University of Tennessee v. Elliott Joint Appendix

    No. 85-588

In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1985

THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE, et al., Petitioners,
v.

ROBERT B. ELLIOTT, Respondent.

On W rit of Certiorari to the Court of A ppeals 
for the Sixth  Circuit

JOINT APPENDIX

Of Counsel 
W. J. M ichael Cody 

Attorney General 
& Reporter 

State of Tennessee 
450 James Robertson 

Parkway
Nashville, Tennessee 

37219-5025 
John L. Sobieski, Jr.

Professor of Law 
The University of 

Tennessee
1505 W. Cumberland 

Avenue
Knoxville, Tennessee 

37996-1800

Beauchamp E. Brogan*
General Counsel 

A lan M. Parker*
Associate General Counsel 

Catherine S. M izell 
Associate General Counsel 

The University of Tennessee 
810 Andy Holt Tower 
Knoxville, Tennessee 37996-0184 
(615) 974-3245 
G. Ray Bratton 
1620 First Tennessee Bank Bldg. 
165 Madison Avenue 
Memphis, Tennessee 38103 
N. Richard Glassman*
John Barry Burgess*
26 N. Second Street 
Memphis, Tennessee 38103 

Attorneys for Petitioners 
* Counsel of Record 

To m m y  Coley 
532 Smith Lane 
Jackson, Tennessee 38301 

Pro Se Petitioner

Petition for Certiorari Filed Oct. 3, 1985 
Certiorari Granted Dec. 2,1985

E. L. M endenhall,  Inc., 926 Cherry Street, Kansas City, Mo. 64106, (816) 421-3030



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chronological List of Relevant Docket Entries ........... 1
Plaintiff’s Complaint, Filed January 14, 1982 ...............  2
Defendant University of Tennessee’s Motion to Dis­

solve Restraining Order to Dismiss Complaint or for
Summary Judgment, Filed February 18, 1982 ...........  19

Exhibit L (Disciplinary Charge Letter From The Agri­
cultural Extension Services to Plaintiff Dated De­
cember 18, 1981) to Affidavit of M. Lloyd Downen,
Filed February 18, 1982 .................................................. 21

Plaintiff’s Motion for TRO and/or Temporary Stay of 
Agency Order and For Preliminary Injunction Filed
October 24, 1983 .............................................................  24

Initial Order of Administrative Law Judge (Attach­
ment A to Plaintiff’s Motion of October 24, 1983),
Filed October 24, 1983 .......................... P.A.36

Final Agency Order (Attachment C to Plaintiff’s Mo­
tion of October 24, 1983), Filed October 24, 1983 ....P.A.33 

Defendants’ Amended Motion For Summary Judg­
ment, Filed February 6, 1984 ......................................  31

District Court’s Memorandum Decision on Defendants’ 
Amended Motion For Summary Judgment, Filed
May 2, 1984 .................................   P.A.26

Judgment of The District Court, Filed May 8, 1985 .....  32
Opinion of The Court of Appeals, Filed July 9, 1985 ....P.A.l 
Judgment of The Court of Appeals, Filed July 9,

1985 ................     P.A.183



CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF RELEVANT 
DOCKET ENTRIES

Jan. 14, 1982—Plaintiff Elliott’s original complaint 
filed in U. S. District Court for the Western District of 
Tennessee, Jackson Division.

Feb. 18, 1982—Defendant University of Tennessee’s 
Motion to dissolve restraining order, to dismiss complaint 
or for summary judgment, with disciplinary charge letter 
dated December 18, 1981, attached as Exhibit L to affi­
davit of Mr. Lloyd Downen, filed.

Oct. 24, 1983—Plaintiff’s motion for TRO and/or tem­
porary stay of agency order and for preliminary injunctive 
relief filed.

Oct. 24, 1983—Initial Order of Administrative Law 
Judge filed as Attachment A  to plaintiff’s motion for TRO 
and/or temporary stay of agency order.

Oct. 24, 1983—Final Agency Order filed as Attachment 
C to plaintiff’s motion for TRO and/or temporary stay 
of agency order.

Feb. 6, 1984—Defendants’ amended motion for sum, 
mary judgment filed.

May 2, 1984—District Court’s Memorandum Decision 
on defendant’s motion for summary judgment filed.

May 8, 1984—Judgment of the District Court filed.

July 9, 1985—Opinion and Judgment of the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit filed.



2

PLAIN TIFF’S COMPLAINT
Filed January 14, 1982 

IN THE
DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

FOR THE W ESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
JACKSON DIVISION

ROBERT B. ELLIOTT, )
Plaintiff )

VS. )
THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE )
P. O. Box 1071 )
Knoxville, Tennessee 37901 )
THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE )
INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE )
P. O. Box 1071 )
Knoxville, Tennessee 37901 )
THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE )
AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION SERVICE )
P. O. Box 1071 )
Knoxville, Tennessee 37901 )
M. LLOYD DOWNEN, DEAN )
UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE )
AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION SERVICE )
P. O. Box 1071 )
Knoxville, Tennessee 37901 )
WILLIS W. ARMISTEAD, VICE )
PRESIDENT FOR AGRICULTURE )
UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE )
P. O. Box 1071 )
Knoxville, Tennessee 37901 )
EDWARD J. BOLING, PRESIDENT )
UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE )
P. O. Box 1071 )
Knoxville, Tennessee 37901 )



3

HAYWOOD W. LUCK, DISTRICT )
SUPERVISOR )
UT AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION SERVICE ) 
605 Airways Boulevard )
Jackson, Tennessee 38301 )
CURTIS SHEARON, EXTENSION LEADER ) 
UT AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION SERVICE ) 
309 North Parkway )
Jackson, Tennessee 38301 )
BILLY DONNELL )
Highway 70 )
Jackson, Tennessee 38301 )
ARTHUR JOHNSON, JR. )
Malesus, Tennessee )
MRS. NEIL SMITH )
Matthews Road )
Jackson, Tennessee 38301 )
JIMMY HOPPER, )
Denmark Road )
Jackson, Tennessee 38301 )
MRS. ROBERT CATHEY )
Oakfield, Tennessee )
MURRAY TRUCK LINES, INC. )
519 E. Chester )
Jackson, Tennessee 38301 )
TOM KORWIN, SHOP MANAGER )
Murray Truck Lines, Inc. )
519 E. Chester )
Jackson, Tennessee 38301 )

and )
TOMMY COLEY )
Old Denmark Road )
Jackson, Tennessee 38301, )

Defendants )



4

COMPLAINT

1. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 
the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C., Secs. 1331 and 1343, this 
being a suit wherein the matter in controversy exceeds 
the sum or value of $10,000.00 exclusive of interest and 
costs, arising under the Constitution and laws of the 
United States, and this being a suit in equity authorized 
by law, Title 42, U.S.C. Sec. 1983, to be commenced by 
any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to redress the deprivation under color 
of statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of a 
State of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States; and to recover 
damages and other relief under the provisions of said 42 
U.S.C., Sec. 1983. The rights, privileges and immunities 
sought to be redressed by this action are rights, privileges 
and immunities secured by the First and Thirteenth 
Amendments, and by the due process and equal protection 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, to the Constitu­
tion of the United States, by Title 42 U.S.C., Secs. 1981, 
1985, 1986, 1988 and 20G0d and e, as hereinafter more 
fully appears. Pendent jurisdiction over state law ques­
tions is invoked.

2. At all times material herein the following was 
true:

(a) plaintiff, Robert B. Elliott, hereafter plain­
tiff, was a black citizen of and residing in Gibson County, 
Tennessee, and the United States of America, employed 
as an Agricultural Extension Agent by the Agricultural 
Extension Service of the University of Tennessee Institute 
of Agriculture, identified more particularly hereinafter.



5

(b) defendant, The University of Tennessee, 
hereafter defendant UT, was an institution of higher learn­
ing and a public body corporate established by law of the 
State of Tennessee as a land grant institution under the 
Federal Land Grant Act of 1862 for white students only 
and subsequently desegregated involuntarily by Federal 
Court Decisions under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States.

(c) the defendant, Agricultural Extension Ser­
vice of The University of Tennessee Institute Of Agricul­
ture, hereafter defendant AES, was an administrative 
agency or department of The University of Tennessee es­
tablished by State Law to take advantage of Federal 
monies and services made available to the State under 
the provisions of the Smith Lever Act of 1914, as amended 
(7 U.S.C., Sec. 341 et seq.) It is a public agency.

(d) defendants, Edward J. Boling, Willis W. 
Armistead and M. Lloyd Downen, were President, Vice 
President for Agriculture, and Dean of the Institute of 
Agriculture, of defendant UT respectively and are here­
after referred to as defendants Boling, Armistead and 
Downen, respectively. In said capacity they are charged 
with administrative responsibilities at the levels indicated 
for the operation of defendants UT and AES.

(e) defendant, Haywood W. Luck, is a District 
Supervisor of defendant AES in administrative charge of 
its operations in several West Tennessee counties incud- 
ing Madison County, the County in which plaintiff is em­
ployed by defendant AES.

(f) defendant, Curtis Shearon, is an Extension 
Leader employed by defendant AES and in charge of its 
Madison County Office.



6

(g) defendants, Billy Donnell, Arthur Johnson, 
Jr., Mrs. Neil Smith, Jimmy Hopper and Mrs. Robert 
Cathey, are members of the Agricultural Extension Service 
Committee, hereafter AESC of Madison County, Tennessee, 
an agency utilized by defendant AES in its operations in 
said County.

(h) defendant, Tommy Coley, is a citizen of 
Madison County, Tennessee, used by said defendant AES 
in its operations in Madison County, Tennessee.

(i) defendant, Murray Truck Lines, Inc., is a 
corporation, operating in Madison County, Tennessee, with 
business offices at 519 East Chester Street, Jackson, Ten­
nessee 38301 and defendant, Tom Korwin, is Shop Man­
ager and, on information and belief, an officer or manag­
ing agent of said defendant, Murray Truck Lines, Inc. 
Said defendants are hereafter called respectively defen­
dants Murray and Korwin.

(j)  all defendants are white and are sued herein 
both in their official and individual capacities.

3. This is a proceeding for preliminary and perma­
nent injunctive relief and for damages by plaintiff against 
all defendants seeking:

(a) an injunction restraining defendants, UT, 
AES, Boling, Downen, Armistead, Luck, Shearon, Donnell, 
Johnson, Smith, Hopper, Cathey and Coley, from discrim­
inating or acting against plaintiff or any other person or 
persons employed, utilized or affected in any way 
in any agricultural extension or related programs op­
erated or participated in by any of said defendants in 
the State of Tennessee on account of race or color or in 
a racially discriminatory manner; and from failing and re­
fusing to disestablish existing racial discrimination and



7

segregation in the operation of said AES programs includ­
ing but not limited to the compensation and job assign­
ments of black personnel, the limitation of or racial dis­
crimination or segregation in the program benefits made 
available to black citizens who are the intended bene­
ficiaries of said AES programs or involved therein in any­
way, and the disestablishment of existing racial segrega­
tion and discrimination in all of said programs admin­
istered by or connected with any of said defendants, in­
cluding but not limited to back pay and other relief for 
past discrimination to plaintiff and other class members 
so entitled.

(b) specific preliminary and permanent injunc­
tive relief requiring all defendants herein to cease and 
desist from attempts to discharge or cause the discharge 
of plaintiff and/or to otherwise penalize him pursuant to 
false allegations of inadequate job performance and in­
adequate job behavior and to punish plaintiff by derog­
atory warning letters and supervisory harassment because 
of his race and because of his protest against racial dis­
crimination by various of the defendants including but not 
limited to defendants, Coley, Murray, Korwin and Shearon.

(c) injunctive relief against the use of Federal 
or other public funds for purposes unauthorized by law, 
including but not limited to said racial discrimination and 
segregation.

(d) restraint of the defendants and each of them 
from conspiring to do any of the foregoing acts or from 
participating in or causing such acts to be done.

(e) damages against the defendants in sum of 
One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00) for deprivation of his 
rights under the statutory and constitutional provisions



8

cited in paragraph 1 hereinabove, by the actions and omis­
sions of defendants charged herein.

4. Plaintiff brings this action, pursuant to Rule 23 (a) 
and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on his own 
behalf and on behalf of all other persons in Tennessee 
who are similarly situated and/or affected by the policies, 
practices, customs and usages complained of herein which 
violate not only the rights of plaintiff and other black 
employees, applicants for employment, continuance of em­
ployment or re-employment as personnel in said defen­
dants UT and AES, but also the rights of black infant and 
adult citizens who are intended beneficiaries of said AES, 
who are subjected to racial discrimination and segrega­
tion therein by virtue of the discriminatory restraints upon 
plaintiff and other AES personnel and otherwise, as to 
whose rights there is a close nexus with those of plaintiff 
and other black AES personnel here sought to be vindi­
cated and in whose behalf plaintiff also brings this suit. 
The members of the class on whose behalf plaintiff sues 
are on information and belief more than 200 persons and 
are so numerous that joinder of all members is imprac­
ticable; there are questions of law or fact common to the 
class, the claims of the plaintiff are typical of the claims 
of the class and the plaintiff will fairly and adequately 
protect the interest of the class. Further this action meets 
the prerequisites of Rule 23 (b )(1 ) and the defendants 
have acted or refused to act on grounds generally ap­
plicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final 
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with 
respect to the class as a whole.

5. For many years past, the defendant UT, acting 
under color of the laws of the State of Tennessee, includ­
ing State segregation statutes, pursued a policy, practice,



9

custom and usage of operating an exclusively white in­
stitution of higher learning in the State of Tennessee and, 
in connection therewith, also operated an exclusively white 
Institute of Agriculture which in turn established and/or 
operated an exclusively white Agricultural Extension Ser­
vice taking advantage of and using the Federal funds avail­
able under said Smith Level Act of 1914, After Congress 
established the Act of 1890 requiring that Federal funds 
be distributed also to black State Institutions, the defen­
dant UT sought and continued to receive virtually all 
Federal Land Grant Funds despite the existence of a black 
Land Grant Institution at Tennessee State University. The 
AES was and is headed by defendant Downen with the 
majority of administrative personnel and specialists quar­
tered at the UT Campus. For supervision purposes defen­
dant AES is divided into five districts each having over­
sight responsibilities for 18 to 22 of 95 County Offices 
established by defendant UT throughout the State. The 
District Offices are headed by a District Supervisor and the 
County Offices are headed by an Extension Leader. Before 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, notwithstanding the decision 
of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Segre­
gation Cases, defendant UT continued to permit AES to 
be organized and to provide services through a dual sys­
tem whereby black employees served blacks and white 
employees generally served whites. The white staff was 
quartered at UT Knoxville and the black staff was quar­
tered at the YMCA Building in Nashville. On information 
and belief it was only after prodding by Federal Officials 
that the dual system was merged sometime after 1964. 
Nevertheless, defendant AES continued and continues to 
discriminate in the following particulars:

(a) failure and refusal to implement an effective 
affirmative action plan as required by law;



10

(b) insufficient action to integrate and eliminate 
racial discrimination in homemaker demonstration clubs 
and other educational activities;

(c) failure and refusal to racially integrate and 
eliminate racial discrimination and segregation in 4-H 
Clubs and their activities and programs;

(d) failure and refusal to address low minority 
participation in agricultural programs and community re­
source development programs;

(e) persistent refusal to eliminate blatant dis­
crimination against black persons in hiring, job assign­
ment and actual salaries;

(f) blatant discrimination against black employ­
ees in promotions, training and continuing education;

(g) discrimination in the establishment and op­
eration of agricultural extension committees wherein black 
citizens are either excluded or limited in their member­
ship and said committees are permittted to discriminate 
racially against black AES personnel and against black 
citizens entitled to the benefit of the program;

(h) permitting discrimination against black par­
ticipants in AES programs by local white officials includ­
ing but not limited to Judges in educational programs 
sponsored by defendant AES.

6. Plaintiff was employed by defendant AES as an 
Assistant Extension Agent on 12 September 1966 and as­
signed to the Madison County Office where he has been 
employed ever since. At time of said employment he 
was a 1962 graduate of Tennessee State University with 
a BS in Agronomy. He was promoted to Associate Ex­
tension Agent on 1 July 1974 and still holds that position.



11

Although the racially dual system had obstensibly merged 
by the time of his employment racial segregation con­
tinued in that plaintiff and other black Extension Agents 
were assigned almost exclusively to work with predom­
inantly black citizens. When schools were segregated 
racially black agents served separate black 4-H Clubs. 
When the schools were desegregated black agents, includ­
ing plaintiff, were relieved of 4-H Club assignments and 
assigned to a previously non-existent make-shift job des­
ignated as “working with low income or small farm fa- 
milites” who turned out to be predominantly black. The 
AESC which materially affects AES operations and in­
fluences the employment and assignment of its personnel, 
was exclusively white in most counties, including Madison, 
until 1975 when plaintiff protested and, notwithstanding 
said protest, is still exclusively white in many counties. 
On information and belief there are no black personnel 
in the AES above the level of Extension Agent in the en­
tire State of Tennessee except for one black woman em­
ployed as a Nutrition Specialist in the Home Office at 
Knoxville. The West Tennessee Experiment Station, which 
has approximately 50 personnel, has only 3 black em­
ployees: a secretary, farm worker and janitor respectively. 
Plaintiff’s complaints about such racial discrimination in­
cluded the following:

(a) oral complaint against all-white AESCs 
about 1375 resulting in first historical appointment of a 
single black citizen on the Madison County AESC. A 
second black person became a member only by virtue of 
election by the County Commission of one of its black 
members as a committee member about three years ago.

(b) written complaint on 23 January 1981 placed 
in the Agency’s Civil Rights file protesting racial discrim­



12

ination in defendant Shearon and Madison County AESC 
failing and/or refusing to utilize and treat in an equitable 
fashion black leaders, students and staff personnel in con­
nection with 4-H Club events.

(c) oral protest in 1967, 1968 and thereafter to 
and including 1981 of the refusal of AES staff members 
and local white AESC members to accord black citizens 
and staff personnel the right to be called Mr. and Mrs. 
on the same basis as white personnel.

(d) an oral protest about 1978 of the use by a 
Knoxville UT Administrative Official of the term “ great 
white hope” in referring to job goal aspirations when speak­
ing to an integrated group of extension agents in West 
Tennessee.

(e) a written complaint by letter dated 27 July 
1981 to defendant Downen regarding an incident at a 
4-H Club event sponsored by the Madison County AESC 
wherein defendant Coley referred to a black child as a 
“nigger” .

(f) a written complaint dated 22 October 1981 
addressed to defendant Shearon wherein plaintiff com­
plained of black business persons and entities being ex­
cluded from a list to be contacted in connection with the 
sponsorship and fund raising for Farm-City Week.

(g) the subsequent written complaint by plaintiff 
to defendant Shearon in October 1981 regarding the failure 
and refusal of defendant Shearon to involve black per­
sons on the program of said Farm-City Week.

7. Following said complaint of plaintiff about the 
Coley-“nigger” incident, all of individual defendants set 
about or, on information and belief, conspired to set about



13

a course of events calculated and designed to result in the 
plaintiff’s removal from defendant AES. It was a part of 
said conspiracy that defendants, Downen, Luck and Shearon 
seized upon an incident which occurred in June 1981 
wherein the plaintiff, while off duty, had protested about 
eight racially insulting signs casting racial slurs upon black 
persons which were placed in the business windows of 
defendant Murray, and conspired with defendants Murray 
and Korwin, to solicit and secure a letter from Korwin to 
Downen accusing plaintiff of referring to Mr. Murray as 
a “ white racist and other racially oriented slurs” as a 
means of adversely affecting plaintiff’s employment. Pur­
suant to this conspiracy said letter, stating falsely that 
plaintiff threatened Mr. Murray by saying: “ I hope I
catch you out somewhere, because I’ll be waiting” , and 
other false statements, was sent by Korwin to Downen 
and Downen then called plaintiff in on 5 August 1981 and 
placed a letter in plaintiff’s file reprimanding him for 
“unacceptable job behavior” on 5 August 1981. Although 
a copy of plaintiff’s complaint letter of 27 July 1981 was 
sent by defendant Downen to defendant Coley, so far as 
plaintiff was made aware defendant Coley was not re­
quired to answer same and no action was taken against 
Coley in response to said complaint. Thereafter, on infor­
mation and belief, defendants Downen, Luck and Shearon, 
conspired with defendants Donnell, Johnson, Smith, Hop­
per and Cathey, whereby meetings of the Madison County 
AESC were held on 17 and 27 August 1981 in which it was 
proposed to recommend to defendant Downen that plain­
tiff be removed as an Extension Agent and Shearon pri­
vately went to one or more of said AESC members re­
questing them to vote for said removal. The two black 
members, Ivey and Boone, refused to do so, while all four 
of the defendant white members, two of whom were rel­



14

atives by marriage of defendant Coley, voted to recommend 
plaintiff’s removal.

8. It was also a motivation of defendants’ actions 
and/or a part of said conspiracy that one or more of the 
individual defendants were aware of and opposed to efforts 
which plaintiff had been making, including a suit in Fed­
eral Court, to secure the rights of membership and golf 
privileges in various racially, segregated, exclusively white, 
country clubs in Gibson and Madison County, Tennessee, 
and all of the defendants, on information and belief, de­
sired and sought to remove plaintiff from his employment 
and to damage or destroy him because of his efforts to 
eliminate racial discrimination in that regard.

9. Plaintiff sought and obtained a recorded conference
with defendant Downen and his counsel on 12 October 1981 
specifically requesting that said defendant: (a) remove
said reprimand of 5 August 1981 regarding the Murray 
incident from his personnel file; (b) redress plaintiff’s 
complaint against defendant Coley contained in his letter 
dated 27 July 1981; and (c) cause certain on-going harass­
ment of plaintiff by his immediate supervisor, defendant 
Shearon, to be discontinued. Said harassment included 
as of that time such disparate treatment as Shearon de­
manding that plaintiff produce mileage books when white 
employees, similarly situated, were not and had not been 
required to produce or keep same in that manner. Defen­
dant Downen said substantially nothing during said con­
ference and, on information and belief, shortly afterwards 
made a personal visit to Jackson. Following his visit to 
Jackson the harassment intensified in the form of discrim­
inatory job assignments, unjustified fault finding, and open 
attempts by defendant Shearon to establish and place 
pretextual supervisory complaints in plaintiff’s personnel



15

record on which to base a false claim of inadequate or 
unsatisfactory job performance. Plaintiff’s employment 
record of 15 years with AES had been unblemished up 
to the time of his said oral protest against racial discrim­
ination in June 1981 at the office of defendant Murray 
and his written protest letter of 17 July 1981 about the 
use by defendant Coley, of a racial epithet toward a black 
child in a 4-H demonstration proceeding. Subsequently, 
on 5 November 1981 defendant Downen wrote letters to 
plaintiff and his counsel officially condoning and attempt­
ing to justify the use of racial slurs by defendants, Murray 
and Coley, refusing to remove defendant Coley as a live­
stock demonstration judge in AESC proceedings and in­
sisting on continuing the reprimand of plaintiff for his 
protest of both the Murray and Coley incidents.

10. Shortly afterwards, defendant Shearon attempted 
to wrap up his campaign of occupational vilification against 
plaintiff by falsely charging him with the failure to carry 
out a specific assignment on surveying small farmers 
throughout Madison County and stating that his over-all 
job performance was inadequate for the calendar year. 
Utilizing that letter and said previous letters regarding 
the Murray and Coley incidents as a basis, defendant 
Downen then wrote to plaintiff a letter dated 18 December 
1981, proposing to terminate his employment immediately 
on the basis of same and of the alleged recommendation 
of the Madison County AESC.

11. Plaintiff filed a contest and demanded a hearing 
under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act of 
Tennessee of said action of the defendants in charging 
him with inadequate or unsatisfactory job performance 
and job behavior and proposing to discharge him, and 
of defendant Downen’s action in refusing to remove from 
his personnel file Downen’s said letters of 5 August 1981



16

and 5 November 1981, and defendant Downen’s refusal 
to respond to plaintiff’s complaint against defendant Coley 
or to order plaintiff’s said supervisor to stop harassing 
him because of his race. However plaintiff avers that 
said harassment continues as of this very day and that, 
despite said demand for hearing, the defendants are now 
treating plaintiff as if he were already discharged. His 
job assignments in effect have been withdrawn in that 
defendant Shearon has refused to hold the usual office 
conferences with him for several weeks and, on informa­
tion and belief, the entire Madison County community 
has been informed by defendants that plaintiff is dis­
charged and preparations are being made to select his 
successor. As a result of said actions of defendants, plain­
tiff has been and is being subjected to loss of professional 
standing, reputation, experience and development; and to 
untold humiliation, pain and agony, loss of sleep and suf­
fering which can never be restored or redressed by mere 
payment of damages and which will injure him irreparably 
unless he is granted immediate injunctive relief against 
the actions of the defendants as set out in the above para­
graph 5 to 11, both inclusive, which were all made and 
done pursuant to defendants’ historical and continuing 
policy of racial discrimination against black staff personnel 
and citizens.

12. Plaintiff has filed a formal complaint with the 
EEOC against said racial discrimination but will ask for 
a suit letter because of the lack of time for adequate EEOC 
investigation and disposition of same and because of said 
need for immediate injunctive relief.

13. Plaintiff alleges that the actions or omissions of 
the defendants as outlined hereinabove including but 
not limited to their said false allegations against him on 
account of his complaints, actions, speech or protests



17

against racial discrimination deprive him of rights secured 
by the First, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the Constitution of the United States and 42 U.S.C., Secs. 
1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988 and defame his character 
and professional reputation and have caused and will cause 
him professional damage and personal injury as set out 
above; that same were done deliberately and/or pursuant 
to a conspiracy on the part of one or more of said defen­
dants to injure him because he is a black person and/or 
because of his said protests against said racial discrimina­
tion, segregation and/or slurs and that he is therefore 
entitled to damages, both compensatory and punitive.

14. Plaintiff further avers that the imposition of said 
racially motivated discrimination and segregation upon and 
against plaintiff and other black persons, including the 
persons entitled to receive the benefit of said AES program, 
imposes upon plaintiff and said class a badge of slavery, 
denies, abridges and intimidates, coerces and interferes 
with them in the exercise of their rights to free speech 
and freedom of expression; deprives them of due process 
of law and equal protection of law and of their statutory 
rights as set out hereinabove, and constitutes such egre- 
grious discrimination against them as to entitle the class 
as well as plaintiff to said compensatory and punitive 
damages as hereinafter prayed.

15. There is between the parties an actual controversy 
as hereinbefore set forth.

WHEREFORE plaintiff respectfuly prays that the 
Court advance this case on the docket and order a speedy 
hearing of same according to law, and after such hearing:

1. Issue a Temporary Restraining Order And/Or 
Preliminary Injunction requiring the defendants and each 
of them to:



18

(a) immediately refrain and desist from any 
type of action whatsoever seeking to discharge, with­
draw the job assignment or opportunities of or racially 
discriminate against or harass the plaintiff in any 
manner in the enjoyment and performance of his 
duties as an Associate Agricultural Extension Agent; 
and to promote plaintiff and provide equal pay and 
other terms and conditions of employment to plain­
tiff, including but not limited to back pay.

2. That the Court set this case for hearing at an early 
date and certify same as a class action.

3. That upon the final hearing this Court declare 
and determine the rights of plaintiff and the class he rep­
resents as claimed in this complaint and enter a Decree 
granting plaintiff and said class all the permanent in­
junctive relief against the defendants and each of them, 
their agents, employees and successors, as set forth here­
inabove in paragraph 3, 4 and 11 in the body of this Com­
plaint.

4. That the plaintiff have and recover of each and 
every one of the defendants damages in sum of Five Hun­
dred Thousand ($500,000.00) Dollars for compensatory 
damages and Five Hundred Thousand ($500,000.00) Dol­
lars for punitive damages, totaling One Million ($1,000,-
000.00) Dollars.

5. That plaintiff and all class members be awarded 
back pay and/or damages.

6. Plaintiff prays that this Court will award reason­
able counsel fees to his attorneys for services rendered 
and to be rendered in this case and allow this plaintiff his 
reasonable costs herein and grant such further, other, addi­
tional or alternative relief as may appear to the Court to 
be equitable and just.



19

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISSOLVE R E ­
STRAINING ORDER TO DISMISS COM­

PLAINT OR FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT

Filed February 18, 1982 

IN THE
DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
JACKSON DIVISION

(Title Omitted in Printing)

The University of Tennessee, The University of Ten­
nessee Institute of Agriculture, The University of Tennessee 
Agricultural Extension Service, Dr. Edward J. Boling, Uni­
versity of Tennessee President, Dr. Willis W. Armistead, 
University of Tennessee Vice President for Agriculture, 
Dr. M. Lloyd Downen, University of Tennessee Dean of 
the Agricultural Extension Service, Mr. Haywood W. Luck, 
District Supervisor, UT Agricultural Extension Service, 
and Mr. Curtis Shearon, Madison County Extension Leader, 
(herein called “University of Tennessee Defendants” ) move 
the Court as follows:

A. Dissolve restraining order, entered ex parte on 
January 19, 1982, enjoining defendants from taking any 
further personnel action against plaintiff.

B. Dismiss this action as to them because the com­
plaint fails to state a claim against said defendants upon 
which relief can be granted for the following reasons:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is premature and fails to
state a justiciable claim because (a) this action is not



20

ripe for judicial review and (b) this Court should 
abstain from reviewing this case because of the pend­
ing evidentiary, trial type due process hearing af­
forded and requested by plaintiff under the contested 
case provisions of The Tennessee Uniform Adminis­
trative Procedures Act, T.C.A. §§ 4-5-108, et seq.;

2. Plaintiff does not meet the jurisdictional or 
criterial prerequisite for injunctive relief;

3. The Court lacks jurisdiction over The Univer­
sity of Tennessee Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
and 2000d and e because (a) The University of Ten­
nessee is not a person under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (b) 
the UT defendants are not personally liable to plaintiff 
for monetary damage because all of them possess 
either absolute immunity or a qualified good faith 
immunity, and (c) the complaint fails the jurisdic­
tional prerequisite for a Title VII action.

C. Alternatively, The University of Tennessee Defen­
dants move the Court for summary judgment in their favor 
dismissing the action as to them on the grounds that the 
pleadings and affidavits of Dr. Edward J. Boling, Dr. W. W. 
Armistead, Dr. M. Lloyd Downen, Mr. Haywood Luck, 
and Mr. Curtis Shearon, hereto annexed, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that these 
defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.



21

DISCIPLINARY CHARGE LETTER

Filed February 18, 1982

FROM M. LLOYD DOWNEN, DEAN OF 
AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION SERVICE 

TO PLAINTIFF

Dated December 18, 1981

Dear Mr. Elliott:

I have received a copy of Mr. Curtis Shearon’s December 9, 
1981 letter regarding your job performance in which Mr. 
Shearon states that your over-all job performance has 
been inadequate for this calendar year.

As you know, I have personally given you two written 
warnings this year regarding your job behavior and per­
formance. Moreover, as you also know the Madison 
County Agricultural Extension Committee has recom­
mended to me that you be removed from Madison County 
due to your inadequate job performance.

Due to the serious allegations and incidents of inadequate 
job performance and inadequate job behavior which have 
continued this year, I have decided to propose that your 
employment with The University of Tennessee Agricul­
tural Extension Service be terminated for inadequate job 
performance and inadequate job behavior.

You have a right to request a hearing to contest these 
charges of inadequate job performance and job behavior. 
If you desire to contest these charges, you must file a 
written request for a hearing with the Business Office 
within five working days from receipt of this letter. Please 
send a copy of your hearing request to me.



22

If you do not request a hearing within five days, the 
charges of inadequate job performance and inadequate 
job behavior shall remain uncontested and your employ­
ment shall be terminated.

If you do request a hearing, you have the option to select 
the University’s internal hearing mechanism as delineated 
in Section 500 of the Institute of Agriculture’s Personnel 
Procedure. If you select this hearing procedure, the Di­
rector of Business Affairs shall convene a hearing panel 
to rule on the validity of the proposed discharge. If you 
choose this procedure, you must notify me and the Busi­
ness Office at least three days prior to the hearing if you 
desire to be represented by an attorney. A copy of this 
internal hearing procedure is attached hereto for your 
study.
You also have an option to choose a hearing under the 
contested case provisions of The Uniform Administrative 
Procedures Act. If you choose this procedure, the Uni­
versity’s Vice President for Agriculture will appoint the 
necessary hearing panel or hearing examiner to hear this 
case. The hearing examiner will make proposed findings 
and conclusions to the Vice President for Agriculture who 
shall render the final decision.

I am enclosing a waiver form, which if you choose the 
University’s internal hearing, you are to return to me 
indicating that you waive any right to a hearing under 
The Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. You only 
have the right to one hearing. Therefore, if you desire 
a hearing you must decide which type of hearing you 
want. Basically, the University’s internal hearing is more 
informal than the procedure under The Uniform Admin­
istrative Procedures Act.



23

At either type hearing, the University shall have the bur­
den of proving the charges by a preponderance of the 
evidence. If either of the charges is sustained, your em­
ployment will be terminated. If the charges are not sus­
tained, your employment with the University shall con­
tinue.

In the event your employment is terminated, you have 
the right under the University’s internal hearing to appeal 
the hearing panel’s findings to the Vice President for 
Agriculture, and subsequently to the University President 
and Board of Trustees if necessary. The decision of the 
Vice President for Agriculture under The Uniform Admin­
istrative Procedures Act is final, and can only be reviewed 
in court in accordance with the terms of The Uniform 
Administrative Procedures Act, the pertinent portions of 
which are attached hereto.

If you do elect a hearing to contest these charges, we 
shall be glad to establish a hearing date which will not 
inconvenience you.



24

PLAIN TIFF’S MOTION FOR TRO AN D /O R A 
TEM PO RARY STAY OF THE 

AGENCY ORDER

Filed October 24, 1983 

IN THE
DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

FOR THE W ESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
JACKSON DIVISION

(Title Omitted in Printing)

Now comes the plaintiff, Robert B. Elliott, and moves 
this Court for a temporary restraining order and/or tem­
porary stay of the decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge and the order of the University of Tennessee Agri­
cultural and Extension Service issued by its Vice Presi­
dent, W. W. Armistead, on 1 August 1983 wrongfully tran- 
ferring the plaintiff’s job assignment from Madison to 
Shelby County for one year and unlawfully placing the 
plaintiff in the unclassified service for one year. Plain­
tiff herein seeks an order temporarily preserving the status 
quo until this matter can come on for hearing upon plain­
tiff’s simultaneously filed motion for preliminary injunc­
tion. Said order herein requested is one restraining all 
defendants in the captioned case, their agents, employees 
and all persons acting in concert or participation with 
them, pending hearing on preliminary injunction before 
this Court under Rule 65, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
as follows:

1. From reassigning and/or further maintaining the 
reassignment of plaintiff from his position as Associate 
County Extension Agent for Madison County to an un­



25

classified position as Extension Agency at large in Shelby 
County for an entire year as set forth in said agency de­
cision, implemented by defendants;

2. From unlawfully placing and/or further main­
taining the plaintiff in the unclassified service or on “pro­
bation” for a year and/or from taking any job action 
against the plaintiff upon the basis of, or as a result of, 
his unprotected status;

3. From taking any job action whatsoever, including 
the projected or existing reassignment for a year and the 
proposed or existing relegation to the unclassified service 
for a year, against the plaintiff;

4. Requiring the defendants, to the extent that the 
defendants have already discriminatorily and unlawfully 
begun to alter the status quo, to immediately restore the 
plaintiff to the status quo as a full-fledged classified em­
ployee of defendant and an Associate Extension Agent for 
Madison County; and

5. Staying completely any and all enforcement of said 
agency decision.

As grounds for this motion, plaintiff submits the fol­
lowing:

1. On or about 18 December 1981, Dr. M. Lloyd 
Dowen, Mr. Elliott’s employer, proposed to discharge Mr. 
Elliott for alleged inadequate job performance and in­
adequate job behavior. The employee appealed this pro­
posed discharge. The specific charges, which were made 
known only by virtue of the Employee’s Motion For A More 
Definite Statement, were in essence, as follows:

(a) Haying golf on duty time from 1976 to 31 
July 1981.



26

(b) Engaging in a commercial cabinet business 
and other unspecified personal business during working 
hours.

(c) Making anonymous harassing phone calls to 
a resident of Gibson County when these alleged calls had 
nothing whatsoever to do with the Employee’s job.

(d) Trespassing charges in another non-work re­
lated incident when the Employee vigorously protested 
a racially inflamatory sign in a business establishment.

(e) For allegedly using profanity against a mem­
ber of the general public when that person referred to 
a black 4-H contestant as a “nigger” and stated that he 
was not going to award this child the prize he deserved; 
and for the Employee’s reporting of this apparent dis­
crimination to the appropriate authorities.

(f) Leaving work early on two specified occas­
ions and on other unspecified occasions.

(g) Charging personal long distance phone calls 
on the defendants’ telephone bill even though the defen­
dants allowed this practice.

(h) For an alleged refusal to follow vague and 
unclear job instructions.

(i) For an alleged unspecified failure to com­
plete job assignments.

(j) For an alleged use of profanity relating to 
the exact same incident alleged in Charge (e).

The Hearing Offficer sustained Charges (a), ( e ) , 
(g), and (j) against the Employee and dismissed the 
others. As a remedy, the A.L.J. recommended that Em­
ployee be reassigned for a year during which time he had 
to prove his competence, etc. at the Employer’s discretion.



27

Further, the A.L.J. rejected the Employee’s defense of 
racial discrimination by virtue of his analysis of the 
Supreme Court cases of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Greene, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Texas Department Of 
Community Afffairs v. Burdine, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (1981). 
The Agency, in a cursory opinion issued on 1 August 1983, 
rubber stamped the decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge, wholly adopting said opinion as its own. See At­
tachment “C” .

The defendants have attempted to implement the 
remedy by transferring him to Shelby County, placing him 
on probation while at the same time loading him down 
with extensive and unprecedented responsibilities in an 
effort to further damage his reputation and standing in 
West Tennessee as an extension agent and by creating a 
situation where a satisfactory rating is a virtual impossi­
bility. The remedy placed him almost totally under the 
exclusive supervision of Luck and Turner, two of the 
very persons that the plaintiff has alleged in this lawsuit 
conspired to have him discharged. Turner is one of the 
persons who testified against him in the Administrative 
hearing wherein the defendants vigorously prosecuted 
false charges against the plaintiff in retaliation against 
him for his efforts to integrate all-white golf courses in 
Madison County and for the exercise of his First Amend­
ment right to protest racial epithets and signs in public 
places. Because of said discrimination, the plaintiff is 
now required to drive over a hundred miles a day from 
his home. This extensive commuting distance, the newly 
acquired duties which no other extension agent is re­
quired to perform, and the strain occasioned by the job 
uncertainty of plaintiff having been handed over to the 
unfettered discretion of defendant Turner and others, all



28

of which the plaintiff respectfully submits were imposed 
upon him in an eggregious disregard for his rights as se­
cured by the United States Constitution and Federal stat­
ute, have reached the point where the plaintiff needs the 
Court to intervene to protect his physical and emotional 
health as well as his reputation and professional standing. 
The defendants should not be allowed to inflict another 
day of said discriminatory regimen upon the plaintiff until 
this Court can make a preliminary determination under 
Rule 65, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Attach­
ment “D” .

2. Said decision of the Administrative Law Judge 
and the agency constituted an abuse of discretion, is con­
trary to law, and is not supported by reliable, probative, 
and substantive evidence. Said Administrative Law Judge 
and agency have demonstrated their unwillingness and/or 
inability to determine objectively and impartially the con­
stitutional and Federal statutes raised by the plaintiff in 
his Complaint and therefore, said decision should be stayed 
until this Court can make a preliminary determination 
of the likelihood that sucess on the merits is warranted 
since only this Court can exercise the Article III powers 
which are peculiarly applicable to those constitutional 
and Federal claims.

3. The plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the 
defendants are allowed to involuntarily transfer him to 
Shelby County and place him on probation for a year 
since such job action. This case which has been highly 
publicized in local newspapers, improperly, falsely and 
discriminatorily implies substandard performance, dam­
ages his professional and personal reputation and standing 
in the community, and, consequently, is likely to impact 
adversely upon the effectiveness of the service that plain­



29

tiff can be expected to render in Shelby County or any 
other County since his job is dependent, in large part, 
upon the confidence of his competence, character, and 
professionalism held by the community he serves. The 
potential for irreparable harm is further highlighted by 
his current unclassified status wherein the right to a due 
process hearing does not exist as a buffer against discrim­
inatory and retaliatory job action. These threatened in­
juries cannot be adequately redressed by money damages.

4. The plaintiff can establish a strong likelihood of 
sucess on the merits, and, therefore, is entitled to injunc­
tive relief.

5. The plaintiff should not have to perform the func­
tions of a classified position without the statutorily pro­
vided protection. Consequently, the Court should afford 
the plaintiff this protection by restraining and prohibiting 
the defendants from placing the plaintiff in the unclassi­
fied service or from considering the plaintiff as on any 
type of “probation” pending a determination by this Court 
under said Rule 65, FRCP.

6. The defendants have wrongfully and discrimina- 
torily attempted to add subjective stipulations and extrin­
sic requirements to the remedy ordered by the Administra­
tive Law Judge and the agency and have failed to set 
forth in writing “a clearly outlined plan for evaluating 
performance” as required by said remedy, thereby per­
mitting and encouraging further racial discrimination 
against plaintiff. As a result, the intervention of the 
Court is necessary to prevent irreparable harm to the 
plaintiff.

7. The plaintiff already has been disciplined for sev­
eral of the charges upon which the decision of the Admin­



30

istrative Law Judge and of the Agency to transfer him 
and place him in the unclassified service for a year was 
predicated. Consequently, it is unlawful to again disci­
pline him for these incidents. A stay of the remedy, there­
fore, is warranted.

8. The discipline proposed against the plaintiff by 
defendants was a discharge which plaintiff claims to have 
been the result of unconstitutional and unlawful racial 
discrimination. The Administrative Law Judge’s and 
Agency’s decision and remedy was equally unconstitu­
tional and unlawful in wrongfully rejecting said claims 
of racial discrimination by plaintiff despite clear evidence 
thereof, and thereby proposing and effectuating only a 
“modification” of that proposed discharge into a reassign­
ment and a placement of the plaintiff into the unclassified 
service or on “probation” for a year. The Court, there­
fore, should stay the application of the agency remedy to 
the plaintiff.

A  fully incorporated memorandum in support is filed 
herewith.



31

DEFENDANTS’ AMENDED MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Filed February 6, 1985 

IN THE
DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
JACKSON DIVISION

(Title Omitted in Printing)

The University of Tennessee defendants’ move the 
court for summary judgment on the additional grounds 
that the pleadings, together with the final administrative 
order filed under the Tennessee Uniform Administrative 
Procedures Act Contested Cases Provisions, T.C.A, 
§§ 4-5-301, et seq. (filed as Attachment A  to plaintiff’s 
motion for a temporary restraining order, a copy of which 
is attached hereto), demonstrate that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that The University of 
Tennessee defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.



32

JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT

Filed May 8, 1984

IN THE
DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
JACKSON DIVISION

(Title Omitted in Printing)

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that in com­
pliance with the Memorandum Decision entered May 2, 
1984 in the above-styled case, this case is hereby DIS­
MISSED with prejudice in favor of all defendants.