Order; Correspondence from Boyd to Judge Thompson

    #

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RONALD BRADLEY, et al., X
Plaintiffs,

»
X
• CIVIL ACTION

-VS- X
: NO. 35257

WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al., X
Defendants.

•
X

PLAINTIFFS 1 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE 
MOTION TO DISMISS BY DEFENDANTS' MILLIKEN, ET AL.

In the Memorandum in Support of their Motion to 

Dismiss, the defendants Milliken, et al. request that the 
plaintiffs' Complaint and Amended Complaint should be dis­

missed as to them for two reasons. First, these defendants 
assert that, as to them, the decision of the United States 

Supreme Court in this case, Milliken v. Bradley, 414 U.S.

1038 (1974), reversed the lower court findings of segregatory 

conduct on their part, even as to the Detroit-only violations.

Second, and in conjunction with the above, these 
defendants urge that complete relief from the unconstitutional 

conduct of the State Board of Education and the Detroit Board 
of Education may be obtained against the Detroit Board of 
Education alone. In this respect, these defendants assert 

that the Eleventh Amendment prevents this Court from requiring 
them to expend funds to comply with any equitable Detroit-only 

remedy.
It is plaintiffs' position that upon close analysis, 

none of these contentions is viable.

I.

THE DEFENDANTS MILLIKEN, ET AL. SHOULD NOT BE
DISMISSED FROM THIS CASE SINCE THEY HAVE BEEN
FOUND TO HAVE COMMITTED CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS 

IN THE SCHOOL SYSTEM OF DETROIT.



•  #

A.

The district court opinion found the following con­
stitutional violation to have been committed by the State 
defendants as to Detroit-only violations:

The State and its agencies, in addition 
to their general responsibility for and 
supervision of public education, have acted 
directly to control and maintain the pattern 
of segregation in the Detroit schools. The 
State refused, until this session of the 
legislature, to provide authorization or 
funds for the transportation of pupils within 
Detroit regardless of their poverty or distance 
from the school to which they were assigned, 
while providing in many neighboring, most white, 
suburban districts the full range of state 
supported transportation. This and other fi­
nancial limitations, such as those on bonding 
and the working of the state aid formula where­
by suburban districts were able to make far 
larger per pupil expenditures despite less tax 
effort, have created and perpetuated systematic 
educational inequalities.

The State, exercising what Michigan courts 
have held to be in "plenary power" which includes 

5 power "to use a statutory scheme, to create,
alter, reorganize or even dissolve a school dis­
trict, despite any desire of the school district, 
it's board, or the inhabitants thereof," acted 
to reorganize the school district of the City of 
Detroit.

The State acted through Act 48 to impede, 
delay and minimize racial integration in Detroit 
schools. The first sentence of Sec. 12 of the 
Act was directly related to the April 7, 1970 de­
segregation plan. The remainder of the section 
sought to prescribe for each school in the eight 
districts criterion of "free choice" (open enroll­
ment) and "neighborhood schools" ("nearest school 
priority acceptance"), which had as their purpose 
and effect the maintenace of segregation.

In view of our findings of fact already noted, 
we think it unnecessary to parse in detail the 
activities of the local board and the state authori­
ties in the area of school construction and the 
furnishing of school facilities. It is our con­
clusion that these activities were in keeping, 
generally, with the discriminatory practices which 
advanced or perpetuated racial segregation in 
these schools.

Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F.Supp 582, 589 (1971).

These findings were repeated verbatim and affirmed 
by the en banc opinion of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 238-39 (6th Cir. 1973).

2-



As the Sixth Circuit concluded:

The discriminatory practices on the 
part of the Detroit School Board and the 
State of Michigan revealed by this record 
are significant, pervasive and causally re­
lated to the substantial amount of segrega­
tion found in the Detroit school system by 
the District Judge. Bradley v. Milliken, 
supra, at 241.

The Opinion of the United States Supreme Court
stated:

"[t]he District Court also found that 
the State of Michigan had committed several 
constituional violations with respect to 
its general responsibility for and super­
vision of public education." Milliken v.
Bradley, 414 U.S. 1038, 41 L.Ed.2d 1069,
1081 (1974). (Footnote omitted).

More significantly, the Supreme Court stated:

School districts in the State of Michigan 
are instrumentalities of the State and sub­
ordinate to its State Board of Education and 
legislature. The Constitution of the State of 

j Michigan, Art. VIII, §2, provides in relevant
part: "The legislature shall maintain and
support a system of free public elementary and 
secondary schools as defined by law." Similarly, 
the Michigan Supreme Court has stated that "the 
school district is a state agency. Moreover, it 
is of legislative creation...." Attorney General 
v. Aoweey, 131 Mich. 639 , 644 , 92 NW 2 8 9', 290 
(1902); "Education in Michigan belongs to the 
State. It is no part of the local self-government 
inherent in the township or municipality, except 
so far as the legislature may choose to make it 
such. The Constitution has turned the whole 
subject over to the legislature...." Attorney 
General v. Detroit Board of Education, 154 Mich. 
584, 590, 118 NW 606, 609 (1908).

Milliken v. Bradley, ___ U.S. ____, 41 L.Ed.2d 1069 , 1081
n. 5 (1974).

The Supreme Court then catalogued the findings of

the Court of Appeals with respect to the States* violations.
See Milliken v. Bradley, ___ U.S. ____, 41 L.Ed.2d 1069 , 1085

n. 16 (1974). Only after these recitals and in the context of
considering the appropriateness of metropolitan relief, the
Supreme Court stated:

"[0]ur assumption, arguendo... that 
state agencies did participate in the main­
tenance of the Detroit system, should make

3



•  #

it is clear that it is not on this point
that we part company." Milliken v.
Bradley, U.S. , 41 L.Ed.2d 1069,
1092 (197471

Thus, the Opinion of the Supreme Court does not 
support the contention of the State defendants that the Court 

reversed the findings of constitutional violations against 
the defendants Milliken, et al. In fact, the Supreme Court 
accepted the findings of the district court and the Sixth Cir­
cuit with respect to the state involvement in the Detroit-only 
violation.

The State defendants attempt to tie the logic of 

their reasoning to speculation as to the Supreme Court's action 
denying plaintiffs motion to require each party to bear its 
own costs in that Court merely demonstrates the slender reed 

on which their argument rests. Speculation of this sort is
perhaps as weak as speculation as to the Court's reasons for
,the denial of a petition for certiorari.

The State defendants' central role in this litigation 
is highlighted by the history of the case and Michigan's brand 
of interposition. The Michigan Legislature enacted and the 
Governor signed into law, Act 48, Public Acts of 1970. The 
effect of Section 12 of this Act was to rescind for at least 
one year, the attempt made by the Detroit Board of Education 
to achieve integration in some of its high schools. The Sixth 
Circuit stated: " [w]e hold §12 of Act 48 to be unconstitu­
tional and of no effect as violative of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment." Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F.2d 897, 904 (1970). This 

holding was not overturned by the Supreme Court. See Milliken 
v. Bradley, ____ U.S. , 41 L.Ed.2d 1069, 1094(1974).

— In fact they quite deliberately fail to advise this 
Court that they made almost the precise same argument to the 
Sicth Circuit, with respect to what they thought the cost dis­
pute and result in the Supreme Court meant. They sought to 
have the Sixth Circuit retax costs in that Court (it has pre­
viously ordered each side to bear its own costs). On December 
20, 1974, the Sixth Circuit, en banc without a single dissent 
rejected their view and refused to retax costs. A copy of the 
opinion is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

-4-



# #

These state defendants are as necessary now to 

the relief state of the proceedings in this case as when the 

Sixth Circuit determined them to be "proper parties" in 1970. 

See' Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F.2d 897, 905 (6th Cir. 1970).
In that appeal the district court, on these same defendants' 

motion, dismissed them as parties. Plaintiffs appealed and 
argued that at the very least they might be needed for relief. 
We pointed out then and now that many times the Courts have 
been required to add State officials as parties to insure 

compliance with its orders in school cases. Just as Judge 

Roth, when it came time to order the purchase of transportation 

equipment, or require other payments by State defendants, 

found it necessary to add the State Treasurer, Allison Green, 
so too this Court will require the presence of State defendants 

as parties. If any one of them were to be let out of the case, 
and this Court then decided they were needed to assist in
9remedy, these same lawyers would scream that due process was 
violated in that an order had been entered which affected 

them at a time they were not parties. What defendants would 
have this Court do is fall into a trap so that the defendants 
might fill their "error bag." 2/

THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT BAR THE PAR­
TICIPATION OF THE DEFENDANTS MILLIKEN, ET AL.
IN EQUITABLE RELIEF FROM CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS.
These defendants also assert that the Eleventh 

Amendment prohibits the expenditure of public funds from the 
State Treasury, in order to comply with orders of a Federal 
Court. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 657 (1974). Appar­

ently, at this juncture, the defendants Milliken,et al. are

— The record reflects the Governor is an ex officio 
member of the State Board of Education. He signed Act 48 into 
law and he, after the recall of Detroit Board members, ap­
pointed a majority of the interim members of that Board. Act 
48, of course, not only rescinded the Board’s plan for pupil 
assignment, it rescinded integrated regions and set up segre­
gated regional boundaries. It also set up segregation by 
pupil assignment methods. Bradley, supra, 433 F.2d 897, 901 
(1970) .

-5



#

anticipating an order against them for the purchase of bus­
ses or other expenditures to implement the future Detroit- 

only remedy.
These defendants conclude from Edelman that:

[I]t is crystal clear, based on the 
authority of Edelman' v. Jordan, supra, that 
where, as here, the State of Michigan has not 
consented to this suit in federal court, the 
federal courts may not compel defendants 
Milliken, et al. to provide State funds from 
the State Treasury to pay for the acquisition 
of busses for a Detroit-only desegregation 
remedy. Brief of Defendant Milliken, et al., 
in support of their Motion to Dismiss, at 11.

These defendants, however, have overlooked the 

important distinction the Court made in Edelman with respect 
to prospective relief. After discussing a series of cases, 

the Court concluded:
But the fiscal consequences to state 

treasuries in these cases were the necessary 
I result of compliance with decrees which by

their terms were prospective in nature.
State officials, in order to shape their of­
ficial conduct to the mandate of the Court's 
decrees, would more likely have to spend 
money from the state treasury than if they 
had been left free to pursue their previous 
course of conduct. Such an ancillary effect 
on the state treasury is a permissible and 
often an inevitable consequence of the 
principle announced in Ex parte Young, supra. 
Edelman v. Jordan, U.S. , 39 L.Ed.2d
662, 675 (1974).

The argument of the defendants Milliken, et al. that 
the Eleventh Amendment precludes Federal courts from compel­
ling the payment of State funds from the State Treasury is 
based on a misapprehension of the jurisdictional nature of the 
Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment provides:

The judicial power of the United States 
shall not be construed to extend to any suit 
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 
against one of the United States by Citizens 
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects 
of any Foreign State.

The Amendment was proposed by the Congress and ratified by the 

states in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Chisolm 
v. Georgia, 2 Dali. 419 (1793), in which the Court held that

6



# #

federal jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution, 

encompassed a suit brought against a non-consenting state by 

citizens of another state. Thus the Eleventh Amendment was 
intended to clarify the intent of the Framers of the Consti­

tution and to restrict the language of Article III, Section 2 
which states that the federal judicial power shall extend to 
"controversies... between a state and citizens of another 
state."

The Eleventh Amendment limitation on suits against 
states is different than the limitations arising under the 

common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. While sovereign 

immunity, where it applies, protects states from suit in any 
forum absent consent, the Eleventh Amendment merely places 

jurisdiction limitations on federal courts. Justice Marshall, 

in his concurring opinion in Employees v. Department of Public 

Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 294 (1973), articulatedI
this distinction:

The root of the constitutional im­
pediment to the exercise of the federal 
judicial power in a case such as this is 
not the Eleventh Amendment but Art. Ill of 
our Constitution....

■k k  *

This limitation upon the judicial 
power is, without question, a reflection 
of concern for the sovereignty of the States, 
but in a particularly limited context. The 
issue is not the general immunity of the 
States from private suit - a question of the 
common law - but merely the susceptibility 
of the States to suit before federal tribunals.

In Edelman v. Jordan, U.S. , 39 L.Ed.2d 662
(T974), the Court underscored the jurisdictional nature of the

3/Eleventh Amendment.

3/
...[I]t has been well-settled since 

the decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Department 
of Treasury, [323 U.S. 459 (1945)] that the 
Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently par­
takes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar 
so that it need not be raised in the trial 
court. Edelman, supra, at 39 L.Ed.2d 681.

-7



•  •

One limited purpose of the Eleventh Amendment is 
to minimize the tensions of federalism "inherent in making 
one sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the 

other." Employees v. Department of Public Health and Welfare, 
supra, 411 U.S. at 294 (Marshall, J. concurring).

The very object and purpose of the 
11th Amendment were to prevent the indig­
nity of subjecting a State to the coercive 
process of judicial tribunals at the instance 
of private parties. It was thought to be 
neither becoming nor convenient that the 
several states of the Union, invested with 
that large residuum of sovereignty which had 
not been delegated to the United States, 
should be summoned as defendants to answer 
the complaints of private persons, whether 
citizens of other states or aliens, or that 
the course of their public policy and the ad­
ministration of their public affairs should 
be subject to and controlled by the mandates 
of judicial tribunals without their consent 
and in favor of individual interests.

In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505-06 (1887). The Amendment there- 
fpre denies federal courts the jurisdiction to decide certain 
rights and liabilities when asserted against a state.

The jurisdictional bar of the Eleventh Amendment is 
not absolute, however. A long line of cases, beginning with 

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), has established that suits 
for injunctive relief against state officials may be heard in 
federal courts, consistent with the Constitution, where the 
complaint is that the official, acting in his capacity as 
agent of the state, has engaged in unauthorized or unconstitu­
tional conduct. In Ex parte Young, supra, and subsequent
cases, the Supreme Court harmonized this doctrine and the

Eleventh Amendment by holding that such a suit is against the
individual and not against the State, in spite of the fact
that injunctive relief ordered in such cases may require the

4/
expenditure of state funds and other state action.

4/
The Court in Edelman (39 L.Ed.2d 675) explicitly 

noted that the kinds of relief authorized by Ex parte Young 
would result in the expenditure of state funds:

State officials, in order to shape their 
official conduct to the mandate of the Court’s 
decrees, would more likely have to spend money 
from the State Treasury than if they had been 
left free to pursue their previous course of conduct.

-8-



Edelman v. Jordan, supra, marked a clarification 

of the doctrine first enunciated in Ex parte Young. In 

Edelman the Supreme Court held that while suits for prospec­
tive injunctive relief against a state official are not barred

by the Eleventh Amendment, at least certain actions which seek
5/

the award of an accrued monetary liability are prohibited.

The Court found that there were essentially two

causes of action in Edelman: one for injunctive relief, and

one for monetary damages. On the facts before it, the Court
held that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear

6/
certain causes of action which closely resemble actions for

5/
It is notable that while the Court in Edelman 

prohibits some kinds of monetary awards against states, nowhere 
does it state that no form of expenditures may be ordered. 
Indeed, the Court specifically recognizes that one of the in­
evitable consequences of the adjudication of cases involving 
state officials as defendants is that state funds will have to 
be expended. The Court points out, however, that, n[s]uch an 
ancillary effect on the state treasury is a permissible... 
consequence of the principle announced in Ex parte Young, 
supra." 39 L.Ed.2d 675.

£/
As Mr. Justice Marshall, in dissenting in Edelman, 

noted (39 L.Ed.2d 690 n.2), the facts in Edelman did not pre­
sent the question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment in any 
way limits, or authorizes the Congress to limit, such immunity 
as is conferred by the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
2000e et seq. (Supp. II 1972) which authorizes suits by private 
individuals and the United States against state and local 
governments (42 U.S.C. 2000e(a)) for relief from employment 
discrimination, including back pay (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5). See 
also Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196-197 (1974).

While there are considerations which suggest that the 
Eleventh Amendment is limited in part by the Fourteenth, and 
that issue must eventually be decided (perhaps in a case seek­
ing "damages" for Fourteenth Amendment violations), we do not 
feel that the Court must resolve that question to decide the 
issue presented in this case. Of course, Section 718 of the 
Education Amendments presents this same question in that in 
effectuating the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress expressly auth­
orized an award of attorney's fees against State school 
authorities, cf. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Kelley, 493 F.2d 784 
(Fifth Circuit, 1974) n.l at 786; Boston Chapter NAACP, Inc, v. 
Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1028-29 (First Circuit, 1974); Woods 
v. Strickland, 43 U.S.L.W. 4293 (1975).

-9



monetary damages. "[A] suit that seeks the award of an ac­

crued monetary liability which must be met from the general 

revenues of a State..." is beyond the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts. Edelman v. Jordan, supra, 39 L.Ed.2d 673.

The issue now before this Court is not, as it was 

in Edelman, whether the district court had jurisdiction under 
Article III of the Constitution, to decide the case. As 

noted above, Ex parte Young established and Edelman confirmed 
the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear actions for in­
junctive relief against state officials. Rather, the question 
presented here concerns whether a federal court, having juris­
diction to decide a case, may order defendants to take action 
which will cost them money. To state the question is to make 
plain that Edelman itself has already, in plain and simple 

language, answered the question, "yes."
In choosing to defend an action properly brought in

i
a federal forum, defendants must assume responsibility for 
the normal incidents of such a suit, including the cost of 
prospective relief, Court costs, witness fees, and attorneys'

Vfees.

V Indeed it follows inevitably from the doctrine of 
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), that states will be 
requirecTTo expend funds in the court of litigating suits such 
as those now before this Court.

10



#

CONCLUSION

The defendants suggest on the one hand that 
they give large sums of money to the Detroit school 

district and that it is wealthy compared to other dis­
tricts. Such a simplicitic approach to school finance 
can only be intentional in light of the extensive exper­
ience school authorities throughout the nation have had 
with big city systems. Large numbers of dollars may show 

but the far higher per pupil costs because of the educa­

tion deficits suffered by minority and poor youngsters 

together with municipal tax over burden make such figures 
entirely misleading. However, the absurdity of their 

argument (footnore 2 at page 7 of their supplemental brief) 
is shown by the statement that the Detroit district has 

cut back on expenditures by "eighty million dollars" and 
that their remains a projected "one-hundred and eighty 

million dollar deficit that will have . . . to be elimi­
nated by both further reductions in expenditures and obtain 

ing additional revenue." Somehow or another they leap from 
that point to the argument that the State Board and State 
Treasurer should have no responsibility for assisting 

Detroit in the desegregation process. Not since the French 
Revolution has so cavalier a declaration of "let them eat 
cake" been made by public officials.

This Court and the parties are faced with a 

great responsibility for developing a sound and effective 

remedy to desegregate the Detroit public schools within the 

limits of the constitutional authority granted by the 

United States Supreme Court. Even though such plan may 

be on an interim basis, the interests of the children 
involved must be paramount. Unfortunately, it would seem 

that the state officials have no interest in Detroit’s 

children, obviously because so many of them are black.

-11-



•  #

In conclusion, plaintiffs respectfully submit that 

there is absolutely no basis for the defendants' reading 

of the Supreme Court's Decision with respect to the respons­
ibilities of state school authorities for constitutional 
violations within the Detroit school district. The Supreme 

Court has accepted the findings of the District Court and 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals with respect to the 
state defendants.

Plaintiffs have never suggested that Allison 

Green is charged with any of the de_ jure violations. He 

was made a party simply because the defendants insisted 
that it was necessary in order to obtain an order for pay­
ment of state funds for both the desegregation panel and 
the purchase of transportation equipment. That order for 
purchase of transportation equipment was not directed at 
metro relief only. While the order was vacated by the 
Sixth Circuit in its en banc decision, it was with the 
expressed suggestion that it could be reinstated when it 

was necessary. Upon the reinstatement5the defendant Allison 
Green will need to remain a party.

One further point illustrates the necessity 
for keeping the state defendants as parties in the action. 
Under Michigan law the State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction of the State Board had, and has, the power 
to require each board of education and the officers there­
of to observe the laws relating to schools, and to compel 
the observance of such law by appropriate legal proceedings, 
'instituted in the proper courts under the direction of the 
Attorney General. See MSA 15.2352. State law also imposes 
the duty on the Superintendent of Public Instruction to do 

all things necessary to promote the welfare of the public 
schools and public education institutions. MSA 15.3355 
sets forth that no separate school or department should be 
kept for any person or persons on account of race or color. 
Ultimately, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction

12



# #

has the power to remove from office, upon satisfactory 

proof and proper notice, any member of a local school 

board who shall have persistently and without sufficient 

cause refused and neglected to discharge any of the duties 

of his office, which obviously would include complying 
with the probitions against racially separate schools or 
the orders of this Court. See MSA 15.3253; MSA 15.3355.

With regard to the Eleventh Amendment argument 
we respectfully submit that it is simply not applicable 

to the prospective relief situation before this Court. 
Plaintiffs submit that this Court should not only deny 

state defendants’ motion but that it should consider requir­

ing these defendants to assume a full measure of their own 
affirmative duty to end school segregation.

RATNER, SUGARMON, LUCAS & SALKY 
525 Commerce Title Building 
Memphis, Tennessee 38103

JOHN A. DZIAMBA 
746 Main Street 
P.O. Box D
Willimantic, Connecticut 06226

ELLIOTT S. HALL
2755 Guardian Building 
500 Griswald Avenue 
Detroit, Michigan

NATHANIEL JONES .
General Counsel 
N.A.A.C.P.
1790 Broadway
New York, New York 10019

J. HAROLD FLANNERY 
PAUL DIMOND 
WILLIAM E. CALDWELL

Lawyers' Committee For Civil
Rights Under Law
733 15th Street, N.W.
Suite 520
Washington, D.C. 20005 

Counsel for Plaintiffs

-13-



#

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing 

Plaintiffs’ Brief In Opposition To The Motion To Dismiss 
By Defendants’ Milliken, Et Al. has been served on all 
counsel of record by depositing same to them at their 
office by United States mail, postage prepaid, this 3 
day of March, 1975.

-14-



Nos. 72-1809-14

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

RONALD BRADLEY, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, Governor 
of Michigan, etc.; Board of 
EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF 
DETROIT,

Defendants-Appellants,
Iand

DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS 
LOCAL 231, AMERICAN FEDERATION 
OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO,

Defendant-Intervenor-Appellee,

and

ALLEN PARK PUBLIC SCHOOLS et al.,

Defendants-Intervenors-Appellants

and

KERRY GREEN et al.,

Defendants-Intervenors-Appellees.

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l-~t  ji u {  ̂ ;
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r. HEHMV ' K

ORDER

Jerk

Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, and WEICK, EDWARDS, 

CELEBREZZE, PECK, McCREE, MILLER, LIVELY and ENGEL, Circuit

Judges.



Nos. 72-1809-14 - 2

In the decision of this court, reported at 

484 F.2d 215 (1973), it was ORDERED that no costs be taxed

and that each party bear his own costs in the Court of 

Appeals.

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of 

this court in certain particulars in an opinion reported at 

42 U.S.L.W. 5249 (July 25, 1974) and remanded the causes to 

this court for further proceedings in conformity with the 

opinion of the Supreme Court. This court has remanded the 

causes to the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Michigan for further proceedings in conformity 

with the opinion of the Supreme Court.'

The Supreme Court taxed costs in that court 

against Ronald Bradley and Richard Bradley, by mother and 

next friend, Verde Bradley, in the sum of $20,329.60.

Motions have been filed in this court for re- 

faxation of costs in the Court of Appeals. This court con­

strues the decision of the Supreme Court to reverse the 
this

decision of/court in certain particulars but that the Supreme 

Court did not reverse the decision of this court with respect

4



Nos. 72-1809-14 - 3

to the taxation of costs in the Court of Appeals. This 

remains a question for determination by the Court of Appeals.

the responses thereto, it is ORDERED that all motions for 

retaxation of costs be and hereby are overruled. It is 

further ORDERED that no costs are taxed in the Court of 

Appeals and that each party will bear his own costs in this 

court.

Upon consideration of the various motions and -

Entered by order of the court.

i