Appellant's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Hearing In Banc with Cover Letter
Public Court Documents
December 21, 1972

14 pages
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Case Files, Milliken Hardbacks. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Hearing In Banc with Cover Letter, 1972. 62be28b2-53e9-ef11-a730-7c1e5247dfc0. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/804a2252-6338-4895-be4c-aeb86d29937b/appellants-petition-for-rehearing-and-suggestion-for-hearing-in-banc-with-cover-letter. Accessed August 27, 2025.
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H I L L , L E W I S , A D A M S , G O O D R I C H 6c T A I T 3 7 0 0 P E N O B S C O T B U I L D I N G S H E R W I N A . H J L L ( 1 6 0 5 - 1 9 6 1 )T H O M A S H . A D A M S E D W A R D T. G O O D R I C H G A R L A N D D. T A I T J A Y W . S O R G E E L L I O T T H . P H I L L I P S W I L L I A M W. S L O C U M , J R . T H O M A S E . C O U L T E R M A R T I N C . O E T T I N G L E E B D U R H A M , J R . W. M E R R I T T J O N E S , J R . R O B E R T B . W E B S T E R D O U G L A S H . W E S T D A V I D L . R O L L T I M O T H Y W. M A S T T I M O T H Y D . W I T T L I N G E R D E T R O I T , M I C H I G A N 4 0 2 2 6 T E L E P H O N E ( 3 1 3 ) 9 6 2 - 6 - 4 8 5 C A B L E A D D R E S S : H I L L December 21, 1972 G L E N N M . C O U L T E R C O U N S E L C H A R L E S E . L E W I S P E R C Y J . P O W E R E D W I N J . M E R C E R O F C O U N S E L O A K L A N D C O U N T Y O F F I C E I O I S O U T H F I E L D R O A D B I R M I N G H A M , M I C H I G A N 4 8 0 0 9 T E L E P H O N E 6 4 2 - 9 6 9 2 M A R K K . W I L S O N P A U L J . K R A E M E R V I C T O R F. P T A S Z N I K R O B E R T J . L E I D I C H R O B E R T J . R O S S R I C H A R D E . S M O K E Mr. James A. Higgins, Clerk United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Federal Building Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 Re: Bradley, et al v. Milliken, et al Nos. 72-1809 - 72-1814 Dear Mr. Higgins: Enclosed for filing please find Petition of Appellant Grosse Pointe Schools for Rehearing and Suggestion for Hear ing In Banc, together with 25 copies thereof. Attached to the Petition is the Certification of ser vice on all counsel. Very truly yours HILL, LEWIS, ADAMS, GOODRICH & TAIT DHW:cas Enclosures cc : all counsel IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Nos. 72-1809 - 72-1814 RONALD BRADLEY, et al, Plaintiffs-Appellees, vs . WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, Governor of Michigan, etc.; BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF DETROIT, Defendants-Appellants, and DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS LOCAL 231, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, Defendant-Intervenor-Appellee, and ALLEN PARK PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al , Defendants-Intervenors-Appellants, and KERRY GREEN, et al, Defendants-Intervenors-Appellees. / PETITION OF APPELLANT GROSSE POINTE SCHOOLS FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTION FOR HEARING IN BANC INTRODUCTION Now comes Grosse Pointe Schools, one of the Defendant Intervenor school districts and an Appellant in this matter, and respectfully petitions this Court for a rehearing of these appel late proceedings and this Court's decision of December 8, 1972. Grosse Pointe Schools further respectfully suggests that a re hearing in banc would be appropriate under the circumstances of this case. Grosse Pointe Schools reserves and reaffirms its argued position on each of the points presented by it in the Brief of In tervenor School Districts, filed by it jointly with all other inter vening school districts which were Appellants in this matter. Addi tionally, Grosse Pointe Schools makes specific reference to and in corporates herein by reference the Petitions for Rehearing currently being filed in this matter by such other Appellant school districts, as well as the Petition for Rehearing currently being filed by the State Defendants. Grosse Pointe Schools believes rehearing should be granted for the following principal reasons: 1. Even assuming arguendo that the State of Michigan has committed each of the constitutional violations described in Section III(b) of the Court's decision, that such acts are causally related in any way to de jure segregation in the Detroit School System or in the Detroit Metropolitan area, is not supported by the record. 2. The Court's decision affirming the inadequacy of a Detroit only remedy and the necessity of a Metropolitan Plan of desegregation is inconsistent with this Court's previous decisions, as well as the decisions of other Federal Courts. ARGUMENT 1. The Court has affirmed a finding that the "State of Michigan", through the named State Defendants, committed five specified constitutional violations: (a) Pre-1962 supervision of discriminatory site selections; , (b) Bonding authority discrimination; (c) Transportation funds discrimination; (d) Public Act 48; (e) Approval of Transportation of Carver School students. Although Grosse Pointe Schools disagrees that the specified actions amounted to constitutional violations, it is assumed for purposes of this argument that the Court is correct in such findings. Even though assumed to be correct, however, Grosse Pointe Schools further disagrees with the conclusions drawn therefrom. The Court has found that the actions of the State Defendants "...are significant, 2 pervasive and' causally related to the substantial amount of segre gation found in the Detroit school system...." (slip opinion, p. 49). This statement is simply not supported by the record in this cause. There has been no showing whatsoever that these specific acts of the State Defendants had any causal connection with the segregation found to exist in the Detroit schools. The Court fur ther stated: "the record contains substantial evidence to support the finding...that segregation of the Detroit public schools...was validated and augmented by the ...Michigan State Board action of pervasive influence through the system." (slip opinion, p. 50). To the contrary, it is submitted that the record is devoid of any such evidence, except as the Court may have imputed other acts of the Detroit Board of Education to the State Board of Education. In addition to the absence of any evidence of a causal connection between the actions of the State Defendants and segregation within Detroit, the record is even more obviously lacking with respect to the actions of the State Defendants and their effect throughout the Metropolitan area. Indeed, the Plaintiffs' Complaint and the trial before the District Court were limited solely to the issues of the segregated conditions within the Detroit Public Schools. Because the State of Michigan has plenary power over local school districts, the Court found that it had the duty to disregard school district boundary lines for the purpose of providing an effective desegregation plan to eliminate the racial identifiability of the Detroit Schools. The Court concluded: 3 "The- power to disregard such artifical barriers is all the more clear where, as here, the State has been guilty of discrimination which had the effect of crediting a nd~~ma in tanning racial segre gation along school district lines." (slip opinion, p. 65, emphasis added) Again, it is most respectfully submitted that the Court has read into the record that which does not exist. The District Court stated in its June 14, 1972 Order that: "...the Court has taken n_o proofs with respect to the establishment of the boundries of the 86 public school districts in the Counties of Wayne, Oakland and Macomb..." (emphasis added) No testimony was taken or evidence presented as to the effects of the actions of the State Defendants upon the racial make-up of the schools in the Detroit Metropolitan area. No testimony was taken or evidence presented as to whether any school district other than Detroit was de jure segregated as a result of the actions of the State Defendants., Grosse Pointe Schools is aware of the statement by the Court that its conclusions are amply supported by the record. With all due respect to the Court, however, it has misapprehended the content of the record to which it refers. The actions of the State Defendants, if assumed to be constitutional violations, related only to the operation of the schools in the City of Detroit and there is nothing from the nature of the actions themselves which could be presumed by the Court to naturally or probably lead to or tend to cause a segregated condition in one school district vis-a-vis surrounding school dis tricts. In summary, even if it is assumed that all schools within 4 the Detroit school system are de jure segregated, either by action of the Detroit Board of Education or the State Defendants, or both, it is impossible to conclude from the record in this cause that any segregation which the Court might find to exist was created or maintained along school district lines as a result of actions of the State Defendants. 2. The Court has affirmed the District Court's finding that no "Detroit only" plan could achieve the desegregation of the Detroit Public School System and it has quoted with approval the District Court's findings of March 28, 1972 which hold that a Detroit only plan would make Detroit a "racially identifiable" system and that it would be "perceived as Black", thus making de segregation impossible. The Court has further held that "big city school systems for blacks surrounded by suburban school systems for whites" is constitutionally impermissible and is a "problem" which must be solved by disregarding school district boundary lines. As stated above, the findings that actions of the State Defendants had the effect of creating and maintaining racial segre gation along school district lines are totally unsupported by the record and patently erroneous. It is respectfully submitted that this is a conclusion that has been begged from the Court's realiza tion that there exists an enormous social problem which the Court feels a compelling need to solve. In the Court's quest to find evidence necessary to satisfy the clearly established propostion that there must be a legally cognizable violation found to exist 5 as a prerequisite to the granting of equitable relief, the Court has either presumed that the five areas of constitutional viola tions found to have been committed by the State Defendants were causally connected with the problem it wishes to solve, or the Court has simply misapprehended what is contained in the record in this regard. That Detroit is a predominately black school system and that most suburban school districts are predominately white is un- controvertable. That they would not be any the less "perceived" or "identifiable" as black or white, or that there would not be any the less a "problem", even if the alleged actions of the State had never occurred, is also undeniable. Although the Court has sought legal justification for judicial intervention in this case, it is submitted that unless this Court is to abandon its previous decisions in Dea-1 1 , Deal II , Goss , Davis , and most recently Mapp , the de cision of this Court of December 8, 1972 should not stand as written. The Court has emphasized that it does not consider school district boundary lines as being sacrosanct or inviolate in the face of a compelling need to remedy a deprivation of Constitutional rights. We agree. Nor did we argue to the contrary in the Brief of the Intervenor School Districts filed with the Court. What was argued, however, was the proposition that in any event the remedy (disregard ing district boundary lines) must be related to the wrong that has been found to exist. This could not have been more clearly stated than in Swann , at page 16: 1. Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ ., 369 F.2d 55 (CA6 , 19 6 6). 2. Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 419 F.2d 1387 (CA6, 1969). 3. Goss v. Bd. of Educ. of Knoxville, Tenn. , 444 F.2d 632 ICA6, 197ITT ~ ' 4. Davis v. School Dist. of the City of Pontiac, 433 F .2d 573 Tc a g t t97Tt : ~ ..... . ~ 5. Mapp v . Bd. of Educ. of Chattanooga, Slip Opinion, Oct. 11, 1972. 6. Swann v. Charlotte-Meaklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1.971) . 6 "...it is important to remember that judicial powers may be exercised only on the basis of a constitu tional violation. Remedial judicial authority does not put judges automatically in the shoes of school authorities whose powers are plenary. Judicial authority enters only when local authority defaults. ...As with any equity case, the nature of the vio lation determines the nature of the remedy." (emphasis added) The nature of the violation found to exist in this case had nothing whatsoever to do with the Metropolitan remedy which the Court wishes to impose, as a means of correcting the racial identifiability of the black city school district vis-a-vis the white suburban dis tricts. We do not believe that it could be seriously argued that the demographic composition of the City of Detroit and its suburban communities would be any different today if the discriminatory acts alleged to have been committed by the State Defendants had never taken place. Yet it is the demography of the entire Metro politan Detroit area that has been made the subject of the Court's equitable powers; not the effects of the State's Constitutional violations (if any) which might ultimately be found to be causally related to the acts of the State Defendants. On October 11, 1972, this Court issued its decision in Mapp v, Bd. of Educ. of Chattanooga, supra, in which the Court approved a finding that certain schools in Chattanooga would not be subject to a racial balance order because the District Court had found that the racial imbalance with respect to such schools was not the result of past or present discrimination. This Court held: 7 "We do not believe that Boards of Education can be faulted for the residential patterns of a city, or for the heavy concentration of black or white population in certain areas, or for the mobility of both races. These are matters over which the school system has no control, neither does it have authority to assume such control. It has always been the practice in the American educational system, until recently, to locate schools near residences, and these schools have been known as neighborhood schools. Neighborhood schools enabled parents of children to participate in the school's operation, enabled the children to engage in other activities and to associate with their friends and neighbors, and even to walk to and from school. Destruction of the neighborhood school system deprives both parents and their children of these advantages, and can even lower the quality of education." (slip opinion, p. 9) It is respectfully submitted that this, and other portions of the Court's decision in Mapp, are totally inconsistent with the opinion of this Court in the instant matter. Indeed, the Court's decision is inconsistent with its prior decision in this same case7, wherein the Court stated: "The issue in this case is not what might be a desirable Detroit School Plan, but whether or not there are constitutional violations in the school system as presently operated, and, if so, what relief is necessary to avoid further impairment of constitutional rights." The Court has apparently conclusively determined that judicial relief on a metropolitan scale is in all events necessary because anything less "...would result in an all black school system immediately surrounded by practically all white suburban 7. Bradley v. Milliken, 438 F.2d 945 (CA6, 1970) at pg. 946. 8 school systems, with an overwhelmingly white majority population in the total metropolitan area", (slip opinion, page 56). If this is the case, and if this is the real underlying reason for the Court's decision, it is respectfully submitted that, rather than postulate the effects of isolated acts of Constitutional violations by certain State agencies in an effort to conform the legal propo- gsitions upon which the decision is based with the progeny of Brown / the Court should declare the existence of a racial imbalance as between schools in a single school district and as between several school districts to constitute the constitutional violation per 9se. CONCLUSION Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that a rehearing in banc will not ordinarily be granted except: (1) When consideration by the full Court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions, or (2) When the proceeding involves a question of excep tional importance. On November 28, 1972, this Court granted a rehearing in banc of the decision in Mapp, supra. Because of the inconsistency of this Court's decision in the instant case with that of Mapp, as well as other decisions of this Circuit cited above, it is Brown v. Board of Educ . of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) . 9. Cf. Spencer v. Kugler, 326 F.Supp. 1235 (N.J. 1971), aff'd. 404 U.S. 1027(1972). 9 apparent that rehearing in banc should be granted so that uniformity of decisions within the Circuit may be maintained. Additionally, the exceptional importance of this case is also apparent. It involves novel and complex issues of first impres sion in this Circuit, dealing with the education of almost 1,000,000 children and the potential expenditure of enormous amounts of public funds to implement a Metropolitan plan of desegregation. The decision of this Court of December 8, 1972 is, as frankly noted by the Court, in direct conflict with the 4th Circuit in Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), petition for cert, filed 41 U.S.L.W. 3211 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1972). The decision of this Court is also in direct conflict with the 10th Circuit in Keyes v . School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado (10th Cir. 1971) cert, granted 404 U.S. 1036. fully requests that this Court order this Appeal to be reheard and it suggests that a rehearing before the Court sitting in banc would be appropriate under the circumstances. For the foregoing reasons, Grosse Pointe Schools respect- Respectfully submitted, HILL, LEWIS, ADAMS, GOODRICH & TAIT December 21, Dated: Intervenor Grosse Pointe Schools 3700 Penobscot Building Detroit, Michigan 48226 962-6485 10 CERTIFICATION This is to certify that a copy of the attached Petition of Appellant Grosse Pointe Schools for Rehearing and Suggestion for Hearing In Banc, filed by the Grosse Pointe Public School System, has been served upon counsel of record by United States Mail, pos tage pre-paid, addressed as follows: LOUIS R. LUCAS WILLIAM E. CALDWELL 525 Commerce Title Building Memphis, Tennessee 38103 WILLIAM M. SAXTON JOHN B. WEAVER 1881 First National Bldg. Detroit, Michigan 48226 NATHANIEL R. JONES General Counsel, NAACP 1790 Broadway New York, New York 10019 E. WINTHER MC CROOM 3245 Woodburn Avenue Cincinnati, Ohio 45207 JACK GREENBERG NORMAN J. CHACHKIN 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 J. HAROLD FLANNERY PAUL R. DIMOND ROBERT PRESSMAN Center for Law & Education Harvard University Cambridge, Mass. 02138 DAVID L. NORMAN Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530 ROBERT J. LORD 8388 Dixie Highway Fair Haven, Michigan 48023 RALPH GUY United States Attorney Federal Building Detroit, Michigan 48226 EUGENE KRASICKY GERALD YOUNG Assistant Attorney General Law Building 525 West Ottawa Street Lansing, Michigan 48913 THEODORE SACHS 1000 Farmer Detroit, Michigan 48226 ALEXANDER B. RITCHIE 1930 Buhl Building Detroit, Michigan 48226 BRUCE A. MILLER LUCILLE WATTS 2460 First National Building Detroit, Michigan 48226 RICHARD P. CONDIT Long Lake Building 860 West Long Lake Road Bloomfield Hills, Mich. 48013 KENNETH B. MC CONNELL 74 West Long Lake Road Bloomfield Hills, Mich. 48013 DONALD F. SUGERMAN 2460 First National Building Detroit, Michigan 48226 THEODORE W. SWIFT 900 American Bank & Trust Bldg. Lansing, Michigan 48933 FRED W. FREEMAN CHARLES F. CLIPPERT 1700 N. Woodward Avenue P. 0. Box 509 Bloomfield Hills, Mich. 48013 GEORGE T. ROUMELL, JR. LOUIS D. BEER 7th Floor Ford Building Detroit, Michigan 48226 JOHN F. SHANTZ 222 Washington Square Bldg. Royal Oak, Michigan 48067 ERWIN B. ELLMANN 1800 Penobscot Building Detroit, Michigan 48226 CHARLES E. KELLER 1600 Penobscot Building Detroit, Michgian 48226 Respectfully submitted, HILL, LEWIS, ADAMS, GOODRICH & TAIT Douglas H. West 3700 Penobscot Building Detroit, Michigan 48226 Dated: December 21, 1972.