Brief of Appellant (Detroit Board of Education v. Bradley)

Public Court Documents
August 14, 1972

Brief of Appellant (Detroit Board of Education v. Bradley) preview

122 pages

Cite this item

  • Case Files, Milliken Hardbacks. Brief of Appellant (Detroit Board of Education v. Bradley), 1972. b215ce68-53e9-ef11-a730-7c1e5247dfc0. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/8129e363-7d48-452f-9f27-6ca3207d2e12/brief-of-appellant-detroit-board-of-education-v-bradley. Accessed May 16, 2025.

    Copied!

    No. 72-8002
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF DETROIT, 
a school district of the first 
class,

Appellant,
vs.

RONALD BRADLEY, ET AL, 

Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Eastern District of Michigan 

Southern Division

BRIEF
OF APPELLANT BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE SCPIOOL DISTRIC 

OF THE CITY OF DETROIT, A SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE 
_________FIRST CLASS AND OTHER DEFENDANTS

RILEY AND ROUMELL
George T. Roumell, Jr.
Louis D. Beer 
Jane Keller Souris 
Russ E. Boltz
C. Nicholas Revelos, Of Counsel 
720 Ford Building 
Detroit, Michigan 48226 
Attorneys for Appellants and 
certain other named Defendants



TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Table of Authorities...... ......•......
Statement of Issues Presented for Review
Statement of the Case and Relevant Facts......  6
Argument.......................................  20

I. ' THOUGH THE DISTRICT COURT USES THE
LABEL DE JURE SEGREGATION, THE COURT 
IN ACTUALITY REDEFINED THE TERM SO 
AS TO CHANGE ITS MEANING BY ELIMINATING 
THE REQUIREMENT OF INTENT TO SEGREGATE.. 22

II. THE DISTRICT COURT HAS FURTHER DEPARTED
FROM PRESENT LAW IN DESCRIBING THE 
DETROIT SCHOOL SYSTEM AS DE JURE SEGRE­
GATED, OR DUAL: ABSENT A FINDING THAT 
THE ACTS OF THE DETROIT SCHOOL AUTHORI­
TIES ARE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE 
CONDITION OF SEGREGATION...... ......... 33

III. THE MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION, THE SUPREME 
COURT OF MICHIGAN, THE GOVERNOR OF 
MICHIGAN> THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MICHI­
GAN, MICHIGAN SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC 
INSTRUCTION AND THE MICHIGAN STATE BOARD 
OF EDUCATION, HAVE ALL RECOGNIZED THE 
CARDINAL PRINCIPLE OF MICHIGAN SCHOOL 
LAW, NAMELY, THAT THE MICHIGAN PUBLIC 
SCHOOL SYSTEM IS SOLELY A STATE FUNCTION 
WITH THE LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS BEING 
MERELY INSTRUMENTALITIES OF THE STATE 
CREATED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE CONVENIENCE.. 41

IV. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE METROPOLITAN 
REMEDY FOR THE DESEGREGATION OF THE 
DETROIT SCHOOLS BECAUSE OF THE STATE'S 
SOLE RESPONSIBILITY FOR EDUCATION IN 
MICHIGAN, THE STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS LEAD­
ING TO METRO?OLITANIZATION DEVELOPED
BY THE COURTS, AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
OF EQUITY FIRST ANNOUNCED BY THE 
SUPREME COURT IN BROWN II, EACH OF WHICH 
SUPPORTS SUCH A REMEDY.................  55

i

I



PAGE

V. AS A FACTUAL MATTER, THE DISTRICT COURT 
WAS CORRECT IN ORDERING A METROPOLITAN 
REMEDY BECAUSE FAILURE TO DO OTHERWISE 
WOULD CONTINUE UNCONSITUTIONAL RACIAL 
ISOLATION IN THE DETROIT SCHOOLS AND 
CAUSE FURTHER DETROIT SCHOOL SEGREGA­
TION, PARTICULARLY IN A SITUATION WHERE

■ NUMEROUS OTHER GOVERNMENTAL SERVICES
HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED ON A METROPOLITAN 
SCOPE AND THE COMMUNITY IS METROPOLITAN 
IN CHARACTER............................

VI. THE SUPREME COURT HAS ESTABLISHED THAT
NEITHER THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT, NOR THE 
ORDERING OF THE EXPENDITURE OF STATE OR 
LOCAL FUNDS, NOR EXISTING TEACHERS' CON­
TRACTS CAN PREVENT A FEDERAL COURT FROM 
ORDERING STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS TO 
INSTITUTE A PLAN OF DESEGREGATION......

VII. IF SECTION 803 OF THE EDUCATION AMEND­
MENTS OF 1972 IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
SPECIFICALLY APPLICABLE, IT APPLIES 
EQUALLY TO AN INTRA-CITY REMEDY AND A 
METROPOLITAN REMEDY.....................

Relief Requested...............................
Appendix A

Appendix B

Appendix C 
Appendix D 
Appendix E

Appendix F 
Appendix G

Article Detroit Free Press, 
August 2, 1965................
Article Detroit Free Press, 
October 7, 1968 ...............
Article Detroit News..........
House Bill 5840 ...............
Article Detroit Free Press, 
November 11, 19 6 0 .............
School District Revenue Sources
Article Grosse Polnte News, 
August 10 , 1972...............

. 96

. . 97

. 99 

. .10°

. 10 9 

. .no

113

n



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

-Page

Argersenger v. Hamlin, 92 S. Ct. 2006 (1972) 88
Attorney General v. Detroit Board of 
Education, 154 Mich. 584, 118 N.W. 606 (1908) 42

Attorney General v. Lowrey, 131 Mich. 639, 92 
N.W. 289 (1902) 42

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) 81
Bell v. School City of Gary, Indiana, 324 F.2d 
209 (7th Cir. 1963) 26

Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D.
Mich. 1971) 62

Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1970) 7
Bradley v. Milliken, 438 F.2d 946 (6th Cir. 1971) 8, 15
Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, 338 
F. Supp. ___ (E.D. Va. 1972) 62

Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond,
Civil No. 72 - 1058 (4th Cir. June 5, 1972) 63,64,65

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S.
483 (2954) 30,33,74

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas,
349 U.S. 294 (1955) 17,67,75,83

Burleson v. County Board of Election Commission­
ers of Jefferson County, 308 F. Supp. 352 
(E.D.Ark. 1970) 59

Burleson v. County Board of Election Commission­
ers of Jefferson County, 432 F.2d 1356 59
(8th Cir. 1270)

Calhoun v. Cook, 332 F. Supp. 804 (M.D. Ga. 1971) 62
Calhoun v. Cook, 451 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1971) 62

Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School 
District, 330 F. Supp. 1377 (1971)

iii

87



Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School
District, ____ F. 2d ____ (5th Cir., No. 71 - 28 36 39
2397, August 2, 1972) • ' '

Page

Child Welfare v. Kennedy School Dist., 220 Mich. 
290, 189 N.W. 1002 (1922)

Clark v. Board of Education of Little Rock School 
Dist., 426 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1970)

Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, (1958)
Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile 
County, 402 U.S. 33, (1971)

Davis v. School District of the City of Pontiac, 
Inc.,,.443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1971)

Davis v. School District of the City of Pontiac, 
Inc., 309 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1970)

Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 369 F.2d 
55 (6th Cir. 1966)

Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 419 F.2d 
1387 (6th Cir. 1969)

Downs v. Board of Education, 336 F.2d 988 
(10 Cir. 1964) ■

Evans v. Ennis, 281 F.2d 385 (3rd Cir. 1960)
Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
Gilliam v. School Board, 345 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.
19 C 5)

43

78
57,83,84
58,63,70,75,
76,79,82

23,31,37,39

23,31

33

26,39

27
86
84,85 
88 

2 7

Gomilion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)
Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248 (1906)
Green v. County SchooJ Board of Nev; Kent County, 
391 U.S. 430 (1968)

Griffin v. School Board of Prince Edv.’ard County, 
3 7 7 U.S. 218 (3 964 )

58.81 
84
29.63.70.81 

84,89

IV



f

Page

p* St> Helena Parish School Board,197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961)

v: St- He-lena Parish School Board, 28 7 
1 • 2d 176 -(5th Cir. 1961)

Haney v. County Board of Education of Sevier 
■ County, 410 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969)

Godse11' 165 P. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich.

J?Rkin? v* U n s h i p  of Morse School District 98 N.J. 483, 279 A.2d 619 (1971)

Kelley y. Metropolitan County Board of Educa­
tion of Nashville and Davidson County, Term.,
---- **2d ____ (No. 71 1778-79, 6th CirMay 30, 1972) r* '

KFY2d QqriS<̂ ??K D '̂strict No. 1, Denver, 445 f .2a 990 (10th Cir. 1971)

L!?2d'7«” s t £ ° £ £  T m )  of Muoation' 448 

Lm n (5toB« r t ° » 7 " iSh SCh001 EOard' 446 F -2d
Loi’isiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 85 
s. Ct. 81/, 13 L ed 2d 709 (1965)

L (N?D.VOhioaIs64f “ UCati0n' 259 P - S W -  740

255 M i c h -

??aJd °f Educati°» of Men,phis,333 F .2a 661 (6th Cir. 1964)

No. K8 8- 71 (^D?°Mich?11972)EdUCatl0n/ ClVl1

°cl!».v».y?am o f  Education' 250 F-S“PP- J000
Osborn v. Bank of United : tales, 9 Wheat 7 38

59

59

59

27
61,67

76,77,80,87

27,31,33

58

76,78

79

27

43

25

45

27
8 4

v



Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.533 (1964)
Senghas v. L'Anse Creuse Public Schools, 368 
Mich.557, 118 N.W. 2d 975 (1968)
Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967)
Spencer v. Kugler, 326 F.SuDp. 1235 (D.N.J. 
(1971)

State v. Alabama, 304 F. 2d 583 (5th Cir. 1962)
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971)

Turner v. Warren County Board of Education,
313 F.Supp. 380 (E.D. N.C. 1970)

Page
58,88

43
25

65,66,67
25
61,63,64,68,70
75,76,77,79,81,87
59

United States v. Board of School Commissioners 
of City of Indianapolis, 332 F. Supp. 655 
(S.D; Ind. 1971)

United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of 
Education, U.S. ,33 L Ed 75,92 
S. Ct.    (1972)

United States v. State of Texas, 447 F .2d 441 
(5th Cir. 1971)

Wayne Circuit Judges v. Wayne County, 386 Mich. 
1 (1971)

Webb v. Board of Education, 223 F. Supp. 466 
(N.D. 111. 1963)

62

36,59,65,75

60

88

27

(1972)

4 3, 4!
Mich. 620, 171 N. T.7ill* 2d 545 (1969)
■.fright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 28,36,59,65,75U.S. , 33 I, Ed 2d 51, 92 s. Ct. --

FEDERAI, STATUTES AND RULES
Education Amendments of 1972, P.L. 92-318 (92d Congress 
Second Session), §803.

90-94

vx



Page

MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION
Const 1835, Art., 10, §3 41
Const 1850, Art. 13, §1, 4 41
Const 1908, Art.■ 11/ §2, 9 •41,42,43
Const 1963, Art. 8, 5 2 , 3: 42, 53,65
Const 1963 Art. 9, §3 50

MICHIGAN STATUTES
MCLA 209.101, MSA 7.631 50
MCLA 211. 34, MSA 7.52 50

50
MCLA 211.148, MSA 7.206

51
MCLA 257.811 (c) MSA 9.2511(c)

51
MCLA 340.252(c) MSA 15.3252(c)

51
MCLA 340.361, MSA 15.3361

52
MCLA 340.402, MSA 15.3402

52
MCLA 340.431, MSA 15.3431

52
MCLA 340.447, MSA 15.3447

52
MCLA 340.567(a) , MSA 15.3567(1)

51
MCI,A 340.570, MSA 15.3570
MCLA 340.573, MSA 15.3573 52

vi i



Page

MCLA 340.575 MSA 15.3575 49,51,53
MCLA 340.587(a) MSA 15.3587(1) . 52
MCLA 340.612 MSA 15.3612 51
MCLA 340.616 MSA 15.3616 51,52
MCLA 340.688 MSA 15.3688 51
MCLA 340.732(g) MSA 15.3732(g) 51
MCLA 340.775 MSA 15.3775 52
MCLA 340.781 MSA 15.3781 51
MCLA 340.782 MSA 15.3782 51
MCLA 340.789 MSA 15.3789 51
MCLA 340.887(1), MSA 15.3887(1) 51
MCLA 388.201 MSA 15.1916 48
MCLA 388.371 MSA 15.1951 51
MCLA 388.611 MSA 15.1919(51) 50
MCLA 388.681 MSA 15.2299(1) 47
MCLA 388.691 MSA 15.2299(51) 47
MCLA 388.851 MSA 15.1961 52
MCLA 388.1010 (a) MSA 15.1023(10)(C) 51
MCLA 423.201 MSA 17.445(1) 88

MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OPINIONS

•

No. 880, 1949-1950 Report 
(January 24, 1949) of the /attorney General 104

50
No. 1837, 
(Nov. 8,

No. 2333, 
(October

^52~!954 Report of the Attorney General

1955 Report of the Attorney General 56] 20, 1955) '

440
52

50

viii



Pace

No. 4097, 1961-1962 Report of the Attorney General 553 
(October 8, 1962)

No. 4705, 1969-1970 Report of the Attorney General, 156 
(July 7, 1970)

No. 4714, 1969-1970 Report of the Attorney General 201 
(December 1, 1970)

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Northwest Ordinance of 1787

2 Constitutional Convention Official Record, 1961, p3396
Annual Report, Committee on School District Reorganization 
1968 Journal of Senate 422 (March 1, 1968)

Bulletin No. 1005, Michigan State Department of Education
(1970)

Bulletin 1012, Michigan State Department of Education
(1971)

Annual Report, Committee on School District Reorganization 
1968 Journal of the Senate (March 1, 1968)

Michigan State Board of Education Bulletin No. 1005
1968 Journal of the House of Representatives,1965

41
4 4

47

45
51

47,57
45
49

IX



No. 72-8002
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF DETROIT, 
a-school district of the first 
class,

Appellant,

vs.
RONALD BRADLEY, et al,

Appellees.
/

BRIEF
OF APPELLANT BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT 

OF THE CITY OF DETROIT, A SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE
FIRST CLASS AND OTHER DEFENDANTS_____________  * I.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I. Though the District Court used the label "de jure"
segregation, has said Court, in actuality, redefined 
the term so as to change the meaning by eliminating 
the requirement of the intent to segregate?

The Court below answered "No".
The Defendant-Appellants Board of 
Education of the School District of 
The City of Detroit, and other Defendants, 
contend the answer is "Yes".

-1-



II.

III.

Has the District Court furthar departed from precedent 
in finding de jure segregation in the Detroit school 
system absent a finding that acts of the school autho- 
'rities are the proximate cause of the condition of 

segregation?

The Court below answered "No".
The Defendant-Appellants Board of 
Education of the School District of 
the City of Detroit, and other Defendants, 
contend the answer is "Yes".

Based on the Michigan Constitution, decisions of 
the Michigan Supreme Court, statements by the 
Governor of Michigan, opinions of the Attorney 
General of Michigan, and actions of both the 
Michigan Superintendent of Public Instruction and 
the Michigan State Board of Education, is it a 
cardinal principle of Michigan school lav/ that the 
Michigan public school system is solely a State 
function v/ith the local school districts being 
merely instrumentalities of the State created 
for administrative convenience?

The Court below answered "Yes".
If there must be a remedy, the Defendant- 
Appellants Board of Education of the 
School District of the City of Detroit, 
and other Defendants, agree.

-2-



Did the District Court abuse its discretion in 
ordering a metropolitan remedy for the desegre­
gation of the Detroit schools because of the 
-State's sole responsibility for education in 
Michigan, the step-by-step process leading to 
metropolitanization developed by the courts, 
and general principles of equity first announced 
by the Supreme Court in Brown II, each of which 
supports such a remedy?

The Court below answered "Yes".
If there must be a remedy, the Defendant- 
Appellants Board of Education of the 
School District of the City of Detroit, 
and other Defendants, agree.o ^

Was the District Court, as a factual matter, 
correct in ordering a metropolitan remedy, because 
failure to do otherwise would continue unconsti­
tutional racial isolation in the Detroit schools 
and cause further Detroit school segregation, 
particularly in a situation where numerous other 
governmental services have been developed on a 
metropolitan scope and the community is metropolitan 
in character?

The Court below answered "Yes".
If there must be a remedy, the Defendant- 
Appellants Board of Education of the

-3-



School District of the City of Detroit, 
and other Defendants, agree.

VI.

VII.

Has the Supreme Court established that neither 
the Eleventh Amendment nor the ordering of the 
expenditure of State or local funds nor existing 
teachers' contracts can prevent a federal court 
from ordering State and local officials to 
institute a plan of desegregation?

The Court below answered "Yes".
If there must be a remedy, the Defendant- 
Appellants Board of Education of the 
School District of the City of Detroit, 
and other Defendants, agree.

If Section 803 of the education amendment of 
1972 is Constitutional and specifically applicable, 
does it apply equally to an intra-city remedy and 
a metropolitan remedy?

The Court below did not answer this 
question.
The Defendant-Appellants Board of 
Education of the School District of 
the City of Detroit, and other Defendants, 
contend the answer is "Yes".



STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS

A. PROCEDURE BELOW: Plaintiffs commenced this liti-
' gation by filing a Complaint on August 18, 1970, against the 
Board of Education of the City of Detroit, its members and 
the then-Superintendent of Schools, as well as the Governor, 
Attorney General, State Board of Education and State Superin­
tendent of Public Instruction of the State of Michigan. Plaintiffs 
challenged tile Constitutionality of Act 48 of the Public Acts 
of 1970 of the State of Michigan as it affected certain plans 
of the Detroit Board of Education, and also alleged that the 
Detroit Public School System was and is segregated on the basis 
of race as a result of the official policies and actions of 
the Board of Education. After making said allegations, the 
Plaintiffs in two and one-half pages of pleadings asked for 
certain relief,including preliminary injunctions requiring the 
Board of Education to implement a plan of desegregation known 
as the "April 7, 1970" plan restraining implementation of the 
aforementioned Act No. 48 of the Michigan Public Acts of 1970; 
restraining the Board of Education from all further school 
construction and requesting permanent decrees concerning the 
above; and enjoining the Board of Education from building 
schools, approving policies, curriculum and programs "which 
are designed to or have the effect of maintaining, perpetuating

-6-



and supporting racial segregation in the Detroit School System"; 
and ordering Defendant School Board to institute a plan of 
desegregation.

This case was initially tried on Plaintiffs' motion for 
preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of the 
aforementioned Act 48 in order to permit the so-called April 7, 
1970 plan to be implemented. The District Court ruled that 
the Plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction, did 
not rule on the Constitutionality of Act 48, and granted a 
motion dismissing the cause as to all of the State Defendants.

B. PRE-TRIAL APPEALS: This Court in Bradley v. Milliken,
433 F.2d 897,989 (6th Cir.1970), held that the District Court 
did not abuse its dis:retion in denying the motion for prelimi­
nary injunction, but reversed the trial court in part, holding 
that portions of Act 48 were unconstitutional and that the State 
Defendants should remain in the suit.

Subsequently, the Plaintiffs sought to have the District 
Court direct the Defendant, Detroit Board, to implement the 
"April 7th" plan prior to trial. The Court did not order 
implementation of the "April 7th" plan, but, instead, adopted 
a plan submitted by the Board of Education.

Plaintiffs again appealed to this Court, and again, the 
Court held that the District Court had not abused its discretion

t
-7-



in refusing to adopt the April 7, 1970 plan. This Court 
.furthermore remanded with instructions to proceed immediately 
to a trial on the merits of Plaintiffs-' allegations about 
the Detroit School System. Bradley v. Milliken, 438 F .2d 946 
(6th Cir.1971).

C. RULING OF SEPTEMBER 27, 1972: The trial on the
issue of segregation began April 6, 1971, and was concluded 
on July 22, 1971, after consuming 41 trial days.

On September 27, 1971, the District Court issued a 
"Ruling on Issue of Segregation," (App. Ial94). In that Ruling 
at page 3} the District Court noted that at the close of 
Plaintiffs' case it had ruled that a prima facie case of segre­
gation had been presented. Further, from page 4 to page 22,1 2 
the District Court made findings of fact, which are summarized 
as follows:

First, the District Court analyzed the population 
patterns, both of the community at large and the student popu­
lation in Detroit schools, and found that not only was Detroit 
becoming predominantly Black, and growing more so, but so were 
its schools. Projecting present population patterns into the 
future, the District Court noted at page 5 that by 1980-1981 
the Detroit schools will be 80.7% Black, and by 1992 will be 
virtually 100% Black if present trends continue.

1 App. Ia]96.
2 App. Ial9 6-211.

-8-

C



V 1

Secondly, the Court found that out of 319 schools in 
the Detroit School System, 30 had no White pupils (9.4%) and 
11 had no -Black pupils (3.4%). Ruling,at pspes 7-81 The Court 
also found that certain schools, not identified as to race, 
had certain conditions indicating a lower socio-economic 
status than the city-wide average. Ruling, at page 8.2

Following this, the Court stated:

"The City of Detroit is a community generally 
divided by racial lines. Residential segre­
gation within the city and throughout the 
larger metropolitan area is substantial, per­
vasive and of long standing." Ruling, at page 
8. (Emphasis added) .....

*  *  *

"While the racially unrestricted choice of 
Black persons and economic factors may have 
played some part in the development of this 
pattern of residential segregation, it is, 
in the main, the result of past and present 
practices and customs of racial discrimination, 
both public and private, which have and do 
restrict the housing opportunities of Black • 
people." Ruling, at page 9.4

In particular, the District Court attributed this dis- 
cx'imination, at the public level, in the first place to the 
United States Government, not a party here: "For many years 
FHA and VA openly advised and advocated the maintenance of 
"harmonious neighborhoods," i_.e., racially and economically 
harmonious." Ruling, at page 9? Other than a general state­
ment that "the actions or the failure to act by the responsible
I~7^pT- Ial99T
2 App. Ial99-200.
3 App. Ia200.
4 App. Ia200.
5 App. Ia200-201

-9-



school authorities, both city and State, were linked to these
other governmental units," Ruling, at page 9,̂  the manner in
which the' Board of Education was responsible for such acts of
the FHA and VA was not established. See, Ruling, at pages 

29-10.

Concerning the acts of the State Defendants, the 
District Court in its Ruling on Segregation noted that the 
State Board of Education and the Michigan Civil Rights Commission 
had issued a Joint Policy Statement on the Quality of Education 
Opportunity in 1966. Included in this joint policy statement 
was a finding that local school boards should consider racial 
imbalance in the construction of schools so as to maximize 
integration. The State Board of Education, in its School Plan­
ning Handbook, had also similarly warned of the problems of 
segregated schools. Notwithstanding such policies of the State, 
the District Court found: "The State Defendants have similarly
failed to take any action to effectuate these policies." Ruling 
at Page 13. ^

The District Court also found that the State had acted 
to maintain the racial imbalance resulting in monoracial 
schools in the City of Detroit: The District Court noted that
the State had refused to provide authorization for funds for 
transportation for the integration of the Detroit schools, 
v/hile providing similar transportation funds regardless of 1 2 3

1 App. Ia201.
2 App. Ia200-201.
3 App* Ia204. -10-



the intended use for other school district through­
out the State. In addition, the District Court found 
other financial discrimination, such as bonding limitations 
and the Micnigan state school aid formula, as direct causes 
of the monoracial character of Detroit schools. See 
generally, Ruling,at page 14.1 Similarly, the District Court 
noted that the State of Michigan has at times acted to re­
organize the school district of the City of Detroit, and 
moreover.

"The State acted through Act 48 
to impede, delay and minimize 
racial integration in Detroit 
schools. The first sentence 
of Sec. 12 of the Act was di­
rectly related to the April 
7, 1970 desegregation plan.
The remainder of the section 
sought to prescribe for each 
school in the eight districts 
criterion [sic] of "free 
choice" (open enrollment) 
and "neighborhood schools" 
("nearest school priority 
acceptance"), which had as 
their purpose and effect the 
maintenance of segregation." 
Ruling at page 15. 2 1 2

1 App. Ia204.
2 App. Ia205.

-11-



In summary, the District Court found that the Board
did the following:

(1) Operating schools in a city with
established residential segregation, 
caused by federal agencies in part, 
and which action was joined in by 
unspecified "acts" or "failures to act";

(2) Creation of optional attendance zones -
while noting, that specifically the Board . 
in 1959 hired Merle Ilenrickson to eliminate, 
and had, in fact, with minor exceptions, 
eliminated optional attendance zones, prior 
to the filing of the Complaint;

(3) In one or two isolated instances, bussed 
Black students past White schools to 
Black schools, and "only" once bussed 
White students to Black schools;

(4) In one instance, built a school and estab­
lished its attendance zone which may have 
contained Black students; and

(5) Participated in construction of racially 
identifiable schools.

These acts caused the District Judge to state:

"The natural and actual effect of these acts 
and failures to act has been the creation 
and perpetuation of school segregation." 
Ruling, at page 12.̂ -

It must be recognized that Detroit has not had a dual

1 App. la203.



•  •
system of public education since 1869. These findings of very 
isolated instances were made in the background of the nation's 
fifth largest system having over 319 school buildings, 299,500 
students and 12,229 faculty members, plus administrative and 
other school employees. It is a large governmental unit which 
is most difficult to manage. Yet, after close scrutiny, only 
isolated acts were found, many of which were found to have been 
corrected or were already in the process of being corrected. '

Recognizing the sheer magnitude of the Detroit school
system, the District Court was obviously concerned in making
its findings of d£ jure discrimination, for, in spite of such
findings, the Court was moved to state:

"It would be unfair for us not to recognize 
the many fine steps the Board has taken to .
advance the cause of quality education for 
all in terms of racial integration and human 
relations. The most obvious of these is in 
the field of^faculty integration." Ruling, 
at page 15. 1 .

The Court continued, Ruling, pages 15-20? to find that the Detroit 
schools had an exemplary record of faculty integration. While 
in 1961 the Detroit system had a faculty ratio of 78.1% White to 
21.6% Black, by October, 1971 that ratio had changed to 56.4%
White to 42.9% Black. As of October, 1970, only six schools in 
the entire system had no Black faculty members; over 124 had 50% 
or more Black faculty members. As of October, 1971, out of 319 
schools, only four do not have Black faculty members and now 149 
have more than 50% Black faculty members. 1 2

1 App. Ia 2 0 5.
2 App. Ia205 - Ia209.

-13-



t

1

i■i

1

!

i

The Court then concluded:
"The Detroit School Board has, in many other 
instances and in many other respects, under­
taken to lessen the impact of the forces of 
segregation and attempted to advance the cause 
of integration...." Ruling, at page 20.-*-

Continuing, the Court noted at least seven such instances, calling
them "pioneering," Ruling, at page 21: ^

(1) The Board denied use of its facilities
to groups practicing racial discrimination;

(2) Refusal by the Board to allow its facilities 
to be used for discriminatory apprentice 
training programs;

(3) Significant placement efforts on behalf of 
Black students in the building crafts and 
industry;

(4) The Board successfully brought about a sub­
stantial increase in the percentage of Black 
students in apprenticeship programs;

(5) It was the first State agency in Michigan to 
effectuate a policy of requiring contractors 
with which it dealt to take effective steps 
to insure equal employment opportunities in 
their work forces;

(6) It was a pioneer in the use of multi-ethnic 
instructional material significantly influ­
encing publishers thereby.

(7) The Detroit Board "has opposed State legislation 
which would have the effect of segregating the 
district." Ruling, at pages 20-21J (Emphasis added).

1 App. Ia209.
2 App. Ia209-210.
3 App. Ia209.

-14-



In concluding its Findings of Fact, the District Court
ruled:

"The principal causes [of segregation] 
undeniably have been population movement 
and housing patterns, but State and local 
governmental actions, including school 
board actions, have placed a substantial 

- role in promoting segregation." Rulincr, 
at page 22.1 ----- ^

However, in the very next sentence on page 22, the
Court revealed its true finding and thinking; namely, that
this is a "no-fault" situation, at least on the part of the.
Detroit Board of Education, when the Court said:

"It is, the Court believes, unfortunate that 
we cannot deal with public school segregation 
on a no-fault basis, for if racial segregation 
in our public schools is an evil, then it 
should make no difference whether we classify 
it de jure or de facto."

D. THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE AND APPE/iL FROM OCTOBER 
4, 1972 ORDER: Following this Ruling, a pre-trial conference
on the issue of a remedy was held, with the Court setting a time 
table for the presentation of proposed implementation plans.
At that time, the Court indicated that its findings of fact 
and conclusions of law on the issue of segregation were final. 
Subsequently, the Board of Education appealed to this Court 
from what it thought was a final decision of the District 
Court. This Court disagreed. 438 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1971). 1 2

1 App. Ia 210.
2 App. Ia 210.



E. DISTRICT COURT RULINGS ON REMEDIES: On March 24, 1972,
the District Court ruled that it must, of necessity, fashion 
a remedy metropolitan in scope. In so doing, the Court felt 
the necessity of choosing "the alternative or alternatives 
which promise realistically to work now and hereafter to pro­
duce the maximum actual desegregation." Ruling on Propriety 
of Considering a .Metropolitan Remedy, March 24, 1972, at pages

Essential in the District Court's decision were two 
questions, presented by the State Defendants and the interven­
ing suburban school districts, respectively. Upon challenge 
by the State Defendants that the delegation of power from the 
State to the school districts vests the school districts "with 
sovereign powers which may not be disturbed by either the State 
or the Court." Ruling (March 24, 1972), at pages 2-3.2 The 
Court responded by saying:

The State cannot evade its Constitutional responsi­
bilities by a delegation of powers to local units 
of government. The State Defendants position is in 
error in two other respects: 1: The local school
districts are not fully autonomous bodies, for to 
the extent it has seen fit, the State retains control 
and supervision; and 2: It assumes that any metropo­
litan plan, if one is adopted, would, of necessity, 
require the dismantling of school districts included 
in the plan." Ruling (March 24, 1972), at page 3.3

The suburban school districts charge that, absent findings

1
2
3

App. Ia 4 41. 
App. Ia 4 41. 
App. Ia441. -16-



of de jure segregation by them, they may not be included in 
any remedy. While noting a lack of Supreme Court direction 
in this regard, the Court rejected the argument by noting 
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 at 301 (1955) (Brown 
II):

"The courts may consider problems related 
to administration, arising from the physical 
condition of the school plant, the school 
transportation system, personnel, revision 
of school districts and attendance areas into 
compact units to achieve a system of deter­
mining admission to the public schools on a 
non-racial basis, and revision of local laws 
and regulations which may be necessary in 
solving the foregoing problems." Ruling, 
(March 24, 1972) at page 4.1

The Court concluded by noting that an intra-city plan 
proved inadequate, that it would be required to consider a 
metropolitan remedy for desegregation.

Subsequently, on March 28, 1972, the District Court 
rejected all Detroit-only plans presented to it, since it was 
found that no plan could prevent the massive re-segregation of 
the Detroit schools. Speaking of Plaintiffs' Plan (which the 
Court found "would accomplish more desegregation than now 
obtains" or would result from other plans),the Court found, 
inter alia:

"(1) The plan would make Detroit schools 
completely racially identifiable as 
Black, with some schools 75% to 90% 
Black; and

1 App. Ia 44 2. -17-



(2) It would change a bi-racial school system 
to one. perceived absolutely as Black, 
thereby increasing "White flight" to the 
suburbs and correlatively, the Black student 
population."

See,Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav; On Detroit-Only Plans 
of Desegregation (March 28, 1972), at pages 2-4! With these 
findings, the Detroit-only plan would soon result in a virtually 
all-Black Detroit school system surrounded by White suburbs. The 
Court rejected intra-city plans, in toto, saying:

"[R]elief of segregation in the public schools 
of the City of Detroit cannot be accomplished 
within the corporate geographical limits of the 
City." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav/ 
On Detroit-Only Plans of Desegregation (March 28, 
1972), at page 5.

Drawing upon these two rulings on the scope of the 
remedy for the segregation it perceived, the District Court 
established the perimeters of a metropolitan remedy on June 14, 
1972, in its "Ruling on Desegregation Area and Order for Devel­
opment of Plan of Desegregation." In that Ruling and Order, 
the District Court established a panel to design plans of inte­
gration for Detroit and 53 metropolitan school districts, 
subject to its appioval, within certain established guidelines.

F. DISTRICT COURT'S CERTIFICATION OF APPEALABLE ORDERS: 
On July 20, 1972, the District Court certified that certain 
orders, those above included, involve controlling questions 
of law as contemplated by 28 U.S.C. §1292 (b), and that they 1 2

1 App. Ia457-458.
2 App. Ia459. -18-



were final within the meaning of Rule 54(b), F.R.C.P. On the 
same date, this Court granted the motion for leave to appeal of 
the State Defendants, and further ordered that the cause be ad­
vanced on the docket for hearing on August 24, 1972. The Court 
also granted the motion for stay pending appeal of the District 
Court's Order for Acquisition of Transportation, and stayed all 
other proceedings in the District Court other than planning pro­
ceedings .

On July 20, 1972, the Defendants Detroit Board of Education 
and others filed their notice of appeal as to orders made final 
pursuant to F.R.C.P.54(b).

-19-



A R G U M E N T

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

' The District Court redefined the legal meaning of the 
term "de jure segregation". The Court made no findings of 
intent on the part of the Detroit School Board to segregate.nor 
did it make a finding that there was a causal connection between 
any of the acts which the Detroit School Board undertook and the 
existence of segregation in the City of Detroit.

The only possible way for this Court of Appeals to 
find a basis for a Constitutional violation is to change the 
existing established body of school desegregation lav.7. For these 
reasons, there should be no remedy as there has not been a 

Constitutional violation. Thus, this Court should reverse the 
decision of the District Court that de jure segregation was present, 
as a matter of law, and order that the Complaint filed herein be 
dismissed. .

If this Court should find that there is a basis for 
a Constitutional remedy, the only remedy is the remedy chosen by 
the District Court: to-wit; a metropolitan remedy, and this Court 
should affirm the District Court's decisions thereon. This follows 
because of the pervasive control of the State over education in 
Michigan; the fact that local school districts, including the 
Detroit district, are mere instrumentalities of the State and that 
their actions are those of the State: the fact that the relevant

-20-



community is clearly the metropolitan Detroit community; the 
fact that a number of courts have step-by-step laid the legal 
foundation for the ordering of a metropolitan remedy; and the 
fact that equity beginning with Brown II, as reaffirmed in 
Swann, clearly gives a federal district court the right to fashion 
a metropolitan remedy. There are no Constitutional prohibitions 
against doing so. Furthermore, the United States Supreme 
Court has in the past approved federal court orders requring 
State and local expenditures to protect Constitutional rights.

In regard to remedy if Section 803 of the Education 
Amendment of 1972 is Constitutional and specifically applicable, 
it applies equally to an intra-city remedy and a metropolitan 
remedy. .

21



T11OUGII TIIE DISTRICT COURT USED THE I ABEL DE JURE 
SEGREGATION, THE COURT IN ACTUALITY REDEFINED THE 
TERM SO AS TO CHANGE ITS MEANING BY ELIMINATING
THE REQUIREMENT OF INTENT TO SEGREGATE.

The District Court found certain actions and inactions
of the Detroit school authorities, such as the creation and

alteration of attendance zones, feeder school patterns and
grade structures, had as their "natural, probable and actual"
consequence the segregation of certain Detroit schools at certain

points in time. In one instance, the creation and maintenance
of optional attendance zones, the Court found segregation was

the "natural, probable, foreseeable and actual" consequence. In
the main these findings were made without a finding that such* »

actions had as their purpose or intent the segregation of Black 

students from Whites. True, the District Court did so. find as 
to the construction of one elementary school after 41 days of 
trial court scrutiny of a vast system involving 319 schools, 

289,000 students, and over 12,000 faculty members. 338 F.Supp. 
at 488. When the Court shifts from specific instances to dis­

cussing the school system generally, it does not in setting forth 
the principles requisite to a system-wide finding enumerate among 
them any intent to operate a segregated system. It views the 
finding of some one purposeful act at some time to be 

without any general finding of purpose.

sufficient,



\

Nor cioes the District Court, although invited to do so 
by the Plaintiffs (Plaintiffs' Proposed Finding of Fact, P. 20) 
infer a general intent to segregate from a pattern of specific 
actions as did the District Court in Davis v. School District of 
£l^-Qf_Pontiac, Inc., 309 F.Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1970) aff'd. 443 
F* 2d 573 (6th Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 405 U.S. 223 (1971). After 
reviewing the school district's attendance boundary line decisions 
and school location decisions, the Court noted:

"Although, as the District Court stated, 
each decision considered alone night not 
compel the conclusion that the Board of 
Education intended to foster segregation, 
taken together, they support the conclu­
sion that a purposeful pattern of racial 
discrimination has existed in the Pontiac 
school system for at least 15 years."
443 F.2d at 576.

The Court variously noted that the Pontiac Board had "inten­
tionally utilized" its powers, "did a great deal to create the pat­
terns presently existing" and "played a major role in the develop- 
raent and growth of a segregated situation". 309 F.Supo. at 741-742. 
No such findings were made by the District Court here against the 
Detroit Board.

The requisite finding that the Detroit Board of Education 
acted with the general purpose or policy of operating a segregated 
school system is simply not there. Not only is there no language 
m  the District Court’s opinion making a finding based on such an 
inference, but the Court specifically rejects the kind of pattern 
which led tne Court to find in Davis (Pontiac) a purposeful attempt 
to segregate the system, instead finding "many fine steps" taken

1 .
-23-



by Ihe Detroit Board in terms of racial integration. 338 F.Supp. at 589. 

Particular refe^fcce was made by the Court^^o the stellar job 
that the Detroit Board has done in integrating faculty including 
since 1960 increasing the black representation among its teachers 
from 23.3% to 42.1% and among its administrators from 4.5% to 37.8%; 
having the highest percentage of black teachers among northern 
scnool systems in the country; decreasing the number of schools with­
out black teachers from 41 to 4 and increasing the number of schools 
having more than 50% black faculty to 124 out of 319. App. la 205-209 
These are but a few C l the many examples that the Court found as to 
positive faculty integration policies on the part of the Detroit Board 
If the Detroit Board had any general intent or policy to segregate its 
school system then such policies toward faculty integration would 
surely be inconsistent with such purpose. This explains why the Dis­
trict. Court could not find the necessary action under the classic 
definition or de jure segregation, i.e., intent on the part of the 
Detroit Board to segregate. In addition the Court discussed many 
other advances made by the Detroit Board:

The Detroit Scnool Board has, in many other 
instances and in many other respects, under­
taken to lessen the impact of the forces of 
segregation and attempted to advance the cause 
of integration. Perhaps the most obvious one 
was the adoption of the April 7 Plan. Among 
other t.nings, it has denied the use of its faci­
lities to groups which practice racial discrimina­
tion; it does not permit the use of its facilities 
for Discriminatory apprentice training programs; 
it has opposed state legislation which would have 
the effect of segregating the district; it has 
wormed to place black students in craft positions 
in industry and the building trades; it has brought 
about a substantial increase in the percentage of 
black students in manufacturing and construction 
trade apprentice-ship classes; it became the first 
public agency in Micnigan to adopt and implement a 
policy requiring affirmative act"of contractors with 
which .i v deals to insure equal employment opportu­
nities in their work forces; it has been a leader

-24-

I



:^^pi once ring the use of mu^^L-ethnic instruc­
tional material, and in so doing has had an 
impact on publishers specializing in producing 
school texts and instructional materials; and'1 
it has taken other noteworthy pioneering steps 
to advance relations between the white and black 
races." 338 F.Supp. at 591-592.

The Detroit Eoard questions the implicit determination by 
the Court that absent findings the Detroit Board acted with purpose 
or intent to operate a racially segregated school system, and absent 
findings that such action caused the segregation of the system, the 
Court may properly undertake to apply comprehensive remedies previ­
ously applied to the eradication "root and branch" of de jure segre­
gated school systems.

The District Court's Conclusions of Law 2 and 4 make clear its 
rejection of the current doctrine of de_ jure segregation, 338 F.Supp. 
at 592 (App. Ia211 Vol. Ia). The Court found it necessary to cite 
cases other than school desegregation cases, i.e., Sims v. Georgia 
389 U.S. 404 (13G7) , and State v. Alabama, 304 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.
1962) to read out the requirement of motive or intent which is neces­
sary for a finding of d_e jure school segregation.- For School 
Board conduct to be actionable

1/ Tne District Court, in its Conclusions of Law 5, 338 F.Supp. 
592-593, ruled that the Detroit Board's practice of s’ 
tendance zones on a north-south rather than an east-vs 
neld to conform to racial residential dividing lines, 
of lav;, an act of de jure seqreg;
Education of Memohls ,“333 F.2d 6( 
tne District Court is clearly in error. That 
formulatiiu a remeo.v

Lav; 5 , 338 F.Supp. a-U
:ice of shaping schoo1 at-
n east-wes t orientation ,
;g lines , is as a matter
! Northcross v. Board of
19 6 4). On this poini-rcase held only that i -L ‘ *system r Previously C..G v.. L3 _

—  o , cue x . m y  ex scnooi oouncaries
Pr̂ SGrYe a maximum amount of segregation is impermissible. 333 F.5

at 663-664. Clearly, the school boundaries in the City of Detroit had 
been originally established in a north-south orientation, because of 
the arterial system of streets of the City of Detroit and the bus 
transportation routes in existence, for which there is credible record 
evidence. Henri ckson de jure, Tr. p.2931). Aop. IUa285. It is eaual- 
!y apparent that they were not drawn, "where the Board is under com­
pulsion to desegregate the schools." 333 F.2d at 664. For the Dis­
trict Court to hold the Detroit Board's decision to draw at some remot: 
time in the past its lines in such manner to be per se de jure segre­
gation is clearly excessive. ' " —

L -25-



on a system-wide basis, there must be a finding of intent or 
purpose to segregate the system:

"[T]he crucial fact to be found is whether 
the racial imbalance was intentionally caused 
by gerrymandering or by other alleged discrim­
inatory practices on the part of the Board." 
Deal v. C.incinnat.i Board of Education, 369 
F*2d 55, 64 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 847 (1967); on remand, 419 F.2d T387 
(6th Cir. 3969), cert, denied, 402 U.S. 962 
(1971) .

By writing out intent, the District Court has redefined 
de jure segregated school systems. Counsel is unaware of 
any previous finding that a de jure segregated system can 
exist absent a finding of intent or purpose to segregate 
the system. The cases are legion in which courts, including 
this Circuit, have noted the existence of racial imbalance 
absent an intent to segregate and found no de jure segre­
gation, and, therefore, no cause of action; Bell v. School 
City of Gary, Indiana, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. 
denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964) (no Constitutional duty to
change innocently arrived at school attendance districts



merely because shifts in population had increased or decreased 
the percentage of Black or White pupils); Downs v. Board of 
Edu^tion, 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964 ), cert, denied, 380 
U.S. 914 (1965) (no requirement to abandon or destroy the 
neighborhood school system even though it results in racial 
imbalance where it was maintained with no intention or pur­
pose to maintain or perpetuate segregation); Deal v. Cincinnati 
52fl£d_of^^uc_^ion, supra, (no Constitutional duty to bus 
children out of their neighborhoods or transfer classes to 
alleviate racial imbalance caused not by the school board 
but by the racial character of the neighborhoods in which 
the schools were located); Keyes v. School District No. 1, 
Denver, 445 F .2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), cert, granted,
404 U.S. 1036 (1972) (showing of racial animus required 
to support findings of de jure segregation in local schools).
See also Gillian v. School Board, 345 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.
1965); Olson v. Board of Education
(F.D. N.Y. 19 6 6); appeal dismiss ed,
Lynch v. Board of Education. 229 F :
1964); Webb v. Board of Education. :
111. 1963); Henry v. Godsell, 165 F
1958).

-27-



Counsel is aware of the decision by the Fifth 
Circuit in Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent 
School District on August 2, 1972 (No. 71-2397) in which 
that Circuit did find actionable segregation without 
requiring a finding cf intent. But that decision under­
took not to find de_ jure segregation, but specifically 
to abolish the distinction between do facto and de jure, 
segregation, citi.ng the instant case under review here 
as authority for so doing." In Cisneros, the Court 
stated:

"Thus, we discard the anodyne 
dichotomy of classical d_e facto 
and de j ure segregation ... We 
therefore hold that the racial 
and ethnic segregation that 
exists in the Corpus Christi 
school system is unconstitutional
-- not de facto , not de j ure,
but unconstitutional." Slip Op. 
at 10, 13.

Counsel is further aware of the recent Supreme Court 
decisions in Wright v, Counci3. _of City of _Enpo r i a, U .



40 USLW 4817 (June 20, 1972), holding that a city could 
not create a new school district separate from that of 
the surrounding county where its effect would impede the 
process of court-ordered dismantling of a dual system. In 
such a situation, school board action need not be judged 
in terms of its "dominant" purpose, but rather as to the 
effect of the action, as earlier cases found intent was 
established by the trial court. The Fifth Circuit cited this 
holding in Cisneros, supra, in support of its decision to 
abolish the de facto - de jure distinction in the determina­
tion of the existence of violation of Constitutional rights. 
Perhaps the better view is that, in the context of an 
undisputed dual system the Supreme Court has done nothing 
more them explain once again that segregation once found 
must be terminated "root and branch." Green v. County 
School of Hew Kent Countv, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). In either 
event, it is indeed certain that no such finding as to 
effect alone has to this date supported a finding on de_ jure 
grounds of an initial violation of Constitutional rights 
by a school board.

It would be disingenuous for the Detroit Board to argue 
that as the District Court here present did not find intent

-29-

e



or purpose to operate a segregated system that the Court thereby 
did not find fault with the Board. The Court makes clear that 
while it believes that it would be far better to operate on a 
"no-fault" basis, it nevertheless is operating on a basis of 
fault finding. The District Court has not undertaken to abolish 
the concept of de jure/de facto segregation, as in Cisneros; 
rather it has redefined it by creating the novel concept of 
culpable, though non-intentional, segregation defined by the 
foreseeability or probability of a segregatory result. This 
notion of, for lack of a better term "negligent segregation" 
based on the foreseecibility or probability of segregatory conse­
quences of action not found to be taken with any evil purpose 
strains the rationale of the concept, of de jure segregation beyond 
the breaking point. It leaves 'no cognizable difference between 
de facto and de jure segregated schools. If there is a difference 
between the two, it is surely not in the general educational- 
effect of the condition of segregation. The de_ facto segregated 
school is just as racially identifiable as the de jure segregated 
school, and whatever educational consequences flow from that 
condition will flow as freely in the one case as in the other.

What difference there is, then, must be in the cause of 
the segregation rather than in the effect. Brown I says that:

"[T]he policy of separating the races is usually 
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the 
Negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the 
motivation of the child to learn." 347 U.S. at 494.



If there is a distinction between de jure and de facto segre 
gation, the basis of that distinction is therefore in the intentional 
policy of separation, a policy which stigmatizes the Black young­
ster, unconstitutionally impeding his ability to learn. It is 
the intentional policy, the known and perceived official man 
date that the Blacks must be kept from Whites which creates the 
special stigma of the de jure segregated school. Absent that 
purposeful policy, what difference is there on the effective 
ability of a Black child to learn if his consignment to an all­
Black school is due to "benign" influences, whatever they may 
be, or due to the failure of a well-meaning school board to 
foresee the consequences of acts which are found pcst hoc to be 
foreseeable? Purposeful intent is ultimately the touchstone of 
the concept of de jure segregation, for absent it, any differences 

in the effect of Black child of attending an all—Blac;. school, 
and therefore, any variant effect on his Constitutional rignts 

disappears.

Similarly, purposeful intent to operate a system on a 
segregated basis is the touchstone of a finding of a de ]ure 
segregated system. Keyes v. School District Wo. 1, Denver,
445 F .2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 404 U.S. 1036
(1972). Davis v. School District of the City of P(ontmaCj_Inc_._, 
309 F.Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1970), aff1d ., 443 F.2d 573 (6th 
Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 405 U.S. 223 (1971), stands for the

-31



proposition that such intent may be inferred by the consistent 
pattern of action of a Board of Education; the implication that 
such action as unwritten but nonetheless purposeful policy not 
being lost on the Black community and the children attending 
Black schools; and the message of implied inferiority not being 
diminished by its being delivered indirectly.

There is no other reason for the District Court at the 
end of its findings of fact on September 27, 1971, to state:

. "It is, the Court believes, unfortunate
that we cannot deal with school segregation 
on a no-fault basis, for if racial segrega­
tion in the public schools is an evil then 
it should make no difference whether we 
classify it de jure or de facto."
338 F.Supp. 582,592.

The Court's own recognition that it was veering from the classi­
cal definition of de_ jure segregation and eliminating the need to 
find intent. The law in this Circuit is that there must be intent 
The Detroit Board suggests that as there must be an intent, the 
District Court should be reversed or this Court should say that 
"no-fault" is the rule so all will understand. Cf., Deal v.
Cincinnati Board of Education, supra.



II

THE DISTRICT COURT HAS FURTHER DEPARTED FROM
PRESENT LAW IN DESCRIBING THE DETROIT SCHOOL
SYSTEM AS DE JURE SEGREGATED, OR DUAL, ABSENT
A FINDING THAT THE ACTS OF THE DETROIT SCHOOL
AUTHORITIES ARE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE
CONDITION OF SEGREGATION.

It follows naturally that just as a finding of de jure segre­
gation requires a finding of purpose or intent on the part of a 
school authority to operate such a system it also requires a 
finding that such action was the proximate cause of the segrega­
tion. See Deal v, Cincinnati Board of Education, 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 
1966) cert, denied 389 U.S. 847 (1967) where this Court said at 64:

"However, the crucial fact to be found 
is whether the racial imbalance was 
intentionally caused by gerrymandering 
or by other alleged discriminatory prac­
tices on the part of the Board." .
(Emphasis supplied).

This common-sense requirement has more recently been recog­
nized in Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, 445 F.2d 990 
(10th Cir. 1971), cert, granted, 404 U.S. 1036 (1972) where the 
entire de_ jure test was restated by the Court at 1006.

The special stigma of de jure segregation comes not only 
from the placement of the Black child in a racially identifiable 
school, but from the knowledge that the cause of his being there 
is the result of an official policy which tells the child that he 
is inferior. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) .
Absent that causation, that special stigma is also absent, and what



remains is but a racially identifiable school, to which the 

appellation de jure would signal no difference, insofar as the 
Constitutional rights of the child are concerned, than the term 
de facto.'

The District Court recognized the need for a finding of 
causation when it set forth what it felt were the "principles 
essential to a finding of de jure segregation", presumably meaning 
by this, a de jure segregated system and not an individual act 
of 3ure segregation. 338 F.Supp. at 592.

However, the Court did not feel any need to find that such 
causation was proximate. The Court, in the "principles essential 
to a finding", states only that the action must have "aggravated 
segregation , and then states separately without any apparent 
nexus that there must exist a "current condition of segregation". 
The Court notes further that "causation in the case before us is 
both several and comparative". The closest the Court comes to ever 
specifically forming the causal nexus of the acts of the Detroit 
Board is in its statement:

"The principal causes undeniably have been 
population movements and housing patterns, 
but State and local governmental actions, 
including school board actions, have played 
a substantial role in promoting segregation."
388 F.Supp. at 592.

Previously, the Court noted a "link" between the acts of the Detroi 
Board and other governmental units.

-34-



• •

In determining what part of the "substantial" but not 
principal role the Detroit Board played in causing the current 
condition or what link it had to other units of government, the 
only recourse is to the record. That record reveals rather 
limited contracts between the Board and the City Planning Commis­
sion, various model neighborhood agencies, the Urban Renewal 
Division and Department of Parks and Recreation of tne City of 
Detroit none of which involved the slightest segregatory purpose 
or effect. (Henrickson, de jurc, Tr.3515-18) (App.IVa 113-11G) .

As to the role of the acts of the Detroit Board found to 
be wrongful in causing the current condition of segregation 
Plaintiffs proferred to the Court their finding of fact which 
contained only the opinion testimony of several experts to the 
effect that all-Black and all-White schools tended to reinforce 
a feeling of separateness on the part of both races, which, in 
turn, manifested itself to some ^indefinable degree in the choice 
of residence in uniracial neighborhoods on the part of both races.

The mind boggles at the meaning of this assumed, unmeasured 
phenomenon against the standard of proximate cause. First, the 
findings of the District Court as to specific acts of discrimina­
tion relate to a relatively small proportion of the total school 
district: the construction of one specified elementary school, out 
of a total school construction program involv ing a multitude of schools;

busing; and the maintenance of sixseveral instances of Black-to-Black



optional zones, which were in the process of seriatim elimina­
tion, representing but a small fraction of the total of twenty- 
one high school constellations in the City of Detroit. There 
is not an iota of evidence which shows or which even attempts to 
show that any person living in the City of Detroit made housing 
decisions any differently, because of the "acts or failures to 
act" of the Detroit Board. Even the case supposedly which "discards 
the anodyne dichotomy of classical de facto and de_ jure segrega­
tion", Cisneros, ___ F.2d ___ (5th Cir. 1972). Slip Opinion at 10,
plainly states:

"We need only find a real and significant 
relationship, in terms of cause and effect, 
between state action and the denial of edu­
cational opportunity occasioned by the racial 
and ethnic separation of public school students." 
Slip Opinion at 12. (Emphasis supplied). .

See also Texas Educational Agency, ___F . 2d ___ (5th Cir. 1972). Sli
Opinion at 27-28, 30-32, 44. Bradley v. Mi]liken, the instant case,
is cited as authority.

And indeed, the most recent United States Supreme Court 
cases concerning school desegregation, Wright v. Council of City of
Emporia, ____U.S. ____, 40 USLW 4806 (June 20, 1972), and United
States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education, ____ U.S. ___
40 USLW 4817 (June 20, 1972), reaffirmed the "cause-effect" rule 
of discrimination, prohibiting acts which would have caused further 
segregation through the "carving out" of new school districts which 
were less biracial than the original districts from which they 
proposed to secede.

-36-



"

rL
r

F
L

T̂”
fc.~

r

Indeed, the record evidence cited to show causation does 

not relate directly to the acts of the Detroit Board in question, 
it relates merely to the existence of racially identifiable 
schools. There is no basis for belief that a child in one of 
the many schools in the city that was all Black but which was not 
affected by one of the acts of the Detroit Board found wrongful by 
the District Court would be any less impressed by the racially 
separate nature of his condition than one that was. This being 
the case, the causation which the District Court has found is 
nothing more than an assertion that racial separation tends to 
be self-perpetuating. This is a far cry from the finding of this 
Court sanctioned in Davis v. School District of the City of Pontiac, 
443 F.2d 583 (6th Cir.197.1) cert. denied ,405 U .S. 233 (1971), namety, that the 
Board took certain purposeful action, and as a direct result of 
those actions, the schools of the city were racially imbalanced.

The most vivid indicator of the lack of any causal nexus 
between the actions of the Detroit Board and the current condi­
tion of segregation is the finding the Court's "Ruling on Detroit- 
Only Plans", that even had it granted all the relief requested 
by Plaintiffs, the implementation of a pupil assignment plan 
within the jurisdiction of the School District of the City of 
Detroit would nonetheless retain racially identifiable schools.
App. I a 459, Vol. I B. If the District Court, with its broad 
equitable jurisdiction, is unable to overcome residential housing 
patterns within the City of Detroit to eliminate the condition of 
racial identifiability in its schools, then the same condition

-37-



of segregation would exist even if the Detroit Board had acted

exactly as the District Court would have had it act. How then 
can the Detroit Board be found to have proximately caused that 
condition, which even the District Court found itself powerless 
to remedy? The finding is really then not that the Detroit Board 
should have succeeded in eliminating racial identification in its 
schools, but that it should have done a better job of failings 
If failure to alleviate the conditions is inevitable even for the 
Court itself, as the Court has effectively found, then the parti­
cular quality of the Board's failure can hardly be said to have 
caused that condition. Absent that causation, Detroit cannot be 
held to a de jure segregated dual system.

It is unfortunate that this case has taken on an almost 
criminal context. Suburban defendants especially seem obsessed 
with the concept of guilt, operating on the principle that the 
provision to small children of their Constitutional rights is, 
of all things, a punishment to be visited upon the sinful and 
withheld from the righteous, regardless of the effect that appli­
cation may have on the rights of those children. The Detroit 
Board submits that this notion of guilt and punishment is danger­
ously irrelevant. The idea that a Court's duty to provide children 
their Constitutional rights is a punishment is a gross insult, both 
to the Constitution and to all the school children of metropolitan 
Detroit, both Black and White. What we are about is not a game of 
cops and robbers designed to punish a "bad" school district

-38-



for having committed some wrongful act regardless of its effect, 
while finding "not guilty" the "good" school district. The 
requirement of a finding of intent or purpose for d<3 jure segre­
gation is not grounded in a concept of mens rea, but rather in 
the notion that intentional conduct has a unique effect upon the 
Constitutional rights of the child. The requirement of proximate 
cause comes not from a need to fix blame, but frora a recognition 
that causation may vary the effect on Constituticnal rights of the 
complained of condition.

Thus, many Courts, indeed, all but perhaps the Fifth Circuit,
in Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District,__F .2d__
(5th Cir.,No. 71-2397, August 2, 1972), have adopted the distinc­
tion between de facto and intentional de jure segregation as a 
criterion for so deciding Constitutional rights without assessing 
guilt. The trial court followed neither the Fifth Circuit nor the 
majority rule, finding that it was some wrongful act which gave 
rise to remedy but without regard to its purpose or its lack of 
direct effect on the complained of condition. Such elasticizing 
of de jure concept serves only to enervate it. If this Court 
wishes to reverse Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 369 F.2d 
55 (6th Cir. 1966) cert, denied/ 369 U.S. 847 (1967) and Davis v. 
School District of the City of Pontiac, 4 4 3 F.2d 5 7 3 ,cert. denied , 
925 U.S. 233 (1971) and find that absent a finding of intent to 
run a dual system and absent a showing that school board action 
caused the segregation, rather than segregated housing patterns, 
a remedy is appropriate for serious racial imbalance then this

-39-



Court should follow the lead of the Fifth Circuit and do so 
forthrightly, without stretching the current concepts of the law 
into meaninglessness. If a system with acute racial imbalance 
neither intended nor caused by the local board is in the eyes of 
this Court Constitutionally acceptable, then it should reverse. 
Clarity of the law, ana devotion to the Constitutional rights of 
the school children of the Unted States allows no third result.

-40-



THE MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION, THE SUPREME COURT OF 
MICHIGAN, THE GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL Or MICHIGAN, MICHIGAN 'SUPERINTENDENT OF 
PUBLIC INSTRUCTION AND THE MICHIGAN STATE BOARD 
OF EDUCATION, HAVE ALL RECOGNIZED THE CARDINAL
PRINCIPLE OF MICHIGi SCHOOL LAW, N/iMELY ?H AT
THE MICHIGi PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM IS SOLELY A
STATE FUNCTION WITH THE LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
BEING MERELY INSTRUMENTALITIES OF THE STATE 
CREATED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE CONVENIENCE.

The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 governing the Territory 
of Michigan provided:

"Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary 
to good government and the happiness of mankind, 
schools and the means of education shall forever 
be encouraged."

With this genesis, Michigan's four Constitutions have 
clearly established that the public school system in this State 
is solely a State function. The Constitution of 1835 in 
Article X, Section 3, provided, in part: "The legislature shall
provide for a system of common schools..." The Constitution 
of 1850, Article XIII, Section 4, provided, in part: "The
legislature shall... provide for and establish a system of 
primary schools..." Section 1 of the same Article provided, 
"...the Superintendent of Public Instruction shall have general 
supervision of public instruction..."

The Constitution of 1908 in Article XI, Section 2, pro­
vided that the Superintendent of Public Instruction "shall have

41-



Articlgeneral supervision of public instruction in the State."
XI, Section 9, provided, in part as follows:

"The legislature shall continue a system of 
primary schools, whereby every school district 
in the State shall provide for the education of 
pupils without charge for tuition..."

The Constitution of 1963, the present Constitution of the 
State of Michigan, in Article VIII, Section 2, provides, in part 
as follows:

The legislature shall maintain and support a 
system of free public elementary and secondary 
schools as defined by law."

In interpreting the above educational provisions of the 
Constitution of 1850, the Michigan Supreme Court clearly stated, 
The school district is a State agency. Moreover, it is of 

legislative creation..." Attorney General v. Lowrey, 131 Mich. 
639 , 644, 92 N.V,T. 289 , 290 (1902). Again, interpreting the 

Constitution of 1850, the Supreme Court of Michigan in Attorney 
Genereil v. Detroit Board of Education , 15 4 Mi ch. 584, 590, 118 
N.W. 606, 609 (1908), adopted lower court language which read:

"Education in Michigan belongs to the State. It 
is no part of the local self-government inherent 
in the township or municipality, except so far 
as the legislature may choose to make it such. 
The Constitution has turned the whole subject 
over to the legislature..."

The Supreme Court of Michigan interpreted Article XI,



Section 9, of the Constitution of 1908 to mean:

"The legislature has entire control over the 
schools of the State subject only to the pro­
visions above referred to. The division of 
the territory of the State into districts, 
the conduct of the school, the qualifica­
tions of teachers, the subjects to be taught 
therein are all v/ithin its control." Child 
Welfare v. Kennedy School Dist., 220 Mich.
290 , 296, 189 N.W*. 1002 , 1004 (1922).

This principle that education is a State responsibility 
has become so ingrained in Michigan lav;, it is now clear that 
a local school district can exercise only the power given it by 
the State. See, e.g., Senghas v. L'Anse Creuse Public Schools, 
368 Mich. 557, 118 N.W.2d 975 (1968); McLaughlin v. Board of 
Education, 255 Mich. 667, 239 N.W. 374 (1931).

This concept has further been expanded in relationship 
to the Michigan Constitution of 1963. In a per curiam opinion, 
the Michigan Supreme Court interpreted Article VIII, Section 3, 
"Leadership and general supervision over all public education... 
is vested in a State board of education", to mean:

"It is the responsibility of the State board of 
education to supervise the system of free public 
schools set up by the legislature..." Welling 
v. Livonia Board of Education, 382 Mich. 620, 624,
TTTN . W. 2d~5T5~T3"4 6 (196 9) .

The concurring opinion spelled out the change from the 
Constitution of 1908 to the Constitution of 1963 as it described 
the transfer of authority over the school system from the

-43-

I



legislature to the State Board of Education:

"By the Constitution of 1963...the framers 
proposed and the people adopted a new policy 
for administration of the system. Now the 
State board of education... is armed and 
charged exclusively with the power and 
responsibility of administering the public 
school system which the legislature has set 
up and now maintains pursuant to Section 2 
of the Eighth Article. By Section 3 of the * 
same Article, the board has been directed - 
not by the legislature but by the people - 
to lead and superintend the system and be­
come , exclusively, the administrative policy­
maker thereof..." 382 Mich, at 625, 171 N.W. 
2d at 546-547.

The concurring opinion referred to the official comments 
of the Constitutional Convention, noting the following language.

"'The enlarged State board provides a policy­
making body on a State level.' (emphasis added) 
2 Constitutional Convention Official Record, 
1961, p 3396." 382 Mich, at 625, 171 N.W.2d
at 547.

Nor is a judicial finding that the State of Michigan is 
totally responsible for education in Michigan confined to the 
State courts. A federal district court, other than the instant 
court, made such a finding. Thus, the Honorable Noel Fox,
United States District Judge for the Western District of Michigan, 
specifically ordered the State of Michigan to take an active role 
in the desegregation case in Kalamazoo, Michigan and in doing 
so said, "The State of Michigan is represented by two entities, 
but the entity is an agent of the Stcite ... the Constitution says

-44-



i

something about your (the State's) responsibility." Oliver v.
Kalamazoo Board of Education, Civil No. K88-71 (W.D. Mich. 1972) ,

f ,Pre-trial- order and transcript.I -

Attorney General Frank J. Kelley, on July 7, 1970, in ai
letter to the Acting Superintendent of Public Instruction made 

this cogent observation: .

"It is clear that the State Board of Education, 
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3, has Consti­
tutionally conferred rule-making power. Welling, 
supra. In addition, the legislature has conferred 
rule-making power on the State Board of Education."
Op. Atty. Gen. No. 4705, 1969-1970 Report of the 
Attorney General 156, 157.

Following the holding of Welling v. Livonia Board of 
Education, supra, that there was no minimum length of day re­
quired under the 180-day school attendance rule absent a State 
Board of Education regulation, the Michigan State Board of .

[ Education, acting under its Constitutional mandate without
legislative authority, established an administrative rule re­
quiring local school boards to provide a minimum number of hours 
per school year. See, School Districts Child Account for Distribution 
of State Aid, Bulletin No. 1005, Michigan State Department of 

[ Education (1970).

Defendant Governor William G. Milliken has recognized his 
position vis-a-vis public education, as the State's Chief 
Executive. As one of four governors in an amic-i brief filed in 
the Supreme Court of the United States, No. 71-1332, San Antonio

L  ~45~
6



Independent School District v. Rodriquez, the Governor said, at
Page II:

"As Governors and Chief 
their respective States, 
for upholding and carryi 
the Constitutions and la 
States, including the pr 
the establishment of pub 
districts and commanding 
States to attend school, 
for financial decisions 
operations, including th 
and financing of the pub

executive officers of 
Amici are responsible 

ng out the commands of 
v:s of their various 
'.'visions thereof requiring 
lie schools and school 
the children of their 
Amici are responsible 

affecting all State 
ose pertaining to support 
lie schools..."

The Governors' amici brief, speaking of the State of 
Texas, could as well be describing the State of Michigan, when 
it used these words:

"It is also undisputed that the local school 
districts and their boundaries, and hence the 
aggregate value of the property they contain, 
are entirely the creation of and their mainten­
ance is the responsibility of the State of 
Texas. Furthermore, the detailed regulation of 
public education financing in Texas *** is a 
State, not a local responsibility. Indeed, the 
school districts have the power to raise funds 
for education only as a result of delegation by 
the State of its own power to tax for the general 
welfare." (Page 8 of brief)

Thus, four of the present State Defendants - the Attorney 
General, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, the State 
Board of Education and the Governor - have admitted directly or 
by their actions that the State is supreme in matters of 
education. Examples of the pervasiveness of State control over 
public education in Michigan are legion:

-46-



1. Public Act 289 of 1964 (MSA §15.2299 (1) ct seq.,
MCLA §388.681 et scq.) required Michigan school districts to 
operate K-12 systems. When Public Act 289 became effective,
1,438 public school districts existed in Michigan. By the be­
ginning of 1968, this figure had been reduced to 738, meaning 
that 700 school districts in Michigan have disappeared since 1964 
through reorganization. Annual Report, Committee on School 
District Reorganization, 1968 Journal of the Senate 422-423 
(March 1, 1968).

2. Pursuant to Act 289 of 1964 , supra, the State Board 
of Education ordered the merger of the Brownstown No. 10, Hand, 
Maple Grove and Carson school districts, all in Wayne County.
The action is best explained by the fact that Brownstown was,
at that time, the wealthiest school district in the State, indeed, 
with a property valuation of $340,000 backing each child, perhaps 
the wealthiest district in the nation, while the other three 
districts were extremely poor. Detroit Free Press, Aug. 2, 1965. 
(See Brief, Appendix A).

3. When the Sumpter School District was on the verge
of bankruptcy in 1968, the State Board of Education, acting under 
Public Act 239 of 1967 (MSA §15.2299(51) et seq., MCLA §388.691 
et seq.), merged the district with four adjoining districts, 
including the Airport School District. Significantly, though 
Sumpter was in Wayne County, Airport was in Monroe County,



showing that county lines are not inviolate in Michigan. Be­
cause of resentment against the forced merger, residents of the 
Airport district refused to approve a bond issue. The voters' 
reaction was explained as follows:

- "What's the use, if the State can tell you what
to do like they did this time, why shouldn't 
the State foot the bill?" Detroit Free Press,
October 7, 19i8. (See Brief, Appendix B) .

4. The Nankin Mills School District in Wayne County was 
beset with financial problems and had no high school. Again, 
pursuant to Act 239, the State Board of Education in 1969 
ordered this school district to merge with the Livonia, Garden 
City and Wayne Community schools. The Detroit News, May 15,
1969. (See Brief, Appendix C).

5. When the Inkster School District in Wayne County was 
on the verge of financial bankruptcy, the Michigan legislature 
passed Public Act 32 of 1968 (MSA §15.1916 et sea., MCLA §388.201 
et seq.) enabling the district to borrow $705,000 but on the con­
dition that if the district could not balance its budget, the 
State Board of Education could reorganize, merge or annex the 
district. The legislative history of Act 32 indicates at least 
two legislators voted against the bill in the House of 
Representatives because of the excessive control given to the 
State Board of Education:

-48-

(



"I voted No on House Bill No. 3332 because in 
setting up the machinery to bail out distressed 
districts, it takes from the local communities 
the control over their own educational system 
by providing for excessive arbitrary reorgani­
zation powers in the hands of the Board of 
Education "...

. "This bill certainly sets up the State Board
' of Education to be a dictator of all school

districts that run into financial problems." .
1968 Journal of the House of Representatives
1965.

6. The current legislature has passed H.B. 5840 provi­
ding financial relief for insolvent school districts, including, 
as in the Inkster legislation, procedures for reorganization
of the districts. (See Brief, Appendix D).

7. Too small and too poor to operate a high school, the 
all-Black Carver School District in suburban Oakland County 
reached a crisis in 1960 when surrounding White districts re­
fused to accept Carver pupils on a tuition basis. The Governor 
and Superintendent of Public Instruction engineered the v.’here- 
withal to merge the Carver district with Oak Pari. Detroit Free 
Press, Nov. 11, 1960. (See Brief, Appendix E).

8. The State Board of Education and Superintendent of 
Public Instruction may withhold State aid for failure to operate 
the minimum school year. MSA §15.3575, MCLA §340.575. In 1970, 
funds were withheld from the.City of Grand Rapids School District. 
17 Michigan School Board Journal 3 (March, 1970). For Attorney 
General Opinions holding that State aid may be withheld by the

-49-



State Board of Education from school districts for hiring un­
certified teachers, defaulting on State loans and for other 
reasons, see Op. Atty. Gen. No. 880, 1949-1950 Report of the 
Attorney General 104 (January 24, 1949, Roth); No. 2333, 1955 
Report of the Attorney General 561 (October 20, 1955, Kavanaugh); 
No. 4097, 1961-1962 Report of the Attorney General 553 (October 
8, 1962, Kelley).

9. The State of Michigan contributes, on the average,
34% of the operating budgets of the 54 school districts 
included in the Metropolitan Plan of Integration. In eleven 
of the 54 districts, the State's contribution exceeds 50% and in 
eight more, it exceeds 40%. (See State Aid Chart, Brief,
Appendix F)• State aid is appropriated from the General Fund, 
revenue raised through state-wide taxation, and is distributed 
annually to the local school districts under a formula devised 
by the legislature. See, e.g., Public Act 134 (1971), MSA 
%15.1919 (51) , MCLA §388.611.

Though the local, school districts obtain funds from 
the assessment of local property, the ultimate authority in 
insuring equalized property valuations throughout the State 
is the State Tax Commission. MSA §7.631, et seq., MCLA §209.101, 
et seq.; MSA §7.206, MCLA §211.148; MSA §7.52, MCLA §211.34.
The State's duty to equalize is required by the Michigan 
Constitution, Article IX, Section 3. This "State equalized



valuation 
yields. 
Districts 
Michigan

" serves as the basis for calculating local revenue 

See, Ranking of Michigan Public High School - School 
by Selected Financial Data, 1970, Bulletin 1012, 
State Department of Education (1971).

10. Perusal of the Michigan School Code reaffirms the 
ultimate control of the State over public education. Local 
school districts must observe all State laws relating to 

schools,

Av ri/ y \ i v *hold school a minimum number of days per year, ^
3/ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ------- ----- .

employ only certified teachers, teach civics, health and physical
1/education and drivers' education, excuse students to attend

vreligious instruction classes, observe State reauirements
6/

when teaching sex education, make annual financial and other
7/

reports to the Superintendent of Public Instruction, adopt
only textbooks which are listed with the Superintendent of

£/Public Instruction and must follow’ all rules and regulations 
of the State Department of Education.

1/ MSA §15. 3252(c) , MCLA §340.252(c).
2/ MSA §15. 3575, MCLA §340.575.
3/ MSA §§15 .1023 (10) (a) / 15.3570, MCLA §§388. 1010 (a) , 340.570
1/ MSA §§15 .1951, 15. 3361 , MCLA §§388.3 71 , 34,0.361; MSA §§15.

3781-15. 3782, MICLA §§340.781-340.782 / MSA §9 .2511 (c) , MCLA
§257 . 811 (c)

5/ MSA §15. 3732(g) , M.CL A §340.732(g).
6/ MSA §15. 3789, KICLA §340.789.
7/ MSA §15. 3612, KICLA §34 0.612; MSA §§1 5. 361C 15.36 88 , MCLA

§§34 0.616, 340. 688 •
8/ MSA §15. 3887 (1) , MCLA §340.887 (1) .

-51-



Local school districts, unless they have the approval
of the State Board of Education or the Superintendent of
Public Instruction cannot consolidate v/ith another school 

9/ 10/
district, annex territory, divide or attach parts of other 

11/ 12/ 
districts, borrow monies in anticipation of State aid,
construct, reconstruct or remodel school buildings or additions 

13/
to them, establish a program for the prevention and treat-

ii/ment of behavior problems of children, employ a superinten­
dent without a bachelor's degree from a college acceptable

15/to the State Board of Education, establish facilities and
programs for the day care of the physically handicapped or

1_6./initiate programs for the mentally handicapped.

11. The Detroit Board of Education, of its own knowledge, 
is fully aware of State control with regard to its financial 
crisis. Having received the State's permission to borrow money 
in 1971-72, permission for further borrowing was denied for

9/ MSA §15.3402, MCLA §340.402.
10/ MSA §15.3431, MCLA §340.431.
11/ MSA §15.3447, MCLA §340.447.
12/ MSA §15.3567(1), MCLA §340.567(a).
13/ MSA §15.1961, MCLA §388.851, Op. Atty. Gen. No. 1837, 

1952-1954 Report of the Attorney General 440 (Nov. 8 
1954) .

14/ MSA §15.3618, MCLA §340.616.
15/ MSA §15.3573, MCLA §340.573.
16/ MSA §15.3587(1), MCLA §340.587(a); MSA §15.3775, MCLA 

§340.775.

-52-

C



1972-73. The Detroit Eoard then determined it did not have
sufficient revenues to operate for 180 days as required by 
law. Faced with the prospect of either violating the 180- 
day requirement (MSA §15.3575, MCLA §340.575; Op. A.tty. Gen.
No. 4714 [Dec. 1, 1970]) or violating the prohibition against 
operating with a deficit budget (MSA §15.3197, MCLA'§340.197), 
inquiry was made of the State agencies, including the Super- 
intendet of Public Instruction'and a representative of the 
Governor's office for an answer to the dilemma. The State 
informed the Detroit Board that the filing of a balance budget 
Was preferred. The situation has been resolved by the District 
Court in this case, ordering the Detroit Board to maintain a 
180-day school year. Any suggestion that the Detroit Board of 
Education, an entity so sharply restricted in its powers, is 
in some way sovereign and apart from the State is obviously 
unsupportable.

12. Any doubt as to the pervasiveness of State control 
over education in Michigan has been resolved by the intro­
duction of Senate Joint Resolution "Z" in the legislature 
this year. Already passed by the Senate, the purpose of SJR 
"Z" is to amend Article VIII, Section 3, of the Michigan 
Constitution to divest the State Board of Education of its 
leadership and supervision over education in this State.
Perhaps the resolution is called "Z" after the famous movie

-53-



of the same name because it indicates at least some legislators 
feel that the State Board of Education is dictatorial over public 
education in Michigan. We suggest that this is the fact.

Based upon the Constitutional history, decisions of the 
Michigan Supreme Court, a finding by another Federal District 
Court in Michigan, opinions of the Attorney General of the State 
of Michigan, actions of the Superintendent of Public Instruction 
and the State Board of Education, itself, and numerous State 
statutes and actions taken pursuant thereto, there is no question 
that local school districts are mere agents or instrumentalities 
of the State. Action of a local district is action of the State. ̂  1

1 If there be any doubt as to the pervasiveness of State control 
over Michigan Education, we call the Court's attention to an 
article in the August 10, 19 72 issue of the Grosse Pointe Nev.’s, 
page 1, (See Brief, App. G) where Attorney General Frank Kelley, 
a Defendant herein, as Chairman of the Municipal Finance Commission 
had given permission to the Grosse Pointe School to borrow money 
for operation purposes. Incidentally, the other two members of 
the Municipal Finance Commission are also Defendants herein. State 
Superintendent of Public Instruction, John W. Porter and State 
Treasurer, Allison Green. If the State di.d not control Education 
in Michigan, then why did the Grosse Pointe Schools have to get 
State permission to borrow funds? We have brought this information 
to the Court's attention via a foot note because of its recent 
origin.

- 54-



IV. ■

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN- ORDERING THE IMETROPOLITAN REMEDY FOR THE

OFDESEGREGATION OF THE DETROIT SCHOOLS BECAUSE
THE STATE'S SOLE RESPONSIBILITY FOR EDUCATION IN
MICHIGAN, THE STIDP-BY-STEP PROCESS LEADING TO
METROPOLITAN!ZATION DEVELOPED BY THE COURTS, AND
GENEEAL P RINCIPLIIS OF EQUITY FIRST ANNOUNCED BY
THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN II, EACH OF WHICH SUP-
POHTS SUCH A REMEDY." . '..........

It is the position of the Defendant Detroit Board that 
the orders of the District Court may not be affirmed based on a 
traditional de jure segregation finding against the Detroit Board. 
Reduced to its essence, the finding does not exist and has not 
been made. There then remain two bases on which the Court can 
grant metropolitan relief if it believes it is necessary to do 
so. First, this Court may affirm the findings of the District 
Court with regard to traditional dc j ure segregation as those 
findings were made to both State and city Defendants. Action 
of the City, which is an agent of the State, is action of the 
State and action of the State is exactly that. In either event, 
it is clear that the desegregation of Detroit schools cannot be 
accomplished within the city limits of Detroit which are co­
terminous with the Detroit school district. The State, having 
the sole responsibility for education in Michigan, has the power 
and authority to involve the metropolitan Detroit community in 
desegregating the Detroit school system.

Secondly, were the Court to adopt the Ci sneros doctrine,

“55-



discuss*,] above, there certainly would be no reason to limit 
the op* tat ion of relief to the City of Detroit in the face of 
the clc'viv findings of the District Court that such relief could 
not be effective. As the Cisneros doctrine does away with the 
distinct;on between de jure and de facto segregation, the ob­
jection interposed by suburban Defendants that they have not 
themselves been found to have committed acts of de jure 
segregation loses whatever alleged vitality it might have had.

However, if for whatever reason this Court should uphold 
the Detroit Court's findings as the basis for a remedy, then 
this Court has no choice but to affirm the District Court's 
ruling as to the necessity of a metropolitan remedy. This 
proposition follows because of the following cogent and legally 
unassailable arguments. .

I

This Court on July 24, 1972, specifically ordered a 
briefing of the legal status of local school districts vis-a-vis 
the State of Michigan. The result is astoundingly clear: 
education in Michigan is solely a fun-' cion of the State. Local 
school di' 1 riots are. mere creatures of the State acting as agents 
or instrumentalities of the State under pervasive State control. 
If State action has violated the Plaintiff's Constitutional right 
es the District Court has found, then the State must provide the 
remedy. in doing so, the State cannot hide behind the school

-56



boundaries of the 54 school districts or State instrumentalities
included in the Metropolitan Desegregation Plan to avoid a remedy 
on the absurd theory that 53 of these districts did not partici­
pate in violating Plaintiffs' Constitutional rights. But 
for the administrative convenience of the State, these metropol­
itan area districts would not exist. As a proof of this fact, . 
since 1964, the State has eliminated 700 school districts because 
they were no longer administratively convenient. See Annual 
Report, Committee on School District Reorganization, 1968 Journal 
of the Senate 422-423 (March 1, 1968). Furthermore, as the Supreme 
Court said in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 , 16-17 (1958) , local 
school officials are agents of the State for Fourteenth Amendment 
purposes. In summary, the unconstitutional actions of the State 
affect all its instrumentalities; if the State must supply a 
remedy, then its instrumentalities in the metropolitan area must 
all be affected.

If the Court should find that only the Detroit Board 
violated the Plaintiffs' Constitutional rights and the State was 
allegedly blameless, the same result must necessarily follow.
The Detroit Board is an instrumentality of the State. In Detroit, 
the State acts through the Detroit Board. If a remedy must be 
afforded, it must be that of the State.

When the District Court, having heard over 58 days of 
testimony, including five days on a Detroit-only remedy, ruled

-57-



in favor of a metropolitan remedy, it was simply responding to 
the Supreme Court directive to "make every effort to achieve the 
greatest possible degree of actual desegregation". Davis_^,
Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33, 37 
(1971). In doing so, the District Court merely followed the 
obvious stepping-stones to school metropolitanization now ,
emerging in the law. As this Defendant Detroit Board noted in 
its response to a request for emergency stay, no party to this 
date has quarreled with the fundamental remedial finding of the 
District Court, namely that relief for the condition of Sv,g 

regation in the City of Detroit is impossible.

The legal path to the metropolitanization of school 

districts was first cleared by the United States Supreme Court 
in the so-called voting rights cases. These decisions established 
that Constitutional requirements supercede the importance of main­

taining State created legislative districts. hgYB£---as.-Hr.—
377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gomillion v. lA^MSoot, 364 U.S. 33y vxy6u).

The concept of ignoring political division lines for 
purposes of guaranteeing Constitutional rights has been extended 
to school districts. Where a city attempted to remove its 
schools from a county system when the latter was ordered to 
establish a unitary school system, the Fifth Circuit refused to 
permit the secession because it would have had a substantial ad­
verse effect on desegregation. ^e_y^la^ii_Cou)Lt_y_Board_of

-58-



Education, 448 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1971). The Court observed:

"[Sjchool district lines within a State are 
matters of political convenience." 448 F.2d at 752.

A District Court refused to permit the creation of two school 
districts where one could operate as easily as two, and the 
action was obviously designed to foster racial segregation. 
Turner v. Warren County Board of Education, 313 F. Supp. 380 
(E.D. N.C. 1970). See also, Hall v. St. Helena Parish School 
Board, 197 F. Supp. 649, 658 (E.D. La. 1961) aff*d. 287 F.2d 
376 (5th Cir. 196'’ ), aff1 d. per curiam, 368 U.S. 515 (1962); 
Burleson v. County Board of Election Commissi ■: ners of Jefferson 
County, 30 8 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Ark. 1970) , af f1d. pgr curi am,
432 F.2d 1356 (8th Cir. 1970).

The principle that school district lines may not be 
used for purposes of violating fundamental Constitutional rights 
has recently been recognized by the United States Supreme Court. 
School distiricts are not permitted to withdraw from county-wide 
systems where the effect of such a separation would impede the 
process of dismantling a segregated school system. Wright v. 
Council of City of Empori a, 40 USLW 4806 (June 20 , 1972) ; Uni ted 
States v. Scotland.Heck Citv Board of Education, 40 USLW 4817 
(June 20, 1972).

Refusal to permit the separation of school districts 
where such action would foster segregation has its counterpart 
in court-ordered merger of districts. In Haney v. County Board

-59-



theEducation of Sevier County, 410 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969),
Court ordered the merger of a White and a Black school district 
even though they had been maintained as separate units for 14 
years. The Court declared:

"[S]tate political subdivisions have long 
. ago lost their mastery over the more desired 

effects of protecting the equal rights of all 
citizens." 410 F.2d at 924.

The Court viewed merger of the two districts in Sevier County 
as the only possible means of effectively desegregating the 
schools. In Texas the annexation and consolidation of all­
Black school districts with nearby biracial units was ordered 
as a means of achieving meaningful desegregation. United States 
v. State of Texas, 447 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971). With regard 
to changes in school district boundaries, the Court specifically 
directed:

"Defendants shall not permit, make arrangements 
for, approve, acquiesce in, or give support of 
any kind to changes in school district boundary 
lines - whether by detachment, annexation, or 
consolidation of districts in whole or in part - 
which are designed to, or do in fact, create, 
maintain, reinforce, renew, or encourage a 
dual system based on race, color, or national 
origin." 447 F.2d at 443-444.

In short, the State has an affirmative duty to enforce Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.

The penultimate stepping-stone toward school metropoli- 
tanization, and perhaps also the first completed litigation

-60-



involving consolidation of a northern school system, is illustrated 
by Jenkins v. Tov/nship of Morris School District, 58 N .J. 483,
279 A.2d 619 (1971). Morristown contained most of the Blacks in 
the region, and the surrounding Morris Township was a White 
suburban area. The two areas operated separate elementary schools, 
but the Township had sent its students to the Morristown High 
School since 1865. The Township planned to withdraw its students 
from the high school and Plaintiffs sought to have the Commission­
er of Education take steps to prevent the withdrawal and to 
effectuate a merger of the Morris Township and Morristown school 
systems. The Commissioner dismissed the petition for lack of 
legal authority to take the requested action. The Supreme Court 
of New Jersey unanimously held that to avoid racial imbalance 
in the schools, which is unconstitutional under the New Jersey 
Constitution, the Commissioner had the authority not only to 
prevent the withdrawal of the Township from the City, but also 
to effect a merger of the two systems and to cross district 
lines to do so.

The Supreme Court further paved the way toward 
metropolitanization in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
EduCeltion, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) , where the neighborhood school concept 
was abandoned and busing was explicitly recognized as a permiss­
ible tool for desegregating schools. At least two Federal 
District Courts and one Circuit Court of Appeals have hinted that 
metropolitan desegregation plans may be a legal necessity to 
effectively desegregate schools in large cities.

-61



In Calhoun v. Cook, 332 F.Supp. 804 (N.D. Ga. 1971) ,
vacated in part 451 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1971), the District 
Court recommended a "sweeping examination" v/ith regard to the 
question of consolidating the Atlanta City school system v/ith 
the Fulton County system as a means of producing long-range 
improvement in school desegregation. The Court noted that a 
metropolitan community vehicle might be the proper solution. •
See, 332 F.Supp. at 809-810. Although the Fifth Circuit 
vacated part of the lower court decision, the Court of Appeals 
ordered consideration of the District Court's recommendation.
451 F.2d at 583. See also, United States v. Board of School 
Commissioners of City of Indianapolis, 332 F.Supp. 655, 679 
(S.D. Ind. 1971).

Obviously, the final stepping-stone to metropolitan!zation 
has been the District Court opinions in Bradley v. School Board.
of City of Richmond, 338 F.Supp.____(E.D. Va. 1972) and the
instant case of Bradley v. Hllliken, 338 F.Supp. 582 (E.D.
Mich. 1971). In the Richmond case, the District Court char­
acterized the central issue as follows:

"The Court concludes, in the context here ■
presented, that the duty to take whatever 
steps are necessary to achieve the great­
est possible degree of desegregation in 
formerly dual systems by the elimination 
of racially identifiable schools is not

-62-

ff



L

[

[

[

i

f

!,

[

[

[

!

I

[

[

[

l

r

circumscribed by school division boundaries 
created and maintained by the cooperative 
efforts of local and central State officials." 
338 F.Supp. 79-80, citing Green v. County 
School Board of New Kent County , 3 81 U. S .
430; Davis v. Board of School Commissioners 
of Mobi 1 e Connty , 4 02 U.S. 33; Swann v. 
Charlotte-Meeklenburg Board of Education,
402 U.S. I.

We invite this Court's attention to the close 
similarity of the Michigan case where Judge Roth concluded:

"That a State's form of government may 
delegate the power of daily adminis­
tration of public schools to officials 
with less than State-wide jurisdiction 
does not dispel the obligation of those 
who have broader control to use the 
authority they have consistently with 
the Constitution. In such instances 
the Constitutional obligation toward 
the individual school children is a 
shared one." 338 F.Supp. at 593.

We recognize that the District Court in Bradio 
Ri chraond was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the 
Circuit. However, the Fourth Circuit reversal of the 
case imposes no obstacle to a metropolitan remedy for 
First, the Fourth Circuit erred in its application of 
case. It is true that racial balance is not required

y v.
Fourth 
Richmond 
Detroit. 
the Swann 
to

t -63-

C



effectuate a unitary school system. Nonetheless, Swann makes 
it clear that when past Constitutional violations have been 
found, racial ratios are likely to be useful starting points 
in shaping a remedy, 402 U.S. 1, 23-25 (1971). The District 
Court in Richmond did not employ the racial balance concept 
as a means of finding a violation of Fourteenth Amendment rights; 
it was instead concerned with developing a remedy to eliminate 
the previously determined violation. Although the majority 
correctly quoted Swann in stating that once the affirmative 
duty to desegregate has been accomplished, year-by-year adjust­
ments of the racial composition of student bodies it not required 
(Bradley v. Richmond, Civil No. 72-1058 [4th Cir. June 5, 1972] 
at 29) , in the case at bar, we are concerned with initiating a 
remedy. Therefore, racial ratios are valid starting points in 
formulating an appropriate remedy for Detroit.

Secondly, the impact of the Fourth Circuit Richmond 
decision may be limited in light of major differences in Virginia 
and Michigan school law. According to the Fourth Circuit opinion:

"The power to operate, maintain and supervise public 
schools in Virginia is, and has always been, within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the local school boards 
and not within the jurisdiction of the State Board of 
Education. Indeed, the operation of public schools 
has been a matter of local option. Section 133 of 
the 1902 Constitution of Virginia provided that the 
supervision of the schools in each county or city shall 
be vested in a school board." Bradley v. Richmond,
Civil No. 72-1058 (4th Cir., June 5, 1972) 2l. (Citations 
omitted).

-64-

t



In contrast, the public school system is constitutionally 
compelled in Michigan, and as we have previously demonstrated, 
theme is pervasive State control over local school districts.
Mich. Const., 1963, Article VIII, §§2,3. While the propriety 
of court-ordered metropolitanization may be questioned where 
a pattern of local independent control of schools prevails, 
where State control overwhelmingly predominates, a metropolitan 
remedy is most appropriate.

Thirdly, the Fourth Circuit is not the best weathervane /  
in determining the course of school desegregation law. Judge 
Craven authored the majority opinions in Scotland Neck, Emporia 
and Bradley v. Richmond, with dissenting opinions by Judge Winter 
in each, two of which have been reversed by the Supreme Court 
of the United States of America, adopting, interestingly enough, 
the rationale of dissenting opinions of Judge Winter.

We note that suburban Defendants have attempted to rely 
on the case of Spencer v, Kugler, 326 F. Supp. 1235 (D. N.J.
1971) , aff1d. , 40 USLW 3329 (Jan. 17 , 1972) , inserting their 
unique proposition that there can be a finding that racially 
identifiable schools violate constitutional rights, but that 
the remedy for that violation may and must be the continuation of 
racially identifiable schools. The suburban Defendants here 
confuse matters dealing with remedy and the determination that 
the right to such a remedy exits. Spencer v , Kugler

- 65-



simply held that a statute of the State of New Jersey making 
school district boundary lines co-terminous with the boundary 
lines of municipalities in the State was not unconstitutional.
The case .did not involve an effective allegation that the act 
of enacting the statute was segregation by State action, rather 
it contemplated an assertion that the act involved a suspect 
classification based on race. On those assertions the lower 
Court found, and the Supreme Court affirmed, that the classifi­
cation was neutral and had a reasonable basis. Not only does 
the case have no implication to the appropriateness of school 
desegregation remedies, it did not even attempt to establish 
a right to a desegregation remedy! Furthermore, the facts here 
are entirely different. Spencer involved the entire State1, of 
New Jersey, devoid, obviously, or any allegation that the State 
comprised a single school community. Had the District Court 
here held that, for instance, cities like Alpena, Traverse City, 
Marquette, and Iron Mountain must have the same racial compo­
sition of their schools as the relevant metropolitan Detroit 
school community, Spencer might be applicable. However, to 
a finding limited to a school community, it is not.

It should be further noted that the facts relied on in 
Spencer are entirely different. As already pointed out in detail 
above, Michigan school districts are agencies of the State, 
entirely separate from municipal government. Their bound­
ary lines, which arc subject to administrative change

-6G-



without vote of the people, bear no relationship whatsoever 
to any other municipal corporation lines, except by coincidence. 
Furthermore, we suggest quite strongly that if Spencer v. Kugler, 
supra, were tried in the State courts of New Jersey, the result 
could very well have been different for, as already pointed out, 
in 1971, the year that Kugler was first decided, the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey ‘held that racial imbalance is unconstitutional 
under the State's Constitution. Jenkins v. Township of Morris 
School District, 58 N.J. 483, 279 A. 2d. 619 (1971). * 11

We come back to the initial proposition. The State of 
Michigan controls all education in Michigan. The Detroit Board 
of Education is its instrumentality. If either or both have 
violated the Constitutional rights of the Plaintiffs, then the 
remedy can extend to the other 53 school districts in the rnetro- 
politcin Detroit area, because they too are mere instrumentalities 
of the State and it is the State which must act to remedy the 
si tuation.

11

As an alternative, we cannot ignore the equity teachings 
of Brown II, which are equally as important today as they were 
in 1955 when the Supreme Court said:

"In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the
courts will be guided by equitable principles.



Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a 
practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by 
a facility for adjusting and reconciling public 
and private needs. These cases call for the 
exercise of these traditional attributes of 
equity power. At stake is the personal interest 
of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools 
as soon as practicable on a non-discriminatory 
basis. To effectuate this interest may call for 
elimination of a variety of obstacles in making 
the transition to school systems operated in 
accordance with the Constitutional principles set 
forth in our May 17, 1954, decision. Courts of 
equity may properly take into account the public 
interest in the elimination of such obstacles in 
a systematic and effective manner. But it should 
go without saying that the vitality of these 
Constitutional principles cannot be allowed to 
yield simply because of disagreement with them."

"(T]he courts may consider problems relating to 
administration, arising from the physical condition 
of the school plant, the school transportation 
systems, personnel, revision of school districts 
and attendance areas into compact units to achieve 
a system of determining admission to the public 
schools on a non-racial basis, and revision of 
local laws and regulations which may be necessary 
in solving the foregoing problems." 349 U.S. 294, 
299-300.

This posture was reiterated in Swann, which quoted the above 
language verbatim, 402 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1971). The Swann decision

further emphasized:

"Once a right and a violation have been shewn, 
the scope of a district court's equitable 
powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for 
breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable 
remedies." 402 U.S. at 15.

There is absolutely no reason why the power of a court of equity

-60-



should not be extended to metropolitan school desegregation
plans. Under principles of equity, the remedy must be eval­
uated by assessing its capacity to achieve the ultimate objective, 
the establishment of a unitary school system.

In short, if Constitutional rights have been violated - 
a point which the Detroit Board of Education emphatically dis­
putes - then from a legal standpoint, there is no basis for 
preventing the District Court from ordering a metropolitan 
remedy either under the State control theory or the equitable 
theory.

-G9-

C



V.

AS A FACTUAL MATTER, THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT
IN ORDERING A METROPOLITAN REMEDY BECAUSE FAILURE TO
DO OTHERWISE WOULD CONTINUE UNCONSTITUTIONAL RACIAL

TEE' DETROIT SCHOOLS AND CAUSE FURTHER DETROIT 
.AT I ON ,

ISOLATION IN
SCHOOL 
NUMERO 
ON -A METROPOLITAN

SEGR;
NS OTHER.

PARTICULARLY IN A SITUATION NHERI
GOVERNMENTAL SERVICES HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED

SCOPE AND THE COMMUNITY IS METROPOLITAN
IN CHARACTER.

If there has been a violation of Plaintiffs' Constitutional
Rights, it is well established by the Supreme Court of the United
States of America that the State is obliged to come forward with a
plan for the achievement of a unitary school system that "promises
realistically to work and promises realistically to work now." Green
v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Swann
v. Charlotte-Meeklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Davis
v. Board of School Comm? ssioners of Mobile County, 4 02 U.S. 73 (19 71).
It is also well established that a desegregation plan must wipe out
segregation "root and branch." Green v. County School Board of New
Kent. County , supra, .

With this admonition obviously in mind, on. March 24, 1972,
the District Court had concluded:

"...that it is proper for the Court to consider a metro­
politan plan directed toward the desegregation of the 
Detroit Public Schools as an alternate to the present .
intra-city desegregation plan before it,and,in the event 
that the Court finds such intra-city plans inadequate to 
desegregate such schools,the Court is of the opinion that 
it is required to consider a metropolitan remedy for dese­
gregation. " Ruling on Proprietv of Con&idorinq a Metropo- 
3. i t a n Rome d y_ _t o Acc omp 1 is h Dos e grog a iron of the Public 
Schools of City of Detroit, March 24 , 197 2 , page 4 . i
On March 28, 1972, the District Court, after hearings on

the Detroit-only plans, found that none of the three plans proposed

1 App. Ia442, Vo1. 3b.

-70-



•  •

"would result in the desegregation of the public schools of the 
Detroit School District." The Court also made this conclusion of lav;

"The conclusion, under the evidence in this 
case, is inescapable that relief of segregation 
in -the public schools of the City of Detroit 
cannot be accomp]ished within the corporate 
geographical limits of the city. The State, 
however, cannot escape its Constitutional duty 
to desegregate the public schools of the City 
of Detroit by pleading local authority...." 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav; on 
Detroit-Only PI ans of Dese g rogation'7~MaFch“ 2 8, 
19 72, page 5 [App. Ia459, Vol." IB]).

How correct the Court was 1 On June 14 , 1972, the 
District Court found that:

"75. Some educational services are already 
provided to students on an interdistrict, 
county, intercountry, or metropolitan basis; 
and many support services are provided by the 
intermediate school districts and the State 
Department of Education. For various reasons 
many pupils already cross school district lines 
to attend school or receive education services.
"76. In many respects - patterns of economic 
life, work, play, population, planning, trans­
portation, health services - the tri-county 
area constitutes a rough series of interrelated 
communities constituting, in the view of the 
Unitea States Census Bureau, a single standard 
metropolitan statistical area.

"77. Local units of government in the metropo­
litan area have in many instances joined together 
for the purpose of providing better solutions 
to problems confronting them. In such instances, 
various units of government have either disre­
garded local boundaries or have concluded that 
the problems were such as to call for a metropo­
litan solution. In some cases, they have created
overlay organizations. SEMCOG, recreational 
authorities, a metropolitan sewage system, SEMI
and the Detroit Water System 
these metropolitan approaches

are examples of 
. (App. la 517-518

fAr

Vo1. IB).

-71-



The simple fact is that the only relevant community 
is much larger than the City of Detroit. Whether the index is 
subjective perceptions or objective indicia, the community that 
is centered in Detroit includes at least parts of Wayne, Oakland 
and Macomb Counties, which comprise the desegregation area. The 
objective data alone should be conclusive. The tri-county area 
has been labeled by the Bureau of the Census as a Standard Metro­
politan Statistical Area largely on the basis of the high degree 
of interaction among the populace of the three counties. The 
State of Michigan has recognized the interdependence of the citizens 
of the whole area in establishing the Metropolitan Detroit Water 
System, the Southeastern Michigan Transportation Authority (SEMTA) 
and the Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Valley Authority. The local 
governments have recognized their inter-dependence in creating 

. the Southeastern Michigan Council of Governments (SEMCOG). The 
various highway planners have recognized it in developing the 
network of interstate highways that lead into Detroit from all 
directions. The school authorities of the State have recognized it, 
at least in part, by creating Intermediate School Districts in each 
county. (Tr. 200-212, March 15, 1972). (App. Va89-97, Vol. V).

Subjective perceptions coincide with the objective 
data, as one would expect with so gross a phenomenon. Local resi­
dents cross political lines casually in shopping, commuting to 
work, seeking recreation and seeking private or collegiate educations. 
Dr. Robert Green, an expert witness, gave perhaps uncontroverted 
testimony to that perception when he referred to the stream of

-72-

e



f

whites driving down the freeway from Southfield to Detroit in the 
morning rush and when he described how Detroit-educated whites have 
fled to Oak Park, Livonia and Bloomfield 'Hills. (Tr. 965-66 April 
28, 1971) • Just as black children in a 90% black school still per­
ceive their school as identifiably black even though all children 
in the attendance zone go to the same school (Dr. Green, Tr. 1023-25 
April 28, 1971), children in a 60% - 80% blfick Detroit school will 
continue to perceive their school as identifiably black even though 
it is no different than any other school in Detroit— precisely 
because they know there are suburbs full of white youngsters receiv­
ing educations in all-white schools. It would be a most unusual 
third grader of any race who could stand on Tireman Street, a boundary 
line between Dearborn and Detroit, and explain that a political 
boundary rather than a race was the reason the white children 
south of Tireman attended a white school and the black children 
north of Tireman attended a black school. Ilis perception of the 
metropolitan community is conditioned by the communication media to 
which he is exposed and his perception of the metropolitan community 
of which he is a. part . (Tr. 458-9 March 17, 1972) 3 There i.s no record 
evidence on which to base an assumption that the perception of the 
community felt by a black child in Detroit is limited to the 

irregular boundaries of the school district of the City of Detroit

1 App. Va219, Vo1. V.

L

-73-



•  •
and further limited to the racial composition of the students 
in the school district. It is obvious, in a community that 
is so inter-related between city and suburbs, that the child 

would be wondering why his school does not reflect the total 
racial composition of the metropolitan community.

The avoidance of racial isolation has been a part of the 
lav/ school desegregation for 18 years. Mr. Chief Justice 
Warren formulated this issue in Brown v. Board of Education 
of Topeka, (Brown I), 437 U.S. 483 (1954) when he said:

"To separate them (blacks) from others of 
similar age and qualification solely because 
of their race generates a feeling of infer­
iority as to their status in the community 
that may affect their hearts and minds in 
a way unlikely ever to be undone." 347 
U.S. at 494.

There are over a million children of school age in 

the metropolitan Detroit area. There are 289,500 school 
children in the Detroit system, of which 188,000 are black . 
children. (See, Ex. PC-6, App. IXa285, Vol. IXA.). It 
v/ould be unconstitutional racial isolation to confine these 
children to the city limits of Detroit, when their education 
is the responsibility of the State, and the other 53 surrounding 
basically white school districts are mere administrative
conveniences of the State of Michigan.



We may add that in Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) ,
Chief Justice Warren speaking to the method of desegregation, 
stated: .

"To that end, the Courts may consider problems 
related to administration, arising from the 
physical condition of the school plant,the 
school transportation system, personnel, re­
vision of school districts and attendance 
areas into compact units to achieve a system 
of determining admission to the public schools 
on a non-racial basis, and revision of local 
laws and regulations which may be necessary 
in solving the foregoing problems. They will 
also consider the adequacy of any plans the 
Defendants may propose to meet these problems 
and to effectuate a transition to a racially 
nondiscriminatory school system." 349 U.S. at 
300-301.

Through the Supreme Court since Brown I and TI_ has re­
viewed the question of school desegregation numerous times, 
there is little question that, including the Scotland Keck 
and Emporia excursions, Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Board 
of Education, 402 U.S.l (1971); Davis v. Board of School Commis­
sioners of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33 (1971) are the Court's 
farthest advances toward desegregating the nation's schools, 
particularly as to three points:

1.
be made "to
segregation
situation. 
must be of

Davis (Mobile) clearly 
achieve the greatest 
, taking into account 
402 U.S. at 37. In 

paramount importance.

stated that every 
possible degree of 
the practicalities 
other words, deseg

effort should 
actual dc- 
of the 
rogation

ramount



2 . In order to achieve the maximum desegregation,the 
Courtin Swann abandoned the neighborhood school concept and 
put its stamp of approval on what was in effect a massive long 
distance transportation program in the metropolitan Charlotte- 
Mecklenburg area. 402 U.S. at 29-30.

■ 3‘ §warm is significant because it validates the use
of race and student assignments when the goal is desegregation 
rather than segregation. 402 U.S. at 22-25.

Thus, in essence, there are at least four elements that 
must be_ present for a. plan to work.

(1) Every school, or almost every school, should contain 
a mixture of the races that roughly approximates the make-up of 
the student community as a whole. Swann, supra; Davis (Mobile), 

~2A— * Thc Plan should be educationally sound.
— —- ~'‘no- i'l-• (2) plan snould avoid resegregation. Lemon

Parish School Foard, 4 4 6 F. 2d 911 (5th Cir. 19 7].). ^  
(4) The plan must be practical. Each of these elements of a 
woi.cable plan deserves to be examined more closely. Swann, suora 
Davis, (Mobile), supra.

BacM.al Mix: Ke repeat that Swann validates the use of
race in student assignments where the goal is desegregation 
rather than segregation. This Court has recognized this racial 
assignment concept to be a primary teaching of Swann for in 

Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board of Education of Nashville

-76-



decided and
filed on May 30, 1972, the Court said at 22 (slip
opinion) as follows:

and Davidson County, Tennessee,____ F.2d

"Perhaps the primary thing that the Swann 
case decided was that in devising plans 
to terminate such residual effects, it 
is appropriate for the school system and 
the District Judge to take note of the 
proportion of white and black students 
within the area and to seek as practical 
a plan as may be for ending white schools 
and black schools and substituting there­
for schools which are representative of 
the area in which the students live.
We have noted that the District Judge in 
Swann employed a flexible 71% white to 
29% black population ratio as a guide in 
seeking a practical plan. The Supreme 
Court specifically approved his doing so. 
See Swann v. Charlotte-Meck.1 enbur_gBoard 
of Education, supra at 16, 23-24. The 
District Judge in this case clearly recid 
and followed the Swann guideline. As 
to this issue, we-find' no error."

The District Court found that as compared to the metro­
politan Detroit desegregation area that the ratio of whites to 
blacks was approximately 75% to 25% and therefore, on June 14, 

1972, adopted a plan that would approximate this ratio, in the 
spirit of Swann as approved by this Court in Nashville.

Educational soundness: No desegregation plan can "work"
unless it is educationally sound. The educational soundness 
of an integration plan is to a large extent dependent upon how 
effectively it gives children an opportunity to have stable



multi-racial experiences in groups composed substantially like 
the surrounding community. Such experiences, especially if 
begun as early as possible, give children of both major races 
accurate perceptions of their own abilities and those of the 
members of the opposite race. These informed self-perceptions 
in turn lead to more self-confidence and better scholastic 
performance. Multi-racial education is essential preparation 
for li e in a multi-racial society. For this reason, if no other 
schools should reflect the racial composition of the entire com­
munity v,7hich they serve.

The testimony of witness, Dr. Green, is substantially 
in agreement with this view of what constitutes a sounds educa­
tional plan. (Tr. 863-69; 1049-51). See undisputed testimony 
also in agreement in record of other educators that a Metropol­
itan Plan is educationally sound. (City Tr. 245^ 469-470? 589)'?

Resegregati on: No plan can "work" if it offers a
ready avenue for rcsegregaticn. Even policies pursued by school 
board officials in good faith do not relieve them of their duty 
to fully eradicate the vestiges of segregation. Clark v. Board 
of Education of Little Rock School Dist., 426 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir 
1970). It follows then that the courts should require school 
authorities to take steps to prevent resegregation by various 
means. Lemon v. Bossier Parish School. Board., 446 F.2d 911 (5th 
Cir. 1971). Similarly, in protecting Fourteenth and Fifteenth 1 2 3

1 App. Vail8, Vo1. V.
2 App. Va 2 2 6-227, Vol. V.
3 App. Va229 , Vol. V.

-78-



Amendment, rights, the Supreme Court has spoken of a "need to 
eradicate past evil effects and to prevent the continuation or 
repetition in the future of discriminatory practices..."
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 156 (1965). Were a 
less rigorous standard insisted upon by the courts, the Consti­
tutional obligation to eradicate segregation "root 

and branch" would be reduced to a pruning that would let the 
old evil grow back, more vigorous and more intractable than ever. 
See,Swann v, Charlotte-Meeklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 
(1971). Neither the Court nor the school authorities would be 
true to their duty were they to adopt a plan that foreseeably 
will create more, rather than less, segregation.

This is also the view of the education experts who 
testified in the trial below (See, e.g., City Tr. 463-65).1

Practica 1 i 1ies . Swann and Davis (Mobile) obviously 
suggest that a plan must be practical. The transportcition plan 
envisioned by the District Court in its desegregation area is 
no more massive nor requires no rides longer in distance than 
are presently being undertaken by children in the metropolitan 
area. The clusters are so designed as to provide administrat'
convenience. (See Findings of Fact and Conclusions_of Lav; in
Support of Ruling on _Dosegrogation_Area and Development of Plan,
June 14 , 3 972 , Rulings 41-44 [7\pp. Ia511̂ _] .) In other words,
there is nothing in the plan to suggest that it is not practical. 
To illustrate, a substantial part of the educational program of 1 2

1 App. Va221-223, Vol. V.
2 Vol IB. -7 9-



• •
the State is not conducted on a local school district basis.
With the exception of those districts of sufficiently large size 
to support such special programs themselves, educational pro­
grams for the physically handicapped, the emotionally disturbed, 
as well as substantial programs which are usually on a part time 
basis with regular school programs in vocational education, are 
conducted not by the local school districts, but by the inter­
mediate boards of education. Frequently, with the exception of 
vocational education which is usually operated at large central 
skills centers, these special education programs are operated 
on an inter-district basis. In point of fact, "cross-district 
busing" has been a common phenomenon for the special education 
student for a good many years. (Cf., Metro Tr. 441, 444 ) P- If then 
is any distinction between the propriety of the State of Michigan 
providing cross-district busing of normal children for the pur­
pose of terminating the violation of Constitutional rights, such 
distinction escapes the Detroit Board.

The District Court has found the facts as to a remedy.
Only recently on May 30, IS72, this Court in Ke 11 ey v . r-1 etropo- 
litan County Board of Education of Nashville and Davidson County,
____F.2d____, recognized that the trial court and not the
appellate court is the remedy fact finder. In doing so, the Court 
noted that District Courts have "judicial discretion" in 
adopting desegregation plans and their discretion should not be 
disturbed. (Slip Op. at 25). 1

1 App. VI a 04 , 8 5-0 G, Vo1. VI.

-80-



Failure to adopt a metropolitan remedy, assuming a 
Constitutional violation, would mean that the black children 
of the City of Detroit would, in effect, have had their Con­
stitutional rights denied but without a remedy required by 
Swann. In other v/ords, we would have the anomaly that there 
was a Constitutional wrong but no remedy. Only in recent years 
has it been urged upon the Federal Court system that the Con­
stitutional violation as to voting rights could not be remedied. 
See, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The Court responded 
and now voting rights cases are an intricate part of our system 
of Constitutional protections with remedies. Sec/e.g. < Gomi111of̂  
v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). We suggest that if there must 
be a remedy because of an alleged Constitutional violation, that 
remedy in this case must be the metropolitan remedy adopted by 
the District Court which considered the necessity of racial mix, 
education soundness, prevention of resegregation, the practical­
ities of the situation and which has attempted to root out the 
evils of segregation "root and branch" pursuant to the dictates 
of Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S.
430 (1968).

Finally, the school authorities of the 
district have advised the District Court and 
there have been no Constitutional violations, 
been Constitutional violations, these school 
educational experts and who have assisted the

Detroit school 
this Court that
But if there have 

authorities, who are
District Court in

-81-



applying the Davis doctrine, have advocated a Metropolitan Plan
as the only method of achieving the greatest possible degree 
of actual desegregation in the community, to-wit, the metropolitan 
Detroit community.

No more elegant statement of the legal and practical 
reasons for a metropolitan remedy in the Detroit metropolitan 
community has been made than the District Court's own statement 
from the bench on July 19, 1972:

"I think it should be clearly understood, hov'ever, 
that in my disposition of the motions before me 
today this Court does not retreat from nor 
abandon... our conclusion that any plan for the 
desegregation of the public schools of the City 
of Detroit would not accomplish desegregation 
and that only a Metropolitan Plan of desegrega­
tion would accomplish the desegregation of those 
schools."
"The Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 
as I read it, is not geographically' limited. It 
is difficult for this Court to believe that any' 
higher judicial! authority' of the United States 
would or, for that matter Constitutionally could, 
engraft on that amendment any such geographical 
limitation. The vindication of the Plaintiffs' 
Constitutional right to equal education cannot 
be denied on the claim of alleged sovereign powers 
of local school districts." Tr. 1947-4 8 (App. VIIJa243, 
Vol. VIII).

-82-

(



VI

A PLAN OF DESEGREGATION.

State Defendants have suggested that the financing and
implementation of a metropolitan remedy, or, for that matter, 
any remedy involving an expenditures of funds, is a matter 
beyond the power of the parties to this cause. The argument 
presented by the State Defendants is not novel, for it is one 
which has been made by the states as an attempt to frustrate 
remedial orders of federal courts in the area of school dese­
gregation in a series of cases which date back to Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), if not to Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) 
It lias consistently been laid to rest as quickly as it has 
been raised. The source of this argument is traceable to the . 
restrictions on judicial power vis-a-vis the states, as 
enunciated in the Eleventh Amendment and as related to the 
supremacy clause. It is countered by the universal holdings 
of the courts that it is the duty of State officers to support 
both the Constitution and the rights guaranteed against infringe­
ment by the States under the Fourteenth Amendment.

America has, on occasion, recognized the immunity of States 
from suits involving direct actions against government funds 
or property for complainants' personal benefits, the Supreme

Although the Supreme Court of the United States of

-83-



Court has not deemed the Eleventh Amendment a serious inpedi­
ment to judicial action whenever the protection of compelling 
Constitutional guarantees has been at issue. See, e.g. , 
Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat 738 (1824, U.S.); 
Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248 (1906); Ex parte Young, 209 

U.S. 123 (1908).

In the area of school desegregation, the Court has 
followed this rule. In Cooper v . Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), which 
involved obstructionist tactics by the Governor and legislature 
of the State of Arkansas against implementation of desegregation 
orders of the federal courts, the Court stated:

"In short, the Constitutional rights of children 
not to be discriminated against in school admission 
on grounds of race or color declared by this Court 
in the B r o w n  case can neither be nullified openly 
and directly.by State legislators or State execu­
tives or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly 
by them through evasive schemes for segregation 
whether attempted 'ingeniously or ingenuously.'"
358 U.S. at 17.

In Griffin v t.. School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 
U.S. 218 (1964), involving the closing of public schools and the 
operation of a system of private schools by the county witn the 
acquiesence of the Commonwealth of Virginia, Mr. Justice Black, 
speaking for a unanimous Court, summarily dismissed the Eleventh 

Amendment argument raised.

"It is contended that the case is an action 
against t h e  State, is forbidden by the 
E l e v e n t h  A m e n d m e n t ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  s h o u l d  be 
d i s  t a  i s s c  d .  T  i  i  e  c o m p l a i n t ,  h o w e v e r ,  c n a r c  e d  
that State and county officials were depriving



Petitioners of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. It has been settled law since Ex parte 
Young, (citation omitted), that suits against 
State and county officials to enjoin them from in­
vading constitutional rights are not forbidden by 
the Eleventh Amendment." 377 U.S. at 228.

The Court went on to state that the District Court could, in 
addition to its injunctive powers, force the various Defendants, 
that is, the Board of Supervisors, School Board, Treasurer, and 
Division Superintendent of Schools of Prince Edward County, and 
the State Board of Education and the State Superintendent of 
Education, all of whom were held to have duties which related 
"directly or indirectly to the financing, supervision, or 
operation of the schools", to undertake positive action to 
reopen the public schools in the county:

"For the same reasons, the District Court may, 
if necessary to prevent further racial . 
discrimination, require the Supervisors to 
exercise the power that is theirs to levy 
taxes to raise funds adequate to reoocn, 
operate and maintain without. racial discrimin- 
nation _a_ pub 1 ic school systern in Prince 
Edward County..." (emphasis supplied) 377 
U.S. at 233."

Thus, it becomes readily apparent that the present 
Defendants, through the exercise of the inherent powers which 
they possess as officers and instrumentalities of the State, 
can effectuate and implement the remedy ordered by the District 
Court in this cause, without the necessity of joining as parties

-85-



defendant the legislators of the State of Michigan.

In Evans v. Ennis, 281 F.2d 385 (3rd Cir. 1960) , which 
involved a "spurious" class action suit against the State Board 
of Education, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, 
and three county boards of education to desegregate the public 
schools throughout the State of Delaware, the District Court, 
twitting contentions similar to those being advanced by State 
Defendants in this cause, stated:

"Doubtless integration will cost the citizens of 
Delaware money which otherwise might not have to 
be spent. The education of the young always re­
quires, indeed, demands, sacrifice by the older 
and more mature and resolute members of the 
community. Education is a prime necessity of our 
modern world and of the State of Delaware. We 
cannot believe that the citizens of Delaware will 
prove unworthy of this sacred trust. " 2 81
F .2d at 389. '

The extent of that cost wa.s more clearly illustrated in the 
opinion rendered following a petition for rehearing:

"This second element of the plan, if it is to 
be consummated, will necessitate the making 
of immediate estimates as to future school 
facilities. The making of such estimates is 
not a simple matter. Their creation will re­
quire the exercise of energy, skill, patience, 
and creative adaptability by the public school 
authorities, and, as we have indicated, funds 
to be appropriated by the Generctl Assent] v_of



Delaware. The duty imposed on the State Board 
of "Education in this respect is as clear as is 
the responsibility confided to this court and 
to the court below to make certain that the 
mandate of the Supreme Court is carried out." 
281 F.2d at 392.

Accord, Kelley v._Metropolitan County Board of Education of
Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn. ___ _ F.2d ___ (6th Cir. 19 72)
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 
(1971); Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District, 

330 F. Supp. 3377 (1971).

Furthermore, as the District Court correctly recognized 
in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 318 F,
Supp. 786 (W.D. N.C. 3970), the implementation of procedures 
necessary to assure any Constitutiona.3. rights of the individual 
may place, directly or indirectly, additional financial burdens 
upon the State, even though not a formal party to the proceed­

ings :

However, if a Constitutional right has been denied, 
this court believes that it is the Constitutional 
right that should prevail against the cry of "un­
reasonableness. .. The unreasonableness of putting 
the State to some expense cannot be weighed 
against or prevail over the privilege against self­
incrimination, or the right of people to be secure 
in their homes. If, as this court and the Circuit 
Court have held, the rights of children arc being 
denied, the cost and inconvenience of restoring 
those rights is no reason under the Constitution for 
continuing to deny them." 318 F. Supp. at 801.

For examples of the reaffirmation of other Constitutional rights, 
which may involve demands upon the State Treasury, see, e. g. ,

-87-

e



Argcrsingor v. Hamlin, 92 S.Ct. 2006 (1972) (furnishing counsel

for all indigents charged with misdemeanors); Gideon v. Walnwright 
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (furnishing counsel for all indigents charged 
with felonies); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (legislative 
reapportionment). Indeed, coordinate branches of State govern­
ment have been known to unilaterally impose financial obligations 
upon the State, through the exercise of their inherent powers, 
to ensure their continued and proper functioning. See e.g.,
Wayne Circuit Judges v. Wayne County, 386 Mich. 1 19 0 N 2 d 2 2 8'
(1971), cert. denied, Feb. 22, 1972. These cases demonstrate 
that the State's fiscal power may not be used to defeat the 
judiciary's authority to enforce the legal rights of citizens.

There has been some suggestion that existing collective 
bargaining agreements with teachers and other school board 
employees are a bar to a metropolitan plan. To begin with, no 
contract, union agreement or otherwise, or Board policy or 
practice may impede Fourteenth Amendment obligations. U.S. v, 
Greenwood Municipal Separate School District, 406 F.2d 1086, 109^ 
(5th Cir.), cert, denied, 395 U.S. 907 (1969); Berry v. Benton
Harbor, ____F.Supp.___(W.D. Mich. 1971). Furthermore, the
right of school board employees, including teachers, to 
bargain is a relatively new right in Michigan, having been 
established by Act No. 379 of Public Acts of 1965 (MSA §17.445(1)/



et seq. , MCLA §423.201 , c_t seq.) . In the seven years since the 
passage of Act 379, fact finders and the Michigan Employment 
Relations Commission have led the way in using originality and 
ingenuity in establishing school labor relations. There is 
no reason why, as a practical matter, that there cannot be a 
metropolitan desegregation plan with the availability of this 
wealth of public labor expertise in Michigan to reconcile any 
contract or collective bargaining rights that the school 
teachers or other employees may have with the right of the 
Plaintiffs to insist on their Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.

's

r~y

Of course, should it subsequently be determined that the 
present Defendants do not, in fact, have the inherent or
specific powers to implement the remedy ordered by the District 
Court in this cause, the Court is not powerless to act to add 
such parties as may be found necessary to effectuate a complete
and cidequate remedy 
stration of justice

and to achieve 
" Griffin v.

"an orderly and fair admini- 
School Board of Prince Edward

County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964); F.R.C.P. 15(d); F.R.C.P. 19(b).

As education in the State of Michigan is solely and 
totally a function of the State, the State Defendants have the 
power to implement the metropolitan remedy ordered by the
District Court.



IF SECTION 803 OF THE EDUCATION AMENDMENTS OF 
19*72 IS~CON ST ITUI ORAL AND SPEC I PIC.hLLY APPLIC-

TO AN ~INTRA--CITY REMEDY
AND A METROPOLITAN REMEDY.

This Court has ordered the parties to include in their 

briefs their responses to the following questions: _

"1. Does Section 803 of the Education Amendments 
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318 apply to Metropolitan 
transportation orders which have been or may be 
entered by the District Court in this case?
"2. If Section 803 does apply, is it 
constitutional?"

The Detroit Board of Education takes no position on 
substantive merits of Section 803, because of its position 
in the case. It is the unwavering belief of the Detroit E

the

card

of Education that the District Court erred in finding a

Constitutional violation in Detroit. 
Court concurs with this position, tne 
and constitutionality of Section 803

In the event that this 
issue of the app.' ication 

becomes moot as to Detroit.

Should this Court rule that the District Court was
correct in its findings of a Constitutional violation, the

position of the Detroit Board is 
tinguish as between metropolitan 
portation remedies.

that Section 803 docs not dis- 
or intra-district pupil trans-

Section 803 provides:



"...[I]n the case of any order on the part 
of any United States district court which 
required the transfer or transportation of 
any student or students from any school 
attendance area prescribed by competent 
State or local authority for the purposes 
of achieving a balance among students with 
regard to face..." (Emphasis added) .

Since the School District of the City of Detroit . 
is a "competent... local authority", then the school attendance 
areas within the school district are also within the mandate of 
the Section. The intentional use of the word "any" in Section 
803 reinforces this concept; 11 any attendance area" clearly 
contemplates attendance areas within a school district.

This interpretation of Section 803 is consistent 
with the interpretation given it during the debates in Congress 
over the passage of the Educational Amendments of 1972. In the 
debates in the House of Representatives, the Minority Leader, 
Representative Gerald Ford, (Michigan), stated:

"If this amendment [Section 803] is approved
-- if it is enacted into lav;, it simply means
that no district court order forcing bussing; 
for the purpose of obtaining racial balance 
shall go into effect until the U.S. Supreme 
Court has made the final determination." 
Congressional Record, H10409 (November 4, 1971).

Similarly, stating that the Section applies to intra­
city transfers or transportation, Representative Roman Pucinski 
(Illinois), noted:

-91-



"The amendment merely holds the status quo in_ 
a school district until a final judgment has 
been"made by the'u.S. Supreme Court." 
Congressional Record, H10410 (November 4,1972). 
(Emphasis added).

A similar bill introduced into the Senate, S. 659, 
contained a provision prohibiting pupil transfers or transpor­
tation between local educational agencies, and was therefore 
applicable, if at all, only to the problem of cross district 
transfers. But as the Joint House-Senate Conference Committee 

noted,

"An identical provision was contained in 
the Senate bill but is applicable only to 
court orders requiring transportation of 
students between local educational agencies 
or consolidation of two or more such agencies...

The conference agreement contains 
language of the House amendment.. 
Congressional Record, H4C33 (May 
(Emphasis added).

the precise
T i
23 , 1972) .

was
to

Significantly, the 
altered from being appli 

instead cover all pupil t

enacted version of Section 303 
cable only to metropolitan situations 
runsfer plains, intra-city plans in­

cluded. It was in this altered form that Section 803 was enacted.

meaning

Senator Claiborne Pell (Rhode 
of Congress as to Section 803,

Island) indicated the 
in a non-legal sense;.

I!1
- 92 -

l



"Here I would say that a literal reading 
of the language fof Section 803] by a non­
lawyer would indicate that if a local 
educational agency is under an appealable 
order to transport students to achieve 
racial balance, that local educational 
agency can receive a stay of that order..." 
Congressional Record, S8282 (May 23, 1972).

To the same effect, Senator Walter Mondale (Minnesota), 

speaking in opposition to the Section, stated: •

"But the intention of the principle sponsor 
seems clear enough. The provision is designed
to postpone all orders, in all case s -- hoy;ever

• simplcT^7- Involving either the transporation
or transfer or children to achieve desegregation." 
Congressional Record, S8386 (May 23, 1972) (Em­
phasis added).

Senator Mondale's interpretation was strengthened 
by a memorandum entitled, "The Constitutionality of the Nixon 
Administration's Proposed Student Transportation Moratorium 
Bill", prepared by the Washington Research Project Action Council, 
which Senator Mondale introduced into the Congressional Record at 

at S8387 - 8388:

I

t

L

"The moratorium bill... affects equally every 
school district in the country..."

Finally, the sponsor of Section 803, Representative 
William Broomfield, (Michigan), clearly intended that this 
Section would apply equally as regards metropolitan and intra­
city pupil transportation:

-93-

f



"My antibussing amendment... provides that the 
defendant .school district will have his [sic] 
day in court before he [sic] has to buy buses, 
uproot children from their neighborhood schools, 
and implement forced busing." Congressional 
Record, II5419 (June 8, 1972).

It is clear that throughout the deliberations of 
Congress that it was completely understood by both the support­
ers and opposition to Section 803 that it would apply equally 
to any order of a District Court that would involve pupil 
transfer, or transportation, regardless of whether the re­
assignment was part of a metropolitan plan or an intra-city plan.

As a result, it is the position of the Detroit Board 
of Education that Section 803, if constitutional and applicable, 
applies equally to any intra-city as well as any metropolitan 

remedies.

The Detroit Board of Education has taken no position- 
on the actual constitutionality of Section 803, nor its specific 
application to the remedy of the District Court here. The 
Detroit Board believes that the question of Constitutionality and 
the specific application of Section 803 will be adequately 
briefed by the other parties involved in this litigation.

-9 4-



RELIEF REQUESTED

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants-Appellants 
Detroit Board of Education, e_t al, pray that this Court dismiss 
the Complaint filed herein on the ground that there has been 
no violation of Plaintiffs' Constitutional rights. If this Court 
should find a violation of Plaintiffs' Constitutional rights, then 
Defendants-Appellants, Detroit Board of Education, et al, pray 
that the District Court's Metropolitan Remedial Order be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted, 
RILEY AND ROUMELL

L • \ /S'-h ukVi
George TJ Rournel i r. • t/ t r

Louis D. Beer 
Jane Keller Souris 
Russ E. Boltz
C. Nicholas Revelos, of Counsel 
Attorneys for Appellants and 
certain other named Defendants 
720 Ford Building 
Detroit, Michigan 48226

August 14, 1972

-95-

(



APPENDIX A

fC'lHi)°, 1L
1L »p

m m

B Y  S T A X  P U T N A M  
Frca Prc:s Writer

e a r s

m s i m r s

- ' t o w n  T o w n s h i p  ^ S c h o o l  D i s -  
0 - ‘  n v e n .

W a y n e  C  o  u  n  t  y ’ s  r i c h & i i  
s c h o o l  d i s t r i c t  i s  s c a r c e ] .  T h r e e  
o f  t h e  c o u n t y ’ s  p o o r e s t  s c h o o l  
d i s t r i c t s  w a n t  t o  t a  

T h e  r i c h  d i s t r i c t  i s ,  P r e y

I t  d o e s n ’ t  w a n t  a n y t h i n g  t o  
d o  w i t h  i t s  p o o r  n e i g h b o r s  —  
C a r s o n ,  H a n d  a n d  M a p l e  
G r o v e  S c h o o l  D i s t r i c t s ,  a l l  i n  
B r o w n s t o v r n  T  o  v /  n  s  h  i  p  i n  

S o u t h e r n  W a y n e  C o u n t y .  . ’a * * ;
W O O D E C A Y E N  I S  a  s c h o o l  

d i s t r i c t  w h i c h  h a s  o n l y  o n e  
b u i l d i n g  —  t h e  B a t e s  E l e r r . e s -  ; 
t a r y  S c h o o l .  A n d  B a t e s  p r o ­
v i d e s  e d u c a t i o n  o n l y  u p  t o  t i t s  ; 
s i x t h  g r a d e .  T h a t ’ s  n o  l o n g e r  
e n o u g h .  •
‘ T o e  S t a t e  K - 1 2  l a w  n a y s '  
s c h o o l  d i s t r i c t s  r o u s t  p r o v i d e  ' 
e d u c a t i o n  f ? c m  k i n d e r g a r t e n  . 
t o  t h e  1 2 t h  t i r a d e .  " . '

S o  Y / c o d r u v c n  h a s  t o  g o .  
T h e  q u e s t i o n  i s :  T o  w h o m — o r ,

,  r a t h e r ,  t o  V j h i c h  c f  i t s  n e i g h ­
b o r s ?

W A M C O T T E  c h J j  
wcoDHAVEtUp 0 (/y ,e o ss2

T E O ilO J J  j ' LE .

J.• A  s u p e r i n t e n d e n t  f r o m  o n e  
c f  t h e m . . s r y . d : .  . . . :

’  “ v / e * d  s e l l  c a r  r i g h t  a r m s  t o  
g e t  W c e d i i ’ i Y e n ,  a n d  s o  w o u l d  
a  l e t  o f  e t h e r s . ”
■ T h e  p o o r  d i s t r i c t s ,  o f f e r i n g  

o n l y  k i n d A g a r t e n  . t o  e i g h t h  
g r a c e  t r a i n i n g ,  a l s o  a r c  s l a t e d  
f o r  r e o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  b e c a u s e  t h e  
S t a t e  i s  v o V h i n g  t o  c u t  t i r e  
n u m b e r  o f  • - s c h o o l  • d i s t r i c t s ’ 
f r o m  a b o u t  1 , 2 1 0  t o  S C O .

P o o r - d i s t r i c t  p e o p l e ,  f r o m  
r e s i d e n t s  t o  s u p e r i n t e n d e n t s ,  
h o p e  a  s p e c i a l  r e o r g a n i z a t i o n  
c o m m i t t e e  w i l l  r e c o m m e n d  
t h a t  t h e  t h r e e  p o o r  d i s t r i c t s  
m e r g e  w i t h  V / c o d i i a v c n  t o  
f o r m  o n e  l a r g e  d i s t r i c t .i » J

T U B  C O M M A  t~ B  i s  d r a w ­
i n g  u p  r e o r g a n i z a t i o n  p l a n s  
f o r  e i g h t  E c h c o l  d i s t r i c t s  i n  
t h e  C o u n t y ’ s  <3 t h a t  d o n ' t  
m e e t  t h e  K - 1 2  r e q u i r e m e n t .  
T h e  c o m m i t t e e  r e p o r t  I s  d u e  
D e c .  3 1 ,  I S C e .

E d u c a t o r s  u s a  ‘ ' r i c h "  a n d  
“ p o o r ”  i n  r e g a r d  t o  s c h o o l  d i s ­
t r i c t s  t o  d e s c r i b e  a  d i s t r i c t ’ s  
w e a l t h  i n  a c c e s s e d  v a l u a t i o n  
o f  t a x a b l e  p r o p e r t y  a n d  b n  U ; o

n u m b e r  o f  p u p i l s  t o  b e  e d u ­
c a t e d .  _ ’  ■ ’ . . . . . . . . .

\ V  o  o  d  h  a  y  c  n  h a s  a  s t a t e  
e q u a l i z e d  v a l u a t i o n  c f  $ 1 7 , 1 3 3 , ­
2 1 0 ,  w i i i c h  m e a n s  t h a t  i t  c a n  
d r a ’. v  o n  t h e  t a x e s  f r o m  $ 0 1 , C C 3  
i n  v a l u a t i o n  t o  e d u c a t e  e a c h  c f  
i t s  1 7 3  p u p i l s .  .

I t ’ s  t h e  r i c h e s t  i n  t h e  c o u n ­
t y  b y  f a r .  . ■ | :

I t ’ s  g o i n g  t o  g e t  r i c h e r .  A s  
i t  i s , . t h e  S c c o n y . - l I d t j U  r e f i n e r y  . 
. f o o t s  m o s t  o f  t i : e /  e d u c a t i o n  
h i l l .  B u t  t h e  F o r d  / M o t o r  C o . '  
i s  b u i l d i n g  a  h u g e  
p l a n t  i n  V . ' c o d h a v e n .

’  ’ • M o d e  
p e r i r . t e r . d e r . t ,  s a r d  c o n s t r u c ­
t i o n  o f  t h e  n e w  p l a n t  w i l l  
m e a n  V r ' c o a h u v e n  w i l l  b e  a b l e  
t o  d r a w  o n  t a x e s  f r o m  $ 3 2 0 , ­
0 3 0  t o  e d u c a t e  e a c h  p u p i l .

’  „ A  s t u d y  s h o w e d  t h a t  i f  
Y / o o d h a v e n  m e r g e d  w i t h  i t s  
t h r e e  p o o r  n e i g h b o r s ,  i t  w o u l d  
m e a n  t h e  l a r g e  d i s t r i c t  w o u l d  
b e  a b l e  t o  d r a w  o n  t h e  taxe3 
f r o m  $ 1 7 , 5 2 0  v a l u a t i o n  f o r  e a c h  
o f  i t s  p u p i l s .  ’ •i

The Detroit Free Press, August 2, 1965

-96-
«



•APPENDIX B

,~r '■■■■: • 77 77 O  77 77 ' 7 / T  0 '• r? °  n
^ u r m m i e u  t i e l / m m  . M m m m

g s m m u -

r.Y  v,u?.1aTi 'L an'?^

n X . •
r n d i i i c ^ -

f ro  P.-c;-. Writs."

( C A B L E T O N ,  M i c h .  - -  E : H  
i  G u n t h e r  s e l d o m  g e t s  a n y t h i n "  
I t o  c a t  a t  A i r p o r t  C o m m u n i t y  
i  H i ~ h  S c h o o l ,  w h e r e  h e  i s  a  
i s e n i o r .  T h e  h a l l s  a r e  s o  c r o w d ­

e d  d u r i n g  b r e a k s  t h a t  h e  c a n ­
n o t  g e l  n e a r  t h e  f o o d  m a c h i n e s .

X i n a - y e a r - o ’. d  l / o u  A n n  S m i t h  
m e e t s  h e r  s c h o o l  b u s  a t  7 X 0  
e a c h  m o r n i n g .  A f t e r  a n  h o u t -  
l o n g  t r i p ,  s h e  I s  d e l i v e r e d  t o  
t h e  e l e m e n t a r y  s c h o o l  a  m i l e  
f r o m  h e r  h o m e .

| H e r  r i d e  t a k e s  h e r  p a s t  t h e  
i  s t i l l - c l o s e d  s c h o o l ,  w h e r e  n o  
: t e a c h e r s  a r e  o n  d u t y  t ' n a t  
■ e a r l y ,  t h e  f u l l  l e n g t h  o '  t h e  b u s  
: r o u t e  a r . d  b a c k  a g a i n .

. T H E S E  i n c o n v e n i e n c e s  a r e  
| n o t  u n u s u a l  f o r  t h e  a l m o s t  
; 3 , 0 0 0  s t u d e n t s  L o  t h i s  M o n r o e  

C o u n t y  f a r m i n g  c o m m u n i t y .
T h e '  h i g h  s c h o o l  a n d  j u n i o r  

h i g h  c l a s s e s  a r e  o n  h a l f - d a y  
s e s s i o n s  s o  t h e y  c a n  u s e  t h e  
s a m a '  b u i l d i n g .  B u s  r o u t e s  
a r c  l o n g e r ,  c l a s s e s  l a r g e r  a n d  
m o r a l e  l o w e r  t h a n  a t  a n y  t i m e  
i n  m e m o r y .  -

W h o  i s  t o  b l a m e ?  -

c;If the stale can id I you d m  l toj .
da like they did this time, v/hv 
shoukln’i the stale foot, the hill?"

| T i l 3  p a r e n t s  a r . d  t h e  A i r p o r t  
' C o m m u n i t y  S c h o o l  D i s t r i c t  m y  

th t>  5 "  e. t  o  E e p o r f  m e n t  c l  H a r z *ce:
d e p a r t m e n t  i n iT i i e  d e p a r t m e n t  i a d r r e c  

p o i n t s  t h e  f i n g e r  a t  t r a  D r g t n -  
1 a t t i r e

T h e h a r d ;  f e e i i r
f r o m i ' : i e  S t a t e  B e a r
c a t i o : , ’ s  e r d r r  t o  d r :

! S u m p t e r  S c h r c l  D
W a y , 3  C o u n t y  a n d

j  b u i l d r . g s ,  s t u d e n t s  a

~1

d e

D i s t r i c t  i  
s p l i t  i t  

i d  o p e - r a '  
: t  a m o n g  f o u r  a d j u i :

; — X  n  l i t t l e  q u e s t i o n  | 
t t  S u m p t e r  n e e d e d  h e l p -  j!

S u m p t e r  h a d  n o  h i g h  s c h o o l .
V i r t u a l l y  e v e r y o n e  i n v o l v e d  

i n  t l i e  e d u c a t i o n  o f  t h e  d i s ­
t r i c t ' s  1 . 0 0 0  s t u d e n t s  a g r e e d  5 
t h a t  s o m e t h i n g  d r a s t i c  h a d  t o  
b e  d o n e .

' T l t e  s t a t e  b o a r d  w a s  g i v e n  
-, t h e  a u t h o r i t y  t o  d i s s o l v e  a  d i r , -  
S t r i c t  l i k e  S u m p t e r  u n d e r  
( " e m e r g e n c y  c o n d i t i o n s , "  a c -  
I c o r d t r . g  t o  t h e  t e r m s  o f  a  1 0 5 7  

a w .  .

H o w e v e r ,  t h e  f i n a l  v e r s i o n  o f  
h e  a c t  p a s s e d  b y  t h e  L e g i s l a ­
t u r e  w a s  p o t  w i t  a t  t h e  D e p a r t -  
r . e r . t  c f  E d u c a t i o n  w a n t e d .

T h e  L e g i s l a t u r e  m a d e  t i t s  
a c t  a p p l y  o n l y  t o  s c h o o l  d i s ­
t r i c t s  i n  c o u n t i e s  o f  a  m i l l i o n  
p o p u l a t i o n  o r  m o r e .  .

T l i i s  m a k e s  t h o  l a w  a p p l y  
o n l y  t o  W a y n e  C o u n t y  a n d  e x ­
c l u d e s  a n y  t r o u b l e d  d i s t r i c t s  
o u t s t a t e .  O n e  j l e g i s l a t o r  s a i d  
i b i s  w a s  t h e  p i l y  v . a y  t o  g e t  
t i i e  l a w  p n s s r j .  .

• A n o t h e r  a m e n d m e n t  p r o v i d ­
e d  t h a t  r . o  d i s t r i c t  c o u l d  g e t  
m o r e  t h a n  j.0 p e r c e n t  o f  t h o  

- t e r r i t o r v  o f  . . h e  d i s s o l v e d  
s c h o o l  s y s t e m .  ( . T i n s  h a s  s i n c e  
b e e n  c h a n g e d . )  •

A i r p o r t  h a d  f o u r  o : ; e - r o  
s c h o o l s .  T h r e e - r e m a i n  o p e n  
c a u s e  o f  l a c k  o f  s p a c e  i n  
n e w e r  s c h o o l s .  A  b o n d  : s  
w a s  p u t  o n  t h e  b a l l o t .

T h e n  t h e  S t a t e  D e p a r t : '  
o f  E d u c a t i o n  b e g a n  p u b  
h e a r i n g s  o n  S u m p t e r .  C a  
t o n  s u s p e c t e d  i t  w a s  g o i n g  
g e t  p a r t  o f  t h a t  s y s t e m .

A T h e  b o n d  I s s u e  w a s  s o u n  
j r e j e c t e d .  L a s t  A u g u s t  a  
j m i l l  . o p e r a t i n g  r e v e n u e  p r e :  
I & 1  w a s  t u r n e d  d a w n ,  2 - 1 .
| T h e  A i r p o r t  b a n r d  e r d - a r c  

u n d e r  c o n s t r u e -  ( S u r v e y  t o  f i n d  c u t  w h y .

I

T W O  O F  T H E  o t h e r  d i s ­
t r i c t s  i n v o l v e d  —  H u r o n  a r . d  
V a n  B u r e r . .  b o t h  i n  W a y n e  —  
a r e  o v e r c r o w d e d  b e c a u s e  c f  
t h e  S u m p t e r  s t u d e n t s  t h e y  g o t .  jBuildings __
t i o n  s h o u l d  h e l p  t h i n g s  c o m i c ! -  I f o u n d  s t r o n g  v o t e r  r c s e r . t r  
c r a f c i y .  | t o  t h e  S u m p t e r  m e r g e r .

O n e  d i s t r i c t ,  L i n c o l n ,  a c t u a l -  I n  r a a  i n t o  f ! : e  a r g u i i i e n t  • 
i y  c a m e  o u t  b e t t e r  t h a n  b e f o r e ,  j a n y  a d d i t i o n a l  t a x  w o u l d  
b e c a u s e  i t  r e c e i v e d  a r .  a l r r . e e * .  | p r i m a r i l y  f o r  h a w s i n g  S u r a ,  
n e w  j u n i o r  h i g h  s c h o o l  t h a t  r . c -  ; s t u d e n t s '  w h i l e  t h a i r  p a r !  
c o m m o d a t e s  m o r e  e t u d e n t u  j w o u l d  r . p i  p a y  a r y  c f  i t  
t a a n  c a m e  v . n t l i  i t .  j c a u s e  t h e y  w e r e  n e t  r e s i A

D u t  i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  t i n y  A i r -  j o f  t h e  A i r p o r t  d i s t r i c t  n t  
I p o r t  w a s  l e f t  h o l d i n g  t h e  t a g .  • t i m e  o f  t h e  e l e c t i o n .

1 T V s  d i s t r i c t ' s  S l A - m l l l i c r ’ 
b u d g e t  w i l l  b e  s t r e t c h e d  t o  t h e
b r e a k i n g  p o i n t  t o  p r o v i o a  
t h e  M 3  S u m p t e r  s t u d e n t s  i t

f o r  ~

h  s a y s  t h e  v o t e r s  
; - v e r  w i l l  a n n r s v e  £

:c i r . d e  i t  n c c e - v
o l i t l e d  d i s t r i c t  t o  b ?

i n g  d i s f r i c t - s .  _ _ _ _ _ J
• A  u p o n h a d  t o  t a k e  o n  2 3 3
S u m p t e r s t u b e ' n t s  - -  w h i c h
i n f a n t  i : n e e d e d  m o r e  t e a c h -
e r s .  rr.r•: e  d e s k s ,  m o r e  s u p -
p l i e s  a n d m o r e  s p r i e r * .

l t 5  ! 'C T i r r . t r ,  r c . ' : : - c J ,  i n  a n
e l e c t : : : : , t o  a p p r o v e  r.:o :c

T n e  p r o v i s i o n  m  
s a r y  f o r  t i

' b o u n d e d  b y '  c f  l e a n  f o u r  o t h ­
e r s .  T h e  K p r l l i  D e a r b o r n  
H e i g h t s  D i s t r i c t  t r i e d  t o  s p l i t  

! i t s e l f  v . o  i n  1 E 5 7  b u t  f a i l e d  b e -  
j c a u s e  t h e r e -  w e r e  n o t  e n o u g h  
, d i s t r i c t s  c n  i t s  b o r d e r s . _ _ _ _ _ _

i n  t h e  b u m p i e r  c a s e ,  t h e  3 0
p e r c e n t  '

h a d  t o  a b s o r b .  I i i j ; k : I .  C U T

I c r . c h c r s  w e r e  h i r e d a :  n l o t r l
a r . r . w J » v a ! a r y  o f  S 5 5 .C C D . X c - . T
d e s k s r . r . d  s u p p l i e s w e r c  o r *
t i c  r e d .

TS .j* t h e  b i g  p n a  h i  c m .  I s
s  c a v e . T h e r e  a r e  n o f c u i l o : r . " 2
u n d e r e o n s i l r u c l i o n  t o  c'J. e r  f u -
t o r e  r e l i e f .

T h e p e o p l e  i n  C m l c t o n  e r e
c r p e c i a l l y  p r o u d  o f  t t i c ! r  s c h o o l
b u d d i n g s .

T i : e d i s t r i c t  s t a r t t d  ;i n  c n
p  b  m b ■ • i n ' l l  a . i ! * p '> r t b a : r a c k s
p . t  t h e  n u t  o f  W o r l d  V . ‘ a r  I I
C-r.'Z r. r e w  i n t o  f i v e b u n ! d i n g n  .
c o n ? * . : u c f . ' d  w i t h  b o n d  r . t o n c y . '

T h e b o n d e d  d e b t h o . 3 b e a n

V . l l j o f f .  L o u i s  S r . u i t h . a  f o r :

m . e  v p r e s i d e n t  o f  t l e  / • . i r p o r t

B o a r d  o f  E d u c a t i o n . t o ’ :*: s  o p a -

c i r . 7  1. • r i d e  i n  s i - . o w i : r»£  %■ i ' i t o i ' . i

t r  m i ' d a g e  L=st:e.. “ lh-ay f i ~ .  
V.'hrfs t h e  u s e ?  I t  s 
C a n  t c l i  y o u  w h a t  t o  c :  
t h e y  d i d  t h i s  t i m e .  ■­
s h o u l d n ’ t  t h e  s t a t e  f o o t  
b i l l ? "

■ B i l l  G u n t h e r ’ s  m o t h e r ,  
r i c ,  a  t y p i c a l  p a r e n t ,  s :  

" O u r  s c h o o l s  w e r e  p r e t t y  a  

b e f o r e  t i n s .  N o w  t h e y ' r e  c  
c r o w d e d .  W e  d o n ' t  b n  w  e  
S u m p t e r  k i d s  . . .  i t  w a s  
s t a t e  t h a t  d i d  t h i s  t o  u s . "

M e m b e r s  o f  t V  A i r p  
s c h o o l  b o a r d  a r e  b i t t e r .  "  
a r e  f a c e d  w i t h  a  f i n a n c i a l  
e d u c a t i o n a l  c r i s i s  t r . e y  c  
c r e a t e  a n d  c a n ' t  c o p e  v . .

" W e  w e r e  a  f i n a n c i a l l y  s  
r - ' d i s t r i c t , "  o n e  t c h o o i  t  

m e m b e r  s a y s ,  " s o  t h e  .  
f i g u r e d  w e  w e r e  a  g o o d  r  

f  t  V. c  s  f* k  1N. 5 .l o s o  m o  o i

a p p a r e n t l y  l a r g e l y  t h r o u g h  r e -  
f i c r . ' . t m v . l  e v e r  b r i n g  f o r c e d  t o  
t a k e  c n  S u T - p t e r  s t u d e n t s .  M o w  
f r a  d i r t : l e t  f a c e s  a . f i n a n c i a l

s i n r y  f o r  t h e  
r o a c h  < l: - w r .  i:  
t y  f o r  A i r p o r t

: t , LI-A
r . a d e  i t  r . e c c s -  

s t c . t c  b o r . r d  t o  
t o  k t o m ' o o  C o m : -

a  p e n n y  o n  t h e m . "

1 \  I f 5 7  t i i e  d i s t r i c t  w a s  j u s t  
beginning t o  plan for adchtion- 
e 1 b u i l d i n g s  w h e n  t h e  S u m p t e r  
s i t u a t i o n  c a m e  t o  a  h e a d .

t h r o u g h  D c  y e a r s  t o  
o f  d e b t ? "

-97-



APPENDIX ^ continued)

T i l r ;  A I  f t  P O U T  d i s t r i c t  s u -  i 
p c r i r . t c n d e n t ,  J o s e p h  S t e r l i n g ,  
s e c s  n o  w a y  o ' . i t .

" W e ’ r e  o n l y  b e g i n n i n g  t o  a s -  i 
c e s s  t h e  c o s t  o f  t h i s  S u m  p i e r  
t h i n g . ”  h e  s a y s ,  " n u t  y o u  c r . n  
s e e  t h a t  i t ' s  g o i n g  t o  c r i p p k D  

u s  e d u c a t i o n r i ' . l y  t o r  s o m e  
y e a r s  t o  C o m e . " .  ,

W i t h  t h e  v o t e r s  u n w i l l i n g  t o  
a p p r o v e  m o r e  t a x e s  t o r  s t u ­
d e n t s  t h e y  d i d n ' t  w a n t ,  t h e  b u d ­
g e t  a l r e a d y  s p r e a d  t u r n ,  a n d  | 
b u i l d i n g s  b u r s t i n g  a t  t h e !  
s e a m s .  A i r p o r t  s c h o o l  o f f i c i a l s  
s a y  t h a t  o n l y  t h e  s t a l e  c a n  
r e s c u e  t h e m  f r o m  t h i s  c r i s i s .

T h e  s t a t e  b o a r d ' s  p l a n  f o r  
d i s s o l v i n g  S u m p t e r  c a l l e d  t o r  
t h r e e  o f  t h e  f o u r  d i s t r i c t s  t o  
r e c e i v e  a  l u m p  s u m  t o  p r o ­
v i d e  h o u s i n g  f o r  t h e  n e w  s t u ­
d e n t s .  T i l e  f o u r t h .  L i n c o l n ,  g o t  
t h e  n e w  j u n i o r  h i g h .  . :

j
T h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  n e v e r  a p p r o -  

p r i . a l e d  t h o  m o n e y .  A l l  l i n g e r  
U o l i n e ,  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  K i l u e a -  
t i o n  n i d o  w h o  w o r k e d  o n  t h o  
c a s e ,  r a n  d o  i s  t o  h o p o  t h a t  

t h e  n p p r o p r i n l i n n  w i l l  h e  m a d e h  
n e x t  y e a r .  I

I n  a d d i t i o n .  H o l m e  h o p e s  t o '  
g e t  s t a t e  m o n e y  t o  p a y  o f f  \ 
w h a t  r e m a i n s  o f  S u m p t e r ' s  
$ 1 3 0 , 0 0 0  o p e r a t i n g  d e b t  a f t e r  
b a c k  t a x e s  a r e  c o l l e c t e d  a n a  
t o  p a y  o f f  t h e  d e b t  o n  S u m p -  . 
t e r ' s  s c h o o l  b u s e s .  I

T h e  b u s e s  w e r e  d i v i d e d  
a m o n g  t h e  f o u r  d i s t r i c t s  b u t  
m o s t  a r e  t o o  o l d  t o  b e  u s e d  
w i t h o u t  e x t e n s i v e  r e p a i r s .

U n l e s s  t h e  L e g i s l a t u r e  c o m e s  
u p  w i t h  s o m e  m o n e y  f o r  S u m p ­
t e r ' s  b i l l s ,  t h e  f o u r  d i s t r i c t s  
w i l l  e a c h  h a v e  t o  p a y  a  s h a r e .* * •

(> K A I I L Y  T H I S  y e a r  t h e  l e g i s ­
l a t u r e  a m e n d e d  t h e  l a w  t o  a d -  
l o w  t h e  S t a t e  H o a r d  o f  K a u r i -  i 
t i o n  t o  b r e a k  u p  d i s t r i c t s  s c -  

' C ' t - r . i m g -  t o  i t s  o w n  f n ,  m . u n ,  
e i t h e r  u s i n g  t r i o  3 d  p . c t c e u .  
rule.

T i n s  m e a n s  t ' a a t  w h a t  h a p -  
r - w . - d  t o  'A irpo rt p r o b a b l y  
w o n ' t  h a p p e n  a g a i n .  .

B u t  Airport's p r o b l e m s  a r e  
t . u  " d o ’. v t d  b y  t h e s e  r e f i n e ­
m e n t s .  ■ -

The Detroit Free Press, October 7, 1968

-98-



C J f l S ' u T i i C l l

t * By V/lLl-lAU CCNNELLAN 
Intjott XiV> tilt/ Vil’M t ]

* '• LAriSf«>^r.-^:n^^P"
JjyudtlL''Q <a n k [y _p. - i 11 s School^ 
District Kas occa ordered tits- - 
so'ygdlMyy the State Board of 
Education. '
' The order, effective June 30. 
ends a ycnr-Icn.^ controversy

• over the fnto of the western
Wnyne County district, which 
Is $230,CCD in debt. |

The district, of 3,230 students , 
— mono with the operating j 
deficit — will be absorb;:! by 
Sjtlie Livonia rut-d Wayne Coin- 
jtmunity districts.

Edward Hines drive will he 
the dividing lino, with Livonia 
netting the students and build­
ings north cf Hir.es and V/r.yno 
everything couth.

ALL CAPITAL DECTS ~  
those incurcd for building 
purposes — wii! remain with 
tire present Nankin Mil's vot­

ers, and thcy'VAd pkc on 
the regular tax burdens of 
t'o.oir new districts, under tire

Etato hoard Cskcd the Lcnisln-v. 
ture to appropriate enough-;: 
money to eliminate the etc:iCit .. 
end provida Livonia a n.d . 
V/ayr.c with any new-facilities'** 
which might he needed to a > ~  
cominodate /Cep) Nankin ettW" 
J ‘“ “  ... "

state board ru!ing.
Livonia v;l[h 3."i_CB0 students

already, i  .-yi.J in!' c-rit CO p or­
cent of i y \ ‘ :l n'kin slutient?,
along v.Dy .he Perririvillo,
Nankin k ' ' \nd Henry Fore
elementary SCltool build: r

The Nan! tin M:ills Boa rd o!
Education offices will also C3 
to Livonia.

V/ayno will get the remain­
ing students r.ud the Tonquish 
and "Robert J. McKee elemen­
tary schools. Nankin M i l l s  
Junior High School also goes 
to Wayne. Nankin does not 
have a high school program.

All other assets, such as 
School buses and other equip- i 
meat, will be divided on a Ct- ! 
<0 ratio. ;

The operating deficit will be , 
split similarly, although t h e j

dents.
A menses’ -.ry.’roviding Ecdi--t 

tional fund/ *•• J sed  the lieu;::.:, 
problems suctr-’as that of Kan* • 
Lin Mills can be avoided.

The state board also ashed. 
tho Legislature to revise. lEe1-* 

-state aid formula, so future * 
yesterday cure! is being consul-- , 
cred b y ’the Senate today. ■... J

THE NANKIN PROBLEM ; 
came to a head last summer" 
wh.cn the school board asked” 
tiie State Board of Education -
to declare an emergency in
the cis trict and rc organize it',"

The hoard was given :tlilS
power by a IS 57 act cf liter
Legisla tu re. ,

At th:at time, the school ths-
trict v.•as $263,USD in debt c.n
its one rating budgeit, and 1
b e e n denied per mission top
seek h:onds to bitlid a h,igh'
school because cf debt pr cd>

A -ct U..
J *' .IStata-‘'DPI

partmc r. t c f Ldi icaticn re-,
veal eel that the t;ix base cf.:
the d.i:strict is in the Iov,
percent in tho eta tc. N

The current ta base ■ i.r
SG.OL’O a student, brcausn ! C •
than 2 percent of the tax I:
is prov■ided by inrr.:stry.

The 3S.S mills ($33.SO per-
$1,CC0 assessed vain at ion)..
Nankin. had for epe rat inn b’d’-n.
c!s was tire highest in the si■«n f .-•»

Tiic study by tr.c dep T̂u-*
ment concluded tbat Kr.i»' • • rr
had mr.dc every c! tort to :rp'V
port it schools cut was v.:::ib: O’
becaus c of the torc strue;;..r% ■
r.r.d the present rt ate aid, fOi>.
mule.. • M*

The Detroit News

■99-

f ? - * " —  r



> / / /

d APPENDIX D
F“ (f*)>—-rs .// N

December 15 , 1971, Introduced by Reps. Cawthorne,

B rad ley ,  Smart, Mctleely and Holbrook and r e fe r r e d  

to the Committee on Educat ion.

O

A b i l l  to p rov ide  fo r  emergency f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  fo r  

i n s o lv e n t  school d i s t r i c t s ;  to p r e s c r ib e  c e r t a i n  powers and 

du t ie s  o f  the in termed iate  board o f  educa t ion  in connec t ion  

therew i th ;  to p rov ide 'a  procedure f o r  r e o rg a n i z a t i o n  o f  such 

school  d i s t r i c t s ;  to prov ide  fo r  cont inuance o f  the s ta te  

committee on reo rgan iza t ion  o f  school d i s t r i c t s ;  to p ro v i c e  

c e r t a i n  powers and dut ies  o f  the s ta te  board o f  educa t ion  in 

connect ion  therew i th;  to c rea te  an emergency loan rev o lv in g  

fund; and to make an a pp rop r ia t io n .

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN ENACT:

1 Sec. 1. As used In t h i s  act:

2 (a) "School  d i s t r i c t "  does not inc lude  an in te rm ed ia te

k 163 ’ 71

*

-100-

6



I'tefeiM.-, _,jA

.IsyK

I

! i

of  wiiiofi In n t tr i l -n in l ' l t*  (U lf»>>
,jay  of Ii- m  t h a n  <-'f n<l v “ lor<-'m  tn x t~*

----------Vj, .nlld the fiscal corvlit̂ s
j>a r t  to n t i im u l  colli-ctionn on t a x  

levied  l y  th e  d i .s t r ie t" .

appendix D
~~ ("continued)

)
H. $8f*0

1
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 
11 
12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

school  d i s t r i c t .

(b) " S ta t e  board" ora re. the s ta te  board o, edu ca t io n .

- Sec. 2. The procedures prov ided  by t h i s  act  may be used

no tw i th s tand ing  any o the r  p r o v i s i o n  o f  law to  the c o n t r a r y .

S c c . 3 . The board o f  educa t ion  o f  a school d i s t r i c t  that

incu rs  a d e f i c i t  and i s  unable to  meet i t s  f i n a n c i a l  o b l i g a ­

t i o n ' s  e l i g i b l e  to app ly  f o r  an emergency loan from the 

s t a t e .  Such a d i s t r i c t  s h a l l  be cons ide red  an i n s o l v e n t  d i s -

t r  i c t .
Sec.<l. A  s c h o o l  d i s t r i c t  to be eligible f o r  an emergency

ioan s h a l l  c e r t i f y ,  based upon a c e r t i f i e d  aud i t  by the s t a t e  

t reasu ry  department, that the school d i s t r i c t  i s  i n s o l v e n t .  Q  

Scc. 5. The board o f  educa t ion  o f  a school d i s t r i c t  meet­

ing the c r i t e r i a  set  f o r t h  in s e c t i o n  k may app ly  to  the s t a t e  

board fo r  an emergency loan to meet i t s  f i n a n c i a l  needs u. t 

the end o f  the f i s c a l  year in  which a p p l i c a t i o n  i s  made. I f ,  

a f t e r  rev iew, the s ta te  board o f  educa t io n  f i n d s  tha t  the 

d i s t r i c t  meets the c r i t e r i a  set f o r t h  in  s e c t i o n  b , a recoc-  

mendation fo r  an emergency loan s h a l l  be submit ted to the 

governor f o r  review and recommendation to the l e g i s l a t u r e .

[ 21
S e c .  6. 7 6 c

2 2 g i b !  e to r e c e i v e

[  « t h i s  a c t  s h a l l  is

r  2-1
F  ■

l o a n ,  m a d e  p a y a b 1

25 not t o r e  t h a n  10

1.

[

it 169 '71

- 1 0 1 -



1
2
3
4

5

6
7

8 

9

10
11

12
13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20 

21 

22

23

24

APPENDIX D
(continued)

3 H. 58^0

annum beginning with the first fiscal year after receipt Oi 

the .loan. The bonds shall be payable out of any funds of the 

school district including state appropriations available to 

the school district under any act. The amount due on the 

bonds with interest in any fiscal year shall be deducted in 

equal portions from the last 3 payments of state school aid 

due the school district in each fiscal year. The bonds 

shall also be the full faith and-credit obligations of the 

school district and all taxable property within the school . 

district shall be subject to the levy of ad valorem taxes 

to repay the principal and interest obtained under the bonds 

without limitation as to rate or amount. The board of educa­

tion shall submit its budget for review and approval to the 

state department of education. This budget shall be a 

balanced budget and shall include a minimum repayment of 10% 

of the original face amount of the loan received under this 

act, plus interest at the statutory rate. The district shall 

submit a monthly expenditure report to the state department 

of education.

. Sec. 7. However, any school district not levying a mini­

mum of 20 mills for operating purposes in the calendar year 

for which it receives an emergency loan shall be reorganized 

by the state board of education following recommendation by 

the state committee on reorganization of school districts.

h 163 '71

- 1 0 2 -



1
2

3

4

5

6

7

8 

9

10
11
12
13

14

15

16

17

18
19

20 

21 

22

23
24

k

APPENDIX D
(continued)

H. 58*iO

Sec. 8. The slate deportment of educa t i on-*e£«

scl-'K.-i— shall take any steps necessary to 

assure that the expenditures of a school district which receives 

an emergency loan under the provisions of this act shall not 

exceed revenues on an annual basis and that the school di s~

trict maintains a balanced budget.

Sec. 9. If, upon application for an emergency loan, a 

board of education certifies that the school district will 

not be able to balance its budget, the district shall be 

reorganized by the state board of education following 

recommendation by the state committee on reorganization of 

school districts.

Sec. 10. A school district receiving an emergency loan 

under the provisions of this act shall balance its budget in 

the fiscal year immediately following the fiscal year for 

which it receives an emergency loan o r , following recorm.endd- 

tion by the state committee on reorganization of school 

districts, shall be reorganized by the state board of education

Sec. 11. A school district receiving an emergency loan 

under the provisions of this act, which defaults in repayment 

of the loan, shall be reorganized by the state board of educa­

tion following recommendation by the state committee or. reo.- 

ganizntion of school districts.

Sec. 12: Prior to reorganization of a school district

11169 ‘71

-103-



APPENDIX D
(continued)

5 H. 58**0

under this act, the state committee on reorganization of 

school districts shall hold a hearing in the district to be 

reorganized. Notice of the time and place of the hearing 

shall be given the voters of all school districts involved 

in the proposed reorganization. The boards of education of 

the intermediate districts involved in the proposed reor­

ganization shall make recommendations to the state committee • _ 

regarding the proposed reorganization.

Sec. 13. Within 20 days after receipt of a transcript 

of the hearing and recommendations of the boards of education 

of the intermediate districts, the state committee on re­

organization of school districts shall determine if conditions 

exist warranting reorganization of the district under this 

act. Upon a determination by the state committee that condi­

tions in a school district warrant reorganization, the state 

committee shall transmit its report with recommendations to 

the state board of education.

Sec. ] k . The state board of education shall publish the 

report and recommendations of the state committee cn reorganize- 

tion of school districts and shall invite objections or 

comments to be filed with it within 20 days following publica­

tion of the report. The state board then shall consider the 

report of the stale committee, together with the comments 

and objections filed, and make a determination as to indorse-



APPENDIX D
(continued)

H. 5 8 ^ 0

1
2

3
4

5

6

7

8 

9

10
11

12

13

M

15

16

17

18

19

20 

21 

22 

23 

23

merit of the finding of the state committee.

Se c. 1 5 . T h e  s t a t e  b o a r d ,  u p o n  i n d o r s e m e n t  of the 

f i n d i n g  o f  the s t a t e  c o m m i t t e e  o n  r e o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  s c h o o l  

d i s t r i c t s  th at r e o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  a s c h o o l  d i s t r i c t  is 

w a r r a n t e d ,  sh al l r e o r g a n i z e  the d i s t r i c t  w i t h  1 or m o r e  

d i s t r i c t s  c o n t i g u o u s  to it in s u c h  a m a n n e r  as w i l l  p r o v i d e  

the m o s t  e q u i t a b l e  e d u c a t i o n a l  o p p o r t u n i t y  for all o f  the 

s t u d e n t s  of the r e o r g a n i z e d  d i s t r i c t ,  a n d  sh al l d e t e r m i n e  

t h e  e f f e c t i v e  d a t e  of r e o r g a n i z a t i o n .  A c t i o n  b y  the s t a t e  

b o a r d  o f  e d u c a t i o n  shall be final.

Sec. 16. If a s c h o o l  d i s t r i c t  a t t a c h e d  u n d e r  the p r o v i s  

o f  this act at the t i m e  of r e o r g a n i z a t i o n  ha s  a b o n d e d  in­

d e b t e d n e s s  i n c u r r e d  a f t e r  D e c e m b e r  8, 1932, its i d e n t i t y  

sh a l l  no t  b e  lost a n d  its t e r r i t o r y  sh al l r e m a i n  as a n  a s s e s s ­

ing u n i t  for p u r p o s e s  o f  s u c h  b o n d e d  i n d e b t e d n e s s  u n t i l  the 

i n d e b t e d n e s s  has b e e n  r e t i r e d  or the o u t s t a n d i n g  b o n d s  r e f u n d e d  

by the r e o r g a n i z e d  d i s t r i c t .  T h e  b o a r d  o f  the r e o r g a n i z e d  

d i s t r i c t ,  o r  the b o a r d s  o f  d i s t r i c t s  r e c e i v i n g  s c h o o l  b u i l d i n g s  

w i t h  a n  e x i s t i n g  b o n d e d  d e b t  sh al l c o n s t i t u t e  the b o a r d  of

' i
trustees for the original district having a bonded indebtedness 

and the officers of the reorganized or successor district shall 

be the orficcrs for the original district. If any original 

bonds of the reorganized district have been refinanced in any 

way, the state board of education shall rake the final Jeter- 

;i 169 '7! •

1 0.0 s

-105-



APPENDIX D
(continued)

1 a 
2

2a
3

1

4

5

6

7

8 

9
10
11
12
13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20 

21 

22 

23

H. 5 8 ^ 0

7

mination as to placement of the responsibility w ith the 1 or 
r>ore boards of education receiving the buildings as to their 
responsibility in acting as the board of trustees for the
original district. The _ _ •
board of each district assigned the responsibility as the -

board of trustees for dny bonded indebtedness of the divided
' i

district shall certify and order the levy of taxes for the 

bonded indebtedness in the name of the original district. ,

Sec. 17. Any time after 3 years following the reor­

ganization of a school district under this act, a district 

receiving a building having an existing bonded indebtedness 

and assuming the responsibilities set forth in section I d ,  

may assume the obligation of the bonded indebtedness in 

curred after December 8, 1932, of the school building 

attached to its district under the provisions of this act, 

and pay the same from the proceeds of a debt retirement 

tax levy spread uniformly over the territory of the reorganized 

or successor district when the electors of the reorganized 

or successor district approve an increase in the limitation 

on taxes for that purpose and the school tax electors of the 

district have approved the assumption of such bonded indebted­

ness. Assumption of the bonded indebtedness of an original 

school district does not release the territory of the ori­

ginal district from the final responsibility of paying the

obligation or rescind the increase in the limitation on

24 taxes pledged to the bond issue or available to it in tnc 

ill69 '71

-106-



1
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22 ‘
23

24

APPENDIX D
(continued)

H. 58*»0
8

original district., nor be construed as so doing. When the 

bonded indebtedness of an original district has been so 

assumed, the board of the reorganized or successor district 

shall certify and order the levy of taxes for the bonded 

indebtedness equivalent in terms of money to those required 

by the terms under which the indebtedness was originally in­

curred and carry out all provisions of the original bond 

contract. The election to assume the bonded indebtedness 

of an attached district may be held at any time after 3 years 

following the effective date of reorganization when a proposa! 

is placed before the school tax electors to increase the 

bonded indebtedness of the combined district.

Sec. 18. The state committee on reorganization of 

school districts shall continue in existence for purposes of

this act, notwithstanding any expiration date otherwise pro­

vided by law. '

Sec. 13. The school emergency loan revolving fund is 

created in the state treasury from which emergency loans 

shall be made to school districts as provided in this act.

The fund shall consist of sums appropriated by the legislature

plus repayments and interest on loans. The treasurer shall
. r . oc.o,0arentier any amount in the fund in excess of $ £ t h 4 t o

the general fund. Upon approval of an application for an 

emergency loan by concurrent resolution of the legislature 

'11 69 1 7 1

0

y £

-107-



APPENDIX D
(continued)

#  ......  ' .........•

9 H. 58AO .

or, when the legislature is not in session by majority vote

of the members of the special commission on appropriations

created by Act No. 120 of the Public Acts of 1937, as amended,

being sections 5.1 to 5-5 of the Compiled Laws of 19*18, the

state treasurer shall issue his warrant on the fund for the

amount of the loan. There is hereby appropriated from the

general fund to the school emergency loan revolving fund 
^ 3 oo/ cot. 00 

the sum of -$-yS0-,-£Sfh-&6.

Sec. 20. This act shall expire June 30, 1973.

4169 171

i.

-108-



APPENDIX E

By S c h o o l  B o a r d  i
BY UAL CODEX

*> F r c o  Press S t c f f  W r i U r

The Oakland County'j 
Board of E d u c a t i o n ! !  
Thursday dissolved the; 
debt - ridden C a r v e  rj 
School District in Royal; 
Oak Township and made ■ 
it par*, of the Oak Park ' 
School District. ;

| U n d e r  t h e  o r d e r ,  e f f e c t i v e  ' 
( i m m e d i a t e l y ,  O a k  P a r k  w i l l  
j a b s o r b  t h e  O c o r r e .
• W i t f  h i n g t o r ,  ( O  a ; v  r  r  A O l e  ~  •1: a  
f s e i  ; 3 o f r  = r 7 7 l  e  a  S e t  r . 'r . d  ,
j i r r r c - u E P v a n d  t h e  C a r v e r  D i s -  ■ 
j t r i e l ' s  S O O .O G O  d e b t .  •!

I I ) r .  A r t h u r  T a r k H a n .  p r o s l -  
; d e n t  < if  t h e -  O a l ;  P a r k  S c h o o l  
■ H o a r d ,  s a i d  t h e r e  w i t l  b e  n o  
| I m m e d i a t e  c h a n g e s  I n  t h e  
I C a r v e r  c j i s t r i c . t  u n t i l  ■ t h e  
! b o a r d  m e e t s  M o n d a y  t o  i n ­
i v e n t o r v  d a r v e r ' s  a s s e t s  a n d  
! l l a b l L i t i c s ]  . ■
: W h a t  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  t h e  f i n a l  -
s o l u t i o n  o f  C a r v e r ' s  l o n g  h i s t o r y  
o f  f i n a n c i a l  w o e s  w a s  t r i g g e r e d  
l a s t  A v g u s t  t h e  D e t r o i t
B o a r d  o f  E d u c a t i o n .  .

* $ * .
T H E  D E T R O I T  b o a r d  i n ­

f o r m e d  t h e  C a r v e r  d i s t r i c t  t h a t  
C a r v e r  s t u d e n t s  w o r . f d  r . o  l o n g e r  
h e  p e r m i t t e d '  t o  a t t e n d  h i g h ,  
s c h o o l  i n  D e t r o i t .  :

T h e  C a r v e r  d i s t r i c t  h a d  r . o  
h i g h  s c h o o l  * o f  i t s  o w n .  S t u d e n t s  
f r o m  t h e  n i n t h  t h r o u g h  l i k e .  ■ 
g r a d e s  a t t e n d e d  D e t r o i t ' s  

' N m  t h o r n  H i g h  S c h o o l  o n  a  
t u i t i o n  b a s i s .• -r f V ' < t i  • '■■••inn

. p a y m e n t s  t o  D e t r o i t ,  a n d  t h e  ■
. b o a r d  f i n a l l y  r u l e d  a g a i n s t  
* a c c e p t i n g  a n y  m o r e  C a r v e r  .
, . s t u d e n t s  b e c a u s e  o f  “ o v e r ­
; c r o w d i n g "  i n  t h o  D e t r o i t
i s c h o o l s .  i

' T h e  D e t r o i t  h o a r d ,  h o w e v e r ,  
i w i l l  p e r m i t  s t u d e n t s  f r o m  C a r -  
; v e r  - a l r e a d y  e n r o l l e d  i n  N o r t h e r n  
| t o  c o m p l e t e  h i g h  s c h o o l  t h e r e .

T h e  a c t i o n  l e f t  C a r v e r  w i t h  
r a b o i i t  4 0  n i n t h - g r a d e r s  w i t h  n o  
■ s c h o o l  t o  a t t e n d .  ■ ■
; v  »  *

____ _________________________  I

. . .  I , - ,  n j C i . u  o c u -
. d e n t s  '  i n t o  . s c h o o l s  e i t h e r  i n  
j F c r n d a l e  o r  O a k  P a r k  w e r e  
r e b u f f e d  b y  t h e s e  c o m m u n i t i e s . !  
w h i c h  a r e  a d j a c e n t  t o  R o y a l 1 

I O a k  T o w n s h i p .  ;j 1  h .o  C a r v e r  S c h o o l  B o a r d  r.e .t 
t h e  s t a g e  f o r  T h u r s d a y ' s  m o v e  ■ 

| b y  r e s i g n i n g  o n  m a s s e  m i  S e n t . '  02.  ̂,
j A s p o i l : : !  e l e c t i o n  t o  r e p l a c e  . 
. t h o  h o a r d  w a s  c a l l e d  f o r  O c t .  , 
i 2 d  b u t  n o t  o n e  v o t e r  s h o w e d  ■ 
j u p  a t  t h e  p o l l s ,  s o  t h e  C o u n t y  
| w a s  f o r c e d  i n  n e t .
! - F r e d  B e c k m a n ,  p r e s i d e n t  o f  
; t h e  f i v e - m e m b e r  O a k l a n d .  C o t i n ­
; t y  B o a r d  o f  E d u c a t i o n ,  s a i d  t h e  
’ b i g g e s t  f a c t o r  i n  t h e  d e c i s i o n  

t o  m a k e  C a r v e r  a  p a r t  o f  t h e  
O a k  P a r k  d i s t r i c t  w a s  t h e  g e o ­
g r a p h i c a l  l o c a t i o n  o f  O a k  P a r k .  •. » * «

' A D O P T  I D O  p e r s o n s  a t t e n d e d  
, a  m e e t i n g  i n  O a k  F a r i d  H i g h  
, S c h o o l  T h u r s d a y  n i g h t  w h i c h  

w e . a  i n t e n d e d  t o  a n s w e r  s o m e  
j o f  t h o  q u e s t i o n s  s u r r o u n d i n g  
j t h e  a c t i o n  b y  t h e  C o u n t y .

M a n y  o f  t h e i r  q u e s t i o n s  w e n t  
■ u n a n s w e r e d  b e c a u s e  s o m e  o f  
j t h e  p r o b l e m s  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  

m e r g e r  h a v e  b e e n  r e f e r r e d  t o  
. t h e  S t a t e  A t t o r n e y  G e n e r a l ' s  
* o f f  i f  e  f o r  a  r u l i n g .
' O n o  o f  t h e  m o s t  c r u c i a l  
! q u e s t i o n s  i s  w h e t h e r  r c s l -  
! d e n t s  o f  t h e  C a r v e r  d i s t r i c t  
1 w i l l  b e  m a d e  t o  p a y  s c h o o l  
I m d l c a g o  v o t e d  b y  p e o p l e  I n  
J t h e  O a k -  P a r k  d i s t r i c t .
' D r .  P a r k l l a n d  s a i d  t h o  O a k  ' 

P a r k  S c h o o l  B o a r d  w o u l d  u s e  
a l l . U a  I ' m d l t M c . s  t o  a c h i e v e  a n  
o r d e r l y  t r a n s i t i o n  t h a t  w i l l  
" c a m  t h e  r e s p e c t  o f  n i l  c i t i z e n s  
t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  s t a t e  a n d  n a ­
t i o n . "

C a r v e r  n o w  h a s  1 , 2 1 9  s t u - , '  
' • c r . l n ,  l . O . - . l  o f  w h o m  a t t e n d  
• U g h  s c h o o l  I n  D e t r o i t .

T h e  -10  r . i n t h - g r . i d c r n  a r e  n t -  
f- ’ c r h a g  m a k e r  h i t !  c l r s v c a  i n

C . v  c a r  S i im .-ii.

The Detroit Free Press, November 11, 1960
-109-



APPENDIX F

SOURCES OF REVENUE OBTAINED 

BY 54 METRO AREA DISTRICTS 
OF TOTAL REVENUE •

State Redistri-

District.
Total

Operating
Revenue

Local
Revenue

State
Aid

bution 
Federal 

Funds
of
ESEA

Federal
Direct
Aid

Allen Park 900.68 62.53 36.07 1.38 -0-
Berkley 903.62 58.41 40.08 1.44 0.05
Birmingham 1119.78 79.58 19.82 0.03 0.05
Bloomfield

Hills 1203.23 79.77 19.84 0.27 0.11
Centerline 870.23 67.05 21.91 0.72 -0-
Cherry Hill 738.03 37.49 60.01 2.48 -0-
Clarencevilie 935.05 61.51 37.68 0.72 0.07

Clawson 766.90 43.79 55.47 0.73 -0-
Crestwood (information not available)
Dearborn 1340.55 90.96 7.95 1.09 -0-

Dearborn Hts. 758.32 36.34 62.59 1.05 -0-
Detroit 916.68 48.16 40.04 7.71 4.07
East Detroit 856.07 50.41 48.39 0.95 0.22
Ecorse 1010.64 83.01 13.20 3.67 0.11
Fairlane (information not available)

Farmington 918.56 63.80 34.82 1.32 0.04

Ferndale 927.56 61.70 37.68 0.61 -0-

Fitzgerald 1051.33 82.24 17.0 0.75 -0-

- 1 1 0 -



APPENDIX F

l • (continued)

District

Total
Operating
Revenue

Local
Revenue

State
Aid

State Redistri­
bution of 

Federal ESEA 
Funds

Federal
Direct
Aid

Fraser 825.79 52.24 46.82 0.92 -0-

Garden City 775.42 33.94 64.65 1.29 0.11

Grosse Pointe 1195.05 87.21 12.66 0.13 -0-

Hamtramck 1106.76 80.18 12.49 1.53 5.78

Harper Woods 887.65 86.48 12.54 0.97 -0-

Hazel Park 987.98 42.48 44.93 3.04 0.41

Highland Park 1203.91 63.04 23.94 6.74 6.26

Inkster 880.62 24.89 59.77 13.69 1.64

Lakeshore 757.15 37.36 57.49 1.17 0.00 [less]

Lakeview 885.79 46.74 50.79 2.33 0.12

Lamphere 1018.27 71.21 27.45 1.32 -0-

Lincoln Park 729.70 53.35 44.61 2.02 -0-

Livonia 912.55 65.05 34.53 0.42 -0-

Madison Hts. 821.80 43.58 54.26 1.70 0.45

Melvindale 909.52 72.29 26.81 0.88 -0-

N. Dearborn Hts.892.73 63.07 36.12 0.81 -0-

Oak Park 1485.67 85.41 12.00 2.15 0.43

Redford Union 911.63 56.88 42.36 0.74 -0-

River Rouge 1393.23 92.13 2.9 4.66 0.22

Rivervievv7 1067.03, 97.78 2.16 0.00 -0-

Romulus 913.24 68.59 28.50 2.79 0.10

Roseville 820.56 44.73 53.36 1.84 0.05

Royal Oak 886.23 65.01 33.73 1.25 -0-

- 1 1 1 -

0



" ' APPENDIX F

District
Tota!^

Operating
Revenue

Local
Revenue

State
Aid

State^^edistri- 
but^Sn of 

Federal ESEA 
Funds

(continued)

Federal
Direct
Aid

South Lake 769.19 65.99 32.50 1.49 -0-
South Redford 1007.63 82.72 17.27 -0- -0-
Southfield 1039.35 79.56 19.66 0.60 0.18
Southgate 826.35 54.35 44.56 1.07 -0-
Taylor 809.07 47.05 51.08 1.76 0.09
Troy 1002.15 77.19 21.10 1.70 -0-
Van Dyke 1034.91 75.02 23.80 1.15 0.01
Warren 858.25 64.98 34.04 0.41 0.55
Warren Woods 753.37 40.85 58.19 0.94 -0-
Wayne 919.65 54.77 43.65 1.08 0.48
WTest Bloomfield 901.92 64.55 34.29 1.06 0.07
Westwood 929.39 60.65 37.05 1.90 0.38
Wyandotte 855.73 67.42 29.73 0.31 2.53

Sources: Ranking of Michigan Public Hicrh School - School Districts hv
Selected Financial Data, 1970, Bulletin 1012, Michi gan State 

ResultsDepartment of Education (1971); and Local District
Michi'gan Educat ionai Assessment Program, Michi can S-f-a-f-c
Department of Education (1971) , Defendants 1 Exhibit M13 .

- 1 1 2 -



APPENDIX G

School Notes

Attorney General Frank J .  
Kelley, chairman of the Mu­
nicipal Finance Commission, 
announced today that the 
Commission approved $5,- 
720,000.Oil of Tax Anticipa­
tion -Notes-Operating-Current 
Fiscal Tear for The Grosse 
Poinlc Public School System, 
Wayne County.

Attorney Genera! Kelley 
said, ''The proceeds will be ; 
used to operate the School; 
Disl: . t. These note s are to 
be c:Ted August 1, 1972, are, 
to h-e due April 1, 1873, and 
will entry a maximum in­
terest rate of C percent per 
annum." ;

Other members of the Mu- 
nicipa! Finance Commission 
are A l l i s o n  Green. State. 
Treaauier; and John W. Por­
ter, Superintendent of Public 
Instruction. I

Grosse Pointe News, August 10, 1972

- 113-

Copyright notice

© NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.

This collection and the tools to navigate it (the “Collection”) are available to the public for general educational and research purposes, as well as to preserve and contextualize the history of the content and materials it contains (the “Materials”). Like other archival collections, such as those found in libraries, LDF owns the physical source Materials that have been digitized for the Collection; however, LDF does not own the underlying copyright or other rights in all items and there are limits on how you can use the Materials. By accessing and using the Material, you acknowledge your agreement to the Terms. If you do not agree, please do not use the Materials.


Additional info

To the extent that LDF includes information about the Materials’ origins or ownership or provides summaries or transcripts of original source Materials, LDF does not warrant or guarantee the accuracy of such information, transcripts or summaries, and shall not be responsible for any inaccuracies.

Return to top