to codify the existing sys tem ” u n d e r the R L A (P e t . Brief
1 2 ) , th en the codification o f an em p lo y ee’s r ig h t to an
election of rem edies in § 4 4 1 ( d ) d em o n s tra te s th a t the
pre-existing R L A system did n ot l im it “whistleblowers”
re ly ing on a n o n -R L A “prov is ion of law ” exclusively to
the R L A grievance,- 'arbitration p rocedure .
D . T h e a d ju s tm en t b o a rd s ch a rg ed w ith administration
of the m in o r d ispu tes p rov is ions o f the R L A , and the
N a tio n a l R a i l ro a d A d ju s tm en t B o a rd ( “N R A B ” ), par
ticularly , have un ifo rm ly u n d ers to o d those provisions as
p e r ta in ing only to d isputes invok ing co n tra c t-b ase d rights.
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3 1
Thus, the N R A B has repea ted ly and , so fa r as we can
ascertain, consis ten tly re jec ted cases th a t w ere n o t based
on labo r ag reem ents , o r th a t so u g h t to a d ju d ic a te extra-
con trac tua l causes o f ac tion . S e e , e .g ., N R A B F o u r th
Div. A w a rd N o . 4 5 4 8 ( 1 9 8 7 ) ( “T h e fu n c tio n o f this
Board is l im ited to dec id ing disputes in a c c o rd a n c e w ith
the provisions o f a co n tro l l ing L a b o r A g re em en t as ap
plied to th e facts an d ev idence in the re co rd .” ) ; N R A B
Third Div. A w a rd N o . 2 4 3 4 8 ( 1 9 8 3 ) ( “T h e tw o issues
raised by the P e t i t io n e r are no t re la ted to the in te rp re ta
tion or app l ica tio n of co n tra c ts a n d thus are o u ts ide o u r
au thority .” ) ; N R A B T h ird Div. A w a rd N o . 2 1 9 2 6
(1 9 7 8 ) ( “A n ind iv idua l 's . . . a l lega tion th a t A g re em en ts
are illegal . . . w i th o u t even a h in t th a t the A g re e m e n t is
not being p ro p e i ly applied , c learly consti tu te s a case over
which the B o a rd lacks ju risd ic t io n .” ); N R A B S econd Div.
A w ard N o. 6 4 6 2 ( 1 9 7 3 ) ( “T h is B o a rd is no t em p o w e red
to in te rp re t the law s of C o n g ress .” ) ; N R A B T h i rd Div.
A w ard N o . 2 0 0 4 8 ( 1 9 7 3 ) ( T h e B o a rd ’s ju r isd ic t io n is
by s ta tu te l im ited to in te rp re ta t io n a n d ap p ly ing the term s
of in being co llec tive b a rg a in in g agreem ents . . . . W e do
not have jud ic ia l pow er to find an ac tion o r co u rse of
conduct ‘i llegal’.” ) ; N R A B T h i rd Div. A w a rd N o . 1 9790
(1 9 7 3 ) ( “ this B o a rd lacks ju risd ic t ion to en fo rce rights
created by S ta te o r F ed era l S ta tu tes an d is l im ited to
questions ar is ing o u t o f in te rp re ta t io n s an d ap p l ica t io n
of R ailw ay L a b o r A g re em en t .” ) . 22
Airline system b o a rd cases reach the sam e conc lus ion .
S ee N o r th w es t A ir l in e s /A ir l in e P ilo ts A s s o c ia t io n , In te r
22 See also, e.g., NRAB Second Div. Award No. 11768 (1994);
Second Div. Award No. 11768 (1989) ; First Div. Award No. 23909
(1989); Fourth Div. Award No. 4674 (19891; Third Div. Award
No. 27650 (1988) ; Fourth Div. Award No. 4500 (1986) ; Third
Div. Award No. 25554 (1985) ; Second Div. Award No. 9105 (1983) ;
Third Div. Award No. 24348 (1983); Third Div. Award No. 22707
(1980); Third Div. Award No. 22318 (1979); Second Div. Award
No. 8131 (1979) ; Third Div. Award No. 20565 (1974); Third Div.
Award No. 19950 (1973); Fourth Div. Award No. 2967 (1973);
Third Div. Award No. 18352 (1970) ; Third Div. Award No. 18123
(1970); First Div. Award No. 21459 (1968).
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n a t io n a l S y stem B o a r d o f A d ju s tm e n t , D ec is ion o f June
28 , 1972, a t 13; U n ited A ir l in e s , In c ., 48 L A 727
( B N A ) ( 1 9 6 7 ) ( “T h e ju r isd ic t io n of th is system board
does n o t ex tend to in te rp re t in g a n d ap p ly in g the Civil
R ig h t A c t .” ) . 2:1
A s this C o u r t has recogn ized , su ch “ u n ifo rm adminis
tra t ive in te rp re ta t io n ” by the N R A B is of particularly
“g rea t im p o r ta n c e ” u n d e r the R L A , “ reflecting, as it does,
the needs an d fa ir ex p ec ta t io n s of the ra i l ro a d [a n d air
line] in d u s t r i e s ] fo r w hich C o n g ress has p ro v id ed what
m igh t be te rm ed a ch a r te r fo r its in te rna l g overnm en t.”
P en n sy lv a n ia R .R . v. D ay , 3 6 0 U.S. 5 4 8 , 5 5 2 ( 1 9 5 9 ) .
E. T h e foregoing shou ld be m o re th a n sufficient to
establish th a t C ongress d id n o t in tend to d irec t employ
m ent-re la ted causes of ac tion based upon legal principles
ex ternal to the app licab le co llec tive b a rg a in in g agreement
to the d ispu te ad ju s tm e n t p ro c e d u re m a n d a te d by the
R L A . M o reo v er , this is a case in w hich any such intent
w ould hav e to be e s tab lished w ith un u su a l c lar ity , both
because of the usual p re su m p tio n aga ins t federa l displace
m en t of s ta te law ( s e e pp . 8-10, s u p r a ) , a n d to avoid
cons ti tu tiona l p rob lem s as well.
P e ti t ione rs ’ ju risd ic t iona l p re e m p t io n a rg u m e n t— that
C ongress’ in ten t w as to re q u ire th a t even s ta te common
law , ex tra co n trac tu a l causes of ac tion be ad ju d ica ted be- 23
23 The National Mediation Board ns well has always considered
the Adjustment Board’s jurisdiction limited to contract-based
claims. S e e National Mediation Board, F i r s t A n n u a l R e p o r t (1935),
at 5 (RLA contracts “establish property rights for the individual
employees which are enforceable through adjudication by the Na
tional Railroad Adjustment Board.” S e e a lso S e c o n d A n n u a l R e
p o r t (1936) at 3 (NRAB functions “to interpret agreements or to
settle finally grievances of employees arising thereunder”) ; F o u r th
A n n u a l R e p o r t (1938) (adjustment boards resolve “all disputes
growing out of questions, claims, or grievances involving the terms
of these labor agreements.”); T h i r t y - f i r s t A n n u a l R e p o r t (1965)
(“in the application of . . . agreements to specific factual situations,
disputes frequently arise as to the meaning and intent of the
agreement. These are called minor disputes.”).
3 3
fore R L A a d ju s tm en t b o a rd s— ru n s afoul o f a p rincip le
of s ta tu to ry in te rp re ta t io n even s t ro n g er th a n the p re
sum ption aga ins t federa l p re em p tio n :
[W jh e re an o therw ise accep tab le c o n s t ru c tio n o f a
s ta tu te cou ld ra ise serious co n s t i tu t io n a l p roblem s,
the C o u r t will co n s tru e the s ta tu te to avo id such
p rob lem s unless the co n s tru c tio n is p la in ly co n tra ry
to the in ten t of C ongress . [ D e B a r t o lo C o r p . v.
F lo r id a G u lf C o a s t B ld g . & C o n str . T r a d e s C o u n c il ,
4 8 5 U.S. 5 68 , 575 ( 1 9 8 8 ) (c i t in g c a s e s ) .]
In this ins tance , p e t i t io n e rs ’ ju r isd ic t io n a l p reem ption
argument, if ad o p ted , w ould ra ise ser ious Seventh A m e n d
ment ( a n d possib ly A rtic le I I I ) p rob lem s.- ' F o r p e ti t ion
ers would re legate to a non jud ic ia l federa l fo rum , w ith
out a ju ry , s ta te co m m o n law causes of ac tion , such as
this one, with no subs tan tive con n ec t io n to the R L A or
to the collective b a rg a in in g re la t io n sh ip th a t the R L A
was enac ted to foster an d regula te .
Seventh A m e n d m e n t analysis requ ires first, the d e te r
mination of w he the r or not a s ta tu to ry cause of ac tion is
sufficiently “ ana lo g o u s to co m m o n -law causes of ac tion
ordinarily dec ided in English law co u r ts in the la te 18th
century, as o p p o sed to those h e a rd by co u r ts of equ ity or
adm iralty .” G ra n fin a n c ie r a , S . /L v. N o r d h e r g , 4 9 2 U.S.
33, 42 ( 1 9 8 9 ) ; s e e a ls o T e a m s te r s L o c a l 3 9 1 v. T e r r y ,
494 U.S. 5 5 8 , 567 -70 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . T h is case, how ever,
involves a co m m o n law tort , a lbeit one recen tly recog
nized, an d the relief sough t— c o m p en sa to ry an d punitive 24
24 The Seventh Amendment provides that “In Suits at common
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of trial by jury shall not be denied.” U.S. Const., amend. VII.
The Seventh Amendment concerns were not raised below as an
aid to construing the RLA. Parties are not, however, confined
here to the same arguments which were advanced in the court below
upon a federal question there discussed, I l l i n o i s v . G a te s , 462 U.S.
213, 219-220 (1983) ; Y e e v . E s c o n d i d o , 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1532 (1992)
( Once a federal claim is properly presented, a party can make any
argument in support of that claim; parlies are not limited to the
precise arguments they made below.”).
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34
d am ag e s— is c learly legal r a th e r th a n eq u i ta b le in n a
ture. G r a n fm a n c ie r a , 4 9 2 U.S. a t 42 . T h u s , the only
s ignificant q ues t ion as to the app licab il i ty o f the Seventh
A m e n d m e n t is w h e th e r “C o n g ress m ay assign . . . resolu
tion of the re le v an t c la im to a non-A rtic le I I I ad jud ica tive
body th a t does no t use a ju ry as a fac tf in d e r .” Id . a t 42.
A s a g enera l m a t te r , this C o u r t ’s cases do n o t perm it
assigning to a n on -A rtic le I I I , n o n ju ry ad ju d ica t iv e body
“ fw jho lly p r iv a te to rt , co n tra c t , a n d p ro p e r ty cases."
G r a n fin a n c ie r a , 4 9 2 U.S. a t 51 ; s e e a ls o id . a t 51-52
(C o n g re ss “ lacks the p o w e r to s trip p a r t ie s contesting
m a tte rs o f p r iv a te righ t o f the ir co n s t i tu t io n a l righ t to a
tr ia l by ju ry .” ) . F o r b o th Seventh A m e n d m e n t a n d Arti
cle I I I pu rposes , the test of w h e th e r a cause o f ac tion as
to w hich the F ed era l G o v e rn m e n t is no t a p a r ty involves
“ pub lic” r a th e r th a n “wholly p r iv a te” rights is
w h e th e r “C ongress , ac ting fo r a valid legislative pu r
pose p u rs u a n t to its con s t i tu t io n a l pow ers . . . [hasj
c rea ted a seem ingly ‘p r iv a te ’ righ t th a t is so closely
in teg ra ted in to a pub lic reg u la to ry schem e as to be a
m a t te r a p p ro p r ia te for agency reso lu tion w ith limited
invo lvem ent by the A rt ic le I I I ju d ic ia ry .” [ G ran
f in a n c ie r a , 4 9 2 U.S. a t 54 , q u o tin g T h o m a s v. Union
C a r b id e A g r ic . P ro d s . C o . . 473 U.S. 5 6 8 , 593-94
( 1 9 8 5 ) . ]
R L A co llec tive-barga in ing ag reem en t-based causes of
ac tion m eet the “ public r igh ts” /“closely in te g ra te d ” test,
since the s ta tu te as a w hole is d irec ted to w a rd encour
aging the fo rm a tio n a n d en fo rce m e n t of those agree
m ents. T h a t is why, p re sum ab ly , this C o u r t rejected,
su b s i le n t io , S even th A m e n d m e n t a rg u m e n ts ra ised by
the par tie s in at least one R L A m in o r d ispu te contract-
based case. S e e . e .g ., P en n sy lv a n ia R .R . v. D ay , 360
U.S. a t 5 6 0 -6 2 (B lack , J ., d is sen t in g ) . B u t it is all but
im possib le to see w h y causes of ac tion such as the one
here with n o c o n tra c tu a l g ro u n d in g are in a n y w ay sub
stan tively co n n ec ted to the reg u la to ry schem e of the RLA.
A t the least, the con ten t io n th a t a cause of ac tion such as
N o rr is ’ is a p u re ly “priva te r igh t” for Seven th Amend-
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ment pu rp o ses is a substan t ia l one, a n d p e t i t io n e rs ’ p re
emption a rg u m en t , u n ten ab le to beg in w ith , shou ld be re
jected for th a t re a so n as well.
F. N o tw ith s tan d in g these com pell ing p reced en tia l ,
statutory, h is to rica l, adm in is tra t iv e a n d co n s t i tu t io n a l c o n
siderations, p e t i t ione rs an d th e ir a m ic i insist th a t in
Elgin , J o l i e t & E a s te rn R a ilw a y v. B u r ley , 325 U.S.
711 ( 1 9 4 5 ) , a ff'd o n r e h e a r in g ,' 3 2 1 U.S. 661 ( 1 9 4 6 ) ,
this C o u r t h a s d e te rm in ed th a t e x t ra c o n tra c tu a l c la im s
brought by em ployees covered by the R L A ar is ing o u t
of their em p lo y m en t are sub jec t to the exclusive ju r isd ic
tion of the R L A a d ju s tm en t boards . In fact, B a r e ly d id
not decide any issue p e r t in en t to this case.
Petitioners rely on the fo llow ing lan g u ag e in B u r ley
defining an R L A m in o r d ispu te as one tha t
relates e i ther to the m ean in g o r p ro p e r ap p l ica t io n of
a p a r t ic u la r p r o v is io n [of a co llec tive ag reem en t] w ith
reference to a specific s i tua t ion o r to an o m itted case.
In the la t ter event, the c la im is fo u n d e d up o n som e
incident of the em p lo y m en t re la t ion o r a sse r ted one ,
in dependen t of those covered by the collective ag ree
ment, e .g . , claims on acco u n t o f persona l injuries.
[325 U.S. a t 7 2 3 (e m p h a s is a d d e d ) . ]
For a m yriad of reasons, th a t single sen tence in B u r ley
is m uch too th in a reed to su p p o r t p e t i t io n e rs ’ ju r isd ic
tional p reem p tio n a rgum en t.
The B u r ley s ta tem en t is d ic ta by a n a r ro w ly d ivided
Court; the c la im s ac tua lly a t issue in B u r ley w ere in fac t
con tract c la im s/25 A n d . the m e a n in g of the d ic ta is fa r
-5 The issue d e c i d e d in B u r l e y was whether an individual em
ployee can bring a contract-based discharge cause of action in
court if the union has settled the very same contract contention
on behalf of the same member within the RLA grievance-arbitration
procedure. A closely divided Court ruled that a union has no
authority to settle grievances unless the union can show “in some
legally sufficient way [the individual employee has! . . . authorized
it to act in his behalf,’’ 325 U.S. at 738.
As a result of the broad reach of the decision, the United States,
the tailroad, the union and many other a m i c i successfully petitioned
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36
from clear. T h e w o rd “o m it te d ” in the B u r le y p assage is
m ost logically re ad as a re fe re n ce to a n o rm th a t the
par ties hav e c rea ted b u t h av e o m it te d f ro m the labor
ag reem en t’s e x p lic it lan g u ag e w hile m e a n in g to in co rp o
ra te it w ith in the ag reem en t as an im plic i t te rm . C on
versely, the te rm “o m it te d ” does n o t suggest a norm
im posed by the cou r ts o r the leg is la ture , r a th e r th a n by
the par ties to the lab o r ag reem en t. S e e D e tr o it <& T o le d o
S h o r e L in e R .R . v. U n ited T ra n sp . U n ion , 3 9 6 U.S. 142,
154-55 ( 1 9 6 9 ) (em p h as is a d d e d ) ( “ I t w ould be virtually
im possib le to inc lude all w o rk in g co n d i t io n s in a collec
tive-bargain ing ag reem ent. W h e re a co n d i t io n is satis
factorily to lerab le to b o th sides, it is o ften o m itted
from the ag reem en t, an d it has been suggested th a t this
p rac tice is m o re f req u en t in the ra i l ro a d in d u s try than in
m ost o th e rs .” ) ; s e e a ls o C o m a i l , 491 U.S. a t 3 1 1 , qu otin g
T r a n sp o r ta t io n U nion v. U n ion P a c . R .R . , 385 U.S. at
161. F o r all it appears , then , the C o u r t w as referring
for rehearing. The Court was informed in the petitions that the
majority opinion was based on a misunderstanding of the way in
which industrial disputes are determined so fundamental as to
have resulted in “the shutting down of the Adjustment Board,”
because the opinion’s express authority requirement was almost
never met. 327 U.S. at 668-69 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
On rehearing, the Court affirmed its decision in form, but in fact
greatly narrowed its reach, holding that normal laws of agency
do not apply, and that there is a presumption that employees are
aware of the way their union is settling their claim. 327 U.S. at 665-
66. S e e a lso id . at 668 (dissenting) (“the Court ‘adheres’ . . . to
[its previous decision] by extracting from it almost all of its vital
ity . . . . [A union member’s] prospects . . . are largely illusory
because the Court now erects a series of hurdles which will be, and
we assume were intended to be, almost impossible for an employee
to clear.”).
That B u r l e y was reheard is pertinent here for two reasons:
First, the d i c t a relied on here was n o t repeated in the rehearing
opinion. Second, that opinion is an implicit recognition that the
original opinion was based on some basic misconceptions concerning
the world of railroad and airline industrial relations—including,
we maintain, misconceptions concerning the nature of collective
bargaining agreements and the reach of nonjudicial dispute reso
lution processes within that world.
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37
only to c la im s based o n im p lie d c o n t ra c t term s, a n d not,
as pe t i t ione rs w ould have it, to c la im s b ased on in d ep en d
ent sources of law.
F u r th e r , while the section in B u r ley inc lu d in g the
“om itted case" lan g u ag e has o f t been quo ted , it has n ev er
been f o l l o w e d by this C o u r t to g ran t R L A a d ju s tm en t
boards ju risd ic t ion over ex tra c o n tra c tu a l pub lic law causes
of action. S e e , e .g ., C o n r a il , 491 U.S. a t 305 . In s tead ,
the cases in which the b ro ad B u r ley d ic ta is q u o ted are
contrac t-based cases. A t the sam e time, as reco u n ted in
Part 1, su p ra , in every case in w hich the d ic ta m igh t have
been app licab le , the C o u r t has ru led th a t the R L A ad
justm ent b o a rd s are n o t the fo ra in w hich to ad ju d ica te
state law m in im u m lab o r s tan d a rd s . M o s t tellingly in
B u ell, this C o u r t necessarily re jec ted as o u ts id e the a d
justment b o a rd s ' ju risd ic tion th e one s p e c i f ic exam p le of
an “o m itted ca se” th a t B u rley gave— suits fo r persona l
injury th a t do not rest on a co n tra c tu a l base.
Finally , B u r ley was based o n the u n d e rs ta n d in g th a t
the g r ievance-arb itra t ion p ro c ed u re s p rov ided fo r in the
R L A are op tiona l , r a th e r th an exclusive, even fo r c o n
tract-based claims. T here fo re , re ad in g the d ic t a fo r all it
is w orth suggests only th a t the a d ju s tm en t b o a rd s a ls o
have ju risd ic t ion over som e class o f e x t ra c o n tra c tu a l
claims, n ot th a t those c laim s m u st be b ro u g h t exclusively
before ad ju s tm en t boards. A s P ro fesso r Fe lle r has ex
plained,
B u r ley . . . confirm ed w ith em phasis the a ssu m p
tion in M o o r e [v. I l l in o is C en t. R .R ., 312 U.S. 6 3 0
( 1 9 4 1 ) , ] th a t a collective ag reem en t co ns ti tu ted a
co n trac t en fo rceab le by ind iv idua l em ployees w ithou t
regard to the p rocedure s of the A d ju s tm e n t B o a rd .26
26M o o r e held that “neither the original 1925 Act, nor the Act as
amended in 1934, . . . provided for settling disputes based on legal
compulsion”. 312 U.S. at 635. M o o r e based this conclusion on the
fact that 45 U.S.C. § 153, First O'), the section directing minor dis-
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[T ]h e C o u r t held th a t in the absence o f a showing
th a t the em ployees h a d au th o r ized the u n io n to act
for them . . . [ the A d ju s tm e n t B o a rd ’s! resu lt did
no t b ind them . N e i th e r the m a jo r i ty no r the d issent
ers even ra ised the q ues t ion . . . w h e th e r the plaintiffs
h a d an y business in co u r t a t all . . . . [R a th e r ] [b]oth
sides assum ed th a t . . . the c la im s them selves, as
sum ing them to be unsettled , w ere ad ju d icab le in the
cour ts r a th e r th an befo re the B o a rd . [Feller , A
G e n e r a l T h e o r y o f th e C o l le c t iv e B a r g a in in g A g r e e
m en t, 61 C al . L . R ev ., 663 , 680-81 (1 9 7 1 ) . ' ]
G iven th e perm issive system th a t M o o r e an d B u rley
posited , the assu m p tio n th a t the R L A allow ed— b u t did
no t req u ire— arb it ra t io n of a ll em ployer-em ployee disputes
w ould have h ad no im p ac t up o n the right o f individual
em ployees to p u rsu e ind iv idual rights c la im s in cou r t .
D u r in g th a t sam e per iod , how ever, the C o u r t in a
series of cases decisively m oved aw ay from the M oore-
B u r ley v o lu n ta ry a rb it ra t io n d o c tr in e w h e re r igh ts created
b y the co llec tive b a rg a in in g ag reem en t a r e a t the core of
the d ispute . S e e g e n e r a lly F e ller , A G e n e r a l T h e o r y o f
th e C o l le c t iv e B a rg a in in g A g r e e m e n t , su p ra , a t 682-86;
6 9 2 -7 0 0 . In those cases, as the C o u r t c a m e to under
s tan d th a t th e a d ju s tm en t b o a r d ’s ju r isd ic t ion over minor
d isputes w as e x c lu s iv e , the C o u r t has consis ten tly recog
n ized as well th a t those d ispu tes over w hich the b o a rd has
exclusive ju r isd ic t ion are fu n d a m e n ta l ly c o n tra c tu a l . See
O rd er o f R y . C o n d u c to r s v. P itn ey . 3 2 6 U.S. 5 61 , 565
( 1 9 4 6 ) (f ind ing exclusive B o a rd ju r isd ic t ion w hen “the
d ispu te involved w as c o n tra c tu a l in n a tu r e ” ). S e e also
S lo cu m v. D e la w a r e , L a c k a w a n a & W .R .R ., 3 3 9 U.S. 239,
2 4 2 ( 1 9 5 0 ) (c h a ra c te r iz in g the R L A d ispu te resolution
m echan ism s as cove ring “d ispu tes co n c e rn in g the making
of ag reem en ts an d . . . grievances a r is in g u n d er existing
a g r e e m e n ts ” ) (e m p h a s is s u p p l ie d ) ; id . at 2 4 3 ( th e board
has ju r isd ic t ion over “em ployee d isputes g ro w in g ou t of
putes to the NRAB, says that such disputes “may”, not "shall”, be so
directed. Id .
263
the in te rp r e ta t io n o f ex is t in g a g r e e m e n ts ” ) (e m p h a s is
supplied).
W hen, in A n d r e w s v. L o u is v i l l e & N a s h v il le R a i lr o a d ,
406 U.S. 3 2 0 ( 1 9 7 2 ) , the C o u r t finally ov e r ru led M o o r e
and held th a t the R L A ad ju s tm e n t b o a rd s w e re the ex
clusive fo ru m in w hich to ch a llenge b re ach e s o f R L A
labor ag reem ents , the C o u r t also m a d e abso lu te ly c lea r
that the b o a r d ’s exclusive ju risd ic t io n is l im ited to c la im s
alleging b re a c h of the la b o r ag reem en t:
[P e t i t io n e r’s] c la im ag a in s t his em p lo y er [is] a dis
pu te as to the in te rp re ta t io n of a collec tive b a rg a in
ing agreem en t. H is c la im is t h e r e fo r e sub jec t to the
A ct's re q u irem en t th a t i t be su b m itted to the B o a rd
for a d ju s tm en t .” [4 0 6 U.S. a t 3 2 4 (e m p h a s is
a d d e d ) ; s e e a ls o pp. 44-47 , in fr a . ] 27
3 9
^ See also Conrail, 491 U.S. at 305 (“[t]he distinguishing’ feature
of [a minor dispute] is that the dispute may be conclusively resolved
by interpreting the existing [collective bargaining] agreement”) ;
Gunther v. San Diego & Ariz. E. Ry., 382 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1965);
Union Pac. Ry. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601, 609 (1959) (“grievances
arising from the application of collective bargaining agreements to
particular situations”) ; Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Day, 360 U.S. at
551-53 (“Congress [entrusted] an expert administrative board with
the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements”); Chicago
River, 353 U.S. at 38 (quoting legislative history indicating
that the railroad unions agreed to support the RLA on the un
derstanding that “in respect to these minor-grievance cases that
grow out of the interpretation and/or application of the contracts
already made . . . they can very well permit those disputes to be
decided . . . by an adjustment board”) ; Brotherhood of R.R. Train
men v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768, 774 (1952) (permitting under the
RLA itself a judicial remedy to enforce the right of black em
ployees not to be discriminated against on the basis of race because
[t]he claims here cannot be resolved by -interpretation of a bar
gaining agreement so as to give jurisdiction to the Adjustment
Board”) .
269
4 0
III. THE LINGLE DECISION PROVIDES THE APPRO
PRIATE ANALOGY FOR THE RULE OF DECISION
IN THIS CASE.
T h e rem a in in g questions, then , a re tw o: F ir s t , w hat
s ta n d a rd does app ly in d e te rm in in g w h e th e r a p a r t ic u la r
cause of ac tion is sufficiently ro o te d in the co llec tive b a r
gain ing ag reem en t to be w ith in th e exclusive ju risd ic tion
of the R L A ad jus tm en ts b o a rd s ? A n d second , is N orr is ’
H aw aii co m m o n law re ta l ia to ry d isch a rg e c la im within
or w ithou t the ju risd ic t io n of th e R L A m in o r dispute
reso lu tion system u n d e r th a t s ta n d a rd ?
A. T h is C o u r t has , u n d e r the N L R A , d ec ided a case
virtually iden tica l to this o n e w ith re g a rd to the connec
tion betw een the asserted cau se of ac t io n a n d the ap
plicable N L R A la b o r ag reem en t . L in g le v. N o r g e D ivi
s io n o f M a g ic C h e f , In c ., 4 8 6 U .S . 3 9 9 ( 1 9 8 8 ) , like this
case, involved an em ployee co v e red by a la b o r agreem ent
w ho alleged she was d isch a rg ed fro m h e r em p lo y m en t in
v io lation of the sta te co m m o n law of w ro n g fu l discharge.
In bo th cases, the em ployee’s fa c tu a l a l lega tions , if true,
m igh t well have been sufficient to show a v io la t io n of the
app licab le agreem ent, w h ich in b o th cases m a d e a rb itra
tion the exclusive rem edy for c la im ed b re ach e s of the
agreem ent. A n d , in b o th cases, the em ployee in itia lly in
voked the c o n tra c tu a l g r iev an ce p ro c ed u re , a n d there
af te r filed a com m on law w ro n g fu l d isch a rg e su it in state
court. T h e only re levan t d ifference be tw een th e tw o cases
is th a t Jo n n a L ingle w as w o rk in g in an in d u s try covered
by the N L R A , while G ra n t N o rr is w as an air l ine em
ployee subject to the R L A .
Peti tioners m a in ta in th a t d is t inc tion is o f sufficient
m o m en t tha t, even if th e ir b ro a d a rg u m e n t sw eeping all
em ploym ent-re la ted d isputes in to the R L A m in o r dispute
reso lu tion system is re jec ted (a s it m u s t be, fo r reasons
already s ta te d ) , L in g le an d its N L R A predecessors are not
per tinen t analogies in d e te rm in in g the p re e m p t io n ques
tion. In p a r ticu la r , pe tit ioners suggest tha t , w hile L in g le .
would no t p rec lude s ta te law litigation w here there is only
factual parallelism betw een the s ta te cause of ac tion and a
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4 1
breach of th e la b o r ag reem en t c la im th a t co u ld h av e been
made, th e R L A sh o u ld p re c lu d e s ta te law suits as to
which a co n tra c t-b ase d c la im m ig h t p ro v id e an a l te rna tive
remedy, a lbeit no t the o n e the em ployee has chosen to
pursue. A s we now show, how ever, the R L A exclusive
jurisdiction d o c tr in e for co n tra c t-b ase d c la im s paralle ls
the N L R A cases a n d princip les , a n d every cons id e ra t io n
points to w ard a co m m o n p re em p tio n ru le covering bo th
statutes.
( i ) P re e m p t io n u n d e r L M R A § 3 0 1 , a 1947 a m e n d
ment to the N L R A , func tions to assure th a t issues of
N L R A c o n tra c t in te rp re ta t io n a re resolved th ro u g h one
body of federa l co m m o n law, an d , in p a r t ic u la r , th a t if
the par ties to an N L R A lab o r ag reem en t choose to have
contract d isputes resolved th ro u g h a rb it ra t io n , they are
assured the benefit o f th a t b a rg a in .28 A s the C o u r t ex
plained in A llis -C h a lm e r s C o r p . v. L u e c k , 471 U.S. 202 ,
209 ( 1 9 8 5 ) , this p re em p tio n d o c tr in e follows f ro m T e x t ile
W o rk ers v. L in c o ln M ills , 353 U.S. 4 4 8 ( 1 9 5 7 ) , w h e re
“the C o u r t ru led th a t § 301 expresses a federa l policy
that the su b s tan t iv e law to app ly in § 301 cases ‘is federa l
law, w hich the cour ts m us t fa sh ion from the po licy of o u r
national lab o r law s.” ’ L u e c k , 471 U.S. a t 2 0 9 , q u o t in g
L in co ln M ills , 353 U.S. a t 4 56 .
In T e a m s te r s v. L u c a s F lo u r C o ., 3 6 9 U.S. 95 ( 1 9 6 2 ) ,
the C o u r t resolved the “cho ice of law ” ques t ion inheren t
in L in c o ln M ills , by ru ling th a t these federa l c o m m o n law
principles m u s t app ly in all N L R A b re ach of lab o r c o n
tract cases, w h e th e r b ro u g h t in s ta te o r in federa l court.
Thus, the C o u r t dec la red federa l c o n tra c t law p a ra m o u n t ,
and s ta te c o n tra c t law p reem p ted , w hen cou r ts are p re
sented with la b o r co n tra c t claims.
Finally , in a series of cases s ta r t ing w ith L u e c k , and
including L in g le , the C o u r t considered the ex ten t to
-8 S e e Brief for the AFL-CIO As Amicus Curiae In Support of
Petitioner in No. 92-1920, L i v a d a s v . A u b r y , pp. 4-25, for a more
detailed argument of the development and purpose of LMRA § 301
preemption.
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4 2
w hich § 3 0 1 p reem p ts s ta te law claim s th a t a re s ty led as
som eth in g o t h e r th a n b re a c h of c o n tra c t c la im s. C ollec
tively, these cases e s tab lish th a t if th e p a r t ie s to a labor
a g reem en t b a rg a in fo r a rb i t ra t io n o f b re a c h o f con trac t
c la im s, th a t b a rg a in is to be re spec ted regard less of the
label th a t a p lain tiff m a y a t ta c h to a c la im th a t in es s en c e
alleges a b re a c h o f the la b o r ag reem en t . S e e , e.g .,
L u e c k , 471 U.S. a t 211 . V e ry s im ply s ta ted , a state
law c la im th a t s ta tes in s u b s tan ce th a t th e defendant-
em p lo y er d en ied the p lain tiff-em ployee co v e red b y a col
lective b a rg a in in g ag reem en t a c o n tr a c t r ig h t does nothing
m o re th a n give force to the ap p l icab le la b o r agreement,
a n d so is a c o n tra c t c la im p re e m p te d b y § 3 0 1 . Id .
O n th e o th e r h a n d , the § 301 p re e m p t io n law recog
nizes th a t if a p la in t if f’s c la im is g ro u n d e d u p o n a sub
stan tive s ta te lab o r s ta n d a rd s r igh t, the c la im is n o t pre
em p ted by § 301 . T h is is t ru e even th o u g h th e plaintiff
c o u ld h av e so u g h t rem edies fo r the sam e in ju ry u n d e r the
lab o r ag reem en t. L in g le , 4 8 6 U.S. a t 408 -10 . A n d it is
t ru e even th o u g h reso lu tion o f th e s ta te law c la im may
re q u ire tan g en t ia l re ferences to a lab o r ag reem en t, most
p a r t ic u la r ly w h en an em p lo y er asserts th e a g reem en t as a
d e fe n s e to the c laim . S e e , e .g ., C a t e r p i l la r I n c . v. W il
lia m s , 4 8 2 U.S. 386 , 395 ( 1 9 8 7 ) ( “ a p la in tif f covered
by a co llec tive b a rg a in in g ag reem en t is p e rm it te d to as
ser t [in s ta te co u r t] legal r ights in d e p e n d e n t o f th a t agree
m e n t” ) (e m p h a s is in o r ig in a l ) .
W h e n such c o n tra c t ques t ions arise in the cou rse of
reso lv ing an in d e p e n d e n t s ta te law c la im , § 301 re
qu ires th a t “ federa l law w o u ld g overn the in terpre ta tion
of the ag reem en t , b u t the s e p a ra te s ta te-law analysis would
n o t b e th e re b y p re -em pted .” L in g le , 4 8 6 U.S. a t 4 1 3 n.12.
A n y b ro a d e r u n d e rs ta n d in g of § 301 p re em p tio n , the
C o u r t has s tressed repeated ly , w o u ld h a v e the improper
re su lt o f depr iv ing un ion ized w o rk e rs o f the benefits of
in d e p e n d e n t s ta te w o rk e r p ro tec t iv e laws, a consequence
- th a t c a n n o t be sq u ared w ith th e lim ited ro le o f § 301
p re em p tio n in the N L R A - L M R A schem e, o r with the
overa ll pu rp o ses of federa l la b o r leg is la tion , w h ich was
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to im prove the lot o f w orkers , a n d no t to dep r iv e them
of rights o therw ise ava ilab le to w orke rs genera l ly . M e tr o
p o litan L i f e , 471 U.S. a t 754 .
( i i ) T h e R L A co n tra c t-b ase d p re em p t io n d o c t r in e from
its incep tion h as exactly p a ra l le l led in d ev e lo p m e n t an d
scope the L M R A doctrine . T h u s the d o c t r in e o r ig ina ted
from this C o u r t ’s dec is ion in I A M v. C e n tr a l A ir lin es ,
where the C o u r t de te rm in ed th a t “ the [ R L A ] § 2 0 4
contract, l ike the L a b o r M a n a g e m e n t R e la t io n s A c t § 301
contract, is a federa l c o n tra c t a n d is th e re fo re g overned
and enforceab le by federa l law, in the fed e ra l co u r ts .”
372 U.S. a t 692 . A federa l law o f R L A c o n tra c t was
necessary to insure th a t R L A co n tra c ts w ould be subject
to un ifo rm in te rp re ta t io n :
If these co n tra c ts a re to serve this fu n c tio n u n d e r
§ 2 0 4 , the ir validity, in te rp re ta t io n , a n d en fo rce
ability ca n n o t be left to the law s of the m a n y S ta tes
. . . . T h e needs of the sub ject m a t te r m an ife s t ly call
for un ifo rm ity . C o m p a re L o c a l J 7 4 , T e a m s te r s v.
L u c a s F lo u r C o ., 369 U.S. 95 , 103-104 ( 1 9 6 2 ) .
[372 U.S. a t 691-92 .]
In identify ing the source of the p reem p tiv e re ach of the
R L A a rb it ra t io n provision, the C e n tr a l A ir l in e s C o u r t did
not. as pe t i t ione rs w ou ld h av e it, look to polic ies o r la n
guage un iq u e to the R L A a rb i t ra t io n schem e, n o r d id the
Court suggest th a t it was a t tem p t in g to “k ee p em ploy
ment d isputes in the t ra n sp o r ta t io n in d u s try o u t o f the
courts.” Pet. Br. 41 . In s tea d , C e n tr a l A ir l in e s explicitly
adopted the d o c tr in e prev iously d eve loped u n d e r L M R A
§ 301. Indeed , as ju s t no ted , L u c a s F lo u r is th e decision
that was to becom e the p r in c ip a l fo u n d a t io n fo r the § 301
preemption do c tr in e deve loped in L u e c k an d L in g le . A n d
the very pages of L u c a s F lo u r c ited b y the C o u r t in C e n
tral A ir lin es w ere in tu rn ex cerp ted at len g th in L u e c k
and again in L in g le to ex p la in the p rin c ip le of un ifo rm ity
of con trac t in te rp re ta t io n th a t a n im a te d the C o u r t ’s su b
sequent p re em p tio n ho ldings. L u e c k , 471 U .S . a t 2 10 ;
L in g le, 4 8 6 U.S. a t 4 0 4 & n. 3. C e n tr a l A ir lin es , then,
adopted for the R L A the L in c o ln M il ls jL u c a s F lo u r u n
derstanding of the L M R A § 301 .
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4 4
( i i i ) A n d r e w s v. L o u is v i l le & N a sh v ille R a i lr o a d , 406
U.S. 3 2 0 ( 1 9 7 2 ) , b u il t o n the h o ld ing o f C e n tr a l A ir lin es
in exactly the sam e m a n n e r th a t L u e c k bu il t o n L u c a s
F lo u r in cons ide r ing the p reem p tiv e effect o f th e R L A
on claim s th a t are n o t p lead e d as b re a c h o f co n trac t
claim s, b u t a re nevertheless g ro u n d e d on c o n t r a c t rights.
B ecause we agree w ith peti t ione rs tha t “A n d r e w s goes
qu ite fa r to w ard resolving the issues befo re the C o u r t on
the in s tan t pe tit ion , (P e t . Br. a t 2 8 ) — albeit th e reso lu
tion A n d rew s supports is the opposite of the o n e which
petit ioners p ro p o u n d — we consider tha t decis ion in some
detail.
A s n o ted (pp . 38-39 , s u p r a ) , A n d r e w s o v e r ru le d M o o re
a n d held th a t the R L A ad ju s tm en t b o a rd s a re a lw ays the
exclusive fo ra in which to cha llenge b re ach e s o f R L A
labo r ag reem ents . T h e cen tra l issue betw een th e parties
in A n d r e w s w as not, how ever, w h e th e r M o o r e should
still govern in all c la im s alleging b reach of c o n t ra c t under
the lab o r agreem ents . B o th sides recognized th a t M o o re
h ad a lread y been overru led in all bu t nam e. R a th e r , the
ques tion d iv id ing the parties was w h e th e r A n d r e w s was
or was n o t a con trac t-b ased case.
T h u s , the p laintiff em ployee in A n d r e w s c la im ed that
h is case w as n o t really a b re ach of lab o r c o n tra c t case at
all, an d there fo re ad ju d icab le in the cou r ts :
T h is con troversy does n o t involve a “la b o r d isp u te”
as th a t te rm is co m m o n ly u n d e rs to o d : it does not
involve the in te rp re ta t io n of a co llec tive bargaining
ag reem en t o r co n c e rn the w ages o r ra te s o f pay or
v aca tion o r re tirem en t o r pension o r sen io r i ty rights
o r w o rk in g cond itions of an y class o r g ro u p of em
ployees. [A n d rew s , B rief fo r P e t i t io n e r a t 5 (em
phasis in o r ig in a l ) ] .
A n d the d e fen d an t em ployer in A n d rew s co u n te re d with
the insistence th a t the G e o rg ia w rongfu l d isch a rg e tort
“ is n o th ing m o re th an a suit fo r b reach of an em ploym ent
co n tra c t ( fo r absen t the c o n tra c t there a re no rights at
law of c o u r s e ) ; ” A n d rew s , B rief for R e s p o n d e n t at 9.
So u n d ers to o d , the em ployer fu r th e r a rgued , th e case pro-
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vided the vehicle to overru le M o o r e in light o f th e N L R A
decision in M a d d o x , “m a k in g the rights o f w orke rs in the
ra ilroad in d us try c o m p a ra b le to those of w orke rs w ho
have collective b a rg a in in g ag reem en ts w ith in the sphere
of the L a b o r M a n a g e m e n t R e la t io n s A c t .” Id . a t 6, 9.
S ee a ls o id . a t 32-33 , 4 1 -4 2 , 51.
T he A n d r e w s C o u r t acco rd in g ly u n d ers to o d th a t its
decision tu rn e d o n the p ro p e r c h a rac te r iza t io n o f the
claim befo re it :
[T ]h e very c o n c e p t o f “ w rongfu l d isch a rg e” im
plies som e sort o f s ta tu to ry o r c o n t r a c tu a l s ta n d a rd
tha t modifies th e t rad i t io n a l co m m o n law ru le th a t a
co n trac t o f em p lo y m en t is te rm in ab le b y e i th e r p a r ty
a t will. H e r e it is c o n c e d e d b y a l l th a t th e o n ly
s o u r c e o f p e t i t io n e r ’s r ig h t n o t to b e d is c h a r g e d , a n d
th e r e fo r e to tr ea t an a l l e g e d d is c h a r g e a s " w ro n g fu l,”
is th e c o l le c t iv e b a rg a in in g a g r e e m e n t b e tw e e n th e
e m p lo y e r a n d th e u n ion . . . . T h e e x is t e n c e a n d e x
ten t o f su ch a n o b l ig a t io n in a c a s e su ch a s th is w ill
d e p e n d o n th e in te r p r e ta t io n o f th e c o l l e c t iv e b a r
g a in in g a g r e e m e n t . T h u s p e t it io n e r 's c la im , a n d r e
s p o n d e n t ’s d is a l lo w a n c e o f it, s tem fr o m d if fe r in g in
t e rp r e ta t io n s o f th e c o l le c t iv e -b a r g a in in g a g r e e m e n t .
. . . . H is c la im is t h e r e fo r e sub jec t to the A c t ’s
req u irem en t th a t it be su b m itted to the B o a rd for
ad jus tm ent. [4 0 6 U.S. a t 3 2 3 -2 4 (e m p h a s is su p
p lied ) .]
This conc lusion triggered a v igorous d issen t focussing
not on the ru l ing th a t c o n tra c t c la im s shou ld be resolved
exclusively th ro u g h the N R A B , b u t on the m a jo r i ty ’s c o n
clusion th a t A n d re w s ’ c la im w as a c o n tra c t c la im . S e e
406 U.S. a t 327 (D o u g la s , J ., d issen ting ) ( “ no issue
involving the co llective b a rg a in in g ag reem en t is t e n
dered” ) ; id . a t 331 ( “T h is is a p la in , o rd in a ry , com m on-
law suit no t d ep e n d e n t on a n y te rm or provis ion of a
collective-bargaining a g re e m e n t” ) .
In deciding the case, then , the A n d r e w s C o u r t a d o p ted
the em ployer’s a rg u m e n t in b o th respects : th a t the sam e
preem ption ru les shou ld app ly u n d e r the R L A as u n d e r
L M R A § 301 , a n d th a t app ly ing those ru les to the facts
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befo re it, A n d re w s ’ c la im s o u n d e d in c o n t ra c t a n d h a d to
be resolved th ro u g h the a d ju s tm e n t b o a rd . A ccord ing ly ,
A n d rew s re lied square ly u p o n the d o c tr in e established
under the N L R A / L M R A schem e:
In In te r n a t io n a l A s s o c ia t io n o f M a c h in is ts v. C en tra l
A ir lin es , . . ., an ag reem en t re q u ired u n d e r § 2 0 4
of the R a i lw ay L a b o r A c t w as said to b e “ like the
L a b o r M a n a g e m e n t R e la t io n s A c t § 301 c o n tra c t . . .
a federa l co n tra c t a n d . . . th e re fo re go v ern ed and
enforceab le by federa l law , in federa l c o u r ts .” 372
U.S. a t 692 . A s im ilar re so lu t io n w as re a c h e d under
§ 3 0 1 ( a ) of the L a b o r M a n a g e m e n t R e la t io n s Act
in T e x t ile W o r k e r s v. L in c o ln M ills , 3 5 3 U .S . 448
( 1 9 5 7 ) .
In R e p u b lic S te e l v. M a d d o x , 3 7 9 U.S. 650
( 1 9 6 5 ) , the C o u r t d ed u c ed from the L a b o r M an ag e
m en t R e la t ions A c t a p re fe re n c e for the settlement
of d isputes in a c c o rd a n c e w ith c o n tra c tu a l ly agreed
u p o n a rb it ra t io n p ro ced u re s . . . . S ince the com pul
sory ch a ra c te r of the a d m in is tra t iv e rem e d y provided
by the R a ilw ay L a b o r A c t fo r d ispu tes such as that
be tw een p e ti t ione r an d re s p o n d e n t s tem s . . . from
the A c t itself, the case for insisting on re so r t to those
remedies is if an y th ing s t ro n g e r in cases ar is ing under
th a t A c t th an it is in cases ar is ing u n d e r § 301 of
the L M R A . [4 0 6 U.S. a t 3 2 3 .]
T hese are, of course , the sam e dec is ions th a t the Court
relied u p o n in L u e c k . In the A n d r e w s C o u r t ’s view, the
a rg u m en t for app ly ing these sam e § 301 p r inc ip les in the
R L A co n tex t w as “ if a n y th in g s t ro n g e r” th a n in the
LM RA . contex t, because c o n t ra c t a rb i t ra t io n existed by
o pera t ion of s ta tu te u n d e r the R L A . B u t n o th in g in the
A n d rew s op in ion suggests a n y basis fo r a d o p t in g d iffer
en t con trac t-p rec lu s ion p r inc ip les u n d e r the R L A than
u n d e r § 301.
T o the co n tra ry , in re jec t in g the em p lo y ee’s contention
th a t he was seeking to assert a to r t c la im , a n d n o t a con
trac t claim , A n d r e w s a d o p te d essen tia lly the sam e “con
t rac t d ep en d en cy ” ru le for R L A p re em p t io n th a t was
la te r adop ted , using re m a rk a b ly sim ilar ly language , in
L u e c k , L in g le , an d in th e ir p ro g e n y for L M R A § 301
276
4 7
preem ption : O n ly b e c a u s e the A n d rew s C o u r t d e te r
m ined th a t the c la im was in its essence a c o n t r a c t c la im
did the C o u r t ru le th a t the c la im m u s t be reso lved th ro u g h
an ad ju s tm en t b o a rd . C o m p a r e A n d rew s , 4 0 6 U.S. a t
323-24, w ith L u e c k , 471 U.S. a t 2 1 1 -1 7 ; L in g Je , 4 8 6
U.S. a t 405 .
In sum , co n tra ry to pe t i t io n e rs ’ belief, A n d r e w s p rov ides
the s trongest of su p p o r t f o r the H aw aii S u p rem e C o u r t
decision here , w hich engaged in precisely the sa m e an a ly
sis tha t th e C o u r t u n d e r to o k in A n d rew s . Pet. A p p . 13a
& n.10. S e e a ls o P u ch er t r . A g s a h id , 67 H aw . 25, 677
P.2d 4 4 9 ( 1 9 8 4 ) , a p p e a l d is m is s e d f o r w an t o f su b s ta n
tial f e d e r a l q u e s t io n , 4 7 2 U.S. 1001 ( 1 9 8 5 ) .
( iv ) P e ti t ioners nevertheless a rgue th a t a g re a te r o r
different k ind of un ifo rm ity is m a n d a te d by the R L A
than req u ired by L M R A § 301 , because the R L A ’s a rb i
tration schem e is m an d a to ry , w hile “a rb i t ra t io n u n d e r the
L M R A is a m a t te r of co n tra c tu a l u n d e r ta k in g betw een
the par ties a n d is pure ly v o lu n ta ry .” Pet. Br. 40 . B u t
there is no reason th a t a schem e th a t m a n d a te s a rb i t r a
tion of co n tra c tu a l d isputes a n d a schem e th a t en co u rag es
voluntary a rb it ra t io n of such d isputes req u ire p re em p tio n
of different k in d s of claims. T h e p u rp o se of the p re e m p
tion in b o th cases is the sam e: to assu re th a t w hen a
claim is sub jec t to a rb it ra t io n , the co u r ts will re q u ire tha t
it be resolved in th a t m anner . F o r th a t reason , p re su m
ably, A n d rew s app lied a s ta n d a rd precisely para l le l to
L u e c k and L in g le in d e te rm in ing w h e th e r o r n o t the cause
of action befo re it w as con trac t-based , and th e re fo re p re
empted.20
20 Petitioners also argue that LMRA and RLA arbitration differ
in that the former is solely a creation of the union and the employer,
with the employee not even having a right of access to the arbitral
forum, while the latter is by design better suited to adjudicate
individual rights. Pet. Br. 41-42. But from the point of view of
the individual asserting a statutory right, both systems suffer nearly
identical deficiencies: Linder both Acts the arbitration system is
controlled by the union and the employer, and the employee has no
input into crucial aspects of the process. Most of all, the individual
211
48
I t is s im p ly n o t poss ib le to iden tify “ a m u c h b ro a d e r
[legislative] p u rp o s e in e n a c t in g the R L A ” th a n th a t to
be fo u n d in the N L R A w ith r e g a r d to th e r o l e o f co n tra c t-
b a s e d c la im s in th e a r b it r a t io n sy s tem . Pe t . B r. 4 1 . For,
a l th o u g h there are im p o r ta n t differences, the tw o statutes
are fu n d a m e n ta l ly s im ilar in th a t reg a rd : B o th p rov ide a
federa l p rocess for re ach in g ag reem en ts covering te rm s and
cond it ions o f em p lo y m en t , b u t do n o t seek to im pose any
subs tan tive te rm s o n the p a r t ie s to such ag reem en ts . And
b o th p ro v id e a fed e ra l m ech a n ism for resolving disputes
over the ap p l ica t io n of those federa l ag reem en ts . That
be ing so, it is u n su rp r is in g th a t p reem ptive d oc tr ines de
signed to p ro te c t bo th the co llective b a rg a in in g a n d dis
p u te reso lu tion m ech an ism s of the two A c ts have devel
o ped a long para lle l lines, an d result in the sam e govern
ing s tandards .
B. P e ti t ione rs a rg u e a l te rna tive ly th a t even if L in g k
does p rov ide the a p p ro p r ia te ana lo g y for this case, re
s p o n d e n t’s c la im nevertheless shou ld still be preem pted
because in tw o respects th a t c la im differs f rom th a t of the
em ployee in L in g le . Specifically, pe t i t ione rs a rg u e that
re so lu tion o f N o rr is ’ c la im will req u ire a co u r t to interpret
the lab o r a g reem en t in o rd e r to de te rm in e w h e th e r he was
indeed d ischarged , an d w h e th e r his fa ilu re to sign off in
con n ec t io n w ith the w o rk he p e r fo rm ed justified the dis
cipline m e ted ou t. Pet. Br. 43-44 .
F o r reaso n s we have prev iously s ta ted , pe t i t io n e rs ’ as
sertion th a t an y c la im th a t requ ires a co u r t to m a k e som e
re fe rence to a lab o r ag reem en t is p re e m p te d — either
u n d e r L in g le o r u n d e r the app licab le R L A au tho ri ty—
is m is taken . S e e L in g le , 4 8 6 U.S. a t 413 , n .1 2 ; M cK in-
has no say over the selection of the members of the arbitration
board, who are typically management and union representatives,
or of the neutral arbitrator if the board deadlocks. In this case,
the System Board of Adjustment is created by agreement between
the employer and the union, and the procedures adopted and the
jurisdiction of the Board are matters solely between the employer
and the union. Labor Agreement, Art. XVI, Pet. App. 54a-58a.
The union and the employer select the neutral arbitrator. I d . at 55a.
278
4 9
ney v. M is s o u r i-K a n s a s -T e x a s R .R ., 357 U.S. 2 6 5 , 2 6 8 ,
270 ( 1 9 5 8 ) (V e te ra n s A c t c la im s no t p re e m p te d by the
R L A “even th o u g h the ir d e te rm in a t io n m ay necessarily in
volve in te rp re ta t io n of a collec tive b a rg a in in g ag reem en t ,”
since “ the ac tu a l c h a ra c te r of the rights a s se r ted ” derives
from a legal sou rce o th e r th an the lab o r a g re e m e n t ) .
But even a p a r t from this, pe t i t ione rs are s im ply m is
taken w hen they assert th a t re so lu tion o f r e s p o n d e n t’s
claim will req u ire in te rp re ta t io n of the lab o r ag reem en t.
As the C o u r t held in L in g le , the q ues t ion o f w h e th e r an
employee has been d ischarged is obv iously a “pu re ly fac
tual q ues t ion .” 4 8 6 U.S. a t 4 0 7 . A t trial, r e sp o n d en t no
doubt will re ly on a le tter from the C o m p a n y s ta t in g th a t
he was “ te rm in a ted as o f this day, A u g u s t 3, 1987, fo r
insubord ina tion ,” Jt. A p p . 2 1 4 , an d the C o m p a n y ap
parently in tends to a rgue th a t the te rm in a t io n w as resc inded
by a le t ter d a ted S ep tem b er 10, 1987. Jt. A p p . 100. T h e
issue to be dec ided will be w h e th e r the C o m p a n y 's ac tions
— w hatever they w ere a n d ho w ev er it m ay seek to justify
them—-m ak e ou t the e lem en t o f d ischarge u n d e r H aw aii
law. W h e th e r o r n o t these sam e facts co n s t i tu te d ischarge
under the la b o r ag reem en t is s im ply n o t re levan t to
Norris’ case.
By the sam e analysis , fo r p u rp o se s o f th is law su it it is
irrelevant w h e th e r H A L w o u ld have been justified u n d e r
the labor ag reem en t in te rm in a t in g N o rr is for fa il ing to
sign off on w o rk he p e r fo rm e d — an issue w hich , to be
sure, w ould re q u ire in te rp re ta t io n o f the lab o r ag reem en t.
The claim th a t N o rr is chose to b r in g — as o p p o sed to the
claim th a t pe t i t ione rs wish to have resolved th ro u g h a rb i
tration— is th a t H A L w as m o tiv a te d to fire h im becau se
he took his c o m p la in t to the F A A . T h a t a l lega tion raises
a purely fac tu a l issue of m otive , a n d on e th a t will be
resolved w ith o u t hav in g to co n s id e r w h e th e r the d ischarge
is as well v io lative of the co n tra c t . A s the C o u r t ind i
cated in L in g le , the issue of w h e th e r the em p lo y er ac ted
out of a lawful m o tive u n d e r s ta te law is a “pu re ly fac
tual inquiry [ tha t] does no t tu rn o n the m e a n in g of any
provision of a co llec tive-barga in ing ag re e m e n t .” 4 8 6 U.S.
at 407.
279
5 0
W e h as ten to re ite ra te th a t it is n o t o u r po s i t io n — or
the ru le as en u n c ia te d in the dec id ed cases— th a t only in
c la im s such as this one w h e re there is n o con trac tua l
issue p re sen t is there no p re e m p t io n . B u t w h e rev e r the
ap p ro p r ia te line should be d ra w n ; '10 this case is th e easy
one, a n d pe t i t io n e rs ’ a rg u m e n ts th a t H A L h a d sufficient
reason u n d e r the ag reem en t to te rm in a te N o rr is m isunder
s tand the n a tu re of the c la im N o rr is has chosen to bring
to s ta te court.
CONCLUSION
F o r the reasons s ta ted above , the ju d g m e n t of the
H aw aii S up rem e C o u r t shou ld be affirmed.
R esp ec tfu l ly su bm itted ,
Of Counsel:
Marsha S. Berzon
177 Post Street, Suite 300
San Francisco, CA 94108
Mark Schneider
9000 Machinists Place
Upper Marlboro, MD 20772
Laurence Gold
815 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006 30
Edward DeLappe Boyle
Susan Oki Mollway *
Cades Schutte Fleming &
Wright
1000 Bishop Street, 10th Floor
Honolulu, HI 96813
(808) 521-9200
Counsel fo r Respondent
* Counsel of Record
30 Petitioners thus assert that a claim should be preempted when
ever the employer can raise as a defense an argument whose resolu
tion requires interpretation of the labor agreement. Pt. Br. 41-15.
We believe this assertion to be mistaken; indeed the Court already
has rejected this argument in its decision in Caterpillar, 482 U.S.
at 398-99. But even if petitioners accurately stated the law, it
would be of no help to them here. HAL’s only relevant defense is
that it was not motivated by a desire to punish Norris for report
ing the company’s misconduct to the FAA. In the course of that
argument, HAL may assert that it acted as it did because it
believed its actions were authorized by the labor agreement. Whether
HAL s interpretation of the labor agreement was in fact correct is
irrelevant to determining HAL’s true motive. For if HAL per
suades a finder of fact that its true motive was a desire to enforce
the labor agreement, Norris will lose his case, regardless of whether
or not HAL s interpretation of the agreement is sound.
230
No. 92-2058
In The
(Emtri uf % luiif fr §tatPR
October Term, 1993
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.,
P e t it io n e r ,
Grant T. Norris,
R e s p o n d e n t ,
Paul J. Finazzo, Howard E. Ogden and
Hatsuo Honma,
P etit io n e r s ,
Grant T. Norris,
__________ R e s p o n d e n t .
On Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court for the State of Hawaii
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONERS
Kenneth B. Hipp *
David J. Dezzani
Margaret C. J enkins
Lisa Von Der Mehden
Goodsill Anderson Quinn
& Stifel
1099 Alakea S tree t
1800 Alii P lace
Honolulu, Haw aii 96813
(808) 547-5600
C ou n sel f o r P e t it io n ers
* Counsel of Record
2S1
I. MINOR DISPUTES MUST BE RESOLVED
THROUGH RLA ARBITRATION......................... 2
II. RETALIATORY DISCHARGE CLAIMS PRE
SENT ARBITRABLE MINOR DISPUTES........ 6
A. Statutory Language................................. 7
B. Legislative H istory................................................. 12
C. Supreme Com-t Decisions..................... 14
III. RESPONDENT’S READING OF T A N G L E IS
TOO NARROW ....................................................... 17
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
282
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
C A S E S Page
A J l i s - C h a lm e r s C o r p . v . L u e c lc , 471 U.S. 202
(1985).............................................................................. 3
A n d r e w s v . L o u i s v i l l e & N a s h v i l l e R a i l r o a d C o .,
406 U.S. 320 (1972) .......................................... 2 ,12,16-17
A t c h i s o n , T o p e k a & S a n t a F e R a i l w a y C o . v . B u e l l ,
480 U.S. 557 (1 9 8 7 )................................................... 4 ,16
B e a r d v . C a r r o l l t o n R .R . , 893 F.2d 117 (6th Cir.
1989)...................................................... 19
B r o o k G r o u p , L t d . v . B r o w n & W i l l i a m s o n T o b a c c o
C o r p . , 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993) ................................... 8
B u e l l v . A t c h i s o n , T o p e k a a n d S a n t a F e R y . , 771
F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1985), a f f ’d i n p a r t a n d v a
c a te d i n p a r t , 480 U.S. 557 (1987) ....................... 5 ,16
C a p r a r o v . U n i t e d P a r c e l S e r v . C o ., 993 F.2d 328
(3d Cir. 1993) ......... 10
C a te r p i l l a r , I n c . v . W i l l i a m s , 482 U.S. 386 (1987).. 18
C h ic a g o & N o r t h W e s t e r n T r a n s p . C o . v . K a lo
B r i c k & T i l e C o ., 450 U.S. 311 (1981).................... 17
C ip o l lo n e v . L i g g e t t G r o u p , I n c . , 112 S. Ct. 2608
(1992).............................................................................. 4 ,17
C o lo r a d o A n t i - D i s c r i m i n a t i o n C o m m ’n v . C o n t i
n e n t a l A i r L in e s , I n c . , 372 U.S. 714 (1963)........ 5
C o n s o l id a te d R a i l C o r p . v . R a i l w a y L a b o r E x e c u
t i v e s ’ A s s ’n , 491 U.S. 299 (1989) .................1 ,16 ,18 , 20
E a r l y v . D o e , 57 U.S. (16 How.) 610 (1 8 5 3 )........... 7
E lg i n , J . & E . R y . v . B u r l e y , 325 U.S. 711 (1945).. 13,14,
16, 20
E s t a t e o f C o w a r t v . N i c k l o s D r i l l i n g C o ., 112 S. Ct.
2589 (1992) ................................................................... 7
F C C v . P a c i f ic a F o u n d a t i o n , 438 U.S. 726 (1978).. 8
G a r c ia v . U n i te d S t a t e s , 469 U.S. 70 (1984)........... 8
G a te w a y C o a l C o . v . U n i t e d M i n e W o r k e r s , 414
U.S. 368 (1974) ............................................................ 6
G ilm e r v . I n t e r s t a t e / J o h n s o n L a n e C o r p ., 500 U.S.
20 (1991) ....................................................................... 6
H a w a i ia n A i r l i n e s , I n c . v . N o r r i s , No. 92-2058
(January 21, 1 9 9 4 )..................................................... 2, 6
l n g e r s o l l - R a n d C o . v . M c C le n d o n , 498 U.S. 133, 111
S. Ct. 478 (1990) ................................ 17
i l
283
Jackson v. Seaboard Coast L ine R.R., 678 F.2d 992
(11th Cir. 1 982)............................................................ 18
Jones v. R ath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977)..,. 2
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486
U.S. 399 (1988) ............................................................passim
Magerer v. John Sexton & Co., 912 F.2d 525 (1st
Cir. 1990) ....................................................................... 19
Malone v. W hite M otor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978).. 3
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981)........... 4
McCormick v. A T & T Technologies, Inc., 934 F.2d
531 (4th Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 912
(1992)............................................................................... 19
Metropolitan L ife Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,
471 U.S. 724 (1985) ..................................................... 3
Missouri Par. R.R. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249
(1931) .............................................................................. 3
Mock v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522 (10th
Cir. 1992)........................................................................ 19
M ontgomery W ard & Co., Inc. v. N LR B , 904 F.2d
1156 (7th Cir. 1990) .................................................. 9
Moore v. Illinois Central Railroad, 312 U.S. 630
(1941> .............................................................................. 4 ,15
Morton v. Mancani, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).................. 4
Negonsott v. Samuels, 113 S. Ct. 1119 (1993)...... 7
N L R B v. Aquatech, Inc., 926 F.2d 538 (6th Cir.
1991) ..................................... 9
N L R B v. Transportation M anagement Corp., 462
U.S. 393 (1 9 8 3 )............................................................ 18
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Day, 360 U.S. 548 (1959)...... 19
Rayner v. Sm irl, 873 F.2d 60 (4th C ir.), cert, de
nied, 493 U.S. 876 (1 9 8 9 ).......................................... H
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979)...... 8
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council
(San Diego), 436 U.S. 180 (1 9 7 8 )........................... 2
Tenney E ng’g, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach.
Workers, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953) .................. 6
Terminal Railroad Association o f St. Louis v.
Brotherhood o f Railroad Trainmen, 318 U S 1
(1943) .............................................................................. 3.4
i i i
T A B L E O F A U T H O R IT IE S — C o n tin u ed
P a g e
284
iv
Union Pacific R.R. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601 (1959)..,. 20
United Paperworkers In t’l Union v. Misco, Inc.,
484 U.S. 29 (1987) ..... ............... ............................... 5
United S ta tes v. Ron Pair Enter. Inc., 489 U.S. 235
(1989)................................................... '......................... 7
A D M IN IS T R A T IV E C A SE S
Independent Metal W orkers (Hughes Tool Co.),
247 NLRB 1573 (1937) ............................................... 5
NRAB Third Division Award No. 14113 (January
25, 1966)......................................................................... 20
NRAB Third Division Award No. 12970 (October
14, 1 9 6 4 )........................................................................ 20
NRAB T hird Division Award No. 4975 (July 31,
1950) ............................................................................... 20
NRAB F irs t Division Award No. 11224 (February
24, 1947)........................................................................ 20
Public Law Board No. 1483, Award No. 15 (No
vember 7, 1975) .......... 20
F E D E R A L S T A T U T E S
Federal Em ployers’ Liability Act (“FELA ” ), 45
U.S.C. § 51 et seq......................................................... 4 ,16
LMRA Section 301, 29 U.S.C. § 1 8 5 ............................. 17
NLRA Section 8 (a ) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1 ) ...... 9
Railway Labor Act (“RLA” ) , 45 U.S.C. §151
et seq.................................................................................passim
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (c )- (f) ............................................ 5
45 U.S.C. § 441 (c) ............................................................ 11
45 U.S.C. § 441(d) ......... 11
L E G ISL A T IV E M A T E R IA L S
67 Cong. Rec. 4517 (1926) (statem ent of Rep.
B ark ley ).......................................................... 12
67 Cong. Rec. 8807 (1926) (statem ent of Sen.
W atson) .......................................................................... 12
H.R. Rep. 1025, 96t,h Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
- 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3830 ............................................. 11,12
H.R. Rep. No. 2243, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).... 14
H.R. Rep. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)...... 14
T A B L E O F A U T H O R IT IE S — C ontinued
P a g e
285
V
T A B L E O F A U T H O R IT IE S — C o n tin u ed
P a g e
2 NLRB, Legislative H istory of the N ational Labor
Relations A ct of 1035 ........................................... . 11
Subcomm. on Labor of Senate Comm, on Labor and
Public W elfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative
H istory of the Railway Labor Act, As Amended
(1926 through 19G6) (Comm. P rin t 1974)........ 13
PERIO D IC A LS A N D P U B LIC A TIO N S
F irst Annual Report of the N ational Labor Rela
tions Board (1936) ..................................................... 10
Garrison, The National Railroad A d justm en t
Board: A Unique A dm inistra tive Agency, 46
Yale L.J. 567 (1937)................................................... 10
H. Wolf, The Railroad Labor Board (1927) .......... 9
Second Annual Report of the National Labor Rela
tions Board (1937) .................................................... 10-11
286
R E P L Y B R I E F O F P E T IT IO N E R S
In o u r o p en in g brief , we show ed th a t re sp o n d e n t’s state-
law w ro n g fu l d ischarge cla im s are p re em p ted by the R a i l
w ay L a b o r A c t ( “R L A ” ) , 45 U .S .C . § 151 e t s e q . , b e
cause ( a ) the R L A p re em p ts s ta te law as to “m in o r
d isp u tes” sub jec t to m a n d a to ry a rb it ra t io n ; an d ( b ) a
w rongfu l d isch a rg e c la im such as the one in this case is
a classic R L A m in o r d ispute . A s to the first po in t, re
s p o n d e n t a rgues th a t C ongress d id no t in tend for the R L A
to effect a b ro a d p reem p tio n of s ta te law, b u t as we show
in P a r t I below , the k ind of p reem p tio n of s ta te law th a t
w ould resu lt from requ ir ing th a t m in o r d isputes be b ro u g h t
p u rs u a n t to R L A a rb i t ra t io n p ro ced u re s is precisely w h a t
C ongress in tended . As to the second poin t, re sp o n d en t
argues th a t his g rievance is no t a “m in o r d isp u te ” because
it is n o t based on a collective ag reem en t, bu t as d e m o n
s tra ted in o u r o p en in g b rie f ( a t 9 -3 0 ) and in P a r t II
below, the p la in lan g u ag e o f the R L A , its legislative his
tory, an d its in te rp re ta t io n b y this C o u r t m a k e c lea r th a t
re ta l ia to ry d ischarge claims are a rb it rab le grievances th a t
fall sq u a re ly w ith in the m in o r d ispu te p rovis ions o f the
Act, w h e th e r o r n o t they can be fram ed in a “n o n
c o n t ra c tu a l” way.
W e also a rg u ed in o u r o p en ing brief ( a t 4 3 -4 5 ) th a t
re sponden t 's c la im s w ould be p reem p ted by the R L A even
if the ca te g o ry of m in o r d isputes w ere l imited to those
involving in te rp re ta t io n or ap p lica tion o f a collective
agreem ent. A s we show in P a r t III below, r e sp o n d en t’s
opposing a rg u m e n t , based on a n a r ro w re ad in g of L in g le
v. N o r g e D iv is io n o f M a g ic C h e f , In c . ( “L in g le ”), 4 8 6
U.S. 3 9 9 ( 1 9 8 8 ) , is flatly co n tra ry to this C o u r t ’s dec i
sion in C o n s o l id a t e d R a il C o r p . v. R a i lw a y L a b o r E x e c u
tiv es ’ A s s n ( “C o n r a i l” ), 491 U.S. 2 9 9 ( 1 9 8 9 ) , w hich
held th a t a c o n tra c tu a l defense m a y give rise to a m in o r
d ispute. W e re re sp o n d e n t’s read ing of Lingle. app lied in
the R L A con tex t , courts w ould frequen tly be ca lled up o n
to in te rp re t a n d apply ra i l ro a d an d airline collective agree
m ents in d e ro g a t io n o f the R L A .
287
I. M IN O R D IS P U T E S M U S T B E R E S O L V E D T H R O U G H
R LA A R B IT R A T IO N
R e s p o n d e n t ’s first a rg u m e n t is th a t the R L A does no t
genera lly d isp lace s ta te m in im u m su b s tan t iv e p ro tec t io n s
fo r em ployees. R e s p o n d e n t ’s a rg u m e n t fails to ra ise any
real issue b e c au se we h av e n o t a rg u ed th a t s ta te m in im u m
substan tive p ro tec t io n s a re set as ide by the R L A . R a th e r ,
o u r position is th a t s ta te law s a re p re e m p te d on ly to the
ex ten t th a t they in te rfe re w ith the R L A by a t te m p t in g to
rem ove m in o r d ispu tes f rom the m a n d a to ry a rb it ra t io n
fram ew o rk to w hich C ongress assigned them . E .g ., J o n e s
v. R a th P a c k in g C o ., 4 3 0 U.S." 5 1 9 , 5 2 5 - 2 6 ‘ ( 1 9 7 7 )
( “C on g ress io n a l e n a c tm en ts th a t d o no t ex c lude all state
legisla tion in the s a m e field nevertheless o ve rr ide state
law s with w h ich they conflic t.” ) 1
T h e genera l p ro p o s i t io n th a t s ta te law s m ay n o t rem ove
m in o r d ispu tes f ro m R L A a rb i t r a t io n o u g h t n o t be co n
troversial. In d e ed , in A n d r e w s v. L o u is v i l l e & N a sh v ille
R a ilr o a d C o ., 4 0 6 U.S. 320 , 3 2 2 ( 1 9 7 2 ) , this C o u rt
em p h a t ica l ly s ta ted th a t “ the n o t io n th a t th e grievance
a n d a rb i t ra t io n p ro c ed u re s p ro v id ed for m in o r disputes
in the R a i lw a y L a b o r A c t a re op tio n a l , to be ava iled of
as the em ployee o r the c a r r ie r chooses, w as n ever good
1 Indeed, the issue raised in this case—“[wjhether the Hawaii
Supreme Court erred in concluding that respondent’s state law
wrongful discharge claims were not preempted by the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §151 et seq.,” Havjaiian Airlines, Inc. v.
Norris, No. 92-2058 (January 21, 1994)—is even more limited than
that. As we argue below in Part II, state law wrongful discharge
claims, and specifically “whistleblower” retaliatory discharge claims
of the type asserted by respondent, are at the heart of the minor
dispute category and therefore constitute the clearest example of
claims preempted by the RLA. See infra pp. 6-17. Thus, this
case does not present an occasion for deciding what other kinds of
state claims involving other kinds of issues, such as “peripheral
concerns” to the RLA or “deeply rooted” local concerns, might be
preempted by the RLA in the event of an asserted conflict with
the RLA statutory scheme. Cf. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters
Dist. Council (San Diego), 436 U.S. 180 (1978) (state trespass
action upheld despite arguably protected/prohibited conduct within
NLRA preemption test).
2
3
history a n d is no longer good law .” In these c ircum
stances, s ta te laws th a t w o u ld perm it m in o r d isputes to
be b ro u g h t ou ts ide the R L A grievance processes are
p reem pted bec au se they “ ‘w ould fru s tra te the federal
sch em e’ ” ass ign ing such cla im s to m a n d a to ry a rb itra t ion .
A llis -C h d lm ers C a r p . v. L u e c k , A l l U.S. 2 02 , 2 0 9 (1 9 8 5 )
(q u o t in g M a lo n e v. W h ite M o to r C o r p ., 4 3 5 U.S. 497 ,
5 0 4 ( 1 9 7 8 ) ) . 2 In essence, the R L A p roh ib its s ta tes from
tak ing em p lo y m en t d isputes involving d iscip line a n d dis
cha rge ou t of the R L A arb it ra l fo rum and enlisting R L A
em ployees as “ p riva te a t to rn ey s g en e ra l” to p rosecu te
v io lations of s ta te em p lo y m en t s tan d a rd s th ro u g h civil
suits. ( S e e S ta tes Br. 1 1 ) . T h u s , while states m ay enac t
m in im u m la b o r s ta n d a rd s covering R L A em ployers to the
ex ten t perm it ted by federa l s ta tu tes and the C onsti tu t ion ,
and m ay even en fo rce such laws aga inst ca rr ie rs th rough
regu la to ry processes, the R L A prohib its s ta tes from cre
ating p r iva te causes of ac tion for ind iv idual em ployees to
en fo rce those laws.
T h e tw o R L A c a s e s 2 on w h ich re sp o n d en t relies ( a t
10 -15) are w holly consis ten t with this ap p ro ach ; those
cases add ressed s ta te m in im u m lab o r s tan d ard s th a t w ere
enforced by the sta te , r a th e r th an by p r iva te c la im s for
relief b ro u g h t by ra ilw ay em ployees aga inst the ir em ploy
ers. S e e M is so u r i V a c . R .R . v. N o r w o o d , 283 U.S. 249 ,
2 5 0 n . l ( 1 9 3 1 ) (a d d re ss in g A rk a n sa s s ta tu te th a t regu
la ted fre igh t t ra in crew s and prov ided for fines against
n o ncom ply ing ca rr ie rs , b u t d id no t p rovide for a p riva te
right o f ac tion by e m p lo y ee s ) . In T e r m in a l R a i l r o a d A s- * 3
- Both the Hawaii Supreme Court and the Solicitor General have
recognized that “mandatory [RLA] arbitration is the exclusive
remedy for claims arising from minor disputes.” Pet. App. 12a;
se e Sol. Gen. Br. 8-10.
3 Respondent also cites M e t r o p o l i t a n L i f e I n s u r a n c e Co. v . M a s s a
c h u s e t t s , 471 U.S. 724 (1985), but that case did not concern the
RLA. Moreover, M e t r o p o l i t a n L i f e involved a state remedial provi
sion enforced by the state attorney general, and did not provide a
means by which individual employees could avoid adjustment pro
cedures for disputes between them and their employers.
289
4
s o c ia t io n o f St. L o u is v. B r o t h e r h o o d o f R a i l r o a d T r a in
m en , 318 U.S. 1, 7 ( 1 9 4 3 ) , th is C o u r t u p h e ld a re g u la
to ry o rd e r o f the Illinois C o m m e rc e C o m m iss io n on the
g rounds th a t the federa l in terest em b o d ied in the R L A
was c o n c e rn e d w ith “d isag reem en ts o ver w o rk in g c o n d i
t io n s” b u t w o u ld no t be im p lica ted by a s ta te re g u la t io n
d ic ta t in g “w o rk in g cond it ions them selves .” 318 U.S. a t 7 .4
R e s p o n d e n t also relies on A tc h is o n , T o p e k a & S a n ta
F e R a ilw a y C o . v. B u e ll , 4 8 0 U.S. 5 5 7 ( 1 9 8 7 ) , w hich
involved the en tire ly d ifferen t qu es t io n of w h e th e r C o n
gress, in pass ing the R L A d isp u te re so lu tion provis ions,
im plied ly repea led the p reex is ting f e d e r a l s ta tu to ry cause
of ac tion for p ersona l in juries to ra i l ro a d w o rk e rs u n d e r
the F e d e ra l E m p lo y e rs ’ L iab il i ty A c t ( “ F E L A ” ) , 45
U .S .C . § 51 e t s e q . T h e s ta n d a rd s for reconc il ing tw o
federa l s ta tu tes a re des igned to effec tua te b o th s ta tu tes
w h e re possib le , an d are qu ite d iffe ren t from those involv
ing p re em p tio n of s ta te law b y a s ingle federa l e n a c tm e n t .5
T h e re fo re , th e C o u r t ’s dec is ion in B u e ll f inding th a t the
R L A d id n o t im plied ly rep ea l em p loyee F E L A rem edies
does n o t s tan d for the p ro p o s i t io n th a t s ta tes m a y en ac t
laws th a t p e rm it em ployees to c irc u m v en t R L A m in o r
4 Respondent implies (at 12-14) that Terminal allowed employees
to sue independently to enforce the Illinois Commerce Commission
ruling in state court. However, there is nothing to suggest that
employees could sue under the Illinois regulatory scheme. Even if
Terminal did not itself preclude state court actions by individual
employees, the case was decided in the wake of Moore v. Illinois
Central Railroad, 312 U.S. 630 (1941), and so the Court could rea
sonably have assumed concurrent state court jurisdiction over
minor dispute claims.
5 Compare, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608,
2617 (1992) (preemption analysis is rooted in the Supremacy
Clause, such that “state law that conflicts with federal law is
‘without effect’ ”) (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725,
746 (1981)), with Morton v. Mancani, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)
(“courts are not at liberty to pick and choose among congressional-
enactments, and when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is
the duty of the courts, absent, clearly expressed congressional inten
tion to the contrary, to regard each as effective”).
290
5
d isp u te reso lu tio n p ro cedures." In d eed , as d iscussed in fra
a t p . 16, B u e ll , re ad in co n tex t, c lea rly su p p o rts o u r posi
tion co n c ern in g the scope o f m in o r d ispu tes.
P ree m p tio n of sta te-law c la im s ra is in g m in o r d ispu tes
w ould n o t, in fac t, u n d e rm in e the s ta te s ’ leg itim a te in
terests in reg u la tin g p u b lic safe ty o r w o rk p la ce co n d i
tions; n o r w ou ld it th re a te n in d iv id u a l righ ts and in terests .
P ro v id ed th a t such s ta te law s are co n sis ten t w ith o th e r
fed e ra l law s an d th e C o n s titu tio n , th ey w ould rem ain
en fo rceab le ag a in s t em ployers th ro u g h re g u la to ry c h a n
nels, fo rm the floor fo r n e g o tia tio n of co n d itio n s u n d er
the b a rg a in in g ag reem en t,6 7 8 an d h av e to be tak en in to
ac co u n t in the R L A ad ju s tm en t b o a rd p rocess.” In d i
v idual em ployees co v ered u n d e r the R L A h av e the right
to p u rsu e th e ir ow n claim s b e fo re ad ju s tm en t b o ard s, 45
U .S .C . S 153 F irs t ( i ) and ( j ) , an d this C o u rt has recog
6 The Solicitor General (Br. 11, 14, 24-25) also includes Colorado
Anti-Discrimination Comm’n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372
U.S. 714 (19G3), as a case recognizing states’ power to enact and
enforce substantive protections outside of the scope of the RLA.
Respondent did not include Colorado Anti-Discrimination in his
argument, perhaps recognizing that that case, which involved a
claimant who was not covered by RLA adjustment board proce
dures, provides no insight on issues of RLA preemption. It may be,
too, that respondent recognizes Colorado Anti-Discrimination to
raise issues more closely akin to accommodation of federal statutes,
given the special and supportive relationship of federal and state
enforcement of laws protecting civil rights. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(c)
through (f). In any event, a state’s power to issue cease-and-
desist orders against offending carriers, as occurred in Colorado
Anti-Discrimination, is not necessarily implicated by a rule re
quiring employees to submit minor disputes to the federally-
mandated RLA arbitration procedures.
1 See, e.g., Independent Metal Workers (Hvghes Tool Co.), 147
NLRB 1573 (1964) (prohibiting bargaining to obtain illegal con
tract provisions discriminating among employees on invidious bases,
such as race, sex, or national origin).
8 See, e.g., United Papencorkers In t’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484
U.S. 29 (1987) (recognizing public policy grounds for judicial
rejection of arbitral awards).
291
6
n ized th a t a rb itra l fo ra can a n d do p ro v id e m ean in g fu l
a n d fu ll p ro te c tio n o f w o rk e rs ’ p u b lic p o licy rig h ts . S e e
G ilm e r v. I n t e r s t a t e / J o h n s o n L a n e C o r p ., 5 0 0 U .S. 2 0 , 26
(1 9 9 1 ) ° ; G a te w a y C o a l C o . v. U n ited M in e W o rk e r s ,
4 1 4 U .S . 368 ( 1 9 7 4 ) . T h a t C o n g ress itse lf h as c h a n
n elled R L A d isp u tes in to the a rb itra l fo ru m co u n se ls fo r
even g re a te r fa ith in th a t re m e d ia l schem e. T h u s , the
scope o f p re em p tio n u rg ed b y p e titio n e rs p reserves bo th
th e lan g u ag e an d leg isla tive in te n t u n d erly in g the R L A
w hile a t th e sam e tim e av o id in g in frin g em e n t o f th e s ta te s ’
leg itim a te po lice p o w er in te re sts .
II. RETALIATORY DISCHARGE CLAIMS PRESENT
ARBITRABLE MINOR DISPUTES
T h e issue as to w h ich c e r t io r a r i w as g ra n te d in th is case
is “ [w jh e th e r the H aw aii S u p rem e C o u rt e rred in co n c lu d
ing th a t re sp o n d e n t’s s ta te law w ro n g fu l d isch arg e claim s
w ere n o t p re e m p te d by the R a ilw a y L a b o r A c t, 45 U .S .C .
§ 1 5 1 e t s e q .” H a w a iia n A ir l in e s , In c . v . N o rr is , N o .
9 2 -2 0 5 8 (J a n u a ry 2 1 , 1 9 9 4 ) . F o r the reaso n s d iscussed
above , th a t q u es tio n tu rn s o n w h e th e r re sp o n d e n t’s w ro n g
fu l d isch arg e claim s co n s titu te a “m in o r d isp u te ” u n d e r
th e R L A . In o u r o p en in g b r ie f (P e t. B r. 8 -3 6 ) , we
show ed th a t the p la in lan g u ag e o f the R L A , its legisla tive
h is to ry a n d u n d erly in g p u rp o ses, an d its in te rp re ta tio n by
th is C o u rt all e s tab lish th a t re sp o n d e n t’s c la im s co n stitu te
a m in o r d isp u te su b jec t to R L A a rb itra tio n . R e sp o n d e n t’s
b rie f (R e sp . B r. 1 5 -4 0 ) a ttem p ts , b u t u ltim a te ly fails, to
su p p o rt a c o n tra ry p o sitio n u sin g tho se sam e sources.
0 The Solicitor General (Br. 26-27 n.24) attempts to distinguish
G i l m e r on the ground that the claim therein was governed by the
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which specifically excludes
transportation industry employees from its scope. However, it is
clear that Congress excluded those workers from the FAA exactly
because their disputes are already subject to arbitration through
separate legislation. S e e T e n n e y E n p ’p , I n c . v . U n i t e d E le c . R a d io
& M a c h . W o r k e r s , 207 F.2d -150, 452 (3d Cir. 1953).
292
7
A. Statutory Language
T h is C o u rt has re p e a te d ly held th a t the p la in m ean in g
of a s ta tu te 's lan g u ag e co n tro ls its in te rp e r ta tio n .10 T h e
s ta tu to ry lan g u ag e a t issue in this case defines th e ca teg o ry
of m in o r d isp u tes as “g ro w in g o u t o f g rievances o r o u t .
of th e in te rp re ta tio n o r ap p lic a tio n of ag reem en ts co n
ce rn in g ra te s o f pay , ru les, o r w o rk in g co n d itio n s .” 45
U .S .C . § 2 0 4 . O u r b asic co n te n tio n is th a t by inc lud ing
d ispu tes “g row ing o u t o f g riev an ces” in ad d itio n to d is
pu tes o ver in te rp re ta tio n o r ap p lica tio n , the R L A en co m
passes m o re th a n ju s t d isp u te s inv o k in g so m e c o n tra c tu a l
righ t, an d c e rta in ly en co m p asses n o n -c o n trac tu a l re ta lia
to ry d isch arg e c laim s such as th e one asse rted here . S e e
Pet. B r. 9-11.
R e sp o n d e n t ad v an ces a c o n tra ry in te rp re ta tio n , based
on tw o arg u m en ts. F ir s t, re sp o n d en t a rgues (R esp . B r.
17-18) th a t the term “g riev a n ces” does n o t in c lu d e w o rk
place d isc ip line an d d isch arg e cases unless the “g riev an ce”
itself requ ires in te rp re ta tio n o r ap p lica tio n o f the co l
lective ag reem en t. Such a co n s tru c tio n read s the p h rase
“g row ing o u t of g riev a n ces” o u t of the s ta tu te . Second,
respo n d en t co n ten d s th a t th e w ord “o r ,” as used in the
sta tu te , c a n n o t be u n d e rs to o d in th e tra d itio n a l sense th a t
the w ord is used, i .e . , as p re sen tin g a lte rn a tiv e s , e ith e r one
of w hich co u ld sa tisfy a g iven co n d itio n . T h u s , re sp o n d
ent co n ten d s th a t a lth o u g h the s ta tu te en com passes dis
putes “grow ing o u t o f g riev an ces o r o u t o f the in te rp re
ta tion o r ap p lica tio n o f ag reem en ts co n cern in g ra te s of
pay, ru les, o r w o rk in g co n d itio n s ,” it rea lly on ly includes
the la tte r ca teg o ry , w ith the fo rm e r ca teg o ry being
m ean ing less.* 11
'°E.g„ Negonsott. v. Samuels, 113 S. Ct. 1119, 1122-23 (1993);
Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 112 S. Ct. 2589, 2594
(1992) ; United States v. Ron Pair Enter. Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241
(1989).
11 This Court long; ago held that “the construction of a statute
is preferred which gives all the words in it an operative mean
ing.” Early v. Doe, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 610 (1853). Respondent
is wrong to suggest (at 20) that our reading of the term “griev-
293
8
R e sp o n d e n t’s co n s tru c tio n flies in the face o f th is
C o u r t’s reco g n itio n th a t “ [c ja n o n s o f co n s tru c tio n o rd i
n a r ily suggest th a t te rm s co n n e c ted by a d is ju n c tiv e be
g iven se p a ra te m ean in g s , un less th e co n tex t d ic ta te s o th e r
w ise .” E .g ., R e i t e r v. S o n o to n e C o r p ., 4 4 2 U .S. 3 3 0 , 339
(1 9 7 9 ) (u se o f th e p h ra se “busin ess o r p ro p e rty ” in § 4
o f the C lay to n A c t in d ic a te d th a t “p ro p e r ty ” m ean s so m e
th in g o th e r th a n “ b u sin ess” ) . * 12 R e sp o n d e n t sp ecu la tes
(R e sp . B r. 2 1 -2 2 ) th a t in e n a c tin g th e p h ra se “g ro w in g
o u t of g riev a n ces” as a s e p a ra te c a te g o ry o f d isp u tes fro m
th o se in v o lv in g in te rp re ta tio n o r ap p lic a tio n , C o n g ress
“co u ld w ell h a v e ” in ten d ed to en c o m p a ss im p lied as well
as exp ress ag reem en ts , o r “m ig h t eq u a lly h av e b een c o n
c e rn e d ” th a t in d iv id u a l as well as co llec tive d isp u tes be
inc luded . E v en a p a r t from the ex is ten ce o f leg isla tive
h is to ry re fu tin g th is c o n te n tio n , see b e lo w a t 12-14,
re sp o n d e n t’s h y p o th eses as to w h a t C o ngress m ig h t h av e
in ten d ed a re insuffic ien t to overco m e the p re su m p tio n th a t
in u sing the te rm “o r ” to ap p ly to d isp u tes “g ro w in g ou t
o f g riev an ces ,” C o n g ress m e a n t to in c lu d e d isp u tes o th e r
th a n ju s t tho se g ro w in g “o u t o f the in te rp re ta tio n or
a p p lica tio n o f a g reem en ts .” 13
ances” would render the interpretation/application category "mere
surplusage.” Because disputes over interpretation or application
of agreements may be submitted to arbitration by employers as
well as employees, 45 U.S.C. § 184, there are clearly interpretation/
application disputes that are not “grievances.” It is respondent’s
position, not ours, that attempts to read words out of the statute.
12 See also Brook Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993); Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S.
70, 73 (1984) ; F C C v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 739-740
(1978).
13 The appositional usage of “or” cited by the Solicitor General
(Br. 15 n.13) is not consistent with the language of 45 U.S.C.
§ 204 because the phrase “out of” is repeated before both the word
“grievances” and the words “interpretation or application of agree
ments.” The grammar is clearly distinguishable from the apposi
tional example—“fell over a precipice or cliff”—relied upon by the
Solicitor General (Br. 15 n.13) based upon the third meaning of
“or” from a 1986 dictionary. The phrase “fell over a precipice or
294
9
M o re o v e r, re sp o n d e n t is fla tly w ro n g in a rg u in g th a t
the w o rd “g riev an ces” as u sed in the R L A ’s “G en era l
P u rp o ses” an d “ A d ju s tm e n t B o a rd ” sec tions (4 5 U .S .C .
§§ 1 5 1 a ( 5 ) , 153 F ir s t ( i ) , a n d 2 0 4 ) en com passes in the
lab o r re la tio n s se ttin g o n ly c o n tra c tu a l g rievances. O ne
respected c o m m e n ta to r w ritin g c o n te m p o ran eo u s ly w ith
the ad o p tio n o f the R L A in 1926 exp ressed the c lea r
u n d e rs ta n d in g th a t the term “g riev a n ces” w as u n d ers to o d
w ith in th e ra ilro a d in d u s try to in c lu d e d isp u tes beyond
the scope o f the b a rg a in in g ag reem en t:
R a ilro a d lab o r d isp u tes m ay be d iv ided roug h ly in to
tw o classes: first, m a jo r d isp u tes , tho se arising ou t
o f p ro p o sed ch a n g es in ex is tin g ra te s o f w ages, h o u rs
o r w o rk in g co n d itio n s ; second , m in o r d ispu tes, those
a ris in g ou t o f th e a p p lic a tio n o r in te rp re ta tio n o f the
p rov isions o f an aw a rd o r an ag reem en t w ith respect
to w ages, h o u rs o r w o rk in g co n d itio n s . P e r s o n a l
g r ie v a n c e s a r e a ls o o r d in a r ily in c lu d e d in th e c a t e
g o r y o f “m in o r d is p u te s .”
H. W olf, T h e R a i l r o a d L a b o r B o a r d 5 0 (1 9 2 7 ) (e m
phasis a d d e d ) . F u rth e rm o re , th e te rm “g riev an ces ,” read
in co n tex t ap p ly in g n o rm a l ru les o f g ra m m a r a n d s ta tu
to ry co n s tru c tio n , in c lu d es n o n -c o n tra c tu a l c la im s b y em
ployees.14 F in a lly , d isc ip lin e an d d isch arg e cases as a
over a cliff” would be analogous to Section 204’s language, and that
phrase conveys a purely disjunctive meaning, in which the word
“fell” applies to the two separate categories, just as Section 204’s
language extends both to disputes growing out of grievances and
also to disputes growing out of interpretation or application of
agreements. None of the cases cited by respondent (at 19) and
the Solicitor Genera! (at 15) in which this Court has interpreted
or” in its appositional sense involved the repetition of a verb-
preposition phrase as Congress did in Section 204.
14 For instance, the National Labor Relations Board has on
numerous occasions used the term in its broadest sense; indeed,
there is a category of unfair labor practices involving an em
ployer’s non-contractual solicitation of “grievances” that the NLRB
has identified as violating NLRA Section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1). See, e.g., Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. NLRB,
904 F.2d 1156, 1157 (7th Cir. 1990) ; NLRB v. Aquatech, Inc.,
926 F.2d 538, 544 (6th Cir. 1991).
295
c lass w e re co n s id e red to be w ith in the ca te g o ry o f “g riev
an ces” p r io r to th e tim e th a t a ir c a rr ie rs c a m e to be
e n c o m p a ssed w ith in th e A c t. E .g ., G a rriso n , T h e N a
t io n a l R a i l r o a d A d ju s tm e n t B o a r d : A U n iq u e A d m in is t r a
t iv e A g e n c y , 4 6 Y a le L .J . 5 6 7 , 5 8 6 ( 1 9 3 7 ) ( “ [q ju e s tio n s
o f d isc ip lin e o r re fu sa l to p ro m o te (c o n s titu tin g ‘g riev
a n c e s ’) a re rev iew ab le by the B o a rd ” ) ; P e t. B r. 1 2 -14 .”
In S ec tio n 2 0 4 , C o n g ress fu r th e r m ad e it c le a r th a t
a d ju s tm e n t b o a rd ju risd ic tio n ex ten d ed to n o n -c o n trac t-
b a se d d isch arg e c la im s by tra n s fe rr in g to a d ju s tm e n t
b o a rd s “cases p e n d in g an d u n a d ju s te d on A p ril 10, 1936
b e fo re th e N a tio n a l L a b o r R e la tio n s B o a rd .” 45 U .S .C .
§ 184 . C o n tra ry to re sp o n d e n t’s su g g estio n (R e sp . B r.
2 2 -2 3 ) , C o n g ress d id n o t p u rp o r t to lim it the cases tra n s
fe rred fro m th e N L R B to R L A ad ju s tm e n t b o a rd s so lely
to c o n tra c t-b a se d c la im s. T o th e c o n tra ry , C o n g ress w as
w ell aw are fro m tes tim o n y p r io r to e n a c tm e n t o f S ec tio n
2 0 4 th a t p u b lic p o licy d isch arg e c la im s w o u ld be am o n g
the types o f c la im s ex p ec ted to be tra n s fe rre d to R L A
d isp u te re so lu tio n p rocesses. S e e P e t. B r. a t 12, 18. B y
c o n tra s t, th e re is ab so lu te ly n o th in g in th e leg is la tiv e h is
to ry to su p p o rt re sp o n d e n t’s v iew th a t on ly co n tra c t-b ase d
c la im s w ere tra n s fe rre d .* 10
10
15 Respondent also argues that the CBA at issue in this case
itself employs a limited definition of "grievance.” This assertion
has no bearing on this dispute, for it is Congress’s construction of
the term in the context of Section 204 which is at issue. Even
if the parties’ intent were at issue, the RLA language and legis
lative history would be the appropriate starting place for the
discussion, since the CBA in Art. XVII.P specifically provides that
the CBA cannot be construed in any way to limit the rights of
employees, their unions, or the company under the RLA. (Pet.
App. 58a.) Moreover, even if the parties to the CBA sought to
exclude a class of covered grievances from RLA-mandated proce
dures, it would be precluded from doing so. C a p r a r o v . U n i t e d
P a r c e l S e r v . Co., 993 F.2d 323, 33G-337 (3d Cir. 1993).
10 Thus, for instance, the NLRB’s annua! reports from the same
period do not indicate that any attempt was made by the NLRB
to limit the types of airline cases transferred to RLA dispute
resolution bodies. S e e F i r s t A n n u e l R e p o r t , o f t h e N a t i o n a l L a b o r
R e l a t i o n s B o a r d (1936) at 29, 30, 35, 36, 39, 41, 43; S e c o n d An-
296
11
In ad d itio n , C o ngress h as expressly re fe rre d ra ilro a d
em ployees’ “w h istleb lo w er” c laim s to R L A a rb itra tio n . 45
U .S .C . § 4 4 1 ( c ) ; s e e P e t. B r. 12-14. T h e S o lic ito r G e n
eral c o n c e d e s ( a t 13 n . l l ) th a t ra ilro a d em ployees’ state-
law w h istleb lo w er cla im s “m ay be p re e m p te d ” by this
s ta tu to ry p ro v is io n , b u t a rg u es th a t C o n g ress w ou ld n o t
have fo u n d it n ecessary to re fe r su ch cla im s to a rb itra tio n
had it th o u g h t they w ere a lre ad y th ere . T h a t a rg u m e n t
com plete ly igno res leg isla tive h is to ry d em o n s tra tin g th a t
C o n g ress in fa c t h a d th e o p p o site u n d e rs ta n d in g : th a t
em ployees “a lre ad y rece iv e [d ] s im ila r p ro te c tio n . . .
th ro u g h th e g riev an ce p ro c e d u re ” existing" a t the tim e, and
the ad d itio n o f s ta tu to ry lan g u ag e w as n o t m e a n t “ to a lte r
the ex is tin g p ro tec tio n , b u t ra th e r to p u t the p ro h ib itio n
of d isc rim in a tio n in to s ta tu to ry fo rm .” H .R . R ep . N o .
1025 , 9 6 th C ong ., 2d Scss. 8 (1 9 8 0 ) . B ecause a irlin e
em ployees a re su b jec t to th e “ex isting p ro te c tio n ” p ro
vided b y the R L A , th e ir w h istleb lo w er c la im s are also
sub jec t to R L A g riev an ce p ro c ed u re s , an d , thus, u n d e r
the S o lic ito r G e n e ra l’s log ic as w ell as o u r o w n ,. th e ir
s ta te law c la im s are p reem p ted .
R e sp o n d en t, b u t n o t th e S o lic ito r G e n e ra l, a rgues
(R esp . B r. 3 0 ) th a t th e F R S A ’s “e lec tion o f rem ed ies”
prov ision , 4 5 U .S .C . § 4 4 1 ( d ) , allow s em ployees to p u r
sue s ta te-law w h istleb lo w er ac tio n s. T h is a rg u m e n t is
easily d isp en sed w ith. A s the F o u r th C irc u it he ld in
R a y n e r v. S m irl, 873 F .2 d 60, 6 6 n . l ( 4 th C ir .) , c e r t ,
d en ied , 493 U .S. 876 ( 1 9 8 9 ) , a case c ited w ith ap p ro v a l
by the S o lic ito r G e n e ra l ( a t 13 n . l l ) , sec tio n 4 4 1 ( d )
does n o t p ro v id e an em ployee w ith an e lec tion o f re m e
dies to p u rsu e sta te-law w ro n g fu l d isch arg e c la im s p u rsu
an t to “ the co m m on law rem ed ies o f the fifty s ta te s ,” b u t
ra th e r w as in ten d ed to p re se rv e ex is tin g f e d e r a l rem edies.
n u a l R e p o r t o f t h e N a t i o n a l L a b o r R e l a t i o n s B o a r d (1937) at 15,
20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 28. Nor would it be expected that the NLRB
would retain any airline cases in light of the specific exclusion of
RLA employers from NLRA coverage since that Act’s inception.
S e e NLRA Section 2(2), contained in 2 NLRB, Legislative His
tory of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, at 3271 (1935).
297
1 2
In d e ed , C o n g ress m ad e c le a r th a t “ the p ro te c tio n s p ro
v id ed [in th e A c t] w o u ld b e en fo rce d s o le ly th ro u g h the
ex is tin g g riev a n ce p ro c e d u re s p ro v id e d fo r in S ec tio n 3 of
th e R a ilw a y L a b o r A c t,” a n d th a t it “ in te n d fe d ] th is to be
th e e x c lu s iv e m ean s fo r e n fo rc in g th is sec tio n .” H .R . R ep .
N o . 1025 , 9 6 th C o n g ., 2 d Sess. 8, 16 (e m p h a s is a d d e d ) ,
r e p r in t e d in 19 8 0 U .S .C .C .A .N . 3 8 3 0 , 3 8 3 2 , 3 8 4 1 .17
B. Legislative History
In o u r o p e n in g b r ie f ( a t 1 5 -1 9 ) , we sh o w ed th a t the
R L A ’s leg is la tiv e h is to ry , from th e tim e o f its en a c tm en t
th ro u g h its su b se q u e n t rev isions, su p p o rts o u r p o sitio n
th a t d isp u te s o v e r d isch arg e a n d d isc ip lin e , even if n o n
c o n tra c tu a l in o rig in , a re “g riev an ces” w ith in th e scope
o f th e A c t. T h u s , fo r in s tan ce , key leg is la to rs a t th e tim e
th e R L A w as p assed expressed the u n d e rs ta n d in g th a t the
c a te g o ry n o w k n o w n as m in o r d isp u tes in c lu d ed “g riev
a n c es” a n d “a ls o . . . d isp u tes a ris in g o u t o f th e in te rp re
ta tio n an d a p p lic a tio n o f ex is tin g a g reem en ts ,” 67 C ong.
R ec . 8 8 0 7 ( 1 9 2 6 ) ( s ta te m e n t o f Sen. W a tso n ) (em p h asis
su p p lie d ) , a n d “d isag reem en ts o v e r g riev an ces, in te rp re ta
tions, d isc ip lin e , a n d o th e r te ch n ic a litie s th a t a rise from
tim e to tim e in th e w o rk sh o p a n d o u t on the tra c k s in the
o p e ra tio n o f th e ro a d s .” 67 C o n g . R ec . 4 5 1 7 (1 9 2 6 )
(s ta te m e n t o f R ep . B a rk le y ) .
R e sp o n d e n t c ites (R e sp . B r. 2 5 -2 6 ) th ree p o rtio n s of
th e R L A ’s leg isla tive h is to ry to c la im th a t the q u o te d leg
is la to rs defined th e ca te g o ry o f m in o r d isp u tes in n a rro w er
te rm s as en c o m p a ss in g on ly d isp u tes o ver in te rp re ta tio n
o r a p p lic a tio n o f ag reem en ts . In each case, h o w ev er, the
to p ic a t h a n d w as n o t the g en e ra l sco p e o f th e m in o r dis
17 Whereas respondent insinuates (Resp. Br. 16) that the RLA
adjustment procedures are inadequate to adjudicate claims of the
type presented here, Congress has taken exactly the opposite view
in expressly retaining employee whistleblower claims within the
RLA structure pursuant to the FRSA. It should also be noted
that this Court has ignored claimed inadequacies of the grievance
procedure when considering the preemptive power of the RLA.
S e e Petitioners Br. 29 n.19. S e e a lso A n d r e w s , 406 U.S. at 330,
335-336 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
298
13
p u te ca teg o ry , b u t ra th e r th e d is tin c tio n betw een m in o r
d isp u tes an d m a jo r d ispu tes, w hich involve “d isp u tes o v er
the fo rm a tio n o f co llec tive ag reem en ts o r efforts to secu re
chan g es in th em .” E lg in , J . & E . R y . v. B u r ley , 325 U .S.
7 11 , 7 2 3 ( 1 9 4 5 ) . T h u s, a p o rtio n o f the q u o ta tio n fro m
R ep re sen ta tiv e B ark ley (R esp . B r. 2 5 ) , o m itted in ellipses
from re sp o n d e n t’s b rief, m akes c lea r th a t the q u o ted p as
sage re fe rs to a c o n tra s t b e tw een the ro le o f ad ju s tm en t
b o ard s in re so lv in g m in o r d isp u tes and a ro le n o t g iven
to such b o a rd s— d ea lin g w ith “ch an g es o f w ages, th e ir in
creases o r dec reases o r ch an g e in w o rk in g co n d itio n s o r
hours o f se rv ice .” S ubcom m . on L a b o r o f S enate C om m ,
on L a b o r an d P u b lic W elfare , 9 3 d C ong ., 2d Sess., L eg
islative H is to ry o f the R a ilw ay L a b o r A c t, A s A m en d ed
(1 9 2 6 th ro u g h 1 9 6 6 ) 192 (C o m m . P rin t 1 9 7 4 ) [h e re
in a fte r c ited as “ R L A L eg. H is t.” ].
L ikew ise , the sen tence im m ed ia te ly p r io r to the second
q u o ta tio n from R ep re sen ta tiv e B ark ley (R esp . B r. 2 6 ) ,
also o m itte d from re sp o n d e n t’s b rief, m ak es c lea r th a t he
was d ra w in g a d is tin c tio n betw een th e ad ju s tm en t b o a rd s ’
pow er to in te rp re t o r ap p ly ag reem en ts an d the fa c t th a t
“ [t]h e ad ju s tm en t b o a rd s w ere n o t given th e p ow er to co n
sider c h a n g es in w o rk in g co n d itio n s .” R L A L eg . H ist.
205 . F in a lly , re sp o n d e n t’s q u o ta tio n from S en a to r W a t
son (R e sp . B r. 2 6 ) , om its in ellipses re m a rk s m ak
ing c le a r th a t he too w as c o n tra s tin g the ad ju s tm en t
boards p o w er to settle d isp u tes over the in te rp re ta tio n
and ap p lica tio n o f ag reem en ts “ th o u g h th ey do n o t d ea l
w ith th e la rg e r an d m ore d ra s tic an d the m o re d an g e ro u s
p rob lem o f c h a n g e s in th e r a t e s o f p a y o r in th e c o n d i
tion s o f s e r v ic e o r in th e h o u r s o f w o rk '' ’ R L A L eg.
H ist. 4 8 0 (e m p h a sis a d d e d ) .18
I t sh o u ld n o t be su rp ris in g th a t leg isla to rs m ig h t have
used n a rro w e r lan g u ag e co n c e rn in g in te rp re ta tio n /a p p lic a -
18 Although respondent also attempts to divine significance in
quotations from Donald Richberg (at 24-25 & n.20), a private
citizen testifying before a different, Congress about a bill that did
not pass, those quotations nDo appear to have been made in the
context of distinguishing major from minor disputes.
299
1 4
tio n o f ag reem en ts in d is tin g u ish in g m in o r d isp u tes from
m a jo r d isp u tes . A s w e show ed in o u r o p e n in g b r ie f in
d iscussing the C o n r a i l case ( a t 2 6 -2 7 ) , an d as re sp o n d e n t
n o w h ere re b u ts , the d is tin c tio n b e tw een m a jo r an d m in o r
d isp u tes is fu n d a m e n ta lly ab o u t th e c h a ra c te r o f a d isp u te
vis-a-vis an ag reem en t: w h e th e r a d isp u te invo lves a
ch an g e in an ag reem en t su b jec t to N M B m ed ia tio n p ro
ced u res (m a jo r d is p u te ) , o r invo lves in te rp re ta tio n o f an
ag reem en t su b jec t to R L A a rb itra tio n (m in o r d is p u te ) .
T h is d iv id in g line does n o t call in to p lay the ty p e o f in
d iv id u a l d isc ip lin e an d d isch arg e g riev an ces a t issue h ere ,
w hich are c lea rly n o t m a jo r d ispu tes.
A s to su b seq u e n t am en d m en ts to the R L A , re sp o n d e n t
c ites (R e sp . B r. 2 8 ) a s ta tem en t from a H o u se R e p o r t in
co n n e c tio n w ith the 19 3 4 am en d m e n ts as e q u a tin g “g riev
an ces” w ith c o n tra c tu a l d isp u tes . T h a t sam e R e p o rt
n o ted , h o w ev er, th a t “ [ t jh e b ill does n o t in tro d u c e any
new p rin c ip le s in to the ex is tin g R a ilw a y L a b o r A c t,”
H .R . R ep . N o . 1944 , 7 3 d Cong.', 2d Sess. 2 , 6 ( 1 9 3 4 ) ,
an d w e h av e show n th a t n e ith e r th e s ta tu to ry lan g u ag e
n o r C o n g ress 's in te n t w as so lim ited . R e sp o n d e n t also
re lies u p o n a H o u se R e p o r t on the 1936 am en d m en ts
excusing a d e lay in th e fo rm a tio n o f a irlin e ad ju s tm e n t
b o a rd s o n th e g ro u n d th a t they w o u ld h av e “ n o th in g to
d o ” p en d in g fo rm a tio n o f ag reem en ts in the a irlin e in
dustry , b u t re sp o n d e n t o m its the very n ex t passag e o f th a t
R e p o rt, w h ich s ta tes th a t “ t e m p o r a r y b o a r d s m ig h t b e
c r e a t e d . . . t o s e t t le in d iv id u a l d is p u te s” d u rin g th is in
te rim c o n tra c t-fo rm a tio n p e rio d . H .R . R ep . N o . 2 2 4 3 ,
7 4 th C o n g ., 2 d Sess. 1 (1 9 3 6 ) .
C. Supreme Court Decisions
In B u r ley , th is C o u rt es tab lish ed th a t m in o r d ispu tes
“ re la te f j e ith e r to th e m ean in g o r p ro p e r a p p lica tio n o f a
p a r tic u la r p ro v is io n o r to an o m itted ca se” in w h ich “ the
c la im is fo u n d e d u p o n som e in c id e n t o f the em p lo y m en t
re la tio n , o r asse rted one . in d e p e n d e n t o f th o s e c o v e r e d by
th e c o l l e c t iv e a g r e e m e n t :' 325 U .S. a t 7 2 3 (em p h asis
a d d e d ) . W h ereas re sp o n d e n t c la im s th a t the B u r le y C o u rt
300
15
re ach e d th is q u es tio n in d ic ta , a fa ir re ad in g o f th a t case
estab lishes o th erw ise . T h e issue in B u r ley w as w h e th e r
the u n io n o r the in d iv id u a l em ployee h ad th e final say in
settlin g m in o r d ispu tes. T h e C o u rt fo u n d it “difficult to
b e lieve” th a t C o n g ress in ten d ed to “ subm erge w holly the
in d iv id u a l . . . in te re s ts” n o t on ly w ith re g a rd to “ fo rm in g
the c o n tra c ts w hich g o v ern th e ir em ploym en t re la tio n , b u t
also in g iv ing effect to th em a n d to a l l o t h e r in c id en ts o f
th a t r e la t io n .” 325 U .S . a t 7 3 3 -3 4 ( fo o tn o te o m itte d )
(em p h asis a d d e d ) . A s th e C o u r t ex p la in ed , su b m erg in g
the em p lo y ee’s in te re s t to th a t o f th e un io n co u ld have
“d ra s tic effec ts” in cases “w here the g riev an ce arises from
in c id en ts o f th e e m p lo y m e n t r e la t io n n o t c o v e r e d by a
c o l le c t iv e a g r e e m e n t , in w hich p re su m ab ly the co llective
in te re st w o u ld be affec ted on ly rem ote ly , if a t all . . . .”
Id . a t 7 3 6 . T h u s , w hile th e em ployee claim s add ressed in
B u rley w ere c o n tra c tu a l in n a tu re , th e ex istence o f R L A
a rb itra l ju risd ic tio n o v er n o n -c o n trac tu a l g rievances p layed
an im p o rta n t p a r t in the C o u r t’s h o ld in g in th a t case .155
N o r ca n re sp o n d e n t c a s t off the w eigh t o f B u r ley by
a rg u in g th a t the o m itted case desc rib ed th e re in applies
only to “ im p lied ” c o n tra c t term s. T h a t a rg u m en t is flatly
in co n sis ten t w ith the B u r le y C o u r t’s id en tifica tio n o f a
p e rso n a l in ju ry c la im as an ex am p le of an o m itted case.
M o reo v er, the c e n tra l p rem ise o f B u r ley is th a t th ere is a
class o f d isp u tes w ith in R L A ju risd ic tio n as to w hich “ the
co llec tive in te re st w o u ld be affected only rem o te ly ,” 325 10
10 Respondent also argues that Burley’s omitted case discussion
“was based on the understanding that the grievance-arbitration
procedures provided for in the RLA are optional” pursuant to this
Court’s since-overruled Moore decision, and that the quoted lan
guage has thus gone the way of Moore itself. Rut Burley’s ex
planation of the scope of the minor dispute category was in no
way dependent on Moore, and in any event, this Court in Conrail
expressly recognized and quoted Burley’s “omitted case” discus
sion long after Moore had been overruled. 491 U.S. at 303. Conrail’s
use of the above-quoted language from Burley is also fatal to re
spondent’s argument (at 35-36 n.25) that this Court somehow un
dermined this language by failing to repeat it in its opinion on
rehearing in Burley.
301
16
U .S . a t 7 3 6 , an d im p lied c o n tra c t te rm s im p lica te th e
co llec tive in te re s t in ju s t th e sam e w ay as express p ro v i
sions. S e e , e .g ., C o n r a il , 491 U .S. 2 9 9 ( 1 9 8 9 ) ( s u it o v er
“im p lied ” c o n tra c t te rm p ro se c u te d b y la b o r o rg a n iz a
t io n ) .
F in a lly , th is C o u r t’s re cen t dec is ion in B u e ll a c co rd s
w ith B u rley 's ex p ansive re ad in g o f the m in o r d isp u te c a te
gory . In B u e ll th is C o u r t co u ld h av e av o id ed the q u es
tio n o f w h e th e r the R L A im p lied ly re p ea led F E L A re m e
d ies b y sim ply ad o p tin g th e N in th C irc u it’s find ing th a t
the em p lo y ee’s p e rso n a l in ju ry c laim w as n o t a m in o r d is
p u te w ith in R L A ad ju s tm e n t b o a rd ju r isd ic tio n . S e e
B u e ll v. A tc h is o n , T o p e k a a n d S a n ta F e R y ., I l l F .2 d
1320 , 1323 (9 th C ir. 1 9 8 5 ) (d isp u te w as n o t an a rb i
trab le m in o r d isp u te b ec au se “ it is n e ith e r re la te d to th e
co llec tive b a rg a in in g p ro cess n o r a rg u ab ly g o v ern ed b y
its p ro v is io n s” ) . In s te a d the C o u rt exp ressly assum ed th a t
an R L A a d ju s tm en t b o a rd w ou ld h av e ju r isd ic tio n o ver
B u ell's n o n -c o n trac t-b a sed p e rso n a l in ju ry c la im , a n d c ited
p rio r cases inv o lv in g o rd in a ry p e rso n a l in ju ry c la im s—
also ap p a re n tly u n re la te d to the te rm s o f an y b a rg a in in g
ag reem en t— fo r th e p ro p o s itio n th a t p ra c tice s ca u sin g p e r
son a l in ju rie s “m ig h t h av e b een cu red o r av o id ed b y the
tim ely in v o ca tio n o f the g riev an ce m a c h in e ry .” 4 8 0 U .S .
a t 5 6 4 & n . l 1.
A n d r e w s es tab lishes th a t w ro n g fu l te rm in a tio n cla im s
w hich co n s titu te “m in o r d isp u tes” m u st b e reso lv ed
th ro u g h R L A a rb itra tio n even if th e c la im a n t m ig h t en jo y
b e tte r p ro c ed u re s and rem ed ies if allow ed to p u rsu e a
c la im aris in g fro m the d isch arg e u n d e r s ta te law . 4 0 6
U .S. a t 3 2 5 ; s e e P e t. B r. 2 8 -30 . B ased o n th e C o u r t’s
o b se rv a tio n in A n d r e w s th a t the so u rce o f th e em p lo y ee’s
c la im w as th e co llec tiv e b a rg a in in g ag reem en t, re sp o n d e n t
a rg u es th a t A n d r e w s he ld affirm atively th a t o n ly co n tra c t-
based c la im s a re m in o r d isp u tes u n d e r th e A c t. If
A n d r e w s h a d so h e ld , it w ou ld h av e a m o u n te d to an
o v erru lin g o f B u r ley , an d th ere is no ev idence th a t the
C o u rt in ten d ed su ch a resu lt. M o re o v e r, s ince B u r le y ’s
o m itted case d iscussion w as c ited w ith ap p ro v a l in Con-
302
17
ra il, see n o te 19 su p ra , re sp o n d e n t’s a tte m p t to c o n v e rt
o b se rv a tio n s co n c e rn in g a ch a ra c te ris tic o f th e c la im in
A n d rew s in to an u n w a rra n te d legal lim ita tio n o n th e
scope o f m in o r d isp u tes is w holly u n av a ilin g .20 In d eed ,
re sp o n d en t’s p o s itio n is in co n s is ten t w ith th e strongly-
expressed p o licy in A n d r e w s an d its p ro g e n y th a t a r tfu l
p lead in g an d fo ru m sh o p p in g shou ld n o t be allow ed to
u n d erm in e th e in teg rity o f th e R L A ’s m a n d a to ry p ro c
esses. S e e P e t. B r. 3 8 -39 (c itin g c a se s ) .
III. RESPONDENT’S READING OF L I N G L E IS TOO
NARROW
W e show ed in o u r o p e n in g b rie f (P e t. B r. 3 9 -4 3 ) th a t
the H a w a ii S uprem e C o u r t e rred in an a lo g iz in g p re e m p
tion u n d e r th e R L A to th e L M R A S ection 301 p re em p
tion ru le app lied in L in g le v. N o r g e D iv is io n o f M a g ic
C h e f, In c ., 4 8 6 U .S. 399 (1 9 8 8 ) . T h is is so, in the first
in stan ce , b ecau se th e R L A m in o r d isp u te ca teg o ry in
cludes n o n -c o n tra c tu a l g rievances in ad d itio n to d isp u tes
over th e in te rp re ta tio n o r a p p lica tio n o f ag reem en ts , w hile
Section 301 re la te s on ly to “su its fo r v io la tio n o f c o n tra c ts
betw een an em p lo y er an d a la b o r o rg a n iz a tio n .” 29
U .S .C . § 1 8 5 ( a ) . R e sp o n d e n t’s a rg u m e n t th a t the s ta n d
ard ap p lied in L in g le is a p t (R e sp . B r. 4 0 -4 8 ) stem s from
a c o n tra ry u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e scope o f the R L A ’s m in o r
d ispu te p ro v is io n s, an d th u s fa lls a lo n g w ith its p rem ise .21
20 Andrews also disposes of respondent’s suggestion (Resp. Br.
33) that the Seventh Amendment requires recognition of a jury
trial right here. The Dissenting Justice’s Seventh Amendment
protestations, see 406 U.S. at 329 (Douglas, J., dissenting), were
not even addressed by the Andrews Court. Numerous other deci
sions of this Court hold state common law claims, and any allied
right to a jury trial, preempted by federal statutes. E.g., Cipol-
lone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2620-21 (1992) ;
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 111 S. Ct. 478,
481, 483 (1990) ; Chicago <& North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo
Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 315, 327 (1981).
21 For other differences between the RLA and LMRA that coun
sel against importation of the Lingle rule into the RLA context,
see Pet. Br. 39-43.
303
E v en if an a tte m p t w ere m ad e to im p o rt th e ru le in
L in g le in to the R L A c o n te x t— i .e . , even if the line w ere
d ra w n so th a t on ly in te rp re ta tio n / 'a p p lic a tio n d isp u tes
w ou ld be deem ed m in o r d isp u tes— the n a rro w in te rp re ta
tio n o f L in g le ad v a n ced b y re sp o n d e n t w ould still be flatly
in co n s is ten t w ith the R L A . R e sp o n d e n t first a rg u es u n d e r
L in g le (R e sp . B r. 4 8 -5 0 ) th a t c o n tra c tu a l defenses as
se r te d by an em p lo y er do no t c o u n t fo r p u rp o ses of an a ly z
ing w h e th e r a c la im is p reem p ted . T h a t a rg u m e n t is c learly
w ro n g u n d e r th is C o u r t’s dec ision in C o n r a il , how ever,
w hich held th a t th e ex is ten ce o f even an “ a rg u a b l[e j”
c o n tra c tu a l d efense is suffic ient to c rea te a m in o r d ispu te .
491 U .S. at 3 0 7 .22
S econd , re sp o n d e n t a rg u es th a t it does n o t m a tte r
w h e th e r re so lu tio n o f the c la im re q u ires “s o m e re fe ren ce
to a la b o r a g re e m e n t,” b u t ra th e r o n ly w h e th e r re fe ren ce
to an a g reem en t is im p lica ted in th e fo rm al legal elem ents
o f th e c la im asse rted , h e re sa id to be “a p u re ly fac tu a l
issue o f m o tiv e .” R esp . B r. 4 8 -4 9 (em p h asis in o r ig in a l) .
P u ttin g aside the fac t th a t q u es tio n s o f m o tive d o involve
c o n tra c t in te rp re ta t io n ,23 re sp o n d e n t’s p ro ffered legal ru le
in effect a sse rts th a t co u rts m ay in te rp re t la b o r ag reem en ts
in th e co u rse o f d ec id in g s ta te -law to r t cla im s so long as
1 8
22 Respondent’s citation (Resp. Br. 50 n.30) to Caterpillar, Inc.
v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987), is inapposite. Caterpillar merely
held that a state law claim may not be removed from state court
to federal court based on anticipated federal defenses. It did not
address whether those defenses preempt state law claims.
23 In resolving motive issues in discharge cases, courts routinely
examine contractual provisions. See, e.g., Jackson v. Seaboard
Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992, 1018 (11th Cir. 1982) (employer
may rebut plaintiff’s prima facie case of unlawful discrimina
tion by showing that less favorable treatment of employee
was in accordance with union contract). Because the plaintiff in
such a case bears the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding
the employer s motive for discharge, see NLRB v. Transportation
Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983), the plaintiff must address
cont] act interpretation issues to rebut the defendant’s proffered
motive.
304
19
the n eed to in te rp re t the ag reem en t does n o t arise from
the fo rm a l legal e lem en ts o f the c la im b e in g asserted . T h a t
is n o t how the lo w er c o u r ts have in te rp re ted L in g le ,-4 b u t
even if the case w ere o therw ise , such a ru le c lea rly cou ld
n o t o b ta in u n d e r th e R L A , w h ere ad ju s tm en t b o a rd s are
given e x c lu s iv e ju risd ic tio n to in te rp re t ra il an d a irlin e
lab o r ag reem en ts . E .g ., P en n sy lv a n ia R .R . v. D ay , 3 6 0
U.S. 5 4 8 ,5 5 3 (1 9 5 9 ) .
T h ese e rro rs in re sp o n d en t's analysis are im p o rta n t b e
cause , as we show ed in o u r open in g b rie f ( a t 4 3 -4 5 ) ,
ad ju d ic a tio n o f re sp o n d e n t’s w rongfu l d isch arg e claim s in
s ta te co u r t w o u ld invo lve issues o f in te rp re ta tio n o f the
lab o r ag reem en t, in c lu d in g a d e te rm in a tio n o f w h e th e r
re sp o n d en t w as in fac t “d isch a rg ed ,” 24 25 w h e th e r th e re w as
“ju st c a u se” to d isch arg e re sp o n d en t as the ag reem en t re
24 See, e.g., Mock v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522, 530
(10th Cir. 1992) (“[a]n analysis of whether T.G. & Y. acted
properly or not will inevitably require an analysis of what the CBA
permitted”) ; McCormick v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 934 F.2d 531,
537 (4th Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 912 (1992). We do not
mean to suggest that Lingle has been a bright line test which has
been consistently and uniformly applied by the lower courts; it
clearly has not. See, e.g., Beard v. Carrollton R.R., 893 F.2d 117,
122 & n.l (6th Cir. 1989) (contrasting Kentucky’s law of wrongful
interference with contract, which makes breach of contract an essen
tial element of the claim, with Ohio’s doctrine, which does not, and
holding that a state-law claim would be preempted under Kentucky
law but not Ohio law); Magerer v. John Sexton & Co., 912 F.2d 525,
529 (1st Cir. 1990).
25 Respondent (Resp. Br. 49-50) and the Solicitor General (Br.
12-14) assert that whether Norris was “discharged” may be de
termined solely by looking at state law and ignoring the collective
bargaining agreement and practices thereunder. This analytical
approach eviscerates RLA grievance procedures, which provide for
orderly review and adjustment of discipline. Because respondent’s
own invocation of the grievance machinery resulted in the termina
tion being converted to a suspension, Norris should not now be
able to ignore the more favorable result he obtained from the
company through the grievance process. Cf. Union Pacific R.R. v.
Price, 360 U.S. 601 (1959) (employee may not file state court
claims seeking redetermination of matters previously adjudicated
in RLA grievance proceeding he himself had initiated).
305
q u ires , w h e th e r A rtic le I V .D ( a ) o f th e C B A justified
d isc ip lin e o f N o rr is fo r re fu sin g to sign w o rk reco rd s , and
w h e th e r A rtic le X V I I .F of th e C B A , w h ich p ro tec ts em
ployees fro m d isc ip lin e fo r re fu sa l to w o rk in v io la tio n ol
s ta te o r fe d e ra l sa fe ty law s, app lies to re sp o n d e n t’s d ispu te .
A cco rd in g ly , even if th e R L A s ta n d a rd fo r p reem p tio n
re q u ire d th a t th e d isp u te invo lve in te rp re ta tio n o r ap p li
c a tio n o f an ag reem en t, re sp o n d e n t’s w ro n g fu l d ischarge
c laim s w ou ld b e p re em p ted u n d e r su ch a s ta n d a rd .
In o u r o p en in g b rie f an d in the p re ced in g sec tio n s, p e ti
tio n e rs offer a so lu tio n to th e R L A p re e m p tio n d eba te
w hich gives full w e ig h t to all re le v an t s ta tu to ry language ,
p ro p e r co n tex t to the R L A ’s h is to ry an d p u rp o se , an d due
d efe ren ce to each o f the p r io r ru lin g s o f th is C o u rt. In
c o n tra s t, re sp o n d e n t’s a p p ro ach w rites su b s tan tiv e p ro v i
sions o u t o f R L A S ections 1 5 1 a ( 5 ) . 153 F ir s t ( i ) , and
2 0 4 ; req u ires an a b a n d o n m e n t o f tra d itio n a l s ta tu to ry
co n s tru c tio n ru les; en co u rag es fo ru m sh o p p in g a n d in
co n sis ten t re su lts ; u n d erm in es the R L A ’s sch em e fo r re so
lu tio n o f w o rk p la ce d isp u tes ; a n d re q u ire s a rev e rsa l of
B u r le y ’s ex p lic it h o ld in g , c ited w ith ap p ro v a l in C o n ra il ,
th a t n o n -c o n tra c tu a l d isp u tes fa ll w ith in th e sco p e o f R L A
ad ju s tm e n t b o a rd ju risd ic tio n .20
2 0
20 Contrary to respondent’s assertion (Resp. Br. 31-32 and n.22),
there are many examples of adjustment boards taking into account
statutory protections and public policies in resolving RLA minor
disputes. S e e Public Law Board No. 1483, Award No. 15 (Novem
ber 7, 1975) (construing agreement in light of Hours of Service
Law); NRAB Third Division Award No. 14113 (January 25, 1966)
(deciding grievance by reference to California law imposing limit
on weight women could be ordered to lift) ; NRAB Third Division
Award No. 12970 (October 14, 1964) (deciding grievance by refer
ence to municipal licensing rules) ; NRAB Third Division Award
No. 4975 (July 31, 1950) (agreement construed in light of Hours
of Service Law); NRAB First Division Award No. 11224 (Febru
ary 24, 1947) (construing case law regarding continuity in service
rules). Copies of these awards have been lodged wdth the Clerk of
this Court. To the extent other boards have erroneously felt them
selves constrained to avoid such matters, this Court is in a position
to correct them with the decision herein.
306
R esp ec tfu ly su b m itted ,
Kenneth B. Hipp *
David J. Dezzani
Margaret C. J enkins
Lisa Von Der Mehden
Goodsill Anderson Quinn
& Stifel
1 0 9 9 A la k e a S t r e e t
1 8 0 0 A l i i P la c e
H o n o lu lu , H a w a i i 9 6 8 1 3
( 8 0 8 ) 5 4 7 -5 6 0 0
C ou n sel f o r P e t it io n ers
* C o u n s e l o f R e c o r d
307
No. 92-2058
i n tljp ££>upmn? Court of tljr ^Uiutrb g>tatr£
October T erm, 1993
H awaiian A ir u n es , Inc., et ai„, petitioners
v.
Grant T. N orris
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUI'ltEIUE COURT OF HAWAII
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING RESPONDENT
Drew S. Days, III
S o l i c i t o r G e n e r a l
F rank W. H unoer
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l
E dwin S. Kn e e di .er
D e p u t y S o l i c i t o r G e n e r a l
J ohn F . M anninc
A s s i s t a n t , to t h e S o l i c i t o r G e n e r a l
W illiam Ranter
E dward T. Swaine
A t t o r n e y s
D e p a r t m e n t o f J u s t i c e
W a s h i n g t o n , D .C . 2 0 5 3 0
(2 0 2 ) 5 H - 2 2 I ?
309
QUESTION PRESENTED
W h e t h e r r e s p o n d e n t ’s s t a t e l a w w r o n g f u l d i s c h a r g e c l a i m s
a r e p r e e m p t e d b y t h e R a i l w a y L a b o r A c t , 4 5 U .S .C . 151 et seq.
( I)
310
T A B L E OF C O N T E N T S
I n t e r e s t o f t h e U n i te d S t a t e s ................................................. 1
S ta t e m e n t ............................................................ 2
S u m m a r y o f a r g u m e n t ............................................................................... 6
A r g u m e n t :
R e s p o n d e n t ’s s t a t e t o r t c la im s c a n n o t b e c o n c lu s iv e ly
re s o lv e d b y in t e r p r e t i n g th e c o lle c tiv e b a r g a in in g a g r e e
m e n t a n d a r e th e r e f o r e n o t “m in o r d i s p u te s ” s u b je c t to
th e e x c lu s iv e a r b i t r a l m e c h a n is m o f th e R a ilw a y L a b o r
A c t ....................................................................................................................... g
A . T h e R a ilw a y L a b o r A c t e s ta b l i s h e s a n e x c lu s iv e a r b i
t r a l m e c h a n is m fo r “ m in o r d i s p u te s ” ................................ 8
B . R e s p o n d e n t ’s s t a t e t o r t c la im s a r e n o t “ m in o r d is
p u t e s ” b e c a u s e th e y c a n n o t b e c o n c lu s iv e ly re s o lv e d
b y i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e c o lle c tiv e b a r g a in in g a g r e e
m e n t ......................................................................................................... 11
C . N e i th e r t h e t e x t n o r t h e h is to r y o f th e R a ilw a y
L a b o r A c t s u p p o r ts th e b ro a d p r e e m p tio n o f s t a te
t o r t la w u r g e d b y p e t i t i o n e r s .................................................. 15
D . T h is C o u r t ’s d e c is io n s c o n s t r u in g S e c tio n 301 o f t h e
L a b o r - M a n a g e m e n t R e la t io n s A c t s u p p o r t th e c o n
c lu s io n t h a t r e s p o n d e n t ’s t o r t c la im s a r e n o t p r e
e m p t e d ........................................... !............................................... . 27
C o n c l u s i o n .............................................................................................................. 3 0
T A B L E O F A U T H O R I T I E S
C ases:
A llis-C ha lm ers Corp. v. Lu eck, 471 U .S . 202 (1 9 8 5 ) ........ 11, 26,
28 , 29, 30
A nderson v . A m erican A irlin es, Inc., 2 F .3 d 590 (5 th
C ir . 1 9 9 3 ) .................................................................................................... 30
Andrews v . L ou isv ille & N. R .R ., 406 U .S . 320 (1972) . . . 7 , 10,
1 1 ,2 1 , 29
(H I)
Pag e
311
Cases—Continued:
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v . Buell, 480 U .S . 557 (1 9 8 7 ) .. . . 7, 9, 11,
14, 22 , 23, 26
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v , Chicago R. & I. R.R.,
353 U .S . 30 ( 1 9 5 7 ) ................................................................................... 8 , 10, 21
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm’n v . Continental
Air Lines, Inc., 372 U .S . 714 (1963) .................7-8, 11, 14, 24 , 25, 29
Consolidated Rail Corp. v . Railway Labor Executives’
A ss’n, 491 U .S . 299 ( 1 9 8 9 ) ........ ............... 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 20
Davies v. American Air Lines, Inc., 971 F .2 d 463 (1 0 th
C ir . 1992), c e r t , d e n ie d , 113 S . C t . 243 9 (1993) .................... 30
Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v . Burley, 325 U .S . 711 (1945), a f f ’d
o n r e h ’g , 327 U .S . 661 (1946) ................................................. 8 , 9, 10, 23
Fort Halifax Packing Co. v . Coyne, 482 U .S . 1 (1 9 8 7 ) .. . 17, 26
Gilmer v . Inter state!Johnson Lane Corp., I l l S . C t.
164 7 (1 9 9 1 ) ................................................................................................. 26
Gunther v . San Diego & A. E. Ry., 382 U .S . 257
(1 9 6 5 ) ........... 11
Hubbard v. United Airlines, Inc., 927 F .2 d 1094 (9 th
C ir . 1 9 9 1 ) .................................................................................................... 30
International A ss’n of Machinists v . Central Airlines,
Inc., 372 U .S . 682 ( 1 9 6 3 ) ..................................................................... 9 , 29
Lingle v . Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U .S . 399
(1 9 8 8 ) ............................................................................................. 6, 27 , 28 , 29, 30
Local 174, Teamsters v . Lucas Flour Co., 369 U .S . 95
(1 9 6 2 ) ............................................................................................................... 27
Lorenz v . CSX Transportation, Inc., 980 F .2 d 263 (4 th
C ir . 1 9 9 2 ) ................................. 30
Maher v . New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 5 9 3
A .2 d 750 (N.J. 1 9 9 1 ) .......................................... 30
Moore v . Illinois Central R.R., 312 U .S . 630 (1941) ......... 11,20
McNally v . United States, 483 U .S . 3 5 0 (1 9 8 7 ) .................... 15
O’Brien v . Consolidated Rail Corp., 972 F ,2 d 1 (1 s t C ir .
1992), c e r t , d e n ie d , 113 S . C t. 980 ( 1 9 9 3 ) .........................., . . . . 30
Page
V
Pittsburgh & L.E. R.R. v . Railway Labor Executives'
A ss’n, 491 U .S . 4 9 0 ( 1 9 8 9 ) ............................................................. 9( 21
Ratzlaf v . United States, 114 S . C t . 655 (1 9 9 4 ) ................. 20
Rayner v . Smirl, 873 F .2 d 60 (4 th C ir .) , c e r t , d e n ie d ,
493 U .S . 876 (1989) ........................ ................................. ..................... 13
Slocum v . Delaware L. & W. R.R., 3 3 9 U .S . 239 (1950) . 22, 29
Terminal R.R. A ss’n v . Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen,
3 1 8 U .S . 1 ( 1 9 4 3 ) ................................................................. 8 , 1 1 , 2 3 , 2 4 , 2 6
Textile Workers Union v . Lincoln Mills, 353 U .S . 448
U 9 5 7 ) .................................... 27
United Paperworkers Int’l Union v . Misco, Inc., 484 U .S .
U .S . 29 ( 1 9 8 8 ) ................................................................ 16
United States v . Olano, 113 S . C t. 1770 ( 1 9 9 3 ) ..................... 15
United Steelworkers v . W am or & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U .S . 574 (1960) ........................................................'........................ 16, 25
S ta tu te s , r e g u la t i o n s a n d ru le :
A c t o f A p r . 10, 1936, ch . 166, 49 S ta t . 1189 ............................ 9
§ 2 0 5 , 49 S ta t . 1 1 9 0 ............................................................................. 19
A c t o f J u n e 21, 1934, ch . 691 , § 3, 48 S ta t . 1189-1192 ............ 10
A g e D is c r im in a t io n in E m p lo y m e n t A c t o f 1 9 6 7 ,2 9 U .S .C .
621 et seq. ......................................... ............................................................ 26
F e d e r a l A r b i t r a t i o n A c t, 9 U .S .C . 1 et seq............................... 26
9 U .S .C . 1 ..................... 27
9 U .S .C . 2 ................................................................................................ 27
F e d e r a l E m p lo y e r s ’ L ia b i l i ty A c t, 45 U .S .C . 51 et seq........ 22
F e d e r a l R a i l ro a d S a f e ty A c t o f 1970, 45 U .S .C . 431
et seq.......................................................................... ....................................... 13
45 U .S .C . 434 ...................................................... 13
45 U .S .C . 4 4 1 ( a ) .................................................................................. 13
45 U .S .C . 4 4 1 (c ) (1 ) ........................................................................... 13
L a b o r -M a n a g e m e n t R e la t io n s A c t, 29 U .S .C . 141 et seq:
§ 3 0 1 , 2 9 U .S .C . 185 .......................................................... . 6, 27, 28, 29
§ 3 0 1 (a ), 29 U .S .C . 1 8 5 ( a ) .................. .................. .................. 8, 27
R a ilw a y L a b o r A c t o f 1926, ch . 347 , 44 S ta t . 577:
§ 3, 44 S ta t . 578-579 ........................................................................... 10
Cases—Continued: Page
313
VI
Statutes, regulation and rule—Continued: Page
§ 3(c), 44 Stat. 578 ......................................................... 17
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151 et seq. ............................ 1, 4, 8
45 U.S.C. 151a ............................... 1
45 U.S.C. 151a(5).................. 8
45 U.S.C. 152 F i r s t .......................................................... 25
45 U.S.C. 152 Seventh....................................... 9
45 U.S.C. 153............. ....................................................... 13
45 U.S.C. 153 F irst (a) .......................................... 9
45 U.S.C. 153 F irst ( i ) ...... passim
45 U.S.C. 153 F irst (m ).................................................... 10
45 U.S.C. 153 Second ................................................... 9
45 U.S.C. 155 ......................... 9
45 U.S.C. 156................................................. 9
29 U.S.C. 173(d) ........................................... 16
45 U.S.C. 181-188.................................................................... 9
45 U.S.C. 184............................................................................ 9, 10
45 U.S.C. 185............................................................................ 9
Hawaii Whistleblower’s Protection Act, Haw. Rev. Stat.
§§ 378-61 to 378-69 (1994) ..................................................... 3-4
§ 378-62(1).......................................................................... 4
§ 378-63(a).......................................................................... 4
§ 378-66(b)................. ......................................................... 13
14 C.F.R. 43.9(a)...................................................................... 2
Haw. R. Civ. P. 54(b).................................... ......................... 4
Miscellaneous:
67 Cong. Rec. (1926):
p. 4510 ................................................................................. 17
p. 4517 ..................................................................... 17
p. 8807 ........................................ 17
p. 8808 ................................................................................. 17
Garrison, The N ation al R a ilro a d A dju stm en t B oard : A
Unique A dm inistative Agency, 46 Yale L J . 567 (1937),. 13
H.R. Rep. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) ................. 10,18
H.R. Rep. No. 2243, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936)............. . 18,19
National Mediation Board, F irst Ann. Rep. (1935) ......... 18
W ebster’s Third New In tern ation al D iction ary (1986)..... 15
314
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK
3fn tlje Suprem e Court of tlje Mm'teb States!
October T erm , 1993
No. 92-2058
H awaiian A irlin es , I nc., et al., petitioners
v .
Grant T. N orris
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF HAWAII
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING RESPONDENT
INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES
T h e q u e s tio n p re s e n te d in th is case is w h e th e r th e
S u p re m e C o u r t o f H aw aii e r re d in co n c lu d in g t h a t r e
s p o n d e n t’s s ta te law w ro n g fu l d is c h a rg e c laim s a r e n o t
p re e m p te d b y th e R ailw ay L ab o r A ct (R L A ), 45 U .S .C . 151
et seq . T h e R L A is desig n ed to p re v e n t th e in te r ru p tio n of
in te r s ta te com m erce and to p ro v id e an ex c lu siv e m ech a
n ism fo r th e p ro m p t and o rd e rly re so lu tio n of all d isp u te s
in th e c o v e red in d u s tr ie s “g ro w in g o u t of g r ie v a n c e s o r
o u t o f th e in te r p r e ta t io n o r ap p lic a tio n o f a g re e m e n ts
c o v e rin g r a te s of pay , ru le s , or w o rk in g co n d itio n s .” 45
U .S .C . 151a. T h e U n ited S ta te s h as a s u b s ta n tia l in te r e s t
in f u r th e r in g th e p u rp o se s s e rv e d b y th e A c t a n d its
e x c lu s iv e a r b i t r a l m ech an ism , w h ile a t th e sam e tim e
avo id ing u n n e c e ssa ry en c ro ach m en t upon th e ab ility of th e
316
(1)
2
S ta te s to le g is la te on m a t te r s o f le g it im a te s t a te co n cern .
A t th e C o u r t ’s in v ita tio n , th e U n ite d S ta te s filed a b r ie f
am icus cu ria e a t th e p e tit io n s ta g e o f th is case.
S T A T E M E N T
1. P e t i t io n e r H a w a iian A irlin e s , In c . (H A L ), em p lo y ed
re s p o n d e n t as an a irc ra f t m echan ic . R e s p o n d e n t’s license ,
is su e d b y th e F e d e r a l A v ia tio n A d m in is tr a t io n (F A A ),
a u th o r iz e d h im to a p p ro v e an a i r c r a f t fo r s e rv ic e a f te r
m ak in g , s u p e rv is in g , o r in s p e c tin g r e p a i r s . H e w a s n o t
a u th o riz e d to a p p ro v e fo r se rv ic e an y a i r c r a f t th e r e p a i r s
of w h ich d id n o t conform to ap p licab le fe d e ra l re g u la tio n s .
T he F A A m ay su sp en d o r re v o k e th e licen se o f a m ech an ic
w ho m a k e s a f r a u d u le n t e n t r y in a n y r e c o rd o r r e p o r t
re q u ire d by th o se re g u la tio n s . P e t. A pp . 7a.
D u r in g a ro u tin e in sp ec tio n on J u ly 15, 1987, re s p o n d e n t
n o ticed th a t one of th e t i r e s on an H A L D C -9 w as w o rn .
A f te r r e m o v in g th e t i r e a n d b e a r in g , h e a n d o th e r
m ech an ics n o ticed th a t th e ax le s leev e , w h ich is n o rm a lly
m irro r- s m o o th , w as s c a r re d an d g ro o v e d . A lth o u g h r e
s p o n d e n t an d th e o th e r m ech a n ic s b e lie v e d t h a t th e a x le
s leev e w a s th e re fo re u n sa fe an d in n e e d o f r e p la c e m e n t,
r e s p o n d e n t ’s s u p e r v is o r , J u s t in C u la h a ra , o rd e re d th e
m e c h a n ic s to s a n d th e s le e v e b y h a n d a n d p u t a new
b e a r in g an d t i r e o v e r it . A f te r th e sp ec if ied r e p a i r s w e re
p e rfo rm ed , th e p lan e m ad e i t s s c h e d u le d flig h t. P e t . A pp .
7a.
A t th e en d o f re s p o n d e n t’s sh if t, C u la h a ra d ire c te d h im
to s ig n th e m a in te n a n c e re c o rd fo r th e in s ta l la t io n o f th e
t i r e . U n d e r a p p lic a b le f e d e ra l r e g u la t io n s (14 C .F .R .
43.9(a)), th a t re c o rd w ould h a v e se rv e d to c e r t ify t h a t th e
re p a ir w o rk h ad b e e n sa t is fa c to r i ly p e rfo rm e d . R esp o n d -
e n t re fu s e d to sign th e fo rm on th e g ro u n d th a t th e s leev e
w as s till u n sa fe . H e sa id t h a t h e w ould s ig n th e fo rm only
if C u la h a ra could show him th a t th e D C -9 m an u a l in d ica ted
th a t th e a x le s le e v e w a s in s a t i s f a c to r y c o n d it io n .
C u lah a ra to ld re sp o n d e n t he w ould b e d isc h a rg e d if he
did n o t sign . W hen re s p o n d e n t p e r s is te d in h is re fu sa l,
317
3
he w as im m e d ia te ly su sp e n d e d p e n d in g a te rm in a tio n
h ea rin g . R e sp o n d e n t s u b se q u e n tly re p o r te d to th e F A A
th a t th e re w as a p rob lem w ith an H A L a irc ra f t th a t he had
serv iced . P e t. A pp. 7a-8a.
On Ju ly 31, 1987, re sp o n d e n t w as re p re se n te d b y a union
re p re s e n ta t iv e a t a so-called “S te p 1” g rie v a n c e h e a rin g .
T h re e d ay s la te r , th e h e a r in g o ffice r reco m m en d ed th a t
re sp o n d e n t be te rm in a te d for in su b o rd in a tio n .1 P e t. A pp.
63a-65a. R e sp o n d e n t th e n invo k ed th e g r ie v a n c e p r o c e
d u re s ava ilab le u n d e r th e app licab le co llec tive b a rg a in in g
a g re e m e n t , w h ich p ro v id e s t h a t an em p lo y ee m ay be
d isch arg ed only fo r “ju s t cau se” and m ay no t be d iscip lined
fo r re fu s in g to p e rfo rm w o rk in v io la tio n of a h e a lth or
sa fe ty law . I d . a t 8a. T he g riev an ce p ro cess p ro ceed ed to
“S te p 3,” w hich e n ta ils a h e a r in g b e fo re th e h ead of th e
d e p a r tm e n t in w hich th e em ployee w orks. Id . a t 9a & n.6,
51a. P r io r to th e h e a r in g , H A L o ffe red to re d u c e th e
p u n ish m e n t to su sp e n s io n w ith o u t p ay fo r six w e ek s .
R e sp o n d en t n e v e r rep lied to th e o ffer or, a p p a re n tly , took
fu r th e r s te p s to p u rsu e th e g riev an ce . Id . a t 9a.
2. a. T h is case is a c o n so lid a tio n of tw o la w s u its
re la t in g to re s p o n d e n t’s d isch arg e . On D e cem b er 8, 1987,
r e s p o n d e n t filed an ac tio n in s ta te c o u r t a g a in s t H A L .
N o r r is v. H a w a i ia n A ir l in e s , I n c . , Civ. No. 87-3894-12
(H aw . C ir. C t., 1st Cir.); P e t. A pp. 9a. H e alleged th a t H A L
d isch arg ed him in v io la tion of th e public policy e x p re sse d
in th e F e d e ra l A v ia tio n A c t and im p lem en tin g re g u la tio n s
(C o u n t I); t h a t H A L ’s a c tio n s v io la te d th e H aw aii
W h is tleb lo w er’s P ro te c tio n A ct (H W PA ), H aw . R ev . S ta t.
1 After respondent’s discharge, he gave the FAA details of what
had occurred on July 15, 1987. On August 4, 1987, the FAA seized the
axle sleeve and initiated an investigation. The FAA broadened its
investigation to other HAL planes. Pet. App. 8a. On March 2, 1988, the
FAA proposed a civil penalty concerning the damaged sleeve. The
FAA and HAL later settled the case. JA. 292-294.
318
4
§§ 378-61 to 378-69 (1994) (C ount I I ) ;2 th a t H A L in te n tio n
ally in flic ted em otional d is tre s s on him (C o u n t I I I ) ; th a t
H A L e n g a g e d in o u tra g e o u s co n d u c t, e n ti t l in g him to
p u n itiv e d am ag es (C oun t IV); and th a t H A L b reach ed th e
co llec tiv e b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t (C o u n t V). S ee 12/8/87
Com pl. IK 22, 28, 31, 33, 39; J.A . 7-10.
H A L rem o v ed th e case to th e U n ite d S ta te s D is tr ic t
C o u rt fo r th e D is tr ic t of H aw aii. On M arch 28, 1988, th e
d i s t r ic t c o u r t d ism isse d C o u n t V, h o ld in g th a t i t w as
su b je c t to th e exclusive a rb itra l p ro ced u re s of th e R ailw ay
L a b o r A c t (R L A ), 45 U .S .C . 151 et s e q . , and th e re fo re
p re e m p te d . 3/28/88 D ist. C t. O rd e r 14-15; J .A . 342-344.
T he c o u r t re m a n d ed th e re m a in d e r of th e claim s to th e
s ta te t r ia l co u rt. 3/28/88 D ist. C t. O rd e r 16-17; J .A . 344-
345; P e t. A pp. 9a n.7.
On D e cem b er 5, 1990, th e s ta te t r ia l c o u r t d ism issed
C o u n t I o f th e com plain t ag a in s t H A L , re a so n in g th a t it
lack ed s u b je c t -m a tte r ju r is d ic tio n b ec au se re sp o n d e n t’s
claim w as p re e m p te d by th e R L A . S ee 12/5/90 H aw . C ir.
C t. O rd e r 2; P e t. App. 28a. T he co u rt certified its o rd e r as
final u n d e r s ta te ru le s of civil p ro ced u re (H aw . R. Civ. P.
54(b)) so th a t re sp o n d e n t could ta k e an im m ed ia te appeal.
12/5/90 H aw . C ir. C t. O rd e r 2 .3
2 The Hawaii Whistleblower’s Protection Act provides in pertinent
part that an employer “shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise
discriminate against an employee regarding the employee’s compen
sation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment because
* * * [t]he employee * * * reports or is about to report to a public body
* * * a violation or a suspected violation of a law or rule adopted
pursuant to law of this State, a political subdivision of this State, or the
United States, unless the employee knows that the report is false.”
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-62(1) (1994). The Act authorizes an employee to
file a civil action seeking injunctive relief and actual damages. Haw.
Rev. Stat. § 378-63(a) (1994).
3 Although the Hawaii Supreme Court vacated the state trial
court’s initial order because the federal district court’s remand order
was not part of the record (Pet. App. 9a n.7), the remand order was
later made part of the record, the judgment of dismissal was reinstated,
and petitioner took a fresh appeal from that judgment. Id. at 28a.
319
5
b. On S e p te m b e r 20, 1989, re sp o n d e n t filed su it a g a in s t
p e titio n e rs P au l J . F inazzo, H o w ard E . O gden, and H a tsu o
H onm a, all of w hom w h e re o fficers o f H A L w hen r e s p o n
d e n t w as d isch arg ed . N o r r is v. F in a z z o , C iv. No. 89-2904-
09 (H aw . C ir. C t., 1st C ir.); P e t. A pp. 9a-10a. R e sp o n d e n t
alleged th a t th e ind iv idua l p e ti t io n e rs d irec ted , confirm ed ,
o r ra tif ie d th e a lleg ed r e ta l ia to r y d isc h a rg e . H e a g a in
so u g h t re lie f on th eo rie s of d isch a rg e in v io lation of public
po licy (C o u n t I); v io la tio n of th e H W P A (C o u n t I I ) ;
in te n tio n a l in flic tio n o f em o tio n a l d is t r e s s (C o u n t ( I I I ) ;
and o u tra g e o u s conduct e n titlin g h im to p u n itiv e d am ag es
(C oun t IV ). 9/20/89 Com pl. f f 22, 28, 31, 33; J .A . 16-18. On
D ecem ber 5, 1990, th e s ta te tr ia l c o u r t d ism issed C o u n ts I
and II and ce rtified th e case for im m ed ia te appeal. 12/5/90
H aw . C ir. C t. O rd e r 2-3.
3. T h e S u p re m e C o u r t of H aw aii r e v e r s e d in b o th
cases. P e t. A pp. la -2 6 a { F in a z z o ) ; id . a t 27a-29a ( H a w a i
i a n A ir l in e s , In c .) . T h e co u rt f ir s t o b se rv ed th a t re sp o n
d e n t ’s r e ta l ia to r y d is c h a rg e cla im s a re s u b je c t to th e
R L A ’s ex c lu s iv e a r b it r a l m ech an ism (and a re th e re fo re
p re -e m p te d ) if th e y a re “m inor d is p u te s ” fo r p u rp o se s of
th e R L A , v iz . , if th e y a r e d is p u te s “g ro w in g o u t of
g rie v a n c e s o r o u t o f th e in te rp re ta t io n o r ap p lica tio n of
a g re e m e n ts co n c e rn in g r a te s of p ay , ru le s , o r w o rk in g
co n d itio n s” (45 U .S .C . 153 F ir s t (i)). P e t. A pp. 12a. T he
c o u r t conc luded th a t r e s p o n d e n t’s cla im s a r e n o t p r e
em p ted u n d e r th a t s tan d a rd .
R ely in g on th is C o u r t’s decision in C o n s o l id a t e d R a i l
C o rp . v. R a i lw a y L a b o r E x e c u t iv e s ’ A s s ’n , 491 U .S . 299,
305 (1989), th e s ta te su p re m e c o u rt exp la ined th a t “m in o r
d isp u te s” a re “th o se th a t ‘m ay be conclusively re so lv e d by
in te rp re t in g th e e x is t in g [co llec tiv e b a rg a in in g ] a g r e e
m e n t.’ ” P e t. A pp. 14a. In th e c o u r t’s view , th e re ta lia to ry
d is c h a rg e c la im s could n o t be re s o lv e d in t h a t w ay :
“[R esp o n d e n t’s] re ta l ia to ry d isch arg e claim is b ase d on h is
a llega tion th a t he w as te rm in a te d fo r re p o r tin g a v io lation
o f th e law , an d [p e ti t io n e r s ] do n o t s u g g e s t t h a t a
320
6
re ta l ia to ry d isch a rg e is san c tio n ed o r ju s tif ie d by a pro
vision in th e [collective b arg a in in g ] a g re e m e n t no r do th e y
p o in t to an y p a r t of th e [a g re e m e n t th a t] d e m o n s tra te s
th a t th e c a r r ie r an d u n io n h av e a g re e d on s ta n d a rd s
re le v a n t to [re sp o n d en t’s] s itu a tio n .” Id . a t 19a.
T h e c o u r t r e je c te d p e t i t io n e r s ’ a rg u m e n t t h a t th e
r e ta l ia to ry d isch a rg e claim s a re p re e m p te d b ecau se i t is
n e c e s sa ry to c o n s tru e th e co llec tiv e b a rg a in in g a g r e e
m e n t to d e te r m in e w h e th e r H A L h a d te r m in a te d
re sp o n d e n t fo r in su b o rd in a tio n , and th u s for “ju s t c a u se .”
P e t. A pp. 18a-19a. T he co u rt po in ted ou t th a t in L in g le v.
N org e D iv. o f M a g ic C h e f, In c ., 486 U .S. 399 (1988), a case
a r is in g u n d e r S ec tio n 301 o f th e L a b o r-M a n a g e m e n t
R e la tio n s A ct, 1947 (L M R A ), 29 U .S .C . 185, th is C o u rt
held th a t a claim of w rongfu l te rm in a tio n in re ta lia tio n for
filing a s ta te w o rk e r’s com pensa tion claim did no t re q u ire
in te rp re ta t io n of a co llec tiv e b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t, b u t
dep en d ed upon p u re ly fa c tu a l q u e s tio n s c o n c e rn in g th e
em ployee’s conduct and th e em p lo y er’s m otive. P e t. App.
15a-16a. T he S u p rem e C o u rt of H aw aii d e te rm in ed th a t , as
in L in g le , th e cla im s in th is case do n o t tu rn upon an
in te rp re ta t io n o f th e la b o r c o n tra c t, b u t upon “p u re ly
fac tu a l q u e s tio n s [ th a t] p e r ta in [] to th e co n d u c t o f th e
em ployee and th e conduct and m otivation of th e em ployer.”
P et. A pp. 19a (quoting L in g le , 486 U.S. a t 407).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A. T he R ailw ay L abor A c t (R L A ), 45 U .S.C . 153 F ir s t (i),
e s tab lish es an exc lusive a rb it r a l m echan ism fo r so-called
“m in o r d is p u te s ,” w h ich a r e d is p u te s “g ro w in g o u t of
g riev a n ces o r o u t of th e in te rp re ta t io n o r ap p lica tio n of
a g re e m e n ts co n c e rn in g r a te s of p ay , ru le s , o r w o rk in g
cond itions.” T h is C o u rt has exp la ined th a t a rb itra t io n of
m inor d isp u te s is com pulsory and b inding , and th a t S ta te s
m ay n o t su p p le m e n t th e A c t’s a rb itra l re m e d y fo r m ino r
d isp u tes w ith s ta te law ju d ic ia l rem edies.
B. T he t e s t fo r w h e th e r an em ployee’s claim is a “m inor
d isp u te” su b jec t to th e A c t’s exc lusive a rb itra l m echan ism
321
7
is w h e th e r th e claim can b e "conclusively re so lv e d " u n d e r
th e co llec tive b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t. C o n s o l id a t e d R a i l
C o rp . v. R a i lw a y L a b o r E x e c u t iv e s ’ A s s ’n , 491 U .S . 299,
305 (1989). A p p ly in g th a t t e s t , th e S u p re m e C o u r t of
H a w a ii p ro p e r ly h e ld t h a t p e t i t io n e r ’s s t a t e law to r t
cla im s a re n o t p re e m p te d . B eca u se r e s p o n d e n t’s c la im s
a re in d e p e n d e n t of an y r ig h t h e m ay h a v e u n d e r th e
co llec tiv e b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t an d re q u ir e p ro o f th a t
p e ti t io n e rs d isch arg ed him fo r a r e ta l ia to ry m o tiv e th a t is
im p e rm is s ib le u n d e r s t a t e t o r t la w — an d b e c a u se th e
a g re e m e n t w ould n o t ju s t i f y a d is c h a rg e t h a t w a s so
m o tiv a te d — re s p o n d e n t’s c la im s c a n n o t b e co n c lu s iv e ly
re so lv ed b y in te rp re t in g th e lab o r co n tra c t.
C. P e t i t io n e r s e r r in co n ten d in g th a t th e la n g u a g e of
th e R L A re q u ire s p re e m p tio n of e x tra -c o n tra c tu a l c la im s
b ecau se i t app lies to d isp u te s “g ro w in g o u t of g rie v a n c e s
o r ou t of th e in te rp re ta t io n o r ap p lica tio n ” of th e co n trac t.
45 U .S .C . 153 F ir s t (i) (em p h asis added ). T h is C o u rt has
recogn ized th a t th e w ord “o r” does n o t n ec essa rily r e q u ire
t h a t p h ra se s s e p a ra te d b y th e “o r” be g iven in d ep en d e n t
m ean in g . T h e te rm “g rie v a n c e ,” m o reo v e r, is com m only
u n d ers to o d in th e labo r law co n te x t to r e fe r to claim s
a r is in g o u t of a co llec tive b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t. The
le g is la tiv e h is to ry of th e 1926 and 1934 leg is la tio n
e s ta b lis h in g th e R L A ’s a r b i t r a l m ech an ism d o es no t
w a r ra n t a d iffe re n t conclusion.
In a n y e v e n t, th is C o u r t h a s s in ce h e ld t h a t th e
p re e m p tiv e force of th e R L A ’s a r b it r a l m ech an ism arise s
fro m th e e x is te n c e o f a c o n tr a c t c la im , A n d r e w s v.
L o u is v i l l e & N . R .R . , 406 U .S . 320 (1972), an d th a t the
R L A ’s a rb itra l m echan ism does n o t b a r th e im p o sitio n of
to r t d u tie s in d e p e n d e n t of th e co llec tive b a rg a in in g a g re e
m e n t o r p re e m p t th e fie ld o f r e g u la t io n of w o rk in g
cond itions th em se lv es . A tc h is o n , T. & S .F . R y . v. B u e l l ,
480 U .S . 557 (1987); C o lo r a d o A n t i - D is c r im in a t io n
C o m m ’n v. C o n t in e n t a l A ir L in e s , I? ic., 372 U .S . 714
322
8
(1963); T e r m in a l R .R . A s s ’n v. B r o t h e r h o o d o f R .R .
T r a in m e n , 318 U .S. 1 (1943).
D. T h is C o u r t’s dec isions a d d re ss in g lab o r p re em p tio n
u n d e r S ection 301(a) of th e L ab o r M an ag em en t R ela tio n s
A ct, 1947 (L M R A ), 29 U .S .C . 185(a), p ro v id e a p e r tin e n t
a n a lo g y fo r R L A p re e m p t io n c a se s . T h e q u e s tio n
ad d re ssed in both R L A and LM R A p reem ption cases is th e
sam e: how to accom m odate th e fed era l in te re s t in un iform
in te rp re ta t io n of collective b a rg a in in g ag re e m e n ts and th e
le g i t i-m a te in te r e s t s of th e S ta te s in r e g u la t in g th e
conduct of em ployers su b je c t to th e ir police pow er.
A R G U M E N T
RESPONDENT’S STATE TORT CLAIMS CANNOT
BE CONCLUSIVELY RESOLVED BY INTERPRET
ING THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
AND ARE THEREFORE NOT “MINOR DISPUTES”
SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIVE ARBITRAL MECH
ANISM OF THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT
A. The Railway Labor Act Establishes An Exclusive
Arbitral Mechanism For “Minor Disputes”
T he R ailw ay L ab o r A ct (R L A ), 45 U .S.C . 151 et s eq ., w as
en ac ted , i n t e r a l i a , to e s ta b lis h a m ech an ism fo r “th e
p rom pt and o rd e rly s e t t le m e n t of all d isp u te s g row ing ou t
of g riev an ces o r ou t o f th e in te rp re ta t io n o r app lica tion of
a g re e m e n ts co v e rin g r a te s o f p ay , ru le s , o r w o rk in g
c o n d itio n s .” 45 U .S .C . 151a(5). A s th is C o u r t h a s
explained, th e se so-called “m inor d isp u te s ,” E lg in , J . & E .
R y . v. B u r l e y , 325 U .S. 711, 723 (1945), a f f ’d on re h ’g, 327
U.S. 661 (1946), involve “co n tro v e rs ie s o v er th e m ean ing of
an e x is t in g co llec tiv e b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t in a p a r
ticu la r fa c t s itu a tio n .” B r o t h e r h o o d o f R .R . T r a in m e n v.
C h ic a g o R . & I. R .R . , 353 U .S . 30, 33 (1957); see also
323
9
P it t s b u r g h & L .E . R .R . v. R a i l iv a y L a b o r E x e c u t i v e s ’
A s s ’n , 491 U .S. 490, 496 n.4 (1989) (sam e).4
T h e R L A e s ta b lish e s an e la b o ra te a rb it ra l m ech an ism
fo r th e re so lu tio n o f m ino r d isp u te s . S ee 45 U .S .C . 153
F i r s t (i) ( r a i lr o a d in d u s t ry ) ; 45 U .S .C . 184 (a ir l in e
in d u s try ) . I t re q u ire s th a t m ino r d isp u te s f ir s t be su b m it
te d to a c a r r ie r ’s “in te rn a l d isp u te re so lu tio n p ro c e s s e s .”
A tc h is o n , T. & S .F . R y . v. B u e l l , 480 U .S. 557, 563 (1987);
45 U .S .C . 153 F i r s t (i), 184. I f th e d isp u te c a n n o t be
re so lv e d in te rn a lly , e i th e r p a r ty m ay r e fe r i t to a r b i t r a
tio n b e fo re th e N a tio n a l R a ilro a d A d ju s tm e n t B o a rd
(N R A B ) o r an a d ju s tm e n t b o a rd e s ta b l is h e d b y th e
em p lo y er and unions. C o n s o l id a t e d R a i l C orp . v. R a i lw a y
L a b o r E x e c u t iv e s ’ A s s ’n, 491 U .S. 299, 303-304 (1989) ( C on -
r a i l ); see also 45 U .S .C . 153 F ir s t (i) and Second, 184.5
4 This Court adopted the “major/minor” dispute terminology “from
the vocabulary of rail management and rail labor.” Consolidated Rail
Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 491 U.S. 299, 302 (1989)
(Conrail). The term “major dispute” refers to “disputes over the
formation of collective agreements or efforts to secure them,” Burley,
325 U.S. at 723, or over “proposals to change rates of pay, rules, or
working conditions," Pittsburgh & L.E. R.R., 491 U.S. at 496 n.4. In
the case of a “major dispute,” the RLA requires the parties “to undergo
a lengthy process of bargaining and mediation.” Conrail, 491 U.S. at
302; see 45 U.S.C. 152 Seventh, 155, 156. Petitioners do not argue that
the claims in this case constitute “major disputes.” See Br. 11 n.3.
5 The NRAB consists of 34 members, half of whom are selected by
railroads and half of whom are selected by national labor organizations.
45 U.S.C. 153 First (a). The Act also provides that “any individual
carrier, system, or group of carriers and any class or classes of its or
their employees” may agree to establish “system, group, or regional”
boards of adjustment. 45 U.S.C. 153 Second. The arbitral scheme
differs somewhat for the airline industry, to which Congress extended
the RLA in 1936. See Act of Apr. 10, 1936, ch. 166, 49 Stat. 1189; 45
U.S.C. 181-188. The principal difference between the tw'o statutory
schemes, which is not material here, is that Congress left the creation of
a national adjustment board for airlines to the discretion of the
National Mediation Board. See 45 U.S.C. 185; International Ass’n of
Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682, 685-686 (1963). In the
absence of a national board, minor disputes are adjudicated exclusively
324
10
T h e su b m iss io n of a m in o r d isp u te to a r b i t r a t io n is
“com pu lso ry and b in d in g ” upon th e p a r tie s . C o n r a i l , 491
U .S. a t 303-304; see 45 U .S.C . 153 F ir s t (i). “E ach p a r ty to
th e d isp u te m ay su b m it i t fo r decision, w h e th e r o r no t th e
o th e r is w illing , p ro v id ed he h as h im se lf d isc h a rg e d th e
in itia l d u ty of n eg o tia tio n .” B u r l e y , 325 U .S. a t 727; see 45
U .S .C . 153 F ir s t (i). A nd th e decision of an a d ju s tm e n t
board a rb itra t in g a m in o r d isp u te is e x p re ss ly m ade “final
and b in d in g upon b o th p a r tie s to th e d isp u te .” 45 U .S.C .
153 F i r s t (m); see C h ica g o R . & I. R .R ., 353 U .S. a t 35 ,6
T h is C o u r t h a s in te r p r e te d th e R L A ’s com pulsory
a r b i t r a t io n p ro v is io n s to p re c lu d e r e s o r t to ju d ic ia l
re m e d ie s fo r m in o r d isp u te s o th e r th an th e ju d ic ia l rev iew
p rov isions of th e R L A itself. See A n d rew s v. L o u is v i l l e &
N. R .R . , 406 U .S. 320 (1972). In A n d r e w s , th e C o u rt held
th a t a ra ilro a d e m p lo y ee ’s s ta te law w ro n g fu l d isch a rg e
c la im is s u b je c t to th e R L A ’s e x c lu s iv e a r b i t r a l
m echan ism w h e re th e “so u rce of [th e em ployee’s] r ig h t no t
to b e d is c h a rg e d , a n d th e re fo re to t r e a t an alleged
d isch arg e as a ‘w rongfu l’ one th a t en title s him to dam ages,
is th e c o l le c tiv e -b a rg a in in g a g r e e m e n t”— i .e . , if “[th e
by system adjustment boards formed by the airlines and unions under
45 U.S.C. 184. See Conrail, 491 U.S. at 304 n.4.
6 The compulsory aspect of the statutory scheme was a product of
the 1934 amendments to the RLA. See H.R. Rep. No. 1944, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 2-4 (1934). Under the 1926 version of the Act, the formation of
boards of adjustment to resolve minor disputes was left to the agree
ment of the parties. Railway Labor Act of 1926, eh. 347, § 3, 44 Stat.
578-579. Under that system, each party could “defeat the intended
settlement of grievances by declining to join in creating the local
boards of adjustment provided for by the Act.” B u r l e y , 325 U.S. at 726.
As a result, the machinery quickly broke down, and grievances
accumulated to the point that on several occasions employees resorted
to the issuance of strike ballots and threats to disrupt commerce. H.R.
Rep. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934). Congress in 1934
established the present system, creating the NRAB and vesting it and
other adjustment boards with authority finally to resolve minor
disputes. See Chicago R. & I. R.R., 353 U.S. at 35-39; Act of June 21,
1934, ch. 691, § 3, 48 Stat. 1189-1192.
325
11
em p lo y ee’s] claim , and [his em p lo y e r’s] d isa llow ance o f it,
s te m from d if fe r in g in te r p r e ta t io n s of th e c o l le c tiv e
b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t.” I d . a t 324. F in a lly , a p a r ty w ho
h as litig a te d an issu e b efo re an a d ju s tm e n t b o ard m ay n o t
re li t ig a te th e issu e in a s e p a ra te ju d ic ia l p ro ceed in g , b u t
m ay see k only th e lim ited ju d ic ia l re m e d y ava ilab le u n d e r
th e re v ie w prov isions of th e R L A . I d . a t 325; see G u n t h e r
v. S a n D ieg o & A . E . R y ., 382 U .S. 257, 261-264 (1965).7
B. R espondent’s S tate Tort Claims Are N ot “Minor
D isputes” Because They Cannot Be C onclusively
R esolved By In terpreting The C ollective B ar
gaining A greem ent
1. T h e R L A d o es n o t g e n e ra l ly im p o se s u b s ta n tiv e
l im ita t io n s on th e S ta t e s ’ p o lice p o w e r, o r a u th o r iz e
p a r t ie s to a co llec tive b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t to a g re e to
th a t w hich S ta te law p ro h ib its as a m a t te r of public policy
and places beyond th e p a r tie s ’ p o w er to c o n tra c t aw ay . S ee
T e r m in a l R .R , A s s ’n v. B r o t h e r h o o d o f R .R . T r a in m e n ,
318 U .S . 1, 6-7 (1943); C o lo r a d o A n t i - D is c r im in a t io n
C o m m ’n v. C o n t in e n ta l A ir L in e s , In c ., 372 U .S. 714, 724
(1963); see a lso B u e l l , 480 U .S . a t 563-565; cf. A llis -
C h a lm e r s C orp . v. L u e c k , 471 U .S. 202, 212 (1985). R a th e r ,
b e c a u se th e R L A ’s p re e m p tio n o f s t a t e law re m e d ie s
r e s u l t s d ire c t ly fro m its c h a n n e lin g of m in o r d is p u te s
th ro u g h th e exc lusive a rb itra t io n schem e, th e q u e s tio n of
p re e m p tio n in th is case tu rn s on w h e th e r r e s p o n d e n t’s
c la im s a re m in o r d is p u te s , t h a t is , w h e th e r th e y a re
7 The Court in Andrews overruled Moore v. Illinois Central R.R.,
312 U.S. 630 (1941). See 406 U.S. at 326. In Moore, the Court had
permitted a railroad employee to bring a state law damage action
alleging “that he had been wrongfully discharged contrary to the terms
of a [labor] contract.” 312 U.S. at 632. That holding was premised on
the notion that the RLA’s arbitral procedures were intended “to be
optional, not compulsory, and that therefore a State was free to accord
an alternative remedy to a discharged railroad employee under its law
of contracts.” Andrews, 406 U.S. at 321-322. The Court in Andrews
concluded that the premise of Moore “was never good history and is no
longer good law.” Id. at 322.
326
12
“d isp u te s * * * g ro w in g ou t of g r ie v a n c e s o r o u t of th e
in te r p r e ta t io n o r ap p lic a tio n of a g re e m e n ts co n c ern in g
ra te s of pay , ru le s , o r w o rk in g cond itions.” 45 U .S.C . 153
F ir s t (i).
T h e p ro p e r fram ew o rk fo r ev a lu a tin g th e ex is ten ce o f a
m in o r d is p u te is s e t fo r th in th is C o u r t ’s d ec is io n in
C o n r a i l . T h e re , th e C o u rt a d d re sse d w h e th e r a d isp u te
a b o u t th e c a r r ie r ’s im p le m e n ta tio n of an em ployee d ru g
te s t in g p ro g ra m w as a “m a jo r d is p u te ” co n c e rn in g a
change in th e co llec tive b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t (su b jec t to
th e R L A ’s b a rg a in in g and m ediation provisions, see n o te 4,
s u p r a ) o r a “m in o r d i s p u te ” ( s u b je c t to c o m p u lso ry
a rb itra tio n ) . In ho ld ing th a t th e d ru g te s t in g c o n tro v e rsy
w as a m ino r d isp u te , th e C o u rt looked “to w h e th e r a claim
has b e e n m ade th a t th e te rm s of an e x is tin g a g re e m e n t
e i th e r e s ta b lish o r re fu te th e p re sen ce of a r ig h t to tak e
th e d is p u te d a c tio n .” 491 U .S. a t 305. A s th e C o u r t
exp la ined , “[t]he d is tin g u ish in g fe a tu re of such a case [ i.e .,
a m in o r d isp u te ] is th a t th e d isp u te m ay be co n c lu siv e ly
re so lv ed b y in te rp re t in g th e ex is tin g [co llec tive b a rg a in
ing] a g re e m e n t.” I b id .8
2. T h e h o ld in g b y th e S u p rem e C o u rt of H aw aii th a t
re s p o n d e n t’s to r t claim s fo r re ta l ia to ry d isch arg e a re no t
m inor d isp u te s (P e t. A pp. 10a-20a) is su p p o rted by C o n r a i l ,
b e c a u se th o se claim s c a n n o t b e “co n c lu siv e ly re s o lv e d ”
(491 U .S . a t 305) b y in te rp re t in g th e co llective b a rg a in in g
a g re e m e n t. R e sp o n d e n t’s f ir s t claim — alleg ing re ta l ia to ry
d isch arg e in v io lation of public policy— re q u ire s p ro o f th a t
th e te rm in a t io n “v io la te [d ] a c le a r m a n d a te of pub lic
po licy .” P e t . A pp . 20a-21a. A s th e S u p re m e C o u rt o f
H aw aii exp lained , if H A L dism issed re sp o n d e n t in o rd e r to
8 The Court made plain that a party may not trigger the RLA’s
arbitral mechanism by asserting a contract right on “insubstantial
grounds.” Conrail, 491 U.S. at 306. When an employer asserts “a
contractual right to take [a] contested action, the ensuing dispute is
minor [only] if the action is arguably justified by the terms of the
parties’ collective-bargaining agreement.” Id. at 307.
327
13
p u n ish h im fo r t r y in g to re c t i fy an a lleg e d s a f e ty in
fra c tio n , t h a t a c tio n w ou ld v io la te th e p o licy “o f th e
F e d e ra l A v ia tio n A c t an d [im p lem en tin g re g u la tio n s ] to
p ro te c t th e pub lic from sh o d d y r e p a i r and m a in te n a n c e
p ra c tic e s .” Id . a t 21a.9 R e sp o n d e n t’s second claim , w hich
a r ise s u n d e r th e H W P A , also does n o t tu rn on th e m ean in g
of th e co llec tive b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t;10 11 it m ere ly calls for
p roo f th a t H A L d isch arg ed re sp o n d e n t because he re p o r te d
th e sa fe ty in frac tio n to th e F A A . Id . a t 21a-22a.!!
9 Hawaii law makes the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy available regardless of whether a worker is employed at-
will or protected by a collective bargaining agreement. Pet. App. 20a-
21a.
10 The HWPA provides that it should not be construed to diminish
an employee’s rights under a collective bargaining agreement, but that
it shall “supersede and take precedence over the rights, remedies, and
procedures provided in [such] agreements” if the rights and remedies
are inferior. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-66(b) (1994).
11 For an employee working in the railroad rather than the airline
industry, a state law whistleblower claim may be preempted by the
Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA), 45 U.S.C. 431 et seq. The
FRSA provides that common carriers by railroad “may not discharge
or in any manner discriminate against any employee because such
employee * * * has—(1) filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be
instituted any proceeding under or related to the enforcement of the
Federal railroad safety laws; or (2) testified or is about to testify in any
such proceeding.” 45 U.S.C. 441(a). The FRSA contains an express
preemption provision that would appear to preempt certain state
whistleblower laws. See 45 U.S.C. 434; Rayner v. Smirl, 873 F.2d 60,
64-66 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 876 (1989)
The FRSA also provides that “[a]ny dispute, grievance, or claim
arising under this section” is subject to the arbitral remedy provided by
the RLA. See 45 U.S.C. 441(c)(1) (referring claims to arbitration under
45 U.S.C. 153). Petitioners argue (Br. 12-14) that the FRSA thus
demonstrates Congress’s intent to have whistleblower claims adjudi
cated under that arbitral mechanism. To the contrary, if retaliatory
discharge claims in the railroad industry were generally preempted as
“minor disputes” subject to Section 153 First (i), Congress would not
have found it necessary to invoke the RLA’s arbitral mechanism
expressly in Section 441(c)(1).
328
14
A ccord ing ly , as th e s ta te su p re m e c o u rt ex p la in ed , th e
to r t c la im s in th is case tu rn on a fac tu a l d isp u te a b o u t
w h e th e r H A L te rm in a te d re sp o n d e n t based on an im p e r
m issib le m o tiv e— b ecause he en gaged in conduct p ro te c te d
by s ta te to r t law , in d e p e n d e n t of an y c o n tra c t r ig h ts of
re sp o n d en t o r H A L . T he co llective b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t
can n o t e lim in a te such s u b s ta n tiv e legal p ro te c tio n s p ro
v ided to em p lo y ees in d e p e n d e n t of th e a g re e m e n t. S ee
B u e ll , 480 U .S. a t 563-565; C o lo r a d o A n t i - D is c r im in a t io n
C o m m ’n , 372 U .S. a t 724. M oreover, th e e le m e n ts of th e
t o r t a n d c o n tr a c t c la im s and d e fe n se s a r e d is t in c t.
R e sp o n d e n t can n o t p re v a il on h is to r t claim s m ere ly b y
p ro v in g th a t H A L lack ed “ju s t c a u se ” to d ism iss him
u n d e r th e co llec tive b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t, b ec au se th e
to r ts a lleg ed re q u ire p ro o f of un law ful p u rp o se to p un ish
re s p o n d e n t fo r re c tify in g sa fe ty v io la tio n s o r r e p o r t in g
th em to th e F A A . C onverse ly , even if th e s ta te co u rt w e re
to find th a t re sp o n d e n t co m m itted in su b o rd in a tio n u n d e r
th e c o n t r a c t b y re fu s in g “to s ig n w o rk r e c o rd s in
connection w ith th e w o rk he p e rfo rm e d ” (P e t. A pp. 49a
(A rt. IV 1 D .4 (a))), t h a t f in d in g could n o t “a rg u a b ly
j u s t i f [y]” ( C o n r a i l , 491 U .S. a t 307) a d isch arg e m o tiv a ted
by th e d e s ire to p en a lize re s p o n d e n t fo r re c t ify in g o r
r e p o r t in g a s a fe ty in fra c tio n . T h u s , th e c o u r t b e lo w
c o r re c tly d e te rm in e d th a t th is case does n o t p re s e n t a
m ino r d is p u te s u b je c t to th e R L A ’s ex c lu s iv e a r b i t r a l
m echan ism b ec au se “[re sp o n d e n t’s] r e ta l ia to ry d isch a rg e
claim is b ased on his a lleg a tio n th a t he w as te rm in a te d for
re p o r t in g a v io la tion of th e law , and [p e titio n e rs ] do no t
s u g g e s t t h a t a r e ta l ia to r y d isc h a rg e is s a n c tio n e d o r
ju stified b y a p rovision in th e a g reem en t.” P e t. A pp. 19a.12
12 Petitioners argue (Br. 34) in this Court that respondent’s claims
are preempted because the state court must construe the collective
bargaining agreement to determine if respondent was “discharged.”
Petitioners have provided no basis, however, for concluding that the
Hawaii tort of retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy or of
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15
C. N eith er The T ex t Nor The H istory O f The
Railway Labor A ct Supports The Broad P re
em ption Of S tate Tort Law Urged By P etitioners
P e titio n e rs con tend (B r. 26-27, 48-49) th a t C o n r a i l does
n o t supp ly th e a p p ro p ria te fram ew o rk fo r ev a lu a tin g R L A
p reem p tio n . T h ey a rg u e (B r. 10-11) in s tead th a t th e R L A ’s
co m p u lso ry a r b i t r a l m e c h a n ism — w h ich ap p lie s to d i s
p u te s “g ro w in g o u t of g riev a n ces o r o u t o f th e in te r p r e ta
tion o r ap p lica tio n of a g re e m e n ts co n cern in g r a te s o f pay,
ru le s , o r w o rk in g c o n d itio n s ,” 45 U .S .C . 153 F i r s t (i)—
e x te n d s n o t m e re ly to c o n tra c t cla im s, b u t to an y claim
a r is in g ou t of d isc ip lina ry ac tion in an em p lo y m en t s e t t in g
covered by th e Act.
1. a. C o n tra ry to p e ti t io n e rs ’ a rg u m e n t (B r. 10-11), th e
lan g u ag e of S ection 153 F ir s t (i) does n o t in d ica te th a t th e
c lass of “g r ie v a n c e s ” n e c e s sa r ily e n c o m p a sse s all claim s
to u ch in g upon th e em p lo y m en t re la tio n sh ip , re g a rd le s s of
w h e th e r th e y a re b a se d on c o n tra c tu a l r ig h ts . F i r s t ,
a lth o u g h th e A c t a p p lie s to d is p u te s “g ro w in g o u t of
g riev an ces o r o u t of th e in te rp re ta t io n o r ap p lica tio n ” of a
co llec tive b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t (45 U .S .C . 153 F i r s t (i)
(em phasis added)), th is C o u rt has recogn ized th a t th e w ord
“o r” is n o t n ec essa rily d is ju n c tiv e and th a t “o r” does no t
a lw ay s re q u ir e t h a t th e p h ra s e s i t s e p a ra te s b e g iv en
in d ep en d e n t m eaning . See, e.g., U n ited S ta te s v. O la n o , 113
S. C t. 1770, 1776-1777 (1993); M c N a lly v. U n ited S t a t e s , 483
U .S . 350, 358-359 (1987).13 S eco n d , a lth o u g h th e te rm
“g rie v a n c e ” m ig h t in th e o ry be u sed m o re b ro a d ly , i t is
the HWPA depends on a finding of “discharge” as defined by the labor
contract, rather than by state tort law.
13 See also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1585
(1986) (the word “or” may be used “to indicate * * * (3) the synonymous,
equivalent, or substitutive character of two words or phrases <fell over
a precipice [or] cliff> <the off [or] far side> clessen [or] abate>; (4)
correction or greater exactness of phrasing or meaning cthese essays,
[or] rather rough sketches? <the present king had no children—[or]
rather no legitimate children * * *>”).
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16
com m only u sed in th e lab o r law co n tex t to r e fe r to claim s
a ris in g ou t of a co llective b a rg a in in g a g reem en t. See, e .g . ,
U n ited P a p e r w o r k e r s I n t ’l U n ion v. M isco , In c . , 484 U .S.
29, 36 (1987) (“[c jo lle c tiv e -b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n ts c o m
m only p ro v id e g rie v a n c e p ro c e d u re s to s e t t l e d is p u te s
b e tw e e n union and em p lo y er w ith re sp e c t to th e in te rp re
ta tio n and app lica tion of th e a g re e m e n t”); 29 U .S .C . 173(d)
(“F in a l a d ju s tm e n t by a m ethod ag reed upon by th e p a r tie s
is d ec la red to be th e d e s ira b le m ethod for s e t t le m e n t of
g rie v a n c e d isp u te s a r is in g o v e r th e ap p lica tio n o r i n t e r
p r e ta t io n o f an e x is t in g c o lle c tiv e -b a rg a in in g a g r e e
m en t.”). A lth o u g h th e re is in ev itab le o verlap b e tw e e n th e
p h ra s e s s e p a ra te d b y th e “o r” in S ec tio n 153 F i r s t (i)
u n d e r an y re a d in g of th a t p ro v is io n ,14 th is C o u r t’s ca se s
d e m o n s tra te th a t th a t is too s len d er a basis fo r co n s tru in g
th e R L A to p re e m p t all to r t d u tie s re la te d to em p lo y m en t
covered by th e A c t.15 See pp. 19-26, in fr a .
14 Petitioners have not identified any dispute growing out of the
interpretation or application of a collective bargaining agreement that
could not be treated as a “grievance.” Thus, even under petitioners’
construction of the RLA, Congress’s inclusion of a reference in Section
153 First (i) to disputes “growing out of grievances or out of the
interpretation or application” of a labor contract would make one of the
alternatives superfluous (emphasis added)).
15 Although the legislative history does not give a clear explanation
of why the term “grievances” was included in Section 153 First (i),
there is a plausible explanation for Congress’s decision to include
additional language to make its intent unmistakable. As this Court has
explained, a collective bargaining agreement “is more than a contract;
it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases ’which the
draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate," and it “calls into being a new
common law—the common law of a particular industry or of a
particular plant.” United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-579 (1960). The express terms of such agreements
are thus inevitably supplemented by “practice, usage and custom.”
Conrail, 491 U.S. at 311-312. Although claims based on practice or
custom are appropriately regarded as an incident of the contractual
relationship between the employer and union, inclusion of the term
“grievances” in Section 153 First (i) serves to foreclose any contention
that arbitration is unavailable for claims that are not based on the
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17
b. P e t i t io n e r s a rg u e (B r. 15-16) t h a t th e le g is la tiv e
h is to ry of th e R L A sh o w s th a t th e te rm “g r ie v a n c e s ”
e x te n d s to w o rk p la c e d is p u te s o u ts id e th e co llec tiv e
b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t. I t is t r u e t h a t w h en th e re le v a n t
lan g u ag e w as f irs t en a c ted in 1926, see R ailw ay L a b o r A ct,
ch. 347, § 3(c), 44 S ta t . 578, som e M em b ers of C o n g re ss
m ade floor s ta te m e n ts t h a t could , in iso la tion , b e r e a d to
s u g g e s t th a t th e class of “g r ie v a n c e s ” is n o t co te rm in o u s
w ith th e class of d isp u te s a r is in g from th e co n tra c t. See,
e .g . , 67 Cong. R ec. 4517 (1926) (R ep . B ark ley ) ( re fe r r in g to
“d is a g re e m e n ts o v e r g r ie v a n c e s , i n te r p r e ta t io n s , dis
c ip lin e , a n d o th e r t e c h n ic a l i t i e s ” ); i d . a t 8807 (S en .
W atso n ) (d iscu ssin g “g rie v a n c e s” and o b se rv in g th a t “[o]f
th is c la ss , a lso , a re d is p u te s r i s in g o u t o f th e i n t e r
p re ta tio n o r ap p lica tio n of e x is tin g a g re e m e n ts ”). T h o se
s t r a y re m a rk s , h o w e v e r, a re in co n c lu s iv e . T h e re w e re
o th e r floor s ta te m e n ts (som e by th e sam e M em bers q u o ted
above) t h a t e q u a te d “g r ie v a n c e s ” w ith q u e s t io n s o f
c o n tra c t in te rp re ta t io n , th e re b y fo rec lo sin g th e a s s e r t io n
th a t th e te rm “g r ie v a n c e ” w as g e n e ra lly u n d e rs to o d to
encom pass e x tra -c o n tra c tu a l d isp u te s . See, e .g ., id . a t 4510
(R ep . B ark ley ) (“T h e re a re tw o s o r ts of d isp u te s th a t a r ise
on ra ilro a d s . O ne k in d is a d is p u te g ro w in g o u t o f th e
in te r p r e ta t io n o f a g r e e m e n t s ] as to w a g e sc a le s o r
w o rk in g co n d itio n s t h a t a lre a d y e x is t . T h e se d is p u te s
m ig h t be te rm e d g r ie v a n c e s .”); id . a t 8808 (Sen. W atson)
(n o tin g th a t u n d e r p re v io u s law , “b o a rd s of a d ju s tm e n t
* * *, as in th is b ill p ro v id e d , h a d to do o n ly w ith
g riev a n ces— th a t is to say , w ith th e in te rp re ta t io n and th e
ap p lica tio n of e x is tin g a g re e m e n ts as to w ag es, h o u rs of
labo r, and cond itions of se rv ic e ”). B ecause th e p re em p tio n
of em p lo y m en t s ta n d a r d s “w ith in th e t r a d i t io n a l police
pow er of th e S ta te f s ]” “sh o u ld n o t b e lig h tly in fe r re d ,”
F o r t H a l i f a x P a c k in g C o. v. C o y n e , 482 U .S. 1, 21 (1987),
express terms of the collective bargaining agreement, but on the
practice, usage, and custom of the workplace.
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th e in c o n c lu s iv e n a tu r e of th e le g is la t iv e m a te r ia ls
s u r ro u n d in g th e 1926 e n a c tm e n t of th e R L A w e ig h s
h eav ily a g a in s t fash io n in g a b ro ad ru le of p re e m p tio n on
th e b as is o f th o se m a te ria ls .
M oreo v er, w hen C o n g ress am ended th e R L A in 1934 to
m ak e th e a r b i t r a l m ech a n ism c o m p u lso ry fo r m in o r
d isp u te s , th e acco m p an y in g H ouse R e p o r t s ta te d : “T he
second m ajo r p u rp o se of th e bill is to p rov ide suffic ien t and
e f fe c tiv e m e a n s fo r th e s e t t le m e n t of m in o r d is p u te s
k n o w n as ‘g r ie v a n c e s ’, w h ich d ev e lo p from th e i n t e r
p re ta t io n an d /o r app lica tion of th e c o n tra c ts b e tw e e n th e
lab o r u n ions and th e c a rr ie rs , fix ing w ag es and w o rk in g
co n d itio n s.” H .R . R ep . No. 1944, 73d C ong., 2d S ess. 2-3
(1934). A lth o u g h th e r e w as l i t t le d is c u s s io n o f th e
m ean in g o f m in o r d is p u te s in 1934, th e H o u se R e p o r t
in d ica tes th a t a t th e p o in t w hen C ongress m ade th e R L A ’s
g riev an ce m ach in e ry exclusive , th e wrnrd “g riev a n ces” w as
c o n s id e re d sy n o n y m o u s w ith d is p u te s g ro w in g o u t of
co llec tive b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n ts . S ee also G arriso n , T h e
N a t io n a l R a i l r o a d A d ju s t m e n t B o a r d : A U n iq u e A d
m in i s t r a t i v e A g e n c y , 46 Y a le L .J . 567, 567 (1937)
(d e sc r ib in g fu n c tio n o f N R A B as b e in g to “r e n d e r [ ]
ju d ic ia lly e n fo rce ab le d ec isions in c o n tro v e rs ie s a r is in g
ou t o f th e in te rp re ta t io n of c o n tra c ts ”); N a tio n a l M ed ia
tio n B o a rd , F i r s t A n n . R ep . 25-26 (1935) ( lik e n in g
a r b i t r a t io n of m in o r d isp u te s to in te r p r e t in g b u s in e s s
c o n tra c ts ) .16 * 18 F ina lly , th e leg is la tiv e h is to ry of th e R L A in
16 Petitioners argue that Congress’s extension of the RLA to the
airline industry in 1936 shows that the term “grievances” includes
noncontractual claims. Specifically, petitioners rely on the statement
in a House Report that boards of adjustment would be set up immedi
ately under the 1936 amendments, even though there were as yet no
collective bargaining agreements in effect in the airline industry. Br.
18 (discussing H.R. Rep. No. 2243, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1936)). In
fact, the House Report recognized that there would be a delay in the
need for an arbitral mechanism precisely because of the absence of
collective bargaining agreements. The 1936 Act, unlike the 1934 Act,
did not immediately establish a national board of adjustment for the
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g e n e ra l g iv e s no in d ic a tio n t h a t in p ro v id in g fo r th e
a rb itra t io n of m in o r d isp u te s , C o n g ress e v e r in ten d ed th e
A c t’s a rb itra l m ach in e ry to d isp lace in d ep en d e n t s ta te to r t
re m e d ie s fo r ra ilro a d an d a ir l in e w o rk e rs w ho s u s ta in
w o rk -re la te d in ju rie s .
2. In a n y ca se , tw o r e la te d l in e s of th is C o u r t ’s
p re c e d e n ts s q u a re ly fo rec lo se p e t i t io n e r s ’ b ro a d v iew of
th e p re e m p tiv e force of th e R L A . F i r s t , th e C o u r t h as
h e ld th a t th e t r ig g e r fo r th e R L A ’s ex c lu s iv e a r b i t r a l
m ech a n ism is th e e x is te n c e o f a d is p u te t h a t can b e
conclusively re so lv e d b y c o n s tru in g th e c o n tra c t, th a t is, a
claim of legal r ig h t th a t can be e s ta b lish e d o r d e fea ted by
p rov isions of th e co n tra c t. Second, th e C o u rt has also held
th a t th e R L A does no t p re e m p t s u b s ta n tiv e re g u la tio n of
airline industry. See Act of Apr. 10, 1936, ch. 166, § 205, 49 Stat. 1190.
Rather, as the House Report explained:
Under Title II a similar board [i.e., one similar to the National
Railroad Adjustment Board] is established to handle similar
matters [i.e., minor disputes] for air transportation * * *. This new
adjustment board will be created and will function in the same
manner as the railway board, excepting that it need not be
established immediately but only when deemed necessary by the
Mediation Board. The reason for the permissive delay in its
formation is that there is nothing for such a board to do until
employment contracts have been completed, and there are no such
contracts in operation now.
H.R. Rep. No. 2243, swpra, at 1 (emphasis added). Although the Act
contemplated a more immediate establishment of system, group, or
regional boards, “it was thought that temporary boards might be
created under this power to settle individual disputes pending the time
when the volume of disputes warranted the creation of a full-time
board.” Ibid. Thus, the 1936 House Report merely shows that the
system, group, or regiunal adjustment boards were to be set up as
needed to handle the same disputes that would ultimately be handled
by the national board. In any case, even if Congress believed that there
might be some form of precontractual disputes arising out of (and
defined by) the employment relationship that could be submitted to
arbitration, that does not support the further conclusion that boards of
adjustment in 1936 were charged with handling state law tort claims.
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20
th e r a i l r o a d an d a ir l in e in d u s tr ie s o r fo re c lo se th e
ap p lica tio n of to r t re m e d ie s to en fo rce th o se su b s ta n tiv e
s ta n d a rd s .
a. A s exp la ined above, th is C o u rt in C o n r a i l held th a t
th e “d is tin g u ish in g fe a tu re ” of a m inor d isp u te “is th a t th e
d isp u te m ay b e conclusively re so lv ed by in te rp re t in g th e
e x is tin g [co llec tive b a rg a in in g ] a g re e m e n t.” 491 U .S . a t
305. P e t i t io n e r s a rg u e (B r. 48-49) th a t C o n r a i l is n o t
d e te rm in a tiv e h e re b ecau se its te s t w as a rtic u la te d in th e
co n tex t of d is tin g u ish in g a “m ajo r d isp u te ” from a “m inor
d isp u te ” u n d e r th e A ct, and no t in th e co n tex t of dec id ing
w h a t c o n s t i tu te s a “m in o r d is p u te ” fo r p u rp o se s of th e
p re e m p tio n o f re m e d ie s o u ts id e th e A ct. P e t i t io n e r s ’
a s s e r te d d is tin c tio n , how ever, does no t w ith s tan d analysis.
A s d iscu ssed above (see pp. 10-11, s u p r a ) , th e basis for
p re e m p tio n u n d e r th e R L A is th a t m in o r d isp u te s a re
channeled to an exclusive a rb itra l p rocess th a t allow s only
lim ited a v e n u e s fo r ju d ic ia l rev iew . I t follow s th a t th e
p re e m p t io n in q u iry n e c e s s a r i ly tu r n s on th e s a m e
questio n th a t w as ad d re ssed in C o n r a i l—w h e th e r th e case
p re se n ts a d isp u te “g row ing ou t of g rievances o r ou t of th e
in te rp re ta t io n o r ap p lica tio n of a g re e m e n ts co n c e rn in g
ra te s o f pay , ru le s , o r w o rk in g cond itions,” 45 U .S .C . 153
F ir s t (i). T h e re is no b as is fo r co n stru in g th e sam e te rm s
d iffe ren tly h e re . Cf. R a t z l a f v . U n ited S ta t e s , 114 S. C t.
655, 660 (1994) (a s ing le s ta tu to ry p h ra se should be read
“th e sam e w ay each tim e i t is called into p lay”).
F u r th e r , th is C o u r t’s an a ly s is in A n d r e tv s co n firm s
th a t th e t e s t fo r p re e m p tio n tu rn s on w h e th e r th e s ta te
law claim a s s e r te d by a ra ilro a d em ployee is b ased on th e
collective b a rg a in in g a g reem en t. A s po in ted ou t in n o te 7,
s u p r a , th e C o u rt in A n d r e w s o v e rru le d its dec ision in
M o o r e v. I l l i n o i s C e n tr a l R .R ., 312 U .S. 630 (1941), and
held t h a t th e R L A ’s ex c lu s iv e a rb it ra l m ech an ism p re
em pts a l te rn a t iv e s ta te law re m e d ie s fo r m ino r d isp u te s .
In so do ing , th e C o u rt re je c te d A n d re w s’ a rg u m e n t th a t
his c la im ( th a t h is e m p lo y e r im p ro p e r ly re fu s e d to
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21
re in s ta te him a f te r an au tom obile acc iden t) w as sav ed from
p re e m p tio n b ec au se A n d re w s h ad s ty le d i t a “w ro n g fu l
d isch a rg e” claim . T he C o u rt ex p la in ed (406 U .S. a t 324):
H e re i t is conceded by all t h a t th e on ly so u rc e of
[A n d rew s’] r ig h t no t to be d isch arg ed , and th e re fo re to
t r e a t an a lleged d isch a rg e as a “w ro n g fu l” one th a t
e n tit le s h im to d am ag es , is th e co lle c tiv e -b a rg a in in g
a g r e e m e n t * * *. [T h e e m p lo y e r ] in th i s c a se
v igo rously d isp u te s any in te n t on i ts p a r t to d isch arg e
[A n d re w s] , an d th e p le a d in g s in d ic a te t h a t th e
d isa g re e m e n t tu rn s on th e e x te n t of [its] ob lig a tio n to
r e s to r e [A n d re w s] to h is r e g u la r d u t ie s fo llo w in g
in ju ry in an au to m o b ile ac c id en t. T h e e x is te n c e and
e x te n t of such an obligation in a case such as th is
w ill d ep en d on th e in te r p r e ta t io n of th e c o lle c tiv e
b a rg a in in g ag reem en t. T h u s [A n d rew s’] claim , and th e
[e m p lo y e r’s] d isa llo w an ce of i t , s te m fro m d iffe r in g
in te r p r e ta t io n s of th e c o l le c tiv e -b a rg a in in g a g r e e
m en t. * * * H is claim is th e re fo re su b je c t to th e A c t’s
re q u ir e m e n t t h a t i t b e s u b m itte d to th e B o a rd fo r
a d ju s tm en t.
I f th e exc lusive a rb itra l m ech an ism of th e R L A applied
to any w o rk -re la te d claim , ir re s p e c tiv e of i ts b a s is in th e
co n tra c t, th e n th e C o u r t’s a n a ly s is ty in g A n d re w s’ claim
to th e c o n tra c t w ould h av e b ee n e n t i r e ly u n n e c e s sa ry ; i t
w ould h a v e b e e n su ffic ie n t to n o te t h a t A n d re w s ’ claim
a ro se ou t of a p o te n tia lly g r ie v a b le e m p lo y m e n t d isp u te
su b je c t to th e R L A . B u t g iv e n th e C o u r t ’s e x te n s iv e
a n a ly s is e s ta b l is h in g t h a t th e “ s o u rc e o f [A n d re w s ’
c la im ed ] r ig h t n o t to b e d is c h a rg e d [] * * * [w as] th e
co llec tiv e -b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t” (406 U .S . a t 324), th e
co n tra c tu a l n a tu re of th e claim w as n e c e s s a r i ly a c ru c ia l
fa c to r in th e C o u rt’s find ing p re e m p tio n .17
17 See also, e.g. , Pittsburgh & L.E. R.R., 491 U.S. at 496 n.4 (minor
disputes “are those involving the interpretation or application of
existing contracts”); Chicago R. & 1. R.R., 353 U.S. at 33 (minor
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b. In a closely re la te d line of cases, th is C o u rt h as also
held th a t th e R L A does no t p rec lude en fo rcem en t of claim s
b ase d on s u b s ta n tiv e re g u la to ry g u a ra n te e s th a t o p era te
in d e p e n d e n tly of th e co llec tive b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t. In
A tch iso n , T. & S .F . R y . v. B u e l l , su p ra , th e C o u rt re je c te d
th e co n ten tio n th a t a p e rso n a l in ju ry claim b ro u g h t u n d e r
th e F e d e ra l E m p lo y e rs ’ L iab ility A ct (F E L A ), 45 U .S .C .
51 et s e q ., w as b a r re d b y th e R L A b ecau se th e alleged
w o rk p lace d e fe c ts g iv in g r ise to h is F E L A claim m ig h t
also h av e b ee n th e p ro p e r su b jec t of g riev an ce p ro ced u re s
as a m in o r d is p u te . T h e C o u r t re c o g n iz e d th a t th e
ra ilro a d ’s d u ty to use reaso n ab le ca re “w as reco g n ized a t
com m on law , * * * is g iven force th ro u g h th e [F E L A ] * * *,
and is co n firm ed in som e, if no t all, co llec tiv e-b arg a in in g
a g r e e m e n ts .” 480 U .S . a t 558.18 B u t i t r e je c te d th e
a r g u m e n t t h a t B u e ll’s t o r t cla im w as b a r r e d s im p ly
b ecau se th e a lleged in ju ry a ro se from conduct “th a t m ay
h ave b e e n su b je c t to a rb itra t io n u n d e r th e R L A .” Id . a t
564. T h e C o u rt reaso n ed th a t “n o tw ith s ta n d in g th e s tro n g
policies en c o u rag in g a rb itra tio n , ‘d iffe ren t co n -s id e ra tio n s
ap p ly w h e re th e e m p lo y e e ’s claim is b a se d on r ig h ts
a r is in g o u t o f a s t a tu te d e s ig n ed to p ro v id e m in im um
s u b s ta n tiv e g u a ra n te e s to individual w o rk e rs .’ ” Id . a t 565.
I t a d d e d t h a t th e F E L A “n o t on ly p ro v id es ra ilro a d
w o rk e rs w ith s u b s ta n t iv e p ro te c tio n a g a in s t n e g lig e n t
conduc t th a t is in d e p e n d e n t of th e em p lo y er’s ob ligations
u n d e r i ts co llec tive b a rg a in in g ag reem en t, b u t also affo rds
in ju re d w o rk e rs a re m e d y su ited to th e ir needs, un like th e
lim ited r e l ie f t h a t se e m s to be av a ila b le th ro u g h th e
disputes are “controversies over the meaning of an existing collective
bargaining agreement in a particular fact situation”); Slocum v.
Delaivare, L. & W. R.R., 339 U.S. 239, 243 (1950) (arbitral mechanism is
meant “to provide effective and desirable administrative remedies for
adjustment of railroad-employee disputes growing out of the interpre
tation of existing agreements”).
18 In fact, Buell had taken “preliminary though abortive steps” to
invoke the grievance machinery. 480 U.S. at 564.
337
23
A d ju s tm e n t B o a rd .” I b id . B u e l l th e re fo re co n firm s th a t
w h en a cau se o f ac tio n is b a se d on s u b s ta n t iv e r ig h ts
in d e p e n d e n t o f th e co llec tive b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t, i t is
n o t p re e m p te d b y th e R L A ev en if p a ra lle l cla im s could
also have b een b ro u g h t as m ino r d isp u te s u n d e r th e R L A .19
T h e r e s u l t in B u e l l , m o re o v e r , is s u p p o r te d by th is
C o u r t’s p r io r d ec is io n s h o ld in g th a t th e R L A do es n o t
p r e e m p t th e S ta t e s f ro m r e g u la t in g th e w o rk in g
cond itions of em ployees su b je c t to th e A ct. F o r exam ple ,
in T e r m in a l R .R . A s s ’n v. B r o th e r h o o d o f R .R . T r a in m e n ,
s u p r a , th e C o u rt su s ta in e d th e Illin o is C o m m erce C o m
m issio n ’s o rd e r re q u ir in g ra ilro a d s to p lace cab o o ses on
th e i r t r a in s as a s a f e ty m e a s u re fo r th e p ro te c tio n of
sw itch m en w ho p e r fo rm e d th e i r d u t ie s a t th e b ac k of
19 Petitioners suggest (Br. 46 n.28) that Buell is inapposite because
it reconciled the RLA with another federal statute, rather than with
state law. The Court, however, emphasized that the FELA provides
“substantive protection * * * independent of the * * * collective
bargaining agreement” (480 U.S. at 565); it did not suggest that a
different result would obtain with respect to a state law that similarly
provided independent substantive protection to an employee. In any
event, other decisions of this Court confirm that Congress did not intend
the RLA’s grievance machinery to preempt all state regulation of the
railroad and airline employment. See pp. 23-26, infra.
Buell also undermines petitioners’ reliance (Br. 23-24) on the follow
ing dicta in Burley, 325 U.S. at 723: a minor dispute “relates either to
the meaning or proper application of a particular provision with
reference to a specific situation or to an omitted case. In the latter
event the claim is founded upon some incident of the employment
relation, or asserted one, independent of those covered by the collective
agreement, e.g., claims on account of personal injuries.” In our view,
the Court’s reference to an “omitted case” is properly understood as
drawing a contrast with a dispute relating to a “particular provision” of
the labor contract. An “omitted case,” in other words, is a case that
arises not from the express terms of the contract, but by implication
from practice, usage, or custom. See note 15, supra. Biiell now makes
clear that the mere possibility of bringing a grievance on an “omitted
case’ such as a “claim[] on account of personal injur[y]” (Burley, 325
U.S. at 723) does not preempt a separate tort action based on a standard
of care independent of the agreement.
338
24
m o v in g t r a in s . In so h o ld ing , th e C o u rt r e je c te d th e
a r g u m e n t t h a t th e s t a t e c o m m iss io n ’s o r d e r w a s
p re e m p te d b y th e R L A b ecau se th e dem and fo r cabooses
a ro s e fro m a d is p u te b e tw e e n th e c a r r i e r an d its
em ployees, and b ec au se th e co llec tive b a rg a in in g a g re e
m e n t i t s e l f c o n ta in e d a p ro v is io n d ea lin g w ith th e p ro
v is io n o f c a b o o se s . T h e C o u r t “a s su m e fd j, w ith o u t
dec id ing , th a t th e d em an d fo r add itio n a l caboose se rv ice
an d i t s r e fu s a l c o n s t i tu te a d is p u te a b o u t w o rk in g
co n d itio n s, and th a t th e N a tio n a l R a ilro ad A d ju s tm e n t
B o ard w ou ld h a v e ju r is d ic t io n of i t on p e ti t io n of th e
em ployees o r th e i r r e p re s e n ta tiv e s and m ig h t h av e m ade
an a w a rd s u c h a s th e o r d e r in q u e s tio n o r so m e
m odification of i t .” 318 U .S. a t 6. B u t th e C o u rt reaso n ed
as follows { id . a t 6-7 (em phasis added)):
S ta te law s h av e long re g u la te d a g r e a t v a r ie ty of
c o n d itio n s in t r a n s p o r ta t io n and in d u s try , su ch as
s a n i ta ry fac ilitie s and cond itions, s a fe ty dev ices and
p ro tec tio n s , p u r i ty of w a te r supply , fire p ro tec tio n , and
in n u m e ra b le o th e rs . * * * W e su p p o se em ployees
m ig h t co n sid e r th a t s ta te o r m unicipal re q u ire m e n ts
of f ire e sc ap es , f ire doo rs , and fire p ro te c tio n w e re
in a d e q u a te and m ake th e m th e su b jec t o f a d isp u te , a t
le a s t som e p h ases of w hich would be of fe d e ra l concern .
B u t it c a n n o t b e th a t th e m in im u m r e q u ir e m e n ts la id
d o w n by s t a t e a u t h o r i t y a r e a l l s e t a s id e . W e h o ld
th a t th e e n a c tm e n t by C o n g ress o f th e R a i lw a y L a b o r
A c t w a s n o t a p r e e m p t io n o f th e f i e l d o f r e g u la t in g
w o r k in g c o n d it io n s th e m s e lv e s a n d d id n o t p r e c lu d e
th e S t a t e o f I l l i n o i s f r o m m a k in g th e o r d e r in
q u e s t io n .
S im ila rly , in C o lo r a d o A n t i - D is c r im in a t io n C o m m ’n
v. C o n t in e n ta l A ir L in e s , In c ., s u p r a , th e C o u rt re je c te d
th e co n te n tio n th a t th e R L A p re e m p te d a s ta te s ta tu te
“p ro te c t in g em p lo y ee s a g a in s t ra c ia l d is c r im in a tio n .”
339
25
372 U .S . a t 7 24 .20 A s th is C o u r t e m p h a s iz e d , “ [n]o
p ro v is io n in th e [R L A ] ev en m e n tio n s d isc r im in a tio n in
h ir in g ,” and n o th in g in th e A c t “su g g e s ts th a t [it] p lace s
u p o n an a i r c a r r i e r a d u ty to e n g a g e o n ly in f a ir
n o n d isc r im in a to ry h ir in g p ra c t ic e s .” I b id . B eca u se th e
R L A “h as n e v e r b ee n u sed fo r t h a t p u rp o se ,” th is C o u r t
found th a t i t did n o t p re e m p t th e s ta te an ti-d isc rim in a tio n
s ta tu te th e re a t issue. Ib id .
In lig h t of B u e l l , T e r m in a l R .R . A s s ’n , and C o lo r a d o
A n t i - D is c r im in a t io n C o m m ’n , th e co m p u lso ry a r b i t r a
tio n prov isions of th e R L A do no t p re e m p t claim s p re m ise d
on s ta te law d u tie s in a re a s of le g itim a te s ta te co n cern
t h a t a r e in d e p e n d e n t o f d u t ie s a s s u m e d u n d e r th e
co llec tive b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t .21 G iven th e b re a d th of
th e su b je c t m a t te r co v e red b y a ty p ic a l co llec tiv e b a r
g a in in g a g re e m e n t,22 p e ti t io n e rs ’ co n s tru c tio n of th e R L A
20 Petitioners suggest (Br. 47-48) that Colorado Anti-Discrimination
Comm’n is inapposite here because it involved discrimination against
prospective employees, and not against incumbents. Nothing in the
Court’s reasoning, however, suggests that the principle of the case is so
limited.
21 Those decisions foreclose petitioners’ reliance (Br. 10) on 45 U.S.C.
152 First, which requires carriers and employees “to exert every
reasonable effort * * * settle all disputes, whether arising out of the
application of * * * agreements or otherwise.” Ibid. That provision—
which is phrased more broadly than the operative language of Section
153 First (i)—may refer to both major and minor disputes. But even if
Section 152 First is read to require the parties (independent of the
major dispute mechanism) to try to settle certain issues arising out of
the employment relationship but not specifically addressed by the
agreement, the decisions discussed in text make clear that Section 153
First (i) of the RLA does not preempt claims based on independent tort
duties, rather than on the collective bargaining agreement.
22 A collective bargaining agreement “is more than a contract; it is
a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen
cannot wholly anticipate. The collective agreement covers the whole
employment relationship. It calls into being a new common law—the
common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant.” Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 578-579 (citation omitted; emphasis
added). For that reason, a vast array of injuries sustained by railroad
340
26
w ould re s u lt in a w holesa le p reem p tio n of s ta te to r t law as
it a p p lie s to em p lo y m e n t re la tio n sh ip s c o v e red b y th e
R L A . B u t b ecause “th e te x t o f th e R L A does no t * * * deal
w ith th e su b je c t o f to r t liab ility ” ( B u e l l , 480 U .S. a t 562),
or d isp lay an y in te n t to p re e m p t “th e field of r e g u la t in g
w o rk in g co n d itio n s th e m s e lv e s ” ( T e r m in a l R .R . A s s ’n ,
318 U .S. a t 7), th e R L A should no t be co n stru ed to p re e m p t
S ta te s from a d o p tin g m in im um d u tie s , in d e p e n d e n t of th e
co llec tive b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t, th ro u g h th e i r law of
to r t s ,23 ev en if th o se d u tie s p e r ta in to em ployees co vered
by th e R L A .24
workers could theoretically be addressed by “the timely invocation of
the grievance machinery.” Buell, 480 U.S. at 564.
23 That conclusion is supported not only by this Court’s decisions
construing the RLA in particular, but also by general principles of
labor law preemption, which counsel against construing federal statutes
to displace the police power of the States. See, e.g., Fort Halifax
Packing, 482 U.S. at 21, 23 (preemption “should not be lightly inferred,”
because “establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional
police power of the State[s]” and “does not impermissibly intrude upon
the collective-bargaining process”); Lueck, 471 U.S. at 212 (avoiding
interpretation that “would delegate to unions and unionized employers
the power to exempt themselves from whatever state labor standards
they disfavored”).
24 Petitioners argue (Br. 35) that their claim of preemption is but
tressed by Gilmer v. Inter state/Johnson Lane Corp., I l l S. Ct. 1647,
1651-1657 (1991), which held that an agreement to arbitrate claims
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. 621
et seq., may be judicially enforced. Petitioners contend that Gilmer
shows that parties may by contract provide for the arbitration of
independent claims of statutory right, and that RLA preemption would
extend to any such claims brought within the scope of a collective
bargaining agreement. For two reasons, Gilmer does not assist
petitioners here. First, the Court in Gilmer took pains to distinguish
this Court’s prior decisions holding that the arbitration of contract
claims does not preclude subsequent judicial resolution of independent
statutory claims. Second, the claim in Gilmer was subject to the
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., and the Court specifically
relied on a provision of that Act, 9 U.S.C. 2, making compulsory
arbitration clauses enforceable. I l l S. Ct. at 1651, 1657. In contrast,
341
27
D. This C ourt’s D ecision s C onstruing S ection 301
Of The Labor-M anagem ent R elations A ct Sup
port The C onclusion T hat R esp on d en t’s T ort
Claims Are N ot Preem pted
P e ti t io n e r s con tend (B r. 39-43) th a t th e S u p rem e C o u rt
of H aw aii e r re d in re ly in g on L in g le v. N o rg e D iv is io n o f
M a g ic C h ef, I n c . , 486 U .S . 399 (1986), a case a r is in g u n d e r
S ec tio n 301(a) of th e L a b o r-M a n a g e m e n t R e la tio n s A c t
(L M R A ), 29 U .S .C . 185(a). In o u r v iew , h o w ev er, L in g le
a ffo rd s an a p p r o p r ia te f r a m e w o rk fo r a d d re s s in g th e
p re em p tio n q u estio n u n d e r th e R L A .
S ection 301(a) of th e L M R A con fers ju risd ic tio n on th e
fe d e ra l d is tr ic t co u rts of “[s ju its fo r v io la tion of c o n tra c ts
b e tw e e n an em p lo y er and a lab o r o rg a n iz a tio n r e p r e s e n t
in g em p lo y e e s in an in d u s t r y a f fe c tin g co m m erce as
d efin ed in th is [A ct], o r b e tw e e n an y su ch la b o r o r g a n
iza tio n s .” 29 U .S .C . 185(a). U n d e r th is C o u r t’s decisions,
d isp u te s re q u ir in g th e in te r p r e ta t io n o f la b o r c o n tra c ts
co v e red b y S ec tio n 301 a re g o v e rn ed by fe d e ra l com m on
law ru le s th a t p re e m p t s ta te ru le s of decision. S ee T e x t i le
W o rk er s U n io n v. L in c o ln M ills , 353 U .S. 448, 456 (1957);
L o c a l 17U, T e a m s te r s v. L u c a s F l o u r C o ., 369 U .S . 95, 103
(1962). In L in g le , th e C o u rt a d d re sse d th e e x te n t to w hich
p re e m p tio n u n d e r S e c tio n 301 e x te n d s to t o r t c la im s
a r is in g ou t of th e em ploym en t re la tio n sh ip .
S pecifically , th e C o u rt in L in g le h e ld th a t S ec tio n 301
d id n o t p re e m p t a s t a t e t o r t s u i t b a se d on r e ta l ia to r y
d is c h a rg e fo r f ilin g a w o r k e r ’s c o m p e n s a tio n c la im .
N o tin g th a t th e e lem e n ts of th e s ta te law cau se of ac tio n
consisted of (1) d ism issa l o f an em ployee and (2) a m o tive to
d e te r o r in te r fe re w ith h is filing of a w o rk e r ’s co m p e n sa
tion claim , th e C o u rt concluded:
the Federal Arbitration Act explicitly provides that “nothing herein
contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce.” 9 U.S.C. 1. Hence, it has no application here.
342
28
E ach of th e s e p u re ly fac tual q u es tio n s p e r ta in s to th
c o n d u c t o f th e e m p lo y e e an d th e c o n d u c t an
m o tiv a tio n of th e em ployer. N e ith e r o f th e elem ent
re q u ire s a c o u rt to in te rp re t any te rm of a co llectiv t
b a rg a in in g ag reem en t. To defend a g a in s t a re ta l ia to r
d isch a rg e claim , an em p lo y er m u s t show th a t i t had
n o n re ta l ia to ry re a s o n fo r th e d isch a rg e * * *; th i
p u re ly fa c tu a l in q u iry likew ise does n o t tu rn on th
m ean in g of an y p ro v is io n o f a c o llec tiv e -b a rg a in in
a g reem en t.
486 U .S . a t 407. T h e C o u rt acco rd in g ly found th a t th
s ta te to r t w as “ ‘in d e p e n d e n t’ of th e co llee tive-barga in in j
a g re e m e n t” b ec au se its re so lu tio n did “n o t r e q u i r e cor
s tru in g [ th a t] * * * a g re e m e n t.” I b id , (em phasis added).25
To b e su re , th e s ta n d a rd fo r p re em p tio n u n d e r L in g l
(w h e th e r a s ta te law claim re q u ire s in te rp re ta t io n o f ;
lab o r c o n tra c t) is a r tic u la te d so m ew h a t d iffe re n tly fro r
th e s ta n d a rd fo r fin d in g a m ino r d isp u te u n d e r C o n r a i
(w h e th e r a d is p u te m ay be co n c lu s iv e ly re s o lv e d b;
in te rp re t in g th e co llec tive b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t) . I t i
also t ru e th a t th e R L A , un like th e L M R A , a ff irm a tiv e !
calls fo r th e a r b i t r a t io n o f c o n tra c t c la im s w ith in i t
sw eep .26 N e v e rth e le ss , L in g le is in s tru c tiv e in th e R L i5
25 The Court in L in g le emphasized that “even if dispute resolutio
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, on the one hand, am
state law, on the other, would require addressing precisely the same se
of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved withou
interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is ‘independent’ of th
agreement for § 301 purposes." 486 U.S. at 409-410 (footnote omitted).
26 This distinction between the RLA and the LMRA should not b>
overstated. In determining when a state tort action is preempted unde
Section 301, the Court confronted the need to “preservefi the central rol
of arbitration in our ‘system of industrial self-government.’ ” L u e c k
471 U.S. at 219. It noted that the “need to preserve the effectiveness o
arbitration was one of the central reasons that underlay the Court’;
[preemption] holding in L u c a s F lo u r ,” and that the standard for LMR7
preemption must protect the parties’ “federal right to decide who is ti
resolve contract disputes.” I b id . Thus, although RLA preemptior
343
29
co n tex t. T h is C o u rt h as ex p la in ed th a t a c e n tra l p u rp o se
of b o th S ec tio n 301 and th e ex c lu siv e a rb it ra l m echan ism
of th e R L A is to p ro m o te th e u n ifo rm in te rp re ta t io n of
co llec tive b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n ts and th e peacefu l, co n sis
t e n t re so lu tio n o f la b o r-m a n a g e m e n t d isp u te s . C o m p are ,
e .g ., L i n g l e , 486 U .S. a t 404, 406, an d L u e c k , 471 U .S . a t
209-210, w ith S lo c u m v. D e la w a r e , L . & W. R .R ., 339 U .S.
239, 242-243 (1950).
N o t su rp ris in g ly , th e re fo re , in its decision in A n d r e w s ,
th is C o u rt re lie d on its p re c e d e n ts u n d e r S ec tio n 301 of
th e L M R A in ho ld ing th a t th e a rb it r a l m ech an ism o f th e
R L A p re e m p ts s ta te law ju d ic ia l re m e d ie s fo r c la im s
a r is in g o u t of a co llec tive b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t. S ee 406
U .S. a t 323; see also I n t e r n a t io n a l A s s ’n o f M a c h in is t s v.
C e n t r a l A i r l i n e s , In c ., 372 U .S . 682, 692 (1963) (“th e
[R L A ] c o n tra c t , lik e th e [L M R A ] § 301 c o n tra c t , is a
fed e ra l c o n tra c t * * * g o v ern ed and en fo rceab le b y federa l
law ”). B y th e sam e to k en , in i ts d ec ision in L in g le , th e
C o u rt spec ifica lly re lie d on its R L A dec ision in B u e l l in
d e te rm in in g th a t a s ta te law r e ta l ia to r y d isc h a rg e claim
w as n o t p re e m p te d b y S ec tio n 301 b e c a u se i t d id no t
re q u ire in te rp re ta t io n of th e co llec tiv e b a rg a in in g a g re e
m en t. S ee 486 U .S. a t 410-411.
In s h o r t , th e q u e s tio n a d d re s s e d u n d e r th e R L A and
L M R A p re em p tio n cases is com m on to b o th s ta tu te s : how
to acco m m o d a te th e fe d e ra l i n t e r e s t in u n ifo rm in t e r
p re ta t io n o f co llec tiv e b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n ts an d the
le g itim a te in te r e s t of th e S ta te s in a d o p tin g s ta n d a rd s of
conduc t fo r em ployers su b je c t to th e ir police pow er. U nder
th e R L A , as u n d e r th e L M R A , a p ro p e r accom odation of
th o se in te r e s t s lead s to th e conc lusion th a t a s ta te to r t
law claim fo r re ta l ia to ry d isch arg e is n o t p re e m p te d .27
protects a direct statutory right to arbitration, LMRA preemption
protects the important statutory right to contract for an arbitral
remedy.
27 Compare, e.g., L in g le , 486 U.S. at 409 (LMRA “says nothing about
the substantive rights a State may provide to workers when
344
30
CONCLUSION
T he decision o f th e S u p rem e C o u rt of H aw aii should be
affirm ed.
R esp ec tfu lly su b m itted .
DrewS. Days, III
Solicitor General
Frank W. Hunger
Assistant Attorney General
Edwin S. Kneedler
Deputy Solicitor General
J ohn F. Manning
Assistant to the Solicitor General
William Kanter
E dward T. Swaine
Attorneys
April 1994
adjudication of those rights does not depend upon the interpretation of
[labor] agreements”), and Lueck, 471 U.S. at 212 (LMRA “does not
grant the parties to a collective-bargaining agreement the ability to
contract for what is illegal under state law,” and does not preempt
“state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations,
independent of a labor contract”), with Colorado Anti-Discrimination
Comm’n, 372 U.S. at 724 (RLA does not preempt state anti-discrimina
tion law). We therefore agree with those lower court decisions holding
that Lingle offers an appropriate framework for analyzing RLA
preemption of state law tort actions. See, e.g., Anderson v. American
Airlines, Inc., 2 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying Lingle); Davies v.
American Air Lines, Inc., 971 F.2d 463, 466-467 (10th Cir. 1992) (same),
cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 2439 (1993); O’Brien v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,
972 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1992) (same), cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 980 (1993);
Maher v. Neiv Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 593 A.2d 750, 758
(NJ. 1991) (same). But see, e.g., Hubbard v. United Airlines, Inc., 927
F.2d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1991) (Lingle does not govern in RLA cases);
Lorenz v. CSX Transp., Inc., 980 F.2d 263, 268 (4th Cir. 1992) (same).
345
N o. 92-2058
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1993
H aw aiian A irlines, Inc ., et a l.,
P etition ers,
v.
G ran t T . N orris,
R espon den t.
On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Hawaii
B R IEF O F A IR TR A N SPO R T ASSOCIATIO N OF
A M E R IC A AS A M IC U S C U RIA E IN SU PPO R T OF
PETITIO N ERS
* Charles A. Shanor
John J. Gallagher
M argaret H. Spurlin
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky &
W alker
1299 Pennsylvania A ve., NW
W ashington, D .C . 20004
(202) 508-9500
F or Amicus Curiae
The A ir Transport
Association o f Am erica
M arch 4, 1994 * Counsel o f Record
347
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IN TERESTS OF TH E AM ICUS C U R I A E ............. ... 1
STA TEM EN T OF TH E C A S E .............................................. 3
SU M M A R Y O F A R G U M EN T . ........................................... 4
A R G U M EN T ................................................................... 6
I. T H E RAILW AY LABOR A C T ’S
M A N D A TO R Y A D JU STM EN T BOARD
PRO CESSES PR EE M PT R E SP O N D E N T ’S
STA TE W R O N G FU L D ISC H A R G E C LA IM . . 6
A. Preem ption Is M andated By
The P lain Language
O f The R LA .............................................. 8
B. P reem ption Is Supported By
The Legislative H istory O f
These Provisions O f The R LA . . . . . 10
C. Preem ption Is Consistent W ith
This C ourt’s D ecisions And
The R L A ’s Purposes ................................... 16
1. This C ourt’s P rio r
C onstructions O f The RLA
Support Broad P reem ption . . . . 16
2. P reem ption O f
R espondent’s C laim s W ould
Serve RLA Purposes . . . . . . 21
II. R LA PREEM PTIO N SH O U LD N O T BE
G O V ERN ED BY LABOR M A N A G EM EN T
RELA TIO N S A C T STA N D A RD S ...................... 24
C O N C LU SIO N ......................................................... 29
348
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CA SES: Pages:
A laska A irlines, Inc. an d
A ir L in e P ilots A s s ’n,
88 AAR Lab. Rel. Press 0108 (1 9 8 8 ) .............................. 15
A lessi v. R aybestos-M anhattan , I n c . ,
451 U .S. 504 (1981) ............................. .....................................6
A llis-C halm ers C orp. v. L u eck ,
471 U .S. 202 (1985) ................................................................ 26
Andrew s v L ou isv ille &
N. Ry. C o ., 406 U .S . 320
( 1 9 7 2 ) ...................... ... 4, 7, 16, 21, 24, 28
B oston & M ain e C orp. v. L en fest,
799 F .2d 795 (1st C ir, 1986),
cert, d en ied , 479 U .S . 1102 (1987) ................................... 15
B ro th erh o o d o f R. Trainm en v.
C h icag o R. & I. R .R .,
353 U .S . 30 (1957), r e h ’g d en ied ,
353 U .S . 948 (1957) ............................................... 23
B ro th erh ood o f R .R . Trainm en
v. Ja ck so n v ille T erm inal C o .,
394 U .S. 369 (1969), r e h ’g d en ied ,
394 U .S. 1024 (1969) ................................... ... 7
C aliforn ia F e d e r a l Savings &
L oan Assn. v. G u erra ,
479 U .S. 272 (1987) ............................................... 6
C aliforn ia v. T aylor,
353 U .S. 553 (1957) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
C h icag o & N.W . R. C o. v.
United Transp. Union,
402 U .S . 570, 576 ( 1 9 7 1 ) .................................. 19
i 349
C o lo r a d o A nti-D iscrim ination
C o m m ’n v. C ontinental
A ir L in es , In c ., 372 U .S. 714 (1963) 25
C o n so lid a ted R a il C orp. v.
R ailw ay L a b o r E x ecu tiv es ’ Ass 'n,
491 U .S . 299 (1989) ................................................. ... 6, 24, 25
E lg in , J . & E. Ry. v. B u rley ,
325 U .S . 711 (1945) ...................... ... 5, 16, 20, 28
E r ie R .R . v. T om pkins,
304 U .S . 64 ( 1 9 3 8 ) .................................................................... 25
G a d e v. N ation a l S o lid W astes
M an ag em en t A ssoc ia tion ,
112 S .C t. 2374 ( 1 9 9 2 ) ................................................................ 6
G a m e r v. T eam sters,
346 U .S . 485 (1953) .......................................................... ... . 22
G ilm er v. In tersta te /Joh n son
L a n e C o rp ., 500 U .S . 20 (1991) ........................................... 25
IAM v. A laska A irlines, I n c . ,
N o. 88-4079 (9th C ir. Feb. 21, 1990),
cert, d en ied , 498 U .S . 821 ( 1 9 9 0 ) ....................................... 22
In d ep en d en t Union o f F ligh t
A ttendants v. P an A m erican
W orld A irw ays, In c ., 789 F .2d 139
(2d C ir. 1 9 8 6 ) ............................................................. 14
In tern a tion a l A ss ’n o f M achin ists v.
S treet, 367 U .S . 740 (1961) . ................................. 20
In tern a tion a l A ss ’n o f M achin ists v.
W isconsin E m ploym en t R elation s C o m m ’n,
A l l U .S . 132 (1976) .......................... ... 26
In tern a tion a l Assn, o f M achin ists v.
C en tra l A irlines, I n c . ,
372 U .S . 682 (1963) ....................................................... ... 18
350
L in g le v. N orge Div. o f
M agic Chef, In c ., 486 U .S . 399
(1988) ................................................ ... 4, 24, 26, 27, 29
L on g Islan d R. R. v. B ro th erh o o d
o f L ocom otiv e E n g in eers ,
290 F .Supp. 100 (E .D .N .Y . 1968) .................................. 14
L on g Islan d R .R . v. System
F ed era tion No. 156 , 368 F .2 d 50
(2d Cir. 1966) ............................................................................ 14
M issouri-K ansas-T exas R .R . v.
B ro th erh ood o f R. Trainm en,
342 F .2d 298 (5th Cir. 1965) .......................... ................... 14
M oore v. Illin o is C entral R .R . C o .,
312 U .S. 630 ( 1 9 4 1 ) ...................... ........................................ 16
N orris v. H aw aiian A irlines,
842 P .2d 642 (Haw. 1992) ............................................... ... . 9
O rder o f R. C onductors v. Pitney,
326 U .S. 561 ( 1 9 4 6 ) ................ ' ....................................... 22, 28
O rder o f R. C onductors v.
Southern Ry. C o . ,
339 U .S. 255 (1950) ...................... ......................... 17, 23, 28
Pennsylvania R.R. v. D ay,
360 U .S. 548 ( 1 9 5 9 ) ................................................ ... 17
R ayner v. Sm irl,
873 F .2d 60 (4th C ir. 1989),
cert, d en ied , 493 U .S . 876 ( 1 9 8 9 ) ...................................... 15
Richm ond, F. & P. R.R. v.
Transportation C om m unications
In t’l Union, 973 F .2d 276
(4th Cir. 1 9 9 2 ) .................................................. ........................ 22
R odriguez d e Q uijas v.
Shearson /A m erican E xpress I n c . ,
490 U .S. 477 ( 1 9 8 9 ) ...................................... ... ................ ... 26
i i i
351
San D ieg o B u ild ing T rades C ouncil
v. G an n on , 359 U .S . 236 (1959) . 26
Slocum v. D ela w a re L . & W. R. C o . ,
339 U .S . 239 (1950) ................................ ................................ 18
S prin g field T erm in al v.
U nited Transp. Union,
675 F . Supp. 683 (D. M e. 1987) ........................................... 14
T eam sters v. L u ca s F lou r C o . ,
369 U .S . 95 (1962) ....................... ............................................. 26
T exas In tern ation a l A irlines, Inc. v.
A ir L in e P ilots A s s ’n,
518 F . Supp. 203 (S .D . Tex. 1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Union P. R. C o. v. S h eeh an ,
439 U .S . 89 (1978), r e h ’g d en ied ,
439 U .S . 1135 (1979) ................................ 19
Union P a c ific R .R . v. P r ice ,
360 U .S . 601 (1959) ............................................. ... 7, 20
U nited P a p erw o rk ers v. M isco ,
484 U .S . 29 ( 1 9 8 7 ) .............................................................. 14, 25
W isconsin D ept, o f Industry
v. G ould , In c ., 475 U .S. 282 (1986) .................... 22
ST A T U T E S: Pages:
29 U .S .C . § 185(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 , 27
42 U .S .C . § 1981 nt ..................................................................... 26
42 U .S .C . § 2000e ......................... 25
45 U .S .C . § 151 .
45 U .S .C . § 152 .
45 U .S .C . § 153 .
352
i v
2 , 5, 8, 9
. . . 8, 9
. 8, 9, 27
45 U .S .C . § 184
45 U .S .C . § 185
45 U .S .C . § 441
3, 9
. 9
. 15
L E G ISL A T IV E M A T E R IA L : Pages:
67 Cong. Rec. 4517 (1926) ................................... 12
67 Cong. Rec. 4650 ( 1 9 2 6 ) .................................................. 20
67 Cong. Rec. 4665 ( 1 9 2 6 ) .................................................. 12
67 Cong. Rec. 4670 ( 1 9 2 6 ) .................................................. 12
67 Cong. Rec. 4699-4710 (1 9 2 6 ) ........................... 13
67 Cong. Rec. 4706 ( 1 9 2 6 ) .................................................. 13
67 Cong. Rec. 8807 ( 1 9 2 6 ) .................................................. 11
96 Cong. Rec. 16,261 (1950) ... ........................................... 18
96 Cong. Rec. 16,373 ( 1 9 5 0 ) ......................................... 13, 18
96 Cong. Rec. 16,376 (1950) ............................................... 13
96 Cong. Rec. 17,048 ( 1 9 5 1 ) ............................................... 18
126 Cong. Rec. 26,531 (1980) ................................ 15
126 Cong. Rec. 27,056 ( 1 9 8 0 ) ...................... ..................... 15
H .R . Rep. No. 1025, 96th Cong.
2d Sess. (1980) ............................................... 15
H .R . Rep. No. 2243, 74th C ong.,
2d Sess., ( 1 9 3 6 ) ....................................................................... 10
H .R . Rep. No. 2811, 81st C ong.,
2d Sess. (1950) ..................................... 13
V 353
H ouse C om m ittee on Interstate
& F oreign C om m erce, R ailroad
L abor D isputes. H .R . 7180,
69th C ong. 1st Sess. (Jan. 28, 1926) ................................ 19
Pub. L. N o. 103-13,
107 Stat. 43 ( 1 9 9 0 ) ............................................. ......................... 2
Senate C om m ittee on Interstate
C om m erce on S. 3266, 73 C ong.,
2d Sess. (A pril 11, 1934) ....................................................... 19
M IS C E L L A N E O U S : Pages:
B rief for the U nited S t a t e s ....................................... 24, 26
Report o f N ational M ediation Board (1936) ................... 29
354 v i
In The
Suprem e C ourt o f the U nited States
O ctober Term , 1993
N o. 92-2058
H aw aiian A irlines, In c ., et a l., P etition ers,
v.
Grant T. N orris, R espon den t.
O n W rit o f C ertiorari to the
Suprem e C ourt o f Hawaii
B rief of
A ir T ransport A ssociation o f A m erica As
A m icus C uriae In Support o f Petitioners
IN T E R E S T O F T H E A M IC U S C U R IA E
The A ir T ransport A ssociation o f A m erica (" A TA "),
is a non-profit unincorporated trade association o f United
States federally certificated air carriers. ATA was founded in
1936 to facilitate the exchange o f ideas and inform ation
concerning m atters that affect the airline industry, and to
represent the m em ber carriers in legislative, jud icial and
adm inistrative m a tte rs .1 A TA has filed num erous am icu s
1 The operator members include Alaska Airlines, Aloha Airlines,
American Airlines, American Trans Air, Continental Airlines, Delta Air
Lines, DHL Airways, Evergreen International, Federal Express Corp.,
(continued...)
355
briefs in federal and state court proceedings concerning a
broad variety of issues o f concern to its m em bers. AT A also
works closely with the various Federal agencies that regulate
the airline industry, such as the Federal A viation
Adm inistration and the U .S . D epartm ent o f Transportation.
A TA ’s m embers account for m ore than 97% o f the dom estic
passenger and cargo traffic flow n annually by U .S . air
carriers, transporting 475 m illion passengers over 4S5 billion
miles in 1993. A T A ’s mem bers em ploy over 535,000 people,
the majority o f whom are subject to the Railway Labor Act
("RLA "), 45 U .S .C . § 151 et s eq .
Congress recognized the im portant role o f air
carriers in interstate com m erce when it enacted the Federal
Aviation Act and when, in 1936, it added air carriers to the
coverage o f the RLA. Congress recently reem phasized the
economic im portance o f the airline industry to interstate
commerce when it enacted legislation creating the N ational
Commission to Ensure a Strong C om petitive Airline Industry.
Pub. L. No. 103-13, 107 Stat. 43 (1990).
All air carrier mem bers o f A TA are subject to the
RLA and are significantly affected by state and federal court
decisions, such as the one below , that underm ine the R L A ’s
comprehensive procedures for resolution o f em ploym ent
disputes. These RLA procedures are designed to facilitate the
peaceful and expeditious resolution o f such disputes and to
avoid interruptions to vital interstate com m erce. These
procedures will be eroded if state and federal courts, like the
Hawaii Supreme C ourt in this case, allow state law causes of
action that overlap RLA grievances to escape preem ption by
the RLA. M oreover, in the 1990’s, when airline losses have
1(... continued)
Hawaiian Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Reeve Aleutian Airways,
Southwest Airlines, Trans World Airlines, United Air Lines, UPS Corp.
and USAir. Associate members are Air Canada and Canadian Airlines
International.
2
355
exceeded $11 b illion , airlines are especially concerned with
effective m anagem ent o f operations w hich cross many state
lines. These operations cannot be adm inistered efficiently
when varied local laws and remedies affecting em ploym ent
relationships are held to be perm itted, ra ther than preem pted
by the RLA. A ccordingly, the A TA files this b rie f as am icu s
cu riae in support o f the petitioners.2
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E C A SE
The A TA adopts the Statem ent o f the Case set forth
by Petitioners. B riefly, Respondent G rant T . N orris, a
mechanic em ployed by Petitioner H aw aiian A irlines, Inc .,
perform ed w ork on a tire assembly that he believed to be
unsafe. His supervisor asked him to sign o ff on the w ork
under the term s o f the collective bargaining agreem ent that
stated: "An airline m echanic may be required to sign w ork
records in connection with the w ork he perfo rm s." N orris
refused, and was suspended pending an investigation o f the
question w hether H aw aiian Airlines had ju s t cause to
term inate him. The m echanics’ collective bargaining
agreement, A rticle XVII 5 F , provided that "[a]n em ployee’s
refusal to perform w ork which is in violation o f established
health and safety rules, o r any local, state or federal health
and safety law shall not w arrant disciplinary action." The
agreem ent also provided a m ulti-level grievance and
arbitration procedure culm inating w ith a decision by a System
Board o f A djustm ent, as required by the Railw ay Labor A ct,
45 U .S .C . § 184.
A fter the grievance procedure was initiated, N orris
reported to the Federal Aviation A dm inistration ("FA A ") that
the tire assembly was unsafe, and the FA A inspected the tire
assembly and had it rem oved from the aircraft. N orris
proceeded through the first stage o f the grievance process,
2 This brief is filed with the written consent of all parties pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 37.3.
3
357
where his discipline was reduced to a six-week suspension.
N orris then abandoned the grievance and arbitration
procedure, and filed suit in state court against Hawaiian
Airlines and a num ber o f supervisors alleging, in ter a lia , that
his discharge violated the public policies reflected in the
Federal Aviation Act and the Hawaii W histleblow er’s
P rotection Act. N orris’ claims are com m on law claims; his
C om plaint is not premised upon any alleged statutory
violation.
The F irst C ircuit C ourt of Hawaii held that the
claims w ere preem pted by the Railway Labor Act. The
H awaii Suprem e C ourt reversed, based on the preem ption test
set forth in L in g le v. N orge Div. o f M ag ic C hef, I n c . , 486
U .S . 399 (1988) (hereinafter "Lingle"), a case interpreting
section 301 o f the Labor M anagem ent Relations Act
("LM R A ") rather than the Railway Labor Act.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case presents the question whether the Railway
Labor A ct preem pts respondent’s state law w rongful discharge
claims. The Haw aiian Supreme C ourt below found no RLA
preem ption, expressly relying upon this C ourt’s decision in
L in g le , a case w hich arose under the very different statutory
scheme o f the LM RA. In resolving this issue, the C ourt will
decide w hether to follow or limit its decision in Andrews V
L ou isv ille & N. Ry. C o ., 406 U .S. 320 (1972) (hereinafter
"Andrews"), w hich held that a w rongful discharge claim
prem ised on violation of contract terms was preem pted by the
R L A ’s m andatory and exclusive Adjustm ent Board processes.
A ndrew s should be followed in this case, fo r --
unlike the LM RA, where arbitration is voluntary — the
language, legislative history, and policy o f the RLA all
indicate a clear Congressional intent that discipline and
discharge claims by employees o f R LA carriers m ust be
presented to Adjustm ent Boards, not to state courts, whether
358
4
or not these claim s are presented as o r are intertw ined with
contract in terpretation issues.
The R L A repeatedly and explicitly com m ands that
discipline and discharge grievances go to A djustm ent Boards,
whether o r not the dispute is contract-based. F o r exam ple,
RLA Section 2 calls for "prom pt and orderly settlem ent o f a ll
disputes grow ing out o f g r iev a n ces o r out o f the interpretation
or application o f agreem ents . . ." 45 U .S .C . § 151a
(emphasis added). This p lain legislative com m and concerning
the m andatory and exclusive A djustm ent B oard dispute
resolution processes is re inforced by the legislative history,
which dem onstrates that the language was intentionally chosen
by Congress to include d isciplinary m atters and that Congress
rejected efforts to add less preem ptive provisions to the
statute.
Broad preem ption o f state w rongful discharge claims
by the R L A ’s A djustm ent B oard processes is fully supported
by this C o u rt’s p rio r constructions o f the R LA , and by the
structure and purposes o f the statute. The C ourt has long
held that these processes encom pass not only contract
disputes, bu t "all o ther incidents o f that [employer-em ployee]
relation," E lgin , J . & E . By. v. B u rley , 325 U .S . 711, 733-34
(1945), and it has repeatedly rejected efforts by carriers,
unions, and em ployees alike to circum vent A djustm ent Boards
in favor o f jud icial forum s. This C ourt has recognized in its
decisions several critical aspects o f the RLA statutory scheme
Congress created that com pel a preem ptive effect over state
wrongful discharge claim s: nationw ide uniform ity in dispute
resolution processes involving interstate carriers; substantial
benefits to carriers, unions, and em ployees o f Adjustm ent
Board processes; and A djustm ent Board expertise concerning
industry-specific issues, including reconciliation o f safety and
work perform ance concerns.
In light o f this p lain statutory language and clear
evidence o f Congressional purpose, the C ourt should reject
5
359
the flawed analytical fram ew ork for resolving this case used
by the Supreme C ourt o f Hawaii and supported by the
Solicitor General. It is spurious, and destructive o f the
R L A ’s dispute-resolution processes, to suggest that the
C ourt’s decision in C on solidated R a il C orp. v. R ailw ay L a b o r
E x ecu tiv es’ A ss ’n, 491 U .S . 299 (1989) (hereinafter
" C on ra il”), supports a different result. The C ourt should not
be m isled into applying authority dealing with w hich o f two
RLA dispute resolution processes are appropriate (those for
"major" versus "minor" disputes) to create a th ird type o f
employer-em ployee dispute addressed by n eith er o f these
processes. Discipline and discharge cases clearly give rise to
m inor disputes reserved for m andatory arbitration under the
RLA.
A R G U M EN T
I. T H E R A ILW A Y L A B O R A C T ’S M A N D A T O R Y
A D JU ST M E N T B O A RD P R O C E S S E S P R E E M P T
R E S P O N D E N T ’ S S T A T E W R O N G F U L
D IS C H A R G E C L A IM .
The extent to which a federal statute preem pts state
law is determined by the extent to w hich Congress chose to
exercise its authority to cause such preem ption; such
preem ption is purely a m atter o f statutory construction. C o d e
v. N ation al S olid W astes M anagem ent A ssociation , 112 S .C t.
2374, 2383 (1992) ("nonapproved state regulation o f
occupational safety and health issues for w hich a federal
standard is in effect is impliedly pre-em pted as in conflict
with the full purposes and objectives o f the OSH A ct").
Thus, this Court has held that some federal labor laws broadly
preem pt state laws beneficial to em ployees, bu t that other
federal labor laws do not preem pt state provisions protecting
employees. C om pare A lessi v. R aybestos-M anhattan , In c .,
451 U .S . 504 (1981) (ERISA broadly preem pts state w orkers’
compensation law) with C aliforn ia F e d e ra l Savings & L oan
360
6
Assn. v. G u erra , 479 U .S. 272 (1987) (Title VII does not
preem pt state protection o f pregnant women).
A s this C ourt has repeatedly observed, the RLA was
intended by Congress to displace m uch state law that m ight
otherw ise apply to em ployees in the railroad and airline
industries.3 Indeed, in A ndrew s, this C ourt held an
em ployee’s w rongful discharge claim prem ised on violation of
contract term s was preem pted by the RLA because the
em ployee’s exclusive remedy was before the RLA Adjustm ent
Board. The A ndrew s C ourt noted that "the notion that the
grievance and arbitration procedures provided for m inor
disputes in the Railway Labor A ct are optional, to be availed
of as the em ployee o r the carrier chooses, was never good
history and is no longer good law ." 406 U .S. at 322.
R espondent’s position would require that this Court
restrict A n drew s to its facts. A s will be seen below , such a
restriction would be untenable, for the R L A ’s language,
legislative history, and policy require preem ption o f all state
w rongful discharge actions. A rbitration before an Adjustm ent
3 See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal
Co., 394 U.S. 369, 381 (1969), reh’g denied, 394 U.S. 1024 (1969) (state
law restricting self help is preempted: "interference would be compounded
if the disputants were-as they frequently would be-subjected to various
and divergent state laws."); Union Pacific R.R. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601,
617 (1959) ("To say that the discharged employee may litigate the validity
of his discharge in a common-law action for damages after failing to
sustain his grievance before the Board is to say that Congress planned that
the Board should function only to render advisory opinions, . . . ’with the
consequence that the parties are entirely free to accept or ignore the
Board’s decision . . . [a contention] inconsistent with the Act’s terms,
purposes and legislative history.’"); California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553,
559, 566 (1957) (RLA’s "policy of protecting collective bargaining comes
into conflict with the rule of California law that state employees have no
right to bargain collectively * * * [T]he Railway Labor Act is ’all-
embracing in scope and national in its purpose, which is as capable of
being obstructed by state as by individual action.’")
7
361
Board provides the sole forum in w hich a covered em ployee
may challenge a discharge, regardless o f whether the dispute
involves contract interpretation issues. To be sure, both the
arbitration forum and the "just cause" standard generally
applicable to A djustm ent Board determ inations will be m ore
or less desirable to a covered employee depending on the state
law that m ight otherw ise apply absent RLA processes.
How ever, dilution or abandonment o f the RLA Adjustm ent
Board process fo r resolving such em ployee disputes is for
Congress, not this C ourt, to address.
A. P reem p tio n Is M an d a te d By T he
P la in L an g u ag e O f T he R L A .
The R LA contains uniquely broad language
addressing settlem ent o f em ploym ent disputes. No few er than
six times, C ongress explicitly has decreed that RLA dispute
resolution processes not be limited to contract interpretation
issues, but encompass all em ployee disputes with RLA-
covered em ployers. The RLA general purpose clause, Section
2, states that the statute is "to provide for the prom pt and
orderly settlem ent o f a ll disputes grow ing out o f g riev an ces o r
out o f the interpretation or application o f agreements covering
rates o f pay, rules, o r working conditions." 45 U .S .C .
§ 151a (emphasis added). Section 2, F irst requires carriers
and their em ployees to "settle a ll disputes, whether arising out
o f the application o f such [collective bargaining] agreem ents
o r otherw ise." 45 U .S .C . § 152, F irst (emphasis added).
Section 3, F irst (i) establishes Adjustm ent Boards for "[t]he
disputes betw een an em ployee or group o f employees and a
carrier or carriers growing out o f g riev an ces o r out o f the
interpretation or application o f agreem ents concerning rates o f
pay, rules, or w orking conditions . . . ." 45 U .S .C . § 153,
362
8
First (i) (emphasis added).4 C ongress’ use in these statutory
phrases o f the disjunctive "or" (along with its repetition o f the
w ords "out of" in 45 U .S .C . § 151a and 153, and use o f the
w ord "otherwise" in 45 U .S .C . § 152, First) com bined with
its repeated reference to "all disputes," m akes this broad
legislative intent clear. A cco rd 45 U .S .C . § 152, Sixth
("dispute . . . arising out o f g riev an ces o r ou t o f the
interpretation or application o f agreem ents concerning rates o f
pay, rules, or working conditions . . .").
Two equally broad provisions were added in 1936,
when the RLA was am ended to establish A djustm ent Boards
for the airline industry.5 R ather than narrow Adjustm ent
Board authority over em ployee disputes in the airline industry,
Congress used language identical to that adopted in 1926 to
ensure that all em ployee disputes, not m erely contract
disputes, would be handled by A djustm ent Boards. 45
U .S .C . § 184 ("disputes . . . grow ing out o f g r iev an ces , o r
out o f the in terpretation o r a p p lica tion o f ag reem en ts
concerning rates o f pay, rules, o r w orking conditions . . .
may be referred . . . to an appropriate adjustm ent board
. . ."); 45 U .S .C . § 185 (NM B m ay create N ational A ir
Transport Adjustm ent Board "in order to provide for the
prom pt and orderly settlem ent o f disputes betw een said
4 The error of the Hawaii Supreme Court is nowhere more striking
than in its conclusion that "the plain language of § 153 First(i) does not
support preemption of disputes independent of a labor agreement.' Norris
v. Hawaiian Airlines, 842 P.2d 634, 642 (Haw. 1992) (emphasis added).
5 Conversely, Congress has since 1926 passed and amended numerous
statutes regulating labor relations in both the private and public sectors,
none of which contains such a broad mandate for dispute resolution as the
Adjustment Board system established by the RLA. For example, the
Labor Management Relations Act creates no mandatory arbitration
processes but rather establishes federal court jurisdiction in §301 over
"suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)(emphasis added).
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363
carriers by air . . . and . . . employees, growing out o f
grievan ces, o r ou t o f the in terpretation o r ap p lica tion o f
ag reem en ts , . . covering rates of pay, rules, o r working
conditions . . . ." ) .6
The plain language of the RLA thus dem onstrates
that exclusive A djustm ent Board authority to resolve disputes
explicitly extends beyond contract application disputes.
Congress, by using the phrases *a ll disputes, growing out o f
g riev an ces o r ou t o f the interpretation or application of
[collective bargaining] agreements" and "all disputes, whether
arising out o f . . . agreements o r o th erw ise ,” cannot be
deemed to have sent only contract interpretation m atters to the
Adjustm ent Boards. RLA Adjustm ent Boards were to resolve
a l l em ployee disputes, not m erely contract disputes.
B. Preemption Is Supported By The Legislative
History Of These Ih-ovisions Of The RLA.
Since the respondent’s "wrongful discharge" claim
is precisely the sort o f dispute preem pted by the language of
6 The 1936 amendments extending the RLA to air carriers included
provisions for system Boards of Adjustment even though there were no
collective bargaining agreements yet in existence, thus showing that
Congress intended Adjustment Boards to resolve "individual disputes"
other than those arising out of application of an agreement:
[Tjhere are no such [airline collective bargaining] contracts in
operation now. . . .
Section 3 of the original act permits the formation of regional boards
to handle local disputes and the same option obtains as to air
transportation. Thus by affording a permissive delay in the
formation of the permanent board it was thought that temporary
boards might be created under this power to settle individual disputes
pending the time when the volume of disputes warranted the creation
of a full-time board.
H.R. Rep. No. 2243, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1936) (emphasis added).
10
364
the RLA, it is not essential to exam ine the R L A ’s legislative
history. N evertheless, that history reinforces that C ongress
intended to give A djustm ent Boards exclusive authority over
all em ployee disputes with their em ployers, w hether o r not
such disputes arise out o f interpretation o f collective
bargaining agreem ents. This history also dem onstrates that
wrongful discharge and discipline issues, in particu lar, w ere
included am ong these preem pted disputes.
In the 1926 debates concerning the R L A , Senator
Watson, a proponent o f the proposed legislation, clearly
viewed grievances "of a personal nature ," as w ell as disputes
involving contract interpretation issues, to be w ith in the
purview of A djustm ent Boards:
[T jhere are two classes o f disputes that
arise in connection with the operation o f
railroads. One class is w hat are ordinarily
called grievances. They m ay be o f a
personal nature; they m ay involve a great
m any em ployees; they m ay involve a few
em ployees; they m ay involve bu t one
em ployee. O f this class, a ls o , are disputes
rising out o f the in terpretation and
application o f existing agreem ents as to
w ages, hours o f labor, or w orking
conditions.
67 Cong. Rec. 8807 (1926) (statem ent o f Sen. W atson)
(emphasis added).
Sim ilarly, R epresentative Barkley, the R L A ’s
sponsor, explained that A djustm ent Boards w ere m eant to
resolve grievance and discipline m atters going beyond contract
interpretation issues:
11
365
W e provide that it shall be their duty to set
up adjustm ent boards, not to consider
questions o f wages but disagreem ents over
grievan ces, interpretations, d iscip lin e, an d
o th er techn icalities that arise from tim e to
time in the workshop and out on the tracks
in the operation of the roads.
67 Cong. Rec. 4517 (1926) (statement o f Rep. Barkley)
(emphasis added).
Representative Crosser described the RLA dispute-
resolution m echanisms in broad term s, unconstrained by the
notion that an arbitra tor’s duties should be narrowly confined
to interpreting collective bargaining agreem ent provisions, as
follows:
These boards serve in a m aim er as courts
to determ ine who is right and who is
w rong, w hat is just and w hat is unjust, in
disputes between railroads and their
employees.
67 Cong. Rec. 4665 (1926) (statement o f Rep. Crosser). S ee
a ls o 67 Cong. Rec. 4670 (1926) (statement o f Rep. Arentz)
("M inor disputes involve discipline, grievances, and disputes
over the application and meaning o f an agreem ent.")
C ongress’ intent to preem pt state law is also
supported by the fact that, in the only two instances w hen
Congress explicitly considered deferral to state employee-
protective laws, it chose not to defer. A n amendment
proposed while the RLA o f 1926 was under consideration by
Congress would have permitted operation o f state arbitration
laws as an alternative to the arbitration procedures set forth in
366 12
the RLA . The proposed am endm ent was re jected .7 Later,
in 1950, w hen C ongress added dues checkoff and union
security provisions to the R LA , it expressly declined to perm it
em ployees to "opt out" o f com pulsory union m em bership in
deference to state right-to-w ork law s.8
F inally , C ongress recognized that A djustm ent Boards
are the best forum for striking the proper balance between
em ployee assertions o f safety concerns and em ployer interests
7 67 Cong. Rec. 4699-4710 (1926). In the 1926 debate regarding the
preemptive effect of RLA § 7, providing for voluntary arbitration of major
disputes about contract formation, a Kansas statute that compelled
arbitration was extensively discussed. Representative Tincher from Kansas
argued "[tjhere is no . . . good reason for putting a provision in this bill
. . . to enunciate the principle of being willing to abrogate State laws,
where they attempt to force arbitration . . . " Id. at 4706. Representative
Newton responded, "when Congress writes a law for voluntary arbitration
it ought to protect that legislation by proper safeguards from permitting a
State even to attempt to . . . impose a legal obligation to submit to
compulsory arbitration." Id. at 4706.
8 As the House Committee Report emphasized:
if . . . [union security] agreements are to be permitted in the
railroad and airline industries it would be wholly impracticable
and unworkable for the various States to regulate such
agreements. Railroads and airlines are direct instrumentalities
of interstate commerce; the Railway Labor Act requires
collective bargaining on a system-wide basis; agreements are
uniformly negotiated for an entire railroad system and regulate
the rates of pay, rules of working conditions of employees in
many States; the duties of many employees require the
constant crossing of State lines; many seniority districts under
labor agreements extend across State lines, and in the exercise
of their seniority rights employees are frequently required to
move from one State to another.
H.R. Rep. No. 2811, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1950). The Senate rejected
a proposed amendment offered by Senator Holland that would have
prevented federal preemption of state right-to-work laws. 96 Cong. Rec
16,376 (1950).
13
367
in production, including em ployer interests that alleged safety
concerns not be im properly asserted to avoid perform ance of
w ork duties.9 The low er courts have acknowledged RLA
coverage o f such w orkplace safety disputes, and have not
hesitated in sending them to Adjustm ent Boards, even when
the collective bargaining agreem ents contain no express
provisions on this subject.10 M oreover, in adopting the 1980
Amendments to the Federal Railroad Safety Act, Congress
explicitly recognized that A djustm ent Boards are the proper
9 Refusal to perform work for spurious safety reasons can be a form
of job action in the airline and railroad industries. For example, in the
following cases, such "safety" protests were enjoined. Long Island R.R.
v. System Federation No. 156, 368 F.2d 50, 52 (2d Cir. 1966) (union
"’blue-flagged’ the trains, not for safety reasons, but to coerce the
Railroad into bypassing System Federation and negotiating with the
Brotherhood alone as representative of the carmen."); Missouri-Kansas-
Texas R.R. v. Brotherhood of R. Trainmen, 342 F.2d 298, 300 (5th Cir.
1965); Texas International Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 518 F.
Supp. 203, 207 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (pilots enjoined from delaying and
disrupting operations via "report[ing] equipment outages or malfunctions’);
Long Island R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 290 F.Supp.
100 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (union’s rationale for refusing to perform trips in
and out of Penn Station due to safety concerns is "spurious").
10 See Independent Union of Flight Attendants v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc., 789 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1986) (discipline of flight attendant
who informed FAA that Pan Am violated flight and duty time rules
presents a minor dispute for Adjustment Board); Trainmen, 342 F.2d at
300 (safety dispute is for Adjustment Board despite the silence of the labor
contract as to any terms governing unsafe working conditions; "the
common law duty . . . to use reasonable care in furnishing its employees
with a safe place to work is clear. . . . If . . . plaintiff has failed to
perform that duty its employees are required by the Railway Labor Act to
submit their grievances in that regard to the NRAB . . ."); Springfield
Terminal v. United Transp. Union, 675 F. Supp. 683 (D. Me. 1987); 767
F. Supp. 333, 340 (D. Me. 1991) (safety protest issues fall "precisely
within the arbitration board’s range of expertise," quoting United
Paper-workers v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 45 n .ll (1987) ("The issue of safety
in the workplace is a commonplace issue for arbitrators to consider in
discharge cases."))
14
368
forum fo r such questions. In Section 10, 45 U .S .C . § 441,
Congress adopted whistleblow er protection for em ployees who
reported safety concerns or who refused to w ork in unsafe
conditions. Congress also wrote certain standards into the
Act, how ever, to ensure that safety protests did not encroach
upon the legitim ate concern o f m anagem ent w ith running the
business.11 Congress recognized that it is the RLA
Adjustm ent Boards that m ust resolve any differences in
accom m odating these in terests.11 12 A djustm ent Boards are
11 The refusal to work is protected only if it "is made in good faith and
no reasonable alternative to such refusal is available . . . the hazardous
conditions is of such a nature that a reasonable person . . . would conclude
that . . . the condition presents an imminent danger . . . there is
insufficient time . . . to eliminate the danger through resort to regular
statutory channels . . .[and] the employee . . . has notified his employer
of . . . his intention not to perform further work . . ." 45 U.S.C.
§ 441(b).
12 "[UJnder current laws railroad employees . . . can seek similar
protection through normal grievance procedures established under section
3 of the [RLA]. This subsection is intended to codify the protection
granted . . . by the law boards and panels. It is important to note in this
regard that any grievance under this section is subject to the procedures set
forth in section 3 of the [RLA]." 126 Cong. Rec. 27,056 (1980) (remarks
of Sen. Cannon); "Under this provision, an employee who was fired or
felt he was discriminated against could file a grievance through the existing
Railway Labor Act grievance machinery. The grievance board could
order the employee reinstated, and under already existing practice, award
back pay." 126 Cong. Rec. 26,531 (1980) (remarks of Rep. Florio).
Accord, H.R. Rep. No. 1025, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. (1980), 1980 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3840-41. See also Rayner v. Smirl, 873 F.2d
60 (4th Cir. 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 876 (1989) (section 441 and the
"comprehensive remedial provisions” of the RLA incorporated therein are
the railroad employee’s exclusive remedy and therefore state law claims
for wrongful discharge are preempted); Boston & Maine Corp. v. Lenfest,
799 F.2d 795 (1st Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 1102 (1987)
(enjoining spurious safety protest); Alaska Airlines, Inc. and Air Line
Pilots Ass’n, 88 AAR (Lab. Rel. Press) 0108 (1988) (Sinicropi, Arb.)
(Adjustment Board mitigates discipline of pilot who refused to fly aircraft
on grounds that defect in windshield rendered it nonairworthy.)
15
369
uniquely qualified to resolve the precise issues presented in
respondent’s case — that is, the balancing o f the em ployer’s
interest in requiring work to be perform ed with the individual
em ployee’s and public concern that safety problems be
reported.
C. Preemption Is Consistent With This Court’s
Decisions And The RLA’s Purposes.
In A ndrew s, this Court overruled its earlier decision
in M oore v. Illin o is Central R .R ., 312 U .S. 630 (1941),
which had perm itted employees to circum vent RLA
Adjustm ent Board processes by bringing "wrongful discharge"
actions in state court. The Andrews C ourt viewed the RLA
grievance process to be an exclusive rem edy, "rather than
merely requiring exhaustion o f remedies in one forum before
resorting to another." 406 U .S. at 325. Accordingly, the
C ourt held that "The fact that petitioner characterizes his
claim as one for ’wrongful discharge’ does not save it from
the A ct’s m andatory provisions for the processing of
grievances." Id . at 323-24.
1. This Court’s Prior Constructions Of The
RLA Support Broad Preemption.
A pplication o f the A ndrew s prohibition upon
pursuing "wrongful discharge" claims outside the R L A ’s
m andatory grievance process would be completely consistent
w ith num erous other decisions o f the C ourt recognizing the
broad sweep o f the RLA dispute-resolution provisions. F or
exam ple, in E lg in , the Court defined m inor disputes as not
only those entailed in "contracts w hich govern their
em ploym ent relation but also in giving effect to them and to
all other incidents o f that relation . . .." 325 U .S. at 733-34.
16
370
Adjustm ent Boards were to exercise ju risd ic tion w here "the
claim is founded upon som e incident o f the em ploym ent
relation, o r asserted one, independent o f those covered by the
collective bargaining agreem ent, e .g ., claim s on account o f
personal injuries." Id . at 723. L ikew ise, in O rder o f R.
C onductors v. Southern Ry. C o ., 339 U .S . 255, 256 (1950),
where the railroad had sued in state court, and the un ion filed
before the A djustm ent B oard, this C ourt noted that " if a
carrier o r a union could choose a court instead o f the Board,
the other party would be deprived o f the priv ilege conferred
by § 3, F irst (i) o f the Railw ay Labor A ct."
Sim ilarly, when a form er em ployee attem pted to
bypass the A djustm ent B oard in favor o f state court action in
Pennsylvania R .R . v. D ay , 360 U .S . 548 (1959), the C ourt
again recognized that R LA § 3, First is not lim ited to contract
matters: "The purpose o f the A ct is fulfilled if the claim itself
arises out o f the em ploym ent relationship w hich C ongress
regulated ." Id . at 552. The C ourt saw that various state court
jury verdicts concerning pay disputes w ould underm ine the
role o f Adjustm ent Boards under the RLA:
[N ]ot to respect the centralized determ ina
tion o f these questions through the A djust
m ent Board would ham per if not defeat the
central purpose o f the Railway L abor Act.
Id . at 553.
P reem ption o f R espondent’s claim s in this case,
m oreover, would show no disrespect to the general proposi
tion that state law should not be presum ed displaced by
federal law. Rather, preem ption in this case is a necessary
and intended consequence o f the m andatory A djustm ent Board
mechanism created by C ongress to regulate peculiarly
17
371
interstate rail and air ca rriers .13 14 Disputes between air
carriers and their employees under these RLA procedures
cannot be subject to varying state laws because the "needs o f
the subject m atter manifestly call for uniform ity."
In tern ation al Assn, o f M achinists v. C entral A irlines, In c . ,
372 U .S . 682, 692 (1963).14 A ccord Slocum v. D elaw are L.
13 The very existence of the RLA as a special statute, the first of our
modem labor laws, confirms the uniqueness of labor-management relations
issues in the rail and air industries:
Railroad labor historically has not been dealt with
in exactly the same fashion as other types of labor
in this country; and, of course, when we say
railroad labor we refer also to labor that is
employed by airlines . . . . Employer and employee
relationships in the railroad industry often
independent of State laws have been the subject of
Federal legislation for many years because of the
direct effect of labor disputes in that industry upon
the free flow of interstate commerce. . . .
96 Cong. Rec. 17,048 (1951) (statement of Rep. Beckworth).
Furthermore,
[Rjailroads are much more engaged in interstate commerce
than are telegraph or telephone companies. When we pick up
the telephone in Washington to make a call to Florida it does
not involve any personnel moving out of the District of
Columbia and going to Florida or to any other State. . . .
However, when a railroad train moves out of Washington on
the way to Florida, personnel does cross State lines.
96 Cong. Rec. 16,261 (1950) (statement of Sen. Hill).
14 See 96 Cong. Rec. 16,373 (1950) (statement of Sen. Morse)
("Adjustment Board . . . functions on the principle of uniform application
of its policies throughout the country. . . . [Wjithout preemption] Railway
Labor Act will be so disrupted by great disparities in administrative
policies growing out of differences in State laws that the effectiveness of
the act will at an early date be greatly impaired."); Hearings before the
(continued...)
18
372
& W. R. C o ., 339 U .S . 239 , 243 (1950) (Adjustm ent Board
decisions "provide opportunities for a desirable degree o f
uniform ity in the in terpretation o f agreem ents throughout the
nation’s railw ay sy stem s.")15 16
F inally , this C ourt has been m indful that Congress
deferred to rail and air industry and labor desires in
formulating the R LA to an unprecedented degree. C h icag o &
N.W. R. C o. v. U nited Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 5 7 6
(1971) } 6 Both em ployers and em ployees wanted simple and
14(...continued)
Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 3266, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess., p. 33 (1936) (George Harrison, principal labor spokesperson)
(stating that the Adjustment Boards were the alternative to "a hodgepodge
arrangement by law . . .")
15 Resolution by an Adjustment Board serves not only the interest of
the individual claimant, but also serves all employees throughout the
carrier’s system. A decision in favor of the employee will be a precedent
in any further retaliatory discharge grievances that may arise. The
Adjustment Board is an extension of the collective bargaining process;
what is done there has an impact upon all the employees in that craft
throughout the system. See Slocum, 339 U.S. at 242 (1950) (settlement of
dispute interpreting RLA labor contract "would have prospective as well
as retrospective importance to both the railroad and its employees, since
the interpretation accepted would govern future relations of those parties").
See also Union P. R. Co. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 94 (1978), reh’g
denied, 439 U.S. 1135 (1979) ("The effectiveness of the Adjustment Board
in fulfilling its task depends on the finality of its determinations,")
16 The railroad industry was seen as a "state within a state" that
evolved its own adjustment mechanisms, in which courts were to have no
role:
These [RLA controversies] were certainly not
expected to be solved by ill adapted judicial
interferences, escape from which was indeed one of
the driving motives in establishing specialized
machinery of mediation and arbitration.
(continued...)
19
373
speedy dispute-resolution processes.17 "Employees were
willing to give up their remedies outside o f the statu te” in
favor of a workable and binding Adjustm ent Board remedy.
P rice, 360 U .S. at 613-614 (1959).18 The decision below
improperly repudiates the Adjustment Board fram ew ork which
Congress adopted at the behest o f both the affected industries
and employee representatives.
16(... continued)
Elgin, 325 U.S. at 752 (Frankfurter, J. dissenting); International Ass’n of
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 760 (1961) (quoting above language
with approval).
17 See, e.g., 67 Cong. Rec. 4650 (1926) (statement of Rep. Jacobstein)
(”[K]eep lawyers out of the settling of disputes. . . . Lawyers always tried
to settle things in terms of legal technicalities whereas disputes should be
settled by practical men of affairs in close contact with the situation and
with an understanding of the psychology of the parties involved in the
dispute.")
18 Mr. Richberg, the principal spokesperson for the unions in support
of the RLA of 1926, observed that at the time the RLA was adopted "1
have yet to see any law which effectively prevented tyranny on the part of
the employer, and unjust and arbitrary action against the employees . . . ”
Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate & Foreign Commerce,
Railroad Labor Disputes, H.R. 7180, 69th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 92 (Jan. 28,
1926). The RLA itself was to fill this gap by providing "for the fair
ironing out of all their disputes . . . " without recourse to legal
procedures. Id. Accord Hearings before the Senate Committee on
Interstate Commerce on S. 3266, 73d Cong. 2d Sess., 33 (April 11, 1934)
(statement of George Harrison, spokesperson for the 21 standard railway
labor unions) ("we are willing to take our chances with this national board
because we believe, out of our experience, that the national board is the
best and most efficient method of getting a determination of these many
controversies . . ..")
2 0
374
2. P ree m p tio n O f R esp o n d en t’s C laim s W ould
S erve R L A Purposes.
The present case well illustrates the dysfunctional
results o f abandoning or restricting A n d rew s’ preem ption of
wrongful discharge claim s under state law. W hen Respondent
refused to sign a w ork record (a task required o f mechanics
by Article IV , D .4a o f the collective bargaining agreem ent),
he was held out o f service pending investigation (a process
established by A rt. X V , F . l o f the collective bargaining
agreement), and the norm al grievance processes were
followed to determ ine whether he should be disciplined for
violation o f the w ork rule. Respondent defended his refusal
to sign a w ork record attesting that he had changed a tire on
the grounds that another part o f the tire assem bly was unsafe.
W hen Respondent was dissatisfied w ith the first step
of the grievance process, he appealed to the next step. Soon
thereafter, he abandoned the grievance process and filed suit
in state court on com m on law grounds o f w rongful discharge,
claiming that the discipline imposed on him violated public
policy. The public policy violation alleged was airline safety
— an issue specifically addressed in A rt. X V II, F o f the
collective bargaining agreem ent, which said that "[a]n
em ployee’s refusal to perform w ork w hich is in violation of
established health and safety rules, or any local, state or
federal health and safety law shall not w arrant disciplinary
action ." The holding below thus perm its Respondent to take
a dispute over his discipline or discharge before a state court
jury, com pletely bypassing the m andatory grievance
mechanism and the expertise o f an arbitrator knowledgeable
in industry practices regarding the interplay o f public safety
issues and discipline for refusal to perform w ork. As a result,
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375
the R L A ’s carefully tailored dispute-resolution system is
rendered irre levant.19
The purposes o f the RLA surely will be undermined
if state law is not preem pted for discipline and discharge
m atters assigned by Congress to the Adjustment Board.
U nder the H awaii Supreme C ourt’s holding, a grievant may
have two proceedings in which to challenge an adverse
em ploym ent decision. The prospect o f inconsistent factual
findings and rem edies on the same evidence before an
arbitrator and a state court is sure to undermine the credibility
and finality o f the RLA arbitration process.20 RLA
A djustm ent Boards will become "backup" forums, or may
delay their proceedings to avoid inconsistent results. As a
result, the carriers and their unionized employees would lose
the benefit o f the tribunal that is "peculiarly competent" to
resolve their disputes. O rder o fR . C onductors v. Pitney, 326
U .S. 561, 566 (1946). Such dual processes are inherently
19 Conversely, comprehensive RLA preemption does not eliminate
consideration by the arbitrator of any relevant public policy objectives
embodied in state law. For example, an arbitrator might conclude that a
discharge was impermissible because an unlawful motive, rather than just
cause, was the real reason for the discharge. The arbitrator may look to
state, as well as federal, law as a source of public policy concerning the
meaning of "just cause" and the parties are free to incorporate state law
protection expressly in the collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g.,
Richmond, F. & P. R.R. v. Transportation Communications Int’l Union,
973 F.2d 276, 279 (4th Cir. 1992) ("there is no statutory barrier to
submitting [to Adjustment Board] questions involving the interpretation of
statutes or case law"); IAM v, Alaska Airlines, Inc., No. 88-4079 (9th Cir.
Feb. 21, 1990), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 821 (1990) (Adjustment Board had
the right to rely on external law as the basis for its award).
20 Even in the context of the more limited LMRA, there is "inherent
potential for conflict when ’two separate remedies are brought to bear on
the same activity.’" Wisconsin Dept, of Industry v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S.
282, 289 (1986), quoting Gamer v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485, 498-499
(1953).
376
22
destructive of the m andatory arbitration schem e C ongress has
established.
M oreover, rail and air carriers would be subject to
a multitude o f varying state laws that w ould im pede efficient
interstate operations by applying d ifferen t substantive
standards to em ployees in the same bargaining unit. This
diversity would be contrary to the R L A ’s m andate for system-
wide labor relations. Instead, the parties would be subject to
a "race o f diligence" to obtain the forum that one party
thought m ore desirable in any given instance. Southern R .R .,
339 U .S. at 256. A n em ployee whose w ork touched many
states would surely choose to sue in the state m ost favorable
to him. Such m ultiple and potentially inconsistent dispute-
resolution mechanisms w ould fatally disrupt the essential
purpose o f m andatory arbitration under the RLA — "the
prompt and orderly settlem ent o f all d isputes."21
21 Keeping disputes within the RLA framework of dispute resolution
enhances the value and effectiveness of the Adjustment Boards and the
collective bargaining process as a whole; this process allows RLA
conciliation procedures to work on a broad range of controversies and
promotes industrial peace. See Brotherhood of R. Trainmen v. Chicago R.
& I. R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 34 (1957), reh’g denied, 353 U.S. 948 (1957)
(rejecting the view that parties may voluntarily use Adjustment Board but
may resort to economic duress, if that seems more desirable).
2 3
377
n . R L A P R E E M P T IO N S H O U L D N O T B E
G O V E R N E D BY L A B O R M A N A G E M E N T
R E L A T IO N S A C T STANDA RD S.
Reiterating the rationale o f the H aw aii Supreme
Court, the Solicitor General, w ithout citing or distinguishing
this C ourt’s decision in Andrews, suggests that "Lingle
supplies an appropriate analogy in this case." B rief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition for C ertiorari at
14. As a justification for this analogy, the Solicitor General
blithely dismisses the Railway Labor Act, asserting that
respondent’s state law wrongful discharge claims "are not
m inor disputes subject to the exclusive arbitral m echanism of
the R L A ," and that "[t]he proper fram ework for the existence
of a m inor dispute is set forth in this C ourt’s decision in
C on rail” Id. at 8. W ith all due respect, the Solicitor
G eneral’s effort to shoehorn this case into the C on rail boot is
misguided, and his analogy to L in g le is inappropriate.
The C on rail issue was "whether C onrail’s addition
of a drug screen to the urinalysis component o f its required
periodic and retum -to-duty medical examinations gives rise to
a ’m ajor’ or a ’m inor’ dispute under the R LA ." 491 U .S . at
301. If the dispute were "m ajor,” the parties would have to
go through a protracted bargaining and m ediation process; if
"minor," the dispute would be "subject to com pulsory and
binding arbitration before the National Railroad Adjustment
Board." Id . at 303. The m ajor/m inor line explored by the
C onrail C ourt was solely for the purpose o f differentiating
w hich RLA p ro c e s s w as ap p lica b le , the RLA bargaining
process or the Adjustment Board. The C ourt recognized that,
whether "m ajor” or "minor," RLA processes would control
the fram ework for resolving that dispute.
The Solicitor General now seeks to use C on rail to
perm it employees to opt out o f RLA processes altogether. By
recharacterizing a dispute as not "m inor," (although
378
2 4
admittedly not "m ajor") the Solicitor G eneral seeks removal
of the dispute from the R L A ’s nationw ide dispute resolution
processes to state courts, from arbitrators to juries. As
demonstrated above at 8-16, an em ployee discipline or
discharge m atter is the classic m inor dispute, for RLA "minor
disputes" sweep m ore broadly than LM RA "violation of
contract” m atters. Rem oval o f such issues from the RLA
adjustment process through creation o f a new third category
of uncovered disputes runs com pletely contrary to the R L A ’s
plain language, contradicts the legislative history o f the RLA,
and disserves the policies o f the statute. In short, C on rail is
a red herring , irrelevant to disposition o f this case.22
22 The Solicitor Genera] also relies heavily upon Colorado Anti-
Discrimination Comm’n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714
(1963). There the issue was whether an applicant rejected because of his
race could assert a claim under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act of
1957. Not surprisingly, this Court found that this claim was not barred by
the RLA, just as it would no doubt hold that the RLA would not bar suit
by any other non-employee who filed a tort claim in state court against a
railroad or an airline carrier. See, e.g., Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938). The single paragraph of that opinion devoted to the RLA issue
did not explore any of the statutory provisions, legislative history, or
policy considerations briefed in this case. The Court’s dictum that there is
no indication Congress "intended to bar States from protecting employees
against racial discrimination," 372 U.S. at 724, must be placed in context.
The very next sentence, "No provision in the Act even mentions
discrimination in hiring" (emphasis added), indicates that the Court was
really referring to applicants, and the Court obviously did not intend the
word "employee" in the preceding sentence to have the broad meaning
ascribed to it by the Solicitor General.
This Court should not be misled by any suggestion that preemption
of respondent’s wrongful discharge claim would undermine this nation’s
opposition to employment discrimination. This case does not present any
question of how the RLA and other federal statutes, such as Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq., should be
accommodated. Moreover, the subject of discrimination is not
inappropriate for arbitration. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20 (1991). Congress has reaffirmed the appropriateness of
(continued...)
2 5
379
With respect to L in g le , the Solicitor General
concludes that it "addresses” a question com m on to both the
RLA and the LMRA: "how to accommodate the federal
interest in uniform interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements and the legitimate interest o f the States in adopting
standards of conduct for employers subject to their police
pow er.” U .S. Brief at 15. This statement of the question
both narrows the scope of RLA concerns and broadens the
nature of the state interests - a result that is not surprising,
since the LMRA is much m ore deferential to state law than is
the RLA.
L in g le and its predecessors A llis-C halm ers C orp. v.
L u eck , 471 U .S. 202 (1985), and T eam sters v. L u ca s F lo u r
C o ., 369 U .S. 95 (1962), dealt with the purpose behind § 301
o f the LM RA ,23 which is limited to allowing courts to
22(...continued)
alternatives means of dispute resolution in Title VII cases. Civil Rights
Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 nt (Supp. Ill 1992). See also Rodriguez
de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)
(attacks on arbitration that ”res(t] on suspicion of arbitration as a method
of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law" are "far out
of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring
this method of resolving disputes.") An arbitrator’s decision which
ignores clearly expressed public policy will not be judicially enforced. See
Misco, supra, at 30 (arbitrator’s ruling, if contrary to explicit public policy
embodied in law, will not be enforced).
23 The Solicitor General also inappropriately limits his preemption
analysis to one branch of LMRA preemption doctrine. RLA preemption,
however, is not limited to the Lingle/Lucas Flour issues that arise in § 301
preemption cases, but also encompasses the type of issues present in San
Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (States
may not regulate activity that the NLRA protects or prohibits because of
the potential conflict from having two separate remedies brought to bear
on the same activity), and International Ass’n of Machinists v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976) (NLRA pre-empts
state laws that "’upset the balance of power between labor and
management expressed in our national labor policy.’")
2 6
380
resolve "suits for violation o f contracts betw een an em ployer
and a labor organ ization ." 29 U .S .C . § 185(a), Obviously,
if a state law claim depends upon the m eaning o f a collective
bargaining agreem ent, it m ust be preem pted by § 301.
Conversely, it is appropriate under the LM RA to lim it § 301
preem ption to cases w here the state law claim does depend
upon the m eaning of the agreem ent, since that is the limit of
the § 301 rem edy.24
Significantly, the RLA expressly m andates that
Adjustm ent Boards do m ore than simply resolve disputes
about the interpretation and application o f agreem ents. As
noted above, they m ust settle "a l l d isputes grow ing out o f
grievan ces o r out o f the interpretation or application of
agreements covering rates o f pay, rules, or working
conditions." The use o f the disjunctive, com bined w ith the
legislative history discussed above, shows that "grievance"
was not m erely another term for disputes about the
interpretation or application o f agreem ents. Therefore,
preem ption under the RLA m ust occur not only where the
state law claim depends upon the interpretation of a contract,
but also w henever there is a grievance entrusted by Congress
to the A djustm ent Board.
M oreover, the RLA takes an entirely different and
broader approach than the LM RA in other relevant ways:
F irs t, A djustm ent Boards were designed specifically
to vindicate individual rights, not ju st collective rights secured
by unions through bargaining. The RLA, 45 U .S .C . § 153(i)
and (j), allow s an individual to bring a grievance, without a
union acting on his or her behalf. Indeed, a union is not
24 Indeed, the non-RLA collective bargaining agreement involved in
Lingle actually defined the term "grievance" in contractual terms, as
disputes between the employer and employee "concerning the effect,
interpretation, application, claim of breach or violation of this
Agreement." 486 U.S. at 401-02.
27
381
permitted to com prom ise an individual’s rights in an
Adjustment Board proceeding. E lgin , 325 U .S. at 736.
Second, while LM RA arbitration exists only if
created voluntarily through a collective bargaining agreement,
the RLA m andates the A djustm ent Boards. As this Court
stated in A ndrew s, 406 U .S . at 323, "[sjince the compulsory
character o f the adm inistrative remedy provided by the RLA
. . . stems not from any contractual undertaking . . . but from
the Act itself, the case for insisting on resort to those
remedies is if anything stronger in cases arising under that
Act than it is in cases arising under § 301 o f the LM R A ."
Third, unlike § 301, w hich provides for court
jurisdiction, the RLA does not allow federal or state court
intervention in the interpretation o f collective bargaining
agreements. Instead, the RLA sends disputes about either
employee grievances or the interpretation or application of
agreements to the A djustm ent Boards. Pitney, 326 U .S. at
561; Southern R .R ., 339 U .S. at 255.
Fourth, as Congress has recognized, the need for
uniform ity under the RLA is far greater than under the
LM RA because o f the uniquely interstate nature of these
industries.25 Representation under the RLA must be
"system-wide," and there is one bargaining unit that
encompasses all the states served by a carrier.26 In contrast,
representation under the LM RA is by "appropriate bargaining
unit," usually confined to a single facility.
Fifth, unlike § 301, preem ption must operate to bar
all state actions in the nature o f wrongful or retaliatory
discipline or discharge, since such discipline was explicitly
25 See pages 17 - 18 and notes 14 - 15, supra.
26 See note 8, supra.
28
382
intended by Congress to be included in the "grievances" that
were consigned to the Adjustm ent B oards,27
A ccordingly, this C ourt should reject the fram ew ork
suggested by the H awaii Suprem e C ourt and the Solicitor
General for resolution o f this case. It should read the statute
involved, the RLA , and consider the dispute presented, an
effort by respondent to bypass the A djustm ent Board process.
L in gle was decided under the LM RA , a statute w hich is
different in its term s, its history and its purposes from the
RLA.
C O N C L U S IO N
This C ourt should reverse the judgm ent o f the
Supreme Court o f Hawaii. Because C ongress has com m itted
all disputes between R LA employers and their em ployees to
mandatory grievance and arbitration procedures that are
intended to be the exclusive dispute-resolution m echanism ,
respondent may not disregard this Congressional fram ew ork
by filing an action for w rongful discharge in state court.
Respectfully subm itted,
* Charles A. Shanor
John J. G allagher
M argaret H. Spurlin
Paul, H astings, Janofsky & W alker
1299 Pennsylvania A v e ., NW
W ashington, D .C . 20004
M arch 4, 1994 * Counsel o f R ecord
27 See supra at pp. 8 - 12. See also F irst A nnual R eport o f National
Mediation Board 40 (1935) (summarizing the nature o f disputes
adjudicated by the A djustm ent Board: "[i]n 15 cases com plaints o f
improper discipline were review ed, dem erits and suspensions being
protested in 5, and requests for reinstatem ent after discharge in 10.")
29
383
No. 92-2058
In The
§ ? u p r r m p (E ouri o f
QHnitpb g ’tcttps
October Term, 1993
HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC.,
-against- Petitioner,
GRANT T. NORRIS,
AND
Respondent.
PAUL J. FINAZZO, HOWARD E. OGDEN
and HATSUO HONMA,
-against- Petitioners,
GRANT T. NORRIS,
Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme
Court for the State of Hawaii
BRIEF OF THE ALLIED EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION
AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT
B ertram R. G elfand
J effrey C. D annenberg
(Counsel of Record)
S pector, Scher, F eldman
& S ternklar
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
The Allied Educational Foundation
655 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10017
(212) 818-1400
=sa
385
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES ......... iii
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE ................ 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................... 2
SUMMARY OF A RG U M EN T..................................6
ARGUMENT ............................................................... 7
I. Respondent's Retaliatory
Discharge Claims Are Not
Pre-empted By The R L A ......... .. 7
A. Pre-emption Is Unjustified Under
a "Major" Dispute/"Minor"
Dispute Analysis........................ 7
B. Respondent's Claims Aso
Survive Scrutiny Under The
More Traditional Standard for
Pre-emption ........................... 11
II. Dismissal of Respondent's
State Law Claims Would
Improperly Deprive
Respondent of The
Benefit of Worker
Protection Legislation .........................14
386
n
A. Depriving Respondent of
Protection Under the HWPA
On The Basis of His Union
Membership Interference
With The Collective Bargaining
Process.................................... 14
B. Public Policy is Best Served
by Allowing Claims Asserted
Under State Worker Protection
Laws to be L itigated............ 18
CONCLUSION........................................................ 21
387
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
iii
CASES
Page(s)
A tch ison , T opeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell,
480 U.S. 557 (1987)................................................... 14,
C on so lida ted R a il Corp. v. R ailw ay L a b o r
E xecutives A ss'n, 491 U.S. 299 (1989) . . . . 7, passim
Elgin, J. & E.R . Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S.
711 (1945) ..................................... 8, 11
Fort H alifax P acking Co. v. Coyne, 482
U.S. 1 (1987) .................................................... 17
G olden S ta te Transit Corp. v. City o f L os A ngeles,
475 U.S. 608 (1986) .................................... .. 15
Indepen den t Union o f Flight A tten d a n ts v. Pan
A m erican W orld Airways, Inc., 789 F.2d 139
(2d Cir. 1986)........................................................... 11
In ternational Ass'n o f M achinists & A erospace
W orkers v. A la sk a Airlines, Inc., 813
F.2d 1038 (9th Cir. 1987), cert, den ied,
108 S. Ct. 290 (1988)............................................... 11
In ternational Ass'n o f M achin ists v. A lo h a Airlines,
Inc., 776 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1985) ......................... 11
38S
IV
International Ass'n o f M achinists v. N orthwest
Airlines, Inc., 673 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1982) ........... 11
Lingle v. N orge Div. o f M agic Chef, Inc., 486
U.S. 399 (1988)........................................... 7, 8, 12, 13
L ove v. U nited States, 871 F.2d 1488 (9th
Cir. 1989)...................................................................... 2
M etropolitan L ife Ins. Co. v. M assachusetts,
471 U.S. 724 (1985) ............................................... 17
N L R B v. A llis-C halm ers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175
(1967)................................................................. 16, 17
N L R B v. Jones & Laughline S teel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937) ............................................................ 16
Norris v. H aw aiian Airlines, Inc., 842 P.2d 634
(Haw. 1992) ................................................. 2, 5, 10
STATUTES
Federal
Federal Aviation A c t ..................................................5
Federal Aviation Regulations.................... .. 5, 10, 11
Federal Rail Safety Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C.
§421 ........................................................................ 13
Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185 .................................................................... 7, 12
389
V
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§151,157 .............................. ........................... 15,16
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 . . 5, passim
State
Hawaii Whistleblower Protection Act,
Haw. Rev. Stat., §§ 378-61 though -69
(1988 & Supp. 1992)........................................... 5, 18
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Barnett, O verview o f S ta te W histleblow er Statu tes,
43 Lab. L.J. 440 (1992)........................................... 14
Hoke, P reem ption Pathologies a n d C ivic
R epublican Values, 71 B.U.L. Rev. 685 (1991). 19, 20
Raab, Tim e fo r an Unjust D ism issa l S tatu te in
N ew York, 54 Brook. L. Rev. 137 (1989) .............. 18
Westman, W histleblowing: The L a w o f R etaliatory
Discharge (BNA 1991) . ........................................... 14
Westman, Statement of, H earing on H .R 1664,
C orporate W histleblow er Protection: H earing
Before the Subcom . on L abor-M an agem en t Relations,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).................................... 14
3S0
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
Allied Educational Foundation ("AJEF") is a non
profit public interest group devoted to supporting the
development of public policies that contribute to a free
society in which the rights of individuals guaranteed by
the United States Constitution are fully protected.
Founded in 1964, AJEF is dedicated to promoting
education in diverse areas of study, including law and
public policy, and has appeared as arnicas curiae in the
federal courts on a number of occasions. Supporters of
AEF include representatives of business, labor and the
general public.
It is the belief of AEF that the ability of labor
and management to resolve disputes in an atmosphere
of equality is vital to the strength of the economy of the
United States. Unnecessary government interference
upsets this balance and creates a risk of economic strife
that weakens the American economy. The judicial
process is a critical area for maintaining a free society,
and the public interest is best served by a legal structure
that permits, to the fullest extent possible, the resolution
of disputes between employers and employees by
collective bargaining, with a minimum of governmental
interference, in the free pursuit of the negotiating
process by both sides. AEF is concerned that a
determination adverse to the position of the respondent
in this matter will effectively sanction inappropriate
governmental interference in the collective bargaining
process.
By letters filed with the Clerk of the Court, the
parties have consented to the filing of this brief by AEF
on behalf of respondent.
391
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent was terminated from his employment
because he was a "whistleblower." The basic issue
presented on this appeal is whether the pre-emption
doctrine precludes an employee, such as respondent,
covered by a collective bargaining from availing himself
of a cause of action arising from his termination, Where
he would otherwise have been entitled to assert such a
cause of action under state law if his employment were
not covered by a collective bargaining agreement.
In the decision below, the Supreme Court of
Hawaii denied a motion by the employer to dismiss the
state action of the employee. In so proceeding, the
Court stated:
Our review is based on the contents of the
complaint, the allegations of which we
accept as true and construe in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Dismissal
is improper unless "it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief."
Norris v. H aw aiian Airlines, Inc., 842 P.2d 634, 637 (Haw.
1992) (quoting L o ve v. U nited States, 871 F.2d 1488,1491
(9th Cir. 1989)). Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted
that, for jurisdictional purposes, this Court should accept
as true the factual allegations set forth in respondent's
complaint.
392
3
In summary, respondent alleges that he was
wrongfully discharged by his employer, petitioner
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. ("HAL"),1 from his job as an
aircraft mechanic. At HAL, respondent was responsible
for making aircraft repairs and, thereafter, returning the
aircrafts to service. As a mechanic licensed by the
Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"), respondent
was not permitted to approve for service any aircraft or
part that did not meet safety guidelines.
On July 15, 1987, respondent was inspecting the
landing gear on one of HAL's DC-9 aircrafts, when he
discovered that a critical part of the landing gear was
damaged. Respondent investigated further and found
that the axle sleeve, which normally has a smooth
surface, was so badly scarred, gouged and burned that,
in its present condition, the plane's entire landing
apparatus was in jeopardy of failing. Although
respondent and the other mechanics present believed
that the axle sleeve needed to be changed at once,
respondent's supervisor directed the mechanics to hand-
sand the part and to return the aircraft to service. After
the plane was returned to service, respondent was
directed by his supervisor to certify the maintenance
record, indicating that the repair had been performed
satisfactorily and that the plane was airworthy.
Respondent refused and was immediately suspended.
Later that day, respondent notified the FAA of the
danger that he perceived as a result of the maintenance
1 Petitioners in this appeal include H A L and certain of
H A L ’s o ff icers and managers.
393
4
procedures that had been performed on the HAL DC-9.
Thereafter, respondent returned to the HAL office at
which he worked and reported to an Assistant Director
what had happened, including his having contacted the
FA A, In response, the Assistant Director summarily
terminated respondent on the spot.
As a result of respondent's communications, the
FAA inspected the HAL DC-9 in question and seized
the axle sleeve about which respondent had reported.
Several months later, the FAA notified HAL that it was
to be the subject of a broader FAA investigation. Prior
to the official commencement of the investigation,
however, an FAA investigator caught HAL employees
removing axle sleeves from several aircrafts. The FAA
ordered that the removed sleeves be turned over to it.
HAL advised the FAA, however, that almost all of the
slefeves had been "lost" or "misplaced." Ultimately,
following the FAA's issuing a report of findings and
conclusions regarding the facts surrounding the
disappearance of the axle sleeves,2 HAL agreed to pay
a fine of $360,000, resolving all charges that had been
brought involving this incident.
After his termination, respondent invoked the
grievance procedures outlined in the collective
bargaining agreement between HAL and respondent's
union, the International Association of Machinists,
2 A m ong o ther things, the F A A found that H A L had
made 958 flights with the axle sleeve tha t had been reported
as dam aged by respondent.
394
5
entered into pursuant to the provisions of the Railway
Labor Act ("RLA"), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188. That
agreement provides that an employee may be disciplined
only for just cause. Citing a provision of the agreement
that an aircraft mechanic "may be required to sign work
records in connection with the work he performs," HAL
argued that respondent had been terminated for
insubordination.
Prior to the grievance hearing, HAL offered to
reduce respondent's punishment from termination to
suspension, with the understanding that "any further
instance of failure to perform duties in a responsible
manner" could result in discharge. Respondent
disregarded the offer and, instead, instituted this action
in Hawaii state court. The gravamen of respondent's
complaint is that the retaliatory acts of HAL's employees
resulting in his termination violated public policy as
articulated in the Hawaii Whistleblowers’ Protection Act
("HWPA"), Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 378-61 through -69 (1988
& Supp. 1992), as well as in the Federal Aviation Act
and the Federal Aviation Regulations. The lower state
courts dismissed respondent’s state retaliatory discharge
claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, on the
ground that state jurisdiction was pre-empted by the
RLA. The Supreme Court of Hawaii reversed, holding
that the RLA did not pre-empt respondent's claims. See
Norris v. H aw aiian Airlines, Inc., 842 P.2d 634 (Haw.
1992).
395
6
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The resolution of respondent's retaliatory
discharge claims depends upon factors that would hot
require an interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement. Accordingly, these claims are not pre
empted by the RLA.
The State of Hawaii has statutorily enunciated the
public policy that employees should be afforded
protection from retaliation based upon their having
reporting wrongdoing or unsafe working conditions.
Such public policy is also found in the Federal Aviation
Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
Encouragement of so-called whistleblowers is
fundamental to government's capacity to safeguard the
public from wrongdoing. The instant case is poignantly
illustrative of this concept. The alternative to State
statutory protection of the workers-that is,
countenancing the public's being exposed to the risks of
traveling in unsafe commercial aricrafts-need not be
embraced, inasmuch as respondent's claims do not arise
Uildef a collective bargaining agreement, and the state
litigation of these claims does not offend the principles
underlying the RLA.
Indeed, the dismissal of respondent's claims on
the ground that they are pre-empted by federal
legislation relating to the resolution of disputes under
collective bargaining agreements would improperly
deprive respondent, and others like him, of the same
access to state worker protection laws as is afforded to
396
7
nonunion members, who are not covered by a collective
bargaining agreements, it was never intended that state
laws designed to protect all workers should be foreclosed
to some workers simply because they are unionized.
ARGUMENT
I. Respondent's Retaliatory Discharge
Claims Are Not Pre-empted By The RLA
A. Pre-emption Is Unjustified Under a "Major"
Dispute/"Minor" Dispute Analysis
Much is made in petitioners' brief concerning the
purported distinction between the standard, most
recently reiterated by this Court in C on so lida ted R a il
Corp. v. R ailw ay L a b o r Executives' A ss'n, 491 U.S. 299
(1989), for classifying labor disputes under the RLA as
"major” or "minor," and the standard articulated by the
Court in Lingle v. N orge Div. o f M agic Chef, Inc., 486
U.S. 399 (1988), for the pre-emption of state law by
federal law. A m icu s respectfully submits that, to the
extent that there exists any such distinction, it is
irrelevant to the facts in this case. Although Lingle
involved an application of Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. §
185(a), and not the RLA, the policy reasons furnished by
this Court in connection the pre-emption doctrine are
equally germane:
[Ijf the resolution of a state-law claim
depends upon the meaning of a collective
397
8
bargaining agreement, the application of
state law (which might lead to inconsistent
results since there could be as many state-
law principles as there are States) is
preempted and federal labor law
principles-necessarily uniform throughout
the nation-must be employed to resolve
the dispute.
Id . at 405-06 (footnote omitted). Where, as here, there
exist independent state worker protection laws, under
which claims may be asserted that will create no risk of
results that are inconsistent with any federal labor law
principles, there is no reason to keep the state claim
from proceeding, to the same extent as if plaintiff were
not a unionized employee.
Disputes between labor and management arising
tinder the RLA have been classified as either "major" or
"minor" for the purposes of determining whether
arbitration should be mandated. This Court adopted the
"major/minor" terminology "as a shorthand method of
describing two classes of controversy Congress had
distinguished in the RLA: major disputes seek to crdate
contractual rights, minor disputes to enforcd them."
C on solida ted R a il Corp., supra, 491 U.S. at 302 (citing
Elgin, J. & E.R . Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945)). In
the event of a "major" dispute, the statutory basds of
which are Sections 2 (seventh) and 6 of the RLA, 45
U.S.C. §§ 152 (seventh) and 156, the parties are required
to undergo a lengthy process of bargaining and
398
9
mediation. "Once this protracted process ends and no
agreement has been reached, the parties may resort to
the use of economic force." Id. at 303.
C on so lida ted R a il Corp. did not, itself, involve an
application of the pre-emption doctrine; instead, that
case arose from a challenge by a collection of labor
organizations to an employer’s addition of drug testing
procedures to routine physical examinations. See id. at
300. In determining that the matter should be arbitrated
because resolution of the dispute necessarily involved an
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, the
Court held "that if an employer asserts a claim that the
parties' agreement gives the employer the discretion to
make a particular change in working conditions without
prior regulation, and if that claim is arguably justified by
the terms of the parties' agreement (i.e., the claim is
neither obviously insubstantial or frivolous, nor made in
bad faith), the employer may make the change and the
courts must defer to the arbitral jurisdiction of the
Board." Id. at 310.
At bar, logic dictates that no "interpretation"
(indeed, no reference) to the collective bargaining
agreement is necessary in order to resolve respondent's
claim that he was terminated in retaliation for his having
gone to the FAA with information of what he perceived
to be a dangerous situation, violative of FAA guidelines,
that could result in a loss of human lives. The only
provision of the collective bargaining agreement that
petitioners argue is applicable is Article XVII.F, which
provides that "[a]n employee's refusal to perform work
399
1 0
which is in violation of established health and safety
rules, or any local, state or federal safety law shall not
warrant disciplinary action." (Appendix to the Petitioner
for a Writ of Certiorari, at 60a-61a) However, this
provision does not relate at all to the factual basis of
respondent's retaliatory discharge claims, which is that
respondent was disciplined not for a work refusal, but
for reporting to the FAA wrongdoing and a dangerous
condition at HAL that involved a serious hazard to the
public.
Where, as here, an action taken by an employer
is not even "arguably justified" by the collective
bargaining agreement, the dispute cannot be deemed
"minor," and, therefore, the forum for resolving a
grievance arising out of that action is not limited to the
arbitral mechanism of the RLA. Id. at 307. As the
Court below found:
[Respondent’s] retaliatory discharge claim
is based on his allegation that he was
terminated for reporting a violation of the
law, and [petitioners] do not suggest that
a retaliatory discharge is sanctioned or
justified by a provision in the agreement,
nor do they point to any part of the CBA
which demonstrates that the carrier and
union have agreed on standards relative to
[respondent's] situation.
Norris v. H aw aiian Airlines, Inc., 842 P.2d 634, 644 (Haw.
1992). Thus, under the standard articulated in
400
1 1
Consolidated R ail Corp., inasmuch as the claim need not
(and, indeed, cannot) be resolved by reference to the
collective bargaining agreement, the RLA is not
implicated, and, therefore, the RLA does not pre-empt
the retaliatory discharge claims asserted by respondent.
B. Respondent's Claims Also Survive Scrutiny
Under The More Traditional Standard for
Pre-emption
The "major/minor" test was established by this
Court in Burley and C on so lida ted R a il Corp. in the
context of claims brought against employers in the
United States District Court for violation of the RLA.
Federal courts have jurisdiction to decide "major"
disputes. International A s s ’n o f M achin ists v. N orthw est
Airlines, Inc., 673 F.2d 700, 706 (3d Cir. 1982). "Minor"
disputes, on the other hand, "concern the interpretation
or application of collective bargaining agreements, and
are resolved through binding arbitration before the
System Board of Adjustment." In ternational Ass'n o f
Machinists v. A lo h a Airlines, Inc., 776 F.2d 812, 815 (9th
Cir. 1985). Federal courts do not have subject matter
jurisdiction to resolve "minor" disputes. Ids, see also
International Ass'n o f M achin ists an d A erospace Workers
v. A laska Airlines, Inc., 813 F.2d 1038 (9th Cir. 1987),
cert, denied, 108 S. Ct. 290 (1988); Independen t Union o f
Flight A tten d a n ts v. P an A m erican W orld Airways, Inc.,
789 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1986).
A m ic u s respectfully submits that the
"major"/"minor" test is not appropriate to determining
401
12
whether an action, such as this one, brought in state
court under state statutory or common-law worker
protection principles should be pre-empted by the RLA
Instead, the traditional standard articulated by this Court
in Lingle v. Norge Div. o f M agic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399
(1988), which was employed (at least in part) by the
Court below, should be applied. Although Lingle arose
in the context of Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. §
185, its underlying principles are applicable in any case
in which federal labor laws are invoked in an effort to
pre-empt state law.
For example, this Court held in Lingle that, if
resolution of the claim requires interpretation of the
terms of a collective-bargaining agreement, the state law
should properly be deemed pre-empted by federal labor
law. See id. at 407 n.7. Applying this standard to the
facts in Lingle, the Court analyzed the elements of
plaintiffs state tort claim of retaliatory discharge for
filing a workers' compensation claim: "(1) he was
discharged or threatened with discharge and (2) the
employers' motive . . . was to deter him from exercising
his rights under the Act or to interfere with his exercise
of those rights." Id . at 407 (citation omitted). In
defending against such a claim, the employer "must show
that it had a nonretaliatory reason for the discharge."
Id. Based upon this analysis, the Court held, "the state-
law remedy in this case is 'independent' of the collective
bargaining agreement in the sense of 'independent' that
matters for preemption purposes: resolution of the
state-law claim does not require construing the
collective-bargaining agreement." Id.
402
13
In the case at bar, it is impossible to resolve
respondent's retaliatory discharge claims by construing
the collective bargaining agreement, inasmuch as his
claims are wholly independent of that agreement. Here,
as in Lingle, respondent's claims pertain "to the conduct
of the employee and the conduct and motivation of the
employer. [None] of the elements [of the claims]
requires a court to interpret any term of a collective
bargaining agreement." Id . As was the case in Lingle,
"this purely factual inquiry . . . does not turn on the
meaning of any provision of a collective-bargaining
agreement." Id . Accordingly, inasmuch as no
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is
required to evaluate respondent's claims, those claims
are not pre-empted by the RLA.3
Paren the tica lly , p e t i t ione rs ’ additional a rgum ent tha t
Congress has expressly com m itted "whistleblower" claims to
RLA ju r isd ic t ion (s e e O pen ing Brief of Petitioner , at 12-14)
is simply not the case. Indeed , petit ioners point to no
provision of the R L A that proscribes re ta lia tory discipline by
employers. Instead, pe tit ioners cited a "whistle blower"
provision in the Federa l Rail Safety Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. §
421 ei seq . as som ehow p rov id ing a basis for the contention
that the R L A contains such a provision. To the contrary , the
RLA contains no such provision. (If any th ing , the fact that
Congress chose not to include such a provision in, or to add
such a provision to, the R L A is an indication of Congressional
preference tha t state re ta lia tory discharge claims not be
deemed p re -e m p te d by the R LA .)
403
14
II. Dismissal of Respondent's State Law Claims
Would Improperly Deprive Respondent of The
Benefit of Worker Protection Legislation
A. Depriving Respondent of Protection Under the
HWPA On The Basis of His Union
Membership Interference With The Collective
Bargaining Process
So-called "whistleblower" statutes have become a
central element of a broad spectrum of state legislation
aimed at shielding employees from retributive conduct
on the part of their employers. See generally Westman,
W histleblowing: The L a w o f R etalia tory Discharge, at 177-
87 (BNA 1991). Most state have now adopted
whistleblower statues protecting governmental
employees, and some fifteen states have adopted statutes
that protect private sector employees.4
It seems self-evident that the broad, far-reaching
public policy concerns addressed by the Hawaii state
legislature in the HWPA would be frustrated if one class
4 S ee S ta tem ent of Daniel W estman, H ea rin g on H .R . 1664,
C o rp o ra te W h istleb low er P ro tec tio n : H ea r in g B e fo r e the
S u bcom m . on L a b o r -M a n a g em en t R e la tio n s o f the House
C om m , on E d u ca tio n a n d L a b o r , 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
The states tha t have enacted whistleb low er legislation covering
private sector em ployees include C aliforn ia , Connecticut,
F lorida, H aw aii , Louisiana, M aine, M ich igan , M innesota, New
H am psh ire , New Jersey, New Y ork , Ohio, Rhode Island,
Tennessee and Wisconsin. S e e Barnett , O verview o f State
W h istleb low er P rotection S ta tu tes , 43 Lab. L.J. 440 (1992).
404
15
of employees within the state-that is, employees covered
by collective bargaining agreements-were deprived of
the projections set forth in this legislation. Such
deprivation would be unfair to those employees who
chose to join a union and would deprive the public of
the benefit of information known to that large portion of
the labor force that is unionized.
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 157, provides employees with a
federally protected right to uninhibited, unconditional
participation in the collective bargaining process. The
exclusion of unionized workers from state worker
protection laws could, therefore, easily disrupt the
"balance of power designed by Congress" that this Court
has referred to in the context of employer-employee
relations. G olden S ta te Transit Corp. v. City o f L os
Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 619 (1986).
Indeed, a real danger exists that such a disruption
of the employer-employee relationship could create a
chilling effect on the collective bargaining process
generally. For example, employees considering whether
to join a union would first have to weigh the value of
lost state labor benefits against the benefit of union
membership. This factor places an unfair burden on the
union in collective bargaining, inasmuch as employers do
not lose any of their comparable state law rights when
they enter collective bargaining. Indeed, the prospect of
loss of state labor law protection that would result from
the dismissal of the respondent's claims could be a
powerful weapon in the hands of an anti-union
405
16
employer.5
As this Court stated in N L R B v. A llis-C halm ers
M anufacturing C o., 388 U.S. 175 (1967):
National labor policy has been built on
the premise that by pooling their
economic strength and acting through a * 29
5 Such a scenario w ould be tragically inconsis ten t with a
fundam enta l tenet of A m erican labor law that the government
should foster em ployee organization and p rom ote equity in
bargain ing betw een em ployers and em ployees. For example,
the f indings and policies set fo r th in the N L R A provide, in
per tinen t part:
E xperience has proved that p ro tec tion by law
of the righ t of em ployees to organize and
bargain collectively sa feguards com m erce from
in ju ry , im pairm en t, or in te r ru p t io n , and
prom otes the flow of com m erce by removing
certa in recognized sources of industr ia l strife
and unrest, by encourag ing practices
fu n d am en ta l to the fr iend ly ad jus tm en t of
industr ia l disputes arising out of d iffe rences as
to wages, hours, or o ther w ork ing conditions,
and by restoring equa lity of barga in ing power
be tw een em ployers and employees.
29 U.S.C. § 151; s e e a ls o N L R B v. J o n e s & L a u g h lin e Steel
C orp ., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937) ("[t]he theory of the A ct is that
fre6 o p p o r tu n i ty fo r n e g o t ia t io n w ith accredited
representa tives of em ployees is likely to p rom ote industrial
peace and may b r in g abou t the ad jus tm en ts and agreements
which the A ct in itself does not a t tem p t to compel").
17
labor organization freely chosen by the
majority, the employees of an appropriate
unit have the most effective means of
bargaining for improvements in wages,
hours, and working conditions.
Id. at 180. The Court has also recognized that "both
employers and employees come to the bargaining table
with rights under state law that form a 'backdrop' for
their negotiations." F ort H alifax P acking Co. v. Coyne,
482 U.S. 1, 21 (1987) (citations omitted). Just as an
employer comes into negotiations with the authority
under state common law to exercise fundamental
managerial prerogatives, workers come to collective
bargaining with certain legal rights that underpin their
bargaining position, such as the projections afforded to
all employees by state labor laws. See id. Consistent
with this balance of power, this Court has consistently
ruled that unionized workers should not be penalized for
their collective bargaining activity by the loss of
minimum state labor standards. See, e.g., M etropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. M assachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985).
Yet, depriving respondent of protection under the
HWPA on the sole basis that he is covered by a
collective bargaining agreement would create just such
a penalty.
407
18
B. Public Policy is Best Served by Allowing
Claims Asserted Under State Worker
Protection Laws to be Litigated
Whistleblower protection laws are specifically
designed to protect workers from employer abuses. For
example, the HWPA provides, in pertinent part, that an
employer:
shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise
discriminate against an employee
regarding the employee's compensation,
terms, conditions, location, or privileges of
employment because . . . [t]he employee .
. . reports or is about to report to a public
body . . . a violation or a suspected
violation of a law or rule adopted
pursuant to law of this State, a political
subdivision of this State, or the United
States, unless the employee knows that the
report is false.
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-63(a) (1988). The Act authorizes
an employee to file a civil action seeking injunctive relief
and actual damages. See id. § 378-63(a) (1988). This
legislation is typical in that it is intended to curtail one
of the "most catastrophic events that can happen in life[,]
the sudden and unexpected loss of gainful employment,"
Raab, T im e fo r an Unjust D ism issa l S ta tu te in N ew York,
54 Brook. L. Rev. 1137, 1161 (1989), where that
termination is predicated on an employer's retaliation for
an employee's justified act of disclosing to an
403
19
appropriate authority the employer’s wrongdoing which
adversely affects the general public.
Critical to the importance of allowing the
whistleblower protection laws to provide remedies for
claims such as respondent's is that the whistleblower
laws encourage employees to report the presumably
illegal acts of their employers without fear of retribution.
Clearly such a goal cannot be deemed offensive to the
R IA It would be Kafkaesque irony to allow petitioners
to invoke the worker protection safeguards Congress
promulgated in the RLA in order to defeat different,
unrelated worker protection safeguards promulgated by
the State of Hawaii. As one commentator observed,
business and industry groups often seek to have state
laws pre-empted when "they have found state regulatory
schemes more burdensome, or their enforcement more
aggressive, than pertinent federal legislation." Hoke,
Preemption Pathologies an d C ivic R epublican Values, 71
B.U.L. Rev. 685, 691-92 (1991) (footnote omitted).
Professor Hoke warns:
The shortcomings resulting from current
preemption practice have a broader
impact than that of fortifying the
substantive injuries to the public that flow
from misguided or weak national
regulation . . . . [I]t kills off one line,
perhaps even an entire scheme, of a
particular community's law. Further, the
law slayed by a preemption ruling arises
from the political and legal bodies that are
409
2 0
both closest and most amenable to
practical political efforts by average
citizens. A federal preemption ruling
authoritatively revokes state and local
governmental power over the subject
matter and effectively affirms that power
may be exercised solely by the national
governmental bodies.
Id. at 694 (footnotes omitted).
Were this Court to hold that the RLA pre-empts
the Hawaii whistleblower statute, then the grave public
policy concerns addressed by the Hawaiian legislature in
this legislation would, in this instance, be eviscerated.
410
2 1
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Order of the Court
below should be affirmed. An employee's right to
protection from retaliatory discharge, which the State of
Hawaii, under its police powers, deemed worthy of
specific legislation should not be denied as a result of a
collective bargaining agreement flowing from
respondent’s membership in a union. It is not equal
enforcement that is offensive to federal law, it is the
denial of equal enforcement that is prohibited by federal
law.
Respectfully submitted,
BERTRAM R. GELFAND
JEFFREY C. DANNENBERG
(Counsel of Record)
SPECTOR, SCHER, FELDMAN &
STERNKJLAR
655 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10017
(212) 818-1400
Attorneys for
Allied Educational Foundation
A m icu s Curiae
411
N o . 92-2058
IN THE
g>ujjrEme dourt of tlje §>tate»
October Term, 1993
HAWAIIAN A IR LIN ES, IN C .,
v.
Petitioner,
G R A N T T . N O R R IS ,
Respondent.
On Writ Of Certiorari To The
Supreme Court Of Hawaii
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE NATIONAL
EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS ASSOCIATION IN
SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT
MARY ANN B. OAKLEY
Counsel o f R ecord
Suite 508 Carnegie Building
133 Carnegie Way
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
(404) 223-5250
JANETTE JOHNSON
3614 Fairmount Street, Suite 100
Dallas, Texas 75219
(214) 522-4090
ROBERT B. FITZPATRICK
1875 Connecticut Ave. Suite 1140
Washington, D.C. 20009
(202) 588-5300
Counsel f o r Am icus Curiae
N ational Employment Lawyers
Association
413
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................... iii
I. INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE ............1
II. SUMMARY OF THE A R G U M E N T ...............2
III. ARGUMENT................................ 4
A. Disputes Not Conclusively Resolved
By Interpretation of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement Are Not
Appropriate For Mandatory Arbitration
Under The Railway Labor Act . . . . 5
B. Protecting and Enforcing the Rights
of "Whistleblowers" Constitutes an
Important Public Policy Independent
• of the Collective Bargaining
C o n t r a c t ....................... 11
C Requiring Arbitration Under The
Railway Labor Act Restricts
Substantive Remedies and Procedural
Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . U
1. Substantive Remedies . . . . 14
2. Procedural Rights . . . . . 16
3. Right of Discovery.......... I7
414
TABLE OF C O N T E N T S -co n tin u ed
4. Right to Jury Trial . . .
IV. CONCLUSION
i i i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421
U.S. 454 ( 1975) .................. 16, 19
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
( 1 9 7 4 ) .................................. 9
Atchison, T. & S.F. Railway v. Buell. 480 U.S.
557 ( 1 9 8 7 ) ............................... 8
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission v.
Continental Air Lines, Inc.. 372 U.S. 714
(1963) 9
Consolidated Rail Coro, v. Railway Labor
Executives' Association, 491 U.S.
299 ( 1 9 8 9 ) ...............................6
Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1,
21, 23 ( 1987) 9
Louisiana Public Services Commission v. F.C.C.,
476 U.S. 355 ( 1986) ................... 9
Lytle v. Household Manufacturing, Inc.. 494 U.S.
545 (1990) .................. 19
STATE CASES
Norris v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.. 842 P.2d
634 15
Mayer v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations,
Inc. , 125 N.J. 455, 593 A.2d 750 ( 1991) 13
41
XV
TABLE OF A U T H O R IT IE S -co n tin u ed
STATUTES
42 U.S.C. §1981 a ( b ) ................... .. 16
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e et seq. . . . . . 5
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 . 19
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§621 et seq.............................5
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§12101 et seq. ........................... ..
Employment Income Retirement Security Act, 29
U.S.C. §1140 5
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.
§§51-60, 8
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§153(i) . . . . 4
The Hawaii Whistleblower's Protection Act,
Hawaii Revised Statutes §§378-61-69
(Supp 1992) ..................... 12, 15
Other Sources:
Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle
Accident, Report to the President
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1986)
ppl71-72, 199-201 14
Challenger: A Major Malfunction (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday, 1987) ........... 14
41?
No. 9 2 - 2 0 5 8
In The
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1993
HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC.,
Petitioner,
v .
GRANT T. NORRIS,
Respondent.
On Writ Of Certiorari To The
Supreme Court Of Hawaii
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE NATIONAL
EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS ASSOCIATION IN
SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT I.
I . INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE
The National Employment Lawyers Association
(NELA) is a nationwide bar association of more
than 1800 lawyers who regularly represent
418
2
individual employees. Founded in 1985, with
headquarters in San Francisco, NELA has filed
several amicus briefs in this Court as well as
in Circuit Courts of Appeal and various State
Supreme Courts.
Because of its practical experience with
employment issues, NELA is an appropriate entity
to brief this Court on the importance of the
issues and the practical effects of the Court's
decision on the hundreds of thousands of
transportation employees under the purview of
the Railway Labor Act.
I I . SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Prior decisions of this Court support the
holding of the Supreme Court of Hawaii that the
Railway Labor Act does not preempt disputes
independent of a labor agreement. Public policy
419
3
also supports that holding.
Because the mandatory arbitration provision
of the Railway Labor Act covers only disputes
which arise out of a collective bargaining
agreement, the provision does not preempt
disputes, such as those relating to state labor
laws or federal anti-discrimination statutes,
which are independent of the labor agreement and
do not require interpretation of it.
Extended to its logical conclusion, the
position taken by the Petitioner in this case
would ultimately result in the ability of all
unionized employers, particularly those in the
transportation industry, to exempt themselves
from state labor laws and federal anti-
discrimination laws. Private employers could
effectively enfeeble both state and federal
420
4
labor and anti-discrimination laws by requiring
arbitration to prevent an employee from
asserting in state or federal court the rights
that such employees enjoy wholly independent of
the collective bargaining relationship.
I I I . ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court of Hawaii correctly held
that this case does not involve a minor dispute
subject to mandatory arbitration under the
Railway Labor Act [RLA], 45 U.S.C. §§153(i). To
hold otherwise would deprive employees of
protection and rights accorded under both
federal and state statutes independent of
collective bargaining agreements; these rights
include protection against whistleblowing, as in
the instant case, and protection from
discrimination based on race, gender, religion,
421
5
national origin, age, disability and the
attainment of benefits under pension and health
benefit plans.1
A. Disputes Not Conclusively Resolved By
Interpretation of The Collective
Bargaining Agreement Are Hot
Appropriate For Mandatory Arbitration
Under The Railway Labor Act
Whether a claim must be submitted to
arbitration under the RLA turns on whether the
dispute is major or minor. Petitioner contends
that the issue in the instant case involves a
minor dispute subject- to the mandatory
arbitration provisions of the RLA. The terms
"major dispute" and "minor dispute" do not
1 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e et seq.; Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 2 9 U.S.C.
§§621 et seq.; Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C. §§12101 et seq.; Employment Income
Retirement Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §1140.
422
6
appear in the RLA. This Court has used the
terms to describe two classifications of labor
disputes. "[M]ajor disputes seek to create
contractual rights, minor disputes to enforce
them." Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n. 491 U.S. 299, 302 (1989).
Minor disputes may be "conclusively
resolved" by interpreting the collective
bargaining agreement. Consolidated Rail Corp.
491 U.S. at 305. Thus the whole panoply of
standard contractual interpretations of issues
relating to work time, work rules and work
duties can be classified as "minor disputes" as
can the host of everyday employee grievances
surrounding such contract terms. In such
circumstances, the arbitral provisions of the
Railway Labor Act work well.
423
7
However, as this Court has noted, a
collective bargaining agreement cannot eliminate
substantive legal rights accorded to employees
independent of the collective bargaining
agreement. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n
v. Continental Air Lines, Inc.. 372 U.S. 714
( 1963 ) (rejecting the claim that the RLA
preempted a state law prohibiting racial
discrimination). Any holding to the contrary
would unduly usurp the regulatory powers of the
states. Further, such a decision would require
arbitrators to decide issues of state or federal
anti-discrimination law wholly outside the
confines of the collective bargaining agreement.
This Court has held that the strong policy
in favor of arbitration under the RLA must yield
when an employee's cause of action arises from a
424
8
federal statute which provides "minimum
substantive guarantees to individual workers."
Atchison, T, ...& S.F. Ry. v. Buell. 480 U.S. 557,
565 (1987) (quoting Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight. System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 ( 1981)). In
Buell, this Court held that a railroad employee
could maintain a negligence action under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.
§§51-60, [FELA], even though the claim might
have been subject to arbitration under the RLA.
480 U.S. 557 at 564-567. This Court found it
"inconceivable" that Congress, which provided
substantive protection and a remedy for workers
under FELA, intended to limit federal relief to
remedies providing for arbitration under the
RLA. 480 U.S. 557 at 565.
This Court has also stated that "preemption
425
9
should not be lightly inferred" because "the
establishment of labor standards falls withir
the traditional police power of the State" anc
"does not impermissibly intrude upon the
collective-bargaining process." Fort Halifax
Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21, 23 (1987),
Congress must express "a clear intent to preempt
state law" when it comes into conflict with
federal law. Louisiana Public Services Comm'n
v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355, 368 ( 1986 ). No such
"clear intent" is present in the Railway Labor
Act.
This Court has also stated that arbitrators
exceed their authority if they base their
decisions on a source of law outside the
collective bargaining agreement. Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co.. 415 U.S . 36, 53 ( 1974).
426
1 0
Determination of whether or not Petitioner
violated Hawaii's state whistleblower act, as is
alleged by Respondent Norris, would most
certainly require just such an interpretation of
a state statute, a source of law outside the
collective bargaining agreement. On the other
hand, a determination of whether there was such
a violation would not require any interpretation
of the collective bargaining agreement because
neither party can bargain away rights accorded
under state law.2
In balancing two competing interests, the
2 ,
While the "major-minor dichotomy" is
certainly helpful in the analysis of collective
bargaining issues, as this case readily
establishes, it proves a false construct for
the resolution of issues wholly outside the
contract and the collective bargaining
relationship, such as "whistleblower" rights
accorded by state statute.
427
1 1
state's power to regulate the establishment of
labor standards under its traditional police
powers and the federal interest in unifori
interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements, the former would be wholly nullified
if the latter were to prevail in this case,
Whistleblowing, an issue unrelated to the
collective bargaining agreement, must be
adjudicated under the laws of the state as
delineated by state decisional law rather than
through a collective bargaining arbitral
process.
B . Protecting and Enforcing the Rights of
"Whistleblowers" Constitutes an
Important Public Policy Independent of
the Collective Bargaining Contract
At first blush, many employers might
characterize the "whistleblower" employee as
either "insubordinate" as did the employer
423
1 2
herein or as an uncooperative troublemaker.
Nothing could be further from the truth,
however, for it is the stubborn courage of such
solitary truthseekers which prevents disasters
of a public magnitude. Respondent Norris
refused to give his imprimatur to repairs
performed on an assertedly worn and unsafe
aircraft axle sleeve affecting the aircraft's
entire landing gear system. He also reported
such asserted safety infractions to the Federal
Aviation Authority and alleges that his
discharge was caused by such whistleblowing
activity in contravention of the Hawaii
Whistleblowers' Protection Act [HWPA], Hawaii
Revised Statutes (HRS) §378-61 through 69 (Supp
1992), and the airline safety policies
underlying the Federal Aviation Act.
423
That states choose to protect such
whistleblowers is surely within the confines of
their regulatory police and safety powers,
States such as Hawaii and New Jersey, for
example, are in the vanguard of states seeking
to afford such protection to their citizens.3 To
discourage these protections by over-incursion
of the pre-emption doctrine risks stifling
legitimate reservations, dissents and
constructive criticisms which protect both
employees and the public from dangers to health
and safety. The evisceration of the rights of
trained employees to speak out on matters of
public policy concern, however unpopular such
3 See Maher v. New Jersey Transit Rail
Operations, Inc.. 125 N.J. 455, 593 A.2d 750
(1991) enforcing New Jersey's whistleblower
statute and finding said statute not preempted
by the RLA.
13
430
14
position may be with their immediate supervisor,
may be a prescription for disaster.4
c- Requiring Arbitration Under The
Railway Labor Act Restricts
Substantive Remedies And Procedural
Rights
1• Substantive Remedies
'I'ot’t claims have historically provided
Thus, in its investigation of the
Space Shuttle Challenger Accident in 1987, the
Rogers Commission Report noted that the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) interfered with "the mission" by
stifling the legitimate reservations, dissent
and̂ constructive criticisms of the project
engineers. See Presidential Commission on the
Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to
the President (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1986)
PP- 171-72, 199-201. In fact, as noted in
McConnell, Challenger: A Major Malfunction
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1987) p.
1987, one NASA engineer testified that he did
not express safety concerns because he had
previously been ''personally chastised" and
crucified" by his supervisors for raising
design objections.
431
15
substantive remedies not ordinarily available
under a collective bargaining agreement,
including, in the instant case, the right to
compensatory and/or exemplary damages, Norris
v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 842 P.2d 634, 647.5
Depriving employees of damages beyond the
traditional "reinstatement and backpay" remedies
normally available in the arbitral process
deprives employees of remedies for intangible
and ancillary compensatory losses such as losses
for severe emotional distress, out of pocket
expenses and the financial ramifications of a
ruined credit rating.
5 The Hawaii Whistleblower's Protection
Act (HWPA), Hawaii Revised Statutes §§378-61
through 69 (Supp. 1992), also ensures that any
rights and remedies in a collective bargaining
agreement which are in addition to the rights
and remedies of the HWPA are not limited by
the Act.
432
16
Arbitration ignores such substantive
remedies. It also relieves the employer of the
possibility of monetary liability large enough
to deter wrongdoing in the first instance.6
2• Procedural Rights
The possibility of increased financial
liability and the trial by jury to which
employees have a right under most state tort and
federal anti-discrimination laws encourage many
employer groups, including those filing amicii
briefs herein, to advocate for mandatory
Compensatory and exemplary damages are
also available for intentional discrimination
under Title VII and Americans with Disabilities
Act, which both provide for punitive and
compensatory damages in amounts up to $300,000,
42 U.S.C. §198la(b); and under 42 U.S.C. §1981,
which provides for unlimited compensatory
and possible exemplary damages for intentional
race discrimination. Johnson v. Railway Express
^gncy, Inc.. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
433
17
arbitration as a way of avoiding both increased
liability and jury trials. Should such groups
prevail, employees would thus be essentially
deprived of the only weapons they wield against
the superior economic power of their employer:
the deterrent effect of laws enforced in state
or federal court which protect their rights.
3 • Right of Discovery
Arbitration also radically restricts
employees' right to discovery. In the
employment setting, most documents are within
the control of the employer, and most witnesses
work for, and are therefore paid by, the
employer. Limited or nonexistent access to
discovery of such employer documents or
witnesses often precludes the employee from
presenting as effective a case in arbitration as
434
18
in a trial court and creates a distinct
disadvantage for the employee. Mandatory
arbitration, with its limits on discovery of
company records, statistics, and prior
incidents, becomes the means by which employers
avoid or limit the effect of laws enacted to
protect workers.
4• Right to jury trial
This Court has long noted the importance of
preservation of the right to jury trial. Such a
right to jury trial, whether created by state or
federal statute, is especially critical in the
employment case so that the discharged employee
can be judged by a jury of his or her peers.
Congress and the various states created
these rights and remedies, including the right
to a jury trial in whistleblower and anti-
435
19
discrimination statutes,7 Indeed, Congress went
through a tumultuous struggle over the right to
a jury trial in the Civil Rights Act of 1991
which amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Without a clear Congressional intent to the
contrary - absent in the RLA - the right to jury
trial and the right to a judicial forum to
resolve employment disputes outside the confines
of the collective bargaining contract should be
preserved.
IV . CONCLUSION
7 Damages and jury trials in Title VII
and Americans with Disability Act cases are
provided by 42 U.S.C. §1981a(b) and (c).
Liquidated damages and jury trials in Age
Discrimination in Employment Cases are
provided by 29 U.S.C. §626(b) and (c).
Damages and jury trials are also available in
cases under 42 U.S.C. §1981. Johnson v. Railr
wav Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454; Lytle
v.Household Mfa.. Inc.. 494 U.S. 545 (1990).
436
2 0
Claims which are unrelated to a collective
bargaining agreement and which cannot be
adjudicated by interpreting that agreement
should not, as a matter of construction or
public policy, be preempted by the Railway Labor
Act. NELA respectfully seeks affirmance of the
decision of the Supreme Court of Hawaii in this
case.
Respectfully submitted,
MARY ANN B . OAKLEY*
133 Carnegie Way, Suite 508
Atlanta, Georgia
JANETTE JOHNSON
3614 Fairmount Street, Suite 100
Dallas, Texas 75219
ROBERT B. FITZPATRICK
1875 Connecticut Ave. Suite 1140
Washington, D.C. 20009
*Counsel of Record for Amicus
National Employment Lawyers
Association
437
No. 92-2058
I n T h e
(ta rt itf tlp> Imteh
O c t o b e r T e r m , 1993
H a w aiian A ir l in e s , I n c ., e t a l ..
P e t it io n e r s ,
G r a n t T . N o rr is ,
__________ R e s p o n d e n t .
On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court
for the State of Hawaii
BRIEF OF
THE NATIONAL RAILWAY LABOR CONFERENCE
AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
Ralph J. Moore, J r.
(Counsel of Record)
I. Michael Greenberger
Mark S. Raffman
Shea & Gardner
1800 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 828-2000
David P. Lee
Kenneth Gradia
National Railway
Labor Conference
1901 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 862-7200
A t t o r n e y s f o r t h e N a t i o n a l
Rated: March 4,1994 R a i l w a y L a b o r C o n fe r e n c e
433
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES................................................... ii
INTEREST OF AMICUS C U R IA E ..................................... 1
SUMMARY OF A R G UM EN T.............................................. 1
ARGUM ENT.................................................................... ............ 6
I. THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT GIVES AD
JUSTMENT BOARDS EXCLUSIVE JURIS
DICTION TO RESOLVE DISPUTES GROW
ING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELA
TIONSHIP RETW EEN CARRIERS AND
E M PLO Y EES................................................................. 6
A. Statutory L anguage........................... 6
B. Legislative H istory .................................................. 9
C. Supreme Court C ases.............................................. 12
D. Arbitration of Retaliatory Discharge
C laim s.......................................................................... 14
II. THE HAWAII SUPREME COURT’S PRE
EMPTION RULE LACKS FOUNDATION
EITHER IN THE RLA OR THIS COURT’S
PRECEDENTS AND WOULD CONTRA
VENE THE RLA’S POLICIES ........... 17
A. The Hawaii Supreme Court Misread C o n -
r a i l ............................................................................... 17
B. The Hawaii Supreme Court’s Misreading of
C o n r a i l Undermines its Analogy to L i n g l e . . . . 21
C. The Additional Cases Cited by the Solicitor
General Do Not Support Narrow Preemption
Under C o n r a i l / L i n g l e .......................................... 25
D. The Hawaii Supreme Court’s Preemption
Rule Would Contravene The Policies of
the RLA ................................................................... 29
CONCLUSION .................................. 30
T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S
P age
440
11
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
C A S E S .* Page
A i r L i n e P i l o t s A s s ’n v. E a s t e r n A i r L in e s , I n c . ,
863 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1 988)................................ 8
A l e x a n d e r v. G a r d n e r - D e n v e r C o ., 415 U.S. 36
(1 9 7 4 ).............................................................................. 28
A l l i s - C h a l m e r s C o r p . v. L u e c k , 471 U.S. 202
(1 9 8 5 )................................................................................... 22
A n d e r s o n v. A m e r i c a n A i r l i n e s , I n c . , 2 F.3d 590
(5th Cir. 1993) ............................................................ 24
A n d r e w s v. L o u i s v i l l e & N . R .R . , 406 U.S. 320
(1972) ............................................ ................................ p a s s im
A t c h i n s o n , T . & S .F . R y . v. B u e l l , 480 U.S. 557
(1987)... ............................................................................. 27
B a ld r a c c h i v. P r a t t & W h i t n e y A i r c r a f t D iv . , 814
F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1987), c e r t , d e n ie d , 486 U.S.
1054 (1988) .................................................................. 24
B a y l i s V. M a r r i o t t C o r p . , 906 F.2d 874 (2d Cir.
1990) ............................................................................... 24
B e a r d V. C a r r o l l t o n R .R . , 893 F.2d 117 (6th Cir
1 989)................................................................................ 29, 30
B r o th e r h o o d o f L o c o m o t iv e E n g ’r s v. L o u i s v i l l e
& N . R .R . , 373 U.S. 33 (1963) .................................... 7
B r o th e r h o o d o f R . R . T r a i n m e n V. C h ic a g o R i v e r
& I . R .R . , 353 U.S. 30 (1957) ............... ' ............... 7
B r o th e r h o o d o f R . R . T r a i n m e n V. J a c k s o n v i l l e
T e r m i n a l C o ., 394 U.S. 369 (1969) ........................ 6
B r o w n v. M i s s o u r i P a c . R .R . , 720 S.W.2d 357 (Mo.
1986), c e r t , d e n ie d , 481 U.S. 1049 (1987) .......... 24
C a lv e r t v. T r a n s W o r ld A i r l i n e s , I n c . , 959 F.2d
698 (8th Cir. 1992) .................................... ............. 23, 30
C a m p b e l l v. P a n A m . W o r ld A i r w a y s , I n c . , 668
F. Supp. 139 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) ............................... 30
C a r s o n v. S o u t h e r n R y . , 494 F. Supp. 1104 (D.S.C.
1979) ........................................................................... 30
C h ic a g o & N .W . R y . v. U n i te d T r a n s p . U n io n . 402
U.S. 570 (1971) .................................. ....................... 21
C o lo r a d o A n t i - D i s c r i m i n a t i o n C o m m ’n v. C o n t i
n e n t a l A i r L in e s , 372 U.S. 714 (1 9 6 3 )................. 26
C o n s o l id a te d R a i l C o r p . v. R a i l w a y L a b o r E x e c u
t i v e s ’ A s s ’n , 491 U.S. 299 (1989) ......................... p a s s im
441
I l l
T A B L E O F A U T H O R IT IE S — C o n tin u e d
P age
D a n ie l s V. B u r l i n g t o n N . R . R . , 916 F .2d 568 (9 th
Cir. 1990), v a c a t e d u p o n s e t t l e m e n t , 962 F .2d
960 (9 th Cir. 1 9 9 2 ) ....................................................... 19
D a v i e s v. A m e r i c a n A i r l i n e s , I n c . , 971 F .2d 463
(10 th Cir. 1992), c e r t , d e n ie d , 113 S. Ct. 2439
( 1 9 9 3 ) .................................................................................... 8 ,24
D e l t a A i r L i n e s , I n c . v. A i r L i n e P i l o t s A s s ’n , 861
F .2d 665 (11 th Cir. 1988), c e r t , d e n i e d , 493
U.S. 871 (1989) ................................................................ 28
D e T o m a s o V. P a n A m . W o r ld A i r w a y s , I n c . , 733
P.2d 614 (C a l .) , c e r t , d e n ie d , 484 U.S. 829
( 1 9 8 7 ) .................................................................................... 5, 30
E l g i n , ./. <6 E . R y . v. B u r l e y , 325 U.S. 711 (1945) . . p a s s im
E l l i o t t v. C o n s o l i d a t e d R a i l C o r p . , 732 F. Supp
954 (N.D. Ind. 1990) .... 24
G i l m e r V. I n t e r s t a t e / J o h n s o n L a n e C o r p . , 500 U.S.
20, 116 S. Ct. 1647 (1991) .......................................... 28
G o n z a le s v. P r e s t r e s s E n g ’g C o r p . , 503 M.E.2d
308 (111. 1986), c e r t , d e n ie d , 483 U.S. 1032
( 1 9 8 7 ) ................................................................. ................. 24
G r o te V. T r a n s W o r ld A i r l i n e s , I n c . , 905 F.2d 1307
(9 th Cir. 1990) ................................................................... 23
G u n t h e r v. S a n D ie g o & A . E . R y . , 382 U.S. 257
( 1 9 6 5 ) ......................................... 0 .9
H u b b a r d V. U n i t e d A i r L i n e s , 927 F .2d 1094 (9th
Cir. 1991) ............................................................................... 24
I A M V. A lie g i s C o r p . , 545 N.Y.S.2d 638 (N .Y
Sup. Ct. 1989) .................................................................. 24
J a c k s o n V. C o n s o l i d a t e d R a i l Corp>., 717 F.2d 1045
(7 th Cir. 1983), c e r t , d e n ie d , 465 U.S. 1007
(1984) ....... 24
J a c k s o n V. L i q u i d C a r b o n ic C o r p . , 863 F.2d 111
(1 s t Cir. 1988), c e r t , d e n ie d , 490 U.S. 1107
(1 9 8 9 ) ...... 26
L e u v. N o r f o l k & IF. R y . , 820 F .2d 825 (7 th C ir
1987) 30
L i n g l e V. N o r g e D iv . o f M a g ic C h e f , I n c . , 486 U.S.
399 (1988) .....................................................
L o r e n z v. C S X T r a n s p . , I n c . , 980 F.2d 263
Cir. 1992)
442
........p a s s i m
(4th
......8 , 23, 30
iv
M a g erer v. J o h n S ex to n & Co., 912 F.2d 525 (1st
T A B L E O F A U T H O R IT IE S — C o n tin u ed
P a g e
Cir. 1990) ...................................................................... 5, 29
M a g n u s o n v. B u r l i n g t o n N . , I n c . , 576 F.2d 1367
(9th Cir.), c e r t , d e n ie d , 439 U.S. 930 (1978).... 30
M a h e r V. N e iv J e r s e y T r a n s i t R a i l O p e r a t io n s ,
I n c . , 593 A.2d 750 (N.J. 1991) ............................... 24
M c C o r m ic k v. A T & T T e c h n o lo g ie s , I n c . , 934 F.2d
531 (4th Cir. 1991), c e r t , d e n ie d , 112 S. Ct. 912
(1992) ........................................................................... 25
M e d r a n o V. E x c e l C o r p . , 985 F.2d 230 (5th Cir.),
c e r t , d e n ie d , 114 S. Ct. 79 (1993) ......................... 29
M i s s o u r i - K . - T . R .R . v. B r o th e r h o o d o f R .R . T r a i n
m e n , 342 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1 9 6 5 )........................ 16
M o c k v. T .G . & Y . S t o r e s C o ., 971 F.2d 522 (10th
Cir. 1992) ....................................................................... 25
M o r a le s V. S o u t h e r n P a c . T r a n s p . C o ., 894 F.2d
743 (5th Cir. 1 990).............. 30
N o r t h w e s t A i r l i n e s , I n c . V. A i r L i n e P i l o t s A s s ’n ,
808 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1987), c e r t , d e n ie d , 486
U .S . 1 0 1 4 ( 1 9 8 8 ) ......................................................................... 2 8
O ’B r i e n V. C o n s o l id a te d R a i l C o r p ., 972 F.2d 1
(1st Cir. 1992), c e r t , d e n ie d , 113 S. Ct. 980
(1993) .............................................. 24
P e n n s y l v a n i a F e d ’n o f B h d . o f M a i n te n a n c e o f
W a y E m p l o y e e s V. A m t r a k , 989 F.2d 112 (3d
Cir.), c e r t , d e n ie d , 114 S. Ct. 85 (1 9 9 3 )............. 23
P e n n s y l v a n i a R .R . v. D a y , 360 U.S. 548 (1959)..9,13, 29
P e te r s o n v. A i r L i n e P i l o t s A s s ’n , 759 F.2d 1161
(4th Cir.), c e r t , d e n ie d , 474 U.S. 946 (1985).... 24
R a i l w a y L a b o r E x e c u t i v e s A s s ’n V. A t c h i s o n ,
T . & S .F . R y . , 430 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1970),
c e r t , d e n ie d , 4 0 0 U .S . 1 0 2 1 (1 9 7 1 ) .............................. 8
R a y n e r v. S m i r l , 873 F.2d 60 (4th Cir.), c e r t .
d e n ie d , 493 U.S. 876 (1989) ...................................p a s s i m
R e t a i l C le r k s I n t ’l A ss’n, L o c a l 1 6 2 5 v. S c h e r m e r -
h o m , 3 7 5 U .S . 9 6 (1 9 6 3 ) .................................................... 5 ,2 5
R .J . C o r m a n R .R . v. P a lm o r e , 999 F.2d 149 (6th
Cir. 1993) ...................................... 26
S a b ic h v. N a t i o n a l R .R . P a s s e n g e r C o r p ., 763 F.
S u p p . 9 8 9 ( N .D . 111. 1 9 9 1 ) .................................................. 2 4
443
V
P ape
T A B L E O F A U T H O R IT IE S — C o n tin u e d
S c h r o e d e r V. T ra n s W orld A ir lin e s , In c ., 702 F .2d
189 (9 th Cir. 1983) ........................................................ 30
S locu m V. D ela w a re , L . & W . R .R ., 339 U.S. 239
(1950) ....................................................................................7, 9 ,1 3
S m o la r e k V. C h r y s le r C o rp ., 879 F .2d 1326 ( 6 th
C ir .) , c e r t , d en ied , 493 U.S. 992 (1989) ............... 23
U n d erw o o d V. V en a n g o R iv e r C orp ., 995 F .2d 677
(7 th Cir. 1 9 9 3 ) ................................................................. 23
U nion P a c . R .R . v. P r ic e , 360 U.S. 601 (1959).. .. 11
U nion P a c . R .R . v. S h e e h a n , 439 U.S. 89 (1978)....2 , 7 ,1 3
U nion P a c . R .R . v. U n ited T ra n sp . U nion , 3 F .3d
255 ( 8 th Cir. 1993), c er t , d en ied , 62 U.S.L.W.
3471 (1994) ...................................................................... 28
U n ited P a p er -w o rk ers In t'l U nion V. M isco, In c .,
484 U.S. 29 (1987) ......................................................... 28
U n ited S t e e lw o r k e r s o f A m e r ic a V. A m e r ic a n M fg .
C o., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) ........................................... . 22
U n ited T ra n sp . U nion V. L o n g I s la n d R .R ., 455
U.S. 678 (1982) ........................................ ................ . 26
V erd o n V. C o n so lid a ted R a il C orp ., 828 F . Supp.
1129 (S.D .N.Y. 1 9 9 3 ) ............................... 19
W h iteh o u se V. I ll in o is C en t. R .R ., 349 U.S. 366
(1955) ............................... 9
W .R . G ra ce & Co. v. L o c a l U nion 759, I n t ’l U n ion
o f U n ited R u b b e r W o rk e r s , 461 U.S. 757
( 1 9 8 3 ) ....... 28
A D M IN IS T R A T IV E C A S E S :
N R A B F i r s t Division A w ard No. 24059 (Feb . 6 ,
1 9 9 1 ) ...................................................................................... 15
N R A B Second Division A w ard No. 12148 (Sept.
25, 1991) ...................................................... 15
N R A B T h ird Division A w a rd No. 23151 (Jan .
30, 1981) ............................................................................ 15
N R A B T h ird Division A w ard No. 27505 (Sept. 22,
1988)... .................................................. 15
N R A B T h ird Division -Award No. 28725 (M ar.
28, 1991) ............................................................................. 15
Public L aw B oard No. 3399, A w ard No. 4 (M ar.
444 11> 1985) ............................................................................. 15
VI
Public L a w B oard No. 4269, A w a rd No. 300
(Sept. 25, 1990) ................................................................ 15
S T A T U T E S :
Civil R igh ts A c t of 1964, tit. VIT, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2 0 0 0 e -5 (c ) - ( f ) ............................................................... 27
F edera l E m ployers ’ L iab ili ty Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51
e t s eq . .................................................................................... 27
F edera l R a ilroad S a fe ty Act, 45 U.S.C. § 431 e t
s e q ............................................................................................. 3 ,1 4
45 U.S.C. § 441 (a ) ................................ ...................... 3 ,1 4
45 U.S.C. § 441 (c ) ........................................................ 3 ,1 4
L abor M an ag em en t R ela tions Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ § 1 4 1 - 1 8 8 ......................................................... 4
§ 203 ( d ) , 29 U.S.C. § 173 ( d ) ............ ................ 4, 22
§ 301, 29 U.S.C. § 1 8 5 ...................................... 21
§ 3 0 1 ( a ) , 29 U.S.C. § 1 8 5 ( a ) .................................... 22
R ailw ay L abor Act, 44 S ta t . 577, as amended,
45 U.S.C. § 151 e t s e q .....................................................p a s s im
§ 1 F if th , 45 U.S.C. § 151 F i f t h ............... 27
§ 2, 45 U.S.C. § 1 5 1 a .................................................. 2 ,8
§ 2 F i r s t , 45 U.S.C. § 152 F i r s t .... ’ 8
§ 3 , 45 U.S.C. § 1 5 3 ............................................. 8
§ 3 F i r s t ( f ) , 45 U.S.C. § 153 F i r s t ( f ) ............. 7
§ 3 F i r s t ( i ) , 45 U.S.C. § 153 F i r s t ( i ) ................p a s s im
§ 3 F i r s t ( j ) , 45 U.S.C. § 153 F i r s t ( j ) ............... 7, 29
§ 3 F i r s t ( p ) , 45 U.S.C. § 153 F i r s t ( p ) .......... 7
§ 3 F i r s t ( q ) , 45 U.S.C. § 153 F i r s t (q) ..... 7
§ 3 Second, 45 U.S.C. § 153 S e c o n d ....... ............ 2 , 7
§ 6 , 45 U.S.C. § 1 5 6 ............................................ 6
§ 204, 45 U.S.C. § 1 8 4 .................................................. 7
R U L E S :
Sup. Ct. R. 3 7 .3 .............................................. i
L E G IS L A T IV E H IS T O R Y :
126 Cong. Rec. S13,337 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1980).. 16
H R. Rep. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2 d Sess. ( 1 9 3 4 ) ...... 1 2
II.R. Rep. No. 1025, 96 th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) ,
r e p r in t e d in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3 8 3 0 . ..................... 1 4 ,1 5
T A B L E O F A U T H O R IT IE S — C o n tin u e d
P a g e
445
R a ilw a y L a b o r A c t A m en d m en ts R e la t in g to
N R A B : H e a r in g s on H .R . 701 , H .R . 701, a n d
II .R . 706 B e f o r e th e S u b eo m m . on T r a n s p o r ta
tion a n d A er o n a u t ic s o f th e H o u se C om m , on
In t e r s ta t e and. F o r e ig n C o m m erce , 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1965) ........................................................... . j 2
Subeomm. on L ab o r of S ena te Comm, on L abor
and Public W elfare , 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., L eg is
la tive H is to ry of th e R ailw ay L ab o r Act, As
Am ended (1926 th ro u g h 1966) (Comm. P r i n t
V ll
T A B L E O F A U T H O R IT IE S — C o n tin u e d
P ag e
1974):
67 Cong. Rec. 4499-4526 (Feb. 24, 1926)
e x c e r p t e d a t 162 ct s e q . ....................................... 1 0 ,1 1
67 Cong. Rec. 4647-4671 (F eb . 26, 1926)
e x c e r p t e d a t 298 e t s e q .......................................... 11
67 Cong. Rec. 8805-8820 (M ay 6 , 1926) e x
c e r p t e d a t 475 e t s e q ......... ................................... 10
H.R. Rep. No. 328, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1926) r e p r in t e d a t 47 e t s e q ............................ 11
S. Rep. No. 606, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926)
r e p r in t e d a t 1 0 0 e t s e q .......................................... 11
O T H E R A U T H O R IT IE S :
F i r s t A nnua l R ep o r t of the N a tio n a l Mediation
B oard (1935) ........................................................... 20
Lloyd If. G arr ison , T h e N a t io n a l R a i lr o a d A d ju s t
m en t B o a r d : A U n iqu e A d m in is t r a t iv e A g en cy ,
46 Yale L.J . 567 ( 1 9 3 7 ) ...... ............................ ' .......' 9,20
I N T E R E S T O F A M IC U S C U R IA E
T he N a t io n a l R a i lw a y L a b o r C o n fe r e n c e ( “N R L C ” )
is an u n i n c o r p o r a t e d a s so c ia t io n th a t in c lu d es a lm o s t all
of the n a t io n 's C la s s I ra i l ro a d s , e m p lo y in g m o r e th a n
90% o f all r a i l ro a d em p lo y ee s , a m o n g its m e m b e rs . T h e
C onference r e p re s e n ts m e m b e r ra i l ro a d s in m u l t i -e m p lo y e r
collective b a r g a in in g w ith u n io n s p u r s u a n t to th e R a i lw a y
Labor A c t ( “ R L A ” ) , 4 5 U .S .C . § 151 e t s e q . , a n d in r e
gard to o th e r la b o r - m a n a g e m e n t re la t io n s m a t te r s th a t
affect th e ra i l ro a d s g en e ra l ly . A m o n g o th e r th ings , it
assists a n d adv ises m e m b e r ra i l ro a d s in c o n n e c t io n w ith
the m a n d a to r y sys tem o f a rb i t ra l re m e d ie s e s ta b l ish e d b y
the R L A fo r se t t l in g d isp u te s a r is in g o u t o f w o rk p la c e
grievances.
T h is ca se p re se n ts im p o r t a n t q u e s t io n s c o n c e rn in g the
scope of th e a d ju s tm e n t sys tem es tab l ish ed b y th e R a i l
way L a b o r A c t. T h e d ec is io n be low , w h ich p e rm its a
dissatisfied e m p lo y e e to b y p as s th e A c t ’s g r ie v a n c e p r o c
esses a n d in s te a d b r in g su it in s ta te c o u r t , s u b v e r ts C o n
gress's ex p re s se d a n d o f t - r e p e a te d in te n t to c re a te a c o m
prehensive, m a n d a to r y , a n d exc lus ive sys tem fo r re so lv in g
a b ro a d r a n g e o f w o rk p la c e d isp u te s w i th o u t ju d ic ia l in
tervention. C o n g re s s f irm ly be l iev ed th a t a r b i t r a t io n of
such d isp u te s is c r i t ic a l to pea ce fu l la b o r -m a n a g e m e n t
relations in in h e re n t ly in te r s ta te t r a n s p o r ta t io n in dus tr ie s .
The C o n fe re n c e th u s h a s a v ita l in te re s t in e n s u r in g th a t
the a d ju s tm e n t p ro c e d u re s e s tab l ish ed b y the R L A are
not c i rc u m v e n te d o r u n d e rc u t . A c c o rd in g ly , the C o n f e r
ence files th is b r ie f as a m ic u s c u r ia e in s u p p o r t o f the
petit ioners .1
S U M M A R Y O F A R G U M E N T
I. A . T h e R a i lw a y L a b o r A c t p ro v id es c o m p re h e n s iv e
procedures fo r re so lv in g so -ca lled “m in o r ” d isp u te s in the
rail an d a ir l in e in d u s tr ie s . E lg in , J . & E . R v . v . B u r ley ,
325 U.S. 7 1 1 , 7 2 3 ( 1 9 4 5 ) . “ M in o r ” d isp u te s a re th o se
! This brief is being filed with the written consent of all parties
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.3.
447
2
th a t “ g ro w [] o u t o f g r iev a n ces o r o u t o f the in te rp re ta t io n
o r a p p l ic a t io n o f a g re e m e n ts c o n c e rn in g ra te s o f pay,
ru les , o r w o rk in g c o n d i t io n s ,” 45 U .S .C . § 153 F i r s t ( i) ,
a n d a re su b je c t to m a n d a to r y a n d exc lus ive a rb itra t ion
b e fo re R L A a d ju s tm e n t b o a rd s . “ C o n g re s s co n s id e red it
essen tia l to k ee p these so-called ‘m in o r ’ d isp u te s w ith in the
A d ju s tm e n t B o a rd a n d o u t o f th e c o u r ts . U n io n Pac.
R .R . v . S h e e h a n , 4 3 9 U .S . 89 , 9 4 ( 1 9 7 8 ) .
T h e p la in la n g u a g e o f th e R L A defines the m in o r dis
p u te c a te g o ry ex pans ive ly . I t exp ress ly s ta te s th a t the
A c t is des ig n ed “ to p ro v id e for the p r o m p t a n d orderly
s e t t lem en t o f a l l d isp u te s g ro w in g o u t o f g r iev a n ces o r out
o f th e in te rp re ta t io n o r a p p l ic a t io n of a g re e m e n ts ,” 45
U .S .C . § 1 5 1 a ( e m p h a s is a d d e d ) , a n d c o m m its su ch dis
p u te s to R L A a rb i t r a t io n . Id . § § 1 5 3 F ir s t ( i ) , 153
S econd . T h is b r o a d def in i t ion ca r r ie s o u t C o n g re s s s in
te n t o f h a v in g rail a n d a ir l in e l a b o r d isp u te s re so lved by
in d iv id u a ls “p e c u l ia r ly fa m il ia r w ith the th o r n y problems
a n d th e w h o le r a n g e of g r iev a n ces th a t c o n s ta n t ly exist”
in th o se in dus tr ie s . G u n th e r v . S a n D ie g o <& A .E . Ry.,
3 8 2 U .S . 2 5 7 , 261 ( 1 9 6 5 ) ( c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d ) . See pp.
6-9, in fr a .
B. T h e re le v a n t leg is la t ive h is to ry co n f irm s C ongress’s
des ire to e n c o m p a s s a b r o a d r a n g e o f g r iev a n ces arising
o u t o f th e e m p lo y m e n t re la t io n s h ip w i th in th e R L A ’s
m a n d a to r y a rb i t ra l p rocesses . S p o n so rs o f th e original
19 2 6 leg is la t ion s ta te d th a t th e a d ju s tm e n t b o a r d s were
des ig n ed to c o n s id e r , in te r a l ia , “ g r iev a n ces . . . o f a per
so n a l n a tu r e , ” as w ell as “d isp u te s r is ing o u t o f th e inter
p re ta t io n a n d a p p l ic a t io n o f ex is t ing a g re e m e n ts .” See
pp . 9 -12 , in fra .
C . T h is C o u r t ’s d ec is ions co n f irm th e R L A ’s plain
la n g u a g e a n d leg is la t ive h is to ry sh o w in g th a t th e R L A ’s
m a n d a to r y d isp u te r e s o lu t io n p ro c e d u re s a p p ly broadly
to d isp u te s a r is in g o u t o f th e e m p lo y m e n t re lationship.
I n C o n s o l id a t e d R a i l C o r p . v . R a ilw a y L a b o r E x ec u t iv e s ’
A s s ’n , 491 U .S . 2 9 9 ( 1 9 8 9 ) ( “C o n r a t T ) , q u o t in g its
dec is ion in B u r le y , th is C o u r t ag a in re co g n ized tha t a
m in o r d isp u te “ re la te s e i th e r to the m e a n in g o r proper
44S
3
applica tion o f a p a r t i c u la r p ro v is io n o r to an o m i t te d
case” in w h ic h “ th e c la im is fo u n d e d u p o n so m e in c id e n t
of the e m p lo y m e n t re la t io n , o r a s se r ted o n e , in d e p e n d e n t
o f th o s e c o v e r e d b y th e c o l l e c t iv e a g r e e m e n t .” 4 9 1 U.S.
at 303 ( e m p h a s is a d d e d ) . T h is C o u r t 's d ec is io n s a lso
make c lea r th a t the R L A p ro c e d u re s a p p l ic a b le to su ch
disputes a r e n o t “ o p t io n a l , to b e av a i le d o f as th e e m
ployee o r the c a r r i e r c h o o s e s .” A n d r e w s v. L o u i s v i l l e $
N. R .R . , 4 0 6 U .S . 3 2 0 , 3 2 2 ( 1 9 7 2 ) . See pp. 12-14 ,
infra.
D. W ith re sp ec t to “ w h is t le b lo w e r” c la im s o f the type
at issue h e re , C o n g re s s has exp ress ly m a n i fe s te d its in
tention th a t such d isp u te s b e c h a n n e le d to R L A a r b i t r a
tion. T h e F e d e r a l R a i l r o a d S a fe ty A c t , 45 U .S .C . § 4 3 1
et s e q ., p ro v id e s th a t a r a i l ro a d m a y n o t “d is c h a rg e o r
in any m a n n e r d i s c r im in a te a g a in s t” an e m p lo y e e w h o
has re p o r te d a sa fe ty v io la t io n , id . § 4 4 1 ( a ) , a n d th a t
“any d isp u te , g r iev a n ce , o r c la im a r is in g u n d e r th is sec
tion” m u s t be re so lv ed th ro u g h the R L A g r iev a n ce
process. Id . § 4 4 1 ( c ) . T h e leg is la t ive h is to ry o f th e
FRSA m a k e s c le a r th a t the s ta tu te d id n o t a d d to the
scope o f th e d isp u te s th a t w e re a l re a d y su b jec t to m a n d a
tory R L A a r b i t r a t io n in th e ra il a n d a ir l in e in d u s tr ie s ;
rather, C o n g re s s re co g n iz e d t h a t em p lo y ee s c o u ld “seek
similar p ro te c t io n th ro u g h n o rm a l g r ie v a n c e p ro c e d u re s ”
under “c u r r e n t la w ,” i .e . , th e R L A . R L A a r ib t r a to r s h av e
ad jud ica ted r e ta l ia to ry d is c h a rg e d isp u tes . T h e F o u r th
Circuit h a s re co g n iz e d th a t C o n g re s s 's p ro v is io n o f an
arbitral r e m e d y fo r these types o f r e ta l ia to ry d is c h a rg e a n d
discipline c la im s leaves no ro o m fo r s ta te - law to r t su its
based th e re o n . R a y n e r v . S m ir l, 873 F .2 d 6 0 , 6 4 -6 6 ( 4 t h
C ir .) , c e r t , d e n ie d , 4 9 3 U .S . 8 7 6 ( 1 9 8 9 ) . See pp . 14-17 ,
infra.
II. A . A l th o u g h the H a w a i i S u p re m e C o u r t u n d e r
stood th a t “ a r b i t r a t io n is th e exc lus ive re m e d y fo r c la im s
arising f ro m m in o r d is p u te s ,” P et . A p p . 12a, i t m is re a d
this C o u r t 's dec is io n in C o n r a i l as re s tr ic t in g th e c a te g o ry
of a rb i t ra b le m in o r d isp u te s to th o se th a t “m a y b e c o n
clusively re so lv ed b y in te rp re t in g th e ex is t in g . . . a g re e
449
4
m e n t ,” P e t . A p p . 14a ( q u o t in g C o m a i l , 491 U .S . a t 305 ) .
T h e q u o te d la n g u a g e f r o m C o n r a i l d id no t c o n c e rn R L A
p re e m p t io n of law s o u ts id e th e R L A , as th e Hawaii
S u p re m e C o u r t c o n c lu d e d ; in s tead , th a t l a n g u a g e related
o n ly to the in te r n a l R L A q u e s t io n o f w h a t R L A dispute
re so lu t io n p ro c e d u re s w o u ld ap p ly w h e n a c a r r i e r c laim s a
c o n t r a c tu a l r ig h t to ta k e an a c t io n a n d th e u n io n claims
th a t th e a c t io n c o n s t i tu te s a c h a n g e in an ex is t ing agree
m e n t . T h u s the c o n te x t o f the q u o te d la n g u a g e was a
sen te n c e w h ich s ta te d th a t “ the d is t in g u ish in g fea tu re of
s u c h a c a s e is th a t the d isp u te m a y b e co n c lu s iv e ly re
so lved b y in te rp re t in g th e ex is t ing a g r e e m e n t . ' ’ 491 U.S.
a t 3 0 5 . B y c o n t ra s t , th a t p o r t io n o f C o n r a i l w h ic h spoke
to th e s co p e o f th e R L A in its e n t i re ty re co g n ized that
th e m in o r d is p u te c a te g o ry ex te n d s b ro a d ly to co v e r dis
p u te s “ fo u n d e d u p o n so m e in c id e n t o f the em ploym ent
re la t io n . . . in d e p e n d e n t o f th o se c o v e re d b y th e collec
t ive a g r e e m e n t .” Id . a t 3 0 3 (q u o t in g B u r le y , 3 2 5 U.S.
a t 7 2 3 ) . See pp . 17-20 , in fr a .
B. T h e H a w a i i S u p re m e C o u r t w as w ro n g to conclude
th a t th e s t a n d a r d fo r p re e m p t io n o f s ta te la w u n d e r the
R L A is “ v ir tu a l ly in d is t in g u is h a b le ” f ro m th e ru le for
p r e e m p t io n u n d e r th e L a b o r M a n a g e m e n t R e la t io n s Act
( “L M R A ” ) , 2 9 U .S .C . §§ 1 4 1 -1 8 8 , in L in g le v . N orge
D iv is io n o f M a g ic C h e f , I n c . , 4 8 6 U .S . 3 9 9 (1 9 8 8 ) .
F i r s t , w h e re a s the L M R A d e c la re s a rb i t r a t io n to be “the
d e s i ra b le m e t h o d ” fo r se t t l ing “ d is p u te s o v e r th e applica
tion o r in te rp re ta t io n o f an ex is t in g co llec tive-barga in ing
a g re e m e n t ,” 2 9 U .S .C . § 1 7 3 ( d ) , th e c a te g o ry o f _arbitra
b le m in o r d isp u te s u n d e r the R L A e x ten d s to grievances
in a d d i t io n to d isp u te s o v e r in te rp re ta t io n an d application
o f ag re e m e n ts . M o re o v e r , u n d e r the R L A a rb i t ra t io n is
n o t ju s t a “ d e s i ra b le m e th o d ” fo r re so lv in g la b o r disputes,
b u t r a th e r is m a n d a t e d b y C o n g re s s as the sole an d ex
c lu s ive m e a n s of re so lv ing su ch d isp u tes . T h u s th is Court
h a s he ld th a t “ the ca se fo r ins is t ing o n re so r t to [RLA
a rb i t r a t io n ] r e m e d ie s is if a n y th in g s t ro n g e r in ca ses aris
in g u n d e r th e [ R L A ] th a n it is in ca ses a r is in g u n d e r . . •
450
5
the L M R A . ” A n d r e w s , 4 0 6 U.S. a t 3 2 3 . W h i le th e re is
a split a m o n g the lo w er co u r ts , th e m a jo r i ty — in c lu d in g
the F o u r th , S ix th , S ev en th , a n d N in th C irc u i t s — hav e
recognized these d iffe rences b e tw een the R L A a n d L M R A
and have re fused to im p o r t the L in g le ru le in to the R L A
context. See pp . 2 1 -2 4 , in fr a .
C. R e c o g n i t io n th a t the scope of R L A m a n d a to r y
arb itra tion ex te n d s m o re b ro a d ly th a n ju s t d isp u tes o v e r
in te rp re ta t ion o r a p p l ic a t io n o f co llec tive a g re e m e n ts
would no t, as the S o lic ito r G e n e r a l ’s a m ic u s b r ie f c o n te n d s
(a t 1 2 ) , re su lt in “ an u n d u ly b ro a d p re e m p t io n of s ta te
tort law .” F irs t , b e c au se p re e m p t io n tu rn s on C o n g re s s ’s
intent, R e t a i l C le r k s lnt'1 A ss'n v. S c h e n n c r h o r n , 3 7 5
U.S. 96 , 103 ( 1 9 6 3 ) , a n d b e c a u se C o n g re s s in te n d e d
the R L A to re ach m o re b ro a d ly th a n the L M R A , th e
resulting im p a c t o n s ta te law c a n n o t be d ee m e d “ u n d u e .”
Second, R L A p re e m p t io n o f s ta te r e ta l ia to r y d is c h a rg e
claims w o u ld n o t b e u n d u e , a n d th e cases c ited b y th e
Solicitor G e n e ra l fo r a c o n t r a r y p ro p o s i t io n a re i n a p
posite. See pp . 2 5 -2 8 , in fr a .
D. T h e ru le a d v a n c e d b y the H a w a ii S u p re m e C o u r t
would c o n t r a v e n e th e po lic ies th a t led C o n g re s s to c h a n
nel m in o r d isp u te s to a rb i t r a t io n . F irs t , by m a k in g p r e
emption tu rn on fine p o in ts o f su b s tan t iv e s ta te to r t law
in in h e ren t ly in te rs ta te in d u s tr ie s , the ru le w o u ld j e o p a r
dize u n i fo rm ity a n d co n s is ten cy in the re so lu t io n o f r a i l
road a n d a ir l in e g r iev an ces . See, e .g . , M a g e r e r v . J o h n
Sexton & C o . , 9 1 2 F .2 d 5 2 5 , 5 2 9 ( 1 s t C ir . 1 9 9 0 ) ( f in d
ing th a t r e ta l ia to ry d is c h a rg e c la im s a re p re e m p te d u n d e r
M assachuse tts law b u t no t I l l ino is la w ) . S eco n d , the
rule u n d e rm in e s the in teg r i ty of the R L A by a l lo w in g
employees to a r tfu l ly p lead s ta te to r t c la im s a n d th e re b y
“m ake a n e n d run . . . a v o id in g the ca re fu lly c r a f te d
procedures set fo r th in th e R L A . ” D e T o m a s o v. P a n A m .
W orld A ir w a y s . In c ., 7 3 3 P .2 d 6 1 4 , 621 (C a l . 1 9 8 7 ) ,
cert, d e n ie d , 4 8 4 U.S. 8 2 9 ( 1 9 8 7 ) . See pp. 2 9 -3 0 , in fr a .
451
A R G U M E N T
I. T H E R A IL W A Y L A B O R A C T G IV E S A D JU ST
M E N T B O A R D S E X C L U S IV E J U R IS D IC T IO N TO
R E S O L V E D IS P U T E S G R O W IN G O U T O F THE
E M P L O Y M E N T R E L A T I O N S H I P B E T W E E N CAR
R IE R S A N D E M P L O Y E E S .
A. S ta tu to r y L anguage .
T h e R a i lw a y L a b o r A ct ( “ R L A ” ). 4 5 U .S .C . § 151
e t s e q . , g o v ern s em p lo y e r -e m p lo y e e d isp u te s in the rail
a n d a ir l ine in dus tr ie s . It p ro v id es c o m p re h e n s iv e proce
d u re s fo r p eace fu lly re so lv ing w h a t a re c o m m o n ly re
fe rred to as “ m a jo r" an d “m in o r ” d isp u te s in accordance
w ith th e te rm in o lo g y a d o p te d in E lg in , J o l i e t & E astern
R y . v. B u r le y , 325^U .S . 7 1 1 , 7 2 3 ( 1 9 4 5 ) , th e re b y avoid
ing in te r ru p t io n s o f c r it ica lly im p o r ta n t seg m e n ts o f the
N a t io n ’s in te rs ta te c o m m erce .
T h e R L A ’s “ m a jo r -d is p u te ” p ro c e d u re s a p p ly to “ in
te n d e d c h a n g e fs ] in a g re e m e n ts a f fec tin g ra te s o f pay,
ru les, o r w o rk in g c o n d i t io n s .” 45 U .S .C . § 156 . The
R L A p ro v id es th a t a c a r r ie r o r u n io n seek in g to effect
such a ch a n g e m u s t first serve n o t ic e on th e o th e r party,
a n d th a t if a g re e m e n t c a n n o t be re a c h e d , the p a r t ie s must
e x h a u s t a le n g th y p rocess of co llec tive b a r g a in in g and
m e d ia t io n , fo l low ed , a t the d isc re t io n o f th e P re s id en t , by
inv es t ig a t io n a n d re c o m m e n d a t io n s b y an emergency
b o a r d . See B r o t h e r h o o d o f R .R . T r a in m e n v . J a c k s o n
v il le T e r m in a l C o . , 3 9 4 U .S . 3 6 9 , 3 7 8 ( 1 9 6 9 ) .
M in o r d isp u te s a re th o se th a t “ g ro w [J o u t o f grievances
o r o u t o f the in te rp re ta t io n o r a p p l ic a t io n of agreements
c o n c e rn in g ra te s o f p ay , ru les , o r w o rk in g conditions.
45 U .S .C . § 153 F i r s t ( i ) . I f n o t se t t led b y a g re e m e n t of
the p a r t ie s , these d isp u tes a re re so lv ed th ro u g h arbitra
t io n b e fo re the N a t io n a l R a i l r o a d A d ju s tm e n t Board
( “N R A B ” ) p e r m a n e n t ly e s tab l ish e d by § 3 F i r s t o r be
fo re a l te rn a t iv e a d ju s tm e n t b o a r d s c r e a te d p u r s u a n t to
§ 3 S econd . T h e R L A p ro v id es fo r a p p o in tm e n t of a
n e u t ra l b o a r d m e m b e r to b r e a k d e a d lo c k s . 4 5 U.S.C.
452
6
7
:§§ 153 F i r s t ( f ) , 153 S e c o n d .2 * E m p lo y e e s h a v e th e r igh t
to be h e a rd in g r ie v a n c e a r b i t r a t io n “e i th e r in p e rso n , by
counsel, o r by o th e r r e p re se n ta t iv e s , as th ey m a y re sp ec
tively e le c t ,” 45 U .S .C . § 153 F i r s t ( j ) , a n d to p ro ceed
with th e ir g r iev a n ces on a n in d iv id u a l b a s is even o v e r the
objection o f th e u n io n . B u r le y , 3 2 5 U .S . a t 740-41 &
n.39. C o n s is te n t w ith th e p u rp o s e s o f the R L A , u n io n s
and em p lo y ees a re p ro h ib i te d fro m s t r ik in g o v e r a m in o r
dispute, e i th e r b e fo re o r a f te r the d ec is io n b y an a d ju s t
ment b o a r d .2
T his C o u r t h a s re p e a te d ly h e ld th a t the ju r isd ic t io n
of these a d ju s tm e n t b o a r d s to a r b i t r a t e m in o r d isp u tes
is exclusive an d th a t c o u r ts l a ck su b je c t -m a tte r ju r isd ic
tion to d e c id e the m e r i t s o f a n y m in o r d i s p u te .4 A p a r t
from l im i te d s t a tu to ry g r o u n d s fo r ju d ic ia l rev iew of
a rb itra t ion a w a rd s , 4 5 U .S .C . § 153 F ir s t ( p ) a n d ( q ) ,
the R L A m a k e s n o p ro v is io n fo r ju d ic ia l in v o lv em en t
in re so lv ing m in o r d isp u tes . In sh o r t , “ C o n g re s s c o n s id
ered it e ssen tia l to k e e p these so-called ‘m in o r ’ d isp u tes
within the A d ju s tm e n t B o a r d a n d o u t o f th e c o u r ts ." U n ion
Pac. R .R . v . S h e e h a n , 4 3 9 U .S . 89 , 9 4 ( 1 9 7 8 ) ( e m
phasis a d d e d ) ( c i ta t io n o m i t t e d ) .
T h e R L A 's la n g u a g e m a k e s c le a r t h a t the m a n d a to r y
and exc lus ive m in o r d isp u te re so lu t io n p ro c e d u re s a re no t
limited s im p ly to c la im s “ g ro w in g o u t o f ” the “ in te rp re
tation o r a p p l i c a t io n ” o f co llec tiv e b a r g a in in g a g reem en ts
— an ex p a n s iv e c a te g o ry in i tself— b u t a lso in c lu d e c la im s
“grow ing o u t o f g r ie v a n c e s .” 45 U .S .C . § 153 F ir s t ( i ) .
Indeed, the R L A m a k e s c le a r th a t o n e o f its c e n tra l
2 In the airline industry, minor disputes are resolved by ad
justment boards established by the airline and the unions. 45 U.S.C.
§184. These boards are similar to the alternative adjustment
boards established under § 3 Second, including provision for neu
tral members.
a E.(), Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen V. Chicago River & I. R.R.,
353 U.S.' 30 (1957) (before); Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs
V. Louisville & N. R.R., 373 U.S. 33 (1963) (after).
4E-0-, Andrews v. Louisville & N. R.R., 406 U.S. 320 (1972);
Slocum V. Delaware, L. <£ IF. R.R,, 339 U.S, 230 (1950),
453
8
p u rp o se s is “ to p ro v id e fo r th e p r o m p t a n d o rd e r ly settle
m e n t o f a l l d isp u te s g ro w in g o u t o f g r ie v a n c e s o r out of
th e in te rp re ta t io n o r a p p l ic a t io n o f a g re e m e n ts covering
ra te s o f pay . ru les , o r w o rk in g c o n d i t io n s .” 45 U.S.C.
§ 1 5 1 a ( e m p h a s is a d d e d ) . T h e b r o a d r a n g e o f disputes
co v e red by the R L A is fu r th e r ev id e n c e d b y § 2 F irst of
th e A c t, w h ich re q u ire s ca r r ie r s a n d th e i r em p loyees to
“ se ttle a l l d isp u tes , w h e th e r a r is in g o u t o f th e application
o f such [co llec t ive b a rg a in in g ] a g re e m e n ts o r other
w ise . . . 45 U .S .C § 152 F i r s t ( e m p h a s is a d d e d ) . Thus,
as th is C o u r t re co g n ized n e a r ly fifty y ea rs a g o an d con
firm ed in C o n s o l id a t e d R a i l C o r p . v . R a i lw a y L a b o r Ex
e c u t iv e s ’ A ss'n , 491 U.S. 2 9 9 , 3 0 3 ( 1 9 8 9 ) ( C o n ra il ),
the R L A cove rs n o t o n ly c la im s th a t im p lic a te the terms
of w r i t te n o r im p lied co llec tive ag re e m e n ts , b u t a lso claims
th a t a re “ fo u n d e d u p o n s o m e in c id e n t o f th e em p loy m en t
r e la t io n . . . in d e p e n d e n t o f t h o s e c o v e r e d b y t h e co llectiv e
a g r e e m e n t .” C o n r a i l , 491 U .S . a t 3 0 3 (q u o t in g Burley,
3 2 5 U .S . a t 7 2 3 ) ( e m p h a s is ad d e d ) .*
* C o n r a i l affirmed, as the lower courts have long held, that col
lective bargaining agreements under the RLA “may include im
plied, as well as express, terms.” 491 U.S. at 311. Thus, disputes
over the “interpretation or application of agreements,” as that
language is used in § 3 of the RLA, may relate to terms implied
from past practices as well as express agreement terms. Disputes
"growing out of grievances,” as that term also appears in §3,
relate to “incident[s] of the employment relation” other than
those covered by implied or express agreements. See also pp. 9-10,
i n f r a . Because most disputes will in one way or another involve
interpretation or application of implied terms, if not express ones,
relatively few disputes fall within the residual category of griev
ances.” That does not mean that such disputes are something other
than minor disputes, however. Accordingly, the lower courts have
generally recognized that both interpretation/application disputes
and other grievances are minor disputes, as this Court recognized
in B u r l e y and C o n r a i l . See, e .g ., L o r e n z v. C S X T r a n s p . , In c ., 980
F.2d 263, 268 (4th Cir. 1992) ; A i r L i n e P i lo t s A s s 'n V. E a stern
A i r L i n e s . I n c . . 863 F.2d 891, 898-99 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ; R ailw ay
L a b o r E x e c u t i v e s A s s ’n V. A t c h i s o n , T . & S .F . R y . , 430 F.2d 994,
996-97 (9th Cir. 1970), c e r t , d e n ie d , 400 U.S. 1021 (1971). D avies
v. A m e r i c a n A i r l i n e s , I n c . , 971 F.2d 463, 467-68 (10th Cir. 1992),
454
9
T his b r o a d d e f in i t ion o f m in o r d isp u te s is c o m p e l le d no t
only b y th e s t a tu to r y la n g u a g e b u t a lso b y th e po lic ies
that led C o n g re s s to c re a te “e x p e r t a d m in is t r a t iv e
B oard[sJ” fa m i l ia r w ith “ sp ec ia l iz e d ” in d u s t ry c u s to m a n d
practice a n d r a i l ro a d a n d a ir l in e co l lec t iv e b a r g a in in g
agreements. P e n n s y lv a n ia R .R . v . D a y , 3 6 0 U .S . 5 4 8 ,
551, 5 5 3 ( 1 9 5 9 ) . 11 T h u s , C o n g re s s p ro v id e d fo r m a n d a
tory a rb i t r a t io n o f w o rk p la c e g r ie v a n c e s b y “ re p re s e n ta
tives of m a n a g e m e n t a n d la b o r . . . p e c u l ia r ly fa m il ia r
with the th o rn y p ro b le m s a n d the w h o le ra n g e o f g r iev
ances th a t c o n s ta n t ly ex is t in the r a i l ro a d w o r ld .” G u n
ther v. S a n D ie g o & A .E . R y ., 3 8 2 U.S. 2 5 7 , 261 ( 1 9 6 5 )
(c ita tion o m i t t e d ) ; see a lso S lo c u m v. D e la w a r e , L . & W .
R.R., 3 3 9 U.S. 2 3 9 , 2 4 3 ( 1 9 5 0 ) ( b o a r d m e m b e r s “ u n d e r
stand ra i l ro a d p ro b le m s a n d sp e a k th e r a i l ro a d j a r g o n ” ;
“[Ijong a n d v a r ied e x p e r ien ce s h a v e a d d e d to the B o a rd 's
initial q u a l i f ic a t io n s” ) .
B. L eg is la t ive H is to ry .
T he leg is la tive h is to ry o f th e R L A co n f irm s C o n g re s s ’s
intent to e n c o m p a s s w ith in its sco p e all d i s p u te s g ro w in g
out o f the e m p lo y m e n t re la t io n s h ip b e tw e e n ra i l a n d a ir
carriers a n d the ir em p loyees . T h e R L A w a s o r ig in a l ly
enacted in 1926 . 4 4 S ta t . 5 7 7 . D u r in g th e d e b a te s on
the 1926 leg is la t ion , m in o r d isp u tes w e re so m e tim e s cha r-
aracterized by its sp o n so rs as invo lv ing th e in te rp re ta t io n
of existing la b o r a g reem en ts , in o rd e r to c o n t r a s t th em
with “m a jo r d isp u te s ,” i .e . , d isp u te s o v e r th e fo rm a t io n
of such a g re e m e n ts (w h ic h a re su b je c t to d iffe ren t R L A * 1
cert, d e n ie d , 113 U.S. 2439 (1993), is to the contrary, but that
court—like the Hawaii Supreme Court—was under what we believe
to be the mistaken impression that B u r l e y ’s broader definition had
been "overruled by C n n ra .il.” See pp. 17-20, i n f r a .
“As this Court has observed, “ ‘The railroad world is like a
state within a state. Its population . . . has its own customs and
its own vocabulary, and lives according to rules of its own making.’ ”
1 V h ite h n v s e V. I l l i n o i s C e n t . R .R . , 349 U.S. 366, 371 (1955) (quot
ing Garrison, The. N a t io n a l R a i l r o a d A d j u s t m e n t B o a r d : A U n iq u e
A d m i n is t r a t i v e A g e n c y , 46 Yale L..T. 567, 568-69 (1937)).
455
1 0
p ro c e s s e s ) .7 B u t th e s a m e s p e a k e rs e m p h a s iz e d th a t minor
d isp u tes w e re n o t l im ited so le ly to c o n t r a c tu a l questions.
T o the c o n t ra ry , as ex p la in e d b y R e p re s e n ta t iv e Barkley,
o n e o f th e s u p p o r te r s o f th e H o u s e b ill, th e adjustm ent
b o a rd s w e re d es ig n ed to c o n s id e r “d isa g re e m e n ts over
g r ievances , in te rp re ta t io n s , d isc ip l ine , a n d o th e r techni
calit ies th a t a r ise f ro m t im e to t im e in the w o rk s h o p and
o u t o n the t r a c k s in th e o p e r a t io n o f the ro a d s .” RLA
L eg . H ist . 2 1 0 , s u p r a n o te 7 . S im ila rly , S e n a to r Wat
son, a p r o p o n e n t o f th e S e n a te b il l, s ta te d th a t m in o r dis
p u tes in c lu d e “ w h a t a re o rd in a r i ly ca lled grievances”
(w h ic h co u ld b e “o f a p e rso n a l n a t u r e ” a n d involve a
“g re a t m a n y e m p lo y e e s ,” “ a few em p lo y e e s ,” o r “ bu t one
em p lo y e e ” ) , a n d “a ls o , . . . d isp u te s r is ing o u t o f the in
t e rp re ta t io n a n d a p p l ic a t io n o f ex is t ing a g re e m e n ts as to
w ages, h o u rs of la b o r , o r w o rk in g c o n d i t io n s .” Id . at
4 7 7 ( e m p h a s is a d d e d ) . In sh o r t , f ro m the v ery beginning
C o n g ress in te n d e d th e full r a n g e of d isp u tes ar is ing “in
the w o rk s h o p a n d o u t o n th e t r a c k s ”— even if “ of a per
so n a l n a t u r e ” a n d invo lv in g b u t a s ingle p e r so n ( a n d not
invo lv ing in te rp re ta t io n o r a p p l ic a t io n of a n express or
im p lied a g r e e m e n t ) — to be su b jec t to the reg im e of the
R L A .
T h e leg is la tive h is to ry also con f irm s C o n g re s s ’s pur
poses fo r c h a n n e l in g such a b r o a d ra n g e o f d isp u tes to the
a d ju s tm e n t p rocesses . F ir s t . C o n g re s s w a n te d d isputes to
be reso lved by in d iv id u a ls w h o “ u n d e r s ta n d the problems
b y re a so n of th e ir t e ch n ic a l k n o w le d g e of the industry.”
R L A L eg . H ist , a t 176 ( s t a t e m e n t o f R ep . C o o p e r ) . Sec
o n d , C o n g ress a d o p te d th e po s i t io n , w h ich w as urged by
b o th th e u n io n s a n d th e ra i l ro a d s , th a t the a b se n c e of out
s ide in te r fe re n c e in re so lv in g th ese d isp u tes w as the means
“bes t a d a p te d to m a in ta in s a t i s fa c to ry re la t io n s between
7 See, e.g., Subcomm. on Labor of Senate Comm, on Labor and
Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of the
Railway Labor Act, As Amended (1926 through 1966) 192, 205,
480 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as “RLA Leg. Hist.”]
(■statements of Rep. Barkley and Sen. Watson).
456
11
employers a n d e m p lo y e e s .” 8 * A s R e p re s e n ta t iv e B a rk le y
explained, “ [ t ]h e h is to ry of r a i l ro a d in g in th is c o u n t r y has
dem o n s tra ted th a t the m o s t sa t i s fac to ry m e th o d o f a d
justment o f a l l r a i l r o a d d is p u te s in v o lv in g l a b o r a n d w o r k
ing c o n d it io n s h a s b e e n w h e n . . . b o th s ides w e re p e r
mitted to sit d o w n a t a tab le a n d se tt le th e i r o w n d isp u te s
without in te r fe re n c e f ro m th e o u ts id e .” R L A L eg . H ist ,
at 194 (e m p h a s is a d d e d ) . ”
Finally , the leg is la t ive h is to ry s u r ro u n d in g a m e n d m e n ts
to the A c t in 19 3 4 a n d 1 9 6 6 reaffirm C o n g re s s ’s in te n t
to insu la te d isp u te s b e tw e e n ca r r ie r s a n d e m p lo y e e s f ro m
outside in te r fe re n c e . T h e 1 9 3 4 a m e n d m e n ts w e re d es ig n ed
to m ak e the g r iev a n c e - re so lu t io n p ro cess m o re effec tive
by c rea t in g a p e r m a n e n t N R A B (w h e re a s b e fo re th e A c t
provided fo r b o a r d s by a g re e m e n t , w h ich w as n o t a lw ays
possible, see B u r le y , 3 2 5 U .S . a t 7 2 5 - 2 6 ) , a n d by e s ta b
lishing a p ro c e d u re fo r b r e a k in g d e a d lo c k e d vo tes (w h ic h
had led to a b a c k lo g of u n re so lv e d c la im s, see U n io n
P a c .R .R . v . P r ic e , 3 6 0 U .S . 6 0 1 , 6 1 1 -1 2 ( 1 9 5 9 ) ) . T h e s e
two a m e n d m e n ts w e re a d v o c a te d s t ro n g ly b y the u n io n s ,
whose lead e rs m a d e c le a r th a t e m p lo y e e s w e r e w il l
ing to g iv e u p th e ir r e m e d i e s o u t s id e o f th e s t a tu t e p r o
vided th a t a w o rk a b le a n d b in d in g s ta tu to ry sc h e m e w as
established to se tt le g r ie v a n c e s .” U n ion P a c . R .R . v.
P rice, 3 6 0 U.S. a t 6 1 3 (e m p h a s is a d d e d ) . 10 L ik ew ise ,
8 H.R. Rep. No. 328, 69th Cong., 1st Seas. (1926), RLA Leg.
Hist, at 48; S. Rep. No. 606, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926), RLA
Leg. Hist, at 102.
“That this mandate extended beyond the realm of simply inter
preting contracts is evident in the comments of Rep. Crosser, who
said that adjustment boards would, along with the other boards
established under the Act, “serve in a manner as courts to deter
mine who is right and who is wrong, what is just and what is un
just, in disputes between railroads and their employees,” and thus
prevent them from becoming “tyrants” over each other. RLA Leg.
Hist, at 344.
10 To be sure, and as pointed out by the Solicitor General’s
amicus brief last Term in American Airlines, Inc. v. Davies (No.
92-1077), cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 2439 (1993) (at 6 n.5), the legis
lative history to the 1934 amendments does include a statement
in a discussion of a non-related issue in a House Report that the
457
1 2
w h e n th e A c t w a s a m e n d e d in 1 9 6 6 to i n c o r p o r a t e a nar
ro w s ta n d a r d fo r ju d ic ia l re v ie w o f a r b i t r a t io n awards,
l a b o r u n io n s a g a in o ffered v ig o ro u s s u p p o r t b ec au se , as
o n e u n io n s p o k e s m a n e x p la in e d , “ [ i] f th e ob jec t ives of
speedy , fa ir , a n d sim plified h a n d l in g a n d se t t le m e n t of
c o n t r a c t c la im s an d g r iev a n ces in th is in d u s t ry a re to be
ach iev ed , it will be d o n e b y re d u c in g to a m inim um ,
r a th e r th an by e x p a n d in g , th e ro le o f the c o u r ts in tire
field.” 11
C. S u p rem e C o u r t Cases.
T h is C o u r t 's d ec is ions co n f irm w h a t th e R L A ’s lan
g u ag e a n d p u rp o s e c o m p e l— th a t th e sco p e o f th e A ct’s
co v e rag e , a n d h e n c e o f its m a n d a to r y a rb i t r a l processes,
e x ten d s b ey o n d d isp u te s o v e r th e in te r p r e ta t io n o f labor
a g reem en ts to en c o m p a ss all v a r ie t ie s o f w o rk p la c e griev
ances ar is ing o u t o f the e m p lo y m e n t re la t io n sh ip . In its
l a n d m a r k B u r le y d ec is ion , th is C o u r t s ta te d th a t “so-
ca lled m in o r d i s p u te s” invo lve “ g r iev a n ces . . . which *
bill “provide[s] sufficient and effective means for the settlement
of minor disputes known as ‘grievances,’ which develop from the
interpretation and/or application of the contracts between labor
unions and the carriers, fixing wages and working conditions.”
H.R. Rep. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1934). That single
statement, however, cannot justify equating “grievances” with
contract interpretation disputes in a way that deprives the statu
tory reference to “grievances” of all meaning, contrary to the many
statements by the Act’s original sponsors, set forth above, making
clear that the statutory coverage of disputes “arising out of griev
ances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements
concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions” was meant
to encompass a broader class of disputes than just those arising
from interpretation or application of collective agreements. In
deed, the 1934 House Report stated as to section 2, which incor
porated the above-quoted statutory language, that “ [t]he bill does
not introduce any new principles into the existing Railway Labor
Act.” Id. at 2, 6.
11 Railway Labor Act Amendments Relating to NRAB: Hearings
on H.R. 701, H.R. 704, and H.R. 706 Before the Snbcomm. on Trans
portation and Aeronautics of the House Comm, on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 262 (1965) (statement of
Jesse Clark on behalf of Railway Labor Executives’ Association).
458
13
inevitably a p p e a r in th e c a r ry in g o u t o f [co llec t ive b a r
gaining] a g re e m e n ts a n d po lic ies o r ar ise in c id en ta l ly in
the cou rse o f an e m p lo y m e n t , ” in c lu d in g c la im s “ fo u n d e d
upon so m e in c id e n t o f th e e m p lo y m e n t r e la t io n . . . in d e
pendent o f those co v e re d by the co llec tive a g r e e m e n t .”
325 U.S. a t 7 2 3 -2 4 . T h i s C o u r t h a s a lso he ld th a t th e
N R A B “ w as e s tab l ish ed as a t r ib u n a l to se tt le d isp u tes
arising o u t o f th e r e la t io n s h ip b e tw e e n c a r r i e r a n d e m
ployee, a n d th a t “ [ t ]h e p u r p o s e o f the A c t is fulfilled i f
the c la im i t s e l f a r is e s o u t o f t h e e m p lo y m e n t r e la t io n s h ip .”
P en n sy lv a n ia R .R . v. D a y , 3 6 0 U.S. 5 4 8 , 5 5 1 -5 2 ( 1 9 5 9 )
(em phasis a d d e d ) . A n d th is C o u r t h a s s ta te d th a t “m in o r
disputes” c o v e r th e b r o a d r a n g e o f “g r iev a n ces th a t ar ise
daily b e tw e en e m p lo y ee s a n d ca r r ie r s re g a rd in g ra te s of
pay, ru les , a n d w o rk in g c o n d i t io n s .” U n io n P a c . R .R . v .
S h eeh a n , 4 3 9 U .S . 89 , 9 4 ( 1 9 7 8 ) .
M o s t re cen t ly in C o n r a i l , th is C o u r t p o in te d o u t th a t
“the m in o r d isp u te c a te g o ry is p re d ic a te d o n § 2 S ixth
and § 3 F i r s t ( i ) o f th e R L A , w h ich set fo r th c o n fe re n ce
and c o m p u ls o ry a r b i t r a t io n p ro c e d u re s fo r a d isp u te a r is
ing o r g ro w in g ‘o u t o f g r iev a n ces o r o u t o f the in te r p r e ta
tion o r a p p l ic a t io n o f [co llec t ive b a rg a in in g ] a g re e m e n ts . ’ ”
491 U.S. a t 303 . Q u o t in g B u r le y , th e C o u r t ex p la in e d
that a m in o r d isp u te “ re la tes e i th e r to the m e a n in g o r
p roper a p p l ic a t io n o f a p a r t i c u la r p ro v is io n . . . o r to an
om itted c a se ” in w h ich “ th e c la im is fo u n d e d u p o n so m e
incident o f th e e m p lo y m e n t re la t io n , o r a sse r ted one , in
dependen t o f th o se c o v e red b y th e co llec tive a g re e m e n t .”
Id . (e m p h a s is a d d e d ) .
T h is C o u r t ’s d ec is io n s a lso m a k e c lea r th a t if a d isp u te
is a m in o r d isp u te , th en R L A a rb i t r a t io n is the exclusive
remedy a n d re so r t to a ju d ic ia l f o r u m — in c lu d in g u n d e r
state law — is fo rec lo sed . T h is C o u r t h a s specif ically fo u n d
in the R L A “ a d en ia l o f p o w e r in a n y c o u r t—-s ta t e a s
w ell a s f e d e r a l — to in v a d e the ju r isd ic t io n co n fe r re d on
the A d ju s tm e n t B o a r d b y th e R a i lw a y L a b o r A c t .” S lo c u m
v. D e la w a r e , L . & IV. R .R . , 3 3 9 U .S . 2 3 9 . 2 4 4 ( 1 9 5 0 )
(em phas is a d d e d ) . A s the C o u r t held in P e n n s y lv a n ia
P -R . v. D a y , 3 6 0 U .S . a t 5 5 3 , “ n o t to re sp e c t the cen-
459
14
t ra l ize d d e te r m in a t io n of th e se q u e s t io n s th r o u g h the Ad
ju s tm e n t B o a rd w o u ld h a m p e r if n o t d e f e a t th e central
p u rp o s e o f th e R a i lw a y L a b o r A c t . ” A n d in A n d rew s
V. L o u is v i l l e & N a s h v il le R .R . , 4 0 6 U .S . 3 2 0 , 322
( 1 9 7 2 ) , th en -Ju s t ice R e h n q u is t , w r i t in g fo r a majority
o f the C o u r t , he ld th a t an e m p lo y e e c o u ld n o t b ring a
s ta te - law w ro n g fu l d isc h a rg e c la im in s ta te c o u r t because
th e ca se p re se n te d a m in o r d i s p u te : “ [T J h e n o t io n that
the g r iev a n ce a n d a rb i t r a t io n p ro c e d u re s p ro v id e d for
m in o r d isp u tes in the R a i lw a y L a b o r A c t a rc o p t io n a l , to
b e av a ile d of as the em p lo y ee o r th e c a r r i e r chooses , was
n ev e r go o d h is to ry a n d is no lo n g e r g o o d la w .” 12
D. A rb i t ra t io n of R e ta l ia to ry D isch a rg e Claims.
W ith re sp ec t to “ w h is t le b lo w e r” c la im s o f th e type at
issue in th is case , C o n g re s s h a s p as se d leg is la t ion con
firm ing its in te n t th a t these c la im s be re so lved solely by
R L A a rb i t r a to r s . T h e F e d e r a l R a i l r o a d S afe ty Act
( “F R S A ” ) , 45 U .S .C . § 431 c t s e q . , p ro v id e s th a t a rail
ro a d m a y n o t “ d isc h a rg e o r in a n y m a n n e r discriminate
a g a in s t” a n em p lo y ee w h o h as filed a c o m p la in t o r insti
tu te d a p ro c e e d in g re la ted to th e e n f o rc e m e n t of the
fe d e ra l r a i l ro a d sa fe ty law s ( o r w h o h a s o r is a b o u t to
tes t ify in such a p ro c e e d in g ) . 4 5 U .S .C . § 4 4 1 ( a ) . The
s ta tu te fu r th e r p ro v id es : “A n y d is p u te , g r i e v a n c e , o r claim
a r is in g u n d e r th is s e c t io n s h a l l b e s u b je c t to r e so lu t io n in
a c c o r d a n c e w ith th e p r o c e d u r e s s e t f o r t h in s e c t io n 153
o f th is t it le [ i .e . , th e R L A g r ie v a n c e a r b i t r a t io n process],”
Id . § 4 4 1 ( c ) ( e m p h a s is a d d e d ) . T h e leg is la t ive history
con f irm s th a t th is l a n g u a g e w a s in te n d e d to foreclose
rem ed ies o th e r th a n R L A a r b i t r a t io n .12 T h e N R A B and
12 The sweep of the Andrews decision is evident from the dis
sent of Justice Douglas, who recognized (and criticized) the ma
jority holding that “Congress has vested the Board with jurisdic
tion to entertain nonreinstatement grievances such as Andrews
complaint.” Id. at 331-32 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
w See H.R. Rep. No. 1025, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1980), re
printed in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3830, 3832 ( “The protections pro
vided . . . would he enforced solely through the existing grievance
procedures provided for in Section 3 of the Railway Labor Act,
460
15
other R L A a d ju s tm e n t b o a r d s h a v e h a n d le d m a n y c la im s
alleging p rec ise ly the so r t o f r e ta l ia to ry d is c h a rg e c la im s
advanced in th is c a s e .* 14
T h e F R S A d id n o t a d d to th e s c o p e o f th e d isp u te s
subject to th e R L A 's m a n d a to r y p ro cesses . R a th e r , the
legislative h is to ry of the F R S A co n f irm s th a t C o n g ress
believed th a t r e ta l ia to ry d i s c h a rg e c la im s w e re a lre a d y
included in th e m a n d a to r y R L A a r b i t r a t io n f r a m e w o rk
as it ex is ted p r io r to e n a c tm e n t o f th e F R S A . T h e H o u se
C om m ittee R e p o r t s ta te d th a t
“ rail em p lo y ee s a l r e a d y rece ive s im ila r p ro te c t io n ,
a lo n g w ith b a c k p a y , th ro u g h th e g r ie v a n c e p ro c e d u re .
T h e C o m m it t e e d o e s n o t in te n d to a l t e r th e ex is t in g
p r o t e c t io n , h u t r a t h e r to p u t th e p r o h ib i t io n o f d is
c r im in a t io n in to s t a tu to r y f o r m .” H .R . R e p . N o .
1025 , 9 6 th C o n g . , 2 d Sess. 16 ( 1 9 8 0 ) , r e p r in t e d in
1 9 8 0 U .S .C .C .A .N . 3 8 3 0 , 3 8 4 0 (e m p h a s is a d d e d ) .
including the Adjustment Board, its divisions, and the ‘Public Law
Boards’.” ) ; id. at 3841 (‘‘The Committee intends this to be the
exclusive means for enforcing this section.” ).
14 Public Law Board No. 3399, Award No. 4 (Mar. 11, 1985), at
6 (upholding grievance because suspension from service was “trans
parently retaliatory”) ; NRAB F irst Division Award No. 24059
(Feb. 6, 1991), at 1-2 (addressing claim that employee was dis
charged in retaliation for “comment and complaint of violations of
safe operating procedures” ) ; NRAB Second Division Award No.
12148 (Sept. 25, 1991), at 2 (addressing grievance that railroad
had discharged employee in retaliation “for his having spoken to
reporters on matters of public safety and concern” following dis
missal of retaliatory discharge state-law tort suit) ; see also NRAB
Third Division Award No. 27505 (Sept. 22, 1988) (addressing
claim that employee “was constructively discharged when he was
unwilling to perform allegedly felonious acts” ) ; Public Law Board
No. 4269, Award No. 300 (Sept. 25, 1990), a t 1, 6 (addressing claim
of harassment in retaliation “for reporting unsafe conditions and
practices” ) ; NRAB Third Division Award No. 28725 (Mar. 28,
1991), at 1, 9-10 (addressing grievance that employees had been
subjected to discipline and harassment in retaliation for testimony
to Federal Railroad Administration concerning safety matters) ;
NRAB Third Division Award No. 23151 (Jan. 30, 1981), at 1, 6-7
(addressing grievance that employee had been dismissed in retalia
tion for "disloyalty” to the railroad).
461
S e n a to r C a n n o n su m m a r iz e d th e S e n a te C o m m it te e ’s
v iew s:
“T h e S e n a te c o m m it te e reco g n izes th a t u n d e r cur
re n t law ra il em p lo y ee s . . . c a n see k s im ila r p ro tec
t io n th ro u g h n o rm a l g r iev a n ce p ro c e d u re s established
u n d e r se c t io n 3 o f the R a i lw a y L a b o r A c t. Thi;
su b sec tio n is in te n d e d to co d ify th e protec tion
g ra n te d p u r s u a n t to those p ro c e d u re s b y the law
b o a rd s a n d p an e ls . It is im p o r t a n t to n o te in this
r e g a rd th a t a n y g r iev a n ce u n d e r th is sec t io n is sub
jec t to the p ro c e d u re s set fo r th in sec t io n 3 of the
R a i lw a y L a b o r A c t . ” 126 C o n g . R ec . S I 3 3 3 7 (daily
ed. Sept. 2 4 , 1 9 8 0 ) ( s t a t e m e n t o f Sen. C a n n o n ) .
I n sh o rt , C o n g re s s re co g n ized th a t “ w h is t le b lo w e r” claims
w e re s q u a re ly w ith in th e a m b i t o f m a n d a to r y R L A arbi
t r a t io n b e fo re p assa g e of th e F R S A . ir’ T h is ac know ledge
m e n t is e sp ec ia l ly s ign if ican t b e c a u s e it d e m o n s t r a te s that
w h is t le b lo w e r” c la im s in the a ir l in e in d u s t ry , which is
n o t su b je c t to the F R S A , a lso fall w ith in th e scope of
m a n d a to r y R L A a rb i t ra t io n .
A s the F o u r t h C irc u i t h a s held , C o n g re s s ’s express
p ro v is io n o f an exc lus ive a rb i t ra l r e m e d y fo r th ese types
o f r e ta l ia to ry d isc h a rg e a n d d isc ip l in e c la im s leaves no
ro o m for s ta te - la w to r t su its b a se d th e re o n . R a x n e r v.
S m ir l, 8 7 3 F .2 d 6 0 , 6 4 -6 6 (4 th C i r . ) , c e r t , d e n ie d , 493
U .S . 8 7 6 ( 1 9 8 9 ) . T h e F o u r th C i r c u i t ’s d ec is ion exhibits
sens i t iv ity to th e c o n c e rn s of ex p e r t ise a n d u n ifo rm reso
lu t io n th a t led C o n g re s s to re fe r m in o r d isp u te s to arbi
t r a t io n in th e first in s tan ce :
‘/ [ A ] c la im of w ro n g fu l d is c h a rg e fo r ‘w his t leb low ing’
is in ex t r ica b ly t ied to the q u e s t io n o f p rec ise ly what
16
1,1 Congress s understanding was clearly correct; thus, long be
fore the FRSA was passed the Fifth Circuit had held that em
ployees claiming that the carrier had failed to accord them safe
working conditions must “submit their grievances in that regard
to the National Railway Adjustment Board for adjustment,” even
if the collective agreement was silent on the matter. Missouri-
K.-T. R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 312 F 2d 298, 300
(5th Cir. 1965).
452
1 7
. . . sa fe ty p ra c t ic e s h e w as b lo w in g th e w h is t le on .
T o th e e x ten t th a t th e ju s t if iab le n a tu r e o f the w h is
t leb lo w in g en te r s th e c a lc u lu s in w ro n g fu l d i s c h a rg e
ac t io n s , . . . s a fe ty law s m ig h t b e s u b je c t to an
u n p re d ic ta b le m ed ley o f ju ry d e te rm in a t io n s , w h ic h
C o n g ress , in its q u es t fo r n a t io n a l u n i fo rm i ty . . .
so u g h t to a v o id .” R a y n e r , 8 7 3 F .2 d at 66 .
A pplying th a t logic to th is case w o u ld re q u i r e reversa l o f
the H a w a i i S u p re m e C o u r t ’s dec is ion .
II. T H E H A W A II S U P R E M E C O U R T ’S P R E E M P T IO N
R U L E L A C K S F O U N D A T IO N E I T H E R IN T H E
R L A OR T H IS C O U R T 'S P R E C E D E N T S A N D
W O U LD C O N T R A V E N E T H E R L A ’S P O L IC IE S .
A. T he H aw aii S u p rem e C o u r t M isread Conrail .
T h e H a w a i i S u p re m e C o u r t fu lly u n d e r s to o d th a t
“fm ja n d a to r y a rb i t r a t io n is th e exc lus ive re m e d y fo r
claims a r is in g f ro m m in o r d isp u te s .” P et . A p p . 12a. F o r
the H a w a i i S u p re m e C o u r t , the c ru c ia l q u es t io n w as
“w hether N o r r i s ’ c la im s m a y b e d e e m e d ‘m in o r , ’ th e re b y
p reem pting his s ta te to r t a c t io n a n d re q u ir in g h im to
submit to m a n d a to r y a r b i t r a t io n p u r s u a n t to th e R L A . ”
Id. T h e C o u r t c o n c lu d e d th a t r e s p o n d e n t ’s r e ta l ia to ry
discharge c la im is n o t a m in o r d isp u te , a n d th u s n o t
p reem pted b y the R L A , b e c a u s e it “ is n o t d e p e n d e n t on
an in te rp re ta t io n of [ the co llec tive b a r g a in in g a g re e
m ent] .” Pet. A p p . 14a, 2 0 a . T h e so le s u p p o r t fo r th a t
holding w as the H aw aii S u p re m e C o u r t 's re a d in g of th is
C ourt’s d ec is io n in C o n r a i l as h o ld in g th a t “ ‘m in o r ’ d is
putes, to w hich § 153 F ir s t ( i ) app lies , a re those th a t
‘may b e co n c lus ive ly re so lved b y in te rp re t in g the ex is t ing
[collective b a rg a in in g ] a g r e e m e n t . ’ ” P et . A p p . 14a ( q u o t
ing C o m a i l , 491 U .S . a t ^ O S ) . 3"
T h e H a w a ii S u p re m e C o u r t c o r re c t ly q u o te d , b u t
plainly m is u n d e rs to o d , th is C o u r t ’s h o ld in g in C o n r a i l .
10 The Hawaii Supreme Court conceded that the statutory term
"grievances” could be read to sweep more broadly, but concluded
that this Court had “clearly determined otherwise in” Conrail.
Pet. App. 14a.
453
18
T h a t c a se w a s n o t c o n c e rn e d w i th R L A p re e m p t io n of
s ta te law . R a th e r , th e C o u r t ’s p u r p o s e in C o n r a i l was to
“a r t ic u la te f ] an ex p l ic i t s t a n d a r d for d i f fe ren t ia t in g be
tw een m a jo r a n d m in o r d is p u te s ,” 491 U .S . a t 302, a
d is t in c t io n t h a t is im p o r t a n t b e c a u s e the R L A provides
fo r en t i re ly d if fe ren t p ro c e d u re s d e p e n d in g o n w he the r a
d isp u te is m a jo r o r m in o r . Sec p. 6, s u p r a . T h e problem
fa ced b y th e C o u r t in C o m a i l w as th a t o f te n a carrier
w o u ld in t ro d u c e a p ra c t ic e c la im in g a c o n t r a c tu a l right
to ta k e th a t a c t io n ; co n v e rse ly , the u n io n w o u ld assert
th a t th e c a r r i e r w as in fa c t u n i la te ra l ly c h a n g in g an exist
in g ag re e m e n t , th e re b y c r e a t in g a m a jo r d isp u te . See 491
U.S. a t 3 0 2 . W r i t in g fo r the m a jo r i ty in C o m a i l , Justice
B la c k m u n re so lv ed th a t in te rn a l R L A issue as follows:
“ W h e r e a n e m p lo y e r a s s e r t s a c o n t r a c t u a l r ig h t to
ta k e th e c o n te s te d a c t io n , th e e n su in g d isp u te is minor
if th e a c t io n is a r g u a b ly jus t if ied by th e te rm s of the
p a r t ie s ’ co l lec t iv e -b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t . W here , in
c o n tra s t , th e e m p lo y e r ’s c la im s a re f r iv o lo u s o r obvi
o us ly in s u b s ta n t ia l , th e d isp u te is m a jo r . ” 491 U.S.
a t 3 0 7 ( e m p h a s is a d d e d ) .
T h e re fo re , th e a b o v e -q u o te d l a n g u a g e re lied up o n by
th e H a w a i i S u p re m e C o u r t a p p e a r e d in th e co n tex t of
ad d re s s in g th e R L A ’s in te rn a l m a j o r 'm i n o r d isp u te dis
t in c t io n w h e re a c a r r i e r c la im s c o n t r a c tu a l justification.
R a th e r th a n to u c h in g a t all o n th e R L A ’s re a c h with
re sp ec t to o th e r b o d ie s o f law , th a t l a n g u a g e simply
b u t t re s se d th is C o u r t ’s su b s id ia ry co n c lu s io n th a t “the
fo rm a l d e m a r c a t io n b e tw e e n m a jo r a n d m in o r disputes
does no t t u r n o n a case-by-case d e te r m in a t io n o f the
im p o r ta n c e o f th e issue p re s e n te d o r the l ik e l ihood that
i t w o u ld p r o m p t th e ex e rc ise o f e c o n o m ic se lf-help .” 491
U .S . a t 3 0 5 . T h u s , th e C o u r t w e n t o n to as se r t th a t “the
l ine d ra w n in B u r le y [b e tw een m a jo r a n d m in o r disputes]
looks to w h e th e r a c la im h as b e e n m a d e th a t th e terms
o f an ex is t in g a g r e e m e n t e i th e r e s tab l ish o r re fu te the
p re se n c e o f a r ig h t to ta k e th e d isp u te d a c t io n ,” and
th u s th a t “ [ t j h e d is t in g u ish in g f e a tu re o f s u c h a c a se is
464
19
that the d is p u te m a y b e co n c lu s iv e ly re so lv ed by in te r
preting th e ex is t in g a g r e e m e n t .” Id . ( e m p h a s is a d d e d ) . 17
A lth o u g h C o n r a i l fo cu sed o n the R L A ’s in te rn a l m a j o r /
minor d i s t in c t io n w h e re a p a r ty re lies o n th e c o n t ra c t ,
that case w as f a r f ro m silen t w ith re sp ec t to the genera!
scope o f the R L A ’s m a n d a to r y a rb i t r a t io n p rov is ions .
The p o r t io n s o f J u s t ic e B la c k m u n ’s o p in io n re la t in g to
that issue d e m o n s t r a te the C o u r t ’s in te n t io n to p r e s e r v e
rather th a n re s tr ic t C o n g re s s ’s b r o a d s t a tu to ry co v e ra g e
of d ispu tes “g ro w in g o u t o f g r ie v a n c e s” as well a s those
involving “ in te rp re ta t io n o r a p p l ic a t io n of co llec tive b a r
gaining a g r e e m e n ts .” In p a r t ic u la r , C o n r a i l expressly-
recognized a n d q u o te d B u r le y ’s lo n g -s ta n d in g e x p la n a t io n
that R L A m in o r d isp u te s in c lu d e an “ o m it te d c a s e ”
“founded u p o n so m e in c id e n t o f th e e m p lo y m e n t r e la
tion . . . in d e p e n d e n t o f th o se c o v e red b y th e co llec tive
ag reem en t.” 491 U.S. 303 (q u o t in g B u r le y , 325 U.S. a t
7 2 3 ) .18
T h e re is fu r th e r in d ic a t io n in C o n r a i l th a t th is C o u r t
did no t in te n d to c u t b a c k on the s c o p e o f the R L A ’s
17 A test for distinguishing between major and minor disputes
is not useful to determine whether an individual grievance is a
minor dispute. As noted above, minor disputes are subject to
arbitration, while major disputes involve a lengthy process of
collective bargaining and mediation between the union and the
carrier. Because major disputes are essentially collective in nature
and call for collective resolution, individual grievances of the type
at issue here are not susceptible of characterization as major
disputes. Because the grievance here was clearly not “major,”
there was no point in applying the C o n r a i l test for distinguishing
between “major” and “minor” disputes in this case.
ls In D a n ie ls V. B u r l i n g t o n N . R .R . , 916 F.2d 568, 572 (9th
Cir. 1990), v a c a te d v p o n s e t t l e m e n t , 962 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1992),
the Ninth Circuit quoted this language in C o n r a i l to r e j e c t an
argument that an employment dispute was “not a ‘grievance’ under
the RLA” because it did not “involve or arise out of the application
or interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement.” See also
V erd o n v. C o n s o l id a te d R a i l C o rp ., 828 F. Supp. 1129, 1136
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (quoting C o n r a i l and finding employee’s claim
was a minor dispute because it was “ ‘founded upon’ . . . an ‘inci
dent. of the employment relation’ ” ).
465
2 0
co v e rag e . Im m e d ia te ly fo l lo w in g th e la n g u a g e u p o n which
th e H a w a i i S u p re m e C o u r t re lied , th is C o u r t suggested
th a t a r e a d e r “See G a r r i s o n , T h e N a t io n a l R a i l ro a d Ad
ju s tm e n t B o a rd : A U n iq u e A d m in i s t r a t iv e A g e n c y 46
Y a le L .J . 5 6 7 , 5 6 8 , 5 7 6 ( 1 9 3 7 ) . ” 491 U .S . a t 305.
D e a n G a r r i s o n m a d e c le a r in t h a t a r t ic le t h a t “ [q u e s t io n s
o f d isc ip l ine o r re fu sa l to p ro m o te (c o n s t i tu t in g ‘griev
a n c e s ’) a re re v ie w a b le b y the B o a rd . . . .” 4 6 Y a le L.J.
a t 5 8 6 . T h u s , a t an ea r ly p o in t fo l lo w in g th e creation
o f th e N R A B in 19 3 4 he c o n s id e re d d isc ip l ine ( a n d pro
m o t io n ca se s ) as th o se th a t m a y g ive rise to the juris
d ic t io n o f the N R A B u n d e r the c a te g o ry o f “grievances,”
r a th e r th a n u n d e r th e c a te g o ry a r is in g o u t o f th e inter
p re ta t io n o r a p p l ic a t io n o f a g r e e m e n ts .10 A s we have
sh o w n ab o v e , th e leg is la t ive h is to ry o f th e R L A is in
sq u a re a c c o rd w i th th is r e a d in g o f C o m a i l . See pp. 9-12,
su p ra ™ * 20
10 See also F irst Annual Report of the National Mediation Board
40 (1935) (Adjustment Board had adjudicated 15 cases of "com
plaints of improper discipline”).
20 ^ e note that even if the Conrail language relied upon by the
Hawaii Supreme Court were applicable in the preemption context,
the dispute in this case would still qualify for preemption because
it is one that “may be conclusively resolved by interpreting the
existing agreement.” 491 U.S. at 305 (emphasis added). That is
so, among other reasons, because Article XVII of the agreement
in this case prohibits disciplinary action for "refusal to perform
work which is in violation of established health and safety rules, or
any local, state or federal health and safety law.” Pet. App. 60a-
61a. An RLA arbitrator’s interpretation of that provision "may
. . . conclusively resolve” the dispute in this case because it could
result in a finding that Norris was or was not disciplined in re
taliation for reporting a safety violation. The Hawaii Supreme
Courts conclusion that Article XVII did not apply to.Norris’ dis
pute, oh the ground that the provision related to the safety of the
workplace rather than the safety of the public, Pet. App. 20a, was
itself an impermissible judicial interpretation of the collective
agreement.
466
21
B. T he H a w a i i S u p re m e C o u r t’s M is rea d in g of C o n r a i l
U n d e rm in e s i ts A n a lo g y to L in g le .
As we h a v e ju s t sh o w n , th e H a w a ii S u p re m e C o u r t
misread C o n r a i l as re s tr ic t in g the c a te g o ry o f m in o r d is
putes— a n d th u s the c o v e ra g e o f the R L A m a n d a to r y
arbitration p ro v is io n s— to d is p u te s w h ich c a n b e “c o n c lu
sively re so lved b y in te rp re t in g th e ex is t ing [co llec t iv e b a r
gaining] a g r e e m e n t .” P e t . A p p . 14a. B ased o n th is m is
reading of C o n r a i l , th e H a w a i i S u p re m e C o u r t th o u g h t
that the sco p e o f th e d e f in i t io n o f a m in o r d is p u te — a n d
thus of m a n d a to r y a n d exc lus ive R L A a r b i t r a t io n — w as
“virtually in d is t in g u is h a b le ” f ro m the ru le set fo r th in
L ingle V. N o r g e D iv is io n o f M a g ic C h e f , In c . , 4 8 6 U .S .
399 ( 1 9 8 8 ) . L in g le h e ld t h a t s ta te law to r t c la im s are
not p re e m p te d b y se c t io n 301 o f th e L a b o r M a n a g e m e n t
Relations A c t ( “ L M R A ” ) , 2 9 U .S .C . §§ 141 -1 8 8 , un less
an elem ent o f the c la im “ re q u ire s a c o u r t to in te rp re t [a]
term of a c o l le c t iv e -b a rg a in in g a g r e e m e n t .” P e t . A p p .
16a ( q u o t in g L in g le , 4 8 6 U .S . a t 4 0 7 ) . T h u s , w hile
acknow ledging th a t “ all p a ra l le ls b e tw e en th e R L A a n d
the L M R A m u s t be d r a w n ‘w i th u tm o s t c a r e , ’ ” P e t . A p p .
14a (q u o t in g C h ic a g o & N .W . R v . v. U n ited T r a n s p .
Union, 4 0 2 U.S. 5 7 0 , 5 7 9 n . l l ' ( 1 9 7 1 ) ) , the H a w a ii
Supreme C o u r t h e ld th a t “C o n g re s s in te n d e d the m a n d a
tory a rb i t r a t io n p ro v is io n o f th e R L A b e con f ined to the
same limits the S u p re m e C o u r t ap p l ied to the L M R A in
Lingle." P e t . A p p . 17a.
As we hav e s h o w n ab o v e , h o w e v e r , the ru le u n d e r the
RLA is th a t th e c a te g o ry of m in o r d i s p u te s su b jec t to
m andato ry a r b i t r a t io n in c lu d es d isp u te s “g ro w in g o u t o f
grievances” a b o u t the e m p lo y m e n t r e la t io n sh ip in a d d i
tion to d isp u te s a b o u t i n te rp re ta t io n o f co llec tive b a r
gaining ag re e m e n ts . T h is ru le is n o t “ v ir tu a l ly in d is t in
guishable” f ro m th e ru le in L in g le , as. th e H a w a i i S u
preme C o u r t h e ld ; on th e c o n t ra ry , it d iffers f ro m the
rule in § 301 a r b i t r a t io n cases' w ith re sp ec t to p rec ise ly
those lim its on th e sco p e o f § 301 a r b i t r a t io n on w h ich
L ingle w as p re d ic a te d . T h u s th e re is n o so u n d bas is fo r
467
2 2
th e H a w a i i S u p re m e C o u r t ’s log ic th a t L in g le app lies be
c a u s e C o n r a i l ca lls fo r e s se n tia l ly th e s a m e ru le .21
In fac t , th e re are m a jo r d iffe rences b e tw e e n the RLA
a n d th e L M R A th a t m a n d a t e b r o a d e r p re e m p t io n under
th e R L A th a n th e L in g le ru le p ro v id e s u n d e r the LM RA.
T h e N a t io n a l L a b o r R e la t io n s A c t , as a m e n d e d and
su p p le m e n te d by the L M R A , d o es no t p ro v id e for or
re q u ir e a r b i t r a t io n o f a n y d isp u te s . It d o es s ta te that
“ [ f j in a l a d ju s tm e n t by a m e th o d ag re e d u p o n by the
p a r t ie s is d e c la re d to b e the d e s i r a b l e m e t h o d f o r settle
m e n t o f g r ie v a n c e d is p u te s a r is in g o v e r th e a p p lica tio n
o r in t e r p r e t a t io n o f a n ex is t in g c o l l e c t iv e - b a r g a in in g ag ree
m e n t .” 2 9 U .S .C . § 1 7 3 ( d ) ( e m p h a s is a d d e d ) . Also,
sec tion 301 gives d is t r ic t c o u r ts ju r is d ic t io n o v e r “ [sjuits
fo r v io la t io n o f c o n t r a c t s b e tw e e n an e m p lo y e r and a
la b o r o r g a n iz a t io n ,” 2 9 U .S .C . § 1 8 5 ( a ) (emphasis
a d d e d ) , a n d th u s to e n fo rc e a g r e e m e n ts to a r b i t r a t e such
d isp u tes .22 T h a t m ere e n d o r s e m e n t o r e n c o u ra g e m e n t of
a rb i t r a t io n w a s he ld in L in g le to be suffic ient to preempt
s ta te to r t law th a t in t ru d e s u p o n its scope as so restricted.
4 8 6 U .S . a t 4 1 1 .
I n c o n t r a s t w ith the L M R A , a r b i t r a t io n is n o t merely a
“d es i ra b le m e th o d ” for re so lv in g d isp u te s u n d e r the RLA;
in s tead , i t is m a n d a t e d by C o n g re s s . A c c o rd in g ly , this
C o u r t h a s r e c o g n iz e d th a t “ th e ca se fo r ins is t ing o n resort
to [ R L A a r b i t r a t io n ] re m e d ie s is if a n y th in g s tronger in
ca ses a r is in g u n d e r th e [ R L A ] th a n it is in cases arising
u n d e r § 301 o f th e L M R A . ” A n d r e w s , 4 0 6 U .S . a t 323.
M o re o v e r , u n l ik e th e L M R A , th e R L A ’s m a n d a to r y arbi-
21 Even if the Hawaii Supreme Court’s interpretation of Conrail
were to apply in the preemption context, that standard is not
“virtually indistinguishable’’ from Lingle. We have shown that
the dispute in this case “may be conclusively resolved by inter
pretation of the existing agreement,” see note 20, supra, even if
a similar dispute in Lingle was held not to have “requirefd] a court
to interpret [a] term of a collective-bargaining agreement.”
22 See, r.g'., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220
(1985); United Steehenrkers of America v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (I960).
468
23
tration e x te n d s to d isp u te s “g ro w in g o u t o f g r ie v a n c e s ” in
addition to d isp u te s o v e r i n te rp re ta t io n o r a p p l ic a t io n o f
agreements. See pp . 6-8, s u p r a .* 3
In l igh t o f th ese d iffe rences in th e s t a tu to ry l a n g u a g e
and p u rp o se s , the F o u r th , S ix th , S ev en th , a n d N in th C i r
cuits h av e re fu sed to im p o r t th e ru le in L in g le i n to th e
RLA co n tex t . U n d e r w o o d v. V e n a n g o R iv e r C o r p . , 9 9 5
F.2d 6 7 7 , 6 8 2 ( 7 th C ir . 1 9 9 3 ) ( h o ld in g th a t “ [ t jh e
Supreme C o u r t ’s dec is io n s in L in g le a n d A n d r e w s s u p p o r t
the pos i t ion th a t p re e m p t io n u n d e r th e R L A is b r o a d e r
than p re e m p t io n u n d e r the L M R A ” ) ; L o r e n z v. C S X
T ransp., In c . , 9 8 0 F .2 d 2 6 3 , 2 6 8 (4 th C ir . 1 9 9 2 ) ( c o n
trasting sco p e o f d isp u te s su b je c t to a r b i t r a t io n u n d e r
RLA a n d N L R A ) ; G r o t e v . T r a n s W o r ld A ir l in e s , I n c . ,
905 F .2 d 1307 , 1309 ( 9 t h C ir . 1 9 9 0 ) ( “T h e p re e m p t io n
created u n d e r th e R L A a n d th a t a r is in g u n d e r § 301 of
the L M R A a re no t a n a lo g o u s .” ) ; S m o la r e k v. C h r y s le r
C orp ., 8 7 9 F .2 d 1 3 2 6 , 133 4 -3 5 n .4 ( 6 t h C i r . ) (c i t in g
with a p p ro v a l a p r e - L in g l e R L A p re e m p t io n ca se a p p ly in g
different s t a n d a r d ) , c e r t , d e n ie d , 4 9 3 U .S . 9 9 2 ( 1 9 8 9 ) ;
see C a lv e r t v. T r a n s W o r ld A ir l in e s , I n c . , 9 5 9 F .2 d 6 9 8 ,
700 (8 th C ir . 1 9 9 2 ) ( r e fu s in g to an a lo g iz e f ro m “o u t
rageous c o n d u c t" ex c ep t io n to L M R A p r e e m p t io n ) . * 24 In
2:1 The Solicitor General's amicus brief in support of certiorari
recognizes (at 15) that Lingle does not apply under the RLA, but
deems the Lingle analysis “instructive” on the question of how to
“accommodate the federal interest in uniform interpretation of
collective bargaining agreements and the legitimate interest of the
States in adopting standards of conduct for employers subject to
their police power.” However, the “accommodation” reached in
Lingle, i.e., that disputes are preempted when they require inter
pretation of agreements, is inconsistent with the language and
policies of the RLA, where Congress mandated arbitration for a
wider variety of disputes than those for which it suggested arbitra
tion under the LMRA—only those involving contract interpretation.
24 The Second and Third Circuits have suggested that RLA pre
emption might be broader but have not had occasion to decide
whether it must be so in this particular context. Pennsylvania
ted'n of Bhd. of Maintenance, of Way Employees v. Amtrak, 989
L2d 112, nr> n.7 (3d Cir.) (applying Lingle to find preemption
469
2 4
o th e r cases as w ell, th e a p p e l la te c o u r ts h a v e re ferred to
d iffe rences in th e p u rp o se s o f th e s ta tu te s to find the
R L A ’s s co p e b r o a d e r .25
but observing RLA may be broader), cert, denied, 114 S. Ct. 85
(1993) ; Baylis v, Marriott Corp., 90G F.2d 874, 878 (2d Cir.
1990) , citing with approval Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney Air
craft Viv., 814 F.2d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 1987) (“RLA likely han
greater preemptive reach than LMRA”), cert, denied, 486 U.S.
1054 (1988). The F irst Circuit has found preemption using an
analysis similar to Lingle, but added that “to allow state law claims
arising out of the employment relation” to be brought in court
would “undermine the scheme for labor dispute resolution” and the
“purposes behind the RLA.” O'Brien V. Consolidated Rail Corp.,
972 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1992) (emphasis added), cert, denied, 113
S. Ct. 980 (1993). The two federal circuits that have rejected
RLA preemption using the Lingle analysis did so based on the
narrow reading of Conrail discussed above, from which they con
cluded, like the Hawaii Supreme Court, that the RLA’s coverage
is no different from the coverage of the LMRA and the preemption
analysis is therefore the same. Anderson v. American Airlines,
Inc., 2 F.3d 590, 595-96 (5th Cir. 1993) ; Davies V. American Air
lines, Inc., 971 F.2d 463, 468 (10th Cir. 1992), cert, denied, 113
S. Ct. 2439 (1993) ; see also Maher V, New Jersey Transit Rail
Operations, Inc.. 593 A.2d 750 (N.J. 1991) ; IAM V. Allegis Corp.,
545 N.Y.S.2d 638 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (applying Lingle to RLA).
2r> See, e.g.. Jackson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 717 F.2d 1045,
1052 (7th Cir. 1983) (“It follows . . . that a state claim is more
likely to impinge on an area of exclusive administrative jurisdiction
under the RLA than under the NLRA.” ), cert, denied. 465 U.S.
1007 (1984) ; Hubbard v. United Air Lines, 927 F.2d 1094 (9th
Cir. 1991) (preemption broader under RLA) ; Peterson V. Air
Line Pilots Ass’n, 759 F.2d 1161, 1169 (4th Cir.) (“Unlike pre
emption under the NLRA, the preemption of state law claims under
the RLA has been more complete.” ), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 946
(1985) ; Gonzalez V. Prestress Eng’g Corp., 503 N,E.2d 308, 313
(111. 1986) (case denying preemption under RLA was “clearly
inapposite” to section 301 analysis), cert, denied, 483 U.S. 1032
(1987) ; Brown v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 720 S.W.2d 357, 359 n.5
(Mo. 1986) (en banc) (NLRA "is much less impacting than”
RLA), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1049 (1987). But see, e.g., Sabich V.
National R.R. Passenger Corp., 763 F. Supp. 989, 992-93 (N.D. IF
1991) (holding Lingle standard applied in RLA context) ; Elliott
V. Consolidated Rail Corp., 732 F. Supp. 954, 957 (N.D. Ind. 1990)
(applying Lingle-type analysis in RLA context without addressing
differences between RLA and LMRA).
470
2 5
C. The Additional Cases Cited by the Solicitor Gen
eral Do Not Support Narrow Preemption Under
Conrail/Lingle.
In his a m ic u s b r ie f s u p p o r t in g c e r t i o r a r i ( a t 1 2 ) , th e
Solicitor G e n e ra l a d v a n c e s an a r g u m e n t n o t m a d e in th e
Hawaii S u p re m e C o u r t ’s o p in io n — th a t fa i lu re to l im it
the co v e rag e o f the R L A ’s m a n d a to r y a r b i t r a t io n p ro v i
sions w o u ld re su l t in “ a n u n d u ly b r o a d p re e m p t io n of
state to r t law , in c o n t r a v e n t io n o f th is C o u r t ’s p re c e d e n ts .”
We observe , as an in i t ia l m a t t e r , th a t in th e p re e m p t io n
inquiry “ [ t ]h e p u rp o s e o f C o n g re s s is th e u l t im a te to u c h
stone,” R e t a i l C l e r k s h it ' l A s s ’n , L o c a l 1 6 2 5 v . S c h e r m c r -
horn, 3 7 5 U .S . 9 6 , 103 ( 1 9 6 3 ) , n o t w h a t th e im p a c t o f
Congress’s in te n d e d p re e m p t io n will be. If C o n g re s s
intended th e c o v e ra g e o f th e R L A 's m a n d a to r y a r b i t r a
tion p ro v is io n s to re a c h b r o a d ly ( a s s h o w n ab o v e , pp .
6-17, s u p r a ) , t h a t in te n t io n is n o t a l te re d b y an E x e c u
tive B ra n c h v a lu e ju d g m e n t th a t the re su l t in g p re e m p t io n
of state law is “ u n d u e .”
Indeed, th e p r e e m p t io n o f s ta te law th a t w o u ld re su lt
from g iv ing effect to C o n g re s s ’s in te n t to e n c o m p a s s d is
putes “g ro w in g o u t o f g r ie v a n c e s ” w ith in th e R L A ’s
m andatory p ro c esse s w o u ld n o t b e “ u n d u e .” A f te r all,
Lingle a n d its p ro g e n y p ro v id e a s t ro n g ru le o f p re e m p
tion of s ta te - la w to r t c la im s in v o lv in g in te rp re ta t io n of
agreements, w h ich is th e l im it o f th e L M R A ’s s ta tu to ry
reach. 4 8 6 U .S . a t 411 ( s u c h c la im s a re “ firm ly in th e
arbitral r e a lm ” ) . 20 I t s h o u ld n o t b e s u rp r i s in g th a t C o n - 28
28 Lower courts following Lingle have held any number of state
tort claims preempted by the NLRA. See, e.rj., Mock v. T.G. & Y.
Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522, 530 (10th Cir. 1992) (claims for inten
tional infliction, fraud, invasion of privacy, defamation, false im
prisonment, and conversion arising out of discipline investigation
preempted because ‘‘[a]n analysis of whether T.G. & Y. acted
Properly or not will inevitably require an analysis of what the CBA
permitted”) ; McCormick V. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 934 F.2d 531,
537 (4th Cir. 1991) (claims for intentional infliction, conversion,
and negligence preempted because “ [m]anagement simply could
not have acted negligently or wrongfully if it acted in a manner
contemplated by the collective bargaining agreement”), serf, denied,
471
2 6
gress in te n d e d a b r o a d e r sco p e o f p r e e m p t io n in th e rail
r o a d ( a n d a i r l in e ) in d u s tr ie s , w h e re a “ la s t in g h is to ry of
p e rv a s iv e a n d u n iq u e ly - ta i lo re d c o n g re s s io n a l a c t io n in
d ica te s C o n g re s s ’s g e n e ra l in te n t th a t [ th ey ] sh o u ld be
r e g u la te d p r im a r i ly o n a n a t io n a l level th ro u g h an inte
g r a te d n e tw o r k of f e d e ra l l a w .” R .J . C o r m a n R .R . v.
P a lm o r e , 9 9 9 F .2 d 149, 152 ( 6 th C ir . 1 9 9 3 ) ; see U nited
T r a n s p . U n io n v. L o n g I s la n d R .R . , 4 5 5 U .S . 6 7 8 , 687
( 1 9 8 2 ) ( n o t in g th a t “ [ r ] a i l ro a d s h a v e b e e n su b jec t to
c o m p re h e n s iv e fe d e ra l re g u la t io n fo r n ea r ly a c e n tu r y ” ) .27
T h e p re e m p t io n o f s t a t e law a t issue h e re w o u ld not,
as th e S o lic i to r G e n e ra l says ( a t 1 2 ) , “c o n t r a v e n [e ] . . .
th is C o u r t ’s p r e c e d e n ts .” T h e S o lic i to r G e n e ra l mainly
re lies on C o lo r a d o A n t i-D is c r im in a t io n C o m m is s io n v.
C o n t in e n ta l A ir L in e s , 3 7 2 U .S . 7 1 4 , 7 2 4 ( 1 9 6 3 ) , in
w h ic h th is C o u r t h e ld t h a t n o th in g in fe d e ra l law , in
c lu d in g th e R L A , p re e m p te d e n f o rc e m e n t o f a s ta te law
fo rb id d in g d is c r im in a t io n in h ir ing . T h e C o u r t d id not
d iscuss p re e m p t io n b y re a so n o f a rb i t r a l ju r isd ic i to n over * 111
112 S. Ct. 912 (1992) ; Jackson V. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 863 F.2d
111, 119 (1st Cir. 1988) (statutory invasion of privacy claims
could only be resolved by deciding whether the employer's conduct
was ‘reasonable’ under the labor contract” ), cert, denied, 490 U.S.
1107 (1989).
"7 lh e Solicitor General overstates the likely preemptive effect
of including employment-related “grievances” within the RLA's
scope, in addition to disputes over interpretation or application of
collective agreements. Because collective labor agreements include
implied agreements from past practices, as the Solicitor General
acknowledges fat 12 n.9), most RLA minor disputes do involve
application or interpretation” of implied, if not express, agree
ment terms. See note 5, supra. Such disputes would be preempted
even if the Lingle standard were applied in the RLA context. The
chief effect of not applying the Lingle rule in the RLA context,
thus,^ would be preemption of retaliatory discharge claims, which
are grievances but were held in Lingle (at least under Illinois
law) not to require interpretation of the collective agreement. 486
U.S. at 406-07. Based on Congress’s clear intent to commit rail
road and airline retaliatory discharge claims to RLA arbitration,
see pp. 14-17, supra, preemption of these claims, at least, would
not be “undue.”
472
2 7
RLA g r iev a n ces , a n d in s o fa r as a p p e a rs t h a t w as n o t a n
issue in th e c a s e .28
In a n y ev e n t , th e re is c e r ta in ly n o n e e d to d e c id e in
this c a se w h e th e r p r e e m p t io n o f a s ta te - la w c la im fo r
re ta lia tory d is c h a rg e , w h ich C o n g re s s c le a r ly in te n d e d to
be e n c o m p a s s e d w ith in R L A m a n d a to r y a r b i t r a t io n , see
pp. 14-17, s u p r a , w o u ld a lso affect c la im s by em p lo y ee s
for w ro n g fu l d i s c h a r g e by re a s o n of ra c ia l o r o th e r d i s
crim ination p ro h ib i te d by a s ta te civil r ig h ts law . T h a t
issue is n o t p re s e n te d h e re a n d invo lves c o n s id e ra t io n s
not p re s e n t in th is case . F o r e x a m p le , T i t le V I I o f the
Civil R ig h ts A c t o f 19 6 4 c o n ta in s p ro v is io n s fo r a l lo c a t
ing e n f o rc e m e n t fu n c t io n s b e tw e e n fe d e ra l a n d s ta te a u
thorities w h e re s ta te o r loca l law s a d d re s s th e “ u n la w fu l
em ploym ent p r a c t i c e ” a t issue. 4 2 U .S .C . § 2 0 Q 0 e - 5 ( c )
through ( f ) . I t m a y b e th a t p re e m p t io n o f su ch a s ta te
d iscrim ination s t a tu te invo lves issues s im ila r to those
raised b y a c c o m m o d a t io n of th e R L A w ith T i t le V I I
itself.20
F ina lly , p re e m p t io n of r e ta l ia to r y d i s c h a rg e c la im s does
not m e a n t h a t a r b i t r a to r s c o u ld ( m u c h less th a t they
would) ru n ro u g h s h o d o v e r p a r a m o u n t p u b l ic policies.
An a r b i t r a t io n a w a r d is u n e n fo rc e a b le b y th e c o u r ts if
that “ w o u ld v io la te ‘so m e exp lic i t p u b l ic p o l ic y ’ t h a t is
‘well de f in ed a n d d o m in a n t , ’ a n d is to b e a sc e r ta in e d ‘by
-8 This is understandable because that jurisdiction is limited to
disputes between “an employee or group of employees and a carrier
or carriers,” 45 U.S.C. § 153 F irst (i), and thus does not apply to
disputes growing out of applications for employment, such as the
dispute in that case. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 Fifth, 181 (defining
“employee’ for purposes of the RLA).
The Court addressed an analogous situation in Atchison, T. &
S.F. R t f . v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557 (1987). There, the Court accom
modated the seemingly conflicting provisions in two federal statu
tory schemes, i.e., the RLA and the Federal Employers’ Liability
Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., by holding that Congress, by
enacting these statutes, intended that a railroad employee may
bring suit for a personal injury cognizable under the FELA even
though a grievance over the events at issue could also be pursued
under the RLA. Id. at 5(14.
473
2 8
re fe re n ces to th e law s a n d legal p re c e d e n ts U nited
P a p e r w o r k e r s I n t ’l U n io n v. M is c o , I n c . , 4 8 4 U .S . 29 , 43
( 1 9 8 7 ) ( q u o t in g W .R . G r a c e & C o . v. L o c a l U n io n 759,
I n t ’l U n io n o f U n ite d R u b b e r W o r k e r s , 461 U .S . 757,
7 6 6 ( 1 9 8 3 ) ) . B u t , as th e C o u r t a lso h e ld in M is c o , such
p u b l ic p o l icy rev iew d o es n o t p e r m i t th e c o u r ts to engage
in fa c tf in d in g as th a t is “ the a r b i t r a t o r ’s t a s k .” 4 8 4 U.S.
a t 4 4 -4 5 . A l th o u g h M is c o c o n c e rn e d a r b i t r a t io n under
the N L R A , th e lo w er c o u r ts h a v e h e ld “ th a t arb itra tion
a w a rd s u n d e r the [ R L A ] a re s u b je c t to p u b l ic policy
rev iew ” w ith the s a m e l im its o n su ch rev iew (w h ic h in
c lu d e “o b s e rv in g th e R a i lw a y L a b o r A c t ’s proscrip tion
a g a in s t ju d ic ia l fa c t f in d in g ” ). U n io n P a c . R .R . v. U nited
T ra n sp . U n io n , 3 F .3 d 2 5 5 , 2 6 0 -6 1 , 2 6 4 (8 th C ir . 1993),
c e r t , d e n ie d , 62 U .S .L .W . 34 7 1 ( 1 9 9 4 ) . 30 I n allow
ing N o rr is to s h o r t c i rc u i t th e g r ie v a n c e p ro c e d u re , the
H a w a i i S u p re m e C o u r t h a s c i r c u m v e n te d these limitations
o n p u b l ic p o l icy re v ie w of a r b i t r a t io n a w a rd s , including
th e fa c tf in d in g fu n c t io n o f the a r b i t r a to r .31
30 Accord, Delta Air Lines v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 861 F.2d
665, 669-71 (11th Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 871 (1989);
see Northwest Air Lines v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 808 F.2d 76,
83-84 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (pre-Misco).
31 The Solicitor General also expresses concern (at 13) that “ar
bitrators would be required to adjudicate issues of state tort law,”
citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974)
and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., I l l S. Ct. 1647
(1991). The Solicitor General speculates (at 13 n.10) that Alex
ander would prohibit arbitrators from adjudicating such issues,
and that this Court’s forum-selection ruling in Gilmer (which held
that a federal age discrimination claim had to be resolved by an
arbitrator rather than a court, 111 S. Ct. at 1652) would not apply.
Because this case involves preemption of state tort claims rather
than the appropriate forum for resolving federal claims, there is
no occasion here for this Court to consider the Gilmer forum-
selection issue vis-a-vis the RLA’s mandatory arbitration provi
sions. We are constrained to note, however, that should an appro
priate case reach this Court, the Solicitor General’s asserted ground
for distinguishing Gilmer (at 13 n.10), i.e., that there is "tension
between collective representation and individual statutory rights,”
does not apply in the RCA context, where employees are guaranteed
2 9
D. The Hawaii Supreme Court’s Preemption Rule
Would Contravene The Policies of the RLA.
T h e ru le a d o p te d b y th e H a w a i i S u p re m e C o u r t w o u ld
do vio lence to f u n d a m e n ta l R L A po lic ies . F i r s t , s u c h a
rule je o p a rd iz e s th e co n s is te n c y a n d u n i fo rm i ty in r a i l
road a n d a ir l in e l a b o r r e la t io n s th a t C o n g re s s s o u g h t to
protect. E .g . , P e n n s y lv a n ia R .R . v . D a y , 3 6 0 U .S . 5 4 8 ,
552-53 ( 1 9 5 9 ) . T h e ra i l ro a d in d u s t ry o p e r a te s in 49
states a n d the a i r l in e in d u s t ry o p e r a te s in all 5 0 s ta tes ,
with m o s t c a r r ie r s o p e r a t in g in m o re th a n o n e s ta te . P in
ning p re e m p t io n to th e q u e s t io n of w h e th e r the e lem e n ts
of a p a r t i c u la r c la im re q u ir e “ in te r p r e ta t io n ” w o u ld ho ld
Congress’s p o l icy of u n i fo rm ity h o s ta g e to a r c a n e d is t in c
tions in th e su b s ta n t iv e to r t law o f e a ch s ta te . F o r e x
ample, in B e a r d v. C a r r o l l t o n R . R . . 8 9 3 F .2 d 117 ( 6 th
Cir. 1 9 8 9 ) , the S ix th C i rc u i t h e ld th a t a c la im fo r w r o n g
ful in te r fe re n c e w ith c o n t r a c t u n d e r K e n tu c k y la w w as
preem pted b e c a u s e K e n tu c k y m a k e s b re a c h o f c o n t r a c t
an essen tia l e le m e n t o f the c la im , th e re b y r e q u ir in g in te r
pre ta tion; th e c o u r t o b se rv ed , h o w e v e r , th a t u n d e r O h io
law. such a c la im w o u ld n o t b e p re e m p te d b e c a u s e O h io
law “ is to th e c o n t r a r y .” Id . a t 122 & n . l . E v e n in the
realm o f r e ta l ia to ry d isch a rg e , v a r ia t io n s in s ta te to r t law s
and the u n d e r ly in g fac t p a t te rn s w o u ld re su lt in co n fu s io n
and in co n s is ten t resu lts . See M a g e r e r v. J o h n S e x to n &
C o., 9 1 2 F .2 d 5 2 5 , 5 2 9 (1 s t C ir . 1 9 9 0 ) ( f in d in g re ta l ia
tory d is c h a rg e c la im s p r e e m p te d u n d e r M a s s a c h u s e t t s law
but no t th e I l l ino is s ta tu te ap p l ied in L i n g l e ) ; M e d r a n o v.
E x ce l C o r p . , 9 8 5 F .2 d 2 3 0 , 2 3 3 -3 4 (5 th C i r . ) ( f in d in g
p reem ption b e c a u s e em p lo y ee a rg u e d th a t co llec tiv e a g re e
ment v io la te d re ta l ia to ry d is c h a rg e s t a t u t e ) , c e r t , d e n ie d ,
114 S. C t. 7 9 ( 1 9 9 3 ) . A d d in g to these c o m p l ic a t io n s
would b e p o te n t ia l cho ice -o f- law issues th a t c o u ld ar ise
because e m p lo y ee s in th e a ir l in e a n d ra i l ro a d in d u s t r ie s
often s p e n d th e ir w o rk in g t im e in m o re th a n o n e s ta te .
the right to file and pursue grievances through RLA arbitration
without union involvement and with their own counsel. 45 U.S.C.
§ 153 First ( j ) ; see pp . 6-7 , sirpra.
475
3 0
T h u s , as th e F o u r t h C i rc u i t in R a y n e r w a rn e d , allowing
s ta te - law c la im s in su ch c i r c u m s ta n c e s c o u ld re su l t in “an
u n p re d ic ta b le m e d le y o f ju r y d e te rm in a t io n s , w h ic h Con
gress, in its q u e s t fo r n a t io n a l u n i fo rm i ty . . . so u g h t to
a v o id .” R a y n e r v . S m ir l, 8 7 3 F .2 d 6 0 , 6 6 ( 4 t h Cir.
1 9 8 9 ) .
I n a d d i t io n to je o p a r d iz in g c o n s is te n c y a n d uniformity,
a n a r ro w p re e m p t io n ru le c o u ld u n d e r m in e th e integrity
o f th e R L A ’s m a n d a to r y g r i e v a n c e p rocesses . R a i l and
a ir l in e em p lo y ee s h a v e fo r m u la te d a w id e v a r ie ty of cre
a t iv e to r t th eo r ie s in a t te m p ts to b r in g th e ir c la im s before
a j u r y . ’' T h e ru le a d o p te d by th e H a w a i i S u p re m e Court
w o u ld e n c o u ra g e su ch a t t e m p ts b y a l lo w in g a r t fu l plead
in g of c la im s t h a t d o no t s t r ic t ly d e p e n d o n “ in te rp re ta
t io n ” fo r th e ir re so lu t io n . “ [ l ] f the c o u r ts can be used
as fo ru m s to reso lve a r b i t r a b le d isp u te s , em p lo y ees can
m a k e an en d r u n th e re b y a v o id in g th e ca re fu l ly crafted
co n g re ss io n a l p ro c e d u re s set fo r th in the R L A . These
re su lts c a n n o t be s q u a re d w ith fed e ra l p o l icy .” De-
T o m a s o v . P a n A m . W o r ld A irw a y s , In c ., 7 3 3 P .2 d 614,
621 ( C a l . ) , c e r t , d e n i e d , 4 8 4 U .S . 8 2 9 ( 1 9 8 7 ) .
CONCLUSION
F o r th e re aso n s s ta te d ab o v e , the ju d g m e n t of the
H a w a i i S u p re m e C o u r t sh o u ld be reversed .
32 See, e.g., Lorenz v. CSX Tramp., Inc., 980 F.2d 263, 268 (4th
Cir. 1992) (defamation); Calvert v. Tram World Airlines, Inc.,
959 F.2d 698, 700 (8th Cir. 1992) (international infliction) ; Ray
ner v. Smirl, 873 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1989) ( retaliatory discharge);
Morales v. Southern Pac. Tramp. Co., 894 F.2d 743, 745-46 (5th
Cir. 1990) (fraud) ; Beard v. Carrollton R.R., 893 F.2d 117, 121-22
(6th Cir. 1989) (intentional infliction and interference with con
tractual rights) ; Leu v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 820 F,2d 825, 829-30
(7th Cir. 1987) (fraud and conversion) ; Schroeder v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 702 F.2d 189, 192 (9th Cir. 1983) (wrongful demo
tion) ; Magnvson v. Burlington A7., Inc., 576 F.2d 1367, 1369-70
(9th Cir.) (intentional infliction), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 930
(1978); Campbell v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 668 F. Supp.
139, 145-40 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (defamation and false imprison
ment) ; Carson v. Southern Ry., 494 F. Supp. 1104 (D.S.C. 1979)
(slander).
476
R e s p e c tfu l ly s u b m i t te d
Ralph J. Moore, J r.
(Counsel of Record)
I. Michael Greenberger
Mark S. Raffman
Shea & Gardner
1800 Massachusetts Ave., N.W,
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 828-2000
David P. Lee
Kenneth Gradia
National Railway
Labor Conference
1901 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 862-7200
Attorneys for the National
Dated: March 4,1991 Railway Labor Conference
477
No. 92-2058
I n T he
(Emtrt nf % Ittilrii States
October T erm . 1993
H awaiian A irlines, I nc., et a l,
Petitioners,
v.
G rant T. Norris,
Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court
for the State of Hawaii
BRIEF OF
THE RAILWAY LABOR EXECUTIVES’ ASSOCIATION
AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT
J ohn O’B. Clarice, Jr.
(Counsel of Record)
Donald F. Griffin
Elizabeth A. Nadeau
H ighsaw, Mahoney & Clarke, P.C.
1050 17th S tree t , N.W.
Suite 210
W ash ing ton , D.C. 20036
(202) 296-8500
A t t o r n e y s f o r t h e R a i l w a y L a b o r
Dated: April 1,1994 E x e c u t i v e s ’ A s s o c i a t i o n
479
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................... jv
INTEREST OF AMICUS CU RIAE ................................ 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT................. ....................... 2
ARGUMENT .............................................
I. THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT DOES NOT
COMPLETELY PREEMPT STATE REGULA
TION OF MINIMUM LABOR STANDARDS
APPLICABLE TO EMPLOYEES OF CAR
RIERS SUBJECT TO THAT ACT.................... 5
II. AN EMPLOYEE’S ENFORCEMENT OF THE
HAWAII STATE PROTECTION OF “WHIS
TLEBLOWERS” DOES NOT FRUSTRATE
THE CLAIM AND GRIEVANCE RESOLU
TION PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED BY
CONGRESS IN SECTIONS 3 AND 204 OF
THE RLA ................................................................ 8
A. The State Public Policy Protecting Whistle
blowers From Wrongful Discharge Does Not 1
Interfere Or Conflict With The Purposes Of
The RLA ............................................... ............ 8
B. Section 3 of the RLA Does Not Confer Juris
diction Upon The NRAB To Resolve All
Claims Arising Out Of The Employee-
Employer Relationship .................................... 10
1. At The Time Of The Enactment Of The
RLA in 1926 And Its Amendment in
1934, Individual Contracts Of Employ
ment Could Subsist With Collective
Agreements ................... .............................. 10
2. The Term “Grievance” As Used By The
Proponents Of Both The 1926 RLA And
The 1934 Amendments To It, Contem
plates Claims Arising Out Of Either An
Individual Or Collective Contract Estab
lishing Rates Of Pay, Rules Or Working
480 Conditions For An Individual Claimant. .. 12
ii
3. The NRAB Has Consistently Held That
Its Jurisdiction Is Only Coextensive With
Claims Of Right Arising Under An
Agreement.................................................... 16
4. The transfer Of Certain Pending Disputes
Involving Air Carriers From The Na
tional Labor Relations Board To Section
204 System Boards Following The 1936
Amendments To The RLA Does Not Vest
Jurisdiction In Those Boards To Resolve
Claims Not Based Upon An Existing
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
Contract........................................................ 18
5. This Court Has Consistently Held That
The NRAB’s Jurisdiction Is Limited To
Resolution Of Claims Arising Under
Contracts....... ............................................. . 19
C. The “Omitted Case” Described in Burley
Does Not Vest Jurisdiction In The NRAB
To Resolve Non-Contractual Claims Or
Grievances ......................................................... 22 III.
III. THE POLICIES FAVORING COMPULSORY
ARBITRATION OF CONTRACTUAL DIS
PUTES UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE LMRA
ARE IDENTICAL TO THE POLICIES UN
DERLYING THE STATUTORY DUTY TO
ARBITRATE SIMILAR DISPUTES UNDER
SECTIONS 3 AND 204 OF THE RLA.............. 26
CONCLUSION .................................................................... 30
APPENDIX ...................... .................................... .............
NRAB DECISIONS:
NRAB First Division Award No. 23900 (Twomey,
Referee) (1986) ....... .............................................. 4a
NRAB Fourth Division Award No. 4205 (McAl
lister, Ref eree) (1985)........................................... 8a
481
iii
NRAB Second Divisio?i Award No. 11768 (Carter,
Referee) (1989) ...................................................... 6a
NRAB Third- Division Award No. 25543 (Aiges,
Referee) (1985) ...................................................... j a
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
482
C a s e s
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
A l l i s - C h a l m e r s C o r y , v . L u e c k , 471 U.S. 202
(1985) ................................................................................ 7 ,2 2 ,2 8
A n d r e w s v . L o u i s v i l l e & N . R . R . , 406 U.S. 320
(1972) ................ p a s s i m
A t c h i s o n , T . & S . F . R y . v . B u e l l , 480 U.S. 557
(1987) .............................................................................. p a s s i m
B h d . o f L o c o m o t i v e E n g i n e e r s v . C h i c a g o , R . J . &
P . R . R . , 382 U.S. 423 ( 1 9 6 5 ) ..................' ................... 6, 7
B h d . o f R . R . T r a i n m e n v . C h i c a g o R i v e r & I . R . R . ,
353 U.S. 30 (1957) ...................................................... p a s s i m
B h d . o f R y . C l e r k s v . F l o r i d a E a s t C o a s t R . R . ,
384 U.S. 238 (1966) ...................................................... 9
B o y s M a r k e t s v . R e t a i l C l e r k s U n i o n , 398 U.S. 235
(1970) .............................................................................. 28
Burlington Northern R.R. v. Bhd. of Maintenance
of Way Employes, 481 U.S. 429 (1 9 8 7 )................ 10
Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Trans. Union, 402
U.S. 570 (1971) ................................................. ......... 13
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Executives’
Ass’n, 491 U.S. 299 (1989) ............................ ......passim
Detroit & T.S.L.R.R. v. United Trans. Union, 396
U.S. 142 (1969) ........................................................... 8j 9
Elgin, J. & E.R.R. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945)..passim
J. I. Case Co. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 332 (1944)....... 11
Lingle v. Norge Di.v. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S.
399 (1 9 8 7 ) ............. ..................................................passim.
McKinney v. Missouri-K.-T.R.R., 357 U S 265
(1958) ............................................................................... 25
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,
471 U.S. 724 (1985) ............................ ...... .............. g
Missouri Pacific. R.R. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249
(1931) ............................................................................. 6
Moore v. Illinois Central R.R., 312 U.S. 630 (1941).. 21
Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency,
321 U.S. 342 (1944) ................................................ 1. n -2 4
Order of Ry. Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561
(1.946) ............................................................................. 16, 20
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Day, 360 U.S. 548 (1959).... 20
V
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
P a g e
Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R. v. Ry. Labor Executives’
Ass’n, 491 U.S. 490 (1989) ...................................... 23
Republic. Steel Coi~p. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650
(1965) ............................................................................... 27
Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. U.S., 339 U.S. 142
(1950) ............................................................................... 16
Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W .R .R ., 339 U.S. 239
(1950) ............................................................................. 3,20,27
St. Joe Paper Co. v. Atlantic Coast Live R.R., 347
U.S. 298 (1954) .......... 14
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour, Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).. 28
Term. R.R. Ass’n v. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 318
U.S. 1 (1943) .......... passim
Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Bhd. of Ry. Clerks, 281 U.S.
548 (1 9 3 0 )................................................ 9
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
419 (1957) ...... 27
Union Pacific R.R. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601 (1959).. 14
N R A B D E C IS IO N S :
N R A B F i r s t D i v i s i o n A w a r d N o . 2 3 9 0 9 ( T w o m e y ,
R e fe r e e ) (1 9 8 6 ) .............................................................. . 17
N R A B F o u r t h D i v i s i o n A w a r d N o . 4 2 0 5 ( M c A l
l i s t e r , R e f e r e e ) (1985) .................................................. 18
N R A B S e c o n d D i v i s i o n A w a r d N o . 1 1 7 6 8 ( C a r t e r ,
R e fe r e e ) ( 1 9 8 9 ) .................. 17
N R A B T h i r d D i v i s i o n A i v a r d N o . 2 5 5 4 3 ( A i g e s ,
R e f e r e e ) (1985) .......................................................... 17
S ta tu tes
L a b o r -M a n a g em en t R e la t io n s A c t ; 29 U.S.C. § 141,
et seq .
Section 301; 29 U.S.C. § 1 8 5 ..................................... passim
A d a m so n A c t ; 45 U.S.C. § 65 ....... ................................. 11
R a i l w a y L a b o r A c t , 45 U.S.C. § 151, e t s e q .
Section 2 T h ird ; § 152 T h ird .................................... 9
Section 2 F o u r th ; § 152 F o u r th ....... ..................... 9
Section 2 F if th , 45 U.S.C. § 152 F i f t h .................. 9
484
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
P a g e
Section 3 F i r s t ( i ) ; 45 U.S.C. § 153 F i r s t ( i ) .......p a s s im
Section 2 E ig h th ; 45 U.S.C. § 152 E i g h t h ........ 11
Section 2 T en th , 45 U.S.C. § 152 T e n t h ................ 9
Section 204; 45 U.S.C. § 1 8 4 ..................................... p a s s im
Section 205, 45 U.S.C. § 185...................................... 19
Section 206, 45 U.S.C. § 186........... 18
In t e r s t a t e C o m m erc e A c t ; 49 U.S.C. § 10101, e t
s e q .:
Section 11341 ( a ) ; 49 U.S.C. § 11341 ( a ) ............. 7
Rules
S uprem e C o u r t Rule 3 7 .3 ..... ............. ................................ 2
Legislative History
Debate on S. 3266, June 18, 193b, as reprinted in,
Legislative History of the Railway Labor Act,
As Amended (1926 through 1966), Subcom
mittee on Labor of Committee on Labor and Pub
lic Welfare at 936, U.S. Senate, January 1976.... 14
H.R. Rep. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (June
11, 1934).................................................................... 16
H.R. Rep. No. 2243 at 1 (March 26, 1936), os re
printed in, 1 The Railway Labor Act of 1926, A
Legislative History 1050 ........................................ 19
Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, II.R. 7180 at 12 (January
26, 1926) ........ 13
Hearings before the Committee on Interstate Com
merce, S. 2646 at 202 (April 4, 1924) .................. IS
Hearings before the Committee on Interstate Com
merce, S. 3266 at 34 (April 11, 1934).................. 15
Hearings before the Committee on Interstate Com
merce, S. 3266 at 158 (April 19, 1934).............. 15
485
I n T he
fhtpnmu? (Emtrt xif tip Itttleii States
October T erm , 1993
N o . 9 2 -2 0 5 8
Hawaiian A irlines, Inc ., e t a l ,
V
P e t it io n e r s ,
G rant T. N orris,
R e s p o n d e n t .
On W r i t of C e r t io ra r i to th e S u p rem e C ourt
fo r th e S ta te of H aw aii
B R I E F OF
T H E R A IL W A Y L A B O R E X E C U T IV E S ' ASSOCIATION
AS A M IC U S C U R IA E IN S U P P O R T O F R E S P O N D E N T
I N T E R E S T O F A M IC U S C U R IA E
T h e R a i lw a y L a b o r E x ec u t iv e s ' A sso c ia t io n “R L E A ” )
is an u n in c o rp o ra te d a sso c ia t io n c o m p r ise d o f th e chief
ex ecu tive officers o f th e fo l low ing la b o r organizations:
A m e r ic a n T ra in D isp a tc h e rs ( D e p t , o f B L E ) ; B rother
h o o d of L o c o m o t iv e E n g in ee rs ; B ro th e rh o o d o f M ainte
n a n c e of W a y E m p lo y es ; B r o th e rh o o d of R a i l ro a d Signal
m en ; H o te l an d R e s ta u r a n t E m p lo y e e s In te rna tiona l
U n io n ; In te rn a t io n a l B ro th e rh o o d o f B o ile rm ak e rs , Iron
S hip B uilde rs , B lacksm its , F o rg e r s a n d H e lp e rs ; In terna
t io n a l B ro th e rh o o d o f E lec tr ic a l W o rk e rs ; In te rna tiona l
B ro th e rh o o d o f F ire m e n an d O ile rs ; I n te r n a t io n a l Long
sh o re m e n 's A sso c ia t io n ; Sheet M e ta l W o rk e rs Interna-
486
2
t ional A s s o c ia t io n ; a n d U n i te d T ra n s p o r t a t i o n U n io n .
These o rg a n iz a t io n s re p re s e n t th e o v e rw h e lm in g m a jo r i ty
of u n io n ized ra i l ro a d em p lo y ee s in the U n i te d S ta tes.
O n e o f th e p u rp o s e s o f the R L E A is to p re sen t , w h en
necessary, a un if ied p o s i t io n on m a t te rs o f in te res t to
em ployees s u b je c t to the R a i lw a y L a b o r A c t ( “R L A ” ),
45 U .S .C . § 1 5 1 , e t s e q . A c c o rd in g ly , R L E A is c o n
cerned th a t th e p ro v is io n s o f th a t A c t a re in te rp re te d an d
enforced in a m a n n e r th a t p ro te c ts b o th the fed e ra l a n d
state s t a tu to ry r ig h ts o f r a i l ro a d em ployees . R L E A su b
mits th a t the d ec is ion o f th e S u p re m e C o u r t o f H a w a ii
under re v ie w h e re p ro p e r ly s t ru ck a b a la n c e be tw een the
legitim ate p o l ice p o w e rs o f a s ta te in se t t in g m in im u m
s tandards o f c o n d u c t by em p lo y ees a n d the c o n t ra c tu a l
dispute re so lu t io n p ro c e d u re s p ro v id ed u n d e r th e R L A
in a m a n n e r th a t p re se rv ed the R e s p o n d e n t em ployee 's
rights u n d e r s ta te la w w i th o u t f ru s t r a t in g th e c o n t ra c tu a l
in te rp re ta t io n p ro cesses o f the R L A . A c co rd in g ly , R L E A
respectfu lly su b m its th is b r ie f as a m ic u s c u r ia e in su p p o r t
of R e s p o n d e n t .1
SU M M A R Y O F A R G U M E N T
R L E A su b m its th a t th e R L A does n o t effect a c o m
plete p re e m p t io n of s ta te m in im u m la b o r s ta n d a r d s ap
plicable to em ployees . T e r m . R .R . A ss'n v. B h d . o f R .R .
T ra in m en , 3 1 8 U .S . 1, 7 ( 1 9 4 3 ) . T h e re fo re , e n fo rc e
m ent o f th e ju d ic ia l ly c r e a te d H a w a i ia n s ta te law p ro te c t
ing “ w h is t leb lo w ers" is p re e m p te d by th e R L A o n ly if
en fo rcem en t o f the s ta te r ig h t f ru s t ra te s the s ta tu to ry
regime c r e a te d by C o n g re s s u n d e r the R L A . A th o ro u g h
review o f the p u rp o s e s a n d fu n c t io n in g o f th a t A c t d e m
onstra te th a t e n f o rc e m e n t of a s ta te law r ig h t in d e p e n d
ent o f a r ig h t c re a te d b y a g re e m e n t does n o t f ru s t ra te
the w o rk in g o f the R L A .
1 This brief is presented with the permission of the parties pur
suant to Rule 37.3 of the rules of this Court.
487
3
T h e on ly d irec t R L A re g u la t io n o f em ployee-em ployer
c o n d u c t c o n c e rn s the p ro h ib i t io n s a g a in s t in te r fe ren c e in
the d es ig n a t io n a n d ch o ice o f co llec tive b a rg a in in g repre
sen ta t ives c o n ta in e d in S ec tion 2 T h i r d a n d F o u r th o f the
R L A . 4 5 U .S .C . § 152 T h i rd & F o u r th . T h e state
w h ileb lo w er p ro te c t io n a t issue h e re does n o t to u c h on
th is reg u la ted co n d u c t . T h e re fo re , the o n ly w a y in which
the R L A co u ld p re e m p t the s ta te law is if b o a rd s of
a d ju s tm e n t es tab l ish ed u n d e r S ec tions 3 a n d 2 0 4 of that
A c t , 45 U .S .C . §§ 153 & 184, h av e been g iven jurisdic
tion by C o n g ress of a l l d isp u te s ar is ing ou t o f the em
p loyee-em ployer re la t io n sh ip . H o w e v e r a rev iew of the
legislative h is to ry o f the R L A , dec is ions o f the National
R a i l ro a d A d ju s tm e n t B o a rd ( “N R A B " ) a n d dec is ions of
th is C o u r t d e m o n s t ra te th a t the b o a r d s o f a d ju s tm en t do
no t h av e th a t ex p an s iv e ju r isd ic t io n .
T h e te rm “g r iev a n ces" used in the ju r isd ic t io n a l grant
c o n ta in e d in b o th S ec tions 3 a n d 2 0 4 re fers to the claims
of ind iv id u a ls u n d e r co lo r o f an e m p lo y m e n t contractual
right. T h is is the m a n n e r in w h ich the p ro p o n e n ts o f both
the o rig inal 1926 R L A a n d its 1934 a m e n d m e n ts creating
the c u r re n t Section 3 desc r ib ed the term . Subsequently
th a t defin it ion w as p ick ed u p in the H o u se R e p o r t to the
19 3 4 a m e n d m e n ts an d a d o p te d by th is C o u r t in B h d . o f
R .R . T r a in m e n v. C h ic a g o R iv e r & I .R .R . , 353 U.S. 30,
33 ( 1 9 5 7 ) . T h e sam e w o rk in g def in i t ion h as b ee n utilized
by all fo u r d iv is ions o f the N R A B w hen reso lv ing ques
tions o f its ju r isd ic t io n to act.
T h e dec is ions o f this C o u r t , n o ta b ly S lo c u m v. D ela
w a re , L . & W .R .R .. 3 3 9 U.S. 2 3 9 ( 1 9 5 0 ) , ho ld that
the N R A B has exclusive ju r isd ic t io n to reso lve contractual
in te rp re ta t io n d ispu tes . In d e ed , in A n d r e w v. L ou isv ille
& N .R .R . . 4 0 6 U.S. 3 2 0 ( 1 9 7 2 ) th is C o u r t held that
a n y c la im asse rted b ased u p o n r igh ts c o n ta in e d in a col
lective a g reem en t m u s t be p re se n te d to the N R A B for
re so lu tion . H o w e v e r , in A n d r e w s , this C o u r t d id not
ho ld th a t an e m p lo y e e ’s c la im o f r igh ts u n d e r a sta te law
438
4
that w as in d e p e n d e n t o f r igh ts a r is in g u n d e r the co llec tive
agreem ent w a s p re e m p te d . In s te a d , R L E A su b m its th a t
this C o u r t ’s e a r l ie r d ec is ion in T e r m in a l R a i l r o a d a n d the
later d ec is ion in A t c h is o n , T . & S .F . R y . v. B u e ll , 4 8 0
U.S. 5 5 7 ( 1 9 8 7 ) s u p p o r t the c o n c lu s io n th a t in d e p e n d e n t
rights a r is in g u n d e r e i th e r s ta te o r federa l law m ay be
enforced in fo ru m s o th e r th a n the N R A B a n d such in
dependen t c la im s are n o t p re e m p te d b y th e R L A .
P e t i t io n e r H a w a i ia n A ir l in e s ’ ( “ H a w a i ia n ” ) re l ian ce o n
the re fe re n ce to the “o m it te d c a se ” m e n t io n e d in E lg in ,
J . & E .R .R . v. B u r le y , 3 2 5 U.S. 711 ( 1 9 4 5 ) is eq ua lly
unavailing. T h e o m i t te d case is m ere ly a sh o rt h a n d re f
erence to a c la im o f r ig h t a r is in g u n d e r e i th e r a n im plied-
in-fact co llec tive a g re e m e n t o r an a g re e m e n t a p p l ica b le
to an in d iv id u a l o n m a t te r s the p a r t ie s ag reed to om it
from th e co llec tive ag reem en t .
R L E A su b m its th a t th e h is to ry a n d p u rp o s e o f the
R L A sh o w th a t the p re e m p t io n ana lys is u t i l ized b y this
C ourt in T in g le v. N o r g e D iv . o f M a g ic C h e f , I n c . , 4 8 6
U.S. 3 9 9 ( 1 9 8 7 ) fo r cases a r is in g u n d e r S ec tion 301 of
the L a b o r - M a n a g e m e n t R e la t io n s A c t o f 1947
( “L M R A ” ) , 2 9 U .S .C . § 185 , h a s eq u a l a p p l ica b il i ty to
the R L A . W h ile th e d u ty to a rb i t r a t e u n d e r th e R L A is
s ta tu torily c re a te d , r a th e r th a n c r e a te d by c o n t r a c t as
under S ec t io n 3 0 1 , th e o b l ig a t io n to a rb i t r a te fulfills the
same n a t io n a l l a b o r po licy : the p e a c e fu l re so lu t io n of
disputes o v e r the in te rp re ta t io n a n d a p p l ic a t io n of ag re e
ments. A c c o rd in g ly , th e dec is ion o f the S u p re m e C o u r t o f
Hawaii sh o u ld b e affirmed.
489
5
ARGUMENT
I. THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT DOES NOT COM
PLETELY PREEMPT STATE REGULATION OF
MINIMUM LABOR STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO
EMPLOYEES OF CARRIERS SUBJECT TO THAT
ACT
O v e r fifty yea rs ago , this C o u r t he ld th a t “ th e enact
m en t bv C o n g ress of the R a i lw a y L a b o r A c t w as not a
p re -em ption of th e field of re g u la t in g w o rk in g co n d i t io n s”
by the s ta tes . T e r m in a l R a i l r o a d , 3 1 8 U.S. a t 7. In that
case, the em p lo y ees had o b ta in e d an o rd e r from the
Illinois C o m m e rc e C o m m iss io n m a n d a t in g th a t the car
rier su p p ly a ca b o o se on all t ra in s o p e ra te d by the carrier
w ith in the s ta te . Id . a t 3. T h is C o u r t he ld th a t while
the ap p l ica b le co llec tive b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t contained
a p ro v is io n re g a rd in g the p la c e m e n t of c a b o o ses on the
c a r r i e r ’s t ra in s an d , the re fo re , th e d isp u te m ig h t have
been b r o u g h t b e fo re the N a t io n a l R a i l ro a d A djustm ent
B o a rd ( “ N R A B ” ) fo r a d ju s tm e n t , the em ployees were
no t ob lig a ted to do so in d e ro g a t io n of the ir r igh ts under
s ta te law. Id . a t 6.
T h is C o u r t o b se rv ed th a t in e n a c t in g the R L A , Con
gress d id no t u n d e r ta k e g o v e rn m e n ta l re g u la t io n of rates
of p ay . rules o r w o rk in g c o n d i t io n s o r o th e rw ise set min
im um s ta n d a r d s a p p l ica b le to them . 318 U.S. a t 6. In
s tead , the d o m in a n t federa l in te re s t C o n g re s s fos te red by
the A c t w as th a t d ispu tes o v e r ra te s o f pay , ru les o r work
ing co n d i t io n s d id n o t re su lt in an in te r ru p t io n to com
m erce . Id . In o th e r w o rd s , C o n g re s s w as in terested in
c re a t in g a p r o c e s s w h e reb y d isp u te s o ver ra te s o f pay,
ru les a n d w o rk in g co n d i t io n s w ere re so lved without
e i th e r side to the d isp u te u s ing ec o n o m ic self-help. There
fore, w hile c e r ta in w o rk in g c o n d i t io n s th a t w ere regulated
b y th e s ta tes co u ld be the su b jec t o f co llec tive bargaining
u n d e r this p rocess , this C o u r t s ta ted th a t “ we would
h a rd ly b e ex p ec ted to h o ld th a t the p r ice of the federal
effort to p ro tec t the p eace a n d c o n t in u i ty o f commerce
490
6
has been to s t r ik e d o w n s ta te s a n i ta ry codes , h ea l th re g
ulations, fa c to ry in spec tions , a n d sa fe ty p ro v is ions for in
dustry a n d t r a n s p o r ta t io n .” Id . a t 7.
A ga in , in B h d . o f L o c o m o t i v e E n g in e e r s v. C h ic a g o ,
R .l. & P .R .R . , 3 8 2 U.S. 4 2 3 ( 1 9 6 5 ) , ( h e re in a f te r R o c k
Is la n d ) th is C o u r t co n s id e red , fo r the fo u r th time, w h e th e r
two A rk a n s a s s ta tu te s se t t in g the m in im u m n u m b e r of
employees th a t a c a r r ie r m u s t use o n a tra in ( “ full c rew
laws” ) w e re p re e m p te d b y federa l la b o r leg is la t io n .2 In
that case , th e c a r r ie r s c o n te n d e d th a t spec ia l legis la tion
passed by C o n g ress to reso lve an R L A collec tive b a r g a in
ing d ispu te o v e r th e m a n n in g o f t ra in s p re e m p te d all s ta te
full c rew laws. Id . a t 4 2 7 . T h is C o u r t d isag reed , n o t in g
that n o th in g in the leg is la t ion specifically s ta te d th a t it
should h a v e su ch p re e m p t iv e effect. Id . a t 4 3 3 . A ll C o n
gress w a n te d to a c co m p l ish th ro u g h the leg is la t ion w as
resolution o f the co llec tive b a rg a in in g d isp u te . Id . H o w
ever, this C o u r t n o te d th a t in som e sta tes, such as A r k a n
sas, the size o f the c rew w as a lre a d y re g u la te d b y s ta tu te ,
not by a g reem en t , so th a t the q u es t io n o f h o w m a n y
employees m u s t be ass ig n ed to a t r a in b y the c a r r ie r in
that s ta te a l re a d y h a d been reso lved . Id . T h e re fo re , this
Court fo u n d th a t C o n g re s s d id n o t in te n d to p re e m p t
existing s ta te m in im u m la b o r s ta n d a rd s o n this m a t t e r as
part o f its re so lu t io n o f the specific co llec tive b a rg a in in g
dispute b e tw e en the p ar tie s . Id . a t 4 3 7 .
T h u s , on a t leas t th ree occas io n s , th is C o u r t h a s held
that th e R L A genera l ly , a n d spec ia l leg is la t ion passed
by C o n g ress to reso lve an R L A d ispu te , in p a r t ic u la r ,
did no t ac t as g en e ra l p re e m p t io n of s ta te m in im u m la b o r
s tandards laws. S ignif icantly , H a w a i ia n a n d a m ic i d o no t
mention these cases desp i te th e ir o b v io u s re levance .
2 In the last “Full Crew” decision prior to Rock Island, Missouri
Pacific R.R. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249, 258 (1931), this Court had
stated that “ [n]o analysis or discussion of the provisions of the
[RLA] is necessary to show that it does not conflict with the
Arkansas statutes under consideration.”
491
7
N everthe less , in o rd e r to re a c h th e resu lt w h ich Hawaiian
a n d a m ic i seek here , th is C o u r t w o u ld n ecessa r i ly have
to o v e rru le , or, a t th e v e ry leas t , s u b s ta n t ia l ly limit,
b o th T e r m in a l R a i l r o a d a n d R o c k I s la n d . In d e e d , Hawi-
ia n ’s a n d a m ic i's c la im is t h a t ev e n th o u g h th e re is no
express m e n t io n by C o n g re s s in th e R L A o f a n inten
tion to fully o c c u p y the field o f r e g u la t in g all w orking
co n d i t io n s a p p l ic a b le to e m p lo y ee s o n e sh o u ld be im
plied. H o w e v e r , as will b e d e m o n s t r a te d b e lo w , the
s ta tu to ry sch e m e of the R L A d o e s n o t s u p p o r t such a
conc lus ion . M o re o v e r , it m u s t b e n o te d th a t w h en Con
gress in the p as t h a s e n a c te d leg is la t ion in te n d e d to effect
a co m p le te p re e m p t io n of s ta te law , it has m a d e itself
qu ite c lear. S e e , 4 9 U .S .C . § 1 1 3 4 1 ( a ) (C a r r i e r in
volved in S ection 11343 p ro c e e d in g u n d e r the In tersta te
C o m m e rc e A c t “ is e x e m p t f ro m th e a n t i t r u s t laws, and
f ro m all o th e r law , in c lu d in g S ta te a n d m u n ic ip a l law,
as necessary to let th a t p e rso n c a r ry o u t the t ra n sa c t io n .” )
T h e re is n o t even a h in t o f a s im ila r p re e m p t iv e effect
in the R L A .
In d eed , the logical re su lt o f a c o m p le te preem ption
finding h e re w o u ld b e th a t a n y a g re e m e n t m a d e by a
un io n a n d c a r r ie r u n d e r the R L A w o u ld h a v e th e “force
of federa l law , o u s t in g a n y in co n s is te n t s ta te regu la t ion .”
A llis -C h a lm e r s C o r p . v. L u e c k , 471 U .S . 2 0 2 , 212
( 1 9 8 5 ) . T h is C o u r t h e ld in A ll is -C h a lm e r s th a t Section
301 of the L M R A d id no t c o n fe r u p o n the pa r t ie s “ the
ability to c o n t r a c t fo r w h a t is i l legal u n d e r s ta te law.”
Id . B a se d u p o n the c o m p l im e n ta ry po lic ies expressed in
S ection 301 a n d th e R L A as d iscussed in P a r t III,
in fr a , a n d fu r th e r b a se d u p o n th is C o u r t ’s d iscuss ion of
th e p u rp o se s o f the R L A in T e r m in a l R a i l r o a d , no dif
fe ren t re su lt sh o u ld o c c u r u n d e r the R L A . Therefore,
an y c la im th a t the R L A c o m p le te ly p re e m p ts th e field of
s ta te reg u la t io n of w o rk in g c o n d i t io n s m u s t be re jec ted as
it w as in T e r m in a l R a i lr o a d .
492
8
II. AN EMPLOYEE’S ENFORCEMENT OF THE
HAW AII STATE PROTECTION OF “WHISTLE
BLOWERS” DOES NOT FRUSTRATE THE CLAIM
AND GRIEVANCE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES
ESTABLISHED BY CONGRESS IN SECTIONS 3
AND 204 OF THE RLA
A. The State Public Policy Protecting Whistleblowers
From Wrongful Discharge Does Not Interfere Or
Conflict With The Purposes Of The RLA
E v en th o u g h the R L A m a y no t ac t to co m p le te ly p r e
empt s ta te m in im u m la b o r s ta n d a rd s , c e r ta in s ta te re g u
lations m a y be s t ru c k d o w n if th ey in te r fe re w ith the fed
eral schem e e s tab l ish ed u n d e r th e A ct. S e e , M e tr o p o l it a n
L ife In s u r a n c e C o . v. M a s s a c h u s e t t s , 471 U.S. 7 2 4 , 751
and n .3 2 ( 1 9 8 5 ) ( r e ly in g u p o n T e r m in a l R a i l r o a d fo r
the p ro p o s i t io n t h a t fed e ra l l a b o r law is “ in te rs t i t ia l” , a n d
supplem ents s ta te law w h e re co m p a t ib le a n d s u p p la n ts it
only w h e re th e p u rp o s e of the fed e ra l ac t is f ru s t r a te d
by s ta te a c t io n ) . H e re , th e S u p rem e C o u r t o f H aw aii
has e s tab l ish ed a ju d ic ia l ly c re a te d r igh t fo r all H a w a ii
residents to b e p ro te c te d in th e ir e m p lo y m e n t ag a in s t
d iscrim ination b e c a u s e th e em p lo y ee re p o r te d a n e m
ployer’s a l leged u n la w fu l a c t to a re g u la to ry agency.
In o th e r w o rd s , the H aw aii S u p rem e C o u r t h a s e s ta b
lished a m in im u m s ta n d a r d of c o n d u c t th a t a l l e m p lo y e r s
must fo llow in th e ir d ea lin g s with th e ir em ployees . T h a t
m in im um s ta n d a r d d o es n o t f ru s t r a te the p u rp o se s of the
RLA.
“T h e R a i lw a y L a b o r A c t w as passed in 1926 to e n
courage co llec tive b a rg a in in g b y ra i l ro a d s a n d th e ir e m
ployees in o rd e r to p re v e n t , if possib le , w aste fu l s tr ikes
and in te r ru p t io n s of in te r s ta te c o m m e rc e .” D etro it <6
T .S .L .R .R . v. U n ited T ra n s . U n ion , 3 9 6 U.S. 142, 148
(1 9 6 9 ) . T h e m e a n s ch o sen by C o n g ress to ach ieve th a t
purpose in c lu d ed a “ p u rp o se ly lo n g an d d ra w n o u t” p r o
cess of n e g o t ia t in g a n d c h a n g in g the te rm s of co llec tive
bargain ing a g reem en t , id . at 149, q u o t in g , R h d . o f R y .
493
9
C le r k s v. F lo r id a E a s t C o a s t R .R . , 3 8 4 U .S . 2 3 8 , 246
( 1 9 6 6 ) , as w ell as c o m p u ls o ry a n d b in d in g arb itra tion
o f d ispu tes r e g a rd in g the in te rp re ta t io n of th o se agree
m ents . C h ic a g o R iv e r , 353 U .S . a t 39 .
T h e on ly e m p lo y e r c o n d u c t to w a rd s em p lo y ees ex
pressly re g u la ted by the R L A c o n c e rn s in te r fe ren c e by
the em p lo y e r w ith the e m p lo y ee s ’ r igh ts to o rg a n iz e and
b a rg a in co llec tive ly ( 4 5 U .S .C . § 152 T h i r d & F o u rth )
a n d d isc r im in a t io n b e c a u se a p ro sp e c t iv e em p lo y e e is or
is n o t a un io n m em b er . 4 U .S .C . § 152 F if th . Those
r igh ts m ay be en fo rce d e i th e r b y th e em p lo y ee s through
a civil a c t io n in federa l c o u r t . T e x a s & N .O .R .R . v. Bhd.
o f R y . C le r k s , 281 U.S. 5 4 8 , 5 6 7 -7 1 ( 1 9 3 0 ) , o r in crim
in a l p ro c eed in g s in i t ia ted b y a U .S . A t to r n e y a c t in g under
Section 2 T e n th , 45 U .S .C . § 152 T e n th . T h e balance
of the A c t is d ev o ted to fo s te r in g co llec tive bargaining
by re g u la t in g th e m ech a n ic s o f m a k in g o r m ain ta in ing
co llec tive ag reem en ts a n d by l im it in g th e poss ib ili t ies that
d ispu tes su r ro u n d in g th e m a k in g o r in te rp re ta t io n of those
ag reem en ts m a y in te r ru p t c o m m e rc e . T e r m in a l R a ilro a d ,
318 U .S . a t 6. S h o r e L in e , 3 9 6 U .S . a t 1 5 0 -5 1 ; C o n so li
d a t e d R a i l C o r p . v. R y . L a b o r E x e c u t iv e s ’ A s s ’n , 491
U.S. 2 9 9 , 302-7 ( 1 9 8 9 ) . T h e re fo re , th e whistleblower
p ro te c t io n p ro v id e d u n d e r H a w a i i law , w h ic h does not
involve itself w ith co llec tive b a rg a in in g , su re ly does not
in a n y w a y f ru s t r a te a n y exp ress r e g u la t io n o f employer
c o n d u c t set fo r th in the R L A . T h e r e m a in in g m a jo r area
of in q u iry is w h e th e r a n e m p lo y e e ’s a s se r t io n o f a right
u n d e r s ta te law th a t is in d e p e n d e n t o f th e te rm s of a col
lective b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t s o m e h o w f ru s t ra te s the con
t ra c t in te rp re ta t io n a n d a p p l ic a t io n d isp u te resolution
p ro c e d u re s c o n ta in e d w i th in the A c t . R L E A su b m its that
a th o ro u g h rev iew of th e e v o lu t io n o f th o se p rocesses re
veals th a t th e re is no a p p a r e n t conflic t, a n d , accordingly,
the R L A does n o t p re e m p t th e w h is t leb lo w er protections
c rea ted by the S u p rem e C o u r t o f H a w a i i .
494
10
B. Section 3 of the RLA Does Not Confer Jurisdiction
Upon The NRAB To Resolve All Claims Arising
Out Of The Employee-Employer Relationship
Section 3 F i r s t ( i ) as w ell as S ec tion 2 0 4 con fers j u r
isdiction u p o n a r b i t r a t io n p a n e ls to reso lve “d ispu tes
between an em p lo y ee o r g ro u p of em p lo y ees a n d a c a r r ie r
or ca rr ie rs g ro w in g o u t o f g r ie v a n c e s o r o u t o f th e in te r
pre ta tion o r a p p l ic a t io n o f a g re e m e n ts c o n c e rn in g ra te s
of pay , ru les , o r w o rk in g c o n d i t io n s .” H a w a i ia n a n d
am ici c o n te n d th a t p e rm it t in g a n e m p lo y e e to b r in g an
action u n d e r s ta te law fo r w ro n g fu l d is c h a rg e necessarily
interferes w ith the o p e r a t io n a n d ju r isd ic t io n of these
arbitra l p a n e ls b e c a u s e they h a v e ju r isd ic t io n to resolve
n o n co n tra c tu a l g r iev a n ces a r is in g o u t o f the em ployee-
em ployer re la t io n sh ip . T h is a r g u m e n t , b a se d la rge ly up o n
excerpts o f floor d e b a te s c o n c e rn in g th e 1926 A c t a n d the
reference to th e “o m i t te d c a s e ” in B u r le y , is la rge ly ahis-
torical a n d ig n o re s the fac t th a t the te rm “g r iev a n ces”
used in S ec tion 3 F i r s t ( i ) h a s co n s is ten t ly b ee n u sed by
the sponso rs o f th e R L A , th e N a t io n a l R a i l r o a d A d ju s t
ment B o a rd a n d dec is ions of th is C o u r t to re fe r to c la im
of c o n tra c tu a l e n t i t le m e n t on ly .
1. At The Time Of The Enactment Of The RLA in
1926 And Its Amendment in 193t, Individual
Contracts Of Employment Could Subsist With
Collective Agreements
“T h e R a i lw a y L a b o r A ct of 1926 c a n n o t be a p p r e
ciated a p a r t from th e e n v i ro n m e n t o u t o f w h ich it c a m e
and the p u rp o se s w h ich it w as des ig n ed to se rve .” B u r
lin gton N o r th e r n R .R . v. B h d . o f M a in te n a n c e o f W ay
E m p lo y e s , 481 U .S . 4 2 9 , 4 4 4 ( 1 9 8 7 ) ( in te rn a l q u o ta
tions o m i t t e d ) . A l th o u g h , the federa l c o n tro l o f the ra i l
roads d u r in g W o r ld W a r I h a d re su lted in increased
un ion iza t ion o f r a i l ro a d em ployees , b y 1 9 2 6 n o t all em
ployees w ere re p re sen te d b y a u n io n , a n d no t even all
rep resen ted em ployees w ere su b je c t to a c o l l e c t iv e ag ree
ment se t t ing ra te s o f pay. ru les an d w o rk in g cond it ions .
455
In d e ed , w h e n C o n g ress , in 1 9 1 6 , e n a c te d the A d am so n
A c t, 4 5 U .S .C . § 65, se t t ing th e s t a n d a r d d a y ’s w o rk at
e ig h t h o u rs , the s ta tu te exp ress ly a p p l ie d to “contrac ts
fo r l a b o r a n d serv ice" as o p p o se d to a g re e m e n ts between
g ro u p s o f em ployees a n d a c a r r ie r o r ca rr ie rs .
T h is C o u r t d id no t ad d ress the ro le o f ind iv id u a l con
trac ts u n d e r the R L A until its d ec is ion in O r d e r o f R .R .
T e le g r a p h e r s v. R y . E x p r e s s A g e n c y , 321 U .S . 3 4 2 , 346
( 1 9 4 4 ) w h e re in this C o u r t he ld th a t in d iv id u a l contrac ts
o f em p lo y m en t co u ld no t be en te re d in to in d e ro g a t io n of
r igh ts a l re a d y p ro v id ed in the co llec tive c o n t ra c t . How
ever, this C o u r t a d d e d th a t all such in d iv id u a l agreem ents
w ere n o t p re su m p tiv e ly u n law fu l b e c a u se the c a r r ie r and
re p re sen ta t iv e co u ld ag ree “ th a t p a r t i c u la r s i tu a t io n s are
reserved fo r ind iv idua l c o n tra c t in g , e i th e r co m p le te ly or
w ith in p re sc r ib ed lim its .” Id . a t 347 . '! T h e re fo re , a t the
t im e of the e n a c tm e n t o f the R L A in 1926 a n d its am end
m e n t in 1934 ( s e e , 4 5 Ll.S.C. § 152 E i g h t h ) , a n d beyond,
ind iv idua l c o n tra c ts o f e m p lo y m e n t w e re e i th e r the sole
o r s u p p le m e n ta ry sou rce o f c o n t r a c tu a l r igh ts o f ra ilroad
em ployees v is-a -v is th e ir em p loyers .
3 In Telegraphers and J. 1. Case Co. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 332
(1944), its companion case arising under the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 151, et seq., recognized the statutory limits both Acts placed upon
the negotiation of individual agreements setting the actual terms
and conditions of employment for individual employees. Under the
collective bargaining processes of both acts, collective bargaining
“results in an accord as to terms which will govern hiring and work
and pay in that unit.” J. I. Case, 321 U.S. at 334-5. Therefore, this
Court noted that, after negotiation of the collective or “trade”
agreement, “ ft]here is little left to individual agreement except
the act of hiring.” Id. at 335. As this Court held (id. at 337) :
Individual contracts, no matter what the circumstances that
justify their execution or what their terms, may not be availed
of to defeat or delay the procedures prescribed by the [NLRA]
looking to collective bargaining, nor to exclude the contracting
employee from a duly ascertained bargaining unit; nor may
they be used to forestall bargaining or to limit or condition
the terms of the collective agreement.496
12
T h is b a c k g ro u n d is req u is i te to an a c c u ra te u n d e r
s tand ing o f the ju r isd ic t io n a l g r a n t c o n fe r re d u p o n the
N R A B in S ec t io n 3 F i r s t ( i ) . R L E A su b m its th is s ta tu
tory fo rm u la t io n eq u a te s “g r ie v a n c e s” w ith the c la im s of
in d iv id u a l em p lo y ees u n d e r e i th e r in d iv id u a l c o n tra c ts of
em p loym en t se t t in g te rm s a n d c o n d i t io n s o f em p lo y m en t
or the te rm s o f the co llec tive a g re e m e n t ap p l ic a b le to
the c lass o f em p lo y ees in w h ich th e ind iv id u a l is e m
ployed. T h e te rm “ in te rp re ta t io n ” of ag re e m e n ts app lies
to c la im s a d v a n c e d b y the d e s ig n a te d co llec tive re p re se n
tative u n d e r the co llec tive a g re e m e n t a n d gen e ra l ly w ould
refer to “c la ssw id e” c la im s. H o w e v e r , b o th “g r iev a n ces”
and “ in te rp re ta t io n d is p u te s ” (h e re in a f te r “ c la im s” ) m us t
have the ir bas is in an a g re e m e n t se t t in g ra te s o f pay , rules
or w o rk in g c o n d i t io n s a p p l ic a b le e i th e r to the in d iv idua l
or to a c lass o f em p loyees . W ith th is b a c k g ro u n d , the
1934 a m e n d m e n ts o t th e R L A es tab l ish in g the ju r isd ic
tional re a c h o f the N R A B , a n d , in effect es tab l ish in g the
ju risd ic tion o f a ir l ine sys tem b o a r d s u n d e r S ection 204 .
can be p lace d in co n tex t .
2. The Term “Grievance” /Is Used By The Propo
nents Of Both The 1926 RLA And The 1934
Amendments To It, Contemplates Claims Arising
Out Of Either An Individual Or Collective Con
tract Establishing Rates Of Pay, Rules Or Work
ing Conditions For An Individual Claimant
Section 3 of th e 1926 A c t p ro v id e d for the v o lu n ta ry
estab lishm en t of a d ju s tm e n t b o a rd s c o m p o se d of re p re
sentatives of the em p lo y ee s a n d ca r r ie r s only . S u b sec
tion ( c ) o f th a t S ection re q u ir e d th a t a n y a g reem en t es
tab lish ing such an a d ju s tm e n t b o a r d lim it its ju r isd ic t io n
to “d isp u tes b e tw e e n an em p lo y e e o r g ro u p of em ployees
and a ca rr ie r , g ro w in g o u t o f g r iev a n ces o r o u t o f the
in te rp re ta t io n o r a p p l ic a t io n o f ag re e m e n ts c o n c e rn in g
rates o f pay , ru les , o r w o rk in g c o n d i t io n s .” In te s t im ony
before th e H o u se C o m m it te e on I n te r s ta te an d F o re ig n
C o m m erce , M r . D o n a ld R ic h b c rg , l a b o r sp o k esm an for
497
13
th e p ro p o se d bill, re fe r red to “ m in o r d i s p u te s” th a t some
tim es w ere o f “ a very se r ious c h a ra c te r , th a t involve dis
cip line , fo r e x a m p le , g r ievances , let us say, d isp u te s over
th e a p p l ic a t io n a n d m e a n in g o f an a g r e e m e n t .” H earing!;
b e f o r e th e C o m m it t e e o n In tersta te , a n d F o r e ig n C o m
m e r c e , H .R . 7 1 8 0 a t 12 ( J a n u a r y 2 6 , 1 9 2 6 ) , rep r in ted
in , 2 T h e R a ilw a y L a b o r A c t o f 1 9 2 6 . A c c o rd in g to Mr.
R ich b e rg , the b o a r d s o f a d ju s tm e n t p ro p o s e d in Section
3 w ere to be g iven ju r isd ic t io n to reso lve q u es t io n s over
the “ very c o m p l ic a te d a g re e m e n ts ” in ex is ten ce between
the ca rr ie rs a n d the em ployees . I d d
T h e 19 2 6 A c t has been c h a ra c te r iz e d b y this C o u r t as
essen tia lly an a g re e m e n t b e tw e en la b o r an d the carriers
th a t w as ratified b y C o n g ress a n d the P re s id en t . C h icag o
& N .W . R y . v. U n ited T ra n s . U n io n , 4 0 2 U .S . 5 70 , 576
( 1 9 7 1 ) . A cco rd in g ly , the o b se rv a t io n s of M r. Richberg
shou ld be ac co rd e d g re a t w eigh t in d e te rm in in g the “in
te n t” o f the par tie s in this m a t te r . Id . M r . R ichberg’s
s ta te m e n t above , c o u p led w ith his 19 2 4 te s t im ony , shows
th a t the term “ g r ie v a n c e ” m e a n t , even at this ea r ly date,
a c la im of righ t ar is ing o u t of a c o n tra c t .
T h e a d ju s tm e n t b o a rd p ro c ed u re s u n d e r the 1926 Act
d id no t p ro v id e for co m p u lso ry , final a n d b in d in g resolu- 4
4 In testimony before the Senate subcommittee of the Committee
on Interstate Commerce in 1924 on a proposed bill establishing 4
national boards of adjustment, Mr. Richberg, defined a “grievance”
as a “dispute [thatl arises over the application of an agreement.”
Hearings before the Committee on Interstate Commerce, S. 2646
at 202 (April 4, 1924). Additionally, he answered certain carriers’
criticisms that these adjustment boards would have an expansive
jurisdiction to make rules, rather than interpret them thus (id. at
202) :
The second objection of Mr. Holder is that these national
boards will standardize conditions, and that is an objection
which lacks seriously any good faith. The answer is that this
is precisely what the present Labor Board does and precisely
what these boards will not do, because the present Labor Board
not only interprets rules but makes rules, thus inducing stand
ardization of rules. The proposed boards only interpret rules.
498
14
tion o f th e d ispu tes . In s tead , re so lu t io n of these d ispu tes
was left to v o lu n ta ry a rb i t r a t io n o r n eg o t ia t io n . A c c o r d
ingly, th e n u m b e r o f u n a d ju s te d c la im s a c c u m u la te d to
the p o in t th a t seve ra l l a b o r o rg a n iz a t io n s th re a te n e d
strikes in o rd e r to ge t th em reso lved . U n io n P a c i f ic R .R .
v. P r ic e , 3 6 0 U .S . 6 0 1 , 610-11 ( 1 9 5 9 ) .
W ith this tu rm o il as b a c k g ro u n d , th e F e d e ra l C o o rd i
nator o f T ra n s p o r ta t io n , J o s e p h B. E a s tm a n , d ra f te d la n
guage fo r an a m e n d m e n t to the R L A th a t w o u ld p ro v id e
for the c re a t io n of an in d e p e n d e n t n a t io n a l b o a rd o f a d
justm ent w ith exc lus ive ju r isd ic t io n o v e r d isp u tes a r is
ing o u t o f the in te rp re ta t io n o r a p p l ic a t io n o f co llec tive
bargain ing ag reem en ts . C h ic a g o R iv e r , 3 5 3 U.S. a t 36-7;
B u rley , 3 2 5 U .S . a t 7 2 6 . M r . E a s t m a n ’s p ro p o sa l was
adopted by C o n g ress as S ec tion 3 F i r s t o f the R L A c re a t
ing the N R A B . B u r ley , 3 2 5 U.S. a t 7 2 6 7
M r. E a s t m a n ’s tes t im ony , as well as th a t of o thers ,
before th e S en a te co m m it te e c o n s id e r in g the a m e n d m e n ts
used the te rm s “ in te rp re ta t io n ” an d “ g r ie v a n c e ” in te r
changeab ly to m e a n an asse r t io n of a c o n t r a c tu a l r ig h t .6
In re sponse to the a rg u m e n t ra ise d b y th e A m e r ic a n S h o rt
Line R a i l ro a d A sso c ia t io n th a t S ection 3 sh o u ld no t app ly
to ra i l ro ad s o f less th a n 100 miles in leng th , M r . E a s tm a n
responded thus : * 8
8 In the Senate floor debate on the amendments, the floor manager
Senator Dill stated to the Senate that Mr. Eastman had prepared
the original amendments to the Act and he further stated that
“[Mr. Eastman] approves the amendments the Senate Committee
has adopted and appearing in the bill as reported to the Senate.”
D e b a te o n S . 3 2 6 6 , J u n e 18 , 1 9 3 4 , a s r e p r i n t e d i n , 1 T h e R a i l w a y
L a b o r A c t o f 1 9 2 6 at 936.
8 Mr. Eastman has been described as “one of the weightiest
voices before Congress on railroad matters.” S t . J o e P a p e r C o . v .
A t l a n t i c C o a s t L i n e R . R . , 347 U.S. 298, 304 (1954). Mr. Eastman’s
testimony in 1934 before the Senate and House Committees on the
proposed amendments to the Railway Labor Act was cited exten
sively by this Court in the C h i c a g o R i v e r c ase . 253 U.S. at 34-37.
499
15
T h e B o a rd w o u ld n o t h a n d le m a jo r issues relative
to w ages , ru les , a n d w o rk in g c o n d i t io n s . A ll th a t it
w o u ld h a n d le w o u ld b e m in o r issues r e la t in g to the
in te rp re ta t io n o f su ch ru les as ex is t an d to grievances
of em p lo y ees u n d e r e s tab l ish ed rules.
H e a r in g s b e f o r e th e C o m m it t e e o n I n t e r s t a t e C o m m e r c e ,
S. 3 2 6 6 a t 158 (A p r i l 19, 1 9 3 4 ) , r e p r in t e d in 3 T h e R a il
w a y L a b o r A c t o f 1 9 2 6 .
Sim ilarly , G e o rg e M . H a r r i s o n , P re s id e n t o f the Rail
w ay C le rk s a n d th e s p o k e sm a n fo r R L E A , discussed
c la im s a n d g r iev a n ces as fo llow s:
N o w th e o th e r class o f c o n t ro v e rs y is th e disputes
th a t a r ise o u t of the a p p l ic a t io n o f th a t ag reem en t to
the p ra c t ic a l s i tu a t io n on th e ra i l ro a d . F o r instance,
w e m a y h a v e a c la im fo r t im e c la im in g th a t the rule
of the c o n t r a c t sh o u ld p ro v id e fo r the p a y m e n t of so
m u ch . T h e ra i l ro a d m a y d isp u te th a t a n d c la im that
th ey u n d e r s ta n d it to be a n o th e r w ay . W e m a y have
a g r iev a n ce c o n c e rn in g sen io r i ty o f a m a n ; w e may
h av e a g r iev a n ce co n c e rn in g the d ism issa l o f a man,
the p ro m o t io n of a m an , re d u c t io n o f fo rce . There
are a th o u s a n d a n d one d iffe ren t k in d s o f contro
versies th a t c a n deve lop . T h o s e a re th e controversies
th a t will be se tt led b y th e n a t io n a l b o a rd . The
par tie s in the first in s ta n c e h a v e ag reed o n the con
t ra c t ; they h av e la id d o w n rules.
H ea r in g s b e f o r e th e C o m m it t e e o n In t e r s ta t e C o m m erce ,
S. 3 2 6 6 a t 3 4 (A p r i l 11, 1 9 3 4 ) , r e p r in t e d in 3 T h e R ail
w a y L a b o r A c t o f 1 9 2 6 .
R L E A su b m its th a t th e te s t im o n y o f M essrs . E astm an
a n d H a r r i s o n su p p o r ts the c o n te n t io n th a t “c la im s” are
class-w ide d isp u tes a n d “g r iev a n ces” a re d isp u tes particu
la r on ly to an ind iv idua l. H o w e v e r , it is a p p a r e n t in the
te s t im o n y o f M r. H a r r iso n , an e x p e r ien ce d la b o r union
official, th a t th e tw o term s a re used so m e w h a t in terchange
ab ly in p ra c t ic e by 1 9 3 4 .7 C e r ta in ly w h a t is undisputed
7 Mr. Harrison was subsequently appointed by President Roose-
gggelt to serve upon the "Committee of Six’’ a group composed of
16
in b o th m e n ’s te s t im o n y is th a t b o th “ c la im s ” a n d “g r iev
ances” m u s t h av e th e ir bas is in a r ig h t a r is ing f ro m an
existing a g r e e m e n t se t t in g ra te s of p ay , ru le s a n d w o rk in g
conditions. S im ilarly , th e H o u s e R e p o r t to the H o u se of
R ep re sen ta t iv e s ’ v e rs io n of the 1934 a m e n d m e n ts n o ted
in its d iscuss ion the new ly p ro p o se d S ec tion 3 th a t :
[ t ]h e sec o n d m a jo r p u rp o s e of the bill is to p ro v id e
suffic ient a n d effec tive m e a n s fo r th e se t t le m e n t o f
m in o r d isp u te s k n o w n as ‘g r ie v a n c e s ’, w hich d ev e lo p
f ro m th e in te rp re ta t io n a n d / o r a p p l ic a t io n o f the
c o n t ra c ts b e tw e e n th e la b o r u n io n s a n d the ca rr ie rs ,
fixing w ages, ru les an d w o rk in g co n d i t io n s .
E .R . R e p . N o . 1 9 4 4 , 7 3 d C o n g ., 2 d S e s s ., a t 2-3 ( J u n e
11, 1 9 3 4 ) , r e p r in t e d in , 1 T h e R a i lw a y L a b o r A c t o f
1 9 2 6 a t 9 1 9 -2 0 . M o re o v e r , in C h ic a g o R iv e r , th is C o u r t
defined th e term “g r ie v a n c e ” thus ( 3 5 3 U.S. a t 3 3 ) :
T h e s e a re co n tro v e rs ie s o ver the m e a n in g o f an ex is t
ing co llec tive b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t in a p a r t ic u la r
fa c t s i tu a t io n , g en e ra l ly invo lv ing o n ly o n e em ployee .
This w o rk in g def in i t ion is id en t ica l to th e o n e u tilized by
the N R A B to d e te rm in e its ju r isd ic t io n s ince 1934 .
3. The NRAB Has Consistently Held That Its
Jurisdiction Is Only Coextensive With Claims
Of Right Arising Under An Agreement
T h e N R A B is an “ ag e n cy p e c u lia r ly c o m p e te n t” to
resolve d isp u tes c o n c e rn in g the in te rp re ta t io n of collec tive
b arga in ing ag reem en ts . O r d e r o f R y . C o n d u c t o r s v. P it
ney, 3 2 6 U .S . 5 6 1 , 5 6 6 ( 1 9 4 6 ) . T h e C o n g re s s io n a l p u r
pose b e h in d the N R A B w as to vest this agency , co m p o sed
of re p re se n ta t iv e s of la b o r a n d ca r r ie r s , w i th th e a u
thority to m a k e in te rp re ta t io n s of co llec tive b a rg a in in g
carrier and labor officials charged with recommending to Congress
the appropriate level of statutory protective conditions for railroad
employees adversely affected by railroad mergers and consolida
tions approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Ry. Labor
Executives’ Ass'n v. V.S., 339 U.S. M2, 148-9 & n.10 (liMO).
501
17
ag reem en ts th a t a re final a n d b in d in g u p o n th e parties.
4 5 U .S .C . § 153 F i r s t ( m ) . A c c o rd in g ly , th e decisions
o f the v a r io u s d iv is ions o f the N R A B re g a rd in g their
ju r isd ic t io n a n d re m e d ia l a u th o r i ty sh o u ld b e g iven sub
s tan t ia l d e fe ren ce .
In p ra c t ice , the N R A B d o es n o t a d h e re to the dichot
o m y b e tw e e n “g r ie v a n c e s” a n d “ c la im s” a d v a n c e d by
H a w a i ia n a n d a m ic i . F o r e x a m p le , in a n a w a rd of the
T h i rd D iv is ion re so lv ing a “ g r ie v a n c e ” o n b e h a l f of an
em ployee th a t his s en io r i ty r a n k in g w a s im p ro p e r , the
B o a rd held :
W e no te , m o reo v e r , th a t P e t i t io n e r s ’ c la im does not
a llege th a t N o y e s ’ inc lu s ion o n the d isp u te d seniority
ro s te r v io la ted an y specific p ro v is io n o f th e Agree
m en t . It does no t , in sh o r t , c e n te r u p o n the inter
p re ta t io n of th e c o n t r a c t b e tw e e n th e Parties.
A c co rd in g ly , it does n o t c o n s t i tu te a d isp u te ‘grow
ing o u t o f g r iev a n ces o r o u t o f th e in te rp re ta t io n or
a p p l ic a t io n o f ag re e m e n ts c o n c e rn in g ra te s of pay,
ru les a n d w o rk in g c o n d i t io n s .” Y e t , it m u s t in order
fo r this B o a rd to e s tab l ish ju r isd ic t io n u n d e r Section
3, F ir s t ( i ) o f th e R a i lw a y L a b o r A c t.
N R A B T h ir d D iv is io n A w a r d N o . 2 5 5 4 3 ( A ig e s , R e fe r e e )
( 1 9 8 5 ) . S im ila r ly an a w a rd of th e S econd D iv is ion dis
m issing a c la im fo r la c k of ju r isd ic t io n he ld “ [i]t is well
se t t led th a t the ju r isd ic t io n of th is B o a rd is confined to
d ispu tes w h ich flow f ro m g r ie v a n c e p ro v is io n s of a col
lective b a rg a in in g a g r e e m e n t .” N R A B S e c o n d D ivision
A w a r d N o . 1 1 7 6 8 (C a r t e r , R e f e r e e ) ( 1 9 8 9 ) . S im ilarly , the
F ir s t D iv is ion d ism issed a c la im fo r r e in s ta te m e n t by an
em ployee n o t sub jec t to a n y co llec tive ag re e m e n t . N R A B
F irs t D iv is io n A w a r d N o . 2 3 9 0 9 ( T w o m e y , R e fe r e e )
( 1 9 8 6 ) . In a s im ila r s i tu a t io n , the F o u r th D iv is ion denied
a c la im for r e in s ta te m e n t by an em p lo y ee no t sub jec t to
a collec tive a g reem en t . N R A B F o u r th D iv is io n A w ard
502
18
N o. 4 2 0 5 ( M c A ll is t e r , R e f e r e e ) ( 1 9 8 5 ) .* T h e N R A B ’s
uniform a d m in is t r a t iv e t r e a tm e n t o f th e p a r a m e te r s o f its
jurisdiction em p h a s iz e s th is C o u r t ’s o b s e rv a t io n th a t the
defining c h a ra c te r i s t ic o f a d isp u te re fe ra b le to the N R A B
is “th a t th e d isp u te m a y b e co n c lus ive ly re so lv ed b y in te r
preting th e ex is t ing a g re e m e n t .” Conraif, 491 U.S. a t 305 .
4. The Transfer Of Certain Pending Disputes In
volving Air Carriers From The National Labor
Relations Board To Section 204 System Boards
Following The 1936 Amendments To The RLA
Does Not Vest Jurisdiction In Those Boards To
Resolve Claims Not Based Upon An Existing
Contract
H a w a i ia n has re lied u p o n la n g u a g e in Section 2 0 4
transfe rr ing to sys tem b o a rd s “cases p e n d in g a n d u n
adjusted on th e d a te o f a p p r o v a l o f th is A c t b e fo re the
N a tiona l L a b o r R e la t io n s B o a rd [“N L R B ” ]” as so m eh o w
giving S ec t io n 2 0 4 b o a rd s a type o f u n fa i r la b o r p ra c t ic e
jurisd iction . T h a t in te rp re ta t io n is be l ied b y the lan g u a g e
of S ection 2 0 4 re ad as a w ho le , th e o th e r p o r t io n s of
Title I I o f the R L A a n d by th e H o u se R e p o r t a c c o m p a n y
ing such leg is la tion .
T h e t r a n s fe r o f cases f ro m the N L R B to S ec tion 2 0 4
boards is m e n t io n e d in th e s a m e sen ten c e co n fe rr in g
ju risd ic tion u p o n the B o a rd s to d isp u te s o v e r “g r ievances
or . . . th e in te rp re ta t io n o r a p p l ic a t io n o f ag reem en ts
concern ing the ra te s o f p ay , ru les o r w o rk in g c o n d i t io n s .”
M oreover, S ec tion 2 0 6 , 4 5 U .S .C . § 186 . a lso p rov ided
that:
A ll cases re fe r re d to th e N a t io n a l L a b o r R e la t io n s
B o a rd , o r o ver w h ich th e N a t io n a l L a b o r R e la t io n s
B o a rd shall h av e ta k e n ju r isd ic t io n , invo lv ing any
d isp u te ar is ing fro m a n y c a u se b e tw een an y co m m o n
c a r r ie r b y a ir en g a g e d in in te r s ta te o r fo re ign co m
m e rc e o r a n y c a r r ie r b y a ir t r a n s p o r t in g m ail fo r o r
"Copies of those Awards are contained in the Appendix.
503
19
u n d e r c o n t r a c t w i th the U n i te d S ta te s G o v e rn m en t ,
a n d em p lo y ee s of s u ch c a r r i e r o r ca r r ie r s , a n d un
se t t led o n th e d a te o f a p p r o v a l o f th is A c t , shall be
h a n d le d to c o n c lu s io n b y th e M e d ia t io n B o a rd .
T h e re fo re , S ec t io n 2 0 4 d id n o t t r a n s fe r all p e n d in g air
c a r r ie r cases b e fo re the N L R B to a r b i t r a t io n pane ls . This
d is t inc tion is m a d e m o re a p p a r e n t b y th e H o u s e R e p o r t ’s
d iscussion of th e fu n c t io n of th e N a t io n a l A ir T ra n sp o r t
A d ju s tm e n t B o a rd a u th o r iz e d to b e e s ta b l ish e d u n d e r Sec
t io n 2 0 5 , 45 U .S .C . § 185, w h ic h w as to h a v e co n cu rren t
ju r isd ic t ion w ith S ection 2 0 4 b o a r d s th u s :
T h is new a d ju s tm e n t b o a rd will be c re a te d a n d will
fu n c tio n in the s a m e m a n n e r as th e ra i lw a y board,
ex cep t in g th a t it n ee d n o t b e e s tab l ish e d im m edia tely
b u t o n ly w h e n d ee m e d n ec es sa ry b y th e M edia tion
B o a rd . T h e re a so n fo r th is perm iss ive d e la y in its
fo rm a tio n is th a t th e re is n o th in g fo r such a board
to d o u n ti l e m p lo y m e n t c o n t ra c ts h av e b e e n com
p le ted , a n d th e re are n o t s u ch c o n t ra c ts in opera tion
now .
H .R . R e p . N o . 2 2 4 3 a t 1 ( M a r c h 2 6 , 1 9 3 6 ) , a s rep r in ted
in , 1 T h e R a ilw a y L a b o r A c t o f 1 9 2 6 , A L e g is la t iv e H is
to ry 1050 . A c co rd in g ly , th e re is n o bas is in th e limited
legisla tive h is to ry of T i t le I I o f the R L A to in fe r tha t a
g re a te r ju r isd ic t io n a l g r a n t w as g iven to b o a rd s o f adjust
m e n t u n d e r S ec t io n 2 0 4 th a n th a t g ra n te d to b o a rd s of
a d ju s tm e n t c re a te d u n d e r S ection 3.
5. This Court Has Consistently Held That The
NRAB’s Jurisdiction Is Limited To Resolution
Of Claims Arising Under Contracts
T h is C o u r t 's n u m e ro u s dec is ions re g a rd in g th e juris
d ic t ion of th e N R A B also h a v e p lace d no im p o r ta n c e on
th e d is t in c t io n b e tw e en “ g r iev a n ces” a n d “c la im s” , other
th an th a t e i th e r m u s t h a y e its bas is in a c o n t ra c tu a l right.
In d e ed , those dec is ions, l ike th e te s t im o n y o f Messrs.
E a s tm a n a n d H a rr iso n , ten d to use th e te rm s interchange-
504
20
ably to re fe r to d isp u tes r e g a rd in g th e in te rp re ta t io n of
application of ex is t ing co llec tive b a rg a in in g a g reem en ts .
In P itn ey , th is C o u r t h e ld th a t fed e ra l co u r ts w e re
without ju r isd ic t io n to in te rp re t the m e a n in g o f co llec tive
bargaining a g reem en ts b ec au se such re sp o n s ib i l i ty w as
exclusively w i th in th e p ro v in ce o f the N R A B . 3 2 6 IJ.S.
at 567 . S im ilarly , in S lo c u m , this C o u r t he ld th a t s ta te
courts la ck e d ju r isd ic t io n to in te rp re t co llec tive b a rg a in in g
agreements. T h e d isp u te in q u es t io n c o n c e rn e d w h ich
union's c o n t r a c t ap p l ied to c e r ta in w o rk p e r fo rm e d b y the
carrier. R e s o lu t io n o f th a t d isp u te w o u ld h av e b o th
re trospective a n d p ro sp e c t iv e effect o n th e re la t io n s b e
tween the u n io n s a n d th e ca rr ie r . A s th is C o u r t obse rv ed ,
“[tjhis type of g r iev a n ce h as long been c o n s id e re d a p o te n t
cause o f fr ic t io n lead in g to s t r ik e s .” Id . A c co rd in g ly , in
order to e n su re th a t th e R L A ’s p u rp o s e w as n o t th w a r te d ,
this C o u r t re a so n e d th a t C o n g ress h a d es tab l ish ed the
N R A B , an ag e n cy to “p ro v id e o p p o r tu n i t ie s fo r a d es ir
able d eg ree of u n i fo rm ity in the in te rp re ta t io n of ag re e
ments th ro u g h o u t the n a t io n ’s ra i lw a y sy s te m .” Id . a t 2 4 3 .
T hat re su lt w as re q u ire d in o rd e r to p ro m o te the p r im a ry
purpose of the R L A ; i .e . , av o id a n c e of in te r ru p t io n s to
interstate c o m m e rc e re su lt in g fro m “g r iev a n ces ar is ing
under ex is t ing a g re e m e n ts .” Id . a t 2 4 2 . T h e re fo re , b a se d
upon the p u rp o se s of the A c t a n d the d isp u te re so lu t io n
procedures p ro v id e d there in , this C o u r t he ld th a t the
N R A B h a d exc lus ive ju r isd ic t io n to ad ju s t “g r iev an ces
and d ispu tes o f the type h e re in v o lv ed .” Id . a t 2 4 4 .
This need fo r u n i fo rm ity in the c o n s t ru c t io n a n d a p p l i
cation of ex is t ing co llec tive b a rg a in in g a g reem en ts w as
again e m p h as iz ed in P e n n s y lv a n ia R .R . v. D a y , 3 6 0 U .S .
548, 5 5 3 -4 ( 1 9 5 9 ) w h e re in th is C o u r t h e ld th a t a re t i re d
employee w as n o t p e rm it te d to b r in g an ac tion in s ta te
court fo r c la im s ac c ru in g u n d e r the co llec tive b a rg a in in g
while the em p lo y ee h ad been in ac tive service. F in a l ly ,
in 1972 , this C o u r t e l im in a ted the las t ex c ep t io n to
N R A B ju r isd ic t io n o f c la im s ar is ing o u t o f co llec tive b a r
gaining a g reem en ts in A n d r e w s .
505
21
H o w e v er , A n d r e w s , does n o t c r e a te an e x p a n d e d juris
d ic t io n fo r th e N R A B to re so lve n o n -c o n tr a c tu a ! griev
ances re la ted to em p lo y ee d isc ip l ine . I n A n d r e w s , this
C o u r t o v e r ru le d its ea r l ie r d ec is ion in M o o r e v. I ll in o is
C e n tr a l R .R . , 3 1 2 U .S . 6 3 0 ( 1 9 4 1 ) th a t h a d perm itted
d isch a rg ed em p lo y ees to c o m m e n c e w ro n g fu l d ischarge
ac tions in s ta te c o u r t r a th e r th a n seek re in s ta te m e n t under
the ex is t ing co llec tive b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t a n d N R A B
p ro c ed u re s . Id . a t 3 2 6 . T h is C o u r t n o te d th a t th e “con
cep t o f ‘w ro n g fu l d is c h a rg e ’ im plies so m e so r t o f s ta tu to ry
o r c o n t ra c tu a l s t a n d a r d th a t m odifies th e t rad i t io n a l
c o m m o n -law ru le th a t a c o n t r a c t o f e m p lo y m e n t is term i
n ab le b y e i th e r p a r ty a t w ill .” Id . a t 3 2 4 . In th e case at
b a r , the em p lo y ee c o n c e d e d th a t “ the on ly s o u rc e o f [his]
r igh t n o t be d isch a rg ed , a n d th e re fo re to t r e a t an alleged
d isch a rg e as a ‘w ro n g fu l ’ o n e th a t en ti t le s h im to dam ages,
is the co l lec t iv e -b a rg a in in g a g r e e m e n t .” Id . T h e re fo re , in
a s ta te c o u r t ac t io n fo r w ro n g fu l d isch a rg e , th e court
w o u ld be re q u ire d to d e te rm in e th e e m p lo y e e ’s rights
solely by bas is o f an in te rp re ta t io n o f the ex is t ing contrac t.
Id . I n o th e r w ords , the sam e v ice a p p a r e n t ea r l ie r in
S lo c u m , w as p re se n t h e re : a s ta te c o u r t in te rp re t in g a
co llec tive b a rg a in in g ag re e m e n t , a ta sk g iven b y Congress
exc lusive ly to the N R A B . A c co rd in g ly , the dec is ion in
A n d r e w s re s ted u p o n the lo n g -s tan d in g v iew th a t the
N R A B h a d exc lusive ju r isd ic t io n to reso lve all disputes
th a t re q u ire d the in te rp re ta t io n o r ap p l ic a t io n of an agree
m en t se t t ing ra tes o f p ay , ru les o r w o rk in g co n d it ions .
S ignif icantly , in A n d r e w s th e re w as n o d iscuss ion of
w h a t w ou ld o c c u r if th e em p lo y ee asse r ted a sou rce of
p ro te c t io n ag a in s t w ro n g fu l d isc h a rg e in d e p e n d e n t of the
collec tive b a rg a in in g ag reem en t . T h a t A n d r e w s d id not
im plic i t ly fo reclose such an a rg u m e n t is ev id en t f ro m this
C o u r t ’s c h a ra c te r iz a t io n o f it in B u e ll , 4 8 0 U.S. a t 566
(e m p h a s is a d d e d ) :
In A n d r e w s , an em p lo y ee b r o u g h t a s ta te wrongful
d isch a rg e c la im b ase d s q u a r e ly o n an a l l e g e d b rea ch
22
o f t h e c o l le c t iv e - b a r g a in in g a g r e e m e n t . W e h e ld th a t
C o n g re s s h a d in te n d e d th e R L A d isp u te re so lu t io n
m e c h a n is m to be m a n d a to r y fo r th a t type of d ispu te ,
a n d th a t c o u r ts w e re th e re fo re fo rec lo sed f ro m a d
d re ss in g c la im s th a t p ro p e r ly ar ise u n d e r the R L A .
Indeed, th e s i tu a t io n c o n f ro n t in g this C o u r t in A n d r e w s
was re m a rk a b ly s im ila r to th a t p re s e n te d u n d e r S ection
301 in A llis -C h a lm e r s . T h e re , the em p lo y ee 's c la im u n d e r
state law w a s d e r iv e d f ro m r igh ts c o n fe r re d by the co llec
tive b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t a n d re so lu t io n of th a t c la im
was p re e m p te d by the c o m p u ls o ry a rb i t r a t io n p rov is ions
in the co llec tive b a rg a in in g a g reem en t . 471 U .S . a t 215-
16.
T h e fo re g o in g cases es tab lish the p ro p o s i t io n th a t the
N R A B is the exc lus ive fo ru m fo r the re so lu t io n o f dis
pu tes a r is in g u n d e r co n tra c ts . T h ese d ispu tes in c lude
“g r iev an ces” w h ich a re s im p ly a n o th e r te rm fo r a n in
d iv idual’s c la im of r igh ts a r is in g u n d e r a c o n tra c t . T h e re
is n o th in g in these dec is io n s th a t s u p p o r ts H a w a i ia n ’s
claim th a t the N R A B h as ju r isd ic t io n o f n o n -c o n tra c tu a l
“g r iev a n ces” o r c la im s b y em ployees . R L E A subm its
that th e ju r isd ic t io n a l re a c h o f S ec tion 3 a n d S ection 2 0 4
a rb it ra t io n u n d e r the R L A is g en e ra l ly co ex tens ive w ith
Section 301 a r b i t r a t io n u n d e r the L M R A an d , as show n
in P a r t I I I , in fr a , the L in g le s ta n d a rd s fo r p re e m p t io n
under S ec t io n 301 a p p ly w i th eq u a l fo rce to the R L A .
C. T he “O m itted Case” D escribed in B u r le y Does N o t
V est Ju r isd ic t io n In T h e N R A B To Resolve N on
c o n t r a c tu a l C laim s O r Grievances
T h e o n ly re m a in in g a r g u m e n t av a ilab le to H a w a i ia n
and a m ic i is th a t th is C o u r t ’s m e n t io n o f the “o m itted
case” in B u r le y es tab lishes a d o c t r in e th a t n o n -c o n tra c tu a l
d isputes b e tw e en em p lo y ees a n d em p lo y ers a re w ith in the
exclusive ju r isd ic t io n o f the N R A B . H o w ev er , the
“o m itted c a s e ” re fe r red to th e re in is o n ly a sh o r t-h an d
reference to c la im s a r is in g o u t o f an a g re e m e n t ap p licab le
to an em p lo y e e o th e r th a n the w ri t ten collec tive b a rga in -
507
2 3
in g a g reem en t . I n o th e r w o rd s , th e “ o m i t te d c a se ” still
h a s its f o u n d a t io n in “ righ ts a c c ru e d ” u n d e r a n existing
ag reem en t , w h ic h is the essence o f th e m in o r d isputes
d iscussed in B u r ley .
In B u r le y th is C o u r t co n s id e re d th e issue o f w h e th e r a
d u ly d e s ig n a te d co llec tive b a rg a in in g re p re se n ta t iv e was
em p o w e re d b y the R L A to sett le “ a c c ru e d m o n e ta ry
c la im s” o r su b m it th em to the N R A B to the ex c lu s io n of
the em p lo y ee s ’ r igh t to b r in g th o se c la im s in th e ir in
d iv idual n a m e s to th a t sam e agency . 3 2 5 U S. a t 712.
P a r t o f the C o u r t 's ana lys is in vo lved d is t in g u ish in g those
R L A d isp u tes th a t w e re su b jec t to N R A B ju risd ic t ion
from th o se w h ich w ere not. T h e C o u r t issued its now
fa m o u s def in i t ion o f “m in o r d i s p u te s” th a t in c lu d e d the
“o m it te d c a se ” , i .e . , a c la im “ fo u n d e d u p o n som e incident
o f the e m p lo y m e n t re la t ions , o r a sse r ted o n e , in d ep en d en t
o f those c o v e red by the c o l l e c t iv e a g r e e m e n t , e .g . , claims
o n a c c o u n t o f p e rso n a l in ju r ie s .” Id . a t 7 2 3 (em phas is
a d d e d ) .
In B u r ley , the C o u r t w as n o t c o n f ro n te d w ith an ac
tu a l d isp u te in vo lv ing an “o m it te d c a se ” as the c la im s at
issue w ere fo r m o n e ta r y d am a g e s u n d e r the ex is t ing col
lective b a rg a in in g ag reem en t . Id . a t 7 1 2 . H o w e v e r , the
C o u r t d id re fe r to an in d iv idua l e m p lo y e e ’s p e rso n a l in
teres t in the re so lu t io n o f a g r iev a n ce ag a in s t the carrier
“w h e re [it] a r ises f ro m the in c id en ts o f th e em ploym en t
no t co v e red b y a co llec tive a g re e m e n t .” Id . a t 7 3 6 .
R L E A su b m its th a t th e o m it te d ca se p r im a r i ly concerns
im plied- in -fac t a g reem en ts b e tw e en th e e m p lo y e r and
e i th e r th e u n io n o r em ployees . A s th is C o u r t h a s noted,
a w r i t ten R L A collec tive b a r g a in in g a g re e m e n t d o es not
c o n ta in all w o rk in g co n d i t io n s to w h ic h th e p a r t ie s have
agreed . P itts b u r g h & L .E .R .R . v. R y . L a b o r E x e c u t iv e s ’
A s s ’n , 491 U .S . 4 9 0 , 5 0 3 ( 1 9 8 9 ) . T h e re fo re , a practice
th a t w as m u tu a l ly s a t is fac to ry to th e p a r t ie s c o u ld have
been o m it te d from th e ir w r i t te n m e m o ra n d u m . Id . at
5 04 . In d e e d , the issue p re sen ted in C o n r a i l invo lved an
508
2 4
“o m itted c a s e ” b e c a u se th e re w as n o p ro v is io n in the
written co llec tive a g re e m e n t re g a rd in g r e tu r n to d u ty p h y
sical e x a m in a t io n s . 4 9 1 U .S . a t 3 1 2 . T h e d isp u te th e re
concerned w h e th e r th e c a r r i e r ’s in c lu s io n o f a d ru g -sc reen
urinalysis to these e x a m in a t io n s w a s p e rm it te d u n d e r the
im plied-in-fact ag reem en t . Id . a t 3 1 5 . T h e re fo re , the
dispute c o n c e rn e d the e x ten t o f the p a r t ie s ’ a c c ru e d r igh ts
under th is “o m it te d c a se ” , i .e . , the im p lied - in -fac t ag re e
m ent.9
T h a t the o m i t te d ca se m u s t hav e so m e basis in the
co n trac tu a l re la t io n sh ip b e tw e e n th e e m p lo y e r a n d e m
ployees is a p p a r e n t f ro m th is C o u r t 's su b s e q u e n t t r e a t
ment o f in d iv id u a l c la im s th a t w o u ld o th e rw ise be c o n
sidered “o m it te d c a se s” u n d e r the def in i t ion p ro f fe red by
H aw aiian .
In B u e ll , the C o u r t ac tu a l ly ad d re s se d th e ex a m p le
it h a d g iven in B u r le y fo r the “o m it te d c a s e ” : a c la im
on a c c o u n t o f p e rso n a l in ju r ie s b r o u g h t u n d e r th e F e d e ra l
E m ployers L iab i l i ty A c t ( “F E L A ” ) , 45 U .S .C . § 5 1 , et
seq . In th a t case, an em p lo y ee a l leged th a t the c a r r ie r
had n eg ligen tly p e rm it te d a w o rk p la c e e n v i ro n m e n t to
exist w h e re in he suffered physica l a n d m e n ta l in juries .
480 U.S. a t 5 5 9 . T h e c a r r ie r a rg u e d th a t r a th e r th a n
bring a n ac t io n u n d e r F E L A , the em p lo y e e sh o u ld h av e
been re q u ir e d to b r in g a g r iev a n ce ag a in s t su ch co n d i t io n s
because th e “exc lus ive fo ru m fo r an y d isp u te ar is ing o u t
of w o rk p la c e c o n d i t io n s is th e R L A . ” Id . a t 5 6 3 . T h is
C ourt re je c ted th a t a rg u m e n t . W hile th is C o u r t a c k n o w l
0 The omitted case also could apply to the situation discussed in
Telegraphers, wherein this Court had observed that in formulating
the collective agreement, the parties could agree that certain mat
ters were “reserved to individual contracting” (321 U.S. at 347),
i.e., “omitted” from the collective agreement. This view of the
omitted case is consistent with this Court’s concern in Burley that
the agent of the employee demonstrate some specific power of
attorney to resolve the employee’s individual claim of right under
an agreement independent of those matters covered by the collective
agreement.
509
25
ed g ed th a t th e em p lo y ee c o u ld b r in g a g r iev a n ce pursuan t
to th e co llec tive b a rg a in in g a g re e m e n t a lleg ing th a t the
w o rk in g c o n d i t io n s c re a te d by th e c a r r ie r v io la ted the
te rm s o f th a t a g re e m e n t , th a t r ig h t to g r ieve d id n o t fore
close the e m p lo y e e ’s re so r t to an in d e p e n d e n t fed e ra l stat
u to ry r ig h t a n d re m e d y for the s a m e c o n d u c t th a t could
h a v e b ee n g rieved . Id . a t 5 6 5 . In o th e r w o rd s , B uell
re so lved the q u e s t io n of c o n c u r r e n t r igh ts u n d e r con trac t
a n d federa l s t a tu te in a m a n n e r iden tica l to th a t m a d e in
T e r m in a l R a i l r o a d so m e 4 4 y ea rs b e fo re re g a rd in g state
r ig h ts .10
T h e s ign if icance o f B u e ll is th a t it d e m o n s t ra te s the
limits of the o m i t te d ca se in p rac t ice . C e r ta in ly , the ex
p ans ive a sse r t io n o f N R A B ju r isd ic t io n a rg u ed b y the
c a r r ie r in B u e ll w as re jec ted . In d e ed , in B u e ll , as in T er
m in a l R a i l r o a d , th is C o u r t ap p l ied an ana lys is rem ark ab ly
s im ila r to the on e u n d e r ta k e n in T in g le . In all three
cases, the em p lo y ee s h a d a c o n t ra c tu a l r igh t to seek a
lim ited c o n t r a c tu a l rem edy . H o w e v e r , the ex is tence of
th a t c o n t ra c tu a l r e m e d y d id n o t m e a n th a t it w as exclu
sive. In s te a d the c o n t ra c tu a l r e m e d y w as co m p lem en ta ry
to an in d e p e n d e n t s ta te o r federa l r igh t possessed by the
em ployees . B u e ll a n d T e r m in a l R a i lr o a d , th e re fo re , stand
10 Similarly, in McKinney v. Missouri-K.-T .R.R., 357 U.S. 265
(1958), this Court held that a returning veteran could assert his
reemployment rights under the Universal Military Training and
Service Act, 62 Stat. 614-18, without exhausting his contractual
claims before the NRAB. As part of its discussion, this Court
stated (id. at 270) :
[t]o insist that the veteran first exhaust other possibly lengthy
and doubtful procedures on the ground that his claim is not
different from any other employee grievance or claim under a
collective bargaining agreement would ignore the actual char
acter of the rights asserted and defeat the liberal procedural
policy clearly manifested in the statute for the vindication of
those rights.
Therefore, even though the employee’s claim concerned a matter
within his relationship with the employer, its noncontractual nature
did not require submission of the dispute to the NRAB.
510
2 6
for the p ro p o s i t io n th a t an em p lo y ee w h o asserts an in
dep en d en t r ig h t u n d e r s ta te o r federa l law th a t does no t
rest o n a r ig h t c r e a te d u n d e r the co llec tive o r in d iv id u a l
ag reem en t, m a y asse r t th a t fed e ra l o r s ta te r ig h t in p ro
ceedings in d e p e n d e n t o f a n y p ro c e e d in g b e fo re th e N R A B .
III. T H E P O L IC IE S F A V O R IN G C O M PU L SO R Y A R B I
T R A T IO N O F C O N T R A C T U A L D IS P U T E S U N D E R
S E C T IO N 301 O F T H E LM R A A R E ID E N T IC A L TO
T H E P O L IC IE S U N D E R L Y IN G T H E S T A T U T O R Y
D U T Y TO A R B IT R A T E S IM IL A R D IS P U T E S
U N D E R S E C T IO N S 3 A N D 204 O F T H E R L A
T h e fo re g o in g e x te n d e d d iscuss ion o f the lim its o f the
N R A B ’s ju r isd ic t io n d e m o n s t ra te s w h y this C o u r t ’s h o ld
ing in L in g le , a lso is ap p l ic a b le to th e R L A . In L in g le ,
this C o u r t he ld th a t “even if d isp u te re so lu t io n p u r s u a n t
to a co l lec t iv e -b a rg a in in g a g reem en t , o n th e o n e h a n d , an d
sta te law , o n th e o th e r , w o u ld re q u ire a d d re ss in g p rec ise ly
the s a m e se t o f facts , as long as the s ta te - law c la im can be
resolved w i th o u t in te rp re t in g the a g re e m e n t itself, the
claim is ‘in d e p e n d e n t ’ o f th e ag re e m e n t fo r § 301 p u r
poses.” R L E A su b m its th a t th e p re e m p t iv e effect o f the
R L A is the s a m e as S ec tion 301 o f th e L M R A , 2 9 U .S .C .
§ 185, in all cases w h e re th e re is a co llec tive b a rg a in in g
ag reem en t e s tab l ish in g a g r iev a n ce a n d a rb i t r a t io n
remedy.
L in g le p re su p p o se s the ex is tence o f a r b i t r a t io n p ro v i
sions th a t a re the exc lus ive re m e d y for d isp u tes ar is ing
u n d e r a co llec tive b a rg a in in g a g reem en t , a n d dec ides
w ha t th e im p a c t o f a m a n d a to r y a rb i t r a t io n p ro v is io n is
on s ta te - law c la im s th a t a re in d e p e n d e n t o f th e ag re e
m ent. T h u s , in L in g le , th e p re e m p t io n ana lys is s ta r ts
with the a s su m p t io n th a t if th e c la im invo lved a d ispu te
arising o u t o f th e in te rp re ta t io n o f a co llec tive b a rg a in in g
ag reem en t, a rb i t r a t io n w o u ld be th e exclusive rem ed y .
W h a t is c le a r f ro m L in g le is th a t th is C o u r t d id no t c o n
cern i tself w ith the poss ib il i ty th a t the p a r t ie s co u ld h av e
reached an a g re e m e n t th a t d id no t re q u ire them to arbi-
511
27
t ra te d ispu tes . T h a t issue is i r re le v a n t to the p reem ption
ana lys is in L in g le™
T h e re fo re , the fa c t th a t th e R L A s ta tu to r i ly m andates
th a t an e m p lo y e e su b m it all d isp u te s “g ro w in g o u t of
g r ievances o r o u t of the in te rp re ta t io n o r applica tion
o f a g reem en ts c o n c e rn in g ra te s o f pay , ru les , o r w ork
ing c o n d i t io n s ” to a d ju s tm e n t b o a rd s d o es no t m ean in g
fully d is t in g u ish cases th a t c o n c e rn th e p re e m p t iv e effect
o f S ec tion 301 f ro m th o se in v o lv in g the R a i lw a y L abor
A c t. In d e ed , a l th o u g h em p lo y ees u n d e r the ju r isd ic t io n of
the N L R A h a v e th e c h o ice as to w h e th e r o r n o t they de
sire to n eg o t ia te an a g re e m e n t th a t re q u ire s p a r t ie s to sub
m it c o n t ra c tu a l d isp u tes to a rb i t r a t io n , o n ce th a t choice
h a s been m a d e , a r b i t r a t io n b ec o m e s th e exc lus ive remedy
b y o p e ra t io n of S ec tion 3 0 1 . R e p u b l i c S t e e l C o r p . v. M ad
d o x , 3 7 9 U.S. 6 5 0 , 6 5 3 ( 1 9 6 5 ) . T h is C o u r t h a s made
c lea r th a t w h e re p a r t ie s h av e ag re e d to su b m it disputes
to a rb i t ra t io n , S ec t io n 301 does n o t p e rm i t th em to evade
th a t o b l ig a t io n ev en th o u g h the d ec is io n to in c lu d e a m an
d a to ry a rb i t r a t io n p ro v is io n in a n a g re e m e n t w a s volun
tary . A U is -C h a b r e r s , 471 U.S. a t 2 2 0 . T h is is so, be
c a u se a “ ru le th a t p e r m i t te d a n in d iv id u a l to sidestep
av a ila b le g r iev an ce p ro c e d u re s w o u ld cause a rb itra t ion
to lose m o s t o f its effectiveness, . . . as well as eviscerate
a c e n tra l t e n e t o f fed e ra l l a b o r c o n t r a c t law u n d e r § 301
th a t it is the a rb i t r a to r , n o t the c o u r t , w h o h a s responsi
b i lity to in te rp re t th e l a b o r c o n t r a c t in the first ins tance .”
L in g le , 4 8 6 U .S . a t 4 1 1 , q u o t in g , A ll is -C h a lm e r s , 471
U .S . a t 220 .
11 Even if the parties had not agreed to arbitration of any
disputes involving the interpretation or application of the collec
tive agreement, the preemption analysis would be the same. This
is because Section 301 requires that any court interpreting the
collective agreement apply a developing federal common law to the
meaning of its terms. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 419, 431 (1957). Therefore the concerns regarding uni
formity of result in contract interpretation disputes apply with
equal force under both Section 301 and Section 3 of the RLA.
Slocum, 339 U.S. at 243.512
2 8
In d e c id in g L in g le , i t is ev id e n t th a t th is C o u r t w as
mindful o f th e e x t re m e im p o r ta n c e to s tab le in d u s t r ia l r e
lations of the p re e m p t iv e effec t o f S ec t io n 301 s ince the
C ourt d iscussed in d e ta i l th o se sem in a l dec is io n s c o n
cerning t h a t very issue. T h i s C o u r t n o te d t h a t i ts ea r l ie r
decision in T e a m s t e r s v. L u c a s F lo u r , C o . , 3 6 9 U .S . 95
( 1 9 6 2 ) , h e ld th a t :
T h e o rd e r in g a n d a d ju s t in g o f c o m p e t in g in te re s ts
th ro u g h a p ro c ess o f free a n d v o lu n ta ry co llec tive
b a rg a in in g is th e k e y s to n e o f th e fe d e ra l sch e m e to
p ro m o te in d u s tr ia l p eace . S ta te law w h ic h fru s tra te s
th e effort o f C o n g re s s to s t im u la te th e sm o o th fu n c
t io n in g of th e p ro c ess th u s s tr ikes a t the very c o re of
fe d e ra l la b o r policy .
In a n o th e r p r e - L in g le c a se in v o lv in g p re e m p t io n u n d e r
Section 3 0 1 , w h e re th e co llec tive b a rg a in in g c o n t r a c t c o n
ta ined a “m a n d a to r y g r ie v a n c e a d ju s tm e n t o r a rb i t r a t io n
p ro c ed u re” ( B o y s M a r k e t s v. R e t a i l C le r k s U n io n , 398
U.S. 2 3 5 , 2 5 4 ( 1 9 7 0 ) ) a n d the e m p lo y e r so u g h t to e n
join a s tr ike in b re a c h o f a no -s tr ike o b l ig a t io n in the
agreem ent, th is C o u r t s ta te d th a t th e “v e ry p u rp o se s of
a rb it ra t io n p ro c e d u re s is to p ro v id e a m e c h a n is m fo r
the e x p e d it io u s s e t t lem en t o f in d u s tr ia l d isp u tes w i th o u t
resort to s trikes , lo ck o u ts , o r o th e r self-help m e a s u re s .”
Id. a t 2 4 5 . In B o y s M a r k e t , th is C o u r t he ld th a t the
an ti- in junc tion p ro v is io n s o f the N o r r i s - L a G u a r d ia A c t,
29 U .S .C . § 101, e t s e q . , m u s t be a c c o m m o d a te d to p e r
mit a n an ti-s tr ike in ju n c t io n issued in o rd e r to re q u ire
specific p e r fo rm a n c e o f a c o n t r a c tu a l a rb i t r a t io n p ro v i
sion u n d e r S ection 3 0 1 . In so h o ld in g , th is C o u r t , re ly
ing u p o n C h ic a g o R iv e r , s ta te d th a t the m a n d a to r y a rb i
tra t io n p rov is io n s of th e R L A , like S ec t io n 3 0 1 , are
necessary to th e “pea ce fu l s e t t l e m e n t” of d ispu tes . T h e r e
fore, a l th o u g h C h ic a g o R iv e r “ in vo lved a r b i r ta t io n p ro c e
dures e s tab l ish ed b y s t a tu te ” , the p r in c ip les e la b o ra te d
in th a t case w ere “eq u a lly a p p l ic a b le ” to th e S ection 301
case in l igh t o f the “ im p o r ta n c e th a t C o n g re s s has a t
tached to the v o lu n ta ry s e t t lem en t o f la b o r d isp u tes with-
513
29
o u t the re so r t to self-help a n d m o re p a r t ic u la r ly to arbi
t r a t io n as a m e a n s to th is e n d .” T h u s B o y s M a r k e t not
o n ly s ta n d s fo r th e p ro p o s i t io n th a t m a n d a to r y a rb itra t ion
p rov is ions a re c ru c ia l to f u r th e ra n c e o f th e n a t io n a l labor
p o licy fa v o r in g in d u s tr ia l p e a c e th ro u g h a rb i t r a t io n of
c o n t ra c tu a l in te rp re ta t io n d isp u tes , b u t th a t these prin
ciples, by re l ian ce o n C h ic a g o R iv e r , a re e q u a l ly appli
c a b le to b o th th e N L R A a n d R L A .
W h ile a w a re of the im p o r ta n c e of m a n d a to r y arbi
t r a t io n to in d u s t r ia l p eace , th is C o u r t in L in g lc recog
n ized th a t S ec t io n 301 d o es n o t p r e e m p t c la im s th a t find
th e ir so u rc e in n o n -c o n tr a c tu a l c la im s. T h e s tab il i ty de
r ived f ro m in d u s tr ia l se lf -g o v e rn m en t th ro u g h th e griev
a n c e m a c h in e ry does n o t m e a n , as fo u n d b y th e L in g le
C o u r t , th a t fed e ra l l a b o r law a u to m a t ic a l ly p re e m p ts non
c o n t r a c tu a l c la im s b ro u g h t by u n io n iz e d w o rk e rs against
th e i r em p loyers .
In v iew o f th e fa c t th a t s tr ic t a d h e re n c e to m an d a to ry
a rb i t r a t io n p ro v is io n s fo r the re so lu t io n o f d isp u tes aris
in g o u t o f a g re e m e n ts is c r i t ica l to the e f fec tu a tio n of the
p u rp o se o f S ec t io n 3 0 1 , it is e v id e n t th a t the R L A can
h a v e no g re a te r p re e m p t iv e fo rc e t h a n S ec t io n 301 unless
S ection 3 F ir s t ( i ) re q u ire s s u b m iss io n o f non-con trac
tu a l d isp u tes to a d ju s tm e n ts b o a rd s . H o w e v e r , as ex
p la in ed in S ec t io n II , s u p r a , o n ly d isp u te s a r is in g ou t of
th e in te rp re ta t io n o r a p p l ic a t io n o f ag re e m e n ts m u s t be
su b m i t te d to a d ju s tm e n t b o a r d s c o n s t i tu te d u n d e r the
R L A . T h e re fo re , i t fo l low s th a t th e h o ld in g in L in g le
sh o u ld h a v e a p p l ic a t io n to cases c o n c e rn in g th e preem p
tive effect o f the s ta tu to r i ly m a n d a te d a rb i t r a t io n of
c la im s a n d g r iev an ces u n d e r th e R L A .
514
30
C O N C L U SIO N
F o r th e re a s o n s set fo r th above , R L E A su b m its th a t
the d ec is io n o f th e S u p re m e C o u r t o f H a w a i i sh o u ld be
affirmed.
R esp ec tfu l ly su b m it te d ,
J ohn O’B. Clarke, J r.
(Counsel of Record)
Donald F. Griffin
Elizabeth A. Nadeau
Highsaw, Mahoney & Clarke, P.C.
1050 17th Street, N.W.
Suite 210
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 296-8500
A tto rn ey s f o r t h e R a ilw a y L a b o r
Dated: April 1,1994 E x e c u t iv e s ’ A sso c ia t io n
515
No. 92-2058
■nr.............. i in— ....................................... ....................... ................... .............................. ii in i . n m
I n T h e
Suprem e Court of tfjc Hitffrit ^ ta tru
O c t o b e r T e r m , 1 9 9 3
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.,
P etition er,
v .
Grant T. Norris,
Respondent.
a n d
Paul J . F inazzo, Howard E . Ogden a n d
Hatsuo Honma,
P etitioners,
v .
Grant T. Norris,
R espondent.
On W rit Of C ertio ra ri
To The Supreme Court F o r the S ta te Of Hawaii
BRIEF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
AS AMICUS CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
Deborah T . Poritz
A ttorn ey G en eral o f New Je r s e y
Andrea M. Silkowitz
A ssistan t A ttorney G eneral
O f Counsel
Eldad Philip Isaac*
D eputy A ttorney G eneral
O n th e B r ie f
R .J . H u g h e s J u s t i c e C o m p le x
T r e n to n , N e w J e r s e y 0 8 6 2 5
(2 0 1 ) 4 9 1 -7 0 3 8
*Counsel o f R ecord
517
1
Q U E S T IO N P R E S E N T E D
W hethe r the Hawaii Suprem e C ourt erred in
concluding that respondent’s state law w rongful discharge
claims w ere not preempted by the Railway Labor Act, 45
U .S .C . § 151 e t s e q .
518
11
T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S
Page
Q U E S T IO N P R E S E N T E D .......................... i
IN T ER EST O F N E W JERSEY ...................................................... 1
IN T R O D U C T IO N A N D
SU M M A R Y O F A R G U M E N T .......................... 2
A R G U M E N T ............................. 4
A. The Express Statutory Language o f the
Railway Labor Act Together With the C o u r t’s
Jurisprudence o f the Act Clearly Require that
All Em ployment Disputes Between Employees
and C arriers Be Resolved Nonjudicially Under
the Act and Not U nder State Em ploym ent
L a w ......................................................................................... 4
B. The Jurisprudence o f the C ourt Requires
That W rongful Discharge Causes o f Action be
Preempted as Such Actions Constitute M inor
Disputes Under the Railway Labor Act . . . . . 20
C O N C L U S IO N
519
Ill
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Ca se s:
Ames v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston,
111 U .S . 449 ( 1 8 8 4 ) ........................................ 18
Andrews v. Louisville <£ Nashville Railroad,
406 U .S . 271 ( 1 9 7 2 ) ......................................................... 24, 25
Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Ry. v. United States,
244 U.S. 336 ( 1 9 1 7 ) ........................................................ ... 18
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell
480 U.S. 562 ( 1 9 8 7 ) .................................................................. 14
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees
v. Burlington Northern R. Co. ,
802 F .2d 1016 (8Cir 1 9 8 6 ) ..................................................... 21
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville
Terminal Co., 394 U .S . 369 (1969) ..................................... 29
Burke v. Monumental Division, No. 52,
B ro th e rh o o d o f L o c o m o t iv e E n g in eers ,
273 F. 707 (D .C . Md. 1919)................... 18
California v. Taylor, 353 U .S . 564 (1957)
Chicago & Alton R.R v. United States,
247 U .S . 197 ( 1 9 1 8 ) .................................................................. 18
Chicago & N.W.R. Co. v.
United Transportation Union,
402 U .S . 570 ( 1 9 6 3 ) ..................................................................... 7
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
___ U.S. ____ , 112 S.Ct.
2608 (1992) .
520
16, 20
IV
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm 'n. v.
Continental Airlines, 372 U .S . 714 ( 1 9 6 3 ) ........................ 28
Consolidated Rail Corporation v.
Railway Labor Executives' Association,
491 U .S . 299 (1989) ....................... .. .......................passim
Delta A ir Lines v. A ir Line Pilots,
861 F .2d 665 (11th Cir. 1988),
cert, denied 110 S .C t. 201 ( 1 9 8 9 ) ........................................ 14
Elgin, J. <4 E.R. Co. v. Burley,
325 U .S . 711 ( 1 9 4 5 ) ....................................................passim
English v. General Elec. Co.,
496 U .S . 72 ( 1 9 9 0 ) .................................... ............................. ... 17
Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v.
De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982) .................... ... 16
Gilmer v. Interstate!Johnson Lane Corporation,
111 S .C t. 1647 ( 1 9 9 1 ) ........................................................ 28 , 29
Gunther v. San Diego & Arizona Eastern Ry. Co.,
368 U .S . 257 ( 1 9 6 5 ) .................................................................. 12
International Association of Machinists v.
Central Airlines, 372 U .S . 682 (1963) ............. ................... 6
International Association of Machinists v. Street,
367 U .S . 740 ..................................................... 4, 7, 15, 16, 18
Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,
430 U .S . 519 ( 1 9 7 7 ) .................................................................. 16
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef Inc.,
486 U .S . 399 ( 1 9 8 8 ) ............................................................ 2 , 29
Malone v. White Motor Corp.,
435 U .S . 497 ( 1 9 7 8 ) ........................................... .................... 16
521
V
Northwest Airlines v. Air Line Pilots Assn. Intern.,
808 F .2 d 76 (D .C . C ir. 1987), cert, denied
486 U .S . 1014 (1988) ............................................................... 15
Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. Day,
360 U .S . 554 ( 1 9 5 9 ) .................................................. 23 , 24 , 25
Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. United
States Railroad Labor Board, 261 U .S . 72 ( 1 9 2 2 ) ............. 5
Perrin v. United States,
444 U .S . 37 (1979) ..................................................... ... 5
R.J. Corman R. Co. v. Palmare,
999 F .2d 149 (6 th C ir. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Retail Clerks v. Schermerhom,
375 U .S . 96 (1963) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U .S . 218 ( 1 9 4 7 ) .............................................. ... 17
Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Ry Clerks,
281 U .S . 548 (1929) ........................................... ..........................5
Trainmen v. Chicago River. & Indiana R. Co.,
353 U .S . 30 ( 1 9 5 7 ) ................................. ...................... ... 13
Transportation-Commun. Emp. U. v. Union
Pacific, 385 U .S . 158 (1966) ..................................... 14
Union Pacific R. Co. v. United
Transportation Union, 3 F .3d 255
(8 th C ir. 1993) ............................................................................ 15
Union Pacific Railroad v. Price,
360 U .S . 612 ( 1 9 5 9 ) .................................................................. H
Union Pacific Railroad v. Sheehan,
439 U .S . 94 ( 1 9 7 9 ) ........................................... ... 1 3 , 23-24, 25
522
VI
United Paperworking International
Union v. MIS CO, Inc.,
484 U .S . 29 (1987) ................................. .................................... 14
United States v. Pennsylvania R.,
323 U .S . 612 ( 1 9 4 5 ) .................................................................. 18
United Transportation Union v.
Long Island Railroad Company,
supra at 455 U .S . 678 .................... ........................ 15, 17, 20
Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40,
300 U .S . 515 ( 1 9 3 7 ) ................................................. ... 5 , 6
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers,
461 U .S .757 (1983) .................................................................. 14
Whitehouse v. Illinois Central R.R.,
349 U .S . 366 ( 1 9 5 5 ) .......................... ................................ ... . 10
Wilson v. New,
243 U .S . 332 ( 1 9 1 7 ) .................................................................. 18
Constitution a n d Sta tutes:
U .S . C onst.
A rt. V I, cl. 2 ............................................................................... 16
29 U .S .C . § 1 8 2 ............................................................................. 29
29 U .S .C . § 1 8 5 ( a ) ..................................................... 29
29 U .S .C . § § 1 8 5 ................................................... 29
42 U .S .C . § 12212 ........................ 28
42 U .S .C .A . § 1981 N ote ........................................................ 28
523
45 U .S .C . § 1 5 1 ............................................................ ... 4 , 29
45 U .S .C . § 151a ( 4 ) ........................................... ................... 8, 9
45 U .S .C . § 151a (5) . . . . . .................... .......................8, 9
45 U .S .C . § 152 Eighth ............. ................................................. 7
45 U .S .C . § 152 F irst ........................................ ... 7
45 U .S .C . § 152 F irst and Second ..... 8
45 U .S .C . § 153 F irst (a) ....................................................... 11
45 U .S .C . § 153 F irst (b) and (c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
45 U .S .C . § 153 F irst (d)-(f) . ............ ............ 11
45 U .S .C . § 153 F irst (i) ............................................... 8, 9 , 21
45 U .S .C . § 153 F irst (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
45 U .S .C . § 153 F irst ( m ) ............................... 12
45 U .S .C . § 153 F irst (p) ............... 13
45 U .S .C . § 153 F irst (q) ....................................................... 13
45 U .S .C . § 153 Second . . . . . . . . . . . . . _____ 9 , 12
45 U .S .C . § 155 F irst ........................................ ..........................8
45 U .S .C . § 421 .............................. ..............................................26
45 U .S .C . § 4 4 1 ............. .............................................................. 19
45 U .S .C . § 151a ( 1 ) ........................................... ................... 5, 9
45 U .S .C . §§ 157, 158, 159 ..................................................... 11
45 U .S .C . § 7 0 1 ........................................................................... 19
524
va
Vlll
N .J .S .A . 27: IB-2 ........................................... ... 1
N .J .S .A . 27:25-1 ..................................................................... ... . 1
Miscellaneous:
The N a tio n a l R a ilr o a d
A djustm ent B o a r d : A U nique A dm in istrative
A gen cy , 46 Ya l e L .J. 567, (1937) ................. ... 10
525
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
The S tate o f N ew Jersey has a fundam ental in terest in
securing and m aintaining the peacefu l, o rderly and efficient
operation o f freigh t and passenger rail service to and from its
territo ry . G eographically situated in a densely populated
reg ion , with significant industrial and agrarian econom ic
sectors, the d iversified econom y o f N ew Jersey has long
depended on the existence o f an effic ien t and o rderly regional
and national railroad transportation system . This
transportation system m oves N ew Jersey-produced goods in
interstate com m erce and provides the S ta te ’s citizens and
econom y with efficient and unin terrupted access to the
national econom y. T he N ortheast’s integrated regional
econom y has created in N ew Jersey , as well as in adjoining
states, a large com m uting labor force travelling daily by
railroad service to and from N ew Jersey in interstate
com m erce. The efficient and d isruption-free m ovem ent of
these passengers and freight is an essential and im portant
elem ent o f the developm ent o f N ew Je rsey ’s econom y and the
L egislature o f this State has declared that "a sound, balanced
transportation system is vital to the fu ture o f the State and is
a key factor in its continued developm ent." N .J .S .A . 2 7 :lB -2 .
Pursuant to the S ta te’s L eg isla tu re’s declaration in New
Jersey ’s Public T ransportation Act o f 1979, N .J .S .A . 27:25-1
e t s e q . that "it is the responsibility o f the State to establish and
provide for the operation and im provem ent o f a coherent
public transportation system in the m ost efficient m anner[,]"
the State o f N ew Jersey operates through the N ew Jersey
T ransit C orporation an extensive in trastate and interstate
transportation netw ork. N ew Jersey T ransit Rail O perations,
a subdivision o f N ew Jersey T ransit, and its rail em ployees
are governed by the com prehensive federal schem e enacted by
526
2
C ongress to regulate this na tion’s interstate ra ilroad industry . 1
INTRODUCTION
AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
T he w rit o f certiorari presently befo re the C ourt
originates from the decision o f the Suprem e C ourt o f H aw aii
in Norris v. Finazzo, et al., 842 P .2d 634 (H aw . 1992) and
Norris v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., its unreported com panion
case. T he C ourt below ruled that the R ailw ay L abor A ct, 45
U .S .C . § 151 et seq. does not preem pt H aw aii’s w rongful
discharge law which perm its an action in tort for the v iolation
o f H aw aii’s W histleb low ers’ Protection Act. T he m atter arose
after respondent N orris was fired from his em ploym ent as a
m echanic with H aw aiian A irlines and filed a law suit alleging
that he was dism issed due to reporting safety vio lations at the
airline to the Federal Aviation A dm inistration. In ru ling that
the Railw ay L abor A ct did not preem pt H aw aii’s law , the
court below relied on Lingle v. Norge Div. o f Magic Chef,
Inc., 486 U .S . 399 (1988), which established the preem ption
standard used in the L abor M anagem ent R elations A ct, 29
U .S .C . §§ 141-188. F or the reasons set forth herein , amicus
State o f N ew Jersey respectfully subm its that the Suprem e
C ourt o f H aw aii erred and should be reversed.
T he resolution o f this dispute has far reaching
consequences to the labor relations o f rail and a ir ca rriers in
in terstate com m erce. R espondent and the S olic ito r G eneral
seek a declaration by the C ourt that would allow the S tates to *
While the Railway Labor Act clearly governs labor relations in
both the airline and railroad industry, this brief in support of the petitioner
will focus on the railroad side of the Act.
527
3
regulate the em ploym ent re la tionship betw een ca rriers and
their w orkers by perm itting the im position o f local
em ploym ent tort laws upon in terstate carriers. Such state
regulation o f the railroad and airline industry , how ever, is
d irectly contrary to the express language o f the R ailw ay Labor
A ct, which was enacted by C ongress to prevent any labor
disruption to interstate com m erce o r to carriers engaged
therein. T he historical record and this C o u rt’s ju risp rudence
concerning the A ct clearly establish that C ongress desired that
all railroad and airline labor d isputes be resolved and adjusted
by labor and m anagem ent in the railroad industry pursuant to
the specific schem e established by C ongress and w ithout resort
to the courts. Indeed, the supervisory role granted by
C ongress to the Federal courts under the RLA is so lim ited
that the C ourt has noted that Federal jud icial review under the
A ct is "am ong the narrow est know n to the L aw ." Quite
clearly then, responden t’s dem and that the S tates and their
courts be given a greater role than the Federal courts possess
in this highly federalized area is incongruous with the purpose
and express language o f the Act.
T he respondent and the Solic ito r G eneral’s re liance on
a m yopic reading o f this C o u rt’s decision in Consolidated Rail
Corporation v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association
("Conrail"), 491 U .S . 299 (1989) m ust not serve as the basis
for the uprooting o f the long existing strict lim itation on the
S tates’ regulation o f railroad and a irlin es’ industrial relations.
Q uite the opposite from respondent’s contentions, this C o u rt’s
Conrail decision has only strengthened the R ailw ay L abor Act
by holding that a "m inor" d ispute under the Act occurs where
a discharge o r an adverse em ploym ent action are "arguably"
perm itted by the contract o f em ploym ent, / .e . , that the claim
by the em ployer is not frivolous, not in bad faith o r not
obviously insubstantial. As the gravam en o f w rongful
d ischarge actions is the term ination o f the contract o f
em ploym ent, an em ployer has a light burden to dem onstrate
528
4
that a d ischarge is a "m inor" dispute which m ust be adjusted
under the A ct. In actions involving a w histleb low er’s c laim ,
C ongress has expressly determ ined that such w rongful
d ischarge actions constitu te "m inor" d isputes w hich m ust be
adjusted w ithin the R ailw ay L abor A ct. C ongress has thus
indicated its in tent that all state law s sounding in the "tort o f
public policy" and relating to interstate ra ilroads m ust be
preem pted.
A R G U M E N T
A . T h e E x p ress S ta tu to ry L an g u a g e of
th e R ailw ay L a b o r A ct T o g e th e r W ith th e
C o u r t ’s J u r is p ru d e n c e o f th e A ct C lea rly
R e q u ire th a t All E m p lo y m en t D ispu tes
B etw een E m ployees a n d C a r r ie r s Be
R eso lved N o n ju d ic ia lly U n d e r th e A ct a n d
N ot U n d e r S ta te L aw
1. T h e C a rd in a l P u rp o se o f th e R ailw ay L a b o r A ct is
to A void All D ispu tes D isru p tiv e to In te rs ta te C om m erce
T he Railw ay Labor A ct, as am ended, 45 U .S .C . § 151
et s e q . has created an elaborate and specialized adm inistrative
dispute resolution schem e intended by C ongress to provide a
com prehensive federal m echanism for the nonjudicial
settlem ent o f all em ployer-em ployee disputes w hich arise in
the railroad em ploym ent relationship. "It is fa ir to say that
every stage in the evolution o f this railroad labor code was
progressively infused with the purpose o f securing self
adjustm ent betw een the effectively organized railroads and the
equally effective railroad unions and, to that end, o f
establishing facilities for such self-adjustm ent by the railroad
com m unity o f its own industrial controversies." In tern ation a l
A sso c ia tio n o f M ach in ists v. S treet , 367 U .S . 740, 760
529
5
(quoting Elgin, J. & E.R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U .S . 711 , 752-
753 (1945) (F rankfurter, J ., d issenting), aff'd. on rehearing,
327 U .S . 661 (1946)). A plain reading o f the R ailw ay Labor
A ct leaves no doubt that it was the intention o f C ongress to
have the entire ty o f labor-m anagem ent disputes resolved by
conference and nonjudicial m eans as provided fo r by the
m echanism s created in the Act. T his cardinal congressional
purpose was m otivated by C ongress’s express desire to
prevent labor conflicts and strife injurious to in terstate railroad
transportation and the econom y o f the nation . C ongress
recognized that in the process o f settling p rivate d isputes on
the railroads, appreciable consequences to the public may
follow . Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40,
300 U .S . 515, 552 (1937). "The peaceable settlem ent o f labor
controversies, especially w here they m ay seriously im pair the
ability o f an in terstate rail carrier to perform its service to the
public, is a m atter o f public concern ." Ibid, at 552. A s the
C ourt concluded in Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Ry Clerks, 281
U .S . 548, (1929), "Congress considered it to be ’o f the
highest public in terest to prevent the in terruption o f interstate
com m erce by labor disputes and s trik es .’" Id. at 561 (quoting
Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. United States Railroad
Labor Board, 261 U .S . 72 (1922)).
T he very first stated purpose o f the R LA declares the
intent o f the A ct to "avoid any in terruption to com m erce o r to
the operation o f any carrier engaged there in ." 45 U .S .C .
§ 151a (1) (em phasis added). In ascertaining the m eaning of
a legislative provision, the appropriate place to begin is with
the language o f the enactm ent itself. Perrin v. United States,
444 U .S . 37, 42 (1979). In using the w ords "avoid any
in terrup tion ," C ongress m ade it clear that its first and p rim ary
priority was to prevent not a few or som e in terruptions but
any, i .e . , one and all, in terruptions and causes o f disruption
to the peace o f railroading in interstate com m erce. The
avoidance o f interruptions to com m erce constitutes the raison
530
6
d ’itre o f the RLA and all its m achinery was designed to serve
the stated purposes o f the A ct and prevent labor d isputes and
strife w hich m ay im pair the tranquility and peace o f the
railroads. International Association of Machinists v. Central
Airlines, 372 U .S . 682, 689 (1963). As this C ourt held in
Virginian Ry. v. Federation, supra:
T he R ailw ay L abor A ct, § 2, declares that its
purposes, am ong o thers, are ’[t]o avoid any
in terruption to com m erce or to the operation o f
any carrier engaged th ere in ,’ and ’to p rovide
fo r the prom pt and orderly settlem ent o f all
disputes concerning rates o f pay, ru les o r
w orking cond itions.’ The provisions o f the A ct
and its history ... establish that such are its
purposes, and that the latter is in aid o f the
former. W hat has been said indicates clearly
that its provisions are aim ed at the settlem ent
o f industrial disputes by the prom otion o f
collective bargaining betw een em ployers and
the authorized representative o f their
em ployees, and by m ediation and arb itra tion
when such bargaining does not resu lt in
agreem ent. [Id. at 553; em phasis added .]
A ccordingly , C ongress intended that any labor d ispute
w hich would constitute an interruption to com m erce and could
jeopard ize the tranquility o f the rails m ust be subject to the
A ct’s ow n dispute resolution m echanism s.
2. The RLA Was Designed For the Resolution of All
Employer-Employee Disputes
To im plem ent the Congressional purpose o f preventing
any in terruption to com m erce, the Act im poses a b inding duty
upon labor and m anagem ent to confer in o rder to reso lve all
531
7
their d ifferences. C ongress has "consistently adhered to a
regulatory policy w hich places the responsibility squarely upon
the carriers and the unions to m utually w ork out settlem ents
o f all aspects o f the labor relationship, T hat policy was
em bodied in the R ailw ay Labor A ct o f 1926, 44 S tat. 577,
which rem ains the basic regulatory enac tm en t." S treet, supra,
at 740-41 (em phasis added). Section 2 F irst o f the A ct, 45
U .S .C . § 152 F irst m akes it the affirm ative duty o f carriers
and their em ployees and m andates that m anagem ent and labor
m ust "exert every reasonable effort . . . to settle all disputes
w h eth er aris in g ou t o f th e a p p lica t io n o f su ch a g reem en ts o r
o th erw ise , in o rder to a v o id any in terru ption to com m erce or
to the operation o f any ca rrier grow ing out o f any dispute
betw een the ca rrier and the em ployees th e re o f." Id . ; em phasis
supplied. S im ilarly , Section Tw o, Second requires that ”[a]ll
disputes betw een a carrier o r carriers and its or their
em ployees s h a ll b e c o n s id e r e d , and if possible, decided, with
all expedition , in conference. . . . " Em phasis added.
These provisions, it has been held, are not m ere
exhortations or recom m endations but are intended to be
obligatory and enforceable. C h ica g o & N .W .R. C o. v. U nited
T ran sportation U nion, 402 U .S . 570 (1963). The obligation
to confer and negotiate "is laid on ca rrier and em ployees alike
. . . and in equally plain term s it applies to a l l disputes covered
by the A ct, w hether m ajor or m inor." B u rley , su p ra , a t 325
U .S . 725. L ikew ise, 45 U .S .C . § 152 Eighth requires every
e a rn e r to notify its em ployees that "all disputes betw een the
e a rn e r and its em ployees will be handled" pursuant to the
provisions set forth in § 152. T he A ct thus creates "a process
o f perm anent conference and negotiation betw een the carriers
on the one hand and the em ployees through their unions on the
o ther." S treet, su p ra , a t U .S . 760 (quoting B u rley , su p ra , at
325 U .S . 752-753). Q uite plainly, then, the express language
o f the Act m andates that railroad ow ners and w orkers must
m ake every reasonable effort available to them and to settle
8
"a l l d isputes" which m ay exist betw een them , w hether they
arise ou t o f the application o f a labor contract "or o th e rw ise ."
3. The RLA Establishes A Mechanism For the
Resolution of All Employer-Employee Disputes By Dividing
the Universe of Railroad Disputes Into Two Categories
In the event that a d ispute cannot be am icably resolved
in conference pursuant to 45 U .S .C . § 152 F irs t and Second,
the A ct establishes specific m echanism s to handle such
situations, each depending on the typing o f the dispute into
one o f tw o categories. In this regard , C ongress divided the
total universe o f all railroad disputes into those concerning
rates o f pay, rules, o r w orking conditions, 45 U .S .C . § 151a
(4), know n as "m ajor d isputes", and those grow ing out o f
g rievances or out o f the interpretation or application o f
agreem ents covering rates o f pay, rules, o r w orking
conditions, 45 U .S .C . § 151a (5), known as "m inor d isputes."
As the C ourt succinctly put it, "m ajor disputes seek to create
contractual rights, m inor disputes to enforce them ."
C o n so lid a ted R a il C orp o ra tio n v. R ailw ay L a b o r E xecu tiv es ’
A sso c ia tio n , 491 U .S . 299 (1989) at 302. U nder the Act
unresolved m ajor disputes are referred to the N ational
M ediation Board, 45 U .S .C . § 155 F irst, w hereas m inor
d isputes are subject to the N ational Railroad A djustm ent Board
("N R A B "). 45 U .S .C . § 153 F irst (i).
In referring unsettled labor disputes to the N R A B , the
A ct d irects that these disputes m ust be those "grow ing ou t o f
grievances o r out o f the interpretation o r application o f
agreem ents concerning rates o f pay, rules, o r w orking
conditions." Id . (Em phasis added.) This language in § 153
F irst (i), how ever, does not exist independently o f o ther
provisions in the A ct and is identical to the language in §
151a (5) ("general purposes)" w nich, together with § 151a (4)
constitu te the universe o f all disputes which C ongress was
533
9
seeking to guard against and regulate in im plem enting the
p rim ary purpose o f the A ct, nam ely " [1] ° avoid any
in terruption to com m erce o r to the operation o f any carriers
engaged there in ." 5 151a (1). T hus, w hat C ongress clearly
intended in the A ct was that any dispute w hich did no i fall
w ithin § 151a (4) w ould fall w ithin the ju risd ic tion o f the
N R A B . In o ther w ords, any dispute w hich is not a "m ajor
dispute" m ust ipso facto be a "m inor dispute" and fall under
§ 151a (5) and be subject to A djustm ent Board ju risd ic tio n . 2
T he logic underlying this schem e is sim ple and
consistent with the overall purpose o f the Act: C ongress m eant
for a l l d isputes o f potential d isruptive im pact on com m erce
and carriers to be regulated by the A ct. C ongress then
d ivided this w orld o f disputes into "m ajor" and "m inor"
disputes and created m echanism s to address each w ith in the
fram ew ork o f the Act. A dispute defined as "m inor" under §
151a (5) m ust be finally and conclusively resolved by the
N RA B under § 153 F irst (i) w hereas a "m ajor d ispute" is to
be m ediated by the N ational M ediation Board pursuant to §
155. T o conclude otherw ise would effectively create a third
class o f d isputes in contraindication to the language o f the
2 Section 3 Second of the Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153 Second, also
permits the resolution of disputes by Special Boards of Adjustment, created
voluntarily by mutual consent of union and management, to decide
'disputes of the character specified [in § 153]." Id. Such boards, which
may take a variety of forms, such as system, group or regional boards of
adjustment, may be dissolved upon 90 days’ notice to the other party and,
thereafter, dispute resolution returns to the NRAB. Id.
Section 3 Second, as amended in 1966 by Pub. L. 89-
456, also requires the establishment of Public Law Boards of Adjustment
upon the written request of either the carrier or the union. Special and
Public Law Boards awards are 'final and binding upon both parties to the
dispute," Id., and are enforceable in district court in the same manner as
awards of the NRAB. Id.
534
10
A ct. In C o n ra il, su p ra , at 299, the C ourt explicitly declined
to crea te such a third type o f railroad d ispute, stating , "w e
shall not aggravate the already difficult task o f d istinguishing
betw een m ajor disputes and m inor d isputes by adding a third
ca tegory o f hybrid d isputes." Id . at 310.
4. Congress Intended That All "Minor" Dispute Be
Resolved By the Railroad Community
T he resolution o f all unresolved "m inor disputes"
under the A ct was expressly entrusted by C ongress to the
N R A B , a body exclusively com posed o f ra ilro ad ’s w orkers
and m anagers. In doing so, C ongress recognized that the
w orld o f railroading is unique am ong the trades, with an
insu lar w ork cu lture difficult for outsiders to understand yet
alone en ter and resolve railroad g rievances . 3 As the C ourt
concluded in W hitehou se v. I llin o is C en tra! R .R ., 349 U .S .
366, (1955), "Both its history and the interests it governs
show the Railw ay Labor A ct to be unique. ‘T he railroad w orld
is like a state w ithin a state. Its population . . . has its ow n
custom s and its own vocabulary, and lives according to rules
o f its ow n m ak in g .’" Id . at 371 (quoting G arrison, The
N ation a l R a ilr o a d A djustm ent B o a r d : A U nique A dm in istrative
A g en cy , 46 Yale L .J. 567, 568-69 (1937). C onsistent w ith
this understanding , C ongress established a dispute resolution
system com posed only o f ra ilroad ’s labor and m anagem ent.
5 As noted by Representative Arentz during the 1926 debate on the
Act, "[i]n the operation of a railroad ... minor disputes, involve discipline,
grievances, and disputes over the application and meaning of an agreement.
These disputes are of a character to be understood by those who operate
the railroad and those who work on the railroad, and often very difficult
for an outsider to grasp.- [67 CONG. Rec. 4499-4526 (1926) reprinted in
Senate Rep. 93d Cong 2d Sess. (1974), Legislative History of the
Railway Labor Act as Amended (1926 through 1966), at 359
(1974).]
535
11
Intending that the N RA B be m ade up only o f industry people,
C ongress com posed the Board o f an equal num ber o f m em bers
to be designated by carriers and unions, 45 U .S .C . § 153 F irst
(a), as selected by the respective parties o f their ow n accord ,
45 U .S .C . § 153 F irst (b) and (c), w ith conflic ts ultim ately
resolved by the N ational M ediation Board. 45 U .S .C . § 153
F irst (d)-(f). Indeed, dem onstrating the com plexity inherent
w ithin the railroad industry , C ongress structured the NRAB
into four subunits, each responsible for a particu lar type o f
railroad m etier. As the C ourt stated in U nion P a c ific
R a ilr o a d v. P r ic e , 360 U .S . 612 (1959),
the em ployees considered that their in terests
would be best served by a w orkable statutory
schem e providing for the final settlem ent o f
grievance by a tribunal com posed o f people
experienced in the railroad industry . The
em ployees’ representatives m ade it c lear that,
if such a statutory schem e w ere provided , the
em ployees would accept the aw ards as to
disputes processed through the schem e as final
settlem ents o f those disputes w hich w ere not to
be raised again. [Id . at 614.]
T he language and structure o f the A ct thus reveals C ongress’s
intent that the N RA B, m ade up o f ra ilro ad ’s ow ners and
w orkers, resolve w ithout any outside in terference all d isputes
arising on the roads which are not typed as "m ajo r d ispu tes . " 4
As such, the aw ards m ade by the N RA B have been decreed by
C ongress to be final and binding upon both parties to the
Consistent with Congress's intent that all disputes on the roads be
self-adjusted by the railroads and unions without outside interference,
Congress in Sections 7, 8, 9, 45 .S.C. §§ 157, 158, 159, also created
a voluntary mechanism for final and binding arbitrations, separate from the
mandatory adjustment mechanisms in the Act.
536
12
dispute, 45 U .S .C . § 153 F irst (m ), and the C ourt has
em phasized this tim e and tim e again. G u n ther v. San D ieg o
A rizon a E astern Ry. C o ., 368 U .S . 257, 263 (1965).
5. The Language of the Act Forbids the Removal of
Employer-Employee Dispute Resolution Out of the
Railroad Industry
C learly , then, the Act by its inherent structu re and
constitu tion , forbids m inor disputes to be rem oved ou t o f the
railroad industry for decision. Even w here the m em bers o f
the NRAB are deadlocked or cannot m ake an aw ard , the Act
requires the deadlocked N RA B division to appoint o f its ow n
choosing a referee who will be brought in to "sit w ith the
division as a m em ber thereo f and m ake an aw ard ." 4 5
U .S .C . § 153 F irst (1). N otably, even in the face o f deadlock,
congressional insistence on m aintaining all dispute resolution
within the railroad industry is strongly apparent. T he A ct
creates a schem e w here, instead o f exporting elsew here a
deadlocked dispute for resolution by an outsider, a referee is
selected by the parties them selves and is brought in to sit as
a full N RA B division m em ber to hear the case together with
its railroad industry m em bers, w ho can confer w ith , educate
and seek to convince the referee, p rio r to the la tte r’s casting
o f the tie-breaking vote w hich will decide the dispute f o r the
d iv ision . 5 S im ilarly , in cases involving public law boards,
C ongress m ade it clear that refusal o f a party to subm it to the
d ispute resolution process w ill not be tolerated and the
N ational M ediation Board will appoint an individual fo r the
recalcitrant party. 45 U .S .C . § 153 Second. This sim ple yet
com pelling facet o f the Act m ust be view ed as strong and
In cases where the NRAB cannot agree on such a re^--ee, the Act
permits the National Mediation Board to appoint such a referee to join the
division and decide the case. 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1).
537
13
clear m anifestation o f congressional intent that all disputes
arising in the railroad industry m ust be resolved only within
this industry , unless C ongress clearly indicates o therw ise.
F rom the A ct’s express language, it is c lea r that
C ongress was determ ined to keep railw ay disputes ou t o f the
courts and thereby allow the industry to adjust its own
disputes with little jud icial in terference. "C ongress considered
it essential to keep these so-called ’m in o r’ d isputes w ithin the
A djustm ent Board and out o f the courts ." U nion P a c ific
R a ilr o a d v. S h e e h a n , 439 U .S . 94 , (1979) (quoting Trainm en
v. C h ica g o R iver. & In d ian a R. C o . , 353 U .S . 30, 40 (1957)).
In such actions, "the findings and o rder o f the division o f the
A djustm ent Board shall be conclusive on the parties. . . . " 45
U .S .C . § 153 F irst (p). In this regard , § 153 F irst (p) perm its
actions in U nited States D istrict C ourt to enforce aw ards by a
board o f adjustm ent but on exceptionally narrow grounds. A
d istrict court m ay set aside an o rder by the Board only for
failure o f the division to com ply with the requirem ents o f the
Act; for failure o f the Board to conform or confine itse lf to
m atters w ithin the scope o f the d iv ision ’s ju risd iction ; o r, for
fraud o r corruption . Id. L ikew ise, the review afforded by
45 U .S .C . § 153 F irst (q) in d istrict court is exceptionally
narrow and based on the sam e crite ria as in § 153 F irs t (p).
In S h eeh a n , su p ra , at 439 U .S . 89, (1979) the C ourt noted
that the scope o f jud icial review o f A djustm ent Board
decisions is "am ong the narrow est know n to the L aw ." Id . at
91 . W ithout equivocation , the A c t’s language instructs that
the courts o f the U nited States have few and constricted
pow ers o f review under the Railw ay L abor A ct . 5
5 La this context, the dissent of Justice Frankfurter in Burley is
enlightening. Justice Frankfurter wrote: 'the policy of the legislation,
derived from a long painful experience, is to keep labor controversies on
the railroads out of the courts except in the few specifically defined
situations where Congress has put them into the courts. Congress has
538
14
T he R ailw ay Labor A ct was enacted for the benefit o f
ca rriers , em ployees and the public, Trans p o r t a t ion -C om m u n .
E m p. U. v. U nion P a c ific , 385 U .S . 158, 164 (1966). In so
doing C ongress created a dispute resolution system delicately
balanced betw een the interests o f these three groups, com plete
in itself, and which the C ourt has characterized "provides a
com prehensive fram ew ork for the resolution o f labor disputes
in the railroad industry ." A tch ison , T o p ek a a n d S an ta F e Ry.
C o. v. B u ell, 480 U .S . 562 (1987).* 7 On its face, the A ct
provides m inim al involvem ent by the courts o f the U nited
S tates, a c lear reflection o f congressional intent to contain all
dispute resolution exclusively within the Act. To in terpret the
A c t’s schem e as allow ing the involvem ent o f state and local
courts in railw ay labor disputes is entirely inconsistent with
the language o f the Act and with this C o u rt’s ju risp ru d en ce .'
made a departure in the Railway Labor Act from the normal availability of
judicial remedies, and we ought not read the new law through the
spectacles of the old remedies.' Burley, supra, at 327 U.S. at 677;
emphasis added. These words by Justice Frankfurter resonate validly today
and are probative to the question now before the Court.
7 The Act constitutes a complete and self-contained package agreed
to by carriers and labor to settle their disputes peacefully. The delicate
balancing of interests made by Congress and the various compromises
made by labor and management in return for the ultimate structure of the
Act require no modifications or alterations. The Act 'is a complicated but
carefully devised scheme for adjusting the relations between the two
powerful groups constituting the railroad industry. It misconceives the
legislation and mutilates its provisions to read into it common law notions
for the settlement of private rights.' Burley, supra, at 325 U.S. 758
(Frankfurter dissenting).
* Notably, while review of NRAB and adjustment boards is limited,
it has been held that in post-arbitral award situations the courts may, in
exceptional instances, set aside awards which violate clearly established
public policy. Cf. United Paperworking International Union v. MISCO,
Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987); Cf. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers,
461 U.S.757, 766 (1983); Delta Air Lines v. Air Line Pilots, 861 F.2d
539
1 5
6. Congress Intended that the RLA Preempt State
Employment Law
A s is evident from the preceding discussion o f the A ct,
C ongress intended for the Railw ay L abor A ct extensively and
com prehensively to occupy the field o f ra ilroad labor disputes.
As the C ourt noted , ”[t]he fram ew ork for fostering voluntary
adjustm ents betw een carriers and their em ployees in the
in terest o f the efficient d ischarge by the carriers o f their
im portant functions w ith m inim um disruption from labor strife
has no statutory parallel in o ther industry . T hat m achinery,
the product o f a long legislative evolution , is m ore com plex
than that o f any o ther industry ." S treet, su p ra , a t 367 U .S .
755. N or have the states engaged in regulating this industry .
As the C ourt further held,
T here is no com parable history o f longstanding
state regulation o f railroad collective bargaining
or o f o ther aspects o f the railroad industry.
M oreover, the Federal G overnm ent has
determ ined that a uniform regulatory schem e is
necessary to the operation o f the national rail
system . In particu lar, C ongress long ago
concluded that federal regulation o f railroad
labor relations is necessary to prevent
disruptions in vital rail service essential to the
national econom y. A disruption o f service on
any portion o f the interstate railroad system can
cause serious problem s throughout the system .
[U n ited T ran sportation U nion v. L o n g Is la n d
R a ilr o a d C om pan y, su pra at 455 U .S . 6 8 8 .]
665, 671 (11th Cir. 1988), cert, denied 110 S.Ct. 201 (1989); Northwest
Airlines v. Air Line Pilots Assn. Intern., 808 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
cert, denied 486 U.S. 1014 (1988); Union Pacific R. Co. v. United
Transportation Union, 3 F.3d 255 , 258-260 ( 8th Cir. 1993).
540
16
A s it is c lear that, in creating the R L A , C ongress
determ ined to regulate the industrial relations o f this en tire
industry , preem ption o f state law s which in trude into this field
is requ ired . In analyzing w hether state law has been
preem pted by a federal enactm ent, ” ’[t]he purpose o f C ongress
is the u ltim ate touch sto n e .'" M alon e v. W hite M otor C o rp .,
435 U .S . 497, 504 (1978) (quoting R eta il C lerk s v.
S c h erm erh o m , 375 U .S . 96 , 103 (1963). By v irtue o f the
A c t’s ow n clear schem e o f dividing all d isputes into m ajor and
m inor d isputes and resolving them w ithin the fram ew ork o f
the R LA and, pursuant to this C o u rt’s long ju risp rudence
finding congressional intent to occupy the field o f railroad
regulation and labor re la tions, Street, su p r a , it m ust be
concluded that C ongress has preem pted the field from state
partic ipation and intervention . The United S tates C onstitution
A rt. V I, cl. 2 provides that "the Law s o f the U nited S tates .. .
shall be the suprem e Law o f the Land; .. . any T hing in the
C onstitution o r Law s o f any state to the C ontrary
no tw ithstanding ."
In this case, C ongress, through the extensive and
com prehensive nature o f the Act, has determ ined that all
ra ilroad labor disputes arising betw een em ployees and carriers
m ust be governed by the R LA , no labor d ispute having been
left fo r the sta tes’ ju risd iction . "C ongress’ in tent m ay be
’explicitly stated in the statu te’s language o r im plicitly
contained in its structure and p u rp o se .’" C ip o llo n e v. L ig g ett
G rou p , Inc. _____ U .S . ______, 112 S .C t. 2608 (1992)
(quoting J o n e s v. R ath P ack in g C o ., 430 U .S . 519 , 525
(1977)). "In the absence o f an express congressional
com m and, state law is preem pted if that law actually conflicts
w ith federal law [citations om itted] o r if federal law so
thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to m ake reasonable
the in ference that C ongress left no room for the S tates to
supplem ent i t . ’" C ip o llo n e v. L iggett, su p ra , at 112 S .C t.
2608 (quoting F idelity F e d e r a l Sav ings & L o a n Assn. v. D e L a
541
17
C u esta , 458 U .S . 141, 153 (1982) (quoting R ice v. S an ta F e
E lev a to r C o r p ,, 331 U .S . 218, 230 (1947); s e e a ls o E n glish
v. G en era l E le c . C o ., 496 U .S . 72 , 79 (1990). It is hence
clear that the language o f the A ct federalizes all disputes
betw een carriers and their em ployees and preem pts state
resolution o f labor-m anagem ent disputes.
%
7. The RLA is One Part of A Vast Congressional
Scheme Regulating the Railroad Industry
F urther support for the preem ption o f state law is
found in the positioning o f the R ailw ay L abor A ct in the m idst
o f a vast field o f railroad law s enacted by C ongress. The
Railw ay L abor A ct, is one part o f a w hole expansive statutory
schem e created by C ongress to regulate the nation’s railroads.
F o r decades, this vast congressional regulatory schem e has
defined the legal rights and obligations o f railroad em ployers
and em ployees with respect to one another as w ell as their
obligations to the public at large. "R ailroads have been
subject to com prehensive federal regulation for nearly a
cen tu ry", L on g Is lan d R R , su p ra , at 455 U .S . 687 and "[tjhere
can be no serious question that . . . the C om m erce C lause
grants C ongress the p lenary authority to regulate labor
relations in the railroad industry in general." Id . a t 682-83.
E xecuting its constitutional pow ers under the C om m erce
C lause, C ongress w ove a tight legislative fabric designed to
cover all in terstate rail transportation by enacting a set o f
related and interdependent laws contro lling every facet o f life
on the railroads. As the C ourt has observed , "the Federal
G overnm ent has determ ined that a uniform regulatory schem e
is necessary to the operation o f the national rail system ." Id .
at 6 8 8 . T he net effect o f these congressional enactm ents has
been conclusively to federalize railroad law and rem ove this
substantive area from regulation by the states. The h istory o f
congressional railroad enactm ents clearly dem onstrates the
542
18
pervasive presence o f federal law .’
Recognizing the vital importance of the railroad industry
to the national economy, in 1862 Congress enacted the Pacific Railroad
Act of 1862, c. 120, 12 Stat. 489, enabling the building of a
transcontinental rail system by granting the railroads rights of way through
public lands. See Ames v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 111 U.S. 449, 450
(1884). To regulate and integrate the nation's rail and shipping network
into one cohesive national system of transportation, Congress enacted the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 379, creating over one hundred
years ago a comprehensive federal scheme to regulate the railroad industry
through the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). See United States v.
Pennsylvania R., 323 U.S. 612 (1945). To deal with railroad labor
disputes, in 1888 Congress passed the Arbitration Act of 1888, 25 Stat.
501, which was intended to bring peace to the battles between railroad
owners and employees which were viewed as deleterious to the national
rail system. See Street, supra, at 367 U.S. 756 n. 11 (1961). In 1893,
Congress legislated the Safety Appliance Acts, c. 196 §1, 27 Stat. 531 to
require and regulate safety equipment on interstate railroads. In 1898,
dissatisfied with the lack of peaceful labor relations on the roads.
Congress returned to the railroad labor arena and enacted the Erdman Act,
c. 370, 30 Stat. 424, which created a voluntary system of mediation and
arbitration of railroad disputes.
With the dawn of the twentieth century in 1907, Congress enacted
the Hours of Service Act, c. 2939, § 1, 34 Stat. 1415, limiting the duty
hours of various types of railroad employees and thereby improving safety
and working conditions. See Chicago & Alton R.R v. United States, 247
U.S. 197 (1918); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. United States, 244
U.S. 336 (1917). In 1908, Congress passed the Employers’ Liability Act,
c. 149, § 1, 35 Stat. 65, regulating and standardizing personal injury
actions by railroad employees against the railroads. In 1913, Congress
once again returned to the labor area and enacted the Newlands Act of
1913, c. 5, 38 Stat. 103, repealing the Erdman Act of 1898 and providing
for a new manner of voluntary mediation and arbitration of railroad labor
disputes. In 1916, to avert a strike by four railway unions, Congress
passed the Adamson Act, c. 436, § 1, 39 Stat. 721, mandating the eight-
hour work day for certain types of employees and railroads. See Wilson v.
New, 243 U.S. 332, 340-45 (1917); Burke v. Monumental Division, No.
52, Broth'rhrod of Locomotive Engineers, 273 F. 707 (D.C. Md. 1919).'
In December 1917, during the First World War, the President by
543
19
C ongress has for over one hundred years regulated all
aspects o f RR life as m anifested by the breadth and depth o f
its ra ilroad enactm ents in the last cen tury . A s the Sixth
C ircu it concluded, "C ongress has undertaken the regula tion o f
alm ost all aspects o f the railroad industry , including rates,
safety, labor re la tions, and w orker conditions. T his lasting
history o f pervasive and uniquely tailored congressional action
indicates C ongress’s general intent that ra ilroads should be
regulated prim arily on a national level through an integrated
netw ork o f federal law ." R .J . G orm an R. C o. v. P a lm o r e , 999
F .2 d 149 (6th C ir. 1993). As this C ourt said in C a lifo rn ia v.
T aylor, 353 U .S . 564 (1957), "L ike the Safety A ppliance A ct,
the R ailw ay L abor Act is ’all-em bracing in scope and national
in its purpose, w hich is as capable o f being obstructed by state
as by individual a c tio n .’" Id . (quoting U nited S tates v. State
o f C a lifo rn ia , 297 U .S . 175, 186 (1936)).
authority of an Act of Congress, 1916, c. 418, 39 Stat. 619, 645, took
over the railroads of the country and operated them through the Director
General of Railroads until March 1, 1920. Following the War, Congress
enacted the Transportation Act of 1920. c. 91, 41 Stat. 456, which
returned the railroads to private ownership and established a new railroad
dispute resolution mechanism to replace the Newlands Act of 1913. In
1926, Congress legislated the Railway Labor Act of 1926, c. 347, Title I,
§ 1, 44 Stat. 577, which replaced the dispute resolution mechanism of the
Transportation Act of 1920. In 1934, Congress passed the Railroad
Retirement Act of 1934, c. 868, § 1, 48 Stat. 1283, providing railroad
employees with federal retirement benefits and in 1938, Congress enacted
the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, c. 680, § 1, 52 Stat. 1094,
legislating federal unemployment benefits to railroad employees. In 1970,
Congress passed the Railroad Safety Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. § 421, to
standardize rail safety and reduce accidents and, finally, in 1973, Congress
enacted the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, 45 U.S.C. § 701,
which, following the bankruptcy of eight major railroads, reorganized the
entire collapsed eastern and cnidwestern railroad industry into Conrail to
prevent disruption t > interstate commerce. See Regional Rail
Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
544
2 0
P reem ption o f state law in this case is w arranted as a
result o f C o ngress’s far reaching and thorough occupation o f
the ra ilroad field. C ongressional regulation in this field entails
m uch m ore than safety regulation and includes social
legislation intended to am eliora te the lives o f ra ilroad w orkers
and their fam ilies. Such enactm ents as the Railroad
R etirem ent A ct, the R ailroad U nem ploym ent Insurance A ct,
F E L A , the A dam son A ct, the H ours o f S ervice A ct, and the
R ailw ay L abor Act form together a cohesive net regulating the
non-safety aspects o f the railroad industry. T his set o f federal
laws strongly suggests that federal law so thoroughly occupies
the legislative field that preem ption is required . C ip o llo n e v.
L ig g ett, su p ra . As this C ourt declared, "[t]o allow individual
s ta te s ...to c ircum vent the federal system o f railroad
bargain ing , o r any o f the o ther elem ents o f federal regulation
o f ra ilroads, would destroy the uniform ity thought essential by
C ongress and would endanger the efficient operation o f the
in terstate rail system ." L on g Is la n d RR, su p ra , at 455
U .S .6 8 9 . F o r these reasons, the C ourt should presently hold
that, in the context o f the Railway Labor Act, state w rongful
d ischarge law is preem pted.
B. The Jurisprudence of the Court
Requires That Wrongful Discharge Causes of
Action be Preempted as Such Actions
Constitute Minor Disputes Under the
Railway Labor Act
1. Conrail Establishes The "Arguably Justified" Test
For Minor Disputes
In C on ra il, su p ra , the most recent opinion involving
the defin ition o f a "m inor" dispute, the C ourt clarified the
m anner by which a distinction may be m ade betw een "m ajor"
and "m inor" disputes:
545
21
W e hold that if an em ployer asserts a claim
that the partie s’ agreem ent gives the em ployer
the discretion to m ake a particu la r change in
w orking conditions w ithout p rio r negotiation ,
and if that claim is a rg u a b ly ju s t i f ie d by th e
term s o f th e p a r t i e s ’ a g reem en t f t .e . , th e c la im
is n e ith er obv iou sly in su bstan tia l o r fr iv o lo u s ,
n o r m a d e in b a d fa i t h ) , the em ployer m ay
m ake the change and the courts m ust defer to
the arbitral ju risd iction o f the board . [C o n ra il,
su p ra , at 491 U .S . 310; (em phasis added).]
In announcing this test for analyzing disputes as "m ajor" or
"m inor," the C ourt highlighted that the "arguably justified"
test im poses a " ’relatively light burden which the railroad
m ust beai[] in establishing exclusive arbitral ju risd ic tion under
the R L A ." Id. at 307 (quoting B ro th e rh o o d o f M ain ten an ce o f
Way E m p lo y ees v. B urlington N orthern R. C o ., 802 F .2d
1016, 1022 (8C ir 1986). A ca rrier arguing that its action
against an em ployee is "arguably justified" by the term s o f the
partie s’ contract, can dem onstrate such an assertion o f
arguability with a show ing that its re liance on the con tract is
not frivolous, o r is not obviously insubstantial, o r is no t m ade
in bad faith. D em onstrating any one o f these elem ents perm its
a dispute to be adjusted as a m inor d ispute under the exclusive
ju risd iction o f the N RA B pursuant to 45 U .S .C . § 153 F irst
(i). "W here, in contrast, the em ployer’s claim s are frivolous
o r obviously insubstantial, the d ispute is m ajo r." C o n ra il at
307. 10
P rio r to adopting the "arguably justified" test, the
As Conrail points out with approval, other court"- ha e utilized
terms such as spurious" and "frivolous" to convey the exact same
standard reached by the Court. Conrail at 306-07.
546
2 2
C o n ra il C ourt review ed in passing B u r le y ’s m inor dispute test,
noting that,
B u rley looks to w hether a claim has been m ade
that the term s o f an existing agreem ent either
establish o r refute the presence o f a righ t to
take the disputed action . T he d istinguishing
feature o f such a case is that the d ispute may
be conclusively resolved by in terpreting the
existing agreem ent. [C o n ra il at 305.]
R espondent and the Solic ito r G eneral argue that w ith these
com m ents about the B u rley test, the C ourt created a new test
for m inor disputes. This contention is m isguided as it ignores
the express holding by the C on ra il C ourt, expressly
establishing the "arguably justified" test. The R espondent’s
w ords are thus sim ply out o f context. The first sentence
above paraphrases the language in B urley w hich provides that
a m inor dispute, ”[c]ontem plates the existence o f a collective
agreem ent already concluded . . . [and] [t]he dispute relates
either to the m eaning or p roper application o f a particu lar
provision with reference to a specific situation. . . . " B u rley ,
su p ra , at 325 U .S . 723. The second sentence in the above
C o n ra il quote reflects upon and com m ents on the B u rley te s t’s
potential effect, noting that in such situations a d ispute "may
b e conclusively resolved" by interpreting the contract o f
em ploym ent. As the language o f "may be" is not in the
im perative form but, ra ther is conjectural and perm issive, this
phrase cannot reasonably be accorded the in terpretation sought
by respondent: that a grievance m ust alw ays be conclusively
resolved before being typed as a m inor dispute. Q uite sim ply,
respondent and his am icu s, the Solicitor G eneral, seek to
extract from this language far m ore than what the w ords
contain.
Indeed, the argum ent o f respondent and the Solicitor
547
2 3
G eneral that C o n ra il has created a "conclusively resolved"
preem ption test, has no support in the C o n ra il decision.
R ather, in C o n ra il the C ourt strengthened the R LA in
reaffirm ing that in the railroad industry the un iverse o f
em ployee-em ployer disputes may only b e div ided in to two
classes, "m ajor" and "m inor" disputes, and that such disputes
m ust be resolved exclusively w ithin the confines o f the Act.
N ow here in C o n ra il does the C ourt create o r contem plates
creating a new class o f railroad labor cases to be decided in
state courts. Q uite the opposite, in re jecting an invitation by
the union to create a third class o f "hybrid" d isputes, the
C o n ra il C ourt pointedly w rote , "w e shall not aggravate the
already difficu lt task o f d istinguishing betw een m ajor disputes
and m inor disputes by adding a third category o f hybrid
d isputes." C o n ra il, su p ra , at 491 U .S . 310. Q uite clearly ,
then, the C o n ra il C ourt had absolutely no intention o f creating
a new class o f disputes to supplem ent the tw o already present
in the A ct. As such, there is an incongruity in logic in
concluding, as R espondent and the Solic ito r G eneral conclude,
that C o n ra il, w hile expressly rejecting the creation o f a new
class o f d isputes w ithin the RLA has -- with tw o w ords
("conclusively resolved") — broken new ground and created a
new class o f railw ay labor disputes ou ts id e the A ct under state
ju risd ic tion . Q uite obviously , had the C ourt intended to alter
a guiding and fundam ental polestar o f railw ay labor law , i . e . ,
that o f keeping courts out o f the railroad industry ’s labor
re la tions and encouraging adjustm ent o f disputes, by
perm itting sta te cou rts to regulate the ra ilroads’ labor
re la tions, the C ourt w ould have so stated in a m anner clear
and certain .
2 . C o n ra il Follow s F ro m T h e C o u r t ’s P r io r
J u r is p ru d e n c e
T he C o u rt’s holding in C o n ra il continues in the
footsteps o f B u rley , D ay , and S h eeh a n and is entirely
548
24
consisten t w ith A n drew s. In its decision in A n drew s v.
L o u isv ille & N ash v ille R a ilr o a d , 406 U .S .271 (1972), this
C ourt reversed M o o re v. Illin o is C en tra lR . C o ., 312 U .S . 630
(1941), and held that a railroad em ployee’s w rongful
d ischarge state cause o f action w as preem pted by the Railw ay
L abor A ct. T he C ourt m ade it c lear that the R L A ’s grievance
and arb itra tion procedures are m andatory and m ust be utilized
by em ployer and em ployee alike, Id . a t 322, and, the
characterization o f a claim by an em ployee as one for
" ’w rongfu l d ischarge’ does not save it from the A c t’s
m andatory provisions for the processing o f grievances." Id . at
324-25. A dditionally , by v irtue o f its ru ling , the C ourt
im plicitly acknow ledged that in som e situations, the exclusive
adm inistra tive rem edy m andated by the Act would preclude
o ther rem edies available elsew here. Id. at 325.
In P en n sy lvan ia R a ilr o a d C om pany v. D ay , 360 U .S .
554 (1959), w here NRAB jurisd iction was found in an action
for backpay by a retired em ployee, the C ourt ruled that
railw ay labor disputes " aris in g ou t o f th e r e la t io n sh ip betw een
ca rrier and em ployee," constitute m inor disputes w hich are
subject to the exclusive ju risd iction o f the N RA B under the
A ct. I d .at 360 U .S . 554; (em phasis added). T he C ourt
stated, "[t]he purpose o f the Act is fulfilled if the claim itself
arises out o f the em ploym ent relationship w hich C ongress
regu la ted ." Id. at 552. S im ilarly , in B u rley , su p ra , the C ourt
ruled that a m inor dispute, "relates either to the m eaning or
p roper application o f a particu lar provision with reference to
a specific situation o r to an om itted case . . . found upon so m e
in cid en t o f th e em p loym en t re la tion , o r a s s e r te d o n e ,
independent o f those covered by the collective agreem ent. Id .
at 325 U .S . 723 (em phasis added). A dditionally , in S h eeh an ,
su p ra , the C ourt noted that m inor disputes cover "grievances
that arise daily betw een em ployees and carriers regarding rates
o f pay , rules and w orking conditions." Id. at 95.
549
25
On the basis o f A n drew s, D ay , S h e eh a n , B u rley and
C o n ra il it w ould appear that a d ispute re lating e ith er to the
m eaning o r p roper application o f a contractual provision or
"arising ou t o r o r "found upon som e incident o f the
em ploym ent relation , o r asserted one" w ould b e subject to
exclusive N RA B jurisd iction even if labeled as an action in
w rongful discharge. T hese cases taken together d ictate that
any railroad w rongful d ischarge action , based in con tract, tort
o r public policy , is p reem pted, regardless o f the
characterization rendered by the com plainant as, by defin ition ,
an action challenging a d ischarge is based on som e incident o f
the em ploym ent re lationship and the gravam en o f the action is
the d ischarge from the em ploym ent relationship. A s the
gravam en o f a w rongful d ischarge action is the term ination of
the contractual em ploym ent relationship , carriers need only
dem onstrate that, arguably , a term ination o f the contractual
re lationship o r another adverse em ploym ent action was neither
obviously insubstantial o r frivolous, nor m ade in bad faith.
O nce this "relatively light burden ," C on ra il, su p ra , a t 491
U .S . 306, is m et, the d ispute m ust com e under the ju risd iction
o f the NRAB.
3. A Wrongful Discharge Action Is "Arguably
Justified" By The Employment Contract
T hat the gravam en o f a w rongful d ischarge action,
including a w histleb low er’s action, lies in the em ploym ent
relationship is clear. T he generic cause o f action know n as
"w rongful d ischarge", w hile not new on the scene, contains
the "public policy tort" doctrine w hich, until recently , was
unknow n. H . P erritt, EMPLOYMENT DISMISSAL LAW AND
Pr a c tic e §1.1 , at 3 (1992). T his type o f tort perm its a
dism issed em ployee to recover for the dism issal itself, as
opposed to the consequences o f the d ism issal, e .g . ,
defam ation. Id . at §5.1 at 431. U nder the public policy tort
doctrine, a dism issal is actionable only when the action
550
26
violates a clearly established public policy and, generally , a
cou rt m ust balance the interests o f the em ployee, the em ployer
and the public to determ ine liability . In this balancing, the
em p lo y er’s in terest to d ischarge the em ployee, either fo r cause
o r in at w ill situations, is a crucial elem ent in the em p lo y er’s
defense. Integral to the liability analysis is the m otive w hich
the em ployer possessed in effectuating the dism issal; if the
em ployer dem onstrates that a personnel action w as m otivated
by a valid business reason, as opposed to the p la in tif fs
alleged illicit reason, the em ployer prevails. Only after
hearing the em ployer’s explanation and justification for the
personnel action can the m atter be resolved on the m erits. S ee
id .a t § 5 .9 ("Public Policy T ort: Basic S tructure o f P roof) and
§ 5 .22 ("B urden o f P roo f on Reasons for the D ism issal and
M ixed M otive Problem ). In a case w here the em ploym ent
re la tionship is governed by a collective bargaining agreem ent,
that contract will be the basis for a defense that the em ployee
was discharged for cause." T herefore, there can be no
question that w rongful discharge actions "arguably" relate to
the em ploym ent contract and that such actions m ust be typed
as m inor disputes under the Railway L abor Act.
4. Congress Determined Whistleblower Actions To
Constitute Minor Disputes
Indeed, this sam e conclusion was adopted by C ongress
w hen it determ ined to type a railroad w histleblow ing as a 11
11 While the states which have adopted the public policy tort are
split, some have adopted the Burdine Title VII model of shifting burdens
where: the employee makes his case for a violation of public policy,
followed by the employer who defends by demonstrating that the dismissal
was justified and job-based, and back to the employee who seeks to show
Uiat the employer’s justification as being prete.rtual. See Thompson v. St.
Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash 1984); see also Phipps v. Clark
Oil & Ref. Co., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn 1987).
551
27
m inor dispute. In the Federal R ailroad Safety A ct o f 1970, as
am ended, 45 U .S .C . § 421 e t s e q . , C ongress enacted a
w histleb low er’s provision which pro tects ra ilroad em ployees
from adverse action due to the filing o f a safety com plain t. 45
U .S .C . § 441 (a). C ongress has m ade this provision
enforceable under the RLA before the A djustm ent Board
w hich can aw ard aggrieved em ployees reasonable dam ages,
including punitive dam ages o f up to $20 ,000 . 45 U .S .C . §441
(c)(2). S ee R ay n er v. Sm irl, 873 F .2 d 60 (1989) (holding that
§441 preem pted state cause o f action for w rongful discharge).
N otably , the legislative history o f §441 am ply dem onstrates
that a w histleblow ing cause o f action existed under the
Railw ay L abor Act well before its form al statutory enactm ent.
As the legislative history reflects, C ongress understood that
retaliatory d ischarge claim s w ere already subsum ed w ith in the
rem edies afforded by the R LA , w here reinstatem ent and back
pay rem edies w ere available. T he legislative h istory also
supports a conclusion that retaliatory discharges o r re ta lia tory
jo b personnel actions w ere view ed by C ongress as an
intolerable form o f d iscrim ination and harassm ent to be
adjusted under the RLA . In this respect, the rep o rt by the
S enate’s T ransportation C om m ittee states, "[t]he C om m ittee
is opposed to d iscrim ination o r harassm ent o f railroad
em ployees for any reason. In particu lar, harassm ent o f an
em ployee for reporting or testifying regard ing a safety
violation should be strongly d iscouraged ." S. R ep. N o . 100-
153, 100th C ong ., 2d Sess. 12 rep r in ted in 1988 U .S . C o n g .
& A d m i n . N e w s 695, 706.
5. Colorado and Lingle Are Inapplicable Here
As C ongress indicated its intention in §441 to pro tect
railw ay w orkers from discrim ination and harassm ent by using
the m echam sm s o f the R LA , it is reasonable to conclude that
C ongress intended that all such state causes o f action ,
including those involving race, sex, national o rig in , and
552
28
handicap d iscrim ination , be subject to the R L A ’s dispute
resolution m echanism s. W hile respondent and the Solic itor
G eneral m ay po in t to C o lo r a d o A ru i-D iscrim in ation C om m ’n.
v. C o m in em a l A ir lin es , 372 U .S . 714 (1963) fo r the
proposition that race discrim ination causes o f action are not
preem pted by the R L A , the use o f this case is m isplaced.
C o lo r a d o involved a pre-h iring situation, involving an
applicant for em ploym ent. T he Railw ay L abor Law ,
how ever, does not cover under its scope persons w ho w ish to
one day becom e railroad o r airline w orkers. 11 F o r these
reasons, C o lo r a d o is d istinguishable and should be read as
barring state regulation after the em ploym ent relationship
com m enced.
Even assum ing C o lo r a d o could be read to apply in pre-
h ire situations, given developm ents in the law 12 13 * 15 and the
C o u rt’s decision in G ilm er v. In ters ta te /Jo h n so n L a n e
C o rp o ra tio n , 111 S .C t. 1647 (1991) it is appropriate to
conclude that arb itral tribunals should handle civil rights
g rievances under the Act.
In G ilm er , the C ourt strongly rejected challenges to the
adequacy o f arb itral proceedings and held that, pursuant to a
12 The RLA expressly defines "employee" as "every person in the
service of a carrier ... who performs any work defined as that of an
employee...." 45 U.S.C. § 151 Fifth; (emphasis added).
13 The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1071, §118 (42 U.S.C. A. §1981 Note) provides: "Where appropriate and
to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute
resolution, including settlements, negotiations, conciliations, facilitation,
mediation, factfinding, nunitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve
disputes arising under the Acts or j ,o\isions of Federal law amended by
this title." Virtually identical provisions appear in the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12212.
553
29
contract containing a mandatory arbitration provision,
statutory claims must be arbitrated. Because Congress granted
the NRAB the power to make money awards, to order
reinstatement of wrongfully terminated employees, 45 U.S.C.
8 153 First (o), to issue written awards, and to have parties be
heard with the assistance of counsel,45 U.S.C. § 153 First (j),
the basic requirements of Gilmer with respect to the adequacy
of the arbitral forum are fulfilled under the RLA.
Lastly, Respondent’s reliance on Lingle v. Norge
Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988), and its
preemption standard under § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 185, is misplaced.
While there may be some broad and general similarities
between labor codes such as §301 and the Railway Labor Act,
LMRA’s §301 belongs to a profoundly different statutory
scheme and its principles cannot be imported wholesale into
the railway labor arena. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v.
Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969) In enacting
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 ("NLRA")
as amended by LMRA in 1947, Congress "carved this singular
industry out of [LMRA]," California v. Taylor, supra, at 353
U.S. 565, and expressly excluded railroad employees from
coverage by LMRA and NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 182.
Additionally, in 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) Congress expressly
allowed employer-employee contract disputes to be brought in
federal court under §301, placing no requirement that
arbitration must be included in a collective bargaining
agreement. In contrast to LMRA, under the Railway Labor
Act Congress decreed that all "minor" grievances must be
subject to final and binding adjustment as specified in the Act.
In short, this Court has held that minor disputes under
the RLA include causes of action which sound in wrongful
termination. Simply because a new ton doctrine arrives on the
scene and is utilized to challenge a dismissal does not alter the
554
30
underlying premise of the action as one originating out of the
employment relationship or, arguably rising from the contract
of employment. For these reasons, the Court should hold that
wrongful discharge actions are minor grievances under the
RLA and are preempted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the decision of the
Supreme Court of Hawaii should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
DEBORAH T. PORJTZ
Attorney General of New Jersey
A n d r e a m . S i l k o w i t z
Assistant Attorney General
Of Counsel
E l d a d P h i l i p I s a a c *
Deputy Attorney General
On the Brief
R.J. Hughes Justice Complex
Trenton, New Jersey 08625
(201) 491-7038
Counsel for Amicus State of New Jersey
M arch 4 , 1994
* Counsel of Record
555
No. 92-2058
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1993
---------------♦---------------
HAW AIIAN AIRLINES, INC., et al„
vs.
Petitioners,
GRANT T. NORRIS,
Respondent.
---------------♦---------------
On Writ Of Certiorari
To The Supreme Court Of The
State Of Hawaii
---------------4 ---------------
BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF THE STATES OF HAWAII,
ARIZONA, CONNECTICUT, FLORIDA, ILLINOIS,
INDIANA, KANSAS, MAINE, MICHIGAN,
MISSOURI, MONTANA, NEW MEXICO,
PENNSYLVANIA, AND WEST VIRGINIA, AND THE
COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA
ISLANDS IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT
----------------♦----------------
R o b e r t A. M a r k s
A ttorney General
State of Haw aii
S t e v e n S. M i c h a e l s *
D epu ty A tto rney General
State of Haw aii
*Counsel o f Record
425 Q ueen Street
H onolu lu , H aw aii 96813
(808) 586-1365
Counsel fo r Amicus
Curiae State o f Hawaii
557
I
TABLE OF C O N TEN TS....................................... ;
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..................................................... ii
INTEREST OF THE AMICI C U R IA E ............................... 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUM ENT............. .................................. 6
A R G U M E N T ................................................................................. 9
I. The L anguage of the R ailw ay Labor Act, as
A pp lied by Congress to Air Carriers, and C on
s is ten tly C on stru ed By This C ourt, A p p lie s
Solely to Contract-Based D isp u te s .......................... 9
II. To Read the Railway Labor Act to Preem pt State
W histleblow er Claim s W ould Require O verrul
ing the C ourt's U nan im ous and C onsidered
C o n c lu s io n th a t S ta te A n t id is c r im in a t io n
R e m ed ies are N o t P reem p ted , and W ould
W rongly Threaten a W ide Array of Q uasi-C rim i
nal State L aw s.................................................................... 10
III. The Rationale of this Court's D ecision H olding
that the Railway Labor Act D oes N ot Im pliedly
Repeal Railroad E m ployees' R ights to Go to
Court Under the Federal Em ployer Liability Act
A lso Supports Affirm ance of the J u d g m e n t .. .. 14
IV. P etitioners' C onstruction of the RLA Should
A lso Be Rejected Because it Raises Significant
C onstitutional Q uestions Under the First, Sev
enth, and Tenth A m e n d m e n ts ................................. 17
CONCLUSION ............... 20
T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S
P a g e
558
11
C a s e s :
A le x a n d e r v. G a rd n c r -D en v er C o ., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) . . . . 12
A llis -C h a lm e r s C orp . v. lu e c k , 471 U.S. 202 (1985)............8
A n d rew s v. L o u isv ille & N a sh v ille R a ilro a d C o ., 406
U.S. 320 ( 1 9 7 1 ) .............................................................5, 6, 10, 15
A tc h is o n , T opeka & S an ta F e R a ilw a y C o. v. B u ell, 480
U.S. 5 6 7 ( 1 9 8 7 ) ................................................. 7, 14, 15, 16, 18
B ro th e rh o o d o f R a ilro a d T ra in m en v. C h ica g o R iv er &
In d ia n a R a ilr o a d C o ., 353 U.S. 30 ( 1 9 5 7 ) .............. 6, 9, 10
B u r fo rd v. S u n O il C o ., 319 U.S. 315 ( 1 9 4 3 ) ..................... 17
C ip o llo n e v. L ig g ett G rou p , In c ., 112 S. C t. 2608
( 1 9 9 2 ) ............................................................................. . ............. 1 2 , 15
C o lo ra d o A n t i-D is c r im in a t io n C o m m iss io n v. C o n t i
n en ta l A ir L in es , In c ., 372 U.S. 714 (1 9 6 3 ) ......... 5, 7, 11
C o n s o lid a te d R a il C orp . v. R a ilw a y L a bo r E x ecu tiv es
A s s o c ia t io n , 491 U.S. 299 ( 1 9 8 9 ) .............................. 6, 9 , 13
C u rtis v. L o eth er , 415 U.S. 189 ( 1 9 7 4 ) ................................... 19
D eb a r to lo C orp . v. F lo r id a G u l f C o a st T rades C o u n cil,
485 U.S. 568 ( 1 9 8 8 ) .................................................................8, 17
D ice v. A k ro n , C an ton & Y ou n gstow n R a ilro a d , 342
U.S. 359 ( 1 9 5 2 ) ........................................................ .. 16
E lg in , f . & E .R . C o. v. B u rley , 325 U.S. 711 (1945)
.....................................................................................................10, 12, 13
T A B L E O F A U T H O R I T I E S
P a g e
F r isb y v. S ch u ltz , 487 U.S. 474 ( 1 9 8 8 ) .............................. 8, 17
In te r n a t io n a l A sso c ia t io n o f M a c h in is ts , A F L -C IO v.
C en tra l A ir lin e s , In c ., 372 U.S. 682 ( 1 9 6 3 ) ....................... 9
Jo h n so n v. R o b in so n , 415 U.S. 361 ( 1 9 7 4 ) ............................ 19
559
I l l
T A B L E O F A U T H O R I T I E S - C o n t i n u e d
K elly v. R o b in so n , 479 U.S. 36 (1 9 8 6 ) ...........................
M ach in ists v. C en tra l A ir lin es , In c ., 372 U.S 682
(1 9 6 3 ) .............................................................................. '
M alon e v. W hite M o to r C orp ., 435 U.S. 4 9 7 (1978).
M cD on ald v. S m ith , 472 U.S. 4 7 9 (1 9 8 5 ) .....................
M cG rath v. T C F B a n k S a v in g s , 509 N W 2d 365
(M inn . 1993).............................................. .............................
M orales v. Trans W orld A ir lin es , In c ., 112 S C t 2031
(1 9 9 2 ) ..................................................................... '
Page
. . 11
. . . 6
. . 15
. . 18
. . . 3
. . 19
N ew M o to r V eh ic le B oard o f C a lifo rn ia v. O rrin W
F ox C o., 434 U.S. 1345 (1977) ..................................... 18
N ew York v. U n ited S ta tes , 112 S. C t. 2408 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . . .8 , 20
O hio C iv il R ig h ts C om m iss ion v. D ayton C hristian
S ch oo ls , 477 U.S. 618 ( 1 9 8 6 ) .................................................. \\
O rr v. O rr, 440 U.S. 268 (1 9 7 9 ) ................................................13
P arn ar v. A m er ica n a H ote ls , In c ., 65 H a w 370 652
P.2d 625 ( 1 9 8 2 ) .............................. ...........................' ,
S econ d E m p loy ers' L ia b ility C ases , 223 U.S. 1 (1912) . . . . 18
S t (W 9 3 )'S ^ ° n° r (~ Snter V' H icks , 113 S. Ct. 2742
U n iv ersity o f P en n sy lv a n ia v. E E O C , 493 U S 182
<199° ) ......................................................................... . . . 5 , 1 3
W alters v. N a t io n a l A sso c ia t io n o f R a d ia tion S u r
v iv ors , 473 U.S. 305 ( 1 9 8 5 ) .................................................... 18
W ard v. R o ck A g a in s t R acism , 491 U.S. 781 (1989) . . . . 18
560
IV
W h eeler v. S t. P a u l C o m p a n ies , In c ., 1994 W L 11272
(M in n . A p p . Jan . 18, 1 9 9 4 ) ......................................................... 14
W isco n s in P u b lic In te r v e n o r v. M ortier , 111 S. C t.
2476 ( 1 9 9 1 ) ......................................................................................... 12
Y ou n ger v. H a rr is , 401 U.S. 37 (1971)..................................... 11
C o n s t i t u t i o n , S t a t u t e s a n d L e g i s l a t i o n :
C o m m e r c e C l a u s e ............................................................................... 11
F ir s t A m e n d m e n t ............................................................ 8
S e v e n th A m e n d m e n t . ................................................................. 8, 18
T e n th A m e n d m e n t .......................................... 8
F o u r t e e n t h A m e n d m e n t ........................................ .. ................. .. . 11
42 U .S .C . § 2 0 0 0 e - 3 ( a ) ................................................ H
R a i lw a y L a b o r , 45 U .S .C . § 151 et s e q ...................................1
45 U .S .C . § 1 5 3 ..................................................................................6, 9
45 U .S .C . § 181..................................................................................... 2
45 U .S .C . § 1 8 2 ............................................................ 2
45 U .S .C . § 1 8 3 ........................................................................................ 2
45 U .S .C . § 1 8 4 .................. p ass im
45 U .S .C . § 184 a t 1 1 ............................................................. . . . . . 6
45 U .S .C . § 185 ........................................................................................ 2
F e d e r a l R a il S a fe ty A c t o f 1970, 45 U .S.C . §§ 421 et
s e q .................................... ...................................................................... 12
T A B L E O F A U T H O R IT IE S - C o n t i n u e d
P a g e
V
45 U.S.C. §§ 441 et s e q ........... ........................ ...............................4
A la sk a S tat. § 39.90.100 (1992) .................................................. 2
A riz . Rev. S ta t . A n n . § 38-531 (W est S u p p . 1 9 9 2 ) .........2
C al. G o v ' t C o d e § 1 0 5 4 0 ................................................................2
C olo . Rev. S tat. A n n . § 24.50.5-101 (W est 1 9 9 0 ) ..............2
C o n n . G en . S ta t . A n n . § 31-51q (1993)........... ......................2
Del. C o d e A n n . tit. 29, § 5115 (1 9 9 1 ) ........... ........................ 2
Fla. S tat. A n n . § 112.3187 (W est 1 9 9 2 ) .................................. 2
H aw . Rev. S ta t . § 378-61 (S u p p . 1 9 9 2 ) .................................. 2
5 IL C S /1 ( 1 9 9 3 ) .................................................................................. ....
Ind . C o d e A n n . § 36-1-8-8 (B u rn s S u p p . 1 9 9 2 ) ................2
Io w a C o d e A n n . § 79.28 (W est 1 9 9 1 ) ........... ........................ 2
K an . S tat. A n n . § 75-2973 (S u p p . 1 9 9 2 ) ......... ......................2
Ky. Rev. S ta t . A n n . § 61.101 (M ic h ie /B o b b s -M e r r i l l
1 9 8 6 ) . ......................................... . ............... ........................................ 2
La. Civ. C o d e A n n . a r t . 30:2027 (W est 1 9 8 9 ) .....................2
M e. Rev. S ta t . A n n . tit. 26, § 831 (W est 1988)...................2
M d . C o d e A n n . ar t. 64A, § 12F (S u p p . 1 9 9 2 ) ...................2
M ich . S tat. A n n . § 1 7 -4 2 8 .................. ............. .. 2
M in n . S tat. A n n . § 181.932 (W est S u p p . 1 9 9 3 ) ................ 2
M o. A n n . S tat. § 105.055 (V ernon S u p p . 1 9 9 2 ) ................2
N.J. S tat. A n n . § 34:19-1 (W est 1988)
552
T A B L E O F A U T H O R IT IE S - C o n t in u e d
P a g e
2
VI
N.Y. L ab . L a w § 740 (M c K in n e y 1988)................................... 2
N .C . G e n . S ta t . § 126-84 ( 1 9 9 1 ) . ....................... 2
O h io Rev. C o d e A n n . § 4113.51 ( A n d e r s o n 1 9 9 1 ) .......... 2
O k la . S ta t . A n n . tit. 74, § 841.7 (W est S u p p . 1 9 9 3 ) ..........2
Or. Rev. S ta t . § 659.505 (1 9 9 1 ) ..................................................... 2
43 P a . C o n s . S ta t . A n n . § 1421 ( 1 9 9 1 ) ................................... 2
R . I. G e n . L a w s § 36-15-1 ( 1 9 9 0 ) .................. 2
S. C. C o d e A n n . § 8-27010 (La. C o -o p S u p p . 1 9 9 2 ) ..........2
T en n . C o d e A n n . § 49, 50-1401 ( 1 9 9 0 ) .................................. 2
T en n . C o d e A n n . § 50-1-304 ( 1 9 9 0 ) ............................................ 2
Tex. Rev. Civ. S ta t . A n n . a r t . 6252-16a (W es t S u p p .
1 9 9 3 ) ......................................................................................................... 2
U t a h C o d e A n n . § 67-21-1 (S u p p . 1 9 9 2 ) ................................ 2
W a sh . Rev. C o d e A n n . § 42.40 .010 (W est 1 9 9 1 ) ................ 2
W. Va. C o d e A n n . § 6C-1-1 ( 1 9 9 0 ) ......................................... 2
W is. S ta t . A n n . § 230.80 (W est. 1 9 8 7 ) ..................................... 2
W y o . S ta t . A n n . § 35-2-910 (S u p p . 1 9 92)....................... .. 2
T A B L E O F A U T H O R IT IE S - C o n t i n u e d
P a g e
553
N o . 92-2058
------- ♦--------
In T h e
Suprem e C ourt of the U nited States
O c to b e r T erm , 1993
♦
HAW AIIAN AIRLINES, INC., e t a l ,
vs.
P e t i t i o n e r s ,
GRANT T. NORRIS,
R e s p o n d e n t .
----------------4----------------
O n W rit O f C e r t io r a r i
To T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t O f T h e
S ta te O f H a w a i i
-------------------— _ ♦ ----------------
B R IEF A M I C I C U R IA E O F T H E STATES O F H A W A II,
A R I Z O N A , C O N N E C T IC U T , F L O R ID A , IL L IN O IS ,
I N D I A N A , K A N S A S , M A IN E , M I C H I G A N ,
M I S S O U R I , M O N T A N A , N E W M E X IC O ,
P E N N S Y L V A N IA , A N D W E S T V I R G I N I A , A N D T H E
C O M M O N W E A L T H O F T H E N O R T H E R N M A R IA N A
I S L A N D S I N S U P P O R T O F R E S P O N D E N T
----------------4 ----------------
IN T E R E S T O F T H E A M I C I C U R IA E
The A m ici States and C om m onw ealth are deep ly
interested in this case, in w hich P etitioners seek an
unprecedented expansion of the preem ptive effect of the
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 e t s e q . , insofar as
554
1
2
m a d e a p p l i c a b le to a i r c a r r i e r s , s e e id. §§ 181-185, o v e r
s t a t e s t a t u t o r y a n d c o m m o n to r t l a w c a u s e s of a c t io n
i n t e n d e d to p r o t e c t e m p l o y e e s in all l in e s o f w o r k , i n c l u d
in g th o s e in th e a i r c a r r i e r i n d u s t r y , f ro m r e ta l ia to r y a n d
o t h e r w i s e m a l i c i o u s d i s c h a r g e s , s u s p e n s i o n s , a n d d e m o
tio n s .
T h e S ta te o f H a w a i i is o n e o f a n u m b e r o f j u r i s d i c
t io n s w h e r e p r o t e c t io n s fo r " w h i s t l e b l o w e r s " in th e p r i
v a t e w o r k fo rc e ex is t e i t h e r a s a m a t t e r o f s t a t u t e o r th e
c o m m o n l a w o f to r ts . T h e la w s of th e s e S ta te s a re n o t
l im i t e d to w o r k e r s o u t s i d e o f th e a i r c a r r i e r i n d u s t r i e s . 1
1 Currently, at least thirty-five States have whistleblower
statutes. See Alaska Stat. § 39.90.100 (1992); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 38-531 (West Supp. 1992); Cal. Gov’t Code § 10540; Colo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 24.50.5-101 (West 1990); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 31-51q; Del. Code Ann, tit. 29, § 5115 (1991); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 112.3187 (West 1992); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-61 (Supp. 1992); 5
ILCS/1 (1993); Ind. Code Ann. § 36-1-8-8 (Burns Supp. 1992);
Iowa Code Ann. § 79.28 (West 1991); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-2973
(Supp. 1992); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 61.101 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1986) ; La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 30:2027 (West 1989); Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 26, § 831 (West 1988); Md. Code Ann. art. 64A, § 12F
(Supp. 1992); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 17.428; Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 181.932 (West Supp. 1993); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 105.055 (Vernon
Supp. 1992); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-1 (West 1988); N.Y. Lab. Law
§ 740 (McKinney 1988); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 126-84 (1991); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 4113.51 (Anderson 1991); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.
74, § 841.7 (West Supp. 1993); Or. Rev. Stat. § 659.505 (1991); 43
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1421 (1991); R.I. Gen. Laws § 36-15-1
(1990); S.C. Code Ann. § 8-27010 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1992); Tenn.
Code Ann. §§ 49-50-1401 & 50-1-304 (1990); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann. art. 6252-16a (West Supp. 1993); Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-1
(Supp. 1992); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 42.40.010 (West 1991); W.
Va. Code Ann. § 6C-1-1 (1990); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 230.80 (West
1987) ; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-2-910 (Supp. 1992). Of these States,
California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island,'
565
3
S ta tu to r y r e m e d ie s a m p l i fy a n d c o m p le m e n t a w i d e a r ra y
of c o m m o n la w e n t i t l e m e n ts , d e v e lo p e d w i t h ca re b y the
s ta te c o u r ts , w h i c h as a m a t t e r o f s ta te to r t l a w b a r
r e ta l ia to r y d i s c h a r g e s o f p r iv a te w h is t l e b lo w e r s as c o n
t r a r y to p u b l i c po licy . See, e.g ., P a rn ar v. A m erican a H otels ,
In c., 65 H a w . 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982); M cG rath v. TCP
Bank Savings, 509 N .W .2 d 365 (M inn . 1993).
T h e S ta te s ' i n te r e s t in a p p l y i n g th e se w h is t l e b lo w e r
re m e d ie s to a ir c a r r i e r s lies a t th e h e a r t o f th e S ta te s '
p o l ice p o w e r s , a n d co n f l ic ts w i th n o fed e ra l policy . The
N a t io n 's a i r l in e s o w e th e h ig h e s t d u t y of s a f e ty to the
p u b l ic . E ac h yea r, a i rc ra f t a c c id e n ts tak e d o z e n s o f lives,
a n d in f l ic t m i l l io n s of d o l l a r s in d a m a g e . A v o id a n c e of
th e co s ts o f a i r d i s a s te r s is a t the h e a r t of th e A m ic i 's
c o n c e rn s in th is case .
A s th is ca se so p o ig n a n t ly d e m o n s t r a te s , as a g en e ra l
m a t t e r th e p u b l i c ' s f i r s t l ine of d e f e n s e a g a in s t a i r d i s a s
te rs lies w i t h th e c a r r i e r ' s o w n in s p e c t io n fo rce - the
t r a in e d m e n a n d w o m e n w h o a re c h a rg e d b y la w w i th the
d u t y to e x a m in e th e c o m p le x c o m p o n e n t s th a t c o m p r is e
an a irc ra f t , to see to it t h a t c o m m e rc ia l a i rc ra f t th a t d o n o t
m e e t th e h i g h e s t s t a n d a r d s of sa fe ty d o n o t m a k e their
w a y o u t o f th e h a n g e r , a n d , if in a n y re s p e c t th e re is
d o u b t o v e r a n a i r c r a f t ' s a i rw o r th in e s s , th a t th o s e d o u b ts
a re c o m m u n i c a t e d to r e l e v a n t r e g u la t o r y a g e n c ie s , in
m o s t i n s t a n c e s th e F e d e r a l A v ia t io n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n
(FA A).
A s th is c a se c o m e s to th is C o u r t , th e re c o u ld n o t be a
m o re c o m p e l l i n g s e t o f facts a g a in s t fe d e ra l p r e e m p t io n
o f s ta te s t a t u t o r y re m e d ie s . H e re , the s u m m a r y ju d g m e n t
Tennessee, and Wyoming have statutes that apply to private
employees.
556
4
r e c o r d in th e l o w e r c o u r t s o f H a w a i i d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t a
H a w a i i a n A i r l i n e s m e c h a n ic , R e s p o n d e n t G r a n t N o r r i s ,
w a s f i r e d a f t e r r e p o r t i n g to th e FA A th a t h i s e m p l o y e r
w a s k n o w i n g l y c o n t i n u i n g to fly c e r t a in M c D o n n e l l - D o u -
g la s D C -9 a i r c r a f t w i t h u n s a f e l a n d i n g g ea r , a n d w a s
f a l s i fy in g s a f e ty r e p o r t s - th e m a i n s t a y o f th e FA A 's a ir
s a f e ty s y s t e m - to c o v e r - u p th is d a n g e r o u s p ra c t ic e . T h e
F A A i n v e s t i g a t i o n t h a t r e s u l t e d f r o m N o r r i s ' s w h i s
t l e b l o w i n g u l t i m a t e l y le d to s u b s t a n t i a l f in e s a g a in s t th e
a i r l in e , a s w e l l a s to a d m i n i s t r a t i v e f i n d in g s s t r o n g ly
s u g g e s t i n g t h a t th e a i r l i n e h a d s o u g h t to f r u s t r a t e th e
i n v e s t i g a t i o n a n d e v e n to d e s t r o y m a te r ia l e v id e n c e . S ee
J.A. 26-78 . E v i d e n c e s h o w s th a t N o r r i s w a s p u n i s h e d b y
th e a i r l i n e fo r n o o t h e r r e a s o n th a n h is a c t io n s in r e p o r t
in g H a w a i i a n A i r l i n e s ' d a n g e r o u s c o n d u c t .
U n l ik e t h e a r e a o f r a i l safe ty , w h e r e C o n g r e s s h a s
e n a c t e d s p e c i f ic w h i s t l e b l o w e r p r o t e c t io n s th a t , fo r r a i l
r o a d w o r k e r s , r a is e d i s t i n c t p r e e m p t io n p r o b l e m s (s e e 45
U .S .C . §§ 441 et seq . (F e d e ra l R ail S a fe ty A c t) ) , C o n g r e s s
h a s n o t p r o v i d e d sp e c if ic r e m e d i e s for a i r l in e w o r k e r s
w h o b l o w t h e w h i s t l e o n u n s a f e p r a c t i c e s b y t h e i r
e m p l o y e r s , c l e a r ly l e a v i n g in ta c t a t th is g e n e r a l lev e l s u c h
r e m e d i e s a s t h e S ta te s p r o v i d e . T h e q u e s t i o n p r e s e n t e d in
th is c a s e is w h e t h e r C o n g r e s s , in e n a c t in g th e R a i lw a y
L a b o r A c t a n d a p p l y i n g i t to a i r c a r r ie r s , i n t e n d e d t h a t a
s ta te ju ry , r e p r e s e n t i n g th e c o m m u n i ty s e r v e d b y H a w a i
i a n A i r l i n e s , a n d a p p l y i n g s ta te s t a t u t e s a n d r u le s of
d e c i s io n f a s h io n e d b y a s t a t e l e g i s l a tu re a n d a s t a t e 's
h i g h e s t c o u r t , b e p r o h i b i t e d f r o m h e a r i n g G r a n t N o r r i s ' s
c a se - a c a s e t h a t d o e s n o t d e p e n d o n th e r e le v a n t c o l le c
t iv e b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t , b u t r a th e r so le ly o n w h e t h e r
o r n o t t h e a i r l i n e a c te d w i t h a n i l le g a l r e ta l ia to r y in t e n t in
d i s c i p l in i n g N o r r i s .
567
5
T h e A m ic i S ta te s s u b m i t n o t o n ly th a t th e a n s w e r to
th is q u e r y is c le a r ly " n o ," b u t th a t a n y o th e r a n s w e r
w o u l d g iv e r ise to a ra d ic a l a n d u n w is e e x p a n s io n of the
p r e e m p t iv e fo rce of th e fe d e ra l l a b o r la w s . A l t h o u g h it is
t r u e th a t s ta te l a w w r o n g f u l d i s c h a r g e c la im s are , a n d
d o u b t l e s s s h o u l d be , p r e e m p t e d w h e r e " th e o n ly so u rc e
of [an e m p lo y e e j ' s r ig h t n o t to b e d i s c h a r g e d , a n d th e r e
fore to t r e a t a n a l le g e d d i s c h a r g e as a 'w r o n g f u l ' o n e th a t
e n t i t l e s h i m to d a m a g e s , is th e c o l l e c t i v e - b a r g a in i n g
a g r e e m e n t , " A n d rew s v. L o u isv ille & N ash v ille R a ilroad Co.,
406 U.S. 320, 324 (1971), th is C o u r t m o re th a n th i r ty y ea rs
a g o m a d e c le a r th a t th e R a i lw a y L a b o r A ct h a s n o p r e
e m p t iv e fo rce w i th re s p e c t to s t a t e s t a t u t o r y r e m e d ie s
" p ro te c t in g e m p lo y e e s a g a in s t [ i l legal] d i s c r im in a t io n ."
C olorad o A n ti-D iscr im in a tio n C om m ission v. C o n tin en ta l A ir
L in es, In c ., 372 U.S. 714, 724 (1963). H e re , as in C olorad o
A n ti-D iscr im in a tio n C om m ission , it is th e e m p l o y e r ' s in ten t
th a t m a t te r s . A s in a n t i - d i s c r im in a t io n l i t ig a t io n g e n e r
ally, w h e th e r th e e m p lo y e r h e re w a s r i g h t o r w r o n g as a
m a t t e r o f its c o n t r a c t i n t e r p r e t a t io n is i r r e le v a n t to p l a in
t i f f ' s c l a im , a n d to th e e m p l o y e r ' s d e f e n s e . " W h i s
t le b lo w e r" p ro te c t io n d o c t r in e , in H a w a i i a n d e l s e w h e re ,
d o e s n o t p u n i s h a n e m p l o y e r w h o d i s c i p l i n e s a n
e m p lo y e e fo r g o o d re a so n s , b a d re a s o n s , o r n o r e a s o n s at
all, so lo n g as th e re a s o n s th a t th e e m p lo y e r a c tu a l ly
a c te d u p o n w e re n o t th e i l legal r e a s o n s o f r e ta l ia t in g for
an e m p lo y e e 's w h is t l e b lo w in g . S ee St. M ary's H on or C en
ter v. H icks , 113 S. C t. 2742 (1993); U n iv ersity o f P en n sy lv a
n ia v. E E O C , 493 U.S. 182 (1990). A s th e S ta te s h a v e
c o m p e l l in g in te re s t s in p ro te c t in g th o s e a i r l in e e m p lo y e e s
w h o in th e i r p ro fe s s io n a l j u d g m e n t s b r in g s u b s ta n t i a l
s a fe ty c o n c e rn s to the a t t e n t io n o f r e g u la to r y ag e n c ie s ,
th e y h a v e a s u b s ta n t i a l a n d w e ig h ty in te re s t in th is case,
568
6
a n d u r g e th e C o u r t to a f f i r m th e j u d g m e n t o f th e S u p r e m e
C o u r t o f H a w a i i .
-----------------4 -----------------
S U M M A R Y O F A R G U M E N T
1. S e c t io n 184, T itle 45, U n i t e d S ta te s C o d e , d o e s n o t
r e q u i r e s u b m i s s i o n of R e s p o n d e n t ' s s t a t e w h i s t l e b l o w e r
c la im s to m a n d a t o r y b i n d i n g a r b i t r a t io n , a s th o s e c la im s
d o n o t s e e k to e n fo rc e r i g h t s c o n f e r r e d b y a co l le c t iv e
b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t . P e t i t i o n e r s ' re l ia n c e o n th e t e r m
" g r i e v a n c e " in § 184 s i m p ly r e a d s t h a t t e r m o u t o f c o n
tex t , a n d w i t h o u t r e g a r d to th e b a c k g r o u n d r u le o f a t -w il l
e m p l o y m e n t w h i c h " r a t e s o f p ay , ru le s , o r w o r k i n g c o n d i
t io n s " a g r e e d u p o n e x p r e s s ly o r i m p l i e d l y b y a i r c a r r ie r s
a n d th e i r u n i o n s a b r o g a te . S ee 45 U .S .C . § 184 a t f 1. In
a d d i t i o n to d i s r e g a r d i n g th e l i te ra l l a n g u a g e o f § 184 a n d
i ts p r e d e c e s s o r s , i .e ., 45 U .S .C . § 153 F ir s t (i), H a w a i i a n
A i r l i n e s w o u l d h a v e th is C o u r t i g n o r e d e c a d e s of i ts o w n
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of th e a r b i t r a l s c h e m e e s t a b l i s h e d b y th e
R LA . U n d e r th i s C o u r t ' s l o n g s t a n d i n g p r e c e d e n t s , th e
R L A 's a r b i t r a l m e c h a n i s m a p p l i e s o n l y to s o - c a l l e d
" m i n o r d i s p u t e s " u n d e r th e A ct: " m a jo r d i s p u t e s s e e k to
c r e a t e c o n t r a c t u a l r i g h t s , m i n o r d i s p u t e s to e n f o r c e
t h e m ." C o n so lid a ted R a il C orp . v. R a ih v a y L a b o r E x ecu tiv es
A s s o c ia t io n , 491 U.S. 299, 302 (1989); s e e B ro th erh o o d o f
R a ilro a d T ra in m en v. C h ica g o R iv er & In d ia n a R a ilro a d C o.,
353 U.S. 30, 33 (1957); M a ch in is ts v. C en tra l A ir lin es , In c .,
372 U.S. 682, 687 (1963). By th e s a m e to k e n , i t is o n ly s u c h
c o n t r a c t - e n f o r c i n g c l a im s t h a t a r e p r e e m p t e d b y th e
R L A 's a r b i t r a l m e c h a n i s m . Cf. A n d rew s v. L o u isv ille &
N a sh v ille R a ilro a d C o., 406 U.S. 320, 324 (1971). B eca u se
R e s p o n d e n t ' s s t a t e l a w c la im s d o n o t " s e e k " " to e n fo rc e "
569
7
2. P e t i t i o n e r s ' p r a y e r fo r r e v e r s a l r u n s h e a d lo n g
in to th is C o u r t ' s u n a n i m o u s d e c is io n in C o lorad o A n ti-
D iscr im in a tion C om m iss ion v. C o n tin en ta l A ir L in es , In c.,
372 U.S 714, 724 (1963). T h a t d e c is io n , w h ic h s q u a r e ly
u p h e l d th e a b i l i ty o f S ta te s d i r e c t ly to p ro s e c u te c la im s of
i n v id io u s ra c ia l d i s c r im in a t io n in a ir c a r r ie r h i r in g , is
e q u a l ly a p p l i c a b le to th e in s t a n t c o n te x t , w h e r e in v id io u s
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b a s e d u p o n p r o t e c t e d w h i s t l e b l o w i n g
a c t iv i t ie s is th e t a rg e t o f th e s ta te c la im . It s h o u l d m a k e
no d i f fe re n c e , h e re , th a t a S ta te h a s d e l e g a t e d its law
e n f o rc e m e n t fu n c t io n to a " p r iv a t e a t to r n e y g e n e ra l . " The
r a t i o n a le o f C o lo ra d o A n ti-D is c r im in a t io n C om m iss io n is
th u s fu l ly a p p l i c a b le to th e i n s ta n t su i t , a n d d ic ta te s
a f f i rm an ce .
3. T h e r a t i o n a le of th is C o u r t ' s d e c is io n in A tch ison ,
Topeka & S an ta F e R a ilw a y C o. v. B u ell, 480 U.S. 567 (1987),
in w h ic h th is C o u r t h e ld th a t th e RLA d id n o t co n f lic t
w i t h , a n d t h e r e f o r e d i d n o t i m p l i e d l y r e p e a l , t h e
r e m e d ie s o f th e F e d e r a l E m p lo y e r s ' L iab i l i ty A c t, s im
i la r ly m a n d a t e s th a t s ta te to r t r e m e d ie s n o t d e p e n d e n t on
a co l lec t iv e b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t b e r e a d as c r e a t in g no
in to le ra b le c o n f l ic t" w i t h th e a rb i t r a l m e c h a n i s m c re a te d
for m in o r d i s p u t e s u n d e r th e RLA. If the a rb i t r a l m a n
d a te o f th e R L A w e re as a l l - e n c o m p a s s in g as th e a ir l in e
h e re u rg e s , th e C o u r t in B u ell w o u l d h a v e b e e n r e q u i r e d
to f in d a n in to le r a b le co n f l ic t" b e tw e e n th e la te r -e n a c te d
R LA a n d th e FELA . T h a t it d i d n o t p o in t s th e w a y to
r e s o lu t io n of th e p r e e m p t io n is s u e here , on w h ic h the
a i r l in e m a y p r e v a i l o n ly if C o n g r e s s ' in t e n t is c lea r th a t
s ta te ju r y r e s o lu t io n o f th e r e ta l ia to r y d i s c h a r g e c la im s in
th is ca se co n f l ic ts w i th fe d e ra l l a w o r w o u l d f r u s t r a te
570
a n y c o n t r a c tu a l r i g h t s w h a t s o e v e r , th e y t h u s a r e n o t p r e
e m p te d .
8
th e f e d e r a l s c h e m e . ' " A llis -C h a lm ers C orp . v. L u eck , 471
U.S. 202, 209 (1985). B e c a u s e s u c h c la r i ty d o e s n o t ex is t ,
p r e e m p t i v e i n t e n t s h o u l d n o t b e a s s u m e d .
4. T h e C o u r t s h o u l d n o t e x p a n d th e p r e e m p t i v e
e f fec t o f th e R L A as P e t i t i o n e r s s u g g e s t , fo r to d o so
w o u l d r a d ic a l l y u n h i n g e th e d o c t r in a l b a s i s o f " fe d e ra l
c o m m o n l a w " as i t h a s d e v e lo p e d in th e f ie ld of la b o r
r e la t io n s , b o t h u n d e r th e R L A , a n d th e N L R A , b o th i n t r u
s iv e ly i n je c t in g th e f e d e r a l c o u r t s in to a r e a s of t r a d i t io n a l
s ta te c o n c e r n , t h u s r a i s in g s ig n i f i c a n t i s s u e s u n d e r th e
T e n th A m e n d m e n t , a n d , a s w e l l , t r i g g e r in g s e r io u s p r o b
le m s u n d e r th e F i r s t a n d S e v e n th A m e n d m e n t s . In its
p r a c t i c a l im p a c t , p r e e m p t i o n of th e s o r t s o u g h t b y the
a i r l in e h e r e w o u l d o p e r a t e a s a f e d e ra l m a n d a t e fo r th e
S ta te s to a c c e p t i n t e n t io n a l ly u n s a f e a ir c a r r ie r s w i th in
th e i r b o r d e r s w i t h o u t a n y r e c o u r s e t h r o u g h th e i r c o u r ts
e x c e p t a f te r - th e - f a c t . C f. N erv York v. U n ited S ta te s , 112 S.
C t. 2408, 2421 (1992). P e t i t i o n e r s ' r e q u e s t fo r e l im in a t io n
of R e s p o n d e n t ' s j u r y t r ia l r ig h t s , a s h a r p c u r ta i lm e n t o f
ju d ic ia l r e v ie w , a n d n u l l i f ic a t i o n of h is r i g h t to c o m p e n s a
to ry a n d p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s , w i t h o u t a n y q u id p ro quo,
i n d e p e n d e n t l y r a i s e s s e r io u s a n d s u b s t a n t i a l c o n s t i t u
t io n a l q u e s t i o n s . In t h e a b s e n c e of m u c h c le a re r c o n g r e s
s io n a l l a n g u a g e t h a n is p r e s e n t in 45 U .S.C . § 184, the
C o u r t s h o u l d c o n f in e th e s t a t u t e ' s p r e e m p t iv e ef fec t to
c la im s a r i s i n g o u t o f a c o l le c t iv e b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t .
S ee F r isb y v. S ch u ltz , 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1988); D eB arto lo
C orp . v. F lo r id a G u l f C o a st T rades C o u n cil, 485 U.S. 568, 575
(1988).
— ------------ — — - ♦ ------------------------------------ —
571
9
A R G U M E N T
I. T h e L a n g u a g e o f th e R a i lw a y L a b o r A c t, as A p p l i e d
b y C o n g r e s s to A i r C a r r ie r s , a n d as C o n s i s t e n t l y
C o n s t r u e d b y T h i s C o u r t , A p p l i e s S o le ly to C o n
t r a c t -B a s e d D i s p u t e s .
S ec t io n 184 of Title 45, U n i te d S ta te s C o d e , p r o v id e s
th a t " [ t ]h e d i s p u t e s b e tw e e n a n e m p lo y e e o r g r o u p of
e m p lo y e e s a n d a c a r r ie r o r c a r r ie r s b y a ir g r o w i n g o u t of
g r ie v a n c e s , o r o u t o f th e i n t e r p r e t a t io n o r a p p l i c a t io n of
a g r e e m e n ts c o n c e rn in g ra te s o f pay , ru le s , o r w o r k in g
c o n d i t i o n s " m u s t , if n o t re s o lv e d b y th e " u s u a l " c o m p a n y
p ro c e s s for in te r n a l d i s p u te s , be s u b m i t t e d to a n a d ju s t
m e n t b o a r d c h o s e n b y th e c a r r i e r a n d its e m p lo y e e s .
T h is la n g u a g e , d r a w n f ro m 45 U.S.C. § 153 F irs t (i),
h a s fo r d e c a d e s b e e n c o n s t r u e d b y th is C o u r t to co n f in e
the a r b i t r a l m e c h a n i s m of th e RLA to c la im s t h a t a r is e o u t
of d i s p u t e s o v e r co l lec t iv e ly b a r g a in e d ra te s , ru le s , o r job
c o n d i t io n s . A s e a r ly as B ro th erh ood o f R a ilroad T rainm en v.
C h icag o R iv er & In d ian a R a ilroad C o., 353 U.S. 30 (1957), the
C o u r t d e s c r ib e d th e d i s p u te s s u b je c t to a r b i t r a t io n as
c o n t ro v e r s ie s o v e r th e m e a n in g o f a n e x is t in g co llec tiv e
b a r g a in in g a g r e e m e n t in a p a r t i c u la r fac t s i tu a t io n , g e n e r
a l ly in v o lv in g o n ly o n e e m p lo y e e ." Id. a t 33. T h e s e d i s
p u te s , th e C o u r t o b s e r v e d six y e a r s la ter , c o n c e rn " th e
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d a p p l i c a t i o n o f e x i s t i n g c o n t r a c t s . "
In tern a tio n a l A sso c ia tio n o f M a ch in is ts , A F L -C IO v. C en tra l
A ir lin es , In c ., 372 U.S. 682, 687 (1963). T h u s , m o s t recen tly ,
in C o n so lid a ted R a il C orp. v. R a ilw a y L abor E x ecu tiv es Asso-
c ia tio n , 491 U.S. 299 (1989), th is C o u r t r e i t e r a te d th e tw o-
t ie re d c a te g o r ic a l a n a ly s is th a t d e t e r m in e s w h a t s o r t of
t r e a tm e n t a c t iv i ty th a t is in s o m e fa s h io n su b je c t to the
RLA is to rece iv e . T h a t a n a ly s is d iv id e s R L A -g o v e rn e d
co n f l ic t in to " m a jo r a n d m in o r d i s p u te s , " re c o g n iz in g
572
10
t h a t " t h e m a j o r / m i n o r t e r m i n o l o g y , d r a w n f r o m th e
v o c a b u l a r y o f ra i l m a n a g e m e n t a n d ra i l l ab o r , a s a s h o r t
h a n d m e t h o d o f d e s c r i b in g th e t w o c la s se s o f c o n t r o v e r s y
C o n g r e s s h a d d i s t i n g u i s h e d in th e RLA; m a jo r d i s p u t e s
s e e k to c r e a te c o n t r a c t r ig h t s , m i n o r d i s p u t e s to e n fo rc e
t h e m ." Id . a t 302 (c i t in g E lg in , /. & E. R. C o. v. B u rley , 325
U.S. 711, 1723 (1945)). Im p l ic i t in T rain m en , M a ch in is ts ,
a n d C o n ra il , is th e u n q u e s t i o n a b l e p r o p o s i t i o n th a t th e re
a re c a te g o r i e s o f d i s p u t e s i n v o lv in g e m p l o y e e s a n d c o v
e r e d c a r r i e r s t h a t a re n o t s u b je c t to RLA ju r i s d i c t io n at
a ll . In a s i m i l a r v e in , in A n d rew s v. L o u isv ille & N a sh v ille
R a ilro a d C o ., 406 U.S. 320, 324 (1972), w h ic h h e ld th a t RLA
a r b i t r a t i o n , w h e r e a p t , is m a n d a t o r y a n d e x c lu s iv e , th e
C o u r t p r o p e r l y r u l e d t h a t w h e r e " th e o n ly s o u rc e o f [an
e m p l o y e e 's ] r i g h t n o t to b e d i s c h a r g e d , a n d th e re fo re to
t r e a t a n a l l e g e d d i s c h a r g e as a 'w r o n g f u l ' o n e th a t e n t i t le s
h i m to d a m a g e s , is th e c o l l e c t iv e - b a r g a in in g a g r e e m e n t , "
th e R L A p r e e m p t s s t a t e - l a w c a u s e s o f a c t io n b e c a u s e in
s u c h a c a s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f th e a g r e e m e n t is a b s o lu te ly
n e c e s s a r y to d e c id i n g th e ca se . Id . T h is is n o t so h e re .
II . To R e a d th e R a i l w a y L a b o r A c t to P r e e m p t S ta te
W h i s t l e b l o w e r C l a i m s W o u l d R e q u i r e O v e r r u l i n g
t h e C o u r t ' s U n a n i m o u s a n d C o n s i d e r e d C o n c l u s i o n
t h a t S ta t e A n t i - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n R e m e d i e s a re N o t
P r e e m p t e d , a n d W o u ld W r o n g ly T h r e a t e n a W id e
A r r a y o f Q u a s i - C r i m i n a l S ta te L a w s .
R e a d b r o a d ly , th e p r e e m p t iv e p r o v i s io n s of 45 U.S.C .
§ 184 c o u l d re a c h e v e n th e cr im in a l l a w of th e S ta tes ,
w h e n t h a t l a w w a s d r a w n in p l a y b y " d i s p u t e s b e tw e e n
a n e m p l o y e e . . . a n d a c a r r ie r ." 45 U .S.C . § 184. It is
o b v io u s t h a t a S ta te 's i n te r e s t in e n f o r c in g i ts c r im in a l
l a w s in i t s o w n c o u r t s , a n i n t e r e s t t h i s C o u r t h a s
573
11
d e s c r ib e d as " o n e o f th e m o s t p o w e r f u l o f th e c o n s id e r
a t io n s " th a t " m u s t in f lu e n c e o u r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " o f f e d
e ra l p r e e m p t iv e s t a tu te s , see K elly v. R ob in son , 479 U.S. 36,
49 (1986), c a n n o t b e o v e r c o m e b y th e l a n g u a g e o r po l ic ie s
o f th e RLA. Yet, w h e n all is s a id a n d d o n e , t h a t is exac tly
w h a t th e P e t i t io n e r s a sk th is C o u r t to r e p u d ia t e here .
S u c h a r e p u d ia t io n of th e p o l ic e p o w e r s o f th e S ta tes
is n o t , a n d c o u ld n o t be, th e p r o p e r r e s u l t u n d e r th e law.
T h e r e la t io n s h ip b e tw e e n a S ta te 's c r im in a l a n d an ti-
d i s c r im in a t io n la w s is a c lose o n e . S ee O hio C iv il R ights
C om m ission v. D ayton C h ristian S ch o o ls , 477 U.S. 618 (1986)
( h o ld in g th a t a b s t e n t io n u n d e r Y ou n ger v. H a rr is , 401 U.S.
37 (1971), a p p l i e s to s ta te c o u r t l i t ig a t io n b r o u g h t u n d e r
a n t i - d i s c r im in a t io n law s , in p a r t b e c a u s e s u c h la w s im p l i
ca te ' i m p o r t a n t s ta te in te re s t s " ) . In fact, t h i r ty y e a r s ago
th is C o u r t s q u a r e ly h e ld in C o lo ra d o A n ti-D iscr im in a tio n
C om m ission v. C o n tin en ta l A ir L in es , In c., 372 U.S. 714
(1963), th a t n o t h i n g in th e R LA " b a r fs ] S ta te s f r o m p r o
te c t in g e m p lo y e e s a g a in s t rac ia l d i s c r im in a t io n ." Id . a t
724. T h a t a d m o n i t i o n is s q u a r e ly a p p l i c a b le to th is ca se as
w e l l , fo r th e r e is n o p r in c ip l e d d i f fe re n c e fo r p r e e m p t io n
p u r p o s e s b e t w e e n s ta te la w s a im e d a t d e t e r r in g in v id io u s
rac ia l d i s c r im in a t io n , a n d th o s e t a r g e t e d a t i n v id io u s d i s
c r im in a t io n o n th e b a s is o f p r o t e c t e d c o n d u c t . N o r is th is
case d i f f e r e n t f ro m C olorad o A n ti-D iscr im in a tio n C o m m is
sion b e c a u s e H a w a i i h a s c h o s e n to d e le g a te to a " p r iv a te
a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l " th e a u th o r i t y to in v o k e th e " p u b l ic -
p o l ic y " e x c e p t io n s to th e d o c t r in e o f e m p lo y m e n t - a t -w i l l .
C o n g re s s i tse lf , in ex e rc is in g i ts e n f o r c e m e n t a u th o r i ty
u n d e r th e C o m m e r c e C la u s e a n d S ec t io n 5 o f th e F o u r
t e e n th A m e n d m e n t , h a s i n d e e d m a d e c lea r th a t re ta l ia
to ry d i s c h a r g e s a re a m e n a b le to ju d ic ia l r e s o lu t io n . S ee 42
U-S.C. § 2000e-3(a). P e t i t io n e r s h a v e n o a r g u m e n t th a t
12
f e d e r a l a n t i - r e t a l i a t i o n p r o t e c t io n is n u l l i f i e d b y 45 U .S.C .
§ 184, c f. A le x a n d e r v. G a rd n er -D en v er C o ., 415 U.S. 36
(1974), a n d o f f e r n o p e r s u a s i v e a r g u m e n t w h y a n a lo g o u s
p r o t e c t io n u n d e r s t a t e l a w o u g h t b e su b je c t to th e d r a c o
n i a n t r e a t m e n t t h e y seek .
I n s t e a d , P e t i t i o n e r s o ffe r a se t o f e x c e e d in g ly w e a k
a r g u m e n t s fo r d i v e s t i n g th e s t a t e c o u r t s o f a u t h o r i t y to
h e a r w h y e x a c t ly Mr. N o r r i s w a s d i s c ip l in e d a f te r r e p o r t
in g h is s a f e ty c o n c e r n s to th e FAA. T h u s , P e t i t i o n e r s re ly
o n th e " w h i s t l e - b l o w e r " s t a t u t e c o n t a i n e d in th e F e d e ra l
R ail S a fe ty A c t o f 1970, 45 U .S.C . §§ 421 e l s eq ., w h ic h h a s
n o a n a l o g u e in th e a rea of a i r c a r r i e r safe ty . S ee Pet. Br. a t
12. S u c h r e l i a n c e r e s t s u p o n a t h e o r y of " i m p l i e d p r e e m p
t io n " t h a t th i s C o u r t h a s r e p e a t e d l y re je c te d . A b s e n t a
" c le a r a n d m a n i f e s t in d i c a t io n th a t C o n g r e s s s o u g h t to
s u p p l a n t lo ca l a u th o r i t y , " W iscon sin P u b lic ln te r v e n o r v.
M o rtie r , 111 S. C t. 2476 , 2485 (1991), th i s C o u r t h a s
a l l o w e d th e S ta te s to e n fo rc e n e u t r a l r e g u la t o r y m e a
s u re s , a n d to a d j u d i c a t e s t a t e - l a w c a u s e s o f a c t io n th a t
v i n d i c a t e l e g i t im a te h e a l t h a n d s a f e ty in te re s t s . T h e fac t
t h a t , a s P e t i t i o n e r s c o n c e d e , th e F R S A c o n t a i n s a n
" e x p l ic i t p r e e m p t i o n p r o v i s io n ," Pet. Br. a t 14 n .6 , ca lls u p
" th e f a m i l i a r p r i n c i p l e o f ex p r e s s io n u n iu s es t ex c lu s io
a lt e r iu s : C o n g r e s s ' e n a c t m e n t o f a p r o v i s io n d e f in in g th e
p r e e m p t i v e re a c h o f a s t a t u t e im p l ie s th a t m a t t e r s b e y o n d
th a t r e a c h a re n o t p r e e m p t e d . " C ip o llo n e v. L ig g ett G rou p ,
In c ., 112 S. C t. 2608, 2618 (1992). T h a t r u le g o v e r n s th is
case .
P e t i t i o n e r s , a n d th e i r am ic i , a lso re ly h e a v i ly o n th is
C o u r t ' s d e c i s io n in E lg in , ]. & E. R. C o. v. B u rley , 325 U.S.
711 (1945), as c r e a t in g a n e x p a n s iv e " o m i t t e d c a se " d o c
t r in e , a k in to a n a r b i t r a l " b la c k h o le ," f ro m w h ic h n o s ta te
la w c la im s c a n e s c a p e . A s R e s p o n d e n t p o in t s o u t , the
575
13
" o m i t t e d c a s e " l a n g u a g e in B u r ley is d ic ta , a n d h a s
s p a w n e d c o n f u s io n in th e lo w e r c o u r ts . T h a t c o n fu s io n ,
h o w e v e r , is r e s o lv e d b y th e fo l lo w in g l a n g u a g e o f C on ra il:
" th e l in e d r a w n in B u rley lo o k s to w h e t h e r a c la im h as
b e e n m a d e t h a t th e t e rm s o f a n ex is t in g ag reem en t e i th e r
e s ta b l i s h o r r e fu te th e p re s e n c e o f a r ig h t to ta k e the
d i s p u t e d a c t io n ." 491 U.S. a t 305 ( e m p h a s is a d d e d ) .
H e r e , w e h a v e e s s e n t i a l l y a s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t
re c o rd r a is in g a w e a l th of e v id e n c e th a t H a w a i i a n A ir
l ines d i s c ip l in e d N o r r i s fo r n o o th e r r e a s o n th a n h is
d a m a g i n g r e p o r t to th e FAA. T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t of
H a w a i i , a d o p t i n g as its o w n th e d e f e re n t i a l s t a n d a r d s of
th e lo w e r fe d e ra l c o u r t s o n a n a lo g o u s ju r i s d ic t io n a l q u e s
t ions , see P e t . A p p . 6a, c o n s t r u e d th is e v id e n c e f a v o ra b ly
to N o r r i s , a n d to th is d e g r e e th e d e c is io n o f th e c o u r t
b e lo w re s ts u p o n a n i n d e p e n d e n t a n d a d e q u a t e s ta te
g r o u n d . S ee O rr v. O n , 440 U.S. 268, 274 (1979). V iew in g
th is r e c o rd as d id th e S u p r e m e C o u r t o f H a w a i i , as th is
C o u r t m u s t , R e s p o n d e n t ' s c la im d o e s n o t in a n y w a y
im p l ic a te th e c o l lec t iv e b a r g a in in g a g r e e m e n t ' s l a n g u a g e .
S im ila rly , b e c a u s e H a w a i i a n A ir l in e s is p r iv i l e g e d , so far
as N o r r i s ' s w h i s t l e b l o w e r c la im s a re c o n c e rn e d , to "us[e ]
a n y c r i t e r i a i t m a y w i s h to u s e , e x c e p t t h o s e . . .
p r o h ib i t e d u n d e r [ a n t i - r e ta l ia t io n d o c t r in e , ] " U n iv ers ity o f
P en n sy lv an ia v. E E O C , 493 U.S. 182, 198 (1990), P e t i t io n e r s
n e e d n o t , a n d , m o re im p o r ta n t ly , a s ta te cou rt n e e d no t ,
r e s o r t to th e c o l lec t iv e b a r g a in in g a g r e e m e n t a t a ll to
d e t e r m in e w h e th e r R e s p o n d e n t ' s c la im s t a n d s o r falls. It
is n o t n e c e s s a r y for th e s ta te ju r i e s e v e n to k n o w w h a t is
in th e c o l lec t iv e b a r g a in in g a g r e e m e n t , m u c h less to c o n
s t ru e it, as i t is P e t i t io n e r s ' a n d th e i r a g e n t s ' w r o n g f u l
in te n t , vel n on , t h a t m a t t e r s h e re . S ee St. M ary's H on or
C en ter v. H icks , 113 S. C t. 2742, 2751 (1993) ( th e r e q u ir e d
576
14
f i n d i n g is " t h a t th e e m p l o y e r ' s a c t io n w a s th e p r o d u c t of
u n l a w f u l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , " n o t t h a t " th e e m p l o y e r ' s e x p l a
n a t io n o f i ts a c t io n w a s n o t b e l i e v a b le " ) . C o m p a re W heeler
v. St. P a u l C o m p a n ies , In c ., 1994 W L 11272, 11272*1 (M in n .
A p p . Jan . 18, 1994) ( " T h e b u r d e n of p r o o f in a w h i s
t l e b lo w e r c la im is th e s a m e as fo r a n e m p l o y m e n t d i s
c r im i n a t i o n c la im " ) , w ith P e t . A p p . 19a (" [T ]h e re s p e c t iv e
p o s i t i o n s o f t h e p a r t i e s to b e p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l
a re . . . 'p u r e l y fa c tu a l q u e s t i o n s [w h ic h ] p e r t a in f ] to th e
c o n d u c t o f th e e m p lo y e e a n d th e c o n d u c t a n d m o t iv a t io n
o f t h e e m p l o y e r . N e i t h e r o f [ t h e p a r t i e s ' p o s i t i o n s ]
r e q u i r e s a c o u r t to i n t e r p r e t a n y t e r m o f a co l lec t iv e
b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t ' ").
F o r th e s e r e a s o n s a lo n e , th e C o u r t s h o u ld a ff irm .
II I . T h e R a t i o n a l e o f t h i s C o u r t ' s D e c i s io n H o l d i n g
t h a t th e R a i l w a y L a b o r A c t D o e s N o t I m p l i e d l y
R e p e a l R a i l r o a d E m p l o y e e s ' R i g h t s to G o to C o u r t
U n d e r t h e F e d e r a l E m p l o y e r L i a b i l i t y A c t A lso
S u p p o r t s A f f i r m a n c e o f t h e J u d g m e n t .
A l t h o u g h th e a r g u m e n t s p r e s e n t e d a b o v e a re m o re
th a n s u f f i c ie n t to s u p p o r t th e j u d g m e n t of th e S u p r e m e
C o u r t o f H a w a i i , it is c le a r th a t th is C o u r t s h o u l d a f f i rm
fo r th e a d d i t i o n a l r e a s o n t h a t to d o o th e r w is e w o u l d
s e v e r e ly u n d e r c u t th e r a t i o n a l e o f A tc h is o n , T opeka &
S an ta F e R a ilw a y C o. v. B u e ll, 480 U.S. 557 (1987). In B u ell,
th e C o u r t w a s c a l le d u p o n to d e c id e w h e t h e r a r a i l ro a d
e m p lo y e e w a s b a r r e d b y th e R L A f ro m b r i n g i n g a n a c t io n
fo r d a m a g e s u n d e r th e F e d e r a l E m p lo y e r s ' L iab i l i ty A ct,
s im p ly b e c a u s e c o n d u c t r e la t e d to th e in ju r y c o u ld h a v e
b e e n s u b je c t to a r b i t r a t i o n u n d e r th e RLA.
577
15
In re je c t in g th e a r g u m e n t t h a t th e RLA, e n a c t e d a f te r
th e FE L A , i m p l i e d l y r e p e a l e d th e j u r y t r ia l r ig h t s c o n
fe r re d b y th e F E L A , th e C o u r t h e ld t h a t " [ i ]t is in c o n c e iv
ab le t h a t C o n g r e s s i n t e n d e d th a t a w o r k e r w h o s u f f e r e d a
d i s a b l in g in ju r y w o u l d b e d e n ie d r e c o v e ry u n d e r the
FE L A s i m p ly b e c a u s e h e m ig h t a lso b e ab le to p ro c e s s a
n a r r o w l a b o r g r i e v a n c e u n d e r th e R LA to a su c c e s s fu l
c o n c lu s io n . " B u ell, 480 U.S. a t 565. T h e C o u r t q u o t e d w i th
a p p r o v a l t h e n - d i s t r i c t J u d g e J. S k e l ly W r ig h t 's c o n c lu s io n
th a t " ' t h e R a i lw a y L a b o r A ct . . . h a s n o a p p l i c a t io n to a
c la im fo r d a m a g e s to th e e m p lo y e e r e s u l t in g f ro m the
n e g l ig e n c e o f a n e m p lo y e r r a i l r o a d . ' " Id. In t u r n , the
C o u r t d i s t i n g u i s h e d A n d rew s v. L o u isv ille & N a sh v ille R a il
road C o ., 406 U.S. 320 (1972), as in v o lv in g a c la im w h e r e
th e w o r k e r " b r o u g h t a s ta te w r o n g f u l d i s c h a r g e c la im
b a s e d s q u a r e l y o n a n a l le g e d b re a c h o f th e co l lec t iv e
b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t . " Id. a t 566. T h a t s ta te l a w c la im
w a s p r o p e r l y h e l d p r e e m p t e d in A n d rew s o n ly b e c a u s e
th e R L A d i s p u t e r e s o lu t io n m e c h a n i s m w a s " m a n d a t o r y
fo r t h a t t y p e o f d i s p u t e . " Id.
In r e j e c t i n g t h e r a i l r o a d ' s a r g u m e n t , t h e C o u r t
a d o p t e d r e a s o n i n g th a t is fa ta l to P e t i t io n e r s ' c la im here .
T h e B u ell C o u r t h e ld th e re w a s n o " in to le r a b le c o n f l ic t"
b e t w e e n th e F E L A r e m e d y a n d th e a rb i t r a l s c h e m e o f th e
RLA, re je c t in g th e r a i l r o a d 's " p a r a d e of h o r r ib le s " in l ig h t
of th e d i f f ic u l t ie s o f p r o v in g th e s o r t of e m o t io n a l d i s t r e s s
c la im s th e r a i l r o a d fe a re d w o u l d u p s e t th e R L A 's sch e m e .
480 U.S. a t 566-67 & n.13.
T h is c o n c lu s io n is r e le v a n t to th e p r e e m p t io n a n a l
y s is in th is c a s e as w e ll . " ' "T h e p u r p o s e o f C o n g re s s is
th e u l t im a t e t o u c h s to n e " ' o f p r e - e m p t io n a n a ly s i s ." C ip-
o llo n e v. L ig g ett G rou p , In c., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992)
(q u o t in g M a lo n e v. W hite M otor C orp ., 435 U.S. 497, 504
578
16
(1978)). T h i s t e s t is n o t m a te r i a l l y d i f f e r e n t t h a n th e te s t
a p p l i e d to th e r a i l r o a d ' s " im p l i e d - r e p e a l " a r g u m e n t in
B u ell, a n d , fo r th i s r e a s o n , B u ell is v e r y s ig n i f i c a n t s u p
p o r t fo r t h e n o - p r e e m p t i o n ru l in g b e lo w . T h is is p a r t i c
u l a r l y t r u e in t h a t th e d i s u n i f o r m i ty w h ic h th e P e t i t io n e r s
t r o t o u t in t h e i r o w n " p a r a d e o f h o r r ib l e s " (s e e Pet. Br. a t
19-23) fu l ly e x is t s a l r e a d y in th e FE L A c o n te x t , w h e r e ra il
w o r k e r s h a v e fo r d e c a d e s b e e n ab le to c h o o s e b e t w e e n
s t a t e a n d f e d e r a l c o u r t s w h e n b r i n g i n g th e i r c la im s . E .g .,
D ice v. A k ro n , C an ton & Y ou n gstow n R a ilroad , 342 U.S. 359
(1952). In a d d i t i o n , as in B u ell, g iv e n th e d i f f ic u l t ie s of
p r o v i n g a w h i s t l e b l o w e r s ' c a se , as w e l l a s w h a t o n e
w o u l d c e r t a i n l y h o p e is th e i n f r e q u e n c y o f fa c tu a l s c e
n a r io s t h a t g e n e r a t e s u b s t a n t i a l w h i s t l e b l o w e r l a w s u i t s ,
P e t i t i o n e r s ' a r g u m e n t t h a t a f f i rm a n c e h e r e w o u l d " o p e n
th e f l o o d g a t e s " p r o c e e d s f ro m a s s u m p t i o n s th a t are , a t
b e s t , t o t a l ly s p e c u la t iv e , if n o t w h o l ly m i s t a k e n .2
I n d e e d , r e v e r s a l o f th e S u p r e m e C o u r t o f H a w a i i ' s
r u l i n g in th is ca se , r a th e r t h a n p r e s e r v e th e R L A 's a rb i t r a l
m e c h a n i s m , w o u l d s u m m a r i l y d i s p l a c e , t h r o u g h th e
g u i s e o f R L A a r b i t r a t io n , th e o p e r a t i o n o f w o r k e r s ' c o m
p e n s a t i o n s y s t e m s in all o f th e S ta te s a n d T er r i to r ie s .
B e c a u se a i r l i n e w o r k e r s a re n o t s u b je c t to FE L A p r o t e c
t io n , if P e t i t i o n e r s a re c o r re c t in th is ca se , th e n it is a lso
t r u e t h a t w o r k e r s ' c o m p e n s a t io n d i s p u t e s fa ll w i t h i n th e
2 Moreover, if one is looking to reduce litigation as a whole,
one w ould hardly allow airlines to shunt their employees who
validly blow the whistle on airline safety violations into the
"narrow labor grievance under the RLA." Buell, 480 U.S. at 565.
Had the safety violations Norris disclosed been kept secret as
certa in H aw aiian A irl ines ' em ployees at least seemingly
intended, an extremely serious accident could have occurred, in
which case dozens of lawsuits would certainly have followed.
579
17
a m b i t o f 45 U.S.C . § 184, a n d n o S ta te c o u ld a p p l y its
m e c h a n i s m s fo r r e s o lv in g w o r k e r s ' c o m p e n s a t io n m a t te r s
w i th re s p e c t to a ir c a r r i e r e m p lo y e e s . S u c h a re s u l t , l e a d
in g a t a m i n i m u m to " [d je lay , m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of local
law , a n d n e e d le s s f e d e ra l co n f l ic t w i t h th e s t a t e policy ,"
B u rford v. Sun O il C o ., 319 U.S. 315, 327 (1943), a n d an
a b s u r d a n d u n ju s t i f ie d d i m in u t i o n in th e r ig h t s o f air
c a r r ie r w o r k e r s v is a v is th o s e o f ra il w o rk e r s , is h a r d ly a
ra t io n a l o n e , a n d c o u ld n o t b e r e a s o n a b ly d e e m e d to h av e
b e e n th e i n t e n t o f C o n g re s s w h e n it b r o u g h t a i r c a r r ie rs
w i th in th e c o v e r a g e of th e R LA in 1936.3
To a v o id th is re s u l t , th e C o u r t s h o u ld a f f i rm the
ju d g m e n t .
IV. P e t i t i o n e r s ' C o n s t r u c t i o n o f th e R L A S h o u l d A lso
Be R e je c te d B e c a u s e it R a i s e s S ig n i f i c a n t C o n s t i t u
t i o n a l Q u e s t i o n s U n d e r t h e F i r s t , S e v e n t h , a n d
T e n th A m e n d m e n t s .
E v e n if th e fo re g o in g a r g u m e n t s w e re in s u f f ic ie n t to
c o u n s e l a f f i rm a n c e in th e i r o w n r ig h t , " w h e r e a n o th e r
w ise a c c e p ta b le c o n s t r u c t io n o f a s t a tu t e w o u l d ra ise
s e r io u s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p ro b le m s , th e C o u r t w i l l c o n s t ru e
the s t a tu t e to a v o id s u c h p r o b le m s u n le s s s u c h c o n s t r u c
t io n is p l a in ly c o n t r a r y to th e i n t e n t o f C o n g re s s . " D eB ar-
tolo C ory . v. F lo r id a G u lf C oast Trades C ou n cil, 485 U.S. 568,
575 (1988). T h is r u le " h a s fo r so lo n g b e e n a p p l i e d b y th is
C o u r t t h a t it is b e y o n d d e b a te . " Id .; see a lso F r isby v.
S ch u ltz , 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1988). T h is ru le a p p l i e s h e re
th re e t im e s over.
3 The Court impliedly so held in Pan American World Air
ways, Inc. v. Puchert, 472 U.S. 1001 (1985) (dism'ing appeal from
Puchert v. Agsalud, 67 Haw. 25, 677 P.2d 449 (1984)).
580
18
A s a n in i t ia l m a t t e r , i t is i m p o r t a n t to e m p h a s i z e th a t
th e r e m e d i e s p r o v i d e d b y R L A a r b i t r a t io n h a v e b e e n h e ld
to b e " n a r r o w ," p r o v i d i n g n o g e n e ra l d a m a g e s , n o r p u n i
t iv e d a m a g e s . B u ell, 480 U.S. a t 565 & n.12. S im ila r ly ,
t h e r e is n o t h i n g in th e R L A t h a t e a s e s th e e v i d e n t i a r y
b u r d e n s u p o n N o r r i s (as in th e " c o m p r o m i s e " w o r k e d b y
w o r k e r s ' c o m p e n s a t i o n la w s ; see , e .g ., S eco n d E m p loy ers'
L ia b ility C a ses , 223 U.S. 1 (1912)). T h e re fo re , th e re is n o
" q u id p r o q u o " h e r e to c u s h i o n th e h a r m in f l ic te d b y
f e d e ra l p r e e m p t i o n o n i n d i v i d u a l s l ike N o r r i s , a n d th e
S ta te o f H a w a i i , w h o s e l a w s v in d ic a t e its p e o p l e ' s i n t e r
es ts . N ew M o to r V eh ic le B oard o f C a lifo rn ia v. O rrin W. F ox
C o., 434 U.S. 1345, 1351 (1977) ( R e h n q u is t , in c h a m
b ers ) .
W h e t h e r th e U n i t e d S ta te s C o n g r e s s c o u ld c o n s t i t u
t i o n a l ly fo re c lo s e th e r i g h t s o f H a w a i i c i t i z e n s s u c h as
G r a n t N o r r i s t h r o u g h m a n d a t o r y a r b i t r a t io n o f th e n a t u r e
s o u g h t in th is c a se is a t b e s t u n c lea r . T h is C o u r t h a s h e ld ,
fo r e x a m p le , t h a t " f i l in g a c o m p l a i n t in c o u r t is a fo r m of
p e t i t i o n i n g a c t iv i ty ," M cD o n a ld v. S m ith , 472 U.S. 479, 484
(1985), a n d , a t a m i n i m u m , fe d e ra l p r e e m p t io n , to b e
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , w o u l d r e q u i r e s h o w in g s s u f f ic ie n t to m e e t
a p p l i c a b le l im i t s o n " t im e , p la c e , a n d m a n n e r " r e g u l a
t io n . C o m p a re W ard v. R o ck A g a in s t R acism , 491 U.S. 781,
797 (1989) ( i d e n t i f y in g p e r m is s ib l e s c o p e o f s u c h r e g u la
t io n ) , zvith W alters v. N a tio n a l A sso c ia tio n o f R ad ia tion S u r
v iv o rs , 473 U.S. 305, 334-35 (1985) ( u p h o l d i n g l im i t s o n ly
o n th e a m o u n t s to b e p a i d to c o u n se l) . I n d e p e n d e n t o f
F i r s t A m e n d m e n t i n t e r e s t s , a n y a b o l i t io n o f N o r r i s ' s
s t a t e - c r a t e d ju ry r i g h t r a is e s a le g i t im a te q u e s t io n u n d e r
th e S e v e n t h A m e n d m e n t . T h e C o u r t h a s m a d e c lea r th a t
" [ t ]h e S e v e n th A m e n d m e n t d o e s a p p l y to a c t io n s e n f o rc
i n g s t a t u t o r y r i g h t s , a n d r e q u i r e s a j u r y t r i a l u p o n
d e m a n d , if th e s t a t u t e c r e a te s leg a l r ig h t s a n d re m e d ie s ,
581
19
e n f o rc e a b le in a n a c t io n for d a m a g e s in th e o r d i n a r y
c o u r t s o f law ." C u rtis v. L oeth er, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974). It
is c le a r t h a t N o r r i s w o u l d b e e n t i t l e d to a ju r y tr ia l in th e
f e d e ra l c o u r t s if, fo r e x a m p le , h e w e r e e m p l o y e d b y a n
o u t -o f - s ta te a i r c a r r ie r , a n d s u e d e i th e r u n d e r th e s ta te
w h i s t l e b lo w e r s t a t u t e o r th e c o m m o n la w e x c e p t io n to a t-
w il l e m p l o y m e n t , a n d it is d o u b t f u l th a t C o n g re s s c o u ld
a b o l i s h th a t j u r y r i g h t in th e C o u r t s o f th e U n i te d S ta tes ,
p a r t i c u la r ly as th e a rb i t r a l f o r u m h e r e p r o v id e s n o th in g
in th e w a y of a qu id p ro qu o fo r e l im in a t io n of th e a d v a n
tag e s o f th e s t a t e la w su it . T h e s e d o u b t s a re e q u a l ly
a p p l i c a b le to th is case , w h e r e N o r r i s s o u g h t ( a n d fo u g h t
for) a s ta te f o r u m a g a in s t th e a ir c a r r ie r . S ee a lso Joh n son v.
R ob in son , 415 U.S. 361 (1974) (on th e p r e s u m p t i o n a g a in s t
th e e l im in a t io n o f p l e n a r y ju d ic ia l re v ie w ) .
T h e S ta te s , m o r e o v e r , h a v e i n d e p e n d e n t c o n s t i t u
t io n a l i n te r e s t s in p o l ic e p o w e r m e a s u r e s i n t e n d e d to
p r o te c t th e h e a l th , w e lf a re , a n d sa f e ty of th e i r c i t izen s .
H e re , it s h o u l d b e n o te d , H a w a i i a n A ir l in e s ' M c D o n n e l l -
D o u g la s D C -9 a i rc ra f t w e r e s l a t e d so le ly for in te r - i s la n d
t rav e l . A n a c c id e n t w h ic h in v o lv e d o n e of th e su b je c t
a i r c ra f t w o u l d d o u b t l e s s h a v e a f fe c te d m a n y H a w a i i c i t i
z e n s , b o t h o n th e g r o u n d , a n d in th e air, a n d w o u l d h a v e
h a d e x te n s iv e s e c o n d a r y effec ts o n loca l p ro p e r ty , a n d o n
th e loca l e c o n o m y as a w h o le , w h ic h is h e a v i ly d e p e n d e n t
u p o n to u r i s m . I t is a lso c lea r th a t th e S ta te of H a w a i i h a s
v e r y l i t t le - if a n y - ab i l i ty to k e e p H a w a i i a n A ir l in e s
f r o m a c tu a l ly f ly in g w i t h i n t h e S ta te o f H a w a i i . S ee
M o ra les v. Trans W orld A ir lin es , In c ., 112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992).
U n d e r th e s e c i r c u m s ta n c e s , all H a w a i i can d o is p ro te c t
th o s e w h o a c t as th e ey e s a n d e a r s o f th e p u b l i c - H a w a i
ia n A i r l in e s ' t r a in e d in s p e c t io n p e r s o n n e l - f ro m r e ta l ia
t io n fo r r e p o r t i n g a i r l in e s a f e ty ' p r o b l e m s to r e l e v a n t
f e d e ra l a u th o r i t i e s . To s t r ip th e S ta te o f th is la s t v e s t ig e of
582
2 0
i ts a b i l i ty to p r o t e c t i t s e l f a n d i ts r e s id e n t s w o u l d ra is e a
v e r y s e r io u s T e n th A m e n d m e n t i s s u e u n d e r th is C o u r t ' s
d e c i s io n in N ew Y ork v. U n ited S ta tes , 112 S. C t. 2408
(1992). In t h a t c a se , th e C o u r t h e ld th a t th e " ta k e t i t le "
p r o v i s i o n s o f L o w - L e v e l R a d i o a c t i v e W a s te P o l i c y
A m e n d m e n t s o f 1985 to b e a n u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l " c o n g re s -
s io n a l ly c o m p e l l e d s u b s i d y f ro m s ta te g o v e r n m e n t s to
n u c l e a r w a s t e p r o d u c e r s . " Id . a t 2428. R e v e r s a l o f th e
j u d g m e n t p o r t e n d s a s im i l a r s o r t o f s u b s i d y f ro m th e
S ta te s to th e a i r c a r r i e r i n d u s t r y . T h e C o u r t s h o u l d th u s
a f f i rm .
---------- ----------- .— ---------------------------
C O N C L U S I O N
F o r t h e r e a s o n s a b o v e , t h e j u d g m e n t s h o u l d b e
a f f i rm e d .
D a te d : H o n o l u l u , H a w a i i , A p r i l 1, 1994.
R o b e r t A. M a r k s
A tto rn ey G en era l
S ta te o f H aiv a ii
S t e v e n S. M i c h a e l s *
D ep u ty A tto rn ey G en era l
S ta te o f H aw a ii
*C o u n se l o f R ecord
425 Q u e e n S tre e t
H o n o l u l u , H a w a i i 96813
(808) 586-1365
C o u n se l f o r A m icu s
C u r ia e S ta te o f H aw a ii
[ O th e r C o u n s e l L is te d
I n s id e F ro n t C o v e r ]
583
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5 4 4 2 3 0 t h S t . , N W
W a s h i n g t o n , D C 2 0 0 1 5
(202) 362 8502 (800) 356-0671