Brief of Appellant (Detroit Board of Education v. Bradley)
Public Court Documents
August 14, 1972
122 pages
Cite this item
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Case Files, Milliken Hardbacks. Brief of Appellant (Detroit Board of Education v. Bradley), 1972. b215ce68-53e9-ef11-a730-7c1e5247dfc0. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/8129e363-7d48-452f-9f27-6ca3207d2e12/brief-of-appellant-detroit-board-of-education-v-bradley. Accessed May 16, 2025.
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No. 72-8002
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE SCHOOL
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF DETROIT,
a school district of the first
class,
Appellant,
vs.
RONALD BRADLEY, ET AL,
Appellees.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Michigan
Southern Division
BRIEF
OF APPELLANT BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE SCPIOOL DISTRIC
OF THE CITY OF DETROIT, A SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE
_________FIRST CLASS AND OTHER DEFENDANTS
RILEY AND ROUMELL
George T. Roumell, Jr.
Louis D. Beer
Jane Keller Souris
Russ E. Boltz
C. Nicholas Revelos, Of Counsel
720 Ford Building
Detroit, Michigan 48226
Attorneys for Appellants and
certain other named Defendants
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Table of Authorities...... ......•......
Statement of Issues Presented for Review
Statement of the Case and Relevant Facts...... 6
Argument....................................... 20
I. ' THOUGH THE DISTRICT COURT USES THE
LABEL DE JURE SEGREGATION, THE COURT
IN ACTUALITY REDEFINED THE TERM SO
AS TO CHANGE ITS MEANING BY ELIMINATING
THE REQUIREMENT OF INTENT TO SEGREGATE.. 22
II. THE DISTRICT COURT HAS FURTHER DEPARTED
FROM PRESENT LAW IN DESCRIBING THE
DETROIT SCHOOL SYSTEM AS DE JURE SEGRE
GATED, OR DUAL: ABSENT A FINDING THAT
THE ACTS OF THE DETROIT SCHOOL AUTHORI
TIES ARE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE
CONDITION OF SEGREGATION...... ......... 33
III. THE MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION, THE SUPREME
COURT OF MICHIGAN, THE GOVERNOR OF
MICHIGAN> THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MICHI
GAN, MICHIGAN SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC
INSTRUCTION AND THE MICHIGAN STATE BOARD
OF EDUCATION, HAVE ALL RECOGNIZED THE
CARDINAL PRINCIPLE OF MICHIGAN SCHOOL
LAW, NAMELY, THAT THE MICHIGAN PUBLIC
SCHOOL SYSTEM IS SOLELY A STATE FUNCTION
WITH THE LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS BEING
MERELY INSTRUMENTALITIES OF THE STATE
CREATED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE CONVENIENCE.. 41
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE METROPOLITAN
REMEDY FOR THE DESEGREGATION OF THE
DETROIT SCHOOLS BECAUSE OF THE STATE'S
SOLE RESPONSIBILITY FOR EDUCATION IN
MICHIGAN, THE STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS LEAD
ING TO METRO?OLITANIZATION DEVELOPED
BY THE COURTS, AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF EQUITY FIRST ANNOUNCED BY THE
SUPREME COURT IN BROWN II, EACH OF WHICH
SUPPORTS SUCH A REMEDY................. 55
i
I
PAGE
V. AS A FACTUAL MATTER, THE DISTRICT COURT
WAS CORRECT IN ORDERING A METROPOLITAN
REMEDY BECAUSE FAILURE TO DO OTHERWISE
WOULD CONTINUE UNCONSITUTIONAL RACIAL
ISOLATION IN THE DETROIT SCHOOLS AND
CAUSE FURTHER DETROIT SCHOOL SEGREGA
TION, PARTICULARLY IN A SITUATION WHERE
■ NUMEROUS OTHER GOVERNMENTAL SERVICES
HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED ON A METROPOLITAN
SCOPE AND THE COMMUNITY IS METROPOLITAN
IN CHARACTER............................
VI. THE SUPREME COURT HAS ESTABLISHED THAT
NEITHER THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT, NOR THE
ORDERING OF THE EXPENDITURE OF STATE OR
LOCAL FUNDS, NOR EXISTING TEACHERS' CON
TRACTS CAN PREVENT A FEDERAL COURT FROM
ORDERING STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS TO
INSTITUTE A PLAN OF DESEGREGATION......
VII. IF SECTION 803 OF THE EDUCATION AMEND
MENTS OF 1972 IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND
SPECIFICALLY APPLICABLE, IT APPLIES
EQUALLY TO AN INTRA-CITY REMEDY AND A
METROPOLITAN REMEDY.....................
Relief Requested...............................
Appendix A
Appendix B
Appendix C
Appendix D
Appendix E
Appendix F
Appendix G
Article Detroit Free Press,
August 2, 1965................
Article Detroit Free Press,
October 7, 1968 ...............
Article Detroit News..........
House Bill 5840 ...............
Article Detroit Free Press,
November 11, 19 6 0 .............
School District Revenue Sources
Article Grosse Polnte News,
August 10 , 1972...............
. 96
. . 97
. 99
. .10°
. 10 9
. .no
113
n
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
-Page
Argersenger v. Hamlin, 92 S. Ct. 2006 (1972) 88
Attorney General v. Detroit Board of
Education, 154 Mich. 584, 118 N.W. 606 (1908) 42
Attorney General v. Lowrey, 131 Mich. 639, 92
N.W. 289 (1902) 42
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) 81
Bell v. School City of Gary, Indiana, 324 F.2d
209 (7th Cir. 1963) 26
Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D.
Mich. 1971) 62
Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1970) 7
Bradley v. Milliken, 438 F.2d 946 (6th Cir. 1971) 8, 15
Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, 338
F. Supp. ___ (E.D. Va. 1972) 62
Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond,
Civil No. 72 - 1058 (4th Cir. June 5, 1972) 63,64,65
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S.
483 (2954) 30,33,74
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas,
349 U.S. 294 (1955) 17,67,75,83
Burleson v. County Board of Election Commission
ers of Jefferson County, 308 F. Supp. 352
(E.D.Ark. 1970) 59
Burleson v. County Board of Election Commission
ers of Jefferson County, 432 F.2d 1356 59
(8th Cir. 1270)
Calhoun v. Cook, 332 F. Supp. 804 (M.D. Ga. 1971) 62
Calhoun v. Cook, 451 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1971) 62
Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School
District, 330 F. Supp. 1377 (1971)
iii
87
Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School
District, ____ F. 2d ____ (5th Cir., No. 71 - 28 36 39
2397, August 2, 1972) • ' '
Page
Child Welfare v. Kennedy School Dist., 220 Mich.
290, 189 N.W. 1002 (1922)
Clark v. Board of Education of Little Rock School
Dist., 426 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1970)
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, (1958)
Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile
County, 402 U.S. 33, (1971)
Davis v. School District of the City of Pontiac,
Inc.,,.443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1971)
Davis v. School District of the City of Pontiac,
Inc., 309 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1970)
Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 369 F.2d
55 (6th Cir. 1966)
Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 419 F.2d
1387 (6th Cir. 1969)
Downs v. Board of Education, 336 F.2d 988
(10 Cir. 1964) ■
Evans v. Ennis, 281 F.2d 385 (3rd Cir. 1960)
Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
Gilliam v. School Board, 345 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.
19 C 5)
43
78
57,83,84
58,63,70,75,
76,79,82
23,31,37,39
23,31
33
26,39
27
86
84,85
88
2 7
Gomilion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)
Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248 (1906)
Green v. County SchooJ Board of Nev; Kent County,
391 U.S. 430 (1968)
Griffin v. School Board of Prince Edv.’ard County,
3 7 7 U.S. 218 (3 964 )
58.81
84
29.63.70.81
84,89
IV
f
Page
p* St> Helena Parish School Board,197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961)
v: St- He-lena Parish School Board, 28 7
1 • 2d 176 -(5th Cir. 1961)
Haney v. County Board of Education of Sevier
■ County, 410 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969)
Godse11' 165 P. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich.
J?Rkin? v* U n s h i p of Morse School District 98 N.J. 483, 279 A.2d 619 (1971)
Kelley y. Metropolitan County Board of Educa
tion of Nashville and Davidson County, Term.,
---- **2d ____ (No. 71 1778-79, 6th CirMay 30, 1972) r* '
KFY2d QqriS<̂ ??K D '̂strict No. 1, Denver, 445 f .2a 990 (10th Cir. 1971)
L!?2d'7«” s t £ ° £ £ T m ) of Muoation' 448
Lm n (5toB« r t ° » 7 " iSh SCh001 EOard' 446 F -2d
Loi’isiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 85
s. Ct. 81/, 13 L ed 2d 709 (1965)
L (N?D.VOhioaIs64f “ UCati0n' 259 P - S W - 740
255 M i c h -
??aJd °f Educati°» of Men,phis,333 F .2a 661 (6th Cir. 1964)
No. K8 8- 71 (^D?°Mich?11972)EdUCatl0n/ ClVl1
°cl!».v».y?am o f Education' 250 F-S“PP- J000
Osborn v. Bank of United : tales, 9 Wheat 7 38
59
59
59
27
61,67
76,77,80,87
27,31,33
58
76,78
79
27
43
25
45
27
8 4
v
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.533 (1964)
Senghas v. L'Anse Creuse Public Schools, 368
Mich.557, 118 N.W. 2d 975 (1968)
Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967)
Spencer v. Kugler, 326 F.SuDp. 1235 (D.N.J.
(1971)
State v. Alabama, 304 F. 2d 583 (5th Cir. 1962)
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971)
Turner v. Warren County Board of Education,
313 F.Supp. 380 (E.D. N.C. 1970)
Page
58,88
43
25
65,66,67
25
61,63,64,68,70
75,76,77,79,81,87
59
United States v. Board of School Commissioners
of City of Indianapolis, 332 F. Supp. 655
(S.D; Ind. 1971)
United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of
Education, U.S. ,33 L Ed 75,92
S. Ct. (1972)
United States v. State of Texas, 447 F .2d 441
(5th Cir. 1971)
Wayne Circuit Judges v. Wayne County, 386 Mich.
1 (1971)
Webb v. Board of Education, 223 F. Supp. 466
(N.D. 111. 1963)
62
36,59,65,75
60
88
27
(1972)
4 3, 4!
Mich. 620, 171 N. T.7ill* 2d 545 (1969)
■.fright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 28,36,59,65,75U.S. , 33 I, Ed 2d 51, 92 s. Ct. --
FEDERAI, STATUTES AND RULES
Education Amendments of 1972, P.L. 92-318 (92d Congress
Second Session), §803.
90-94
vx
Page
MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION
Const 1835, Art., 10, §3 41
Const 1850, Art. 13, §1, 4 41
Const 1908, Art.■ 11/ §2, 9 •41,42,43
Const 1963, Art. 8, 5 2 , 3: 42, 53,65
Const 1963 Art. 9, §3 50
MICHIGAN STATUTES
MCLA 209.101, MSA 7.631 50
MCLA 211. 34, MSA 7.52 50
50
MCLA 211.148, MSA 7.206
51
MCLA 257.811 (c) MSA 9.2511(c)
51
MCLA 340.252(c) MSA 15.3252(c)
51
MCLA 340.361, MSA 15.3361
52
MCLA 340.402, MSA 15.3402
52
MCLA 340.431, MSA 15.3431
52
MCLA 340.447, MSA 15.3447
52
MCLA 340.567(a) , MSA 15.3567(1)
51
MCI,A 340.570, MSA 15.3570
MCLA 340.573, MSA 15.3573 52
vi i
Page
MCLA 340.575 MSA 15.3575 49,51,53
MCLA 340.587(a) MSA 15.3587(1) . 52
MCLA 340.612 MSA 15.3612 51
MCLA 340.616 MSA 15.3616 51,52
MCLA 340.688 MSA 15.3688 51
MCLA 340.732(g) MSA 15.3732(g) 51
MCLA 340.775 MSA 15.3775 52
MCLA 340.781 MSA 15.3781 51
MCLA 340.782 MSA 15.3782 51
MCLA 340.789 MSA 15.3789 51
MCLA 340.887(1), MSA 15.3887(1) 51
MCLA 388.201 MSA 15.1916 48
MCLA 388.371 MSA 15.1951 51
MCLA 388.611 MSA 15.1919(51) 50
MCLA 388.681 MSA 15.2299(1) 47
MCLA 388.691 MSA 15.2299(51) 47
MCLA 388.851 MSA 15.1961 52
MCLA 388.1010 (a) MSA 15.1023(10)(C) 51
MCLA 423.201 MSA 17.445(1) 88
MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL
OPINIONS
•
No. 880, 1949-1950 Report
(January 24, 1949) of the /attorney General 104
50
No. 1837,
(Nov. 8,
No. 2333,
(October
^52~!954 Report of the Attorney General
1955 Report of the Attorney General 56] 20, 1955) '
440
52
50
viii
Pace
No. 4097, 1961-1962 Report of the Attorney General 553
(October 8, 1962)
No. 4705, 1969-1970 Report of the Attorney General, 156
(July 7, 1970)
No. 4714, 1969-1970 Report of the Attorney General 201
(December 1, 1970)
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Northwest Ordinance of 1787
2 Constitutional Convention Official Record, 1961, p3396
Annual Report, Committee on School District Reorganization
1968 Journal of Senate 422 (March 1, 1968)
Bulletin No. 1005, Michigan State Department of Education
(1970)
Bulletin 1012, Michigan State Department of Education
(1971)
Annual Report, Committee on School District Reorganization
1968 Journal of the Senate (March 1, 1968)
Michigan State Board of Education Bulletin No. 1005
1968 Journal of the House of Representatives,1965
41
4 4
47
45
51
47,57
45
49
IX
No. 72-8002
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE SCHOOL
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF DETROIT,
a-school district of the first
class,
Appellant,
vs.
RONALD BRADLEY, et al,
Appellees.
/
BRIEF
OF APPELLANT BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT
OF THE CITY OF DETROIT, A SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE
FIRST CLASS AND OTHER DEFENDANTS_____________ * I.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I. Though the District Court used the label "de jure"
segregation, has said Court, in actuality, redefined
the term so as to change the meaning by eliminating
the requirement of the intent to segregate?
The Court below answered "No".
The Defendant-Appellants Board of
Education of the School District of
The City of Detroit, and other Defendants,
contend the answer is "Yes".
-1-
II.
III.
Has the District Court furthar departed from precedent
in finding de jure segregation in the Detroit school
system absent a finding that acts of the school autho-
'rities are the proximate cause of the condition of
segregation?
The Court below answered "No".
The Defendant-Appellants Board of
Education of the School District of
the City of Detroit, and other Defendants,
contend the answer is "Yes".
Based on the Michigan Constitution, decisions of
the Michigan Supreme Court, statements by the
Governor of Michigan, opinions of the Attorney
General of Michigan, and actions of both the
Michigan Superintendent of Public Instruction and
the Michigan State Board of Education, is it a
cardinal principle of Michigan school lav/ that the
Michigan public school system is solely a State
function v/ith the local school districts being
merely instrumentalities of the State created
for administrative convenience?
The Court below answered "Yes".
If there must be a remedy, the Defendant-
Appellants Board of Education of the
School District of the City of Detroit,
and other Defendants, agree.
-2-
Did the District Court abuse its discretion in
ordering a metropolitan remedy for the desegre
gation of the Detroit schools because of the
-State's sole responsibility for education in
Michigan, the step-by-step process leading to
metropolitanization developed by the courts,
and general principles of equity first announced
by the Supreme Court in Brown II, each of which
supports such a remedy?
The Court below answered "Yes".
If there must be a remedy, the Defendant-
Appellants Board of Education of the
School District of the City of Detroit,
and other Defendants, agree.o ^
Was the District Court, as a factual matter,
correct in ordering a metropolitan remedy, because
failure to do otherwise would continue unconsti
tutional racial isolation in the Detroit schools
and cause further Detroit school segregation,
particularly in a situation where numerous other
governmental services have been developed on a
metropolitan scope and the community is metropolitan
in character?
The Court below answered "Yes".
If there must be a remedy, the Defendant-
Appellants Board of Education of the
-3-
School District of the City of Detroit,
and other Defendants, agree.
VI.
VII.
Has the Supreme Court established that neither
the Eleventh Amendment nor the ordering of the
expenditure of State or local funds nor existing
teachers' contracts can prevent a federal court
from ordering State and local officials to
institute a plan of desegregation?
The Court below answered "Yes".
If there must be a remedy, the Defendant-
Appellants Board of Education of the
School District of the City of Detroit,
and other Defendants, agree.
If Section 803 of the education amendment of
1972 is Constitutional and specifically applicable,
does it apply equally to an intra-city remedy and
a metropolitan remedy?
The Court below did not answer this
question.
The Defendant-Appellants Board of
Education of the School District of
the City of Detroit, and other Defendants,
contend the answer is "Yes".
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS
A. PROCEDURE BELOW: Plaintiffs commenced this liti-
' gation by filing a Complaint on August 18, 1970, against the
Board of Education of the City of Detroit, its members and
the then-Superintendent of Schools, as well as the Governor,
Attorney General, State Board of Education and State Superin
tendent of Public Instruction of the State of Michigan. Plaintiffs
challenged tile Constitutionality of Act 48 of the Public Acts
of 1970 of the State of Michigan as it affected certain plans
of the Detroit Board of Education, and also alleged that the
Detroit Public School System was and is segregated on the basis
of race as a result of the official policies and actions of
the Board of Education. After making said allegations, the
Plaintiffs in two and one-half pages of pleadings asked for
certain relief,including preliminary injunctions requiring the
Board of Education to implement a plan of desegregation known
as the "April 7, 1970" plan restraining implementation of the
aforementioned Act No. 48 of the Michigan Public Acts of 1970;
restraining the Board of Education from all further school
construction and requesting permanent decrees concerning the
above; and enjoining the Board of Education from building
schools, approving policies, curriculum and programs "which
are designed to or have the effect of maintaining, perpetuating
-6-
and supporting racial segregation in the Detroit School System";
and ordering Defendant School Board to institute a plan of
desegregation.
This case was initially tried on Plaintiffs' motion for
preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of the
aforementioned Act 48 in order to permit the so-called April 7,
1970 plan to be implemented. The District Court ruled that
the Plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction, did
not rule on the Constitutionality of Act 48, and granted a
motion dismissing the cause as to all of the State Defendants.
B. PRE-TRIAL APPEALS: This Court in Bradley v. Milliken,
433 F.2d 897,989 (6th Cir.1970), held that the District Court
did not abuse its dis:retion in denying the motion for prelimi
nary injunction, but reversed the trial court in part, holding
that portions of Act 48 were unconstitutional and that the State
Defendants should remain in the suit.
Subsequently, the Plaintiffs sought to have the District
Court direct the Defendant, Detroit Board, to implement the
"April 7th" plan prior to trial. The Court did not order
implementation of the "April 7th" plan, but, instead, adopted
a plan submitted by the Board of Education.
Plaintiffs again appealed to this Court, and again, the
Court held that the District Court had not abused its discretion
t
-7-
in refusing to adopt the April 7, 1970 plan. This Court
.furthermore remanded with instructions to proceed immediately
to a trial on the merits of Plaintiffs-' allegations about
the Detroit School System. Bradley v. Milliken, 438 F .2d 946
(6th Cir.1971).
C. RULING OF SEPTEMBER 27, 1972: The trial on the
issue of segregation began April 6, 1971, and was concluded
on July 22, 1971, after consuming 41 trial days.
On September 27, 1971, the District Court issued a
"Ruling on Issue of Segregation," (App. Ial94). In that Ruling
at page 3} the District Court noted that at the close of
Plaintiffs' case it had ruled that a prima facie case of segre
gation had been presented. Further, from page 4 to page 22,1 2
the District Court made findings of fact, which are summarized
as follows:
First, the District Court analyzed the population
patterns, both of the community at large and the student popu
lation in Detroit schools, and found that not only was Detroit
becoming predominantly Black, and growing more so, but so were
its schools. Projecting present population patterns into the
future, the District Court noted at page 5 that by 1980-1981
the Detroit schools will be 80.7% Black, and by 1992 will be
virtually 100% Black if present trends continue.
1 App. Ia]96.
2 App. Ial9 6-211.
-8-
C
V 1
Secondly, the Court found that out of 319 schools in
the Detroit School System, 30 had no White pupils (9.4%) and
11 had no -Black pupils (3.4%). Ruling,at pspes 7-81 The Court
also found that certain schools, not identified as to race,
had certain conditions indicating a lower socio-economic
status than the city-wide average. Ruling, at page 8.2
Following this, the Court stated:
"The City of Detroit is a community generally
divided by racial lines. Residential segre
gation within the city and throughout the
larger metropolitan area is substantial, per
vasive and of long standing." Ruling, at page
8. (Emphasis added) .....
* * *
"While the racially unrestricted choice of
Black persons and economic factors may have
played some part in the development of this
pattern of residential segregation, it is,
in the main, the result of past and present
practices and customs of racial discrimination,
both public and private, which have and do
restrict the housing opportunities of Black •
people." Ruling, at page 9.4
In particular, the District Court attributed this dis-
cx'imination, at the public level, in the first place to the
United States Government, not a party here: "For many years
FHA and VA openly advised and advocated the maintenance of
"harmonious neighborhoods," i_.e., racially and economically
harmonious." Ruling, at page 9? Other than a general state
ment that "the actions or the failure to act by the responsible
I~7^pT- Ial99T
2 App. Ial99-200.
3 App. Ia200.
4 App. Ia200.
5 App. Ia200-201
-9-
school authorities, both city and State, were linked to these
other governmental units," Ruling, at page 9,̂ the manner in
which the' Board of Education was responsible for such acts of
the FHA and VA was not established. See, Ruling, at pages
29-10.
Concerning the acts of the State Defendants, the
District Court in its Ruling on Segregation noted that the
State Board of Education and the Michigan Civil Rights Commission
had issued a Joint Policy Statement on the Quality of Education
Opportunity in 1966. Included in this joint policy statement
was a finding that local school boards should consider racial
imbalance in the construction of schools so as to maximize
integration. The State Board of Education, in its School Plan
ning Handbook, had also similarly warned of the problems of
segregated schools. Notwithstanding such policies of the State,
the District Court found: "The State Defendants have similarly
failed to take any action to effectuate these policies." Ruling
at Page 13. ^
The District Court also found that the State had acted
to maintain the racial imbalance resulting in monoracial
schools in the City of Detroit: The District Court noted that
the State had refused to provide authorization for funds for
transportation for the integration of the Detroit schools,
v/hile providing similar transportation funds regardless of 1 2 3
1 App. Ia201.
2 App. Ia200-201.
3 App* Ia204. -10-
the intended use for other school district through
out the State. In addition, the District Court found
other financial discrimination, such as bonding limitations
and the Micnigan state school aid formula, as direct causes
of the monoracial character of Detroit schools. See
generally, Ruling,at page 14.1 Similarly, the District Court
noted that the State of Michigan has at times acted to re
organize the school district of the City of Detroit, and
moreover.
"The State acted through Act 48
to impede, delay and minimize
racial integration in Detroit
schools. The first sentence
of Sec. 12 of the Act was di
rectly related to the April
7, 1970 desegregation plan.
The remainder of the section
sought to prescribe for each
school in the eight districts
criterion [sic] of "free
choice" (open enrollment)
and "neighborhood schools"
("nearest school priority
acceptance"), which had as
their purpose and effect the
maintenance of segregation."
Ruling at page 15. 2 1 2
1 App. Ia204.
2 App. Ia205.
-11-
In summary, the District Court found that the Board
did the following:
(1) Operating schools in a city with
established residential segregation,
caused by federal agencies in part,
and which action was joined in by
unspecified "acts" or "failures to act";
(2) Creation of optional attendance zones -
while noting, that specifically the Board .
in 1959 hired Merle Ilenrickson to eliminate,
and had, in fact, with minor exceptions,
eliminated optional attendance zones, prior
to the filing of the Complaint;
(3) In one or two isolated instances, bussed
Black students past White schools to
Black schools, and "only" once bussed
White students to Black schools;
(4) In one instance, built a school and estab
lished its attendance zone which may have
contained Black students; and
(5) Participated in construction of racially
identifiable schools.
These acts caused the District Judge to state:
"The natural and actual effect of these acts
and failures to act has been the creation
and perpetuation of school segregation."
Ruling, at page 12.̂ -
It must be recognized that Detroit has not had a dual
1 App. la203.
• •
system of public education since 1869. These findings of very
isolated instances were made in the background of the nation's
fifth largest system having over 319 school buildings, 299,500
students and 12,229 faculty members, plus administrative and
other school employees. It is a large governmental unit which
is most difficult to manage. Yet, after close scrutiny, only
isolated acts were found, many of which were found to have been
corrected or were already in the process of being corrected. '
Recognizing the sheer magnitude of the Detroit school
system, the District Court was obviously concerned in making
its findings of d£ jure discrimination, for, in spite of such
findings, the Court was moved to state:
"It would be unfair for us not to recognize
the many fine steps the Board has taken to .
advance the cause of quality education for
all in terms of racial integration and human
relations. The most obvious of these is in
the field of^faculty integration." Ruling,
at page 15. 1 .
The Court continued, Ruling, pages 15-20? to find that the Detroit
schools had an exemplary record of faculty integration. While
in 1961 the Detroit system had a faculty ratio of 78.1% White to
21.6% Black, by October, 1971 that ratio had changed to 56.4%
White to 42.9% Black. As of October, 1970, only six schools in
the entire system had no Black faculty members; over 124 had 50%
or more Black faculty members. As of October, 1971, out of 319
schools, only four do not have Black faculty members and now 149
have more than 50% Black faculty members. 1 2
1 App. Ia 2 0 5.
2 App. Ia205 - Ia209.
-13-
t
1
i■i
1
!
i
The Court then concluded:
"The Detroit School Board has, in many other
instances and in many other respects, under
taken to lessen the impact of the forces of
segregation and attempted to advance the cause
of integration...." Ruling, at page 20.-*-
Continuing, the Court noted at least seven such instances, calling
them "pioneering," Ruling, at page 21: ^
(1) The Board denied use of its facilities
to groups practicing racial discrimination;
(2) Refusal by the Board to allow its facilities
to be used for discriminatory apprentice
training programs;
(3) Significant placement efforts on behalf of
Black students in the building crafts and
industry;
(4) The Board successfully brought about a sub
stantial increase in the percentage of Black
students in apprenticeship programs;
(5) It was the first State agency in Michigan to
effectuate a policy of requiring contractors
with which it dealt to take effective steps
to insure equal employment opportunities in
their work forces;
(6) It was a pioneer in the use of multi-ethnic
instructional material significantly influ
encing publishers thereby.
(7) The Detroit Board "has opposed State legislation
which would have the effect of segregating the
district." Ruling, at pages 20-21J (Emphasis added).
1 App. Ia209.
2 App. Ia209-210.
3 App. Ia209.
-14-
In concluding its Findings of Fact, the District Court
ruled:
"The principal causes [of segregation]
undeniably have been population movement
and housing patterns, but State and local
governmental actions, including school
board actions, have placed a substantial
- role in promoting segregation." Rulincr,
at page 22.1 ----- ^
However, in the very next sentence on page 22, the
Court revealed its true finding and thinking; namely, that
this is a "no-fault" situation, at least on the part of the.
Detroit Board of Education, when the Court said:
"It is, the Court believes, unfortunate that
we cannot deal with public school segregation
on a no-fault basis, for if racial segregation
in our public schools is an evil, then it
should make no difference whether we classify
it de jure or de facto."
D. THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE AND APPE/iL FROM OCTOBER
4, 1972 ORDER: Following this Ruling, a pre-trial conference
on the issue of a remedy was held, with the Court setting a time
table for the presentation of proposed implementation plans.
At that time, the Court indicated that its findings of fact
and conclusions of law on the issue of segregation were final.
Subsequently, the Board of Education appealed to this Court
from what it thought was a final decision of the District
Court. This Court disagreed. 438 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1971). 1 2
1 App. Ia 210.
2 App. Ia 210.
E. DISTRICT COURT RULINGS ON REMEDIES: On March 24, 1972,
the District Court ruled that it must, of necessity, fashion
a remedy metropolitan in scope. In so doing, the Court felt
the necessity of choosing "the alternative or alternatives
which promise realistically to work now and hereafter to pro
duce the maximum actual desegregation." Ruling on Propriety
of Considering a .Metropolitan Remedy, March 24, 1972, at pages
Essential in the District Court's decision were two
questions, presented by the State Defendants and the interven
ing suburban school districts, respectively. Upon challenge
by the State Defendants that the delegation of power from the
State to the school districts vests the school districts "with
sovereign powers which may not be disturbed by either the State
or the Court." Ruling (March 24, 1972), at pages 2-3.2 The
Court responded by saying:
The State cannot evade its Constitutional responsi
bilities by a delegation of powers to local units
of government. The State Defendants position is in
error in two other respects: 1: The local school
districts are not fully autonomous bodies, for to
the extent it has seen fit, the State retains control
and supervision; and 2: It assumes that any metropo
litan plan, if one is adopted, would, of necessity,
require the dismantling of school districts included
in the plan." Ruling (March 24, 1972), at page 3.3
The suburban school districts charge that, absent findings
1
2
3
App. Ia 4 41.
App. Ia 4 41.
App. Ia441. -16-
of de jure segregation by them, they may not be included in
any remedy. While noting a lack of Supreme Court direction
in this regard, the Court rejected the argument by noting
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 at 301 (1955) (Brown
II):
"The courts may consider problems related
to administration, arising from the physical
condition of the school plant, the school
transportation system, personnel, revision
of school districts and attendance areas into
compact units to achieve a system of deter
mining admission to the public schools on a
non-racial basis, and revision of local laws
and regulations which may be necessary in
solving the foregoing problems." Ruling,
(March 24, 1972) at page 4.1
The Court concluded by noting that an intra-city plan
proved inadequate, that it would be required to consider a
metropolitan remedy for desegregation.
Subsequently, on March 28, 1972, the District Court
rejected all Detroit-only plans presented to it, since it was
found that no plan could prevent the massive re-segregation of
the Detroit schools. Speaking of Plaintiffs' Plan (which the
Court found "would accomplish more desegregation than now
obtains" or would result from other plans),the Court found,
inter alia:
"(1) The plan would make Detroit schools
completely racially identifiable as
Black, with some schools 75% to 90%
Black; and
1 App. Ia 44 2. -17-
(2) It would change a bi-racial school system
to one. perceived absolutely as Black,
thereby increasing "White flight" to the
suburbs and correlatively, the Black student
population."
See,Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav; On Detroit-Only Plans
of Desegregation (March 28, 1972), at pages 2-4! With these
findings, the Detroit-only plan would soon result in a virtually
all-Black Detroit school system surrounded by White suburbs. The
Court rejected intra-city plans, in toto, saying:
"[R]elief of segregation in the public schools
of the City of Detroit cannot be accomplished
within the corporate geographical limits of the
City." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav/
On Detroit-Only Plans of Desegregation (March 28,
1972), at page 5.
Drawing upon these two rulings on the scope of the
remedy for the segregation it perceived, the District Court
established the perimeters of a metropolitan remedy on June 14,
1972, in its "Ruling on Desegregation Area and Order for Devel
opment of Plan of Desegregation." In that Ruling and Order,
the District Court established a panel to design plans of inte
gration for Detroit and 53 metropolitan school districts,
subject to its appioval, within certain established guidelines.
F. DISTRICT COURT'S CERTIFICATION OF APPEALABLE ORDERS:
On July 20, 1972, the District Court certified that certain
orders, those above included, involve controlling questions
of law as contemplated by 28 U.S.C. §1292 (b), and that they 1 2
1 App. Ia457-458.
2 App. Ia459. -18-
were final within the meaning of Rule 54(b), F.R.C.P. On the
same date, this Court granted the motion for leave to appeal of
the State Defendants, and further ordered that the cause be ad
vanced on the docket for hearing on August 24, 1972. The Court
also granted the motion for stay pending appeal of the District
Court's Order for Acquisition of Transportation, and stayed all
other proceedings in the District Court other than planning pro
ceedings .
On July 20, 1972, the Defendants Detroit Board of Education
and others filed their notice of appeal as to orders made final
pursuant to F.R.C.P.54(b).
-19-
A R G U M E N T
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
' The District Court redefined the legal meaning of the
term "de jure segregation". The Court made no findings of
intent on the part of the Detroit School Board to segregate.nor
did it make a finding that there was a causal connection between
any of the acts which the Detroit School Board undertook and the
existence of segregation in the City of Detroit.
The only possible way for this Court of Appeals to
find a basis for a Constitutional violation is to change the
existing established body of school desegregation lav.7. For these
reasons, there should be no remedy as there has not been a
Constitutional violation. Thus, this Court should reverse the
decision of the District Court that de jure segregation was present,
as a matter of law, and order that the Complaint filed herein be
dismissed. .
If this Court should find that there is a basis for
a Constitutional remedy, the only remedy is the remedy chosen by
the District Court: to-wit; a metropolitan remedy, and this Court
should affirm the District Court's decisions thereon. This follows
because of the pervasive control of the State over education in
Michigan; the fact that local school districts, including the
Detroit district, are mere instrumentalities of the State and that
their actions are those of the State: the fact that the relevant
-20-
community is clearly the metropolitan Detroit community; the
fact that a number of courts have step-by-step laid the legal
foundation for the ordering of a metropolitan remedy; and the
fact that equity beginning with Brown II, as reaffirmed in
Swann, clearly gives a federal district court the right to fashion
a metropolitan remedy. There are no Constitutional prohibitions
against doing so. Furthermore, the United States Supreme
Court has in the past approved federal court orders requring
State and local expenditures to protect Constitutional rights.
In regard to remedy if Section 803 of the Education
Amendment of 1972 is Constitutional and specifically applicable,
it applies equally to an intra-city remedy and a metropolitan
remedy. .
21
T11OUGII TIIE DISTRICT COURT USED THE I ABEL DE JURE
SEGREGATION, THE COURT IN ACTUALITY REDEFINED THE
TERM SO AS TO CHANGE ITS MEANING BY ELIMINATING
THE REQUIREMENT OF INTENT TO SEGREGATE.
The District Court found certain actions and inactions
of the Detroit school authorities, such as the creation and
alteration of attendance zones, feeder school patterns and
grade structures, had as their "natural, probable and actual"
consequence the segregation of certain Detroit schools at certain
points in time. In one instance, the creation and maintenance
of optional attendance zones, the Court found segregation was
the "natural, probable, foreseeable and actual" consequence. In
the main these findings were made without a finding that such* »
actions had as their purpose or intent the segregation of Black
students from Whites. True, the District Court did so. find as
to the construction of one elementary school after 41 days of
trial court scrutiny of a vast system involving 319 schools,
289,000 students, and over 12,000 faculty members. 338 F.Supp.
at 488. When the Court shifts from specific instances to dis
cussing the school system generally, it does not in setting forth
the principles requisite to a system-wide finding enumerate among
them any intent to operate a segregated system. It views the
finding of some one purposeful act at some time to be
without any general finding of purpose.
sufficient,
\
Nor cioes the District Court, although invited to do so
by the Plaintiffs (Plaintiffs' Proposed Finding of Fact, P. 20)
infer a general intent to segregate from a pattern of specific
actions as did the District Court in Davis v. School District of
£l^-Qf_Pontiac, Inc., 309 F.Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1970) aff'd. 443
F* 2d 573 (6th Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 405 U.S. 223 (1971). After
reviewing the school district's attendance boundary line decisions
and school location decisions, the Court noted:
"Although, as the District Court stated,
each decision considered alone night not
compel the conclusion that the Board of
Education intended to foster segregation,
taken together, they support the conclu
sion that a purposeful pattern of racial
discrimination has existed in the Pontiac
school system for at least 15 years."
443 F.2d at 576.
The Court variously noted that the Pontiac Board had "inten
tionally utilized" its powers, "did a great deal to create the pat
terns presently existing" and "played a major role in the develop-
raent and growth of a segregated situation". 309 F.Supo. at 741-742.
No such findings were made by the District Court here against the
Detroit Board.
The requisite finding that the Detroit Board of Education
acted with the general purpose or policy of operating a segregated
school system is simply not there. Not only is there no language
m the District Court’s opinion making a finding based on such an
inference, but the Court specifically rejects the kind of pattern
which led tne Court to find in Davis (Pontiac) a purposeful attempt
to segregate the system, instead finding "many fine steps" taken
1 .
-23-
by Ihe Detroit Board in terms of racial integration. 338 F.Supp. at 589.
Particular refe^fcce was made by the Court^^o the stellar job
that the Detroit Board has done in integrating faculty including
since 1960 increasing the black representation among its teachers
from 23.3% to 42.1% and among its administrators from 4.5% to 37.8%;
having the highest percentage of black teachers among northern
scnool systems in the country; decreasing the number of schools with
out black teachers from 41 to 4 and increasing the number of schools
having more than 50% black faculty to 124 out of 319. App. la 205-209
These are but a few C l the many examples that the Court found as to
positive faculty integration policies on the part of the Detroit Board
If the Detroit Board had any general intent or policy to segregate its
school system then such policies toward faculty integration would
surely be inconsistent with such purpose. This explains why the Dis
trict. Court could not find the necessary action under the classic
definition or de jure segregation, i.e., intent on the part of the
Detroit Board to segregate. In addition the Court discussed many
other advances made by the Detroit Board:
The Detroit Scnool Board has, in many other
instances and in many other respects, under
taken to lessen the impact of the forces of
segregation and attempted to advance the cause
of integration. Perhaps the most obvious one
was the adoption of the April 7 Plan. Among
other t.nings, it has denied the use of its faci
lities to groups which practice racial discrimina
tion; it does not permit the use of its facilities
for Discriminatory apprentice training programs;
it has opposed state legislation which would have
the effect of segregating the district; it has
wormed to place black students in craft positions
in industry and the building trades; it has brought
about a substantial increase in the percentage of
black students in manufacturing and construction
trade apprentice-ship classes; it became the first
public agency in Micnigan to adopt and implement a
policy requiring affirmative act"of contractors with
which .i v deals to insure equal employment opportu
nities in their work forces; it has been a leader
-24-
I
:^^pi once ring the use of mu^^L-ethnic instruc
tional material, and in so doing has had an
impact on publishers specializing in producing
school texts and instructional materials; and'1
it has taken other noteworthy pioneering steps
to advance relations between the white and black
races." 338 F.Supp. at 591-592.
The Detroit Eoard questions the implicit determination by
the Court that absent findings the Detroit Board acted with purpose
or intent to operate a racially segregated school system, and absent
findings that such action caused the segregation of the system, the
Court may properly undertake to apply comprehensive remedies previ
ously applied to the eradication "root and branch" of de jure segre
gated school systems.
The District Court's Conclusions of Law 2 and 4 make clear its
rejection of the current doctrine of de_ jure segregation, 338 F.Supp.
at 592 (App. Ia211 Vol. Ia). The Court found it necessary to cite
cases other than school desegregation cases, i.e., Sims v. Georgia
389 U.S. 404 (13G7) , and State v. Alabama, 304 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.
1962) to read out the requirement of motive or intent which is neces
sary for a finding of d_e jure school segregation.- For School
Board conduct to be actionable
1/ Tne District Court, in its Conclusions of Law 5, 338 F.Supp.
592-593, ruled that the Detroit Board's practice of s’
tendance zones on a north-south rather than an east-vs
neld to conform to racial residential dividing lines,
of lav;, an act of de jure seqreg;
Education of Memohls ,“333 F.2d 6(
tne District Court is clearly in error. That
formulatiiu a remeo.v
Lav; 5 , 338 F.Supp. a-U
:ice of shaping schoo1 at-
n east-wes t orientation ,
;g lines , is as a matter
! Northcross v. Board of
19 6 4). On this poini-rcase held only that i -L ‘ *system r Previously C..G v.. L3 _
— o , cue x . m y ex scnooi oouncaries
Pr̂ SGrYe a maximum amount of segregation is impermissible. 333 F.5
at 663-664. Clearly, the school boundaries in the City of Detroit had
been originally established in a north-south orientation, because of
the arterial system of streets of the City of Detroit and the bus
transportation routes in existence, for which there is credible record
evidence. Henri ckson de jure, Tr. p.2931). Aop. IUa285. It is eaual-
!y apparent that they were not drawn, "where the Board is under com
pulsion to desegregate the schools." 333 F.2d at 664. For the Dis
trict Court to hold the Detroit Board's decision to draw at some remot:
time in the past its lines in such manner to be per se de jure segre
gation is clearly excessive. ' " —
L -25-
on a system-wide basis, there must be a finding of intent or
purpose to segregate the system:
"[T]he crucial fact to be found is whether
the racial imbalance was intentionally caused
by gerrymandering or by other alleged discrim
inatory practices on the part of the Board."
Deal v. C.incinnat.i Board of Education, 369
F*2d 55, 64 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 847 (1967); on remand, 419 F.2d T387
(6th Cir. 3969), cert, denied, 402 U.S. 962
(1971) .
By writing out intent, the District Court has redefined
de jure segregated school systems. Counsel is unaware of
any previous finding that a de jure segregated system can
exist absent a finding of intent or purpose to segregate
the system. The cases are legion in which courts, including
this Circuit, have noted the existence of racial imbalance
absent an intent to segregate and found no de jure segre
gation, and, therefore, no cause of action; Bell v. School
City of Gary, Indiana, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964) (no Constitutional duty to
change innocently arrived at school attendance districts
merely because shifts in population had increased or decreased
the percentage of Black or White pupils); Downs v. Board of
Edu^tion, 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964 ), cert, denied, 380
U.S. 914 (1965) (no requirement to abandon or destroy the
neighborhood school system even though it results in racial
imbalance where it was maintained with no intention or pur
pose to maintain or perpetuate segregation); Deal v. Cincinnati
52fl£d_of^^uc_^ion, supra, (no Constitutional duty to bus
children out of their neighborhoods or transfer classes to
alleviate racial imbalance caused not by the school board
but by the racial character of the neighborhoods in which
the schools were located); Keyes v. School District No. 1,
Denver, 445 F .2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), cert, granted,
404 U.S. 1036 (1972) (showing of racial animus required
to support findings of de jure segregation in local schools).
See also Gillian v. School Board, 345 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.
1965); Olson v. Board of Education
(F.D. N.Y. 19 6 6); appeal dismiss ed,
Lynch v. Board of Education. 229 F :
1964); Webb v. Board of Education. :
111. 1963); Henry v. Godsell, 165 F
1958).
-27-
Counsel is aware of the decision by the Fifth
Circuit in Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent
School District on August 2, 1972 (No. 71-2397) in which
that Circuit did find actionable segregation without
requiring a finding cf intent. But that decision under
took not to find de_ jure segregation, but specifically
to abolish the distinction between do facto and de jure,
segregation, citi.ng the instant case under review here
as authority for so doing." In Cisneros, the Court
stated:
"Thus, we discard the anodyne
dichotomy of classical d_e facto
and de j ure segregation ... We
therefore hold that the racial
and ethnic segregation that
exists in the Corpus Christi
school system is unconstitutional
-- not de facto , not de j ure,
but unconstitutional." Slip Op.
at 10, 13.
Counsel is further aware of the recent Supreme Court
decisions in Wright v, Counci3. _of City of _Enpo r i a, U .
40 USLW 4817 (June 20, 1972), holding that a city could
not create a new school district separate from that of
the surrounding county where its effect would impede the
process of court-ordered dismantling of a dual system. In
such a situation, school board action need not be judged
in terms of its "dominant" purpose, but rather as to the
effect of the action, as earlier cases found intent was
established by the trial court. The Fifth Circuit cited this
holding in Cisneros, supra, in support of its decision to
abolish the de facto - de jure distinction in the determina
tion of the existence of violation of Constitutional rights.
Perhaps the better view is that, in the context of an
undisputed dual system the Supreme Court has done nothing
more them explain once again that segregation once found
must be terminated "root and branch." Green v. County
School of Hew Kent Countv, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). In either
event, it is indeed certain that no such finding as to
effect alone has to this date supported a finding on de_ jure
grounds of an initial violation of Constitutional rights
by a school board.
It would be disingenuous for the Detroit Board to argue
that as the District Court here present did not find intent
-29-
e
or purpose to operate a segregated system that the Court thereby
did not find fault with the Board. The Court makes clear that
while it believes that it would be far better to operate on a
"no-fault" basis, it nevertheless is operating on a basis of
fault finding. The District Court has not undertaken to abolish
the concept of de jure/de facto segregation, as in Cisneros;
rather it has redefined it by creating the novel concept of
culpable, though non-intentional, segregation defined by the
foreseeability or probability of a segregatory result. This
notion of, for lack of a better term "negligent segregation"
based on the foreseecibility or probability of segregatory conse
quences of action not found to be taken with any evil purpose
strains the rationale of the concept, of de jure segregation beyond
the breaking point. It leaves 'no cognizable difference between
de facto and de jure segregated schools. If there is a difference
between the two, it is surely not in the general educational-
effect of the condition of segregation. The de_ facto segregated
school is just as racially identifiable as the de jure segregated
school, and whatever educational consequences flow from that
condition will flow as freely in the one case as in the other.
What difference there is, then, must be in the cause of
the segregation rather than in the effect. Brown I says that:
"[T]he policy of separating the races is usually
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the
Negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the
motivation of the child to learn." 347 U.S. at 494.
If there is a distinction between de jure and de facto segre
gation, the basis of that distinction is therefore in the intentional
policy of separation, a policy which stigmatizes the Black young
ster, unconstitutionally impeding his ability to learn. It is
the intentional policy, the known and perceived official man
date that the Blacks must be kept from Whites which creates the
special stigma of the de jure segregated school. Absent that
purposeful policy, what difference is there on the effective
ability of a Black child to learn if his consignment to an all
Black school is due to "benign" influences, whatever they may
be, or due to the failure of a well-meaning school board to
foresee the consequences of acts which are found pcst hoc to be
foreseeable? Purposeful intent is ultimately the touchstone of
the concept of de jure segregation, for absent it, any differences
in the effect of Black child of attending an all—Blac;. school,
and therefore, any variant effect on his Constitutional rignts
disappears.
Similarly, purposeful intent to operate a system on a
segregated basis is the touchstone of a finding of a de ]ure
segregated system. Keyes v. School District Wo. 1, Denver,
445 F .2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 404 U.S. 1036
(1972). Davis v. School District of the City of P(ontmaCj_Inc_._,
309 F.Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1970), aff1d ., 443 F.2d 573 (6th
Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 405 U.S. 223 (1971), stands for the
-31
proposition that such intent may be inferred by the consistent
pattern of action of a Board of Education; the implication that
such action as unwritten but nonetheless purposeful policy not
being lost on the Black community and the children attending
Black schools; and the message of implied inferiority not being
diminished by its being delivered indirectly.
There is no other reason for the District Court at the
end of its findings of fact on September 27, 1971, to state:
. "It is, the Court believes, unfortunate
that we cannot deal with school segregation
on a no-fault basis, for if racial segrega
tion in the public schools is an evil then
it should make no difference whether we
classify it de jure or de facto."
338 F.Supp. 582,592.
The Court's own recognition that it was veering from the classi
cal definition of de_ jure segregation and eliminating the need to
find intent. The law in this Circuit is that there must be intent
The Detroit Board suggests that as there must be an intent, the
District Court should be reversed or this Court should say that
"no-fault" is the rule so all will understand. Cf., Deal v.
Cincinnati Board of Education, supra.
II
THE DISTRICT COURT HAS FURTHER DEPARTED FROM
PRESENT LAW IN DESCRIBING THE DETROIT SCHOOL
SYSTEM AS DE JURE SEGREGATED, OR DUAL, ABSENT
A FINDING THAT THE ACTS OF THE DETROIT SCHOOL
AUTHORITIES ARE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE
CONDITION OF SEGREGATION.
It follows naturally that just as a finding of de jure segre
gation requires a finding of purpose or intent on the part of a
school authority to operate such a system it also requires a
finding that such action was the proximate cause of the segrega
tion. See Deal v, Cincinnati Board of Education, 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir.
1966) cert, denied 389 U.S. 847 (1967) where this Court said at 64:
"However, the crucial fact to be found
is whether the racial imbalance was
intentionally caused by gerrymandering
or by other alleged discriminatory prac
tices on the part of the Board." .
(Emphasis supplied).
This common-sense requirement has more recently been recog
nized in Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, 445 F.2d 990
(10th Cir. 1971), cert, granted, 404 U.S. 1036 (1972) where the
entire de_ jure test was restated by the Court at 1006.
The special stigma of de jure segregation comes not only
from the placement of the Black child in a racially identifiable
school, but from the knowledge that the cause of his being there
is the result of an official policy which tells the child that he
is inferior. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) .
Absent that causation, that special stigma is also absent, and what
remains is but a racially identifiable school, to which the
appellation de jure would signal no difference, insofar as the
Constitutional rights of the child are concerned, than the term
de facto.'
The District Court recognized the need for a finding of
causation when it set forth what it felt were the "principles
essential to a finding of de jure segregation", presumably meaning
by this, a de jure segregated system and not an individual act
of 3ure segregation. 338 F.Supp. at 592.
However, the Court did not feel any need to find that such
causation was proximate. The Court, in the "principles essential
to a finding", states only that the action must have "aggravated
segregation , and then states separately without any apparent
nexus that there must exist a "current condition of segregation".
The Court notes further that "causation in the case before us is
both several and comparative". The closest the Court comes to ever
specifically forming the causal nexus of the acts of the Detroit
Board is in its statement:
"The principal causes undeniably have been
population movements and housing patterns,
but State and local governmental actions,
including school board actions, have played
a substantial role in promoting segregation."
388 F.Supp. at 592.
Previously, the Court noted a "link" between the acts of the Detroi
Board and other governmental units.
-34-
• •
In determining what part of the "substantial" but not
principal role the Detroit Board played in causing the current
condition or what link it had to other units of government, the
only recourse is to the record. That record reveals rather
limited contracts between the Board and the City Planning Commis
sion, various model neighborhood agencies, the Urban Renewal
Division and Department of Parks and Recreation of tne City of
Detroit none of which involved the slightest segregatory purpose
or effect. (Henrickson, de jurc, Tr.3515-18) (App.IVa 113-11G) .
As to the role of the acts of the Detroit Board found to
be wrongful in causing the current condition of segregation
Plaintiffs proferred to the Court their finding of fact which
contained only the opinion testimony of several experts to the
effect that all-Black and all-White schools tended to reinforce
a feeling of separateness on the part of both races, which, in
turn, manifested itself to some ^indefinable degree in the choice
of residence in uniracial neighborhoods on the part of both races.
The mind boggles at the meaning of this assumed, unmeasured
phenomenon against the standard of proximate cause. First, the
findings of the District Court as to specific acts of discrimina
tion relate to a relatively small proportion of the total school
district: the construction of one specified elementary school, out
of a total school construction program involv ing a multitude of schools;
busing; and the maintenance of sixseveral instances of Black-to-Black
optional zones, which were in the process of seriatim elimina
tion, representing but a small fraction of the total of twenty-
one high school constellations in the City of Detroit. There
is not an iota of evidence which shows or which even attempts to
show that any person living in the City of Detroit made housing
decisions any differently, because of the "acts or failures to
act" of the Detroit Board. Even the case supposedly which "discards
the anodyne dichotomy of classical de facto and de_ jure segrega
tion", Cisneros, ___ F.2d ___ (5th Cir. 1972). Slip Opinion at 10,
plainly states:
"We need only find a real and significant
relationship, in terms of cause and effect,
between state action and the denial of edu
cational opportunity occasioned by the racial
and ethnic separation of public school students."
Slip Opinion at 12. (Emphasis supplied). .
See also Texas Educational Agency, ___F . 2d ___ (5th Cir. 1972). Sli
Opinion at 27-28, 30-32, 44. Bradley v. Mi]liken, the instant case,
is cited as authority.
And indeed, the most recent United States Supreme Court
cases concerning school desegregation, Wright v. Council of City of
Emporia, ____U.S. ____, 40 USLW 4806 (June 20, 1972), and United
States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education, ____ U.S. ___
40 USLW 4817 (June 20, 1972), reaffirmed the "cause-effect" rule
of discrimination, prohibiting acts which would have caused further
segregation through the "carving out" of new school districts which
were less biracial than the original districts from which they
proposed to secede.
-36-
"
rL
r
F
L
T̂”
fc.~
r
Indeed, the record evidence cited to show causation does
not relate directly to the acts of the Detroit Board in question,
it relates merely to the existence of racially identifiable
schools. There is no basis for belief that a child in one of
the many schools in the city that was all Black but which was not
affected by one of the acts of the Detroit Board found wrongful by
the District Court would be any less impressed by the racially
separate nature of his condition than one that was. This being
the case, the causation which the District Court has found is
nothing more than an assertion that racial separation tends to
be self-perpetuating. This is a far cry from the finding of this
Court sanctioned in Davis v. School District of the City of Pontiac,
443 F.2d 583 (6th Cir.197.1) cert. denied ,405 U .S. 233 (1971), namety, that the
Board took certain purposeful action, and as a direct result of
those actions, the schools of the city were racially imbalanced.
The most vivid indicator of the lack of any causal nexus
between the actions of the Detroit Board and the current condi
tion of segregation is the finding the Court's "Ruling on Detroit-
Only Plans", that even had it granted all the relief requested
by Plaintiffs, the implementation of a pupil assignment plan
within the jurisdiction of the School District of the City of
Detroit would nonetheless retain racially identifiable schools.
App. I a 459, Vol. I B. If the District Court, with its broad
equitable jurisdiction, is unable to overcome residential housing
patterns within the City of Detroit to eliminate the condition of
racial identifiability in its schools, then the same condition
-37-
of segregation would exist even if the Detroit Board had acted
exactly as the District Court would have had it act. How then
can the Detroit Board be found to have proximately caused that
condition, which even the District Court found itself powerless
to remedy? The finding is really then not that the Detroit Board
should have succeeded in eliminating racial identification in its
schools, but that it should have done a better job of failings
If failure to alleviate the conditions is inevitable even for the
Court itself, as the Court has effectively found, then the parti
cular quality of the Board's failure can hardly be said to have
caused that condition. Absent that causation, Detroit cannot be
held to a de jure segregated dual system.
It is unfortunate that this case has taken on an almost
criminal context. Suburban defendants especially seem obsessed
with the concept of guilt, operating on the principle that the
provision to small children of their Constitutional rights is,
of all things, a punishment to be visited upon the sinful and
withheld from the righteous, regardless of the effect that appli
cation may have on the rights of those children. The Detroit
Board submits that this notion of guilt and punishment is danger
ously irrelevant. The idea that a Court's duty to provide children
their Constitutional rights is a punishment is a gross insult, both
to the Constitution and to all the school children of metropolitan
Detroit, both Black and White. What we are about is not a game of
cops and robbers designed to punish a "bad" school district
-38-
for having committed some wrongful act regardless of its effect,
while finding "not guilty" the "good" school district. The
requirement of a finding of intent or purpose for d<3 jure segre
gation is not grounded in a concept of mens rea, but rather in
the notion that intentional conduct has a unique effect upon the
Constitutional rights of the child. The requirement of proximate
cause comes not from a need to fix blame, but frora a recognition
that causation may vary the effect on Constituticnal rights of the
complained of condition.
Thus, many Courts, indeed, all but perhaps the Fifth Circuit,
in Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District,__F .2d__
(5th Cir.,No. 71-2397, August 2, 1972), have adopted the distinc
tion between de facto and intentional de jure segregation as a
criterion for so deciding Constitutional rights without assessing
guilt. The trial court followed neither the Fifth Circuit nor the
majority rule, finding that it was some wrongful act which gave
rise to remedy but without regard to its purpose or its lack of
direct effect on the complained of condition. Such elasticizing
of de jure concept serves only to enervate it. If this Court
wishes to reverse Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 369 F.2d
55 (6th Cir. 1966) cert, denied/ 369 U.S. 847 (1967) and Davis v.
School District of the City of Pontiac, 4 4 3 F.2d 5 7 3 ,cert. denied ,
925 U.S. 233 (1971) and find that absent a finding of intent to
run a dual system and absent a showing that school board action
caused the segregation, rather than segregated housing patterns,
a remedy is appropriate for serious racial imbalance then this
-39-
Court should follow the lead of the Fifth Circuit and do so
forthrightly, without stretching the current concepts of the law
into meaninglessness. If a system with acute racial imbalance
neither intended nor caused by the local board is in the eyes of
this Court Constitutionally acceptable, then it should reverse.
Clarity of the law, ana devotion to the Constitutional rights of
the school children of the Unted States allows no third result.
-40-
THE MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION, THE SUPREME COURT OF
MICHIGAN, THE GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL Or MICHIGAN, MICHIGAN 'SUPERINTENDENT OF
PUBLIC INSTRUCTION AND THE MICHIGAN STATE BOARD
OF EDUCATION, HAVE ALL RECOGNIZED THE CARDINAL
PRINCIPLE OF MICHIGi SCHOOL LAW, N/iMELY ?H AT
THE MICHIGi PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM IS SOLELY A
STATE FUNCTION WITH THE LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS
BEING MERELY INSTRUMENTALITIES OF THE STATE
CREATED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE CONVENIENCE.
The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 governing the Territory
of Michigan provided:
"Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary
to good government and the happiness of mankind,
schools and the means of education shall forever
be encouraged."
With this genesis, Michigan's four Constitutions have
clearly established that the public school system in this State
is solely a State function. The Constitution of 1835 in
Article X, Section 3, provided, in part: "The legislature shall
provide for a system of common schools..." The Constitution
of 1850, Article XIII, Section 4, provided, in part: "The
legislature shall... provide for and establish a system of
primary schools..." Section 1 of the same Article provided,
"...the Superintendent of Public Instruction shall have general
supervision of public instruction..."
The Constitution of 1908 in Article XI, Section 2, pro
vided that the Superintendent of Public Instruction "shall have
41-
Articlgeneral supervision of public instruction in the State."
XI, Section 9, provided, in part as follows:
"The legislature shall continue a system of
primary schools, whereby every school district
in the State shall provide for the education of
pupils without charge for tuition..."
The Constitution of 1963, the present Constitution of the
State of Michigan, in Article VIII, Section 2, provides, in part
as follows:
The legislature shall maintain and support a
system of free public elementary and secondary
schools as defined by law."
In interpreting the above educational provisions of the
Constitution of 1850, the Michigan Supreme Court clearly stated,
The school district is a State agency. Moreover, it is of
legislative creation..." Attorney General v. Lowrey, 131 Mich.
639 , 644, 92 N.V,T. 289 , 290 (1902). Again, interpreting the
Constitution of 1850, the Supreme Court of Michigan in Attorney
Genereil v. Detroit Board of Education , 15 4 Mi ch. 584, 590, 118
N.W. 606, 609 (1908), adopted lower court language which read:
"Education in Michigan belongs to the State. It
is no part of the local self-government inherent
in the township or municipality, except so far
as the legislature may choose to make it such.
The Constitution has turned the whole subject
over to the legislature..."
The Supreme Court of Michigan interpreted Article XI,
Section 9, of the Constitution of 1908 to mean:
"The legislature has entire control over the
schools of the State subject only to the pro
visions above referred to. The division of
the territory of the State into districts,
the conduct of the school, the qualifica
tions of teachers, the subjects to be taught
therein are all v/ithin its control." Child
Welfare v. Kennedy School Dist., 220 Mich.
290 , 296, 189 N.W*. 1002 , 1004 (1922).
This principle that education is a State responsibility
has become so ingrained in Michigan lav;, it is now clear that
a local school district can exercise only the power given it by
the State. See, e.g., Senghas v. L'Anse Creuse Public Schools,
368 Mich. 557, 118 N.W.2d 975 (1968); McLaughlin v. Board of
Education, 255 Mich. 667, 239 N.W. 374 (1931).
This concept has further been expanded in relationship
to the Michigan Constitution of 1963. In a per curiam opinion,
the Michigan Supreme Court interpreted Article VIII, Section 3,
"Leadership and general supervision over all public education...
is vested in a State board of education", to mean:
"It is the responsibility of the State board of
education to supervise the system of free public
schools set up by the legislature..." Welling
v. Livonia Board of Education, 382 Mich. 620, 624,
TTTN . W. 2d~5T5~T3"4 6 (196 9) .
The concurring opinion spelled out the change from the
Constitution of 1908 to the Constitution of 1963 as it described
the transfer of authority over the school system from the
-43-
I
legislature to the State Board of Education:
"By the Constitution of 1963...the framers
proposed and the people adopted a new policy
for administration of the system. Now the
State board of education... is armed and
charged exclusively with the power and
responsibility of administering the public
school system which the legislature has set
up and now maintains pursuant to Section 2
of the Eighth Article. By Section 3 of the *
same Article, the board has been directed -
not by the legislature but by the people -
to lead and superintend the system and be
come , exclusively, the administrative policy
maker thereof..." 382 Mich, at 625, 171 N.W.
2d at 546-547.
The concurring opinion referred to the official comments
of the Constitutional Convention, noting the following language.
"'The enlarged State board provides a policy
making body on a State level.' (emphasis added)
2 Constitutional Convention Official Record,
1961, p 3396." 382 Mich, at 625, 171 N.W.2d
at 547.
Nor is a judicial finding that the State of Michigan is
totally responsible for education in Michigan confined to the
State courts. A federal district court, other than the instant
court, made such a finding. Thus, the Honorable Noel Fox,
United States District Judge for the Western District of Michigan,
specifically ordered the State of Michigan to take an active role
in the desegregation case in Kalamazoo, Michigan and in doing
so said, "The State of Michigan is represented by two entities,
but the entity is an agent of the Stcite ... the Constitution says
-44-
i
something about your (the State's) responsibility." Oliver v.
Kalamazoo Board of Education, Civil No. K88-71 (W.D. Mich. 1972) ,
f ,Pre-trial- order and transcript.I -
Attorney General Frank J. Kelley, on July 7, 1970, in ai
letter to the Acting Superintendent of Public Instruction made
this cogent observation: .
"It is clear that the State Board of Education,
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3, has Consti
tutionally conferred rule-making power. Welling,
supra. In addition, the legislature has conferred
rule-making power on the State Board of Education."
Op. Atty. Gen. No. 4705, 1969-1970 Report of the
Attorney General 156, 157.
Following the holding of Welling v. Livonia Board of
Education, supra, that there was no minimum length of day re
quired under the 180-day school attendance rule absent a State
Board of Education regulation, the Michigan State Board of .
[ Education, acting under its Constitutional mandate without
legislative authority, established an administrative rule re
quiring local school boards to provide a minimum number of hours
per school year. See, School Districts Child Account for Distribution
of State Aid, Bulletin No. 1005, Michigan State Department of
[ Education (1970).
Defendant Governor William G. Milliken has recognized his
position vis-a-vis public education, as the State's Chief
Executive. As one of four governors in an amic-i brief filed in
the Supreme Court of the United States, No. 71-1332, San Antonio
L ~45~
6
Independent School District v. Rodriquez, the Governor said, at
Page II:
"As Governors and Chief
their respective States,
for upholding and carryi
the Constitutions and la
States, including the pr
the establishment of pub
districts and commanding
States to attend school,
for financial decisions
operations, including th
and financing of the pub
executive officers of
Amici are responsible
ng out the commands of
v:s of their various
'.'visions thereof requiring
lie schools and school
the children of their
Amici are responsible
affecting all State
ose pertaining to support
lie schools..."
The Governors' amici brief, speaking of the State of
Texas, could as well be describing the State of Michigan, when
it used these words:
"It is also undisputed that the local school
districts and their boundaries, and hence the
aggregate value of the property they contain,
are entirely the creation of and their mainten
ance is the responsibility of the State of
Texas. Furthermore, the detailed regulation of
public education financing in Texas *** is a
State, not a local responsibility. Indeed, the
school districts have the power to raise funds
for education only as a result of delegation by
the State of its own power to tax for the general
welfare." (Page 8 of brief)
Thus, four of the present State Defendants - the Attorney
General, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, the State
Board of Education and the Governor - have admitted directly or
by their actions that the State is supreme in matters of
education. Examples of the pervasiveness of State control over
public education in Michigan are legion:
-46-
1. Public Act 289 of 1964 (MSA §15.2299 (1) ct seq.,
MCLA §388.681 et scq.) required Michigan school districts to
operate K-12 systems. When Public Act 289 became effective,
1,438 public school districts existed in Michigan. By the be
ginning of 1968, this figure had been reduced to 738, meaning
that 700 school districts in Michigan have disappeared since 1964
through reorganization. Annual Report, Committee on School
District Reorganization, 1968 Journal of the Senate 422-423
(March 1, 1968).
2. Pursuant to Act 289 of 1964 , supra, the State Board
of Education ordered the merger of the Brownstown No. 10, Hand,
Maple Grove and Carson school districts, all in Wayne County.
The action is best explained by the fact that Brownstown was,
at that time, the wealthiest school district in the State, indeed,
with a property valuation of $340,000 backing each child, perhaps
the wealthiest district in the nation, while the other three
districts were extremely poor. Detroit Free Press, Aug. 2, 1965.
(See Brief, Appendix A).
3. When the Sumpter School District was on the verge
of bankruptcy in 1968, the State Board of Education, acting under
Public Act 239 of 1967 (MSA §15.2299(51) et seq., MCLA §388.691
et seq.), merged the district with four adjoining districts,
including the Airport School District. Significantly, though
Sumpter was in Wayne County, Airport was in Monroe County,
showing that county lines are not inviolate in Michigan. Be
cause of resentment against the forced merger, residents of the
Airport district refused to approve a bond issue. The voters'
reaction was explained as follows:
- "What's the use, if the State can tell you what
to do like they did this time, why shouldn't
the State foot the bill?" Detroit Free Press,
October 7, 19i8. (See Brief, Appendix B) .
4. The Nankin Mills School District in Wayne County was
beset with financial problems and had no high school. Again,
pursuant to Act 239, the State Board of Education in 1969
ordered this school district to merge with the Livonia, Garden
City and Wayne Community schools. The Detroit News, May 15,
1969. (See Brief, Appendix C).
5. When the Inkster School District in Wayne County was
on the verge of financial bankruptcy, the Michigan legislature
passed Public Act 32 of 1968 (MSA §15.1916 et sea., MCLA §388.201
et seq.) enabling the district to borrow $705,000 but on the con
dition that if the district could not balance its budget, the
State Board of Education could reorganize, merge or annex the
district. The legislative history of Act 32 indicates at least
two legislators voted against the bill in the House of
Representatives because of the excessive control given to the
State Board of Education:
-48-
(
"I voted No on House Bill No. 3332 because in
setting up the machinery to bail out distressed
districts, it takes from the local communities
the control over their own educational system
by providing for excessive arbitrary reorgani
zation powers in the hands of the Board of
Education "...
. "This bill certainly sets up the State Board
' of Education to be a dictator of all school
districts that run into financial problems." .
1968 Journal of the House of Representatives
1965.
6. The current legislature has passed H.B. 5840 provi
ding financial relief for insolvent school districts, including,
as in the Inkster legislation, procedures for reorganization
of the districts. (See Brief, Appendix D).
7. Too small and too poor to operate a high school, the
all-Black Carver School District in suburban Oakland County
reached a crisis in 1960 when surrounding White districts re
fused to accept Carver pupils on a tuition basis. The Governor
and Superintendent of Public Instruction engineered the v.’here-
withal to merge the Carver district with Oak Pari. Detroit Free
Press, Nov. 11, 1960. (See Brief, Appendix E).
8. The State Board of Education and Superintendent of
Public Instruction may withhold State aid for failure to operate
the minimum school year. MSA §15.3575, MCLA §340.575. In 1970,
funds were withheld from the.City of Grand Rapids School District.
17 Michigan School Board Journal 3 (March, 1970). For Attorney
General Opinions holding that State aid may be withheld by the
-49-
State Board of Education from school districts for hiring un
certified teachers, defaulting on State loans and for other
reasons, see Op. Atty. Gen. No. 880, 1949-1950 Report of the
Attorney General 104 (January 24, 1949, Roth); No. 2333, 1955
Report of the Attorney General 561 (October 20, 1955, Kavanaugh);
No. 4097, 1961-1962 Report of the Attorney General 553 (October
8, 1962, Kelley).
9. The State of Michigan contributes, on the average,
34% of the operating budgets of the 54 school districts
included in the Metropolitan Plan of Integration. In eleven
of the 54 districts, the State's contribution exceeds 50% and in
eight more, it exceeds 40%. (See State Aid Chart, Brief,
Appendix F)• State aid is appropriated from the General Fund,
revenue raised through state-wide taxation, and is distributed
annually to the local school districts under a formula devised
by the legislature. See, e.g., Public Act 134 (1971), MSA
%15.1919 (51) , MCLA §388.611.
Though the local, school districts obtain funds from
the assessment of local property, the ultimate authority in
insuring equalized property valuations throughout the State
is the State Tax Commission. MSA §7.631, et seq., MCLA §209.101,
et seq.; MSA §7.206, MCLA §211.148; MSA §7.52, MCLA §211.34.
The State's duty to equalize is required by the Michigan
Constitution, Article IX, Section 3. This "State equalized
valuation
yields.
Districts
Michigan
" serves as the basis for calculating local revenue
See, Ranking of Michigan Public High School - School
by Selected Financial Data, 1970, Bulletin 1012,
State Department of Education (1971).
10. Perusal of the Michigan School Code reaffirms the
ultimate control of the State over public education. Local
school districts must observe all State laws relating to
schools,
Av ri/ y \ i v *hold school a minimum number of days per year, ^
3/ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ------- ----- .
employ only certified teachers, teach civics, health and physical
1/education and drivers' education, excuse students to attend
vreligious instruction classes, observe State reauirements
6/
when teaching sex education, make annual financial and other
7/
reports to the Superintendent of Public Instruction, adopt
only textbooks which are listed with the Superintendent of
£/Public Instruction and must follow’ all rules and regulations
of the State Department of Education.
1/ MSA §15. 3252(c) , MCLA §340.252(c).
2/ MSA §15. 3575, MCLA §340.575.
3/ MSA §§15 .1023 (10) (a) / 15.3570, MCLA §§388. 1010 (a) , 340.570
1/ MSA §§15 .1951, 15. 3361 , MCLA §§388.3 71 , 34,0.361; MSA §§15.
3781-15. 3782, MICLA §§340.781-340.782 / MSA §9 .2511 (c) , MCLA
§257 . 811 (c)
5/ MSA §15. 3732(g) , M.CL A §340.732(g).
6/ MSA §15. 3789, KICLA §340.789.
7/ MSA §15. 3612, KICLA §34 0.612; MSA §§1 5. 361C 15.36 88 , MCLA
§§34 0.616, 340. 688 •
8/ MSA §15. 3887 (1) , MCLA §340.887 (1) .
-51-
Local school districts, unless they have the approval
of the State Board of Education or the Superintendent of
Public Instruction cannot consolidate v/ith another school
9/ 10/
district, annex territory, divide or attach parts of other
11/ 12/
districts, borrow monies in anticipation of State aid,
construct, reconstruct or remodel school buildings or additions
13/
to them, establish a program for the prevention and treat-
ii/ment of behavior problems of children, employ a superinten
dent without a bachelor's degree from a college acceptable
15/to the State Board of Education, establish facilities and
programs for the day care of the physically handicapped or
1_6./initiate programs for the mentally handicapped.
11. The Detroit Board of Education, of its own knowledge,
is fully aware of State control with regard to its financial
crisis. Having received the State's permission to borrow money
in 1971-72, permission for further borrowing was denied for
9/ MSA §15.3402, MCLA §340.402.
10/ MSA §15.3431, MCLA §340.431.
11/ MSA §15.3447, MCLA §340.447.
12/ MSA §15.3567(1), MCLA §340.567(a).
13/ MSA §15.1961, MCLA §388.851, Op. Atty. Gen. No. 1837,
1952-1954 Report of the Attorney General 440 (Nov. 8
1954) .
14/ MSA §15.3618, MCLA §340.616.
15/ MSA §15.3573, MCLA §340.573.
16/ MSA §15.3587(1), MCLA §340.587(a); MSA §15.3775, MCLA
§340.775.
-52-
C
1972-73. The Detroit Eoard then determined it did not have
sufficient revenues to operate for 180 days as required by
law. Faced with the prospect of either violating the 180-
day requirement (MSA §15.3575, MCLA §340.575; Op. A.tty. Gen.
No. 4714 [Dec. 1, 1970]) or violating the prohibition against
operating with a deficit budget (MSA §15.3197, MCLA'§340.197),
inquiry was made of the State agencies, including the Super-
intendet of Public Instruction'and a representative of the
Governor's office for an answer to the dilemma. The State
informed the Detroit Board that the filing of a balance budget
Was preferred. The situation has been resolved by the District
Court in this case, ordering the Detroit Board to maintain a
180-day school year. Any suggestion that the Detroit Board of
Education, an entity so sharply restricted in its powers, is
in some way sovereign and apart from the State is obviously
unsupportable.
12. Any doubt as to the pervasiveness of State control
over education in Michigan has been resolved by the intro
duction of Senate Joint Resolution "Z" in the legislature
this year. Already passed by the Senate, the purpose of SJR
"Z" is to amend Article VIII, Section 3, of the Michigan
Constitution to divest the State Board of Education of its
leadership and supervision over education in this State.
Perhaps the resolution is called "Z" after the famous movie
-53-
of the same name because it indicates at least some legislators
feel that the State Board of Education is dictatorial over public
education in Michigan. We suggest that this is the fact.
Based upon the Constitutional history, decisions of the
Michigan Supreme Court, a finding by another Federal District
Court in Michigan, opinions of the Attorney General of the State
of Michigan, actions of the Superintendent of Public Instruction
and the State Board of Education, itself, and numerous State
statutes and actions taken pursuant thereto, there is no question
that local school districts are mere agents or instrumentalities
of the State. Action of a local district is action of the State. ̂ 1
1 If there be any doubt as to the pervasiveness of State control
over Michigan Education, we call the Court's attention to an
article in the August 10, 19 72 issue of the Grosse Pointe Nev.’s,
page 1, (See Brief, App. G) where Attorney General Frank Kelley,
a Defendant herein, as Chairman of the Municipal Finance Commission
had given permission to the Grosse Pointe School to borrow money
for operation purposes. Incidentally, the other two members of
the Municipal Finance Commission are also Defendants herein. State
Superintendent of Public Instruction, John W. Porter and State
Treasurer, Allison Green. If the State di.d not control Education
in Michigan, then why did the Grosse Pointe Schools have to get
State permission to borrow funds? We have brought this information
to the Court's attention via a foot note because of its recent
origin.
- 54-
IV. ■
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN- ORDERING THE IMETROPOLITAN REMEDY FOR THE
OFDESEGREGATION OF THE DETROIT SCHOOLS BECAUSE
THE STATE'S SOLE RESPONSIBILITY FOR EDUCATION IN
MICHIGAN, THE STIDP-BY-STEP PROCESS LEADING TO
METROPOLITAN!ZATION DEVELOPED BY THE COURTS, AND
GENEEAL P RINCIPLIIS OF EQUITY FIRST ANNOUNCED BY
THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN II, EACH OF WHICH SUP-
POHTS SUCH A REMEDY." . '..........
It is the position of the Defendant Detroit Board that
the orders of the District Court may not be affirmed based on a
traditional de jure segregation finding against the Detroit Board.
Reduced to its essence, the finding does not exist and has not
been made. There then remain two bases on which the Court can
grant metropolitan relief if it believes it is necessary to do
so. First, this Court may affirm the findings of the District
Court with regard to traditional dc j ure segregation as those
findings were made to both State and city Defendants. Action
of the City, which is an agent of the State, is action of the
State and action of the State is exactly that. In either event,
it is clear that the desegregation of Detroit schools cannot be
accomplished within the city limits of Detroit which are co
terminous with the Detroit school district. The State, having
the sole responsibility for education in Michigan, has the power
and authority to involve the metropolitan Detroit community in
desegregating the Detroit school system.
Secondly, were the Court to adopt the Ci sneros doctrine,
“55-
discuss*,] above, there certainly would be no reason to limit
the op* tat ion of relief to the City of Detroit in the face of
the clc'viv findings of the District Court that such relief could
not be effective. As the Cisneros doctrine does away with the
distinct;on between de jure and de facto segregation, the ob
jection interposed by suburban Defendants that they have not
themselves been found to have committed acts of de jure
segregation loses whatever alleged vitality it might have had.
However, if for whatever reason this Court should uphold
the Detroit Court's findings as the basis for a remedy, then
this Court has no choice but to affirm the District Court's
ruling as to the necessity of a metropolitan remedy. This
proposition follows because of the following cogent and legally
unassailable arguments. .
I
This Court on July 24, 1972, specifically ordered a
briefing of the legal status of local school districts vis-a-vis
the State of Michigan. The result is astoundingly clear:
education in Michigan is solely a fun-' cion of the State. Local
school di' 1 riots are. mere creatures of the State acting as agents
or instrumentalities of the State under pervasive State control.
If State action has violated the Plaintiff's Constitutional right
es the District Court has found, then the State must provide the
remedy. in doing so, the State cannot hide behind the school
-56
boundaries of the 54 school districts or State instrumentalities
included in the Metropolitan Desegregation Plan to avoid a remedy
on the absurd theory that 53 of these districts did not partici
pate in violating Plaintiffs' Constitutional rights. But
for the administrative convenience of the State, these metropol
itan area districts would not exist. As a proof of this fact, .
since 1964, the State has eliminated 700 school districts because
they were no longer administratively convenient. See Annual
Report, Committee on School District Reorganization, 1968 Journal
of the Senate 422-423 (March 1, 1968). Furthermore, as the Supreme
Court said in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 , 16-17 (1958) , local
school officials are agents of the State for Fourteenth Amendment
purposes. In summary, the unconstitutional actions of the State
affect all its instrumentalities; if the State must supply a
remedy, then its instrumentalities in the metropolitan area must
all be affected.
If the Court should find that only the Detroit Board
violated the Plaintiffs' Constitutional rights and the State was
allegedly blameless, the same result must necessarily follow.
The Detroit Board is an instrumentality of the State. In Detroit,
the State acts through the Detroit Board. If a remedy must be
afforded, it must be that of the State.
When the District Court, having heard over 58 days of
testimony, including five days on a Detroit-only remedy, ruled
-57-
in favor of a metropolitan remedy, it was simply responding to
the Supreme Court directive to "make every effort to achieve the
greatest possible degree of actual desegregation". Davis_^,
Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33, 37
(1971). In doing so, the District Court merely followed the
obvious stepping-stones to school metropolitanization now ,
emerging in the law. As this Defendant Detroit Board noted in
its response to a request for emergency stay, no party to this
date has quarreled with the fundamental remedial finding of the
District Court, namely that relief for the condition of Sv,g
regation in the City of Detroit is impossible.
The legal path to the metropolitanization of school
districts was first cleared by the United States Supreme Court
in the so-called voting rights cases. These decisions established
that Constitutional requirements supercede the importance of main
taining State created legislative districts. hgYB£---as.-Hr.—
377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gomillion v. lA^MSoot, 364 U.S. 33y vxy6u).
The concept of ignoring political division lines for
purposes of guaranteeing Constitutional rights has been extended
to school districts. Where a city attempted to remove its
schools from a county system when the latter was ordered to
establish a unitary school system, the Fifth Circuit refused to
permit the secession because it would have had a substantial ad
verse effect on desegregation. ^e_y^la^ii_Cou)Lt_y_Board_of
-58-
Education, 448 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1971). The Court observed:
"[Sjchool district lines within a State are
matters of political convenience." 448 F.2d at 752.
A District Court refused to permit the creation of two school
districts where one could operate as easily as two, and the
action was obviously designed to foster racial segregation.
Turner v. Warren County Board of Education, 313 F. Supp. 380
(E.D. N.C. 1970). See also, Hall v. St. Helena Parish School
Board, 197 F. Supp. 649, 658 (E.D. La. 1961) aff*d. 287 F.2d
376 (5th Cir. 196'’ ), aff1 d. per curiam, 368 U.S. 515 (1962);
Burleson v. County Board of Election Commissi ■: ners of Jefferson
County, 30 8 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Ark. 1970) , af f1d. pgr curi am,
432 F.2d 1356 (8th Cir. 1970).
The principle that school district lines may not be
used for purposes of violating fundamental Constitutional rights
has recently been recognized by the United States Supreme Court.
School distiricts are not permitted to withdraw from county-wide
systems where the effect of such a separation would impede the
process of dismantling a segregated school system. Wright v.
Council of City of Empori a, 40 USLW 4806 (June 20 , 1972) ; Uni ted
States v. Scotland.Heck Citv Board of Education, 40 USLW 4817
(June 20, 1972).
Refusal to permit the separation of school districts
where such action would foster segregation has its counterpart
in court-ordered merger of districts. In Haney v. County Board
-59-
theEducation of Sevier County, 410 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969),
Court ordered the merger of a White and a Black school district
even though they had been maintained as separate units for 14
years. The Court declared:
"[S]tate political subdivisions have long
. ago lost their mastery over the more desired
effects of protecting the equal rights of all
citizens." 410 F.2d at 924.
The Court viewed merger of the two districts in Sevier County
as the only possible means of effectively desegregating the
schools. In Texas the annexation and consolidation of all
Black school districts with nearby biracial units was ordered
as a means of achieving meaningful desegregation. United States
v. State of Texas, 447 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971). With regard
to changes in school district boundaries, the Court specifically
directed:
"Defendants shall not permit, make arrangements
for, approve, acquiesce in, or give support of
any kind to changes in school district boundary
lines - whether by detachment, annexation, or
consolidation of districts in whole or in part -
which are designed to, or do in fact, create,
maintain, reinforce, renew, or encourage a
dual system based on race, color, or national
origin." 447 F.2d at 443-444.
In short, the State has an affirmative duty to enforce Fourteenth
Amendment rights.
The penultimate stepping-stone toward school metropoli-
tanization, and perhaps also the first completed litigation
-60-
involving consolidation of a northern school system, is illustrated
by Jenkins v. Tov/nship of Morris School District, 58 N .J. 483,
279 A.2d 619 (1971). Morristown contained most of the Blacks in
the region, and the surrounding Morris Township was a White
suburban area. The two areas operated separate elementary schools,
but the Township had sent its students to the Morristown High
School since 1865. The Township planned to withdraw its students
from the high school and Plaintiffs sought to have the Commission
er of Education take steps to prevent the withdrawal and to
effectuate a merger of the Morris Township and Morristown school
systems. The Commissioner dismissed the petition for lack of
legal authority to take the requested action. The Supreme Court
of New Jersey unanimously held that to avoid racial imbalance
in the schools, which is unconstitutional under the New Jersey
Constitution, the Commissioner had the authority not only to
prevent the withdrawal of the Township from the City, but also
to effect a merger of the two systems and to cross district
lines to do so.
The Supreme Court further paved the way toward
metropolitanization in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
EduCeltion, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) , where the neighborhood school concept
was abandoned and busing was explicitly recognized as a permiss
ible tool for desegregating schools. At least two Federal
District Courts and one Circuit Court of Appeals have hinted that
metropolitan desegregation plans may be a legal necessity to
effectively desegregate schools in large cities.
-61
In Calhoun v. Cook, 332 F.Supp. 804 (N.D. Ga. 1971) ,
vacated in part 451 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1971), the District
Court recommended a "sweeping examination" v/ith regard to the
question of consolidating the Atlanta City school system v/ith
the Fulton County system as a means of producing long-range
improvement in school desegregation. The Court noted that a
metropolitan community vehicle might be the proper solution. •
See, 332 F.Supp. at 809-810. Although the Fifth Circuit
vacated part of the lower court decision, the Court of Appeals
ordered consideration of the District Court's recommendation.
451 F.2d at 583. See also, United States v. Board of School
Commissioners of City of Indianapolis, 332 F.Supp. 655, 679
(S.D. Ind. 1971).
Obviously, the final stepping-stone to metropolitan!zation
has been the District Court opinions in Bradley v. School Board.
of City of Richmond, 338 F.Supp.____(E.D. Va. 1972) and the
instant case of Bradley v. Hllliken, 338 F.Supp. 582 (E.D.
Mich. 1971). In the Richmond case, the District Court char
acterized the central issue as follows:
"The Court concludes, in the context here ■
presented, that the duty to take whatever
steps are necessary to achieve the great
est possible degree of desegregation in
formerly dual systems by the elimination
of racially identifiable schools is not
-62-
ff
L
[
[
[
i
f
!,
[
[
[
!
I
[
[
[
l
r
circumscribed by school division boundaries
created and maintained by the cooperative
efforts of local and central State officials."
338 F.Supp. 79-80, citing Green v. County
School Board of New Kent County , 3 81 U. S .
430; Davis v. Board of School Commissioners
of Mobi 1 e Connty , 4 02 U.S. 33; Swann v.
Charlotte-Meeklenburg Board of Education,
402 U.S. I.
We invite this Court's attention to the close
similarity of the Michigan case where Judge Roth concluded:
"That a State's form of government may
delegate the power of daily adminis
tration of public schools to officials
with less than State-wide jurisdiction
does not dispel the obligation of those
who have broader control to use the
authority they have consistently with
the Constitution. In such instances
the Constitutional obligation toward
the individual school children is a
shared one." 338 F.Supp. at 593.
We recognize that the District Court in Bradio
Ri chraond was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the
Circuit. However, the Fourth Circuit reversal of the
case imposes no obstacle to a metropolitan remedy for
First, the Fourth Circuit erred in its application of
case. It is true that racial balance is not required
y v.
Fourth
Richmond
Detroit.
the Swann
to
t -63-
C
effectuate a unitary school system. Nonetheless, Swann makes
it clear that when past Constitutional violations have been
found, racial ratios are likely to be useful starting points
in shaping a remedy, 402 U.S. 1, 23-25 (1971). The District
Court in Richmond did not employ the racial balance concept
as a means of finding a violation of Fourteenth Amendment rights;
it was instead concerned with developing a remedy to eliminate
the previously determined violation. Although the majority
correctly quoted Swann in stating that once the affirmative
duty to desegregate has been accomplished, year-by-year adjust
ments of the racial composition of student bodies it not required
(Bradley v. Richmond, Civil No. 72-1058 [4th Cir. June 5, 1972]
at 29) , in the case at bar, we are concerned with initiating a
remedy. Therefore, racial ratios are valid starting points in
formulating an appropriate remedy for Detroit.
Secondly, the impact of the Fourth Circuit Richmond
decision may be limited in light of major differences in Virginia
and Michigan school law. According to the Fourth Circuit opinion:
"The power to operate, maintain and supervise public
schools in Virginia is, and has always been, within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the local school boards
and not within the jurisdiction of the State Board of
Education. Indeed, the operation of public schools
has been a matter of local option. Section 133 of
the 1902 Constitution of Virginia provided that the
supervision of the schools in each county or city shall
be vested in a school board." Bradley v. Richmond,
Civil No. 72-1058 (4th Cir., June 5, 1972) 2l. (Citations
omitted).
-64-
t
In contrast, the public school system is constitutionally
compelled in Michigan, and as we have previously demonstrated,
theme is pervasive State control over local school districts.
Mich. Const., 1963, Article VIII, §§2,3. While the propriety
of court-ordered metropolitanization may be questioned where
a pattern of local independent control of schools prevails,
where State control overwhelmingly predominates, a metropolitan
remedy is most appropriate.
Thirdly, the Fourth Circuit is not the best weathervane /
in determining the course of school desegregation law. Judge
Craven authored the majority opinions in Scotland Neck, Emporia
and Bradley v. Richmond, with dissenting opinions by Judge Winter
in each, two of which have been reversed by the Supreme Court
of the United States of America, adopting, interestingly enough,
the rationale of dissenting opinions of Judge Winter.
We note that suburban Defendants have attempted to rely
on the case of Spencer v, Kugler, 326 F. Supp. 1235 (D. N.J.
1971) , aff1d. , 40 USLW 3329 (Jan. 17 , 1972) , inserting their
unique proposition that there can be a finding that racially
identifiable schools violate constitutional rights, but that
the remedy for that violation may and must be the continuation of
racially identifiable schools. The suburban Defendants here
confuse matters dealing with remedy and the determination that
the right to such a remedy exits. Spencer v , Kugler
- 65-
simply held that a statute of the State of New Jersey making
school district boundary lines co-terminous with the boundary
lines of municipalities in the State was not unconstitutional.
The case .did not involve an effective allegation that the act
of enacting the statute was segregation by State action, rather
it contemplated an assertion that the act involved a suspect
classification based on race. On those assertions the lower
Court found, and the Supreme Court affirmed, that the classifi
cation was neutral and had a reasonable basis. Not only does
the case have no implication to the appropriateness of school
desegregation remedies, it did not even attempt to establish
a right to a desegregation remedy! Furthermore, the facts here
are entirely different. Spencer involved the entire State1, of
New Jersey, devoid, obviously, or any allegation that the State
comprised a single school community. Had the District Court
here held that, for instance, cities like Alpena, Traverse City,
Marquette, and Iron Mountain must have the same racial compo
sition of their schools as the relevant metropolitan Detroit
school community, Spencer might be applicable. However, to
a finding limited to a school community, it is not.
It should be further noted that the facts relied on in
Spencer are entirely different. As already pointed out in detail
above, Michigan school districts are agencies of the State,
entirely separate from municipal government. Their bound
ary lines, which arc subject to administrative change
-6G-
without vote of the people, bear no relationship whatsoever
to any other municipal corporation lines, except by coincidence.
Furthermore, we suggest quite strongly that if Spencer v. Kugler,
supra, were tried in the State courts of New Jersey, the result
could very well have been different for, as already pointed out,
in 1971, the year that Kugler was first decided, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey ‘held that racial imbalance is unconstitutional
under the State's Constitution. Jenkins v. Township of Morris
School District, 58 N.J. 483, 279 A. 2d. 619 (1971). * 11
We come back to the initial proposition. The State of
Michigan controls all education in Michigan. The Detroit Board
of Education is its instrumentality. If either or both have
violated the Constitutional rights of the Plaintiffs, then the
remedy can extend to the other 53 school districts in the rnetro-
politcin Detroit area, because they too are mere instrumentalities
of the State and it is the State which must act to remedy the
si tuation.
11
As an alternative, we cannot ignore the equity teachings
of Brown II, which are equally as important today as they were
in 1955 when the Supreme Court said:
"In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the
courts will be guided by equitable principles.
Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a
practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by
a facility for adjusting and reconciling public
and private needs. These cases call for the
exercise of these traditional attributes of
equity power. At stake is the personal interest
of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools
as soon as practicable on a non-discriminatory
basis. To effectuate this interest may call for
elimination of a variety of obstacles in making
the transition to school systems operated in
accordance with the Constitutional principles set
forth in our May 17, 1954, decision. Courts of
equity may properly take into account the public
interest in the elimination of such obstacles in
a systematic and effective manner. But it should
go without saying that the vitality of these
Constitutional principles cannot be allowed to
yield simply because of disagreement with them."
"(T]he courts may consider problems relating to
administration, arising from the physical condition
of the school plant, the school transportation
systems, personnel, revision of school districts
and attendance areas into compact units to achieve
a system of determining admission to the public
schools on a non-racial basis, and revision of
local laws and regulations which may be necessary
in solving the foregoing problems." 349 U.S. 294,
299-300.
This posture was reiterated in Swann, which quoted the above
language verbatim, 402 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1971). The Swann decision
further emphasized:
"Once a right and a violation have been shewn,
the scope of a district court's equitable
powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for
breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable
remedies." 402 U.S. at 15.
There is absolutely no reason why the power of a court of equity
-60-
should not be extended to metropolitan school desegregation
plans. Under principles of equity, the remedy must be eval
uated by assessing its capacity to achieve the ultimate objective,
the establishment of a unitary school system.
In short, if Constitutional rights have been violated -
a point which the Detroit Board of Education emphatically dis
putes - then from a legal standpoint, there is no basis for
preventing the District Court from ordering a metropolitan
remedy either under the State control theory or the equitable
theory.
-G9-
C
V.
AS A FACTUAL MATTER, THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT
IN ORDERING A METROPOLITAN REMEDY BECAUSE FAILURE TO
DO OTHERWISE WOULD CONTINUE UNCONSTITUTIONAL RACIAL
TEE' DETROIT SCHOOLS AND CAUSE FURTHER DETROIT
.AT I ON ,
ISOLATION IN
SCHOOL
NUMERO
ON -A METROPOLITAN
SEGR;
NS OTHER.
PARTICULARLY IN A SITUATION NHERI
GOVERNMENTAL SERVICES HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED
SCOPE AND THE COMMUNITY IS METROPOLITAN
IN CHARACTER.
If there has been a violation of Plaintiffs' Constitutional
Rights, it is well established by the Supreme Court of the United
States of America that the State is obliged to come forward with a
plan for the achievement of a unitary school system that "promises
realistically to work and promises realistically to work now." Green
v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Swann
v. Charlotte-Meeklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Davis
v. Board of School Comm? ssioners of Mobile County, 4 02 U.S. 73 (19 71).
It is also well established that a desegregation plan must wipe out
segregation "root and branch." Green v. County School Board of New
Kent. County , supra, .
With this admonition obviously in mind, on. March 24, 1972,
the District Court had concluded:
"...that it is proper for the Court to consider a metro
politan plan directed toward the desegregation of the
Detroit Public Schools as an alternate to the present .
intra-city desegregation plan before it,and,in the event
that the Court finds such intra-city plans inadequate to
desegregate such schools,the Court is of the opinion that
it is required to consider a metropolitan remedy for dese
gregation. " Ruling on Proprietv of Con&idorinq a Metropo-
3. i t a n Rome d y_ _t o Acc omp 1 is h Dos e grog a iron of the Public
Schools of City of Detroit, March 24 , 197 2 , page 4 . i
On March 28, 1972, the District Court, after hearings on
the Detroit-only plans, found that none of the three plans proposed
1 App. Ia442, Vo1. 3b.
-70-
• •
"would result in the desegregation of the public schools of the
Detroit School District." The Court also made this conclusion of lav;
"The conclusion, under the evidence in this
case, is inescapable that relief of segregation
in -the public schools of the City of Detroit
cannot be accomp]ished within the corporate
geographical limits of the city. The State,
however, cannot escape its Constitutional duty
to desegregate the public schools of the City
of Detroit by pleading local authority...."
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav; on
Detroit-Only PI ans of Dese g rogation'7~MaFch“ 2 8,
19 72, page 5 [App. Ia459, Vol." IB]).
How correct the Court was 1 On June 14 , 1972, the
District Court found that:
"75. Some educational services are already
provided to students on an interdistrict,
county, intercountry, or metropolitan basis;
and many support services are provided by the
intermediate school districts and the State
Department of Education. For various reasons
many pupils already cross school district lines
to attend school or receive education services.
"76. In many respects - patterns of economic
life, work, play, population, planning, trans
portation, health services - the tri-county
area constitutes a rough series of interrelated
communities constituting, in the view of the
Unitea States Census Bureau, a single standard
metropolitan statistical area.
"77. Local units of government in the metropo
litan area have in many instances joined together
for the purpose of providing better solutions
to problems confronting them. In such instances,
various units of government have either disre
garded local boundaries or have concluded that
the problems were such as to call for a metropo
litan solution. In some cases, they have created
overlay organizations. SEMCOG, recreational
authorities, a metropolitan sewage system, SEMI
and the Detroit Water System
these metropolitan approaches
are examples of
. (App. la 517-518
fAr
Vo1. IB).
-71-
The simple fact is that the only relevant community
is much larger than the City of Detroit. Whether the index is
subjective perceptions or objective indicia, the community that
is centered in Detroit includes at least parts of Wayne, Oakland
and Macomb Counties, which comprise the desegregation area. The
objective data alone should be conclusive. The tri-county area
has been labeled by the Bureau of the Census as a Standard Metro
politan Statistical Area largely on the basis of the high degree
of interaction among the populace of the three counties. The
State of Michigan has recognized the interdependence of the citizens
of the whole area in establishing the Metropolitan Detroit Water
System, the Southeastern Michigan Transportation Authority (SEMTA)
and the Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Valley Authority. The local
governments have recognized their inter-dependence in creating
. the Southeastern Michigan Council of Governments (SEMCOG). The
various highway planners have recognized it in developing the
network of interstate highways that lead into Detroit from all
directions. The school authorities of the State have recognized it,
at least in part, by creating Intermediate School Districts in each
county. (Tr. 200-212, March 15, 1972). (App. Va89-97, Vol. V).
Subjective perceptions coincide with the objective
data, as one would expect with so gross a phenomenon. Local resi
dents cross political lines casually in shopping, commuting to
work, seeking recreation and seeking private or collegiate educations.
Dr. Robert Green, an expert witness, gave perhaps uncontroverted
testimony to that perception when he referred to the stream of
-72-
e
f
whites driving down the freeway from Southfield to Detroit in the
morning rush and when he described how Detroit-educated whites have
fled to Oak Park, Livonia and Bloomfield 'Hills. (Tr. 965-66 April
28, 1971) • Just as black children in a 90% black school still per
ceive their school as identifiably black even though all children
in the attendance zone go to the same school (Dr. Green, Tr. 1023-25
April 28, 1971), children in a 60% - 80% blfick Detroit school will
continue to perceive their school as identifiably black even though
it is no different than any other school in Detroit— precisely
because they know there are suburbs full of white youngsters receiv
ing educations in all-white schools. It would be a most unusual
third grader of any race who could stand on Tireman Street, a boundary
line between Dearborn and Detroit, and explain that a political
boundary rather than a race was the reason the white children
south of Tireman attended a white school and the black children
north of Tireman attended a black school. Ilis perception of the
metropolitan community is conditioned by the communication media to
which he is exposed and his perception of the metropolitan community
of which he is a. part . (Tr. 458-9 March 17, 1972) 3 There i.s no record
evidence on which to base an assumption that the perception of the
community felt by a black child in Detroit is limited to the
irregular boundaries of the school district of the City of Detroit
1 App. Va219, Vo1. V.
L
-73-
• •
and further limited to the racial composition of the students
in the school district. It is obvious, in a community that
is so inter-related between city and suburbs, that the child
would be wondering why his school does not reflect the total
racial composition of the metropolitan community.
The avoidance of racial isolation has been a part of the
lav/ school desegregation for 18 years. Mr. Chief Justice
Warren formulated this issue in Brown v. Board of Education
of Topeka, (Brown I), 437 U.S. 483 (1954) when he said:
"To separate them (blacks) from others of
similar age and qualification solely because
of their race generates a feeling of infer
iority as to their status in the community
that may affect their hearts and minds in
a way unlikely ever to be undone." 347
U.S. at 494.
There are over a million children of school age in
the metropolitan Detroit area. There are 289,500 school
children in the Detroit system, of which 188,000 are black .
children. (See, Ex. PC-6, App. IXa285, Vol. IXA.). It
v/ould be unconstitutional racial isolation to confine these
children to the city limits of Detroit, when their education
is the responsibility of the State, and the other 53 surrounding
basically white school districts are mere administrative
conveniences of the State of Michigan.
We may add that in Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) ,
Chief Justice Warren speaking to the method of desegregation,
stated: .
"To that end, the Courts may consider problems
related to administration, arising from the
physical condition of the school plant,the
school transportation system, personnel, re
vision of school districts and attendance
areas into compact units to achieve a system
of determining admission to the public schools
on a non-racial basis, and revision of local
laws and regulations which may be necessary
in solving the foregoing problems. They will
also consider the adequacy of any plans the
Defendants may propose to meet these problems
and to effectuate a transition to a racially
nondiscriminatory school system." 349 U.S. at
300-301.
Through the Supreme Court since Brown I and TI_ has re
viewed the question of school desegregation numerous times,
there is little question that, including the Scotland Keck
and Emporia excursions, Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Board
of Education, 402 U.S.l (1971); Davis v. Board of School Commis
sioners of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33 (1971) are the Court's
farthest advances toward desegregating the nation's schools,
particularly as to three points:
1.
be made "to
segregation
situation.
must be of
Davis (Mobile) clearly
achieve the greatest
, taking into account
402 U.S. at 37. In
paramount importance.
stated that every
possible degree of
the practicalities
other words, deseg
effort should
actual dc-
of the
rogation
ramount
2 . In order to achieve the maximum desegregation,the
Courtin Swann abandoned the neighborhood school concept and
put its stamp of approval on what was in effect a massive long
distance transportation program in the metropolitan Charlotte-
Mecklenburg area. 402 U.S. at 29-30.
■ 3‘ §warm is significant because it validates the use
of race and student assignments when the goal is desegregation
rather than segregation. 402 U.S. at 22-25.
Thus, in essence, there are at least four elements that
must be_ present for a. plan to work.
(1) Every school, or almost every school, should contain
a mixture of the races that roughly approximates the make-up of
the student community as a whole. Swann, supra; Davis (Mobile),
~2A— * Thc Plan should be educationally sound.
— —- ~'‘no- i'l-• (2) plan snould avoid resegregation. Lemon
Parish School Foard, 4 4 6 F. 2d 911 (5th Cir. 19 7].). ^
(4) The plan must be practical. Each of these elements of a
woi.cable plan deserves to be examined more closely. Swann, suora
Davis, (Mobile), supra.
BacM.al Mix: Ke repeat that Swann validates the use of
race in student assignments where the goal is desegregation
rather than segregation. This Court has recognized this racial
assignment concept to be a primary teaching of Swann for in
Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board of Education of Nashville
-76-
decided and
filed on May 30, 1972, the Court said at 22 (slip
opinion) as follows:
and Davidson County, Tennessee,____ F.2d
"Perhaps the primary thing that the Swann
case decided was that in devising plans
to terminate such residual effects, it
is appropriate for the school system and
the District Judge to take note of the
proportion of white and black students
within the area and to seek as practical
a plan as may be for ending white schools
and black schools and substituting there
for schools which are representative of
the area in which the students live.
We have noted that the District Judge in
Swann employed a flexible 71% white to
29% black population ratio as a guide in
seeking a practical plan. The Supreme
Court specifically approved his doing so.
See Swann v. Charlotte-Meck.1 enbur_gBoard
of Education, supra at 16, 23-24. The
District Judge in this case clearly recid
and followed the Swann guideline. As
to this issue, we-find' no error."
The District Court found that as compared to the metro
politan Detroit desegregation area that the ratio of whites to
blacks was approximately 75% to 25% and therefore, on June 14,
1972, adopted a plan that would approximate this ratio, in the
spirit of Swann as approved by this Court in Nashville.
Educational soundness: No desegregation plan can "work"
unless it is educationally sound. The educational soundness
of an integration plan is to a large extent dependent upon how
effectively it gives children an opportunity to have stable
multi-racial experiences in groups composed substantially like
the surrounding community. Such experiences, especially if
begun as early as possible, give children of both major races
accurate perceptions of their own abilities and those of the
members of the opposite race. These informed self-perceptions
in turn lead to more self-confidence and better scholastic
performance. Multi-racial education is essential preparation
for li e in a multi-racial society. For this reason, if no other
schools should reflect the racial composition of the entire com
munity v,7hich they serve.
The testimony of witness, Dr. Green, is substantially
in agreement with this view of what constitutes a sounds educa
tional plan. (Tr. 863-69; 1049-51). See undisputed testimony
also in agreement in record of other educators that a Metropol
itan Plan is educationally sound. (City Tr. 245^ 469-470? 589)'?
Resegregati on: No plan can "work" if it offers a
ready avenue for rcsegregaticn. Even policies pursued by school
board officials in good faith do not relieve them of their duty
to fully eradicate the vestiges of segregation. Clark v. Board
of Education of Little Rock School Dist., 426 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir
1970). It follows then that the courts should require school
authorities to take steps to prevent resegregation by various
means. Lemon v. Bossier Parish School. Board., 446 F.2d 911 (5th
Cir. 1971). Similarly, in protecting Fourteenth and Fifteenth 1 2 3
1 App. Vail8, Vo1. V.
2 App. Va 2 2 6-227, Vol. V.
3 App. Va229 , Vol. V.
-78-
Amendment, rights, the Supreme Court has spoken of a "need to
eradicate past evil effects and to prevent the continuation or
repetition in the future of discriminatory practices..."
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 156 (1965). Were a
less rigorous standard insisted upon by the courts, the Consti
tutional obligation to eradicate segregation "root
and branch" would be reduced to a pruning that would let the
old evil grow back, more vigorous and more intractable than ever.
See,Swann v, Charlotte-Meeklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1
(1971). Neither the Court nor the school authorities would be
true to their duty were they to adopt a plan that foreseeably
will create more, rather than less, segregation.
This is also the view of the education experts who
testified in the trial below (See, e.g., City Tr. 463-65).1
Practica 1 i 1ies . Swann and Davis (Mobile) obviously
suggest that a plan must be practical. The transportcition plan
envisioned by the District Court in its desegregation area is
no more massive nor requires no rides longer in distance than
are presently being undertaken by children in the metropolitan
area. The clusters are so designed as to provide administrat'
convenience. (See Findings of Fact and Conclusions_of Lav; in
Support of Ruling on _Dosegrogation_Area and Development of Plan,
June 14 , 3 972 , Rulings 41-44 [7\pp. Ia511̂ _] .) In other words,
there is nothing in the plan to suggest that it is not practical.
To illustrate, a substantial part of the educational program of 1 2
1 App. Va221-223, Vol. V.
2 Vol IB. -7 9-
• •
the State is not conducted on a local school district basis.
With the exception of those districts of sufficiently large size
to support such special programs themselves, educational pro
grams for the physically handicapped, the emotionally disturbed,
as well as substantial programs which are usually on a part time
basis with regular school programs in vocational education, are
conducted not by the local school districts, but by the inter
mediate boards of education. Frequently, with the exception of
vocational education which is usually operated at large central
skills centers, these special education programs are operated
on an inter-district basis. In point of fact, "cross-district
busing" has been a common phenomenon for the special education
student for a good many years. (Cf., Metro Tr. 441, 444 ) P- If then
is any distinction between the propriety of the State of Michigan
providing cross-district busing of normal children for the pur
pose of terminating the violation of Constitutional rights, such
distinction escapes the Detroit Board.
The District Court has found the facts as to a remedy.
Only recently on May 30, IS72, this Court in Ke 11 ey v . r-1 etropo-
litan County Board of Education of Nashville and Davidson County,
____F.2d____, recognized that the trial court and not the
appellate court is the remedy fact finder. In doing so, the Court
noted that District Courts have "judicial discretion" in
adopting desegregation plans and their discretion should not be
disturbed. (Slip Op. at 25). 1
1 App. VI a 04 , 8 5-0 G, Vo1. VI.
-80-
Failure to adopt a metropolitan remedy, assuming a
Constitutional violation, would mean that the black children
of the City of Detroit would, in effect, have had their Con
stitutional rights denied but without a remedy required by
Swann. In other v/ords, we would have the anomaly that there
was a Constitutional wrong but no remedy. Only in recent years
has it been urged upon the Federal Court system that the Con
stitutional violation as to voting rights could not be remedied.
See, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The Court responded
and now voting rights cases are an intricate part of our system
of Constitutional protections with remedies. Sec/e.g. < Gomi111of̂
v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). We suggest that if there must
be a remedy because of an alleged Constitutional violation, that
remedy in this case must be the metropolitan remedy adopted by
the District Court which considered the necessity of racial mix,
education soundness, prevention of resegregation, the practical
ities of the situation and which has attempted to root out the
evils of segregation "root and branch" pursuant to the dictates
of Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S.
430 (1968).
Finally, the school authorities of the
district have advised the District Court and
there have been no Constitutional violations,
been Constitutional violations, these school
educational experts and who have assisted the
Detroit school
this Court that
But if there have
authorities, who are
District Court in
-81-
applying the Davis doctrine, have advocated a Metropolitan Plan
as the only method of achieving the greatest possible degree
of actual desegregation in the community, to-wit, the metropolitan
Detroit community.
No more elegant statement of the legal and practical
reasons for a metropolitan remedy in the Detroit metropolitan
community has been made than the District Court's own statement
from the bench on July 19, 1972:
"I think it should be clearly understood, hov'ever,
that in my disposition of the motions before me
today this Court does not retreat from nor
abandon... our conclusion that any plan for the
desegregation of the public schools of the City
of Detroit would not accomplish desegregation
and that only a Metropolitan Plan of desegrega
tion would accomplish the desegregation of those
schools."
"The Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
as I read it, is not geographically' limited. It
is difficult for this Court to believe that any'
higher judicial! authority' of the United States
would or, for that matter Constitutionally could,
engraft on that amendment any such geographical
limitation. The vindication of the Plaintiffs'
Constitutional right to equal education cannot
be denied on the claim of alleged sovereign powers
of local school districts." Tr. 1947-4 8 (App. VIIJa243,
Vol. VIII).
-82-
(
VI
A PLAN OF DESEGREGATION.
State Defendants have suggested that the financing and
implementation of a metropolitan remedy, or, for that matter,
any remedy involving an expenditures of funds, is a matter
beyond the power of the parties to this cause. The argument
presented by the State Defendants is not novel, for it is one
which has been made by the states as an attempt to frustrate
remedial orders of federal courts in the area of school dese
gregation in a series of cases which date back to Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), if not to Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955)
It lias consistently been laid to rest as quickly as it has
been raised. The source of this argument is traceable to the .
restrictions on judicial power vis-a-vis the states, as
enunciated in the Eleventh Amendment and as related to the
supremacy clause. It is countered by the universal holdings
of the courts that it is the duty of State officers to support
both the Constitution and the rights guaranteed against infringe
ment by the States under the Fourteenth Amendment.
America has, on occasion, recognized the immunity of States
from suits involving direct actions against government funds
or property for complainants' personal benefits, the Supreme
Although the Supreme Court of the United States of
-83-
Court has not deemed the Eleventh Amendment a serious inpedi
ment to judicial action whenever the protection of compelling
Constitutional guarantees has been at issue. See, e.g. ,
Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat 738 (1824, U.S.);
Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248 (1906); Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908).
In the area of school desegregation, the Court has
followed this rule. In Cooper v . Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), which
involved obstructionist tactics by the Governor and legislature
of the State of Arkansas against implementation of desegregation
orders of the federal courts, the Court stated:
"In short, the Constitutional rights of children
not to be discriminated against in school admission
on grounds of race or color declared by this Court
in the B r o w n case can neither be nullified openly
and directly.by State legislators or State execu
tives or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly
by them through evasive schemes for segregation
whether attempted 'ingeniously or ingenuously.'"
358 U.S. at 17.
In Griffin v t.. School Board of Prince Edward County, 377
U.S. 218 (1964), involving the closing of public schools and the
operation of a system of private schools by the county witn the
acquiesence of the Commonwealth of Virginia, Mr. Justice Black,
speaking for a unanimous Court, summarily dismissed the Eleventh
Amendment argument raised.
"It is contended that the case is an action
against t h e State, is forbidden by the
E l e v e n t h A m e n d m e n t , a n d t h e r e f o r e s h o u l d be
d i s t a i s s c d . T i i e c o m p l a i n t , h o w e v e r , c n a r c e d
that State and county officials were depriving
Petitioners of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. It has been settled law since Ex parte
Young, (citation omitted), that suits against
State and county officials to enjoin them from in
vading constitutional rights are not forbidden by
the Eleventh Amendment." 377 U.S. at 228.
The Court went on to state that the District Court could, in
addition to its injunctive powers, force the various Defendants,
that is, the Board of Supervisors, School Board, Treasurer, and
Division Superintendent of Schools of Prince Edward County, and
the State Board of Education and the State Superintendent of
Education, all of whom were held to have duties which related
"directly or indirectly to the financing, supervision, or
operation of the schools", to undertake positive action to
reopen the public schools in the county:
"For the same reasons, the District Court may,
if necessary to prevent further racial .
discrimination, require the Supervisors to
exercise the power that is theirs to levy
taxes to raise funds adequate to reoocn,
operate and maintain without. racial discrimin-
nation _a_ pub 1 ic school systern in Prince
Edward County..." (emphasis supplied) 377
U.S. at 233."
Thus, it becomes readily apparent that the present
Defendants, through the exercise of the inherent powers which
they possess as officers and instrumentalities of the State,
can effectuate and implement the remedy ordered by the District
Court in this cause, without the necessity of joining as parties
-85-
defendant the legislators of the State of Michigan.
In Evans v. Ennis, 281 F.2d 385 (3rd Cir. 1960) , which
involved a "spurious" class action suit against the State Board
of Education, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction,
and three county boards of education to desegregate the public
schools throughout the State of Delaware, the District Court,
twitting contentions similar to those being advanced by State
Defendants in this cause, stated:
"Doubtless integration will cost the citizens of
Delaware money which otherwise might not have to
be spent. The education of the young always re
quires, indeed, demands, sacrifice by the older
and more mature and resolute members of the
community. Education is a prime necessity of our
modern world and of the State of Delaware. We
cannot believe that the citizens of Delaware will
prove unworthy of this sacred trust. " 2 81
F .2d at 389. '
The extent of that cost wa.s more clearly illustrated in the
opinion rendered following a petition for rehearing:
"This second element of the plan, if it is to
be consummated, will necessitate the making
of immediate estimates as to future school
facilities. The making of such estimates is
not a simple matter. Their creation will re
quire the exercise of energy, skill, patience,
and creative adaptability by the public school
authorities, and, as we have indicated, funds
to be appropriated by the Generctl Assent] v_of
Delaware. The duty imposed on the State Board
of "Education in this respect is as clear as is
the responsibility confided to this court and
to the court below to make certain that the
mandate of the Supreme Court is carried out."
281 F.2d at 392.
Accord, Kelley v._Metropolitan County Board of Education of
Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn. ___ _ F.2d ___ (6th Cir. 19 72)
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1
(1971); Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District,
330 F. Supp. 3377 (1971).
Furthermore, as the District Court correctly recognized
in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 318 F,
Supp. 786 (W.D. N.C. 3970), the implementation of procedures
necessary to assure any Constitutiona.3. rights of the individual
may place, directly or indirectly, additional financial burdens
upon the State, even though not a formal party to the proceed
ings :
However, if a Constitutional right has been denied,
this court believes that it is the Constitutional
right that should prevail against the cry of "un
reasonableness. .. The unreasonableness of putting
the State to some expense cannot be weighed
against or prevail over the privilege against self
incrimination, or the right of people to be secure
in their homes. If, as this court and the Circuit
Court have held, the rights of children arc being
denied, the cost and inconvenience of restoring
those rights is no reason under the Constitution for
continuing to deny them." 318 F. Supp. at 801.
For examples of the reaffirmation of other Constitutional rights,
which may involve demands upon the State Treasury, see, e. g. ,
-87-
e
Argcrsingor v. Hamlin, 92 S.Ct. 2006 (1972) (furnishing counsel
for all indigents charged with misdemeanors); Gideon v. Walnwright
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (furnishing counsel for all indigents charged
with felonies); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (legislative
reapportionment). Indeed, coordinate branches of State govern
ment have been known to unilaterally impose financial obligations
upon the State, through the exercise of their inherent powers,
to ensure their continued and proper functioning. See e.g.,
Wayne Circuit Judges v. Wayne County, 386 Mich. 1 19 0 N 2 d 2 2 8'
(1971), cert. denied, Feb. 22, 1972. These cases demonstrate
that the State's fiscal power may not be used to defeat the
judiciary's authority to enforce the legal rights of citizens.
There has been some suggestion that existing collective
bargaining agreements with teachers and other school board
employees are a bar to a metropolitan plan. To begin with, no
contract, union agreement or otherwise, or Board policy or
practice may impede Fourteenth Amendment obligations. U.S. v,
Greenwood Municipal Separate School District, 406 F.2d 1086, 109^
(5th Cir.), cert, denied, 395 U.S. 907 (1969); Berry v. Benton
Harbor, ____F.Supp.___(W.D. Mich. 1971). Furthermore, the
right of school board employees, including teachers, to
bargain is a relatively new right in Michigan, having been
established by Act No. 379 of Public Acts of 1965 (MSA §17.445(1)/
et seq. , MCLA §423.201 , c_t seq.) . In the seven years since the
passage of Act 379, fact finders and the Michigan Employment
Relations Commission have led the way in using originality and
ingenuity in establishing school labor relations. There is
no reason why, as a practical matter, that there cannot be a
metropolitan desegregation plan with the availability of this
wealth of public labor expertise in Michigan to reconcile any
contract or collective bargaining rights that the school
teachers or other employees may have with the right of the
Plaintiffs to insist on their Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.
's
r~y
Of course, should it subsequently be determined that the
present Defendants do not, in fact, have the inherent or
specific powers to implement the remedy ordered by the District
Court in this cause, the Court is not powerless to act to add
such parties as may be found necessary to effectuate a complete
and cidequate remedy
stration of justice
and to achieve
" Griffin v.
"an orderly and fair admini-
School Board of Prince Edward
County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964); F.R.C.P. 15(d); F.R.C.P. 19(b).
As education in the State of Michigan is solely and
totally a function of the State, the State Defendants have the
power to implement the metropolitan remedy ordered by the
District Court.
IF SECTION 803 OF THE EDUCATION AMENDMENTS OF
19*72 IS~CON ST ITUI ORAL AND SPEC I PIC.hLLY APPLIC-
TO AN ~INTRA--CITY REMEDY
AND A METROPOLITAN REMEDY.
This Court has ordered the parties to include in their
briefs their responses to the following questions: _
"1. Does Section 803 of the Education Amendments
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318 apply to Metropolitan
transportation orders which have been or may be
entered by the District Court in this case?
"2. If Section 803 does apply, is it
constitutional?"
The Detroit Board of Education takes no position on
substantive merits of Section 803, because of its position
in the case. It is the unwavering belief of the Detroit E
the
card
of Education that the District Court erred in finding a
Constitutional violation in Detroit.
Court concurs with this position, tne
and constitutionality of Section 803
In the event that this
issue of the app.' ication
becomes moot as to Detroit.
Should this Court rule that the District Court was
correct in its findings of a Constitutional violation, the
position of the Detroit Board is
tinguish as between metropolitan
portation remedies.
that Section 803 docs not dis-
or intra-district pupil trans-
Section 803 provides:
"...[I]n the case of any order on the part
of any United States district court which
required the transfer or transportation of
any student or students from any school
attendance area prescribed by competent
State or local authority for the purposes
of achieving a balance among students with
regard to face..." (Emphasis added) .
Since the School District of the City of Detroit .
is a "competent... local authority", then the school attendance
areas within the school district are also within the mandate of
the Section. The intentional use of the word "any" in Section
803 reinforces this concept; 11 any attendance area" clearly
contemplates attendance areas within a school district.
This interpretation of Section 803 is consistent
with the interpretation given it during the debates in Congress
over the passage of the Educational Amendments of 1972. In the
debates in the House of Representatives, the Minority Leader,
Representative Gerald Ford, (Michigan), stated:
"If this amendment [Section 803] is approved
-- if it is enacted into lav;, it simply means
that no district court order forcing bussing;
for the purpose of obtaining racial balance
shall go into effect until the U.S. Supreme
Court has made the final determination."
Congressional Record, H10409 (November 4, 1971).
Similarly, stating that the Section applies to intra
city transfers or transportation, Representative Roman Pucinski
(Illinois), noted:
-91-
"The amendment merely holds the status quo in_
a school district until a final judgment has
been"made by the'u.S. Supreme Court."
Congressional Record, H10410 (November 4,1972).
(Emphasis added).
A similar bill introduced into the Senate, S. 659,
contained a provision prohibiting pupil transfers or transpor
tation between local educational agencies, and was therefore
applicable, if at all, only to the problem of cross district
transfers. But as the Joint House-Senate Conference Committee
noted,
"An identical provision was contained in
the Senate bill but is applicable only to
court orders requiring transportation of
students between local educational agencies
or consolidation of two or more such agencies...
The conference agreement contains
language of the House amendment..
Congressional Record, H4C33 (May
(Emphasis added).
the precise
T i
23 , 1972) .
was
to
Significantly, the
altered from being appli
instead cover all pupil t
enacted version of Section 303
cable only to metropolitan situations
runsfer plains, intra-city plans in
cluded. It was in this altered form that Section 803 was enacted.
meaning
Senator Claiborne Pell (Rhode
of Congress as to Section 803,
Island) indicated the
in a non-legal sense;.
I!1
- 92 -
l
"Here I would say that a literal reading
of the language fof Section 803] by a non
lawyer would indicate that if a local
educational agency is under an appealable
order to transport students to achieve
racial balance, that local educational
agency can receive a stay of that order..."
Congressional Record, S8282 (May 23, 1972).
To the same effect, Senator Walter Mondale (Minnesota),
speaking in opposition to the Section, stated: •
"But the intention of the principle sponsor
seems clear enough. The provision is designed
to postpone all orders, in all case s -- hoy;ever
• simplcT^7- Involving either the transporation
or transfer or children to achieve desegregation."
Congressional Record, S8386 (May 23, 1972) (Em
phasis added).
Senator Mondale's interpretation was strengthened
by a memorandum entitled, "The Constitutionality of the Nixon
Administration's Proposed Student Transportation Moratorium
Bill", prepared by the Washington Research Project Action Council,
which Senator Mondale introduced into the Congressional Record at
at S8387 - 8388:
I
t
L
"The moratorium bill... affects equally every
school district in the country..."
Finally, the sponsor of Section 803, Representative
William Broomfield, (Michigan), clearly intended that this
Section would apply equally as regards metropolitan and intra
city pupil transportation:
-93-
f
"My antibussing amendment... provides that the
defendant .school district will have his [sic]
day in court before he [sic] has to buy buses,
uproot children from their neighborhood schools,
and implement forced busing." Congressional
Record, II5419 (June 8, 1972).
It is clear that throughout the deliberations of
Congress that it was completely understood by both the support
ers and opposition to Section 803 that it would apply equally
to any order of a District Court that would involve pupil
transfer, or transportation, regardless of whether the re
assignment was part of a metropolitan plan or an intra-city plan.
As a result, it is the position of the Detroit Board
of Education that Section 803, if constitutional and applicable,
applies equally to any intra-city as well as any metropolitan
remedies.
The Detroit Board of Education has taken no position-
on the actual constitutionality of Section 803, nor its specific
application to the remedy of the District Court here. The
Detroit Board believes that the question of Constitutionality and
the specific application of Section 803 will be adequately
briefed by the other parties involved in this litigation.
-9 4-
RELIEF REQUESTED
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants-Appellants
Detroit Board of Education, e_t al, pray that this Court dismiss
the Complaint filed herein on the ground that there has been
no violation of Plaintiffs' Constitutional rights. If this Court
should find a violation of Plaintiffs' Constitutional rights, then
Defendants-Appellants, Detroit Board of Education, et al, pray
that the District Court's Metropolitan Remedial Order be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RILEY AND ROUMELL
L • \ /S'-h ukVi
George TJ Rournel i r. • t/ t r
Louis D. Beer
Jane Keller Souris
Russ E. Boltz
C. Nicholas Revelos, of Counsel
Attorneys for Appellants and
certain other named Defendants
720 Ford Building
Detroit, Michigan 48226
August 14, 1972
-95-
(
APPENDIX A
fC'lHi)°, 1L
1L »p
m m
B Y S T A X P U T N A M
Frca Prc:s Writer
e a r s
m s i m r s
- ' t o w n T o w n s h i p ^ S c h o o l D i s -
0 - ‘ n v e n .
W a y n e C o u n t y ’ s r i c h & i i
s c h o o l d i s t r i c t i s s c a r c e ] . T h r e e
o f t h e c o u n t y ’ s p o o r e s t s c h o o l
d i s t r i c t s w a n t t o t a
T h e r i c h d i s t r i c t i s , P r e y
I t d o e s n ’ t w a n t a n y t h i n g t o
d o w i t h i t s p o o r n e i g h b o r s —
C a r s o n , H a n d a n d M a p l e
G r o v e S c h o o l D i s t r i c t s , a l l i n
B r o w n s t o v r n T o v / n s h i p i n
S o u t h e r n W a y n e C o u n t y . . ’a * * ;
W O O D E C A Y E N I S a s c h o o l
d i s t r i c t w h i c h h a s o n l y o n e
b u i l d i n g — t h e B a t e s E l e r r . e s - ;
t a r y S c h o o l . A n d B a t e s p r o
v i d e s e d u c a t i o n o n l y u p t o t i t s ;
s i x t h g r a d e . T h a t ’ s n o l o n g e r
e n o u g h . •
‘ T o e S t a t e K - 1 2 l a w n a y s '
s c h o o l d i s t r i c t s r o u s t p r o v i d e '
e d u c a t i o n f ? c m k i n d e r g a r t e n .
t o t h e 1 2 t h t i r a d e . " . '
S o Y / c o d r u v c n h a s t o g o .
T h e q u e s t i o n i s : T o w h o m — o r ,
, r a t h e r , t o V j h i c h c f i t s n e i g h
b o r s ?
W A M C O T T E c h J j
wcoDHAVEtUp 0 (/y ,e o ss2
T E O ilO J J j ' LE .
J.• A s u p e r i n t e n d e n t f r o m o n e
c f t h e m . . s r y . d : . . . . :
’ “ v / e * d s e l l c a r r i g h t a r m s t o
g e t W c e d i i ’ i Y e n , a n d s o w o u l d
a l e t o f e t h e r s . ”
■ T h e p o o r d i s t r i c t s , o f f e r i n g
o n l y k i n d A g a r t e n . t o e i g h t h
g r a c e t r a i n i n g , a l s o a r c s l a t e d
f o r r e o r g a n i s a t i o n , b e c a u s e t h e
S t a t e i s v o V h i n g t o c u t t i r e
n u m b e r o f • - s c h o o l • d i s t r i c t s ’
f r o m a b o u t 1 , 2 1 0 t o S C O .
P o o r - d i s t r i c t p e o p l e , f r o m
r e s i d e n t s t o s u p e r i n t e n d e n t s ,
h o p e a s p e c i a l r e o r g a n i z a t i o n
c o m m i t t e e w i l l r e c o m m e n d
t h a t t h e t h r e e p o o r d i s t r i c t s
m e r g e w i t h V / c o d i i a v c n t o
f o r m o n e l a r g e d i s t r i c t .i » J
T U B C O M M A t~ B i s d r a w
i n g u p r e o r g a n i z a t i o n p l a n s
f o r e i g h t E c h c o l d i s t r i c t s i n
t h e C o u n t y ’ s <3 t h a t d o n ' t
m e e t t h e K - 1 2 r e q u i r e m e n t .
T h e c o m m i t t e e r e p o r t I s d u e
D e c . 3 1 , I S C e .
E d u c a t o r s u s a ‘ ' r i c h " a n d
“ p o o r ” i n r e g a r d t o s c h o o l d i s
t r i c t s t o d e s c r i b e a d i s t r i c t ’ s
w e a l t h i n a c c e s s e d v a l u a t i o n
o f t a x a b l e p r o p e r t y a n d b n U ; o
n u m b e r o f p u p i l s t o b e e d u
c a t e d . _ ’ ■ ’ . . . . . . . . .
\ V o o d h a y c n h a s a s t a t e
e q u a l i z e d v a l u a t i o n c f $ 1 7 , 1 3 3 ,
2 1 0 , w i i i c h m e a n s t h a t i t c a n
d r a ’. v o n t h e t a x e s f r o m $ 0 1 , C C 3
i n v a l u a t i o n t o e d u c a t e e a c h c f
i t s 1 7 3 p u p i l s . .
I t ’ s t h e r i c h e s t i n t h e c o u n
t y b y f a r . . ■ | :
I t ’ s g o i n g t o g e t r i c h e r . A s
i t i s , . t h e S c c o n y . - l I d t j U r e f i n e r y .
. f o o t s m o s t o f t i : e / e d u c a t i o n
h i l l . B u t t h e F o r d / M o t o r C o . '
i s b u i l d i n g a h u g e
p l a n t i n V . ' c o d h a v e n .
’ ’ • M o d e
p e r i r . t e r . d e r . t , s a r d c o n s t r u c
t i o n o f t h e n e w p l a n t w i l l
m e a n V r ' c o a h u v e n w i l l b e a b l e
t o d r a w o n t a x e s f r o m $ 3 2 0 ,
0 3 0 t o e d u c a t e e a c h p u p i l .
’ „ A s t u d y s h o w e d t h a t i f
Y / o o d h a v e n m e r g e d w i t h i t s
t h r e e p o o r n e i g h b o r s , i t w o u l d
m e a n t h e l a r g e d i s t r i c t w o u l d
b e a b l e t o d r a w o n t h e taxe3
f r o m $ 1 7 , 5 2 0 v a l u a t i o n f o r e a c h
o f i t s p u p i l s . ’ •i
The Detroit Free Press, August 2, 1965
-96-
«
•APPENDIX B
,~r '■■■■: • 77 77 O 77 77 ' 7 / T 0 '• r? ° n
^ u r m m i e u t i e l / m m . M m m m
g s m m u -
r.Y v,u?.1aTi 'L an'?^
n X . •
r n d i i i c ^ -
f ro P.-c;-. Writs."
( C A B L E T O N , M i c h . - - E : H
i G u n t h e r s e l d o m g e t s a n y t h i n "
I t o c a t a t A i r p o r t C o m m u n i t y
i H i ~ h S c h o o l , w h e r e h e i s a
i s e n i o r . T h e h a l l s a r e s o c r o w d
e d d u r i n g b r e a k s t h a t h e c a n
n o t g e l n e a r t h e f o o d m a c h i n e s .
X i n a - y e a r - o ’. d l / o u A n n S m i t h
m e e t s h e r s c h o o l b u s a t 7 X 0
e a c h m o r n i n g . A f t e r a n h o u t -
l o n g t r i p , s h e I s d e l i v e r e d t o
t h e e l e m e n t a r y s c h o o l a m i l e
f r o m h e r h o m e .
| H e r r i d e t a k e s h e r p a s t t h e
i s t i l l - c l o s e d s c h o o l , w h e r e n o
: t e a c h e r s a r e o n d u t y t ' n a t
■ e a r l y , t h e f u l l l e n g t h o ' t h e b u s
: r o u t e a r . d b a c k a g a i n .
. T H E S E i n c o n v e n i e n c e s a r e
| n o t u n u s u a l f o r t h e a l m o s t
; 3 , 0 0 0 s t u d e n t s L o t h i s M o n r o e
C o u n t y f a r m i n g c o m m u n i t y .
T h e ' h i g h s c h o o l a n d j u n i o r
h i g h c l a s s e s a r e o n h a l f - d a y
s e s s i o n s s o t h e y c a n u s e t h e
s a m a ' b u i l d i n g . B u s r o u t e s
a r c l o n g e r , c l a s s e s l a r g e r a n d
m o r a l e l o w e r t h a n a t a n y t i m e
i n m e m o r y . -
W h o i s t o b l a m e ? -
c;If the stale can id I you d m l toj .
da like they did this time, v/hv
shoukln’i the stale foot, the hill?"
| T i l 3 p a r e n t s a r . d t h e A i r p o r t
' C o m m u n i t y S c h o o l D i s t r i c t m y
th t> 5 " e. t o E e p o r f m e n t c l H a r z *ce:
d e p a r t m e n t i n iT i i e d e p a r t m e n t i a d r r e c
p o i n t s t h e f i n g e r a t t r a D r g t n -
1 a t t i r e
T h e h a r d ; f e e i i r
f r o m i ' : i e S t a t e B e a r
c a t i o : , ’ s e r d r r t o d r :
! S u m p t e r S c h r c l D
W a y , 3 C o u n t y a n d
j b u i l d r . g s , s t u d e n t s a
~1
d e
D i s t r i c t i
s p l i t i t
i d o p e - r a '
: t a m o n g f o u r a d j u i :
; — X n l i t t l e q u e s t i o n |
t t S u m p t e r n e e d e d h e l p - j!
S u m p t e r h a d n o h i g h s c h o o l .
V i r t u a l l y e v e r y o n e i n v o l v e d
i n t l i e e d u c a t i o n o f t h e d i s
t r i c t ' s 1 . 0 0 0 s t u d e n t s a g r e e d 5
t h a t s o m e t h i n g d r a s t i c h a d t o
b e d o n e .
' T l t e s t a t e b o a r d w a s g i v e n
-, t h e a u t h o r i t y t o d i s s o l v e a d i r , -
S t r i c t l i k e S u m p t e r u n d e r
( " e m e r g e n c y c o n d i t i o n s , " a c -
I c o r d t r . g t o t h e t e r m s o f a 1 0 5 7
a w . .
H o w e v e r , t h e f i n a l v e r s i o n o f
h e a c t p a s s e d b y t h e L e g i s l a
t u r e w a s p o t w i t a t t h e D e p a r t -
r . e r . t c f E d u c a t i o n w a n t e d .
T h e L e g i s l a t u r e m a d e t i t s
a c t a p p l y o n l y t o s c h o o l d i s
t r i c t s i n c o u n t i e s o f a m i l l i o n
p o p u l a t i o n o r m o r e . .
T l i i s m a k e s t h o l a w a p p l y
o n l y t o W a y n e C o u n t y a n d e x
c l u d e s a n y t r o u b l e d d i s t r i c t s
o u t s t a t e . O n e j l e g i s l a t o r s a i d
i b i s w a s t h e p i l y v . a y t o g e t
t i i e l a w p n s s r j . .
• A n o t h e r a m e n d m e n t p r o v i d
e d t h a t r . o d i s t r i c t c o u l d g e t
m o r e t h a n j.0 p e r c e n t o f t h o
- t e r r i t o r v o f . . h e d i s s o l v e d
s c h o o l s y s t e m . ( . T i n s h a s s i n c e
b e e n c h a n g e d . ) •
A i r p o r t h a d f o u r o : ; e - r o
s c h o o l s . T h r e e - r e m a i n o p e n
c a u s e o f l a c k o f s p a c e i n
n e w e r s c h o o l s . A b o n d : s
w a s p u t o n t h e b a l l o t .
T h e n t h e S t a t e D e p a r t : '
o f E d u c a t i o n b e g a n p u b
h e a r i n g s o n S u m p t e r . C a
t o n s u s p e c t e d i t w a s g o i n g
g e t p a r t o f t h a t s y s t e m .
A T h e b o n d I s s u e w a s s o u n
j r e j e c t e d . L a s t A u g u s t a
j m i l l . o p e r a t i n g r e v e n u e p r e :
I & 1 w a s t u r n e d d a w n , 2 - 1 .
| T h e A i r p o r t b a n r d e r d - a r c
u n d e r c o n s t r u e - ( S u r v e y t o f i n d c u t w h y .
I
T W O O F T H E o t h e r d i s
t r i c t s i n v o l v e d — H u r o n a r . d
V a n B u r e r . . b o t h i n W a y n e —
a r e o v e r c r o w d e d b e c a u s e c f
t h e S u m p t e r s t u d e n t s t h e y g o t . jBuildings __
t i o n s h o u l d h e l p t h i n g s c o m i c ! - I f o u n d s t r o n g v o t e r r c s e r . t r
c r a f c i y . | t o t h e S u m p t e r m e r g e r .
O n e d i s t r i c t , L i n c o l n , a c t u a l - I n r a a i n t o f ! : e a r g u i i i e n t •
i y c a m e o u t b e t t e r t h a n b e f o r e , j a n y a d d i t i o n a l t a x w o u l d
b e c a u s e i t r e c e i v e d a r . a l r r . e e * . | p r i m a r i l y f o r h a w s i n g S u r a ,
n e w j u n i o r h i g h s c h o o l t h a t r . c - ; s t u d e n t s ' w h i l e t h a i r p a r !
c o m m o d a t e s m o r e e t u d e n t u j w o u l d r . p i p a y a r y c f i t
t a a n c a m e v . n t l i i t . j c a u s e t h e y w e r e n e t r e s i A
D u t i t a p p e a r s t h a t t i n y A i r - j o f t h e A i r p o r t d i s t r i c t n t
I p o r t w a s l e f t h o l d i n g t h e t a g . • t i m e o f t h e e l e c t i o n .
1 T V s d i s t r i c t ' s S l A - m l l l i c r ’
b u d g e t w i l l b e s t r e t c h e d t o t h e
b r e a k i n g p o i n t t o p r o v i o a
t h e M 3 S u m p t e r s t u d e n t s i t
f o r ~
h s a y s t h e v o t e r s
; - v e r w i l l a n n r s v e £
:c i r . d e i t n c c e - v
o l i t l e d d i s t r i c t t o b ?
i n g d i s f r i c t - s . _ _ _ _ _ J
• A u p o n h a d t o t a k e o n 2 3 3
S u m p t e r s t u b e ' n t s - - w h i c h
i n f a n t i : n e e d e d m o r e t e a c h -
e r s . rr.r•: e d e s k s , m o r e s u p -
p l i e s a n d m o r e s p r i e r * .
l t 5 ! 'C T i r r . t r , r c . ' : : - c J , i n a n
e l e c t : : : : , t o a p p r o v e r.:o :c
T n e p r o v i s i o n m
s a r y f o r t i
' b o u n d e d b y ' c f l e a n f o u r o t h
e r s . T h e K p r l l i D e a r b o r n
H e i g h t s D i s t r i c t t r i e d t o s p l i t
! i t s e l f v . o i n 1 E 5 7 b u t f a i l e d b e -
j c a u s e t h e r e - w e r e n o t e n o u g h
, d i s t r i c t s c n i t s b o r d e r s . _ _ _ _ _ _
i n t h e b u m p i e r c a s e , t h e 3 0
p e r c e n t '
h a d t o a b s o r b . I i i j ; k : I . C U T
I c r . c h c r s w e r e h i r e d a : n l o t r l
a r . r . w J » v a ! a r y o f S 5 5 .C C D . X c - . T
d e s k s r . r . d s u p p l i e s w e r c o r *
t i c r e d .
TS .j* t h e b i g p n a h i c m . I s
s c a v e . T h e r e a r e n o f c u i l o : r . " 2
u n d e r e o n s i l r u c l i o n t o c'J. e r f u -
t o r e r e l i e f .
T h e p e o p l e i n C m l c t o n e r e
c r p e c i a l l y p r o u d o f t t i c ! r s c h o o l
b u d d i n g s .
T i : e d i s t r i c t s t a r t t d ;i n c n
p b m b ■ • i n ' l l a . i ! * p '> r t b a : r a c k s
p . t t h e n u t o f W o r l d V . ‘ a r I I
C-r.'Z r. r e w i n t o f i v e b u n ! d i n g n .
c o n ? * . : u c f . ' d w i t h b o n d r . t o n c y . '
T h e b o n d e d d e b t h o . 3 b e a n
V . l l j o f f . L o u i s S r . u i t h . a f o r :
m . e v p r e s i d e n t o f t l e / • . i r p o r t
B o a r d o f E d u c a t i o n . t o ’ :*: s o p a -
c i r . 7 1. • r i d e i n s i - . o w i : r»£ %■ i ' i t o i ' . i
t r m i ' d a g e L=st:e.. “ lh-ay f i ~ .
V.'hrfs t h e u s e ? I t s
C a n t c l i y o u w h a t t o c :
t h e y d i d t h i s t i m e . ■
s h o u l d n ’ t t h e s t a t e f o o t
b i l l ? "
■ B i l l G u n t h e r ’ s m o t h e r ,
r i c , a t y p i c a l p a r e n t , s :
" O u r s c h o o l s w e r e p r e t t y a
b e f o r e t i n s . N o w t h e y ' r e c
c r o w d e d . W e d o n ' t b n w e
S u m p t e r k i d s . . . i t w a s
s t a t e t h a t d i d t h i s t o u s . "
M e m b e r s o f t V A i r p
s c h o o l b o a r d a r e b i t t e r . "
a r e f a c e d w i t h a f i n a n c i a l
e d u c a t i o n a l c r i s i s t r . e y c
c r e a t e a n d c a n ' t c o p e v . .
" W e w e r e a f i n a n c i a l l y s
r - ' d i s t r i c t , " o n e t c h o o i t
m e m b e r s a y s , " s o t h e .
f i g u r e d w e w e r e a g o o d r
f t V. c s f* k 1N. 5 .l o s o m o o i
a p p a r e n t l y l a r g e l y t h r o u g h r e -
f i c r . ' . t m v . l e v e r b r i n g f o r c e d t o
t a k e c n S u T - p t e r s t u d e n t s . M o w
f r a d i r t : l e t f a c e s a . f i n a n c i a l
s i n r y f o r t h e
r o a c h < l: - w r . i:
t y f o r A i r p o r t
: t , LI-A
r . a d e i t r . e c c s -
s t c . t c b o r . r d t o
t o k t o m ' o o C o m : -
a p e n n y o n t h e m . "
1 \ I f 5 7 t i i e d i s t r i c t w a s j u s t
beginning t o plan for adchtion-
e 1 b u i l d i n g s w h e n t h e S u m p t e r
s i t u a t i o n c a m e t o a h e a d .
t h r o u g h D c y e a r s t o
o f d e b t ? "
-97-
APPENDIX ^ continued)
T i l r ; A I f t P O U T d i s t r i c t s u - i
p c r i r . t c n d e n t , J o s e p h S t e r l i n g ,
s e c s n o w a y o ' . i t .
" W e ’ r e o n l y b e g i n n i n g t o a s - i
c e s s t h e c o s t o f t h i s S u m p i e r
t h i n g . ” h e s a y s , " n u t y o u c r . n
s e e t h a t i t ' s g o i n g t o c r i p p k D
u s e d u c a t i o n r i ' . l y t o r s o m e
y e a r s t o C o m e . " . ,
W i t h t h e v o t e r s u n w i l l i n g t o
a p p r o v e m o r e t a x e s t o r s t u
d e n t s t h e y d i d n ' t w a n t , t h e b u d
g e t a l r e a d y s p r e a d t u r n , a n d |
b u i l d i n g s b u r s t i n g a t t h e !
s e a m s . A i r p o r t s c h o o l o f f i c i a l s
s a y t h a t o n l y t h e s t a l e c a n
r e s c u e t h e m f r o m t h i s c r i s i s .
T h e s t a t e b o a r d ' s p l a n f o r
d i s s o l v i n g S u m p t e r c a l l e d t o r
t h r e e o f t h e f o u r d i s t r i c t s t o
r e c e i v e a l u m p s u m t o p r o
v i d e h o u s i n g f o r t h e n e w s t u
d e n t s . T i l e f o u r t h . L i n c o l n , g o t
t h e n e w j u n i o r h i g h . . :
j
T h e l e g i s l a t u r e n e v e r a p p r o -
p r i . a l e d t h o m o n e y . A l l l i n g e r
U o l i n e , D e p a r t m e n t o f K i l u e a -
t i o n n i d o w h o w o r k e d o n t h o
c a s e , r a n d o i s t o h o p o t h a t
t h e n p p r o p r i n l i n n w i l l h e m a d e h
n e x t y e a r . I
I n a d d i t i o n . H o l m e h o p e s t o '
g e t s t a t e m o n e y t o p a y o f f \
w h a t r e m a i n s o f S u m p t e r ' s
$ 1 3 0 , 0 0 0 o p e r a t i n g d e b t a f t e r
b a c k t a x e s a r e c o l l e c t e d a n a
t o p a y o f f t h e d e b t o n S u m p - .
t e r ' s s c h o o l b u s e s . I
T h e b u s e s w e r e d i v i d e d
a m o n g t h e f o u r d i s t r i c t s b u t
m o s t a r e t o o o l d t o b e u s e d
w i t h o u t e x t e n s i v e r e p a i r s .
U n l e s s t h e L e g i s l a t u r e c o m e s
u p w i t h s o m e m o n e y f o r S u m p
t e r ' s b i l l s , t h e f o u r d i s t r i c t s
w i l l e a c h h a v e t o p a y a s h a r e .* * •
(> K A I I L Y T H I S y e a r t h e l e g i s
l a t u r e a m e n d e d t h e l a w t o a d -
l o w t h e S t a t e H o a r d o f K a u r i - i
t i o n t o b r e a k u p d i s t r i c t s s c -
' C ' t - r . i m g - t o i t s o w n f n , m . u n ,
e i t h e r u s i n g t r i o 3 d p . c t c e u .
rule.
T i n s m e a n s t ' a a t w h a t h a p -
r - w . - d t o 'A irpo rt p r o b a b l y
w o n ' t h a p p e n a g a i n . .
B u t Airport's p r o b l e m s a r e
t . u " d o ’. v t d b y t h e s e r e f i n e
m e n t s . ■ -
The Detroit Free Press, October 7, 1968
-98-
C J f l S ' u T i i C l l
t * By V/lLl-lAU CCNNELLAN
Intjott XiV> tilt/ Vil’M t ]
* '• LAriSf«>^r.-^:n^^P"
JjyudtlL''Q <a n k [y _p. - i 11 s School^
District Kas occa ordered tits- -
so'ygdlMyy the State Board of
Education. '
' The order, effective June 30.
ends a ycnr-Icn.^ controversy
• over the fnto of the western
Wnyne County district, which
Is $230,CCD in debt. |
The district, of 3,230 students ,
— mono with the operating j
deficit — will be absorb;:! by
Sjtlie Livonia rut-d Wayne Coin-
jtmunity districts.
Edward Hines drive will he
the dividing lino, with Livonia
netting the students and build
ings north cf Hir.es and V/r.yno
everything couth.
ALL CAPITAL DECTS ~
those incurcd for building
purposes — wii! remain with
tire present Nankin Mil's vot
ers, and thcy'VAd pkc on
the regular tax burdens of
t'o.oir new districts, under tire
Etato hoard Cskcd the Lcnisln-v.
ture to appropriate enough-;:
money to eliminate the etc:iCit ..
end provida Livonia a n.d .
V/ayr.c with any new-facilities'**
which might he needed to a > ~
cominodate /Cep) Nankin ettW"
J ‘“ “ ... "
state board ru!ing.
Livonia v;l[h 3."i_CB0 students
already, i .-yi.J in!' c-rit CO p or
cent of i y \ ‘ :l n'kin slutient?,
along v.Dy .he Perririvillo,
Nankin k ' ' \nd Henry Fore
elementary SCltool build: r
The Nan! tin M:ills Boa rd o!
Education offices will also C3
to Livonia.
V/ayno will get the remain
ing students r.ud the Tonquish
and "Robert J. McKee elemen
tary schools. Nankin M i l l s
Junior High School also goes
to Wayne. Nankin does not
have a high school program.
All other assets, such as
School buses and other equip- i
meat, will be divided on a Ct- !
<0 ratio. ;
The operating deficit will be ,
split similarly, although t h e j
dents.
A menses’ -.ry.’roviding Ecdi--t
tional fund/ *•• J sed the lieu;::.:,
problems suctr-’as that of Kan* •
Lin Mills can be avoided.
The state board also ashed.
tho Legislature to revise. lEe1-*
-state aid formula, so future *
yesterday cure! is being consul-- ,
cred b y ’the Senate today. ■... J
THE NANKIN PROBLEM ;
came to a head last summer"
wh.cn the school board asked”
tiie State Board of Education -
to declare an emergency in
the cis trict and rc organize it',"
The hoard was given :tlilS
power by a IS 57 act cf liter
Legisla tu re. ,
At th:at time, the school ths-
trict v.•as $263,USD in debt c.n
its one rating budgeit, and 1
b e e n denied per mission top
seek h:onds to bitlid a h,igh'
school because cf debt pr cd>
A -ct U..
J *' .IStata-‘'DPI
partmc r. t c f Ldi icaticn re-,
veal eel that the t;ix base cf.:
the d.i:strict is in the Iov,
percent in tho eta tc. N
The current ta base ■ i.r
SG.OL’O a student, brcausn ! C •
than 2 percent of the tax I:
is prov■ided by inrr.:stry.
The 3S.S mills ($33.SO per-
$1,CC0 assessed vain at ion)..
Nankin. had for epe rat inn b’d’-n.
c!s was tire highest in the si■«n f .-•»
Tiic study by tr.c dep T̂u-*
ment concluded tbat Kr.i»' • • rr
had mr.dc every c! tort to :rp'V
port it schools cut was v.:::ib: O’
becaus c of the torc strue;;..r% ■
r.r.d the present rt ate aid, fOi>.
mule.. • M*
The Detroit News
■99-
f ? - * " — r
> / / /
d APPENDIX D
F“ (f*)>—-rs .// N
December 15 , 1971, Introduced by Reps. Cawthorne,
B rad ley , Smart, Mctleely and Holbrook and r e fe r r e d
to the Committee on Educat ion.
O
A b i l l to p rov ide fo r emergency f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e fo r
i n s o lv e n t school d i s t r i c t s ; to p r e s c r ib e c e r t a i n powers and
du t ie s o f the in termed iate board o f educa t ion in connec t ion
therew i th ; to p rov ide 'a procedure f o r r e o rg a n i z a t i o n o f such
school d i s t r i c t s ; to prov ide fo r cont inuance o f the s ta te
committee on reo rgan iza t ion o f school d i s t r i c t s ; to p ro v i c e
c e r t a i n powers and dut ies o f the s ta te board o f educa t ion in
connect ion therew i th; to c rea te an emergency loan rev o lv in g
fund; and to make an a pp rop r ia t io n .
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN ENACT:
1 Sec. 1. As used In t h i s act:
2 (a) "School d i s t r i c t " does not inc lude an in te rm ed ia te
k 163 ’ 71
*
-100-
6
I'tefeiM.-, _,jA
.IsyK
I
! i
of wiiiofi In n t tr i l -n in l ' l t* (U lf»>>
,jay of Ii- m t h a n <-'f n<l v “ lor<-'m tn x t~*
----------Vj, .nlld the fiscal corvlit̂ s
j>a r t to n t i im u l colli-ctionn on t a x
levied l y th e d i .s t r ie t" .
appendix D
~~ ("continued)
)
H. $8f*0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
school d i s t r i c t .
(b) " S ta t e board" ora re. the s ta te board o, edu ca t io n .
- Sec. 2. The procedures prov ided by t h i s act may be used
no tw i th s tand ing any o the r p r o v i s i o n o f law to the c o n t r a r y .
S c c . 3 . The board o f educa t ion o f a school d i s t r i c t that
incu rs a d e f i c i t and i s unable to meet i t s f i n a n c i a l o b l i g a
t i o n ' s e l i g i b l e to app ly f o r an emergency loan from the
s t a t e . Such a d i s t r i c t s h a l l be cons ide red an i n s o l v e n t d i s -
t r i c t .
Sec.<l. A s c h o o l d i s t r i c t to be eligible f o r an emergency
ioan s h a l l c e r t i f y , based upon a c e r t i f i e d aud i t by the s t a t e
t reasu ry department, that the school d i s t r i c t i s i n s o l v e n t . Q
Scc. 5. The board o f educa t ion o f a school d i s t r i c t meet
ing the c r i t e r i a set f o r t h in s e c t i o n k may app ly to the s t a t e
board fo r an emergency loan to meet i t s f i n a n c i a l needs u. t
the end o f the f i s c a l year in which a p p l i c a t i o n i s made. I f ,
a f t e r rev iew, the s ta te board o f educa t io n f i n d s tha t the
d i s t r i c t meets the c r i t e r i a set f o r t h in s e c t i o n b , a recoc-
mendation fo r an emergency loan s h a l l be submit ted to the
governor f o r review and recommendation to the l e g i s l a t u r e .
[ 21
S e c . 6. 7 6 c
2 2 g i b ! e to r e c e i v e
[ « t h i s a c t s h a l l is
r 2-1
F ■
l o a n , m a d e p a y a b 1
25 not t o r e t h a n 10
1.
[
it 169 '71
- 1 0 1 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
APPENDIX D
(continued)
3 H. 58^0
annum beginning with the first fiscal year after receipt Oi
the .loan. The bonds shall be payable out of any funds of the
school district including state appropriations available to
the school district under any act. The amount due on the
bonds with interest in any fiscal year shall be deducted in
equal portions from the last 3 payments of state school aid
due the school district in each fiscal year. The bonds
shall also be the full faith and-credit obligations of the
school district and all taxable property within the school .
district shall be subject to the levy of ad valorem taxes
to repay the principal and interest obtained under the bonds
without limitation as to rate or amount. The board of educa
tion shall submit its budget for review and approval to the
state department of education. This budget shall be a
balanced budget and shall include a minimum repayment of 10%
of the original face amount of the loan received under this
act, plus interest at the statutory rate. The district shall
submit a monthly expenditure report to the state department
of education.
. Sec. 7. However, any school district not levying a mini
mum of 20 mills for operating purposes in the calendar year
for which it receives an emergency loan shall be reorganized
by the state board of education following recommendation by
the state committee on reorganization of school districts.
h 163 '71
- 1 0 2 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
k
APPENDIX D
(continued)
H. 58*iO
Sec. 8. The slate deportment of educa t i on-*e£«
scl-'K.-i— shall take any steps necessary to
assure that the expenditures of a school district which receives
an emergency loan under the provisions of this act shall not
exceed revenues on an annual basis and that the school di s~
trict maintains a balanced budget.
Sec. 9. If, upon application for an emergency loan, a
board of education certifies that the school district will
not be able to balance its budget, the district shall be
reorganized by the state board of education following
recommendation by the state committee on reorganization of
school districts.
Sec. 10. A school district receiving an emergency loan
under the provisions of this act shall balance its budget in
the fiscal year immediately following the fiscal year for
which it receives an emergency loan o r , following recorm.endd-
tion by the state committee on reorganization of school
districts, shall be reorganized by the state board of education
Sec. 11. A school district receiving an emergency loan
under the provisions of this act, which defaults in repayment
of the loan, shall be reorganized by the state board of educa
tion following recommendation by the state committee or. reo.-
ganizntion of school districts.
Sec. 12: Prior to reorganization of a school district
11169 ‘71
-103-
APPENDIX D
(continued)
5 H. 58**0
under this act, the state committee on reorganization of
school districts shall hold a hearing in the district to be
reorganized. Notice of the time and place of the hearing
shall be given the voters of all school districts involved
in the proposed reorganization. The boards of education of
the intermediate districts involved in the proposed reor
ganization shall make recommendations to the state committee • _
regarding the proposed reorganization.
Sec. 13. Within 20 days after receipt of a transcript
of the hearing and recommendations of the boards of education
of the intermediate districts, the state committee on re
organization of school districts shall determine if conditions
exist warranting reorganization of the district under this
act. Upon a determination by the state committee that condi
tions in a school district warrant reorganization, the state
committee shall transmit its report with recommendations to
the state board of education.
Sec. ] k . The state board of education shall publish the
report and recommendations of the state committee cn reorganize-
tion of school districts and shall invite objections or
comments to be filed with it within 20 days following publica
tion of the report. The state board then shall consider the
report of the stale committee, together with the comments
and objections filed, and make a determination as to indorse-
APPENDIX D
(continued)
H. 5 8 ^ 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
M
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
23
merit of the finding of the state committee.
Se c. 1 5 . T h e s t a t e b o a r d , u p o n i n d o r s e m e n t of the
f i n d i n g o f the s t a t e c o m m i t t e e o n r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f s c h o o l
d i s t r i c t s th at r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f a s c h o o l d i s t r i c t is
w a r r a n t e d , sh al l r e o r g a n i z e the d i s t r i c t w i t h 1 or m o r e
d i s t r i c t s c o n t i g u o u s to it in s u c h a m a n n e r as w i l l p r o v i d e
the m o s t e q u i t a b l e e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t y for all o f the
s t u d e n t s of the r e o r g a n i z e d d i s t r i c t , a n d sh al l d e t e r m i n e
t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e of r e o r g a n i z a t i o n . A c t i o n b y the s t a t e
b o a r d o f e d u c a t i o n shall be final.
Sec. 16. If a s c h o o l d i s t r i c t a t t a c h e d u n d e r the p r o v i s
o f this act at the t i m e of r e o r g a n i z a t i o n ha s a b o n d e d in
d e b t e d n e s s i n c u r r e d a f t e r D e c e m b e r 8, 1932, its i d e n t i t y
sh a l l no t b e lost a n d its t e r r i t o r y sh al l r e m a i n as a n a s s e s s
ing u n i t for p u r p o s e s o f s u c h b o n d e d i n d e b t e d n e s s u n t i l the
i n d e b t e d n e s s has b e e n r e t i r e d or the o u t s t a n d i n g b o n d s r e f u n d e d
by the r e o r g a n i z e d d i s t r i c t . T h e b o a r d o f the r e o r g a n i z e d
d i s t r i c t , o r the b o a r d s o f d i s t r i c t s r e c e i v i n g s c h o o l b u i l d i n g s
w i t h a n e x i s t i n g b o n d e d d e b t sh al l c o n s t i t u t e the b o a r d of
' i
trustees for the original district having a bonded indebtedness
and the officers of the reorganized or successor district shall
be the orficcrs for the original district. If any original
bonds of the reorganized district have been refinanced in any
way, the state board of education shall rake the final Jeter-
;i 169 '7! •
1 0.0 s
-105-
APPENDIX D
(continued)
1 a
2
2a
3
1
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
H. 5 8 ^ 0
7
mination as to placement of the responsibility w ith the 1 or
r>ore boards of education receiving the buildings as to their
responsibility in acting as the board of trustees for the
original district. The _ _ •
board of each district assigned the responsibility as the -
board of trustees for dny bonded indebtedness of the divided
' i
district shall certify and order the levy of taxes for the
bonded indebtedness in the name of the original district. ,
Sec. 17. Any time after 3 years following the reor
ganization of a school district under this act, a district
receiving a building having an existing bonded indebtedness
and assuming the responsibilities set forth in section I d ,
may assume the obligation of the bonded indebtedness in
curred after December 8, 1932, of the school building
attached to its district under the provisions of this act,
and pay the same from the proceeds of a debt retirement
tax levy spread uniformly over the territory of the reorganized
or successor district when the electors of the reorganized
or successor district approve an increase in the limitation
on taxes for that purpose and the school tax electors of the
district have approved the assumption of such bonded indebted
ness. Assumption of the bonded indebtedness of an original
school district does not release the territory of the ori
ginal district from the final responsibility of paying the
obligation or rescind the increase in the limitation on
24 taxes pledged to the bond issue or available to it in tnc
ill69 '71
-106-
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22 ‘
23
24
APPENDIX D
(continued)
H. 58*»0
8
original district., nor be construed as so doing. When the
bonded indebtedness of an original district has been so
assumed, the board of the reorganized or successor district
shall certify and order the levy of taxes for the bonded
indebtedness equivalent in terms of money to those required
by the terms under which the indebtedness was originally in
curred and carry out all provisions of the original bond
contract. The election to assume the bonded indebtedness
of an attached district may be held at any time after 3 years
following the effective date of reorganization when a proposa!
is placed before the school tax electors to increase the
bonded indebtedness of the combined district.
Sec. 18. The state committee on reorganization of
school districts shall continue in existence for purposes of
this act, notwithstanding any expiration date otherwise pro
vided by law. '
Sec. 13. The school emergency loan revolving fund is
created in the state treasury from which emergency loans
shall be made to school districts as provided in this act.
The fund shall consist of sums appropriated by the legislature
plus repayments and interest on loans. The treasurer shall
. r . oc.o,0arentier any amount in the fund in excess of $ £ t h 4 t o
the general fund. Upon approval of an application for an
emergency loan by concurrent resolution of the legislature
'11 69 1 7 1
0
y £
-107-
APPENDIX D
(continued)
# ...... ' .........•
9 H. 58AO .
or, when the legislature is not in session by majority vote
of the members of the special commission on appropriations
created by Act No. 120 of the Public Acts of 1937, as amended,
being sections 5.1 to 5-5 of the Compiled Laws of 19*18, the
state treasurer shall issue his warrant on the fund for the
amount of the loan. There is hereby appropriated from the
general fund to the school emergency loan revolving fund
^ 3 oo/ cot. 00
the sum of -$-yS0-,-£Sfh-&6.
Sec. 20. This act shall expire June 30, 1973.
4169 171
i.
-108-
APPENDIX E
By S c h o o l B o a r d i
BY UAL CODEX
*> F r c o Press S t c f f W r i U r
The Oakland County'j
Board of E d u c a t i o n ! !
Thursday dissolved the;
debt - ridden C a r v e rj
School District in Royal;
Oak Township and made ■
it par*, of the Oak Park '
School District. ;
| U n d e r t h e o r d e r , e f f e c t i v e '
( i m m e d i a t e l y , O a k P a r k w i l l
j a b s o r b t h e O c o r r e .
• W i t f h i n g t o r , ( O a ; v r r A O l e ~ •1: a
f s e i ; 3 o f r = r 7 7 l e a S e t r . 'r . d ,
j i r r r c - u E P v a n d t h e C a r v e r D i s - ■
j t r i e l ' s S O O .O G O d e b t . •!
I I ) r . A r t h u r T a r k H a n . p r o s l -
; d e n t < if t h e - O a l ; P a r k S c h o o l
■ H o a r d , s a i d t h e r e w i t l b e n o
| I m m e d i a t e c h a n g e s I n t h e
I C a r v e r c j i s t r i c . t u n t i l ■ t h e
! b o a r d m e e t s M o n d a y t o i n
i v e n t o r v d a r v e r ' s a s s e t s a n d
! l l a b l L i t i c s ] . ■
: W h a t a p p e a r s t o b e t h e f i n a l -
s o l u t i o n o f C a r v e r ' s l o n g h i s t o r y
o f f i n a n c i a l w o e s w a s t r i g g e r e d
l a s t A v g u s t t h e D e t r o i t
B o a r d o f E d u c a t i o n . .
* $ * .
T H E D E T R O I T b o a r d i n
f o r m e d t h e C a r v e r d i s t r i c t t h a t
C a r v e r s t u d e n t s w o r . f d r . o l o n g e r
h e p e r m i t t e d ' t o a t t e n d h i g h ,
s c h o o l i n D e t r o i t . :
T h e C a r v e r d i s t r i c t h a d r . o
h i g h s c h o o l * o f i t s o w n . S t u d e n t s
f r o m t h e n i n t h t h r o u g h l i k e . ■
g r a d e s a t t e n d e d D e t r o i t ' s
' N m t h o r n H i g h S c h o o l o n a
t u i t i o n b a s i s .• -r f V ' < t i • '■■••inn
. p a y m e n t s t o D e t r o i t , a n d t h e ■
. b o a r d f i n a l l y r u l e d a g a i n s t
* a c c e p t i n g a n y m o r e C a r v e r .
, . s t u d e n t s b e c a u s e o f “ o v e r
; c r o w d i n g " i n t h o D e t r o i t
i s c h o o l s . i
' T h e D e t r o i t h o a r d , h o w e v e r ,
i w i l l p e r m i t s t u d e n t s f r o m C a r -
; v e r - a l r e a d y e n r o l l e d i n N o r t h e r n
| t o c o m p l e t e h i g h s c h o o l t h e r e .
T h e a c t i o n l e f t C a r v e r w i t h
r a b o i i t 4 0 n i n t h - g r a d e r s w i t h n o
■ s c h o o l t o a t t e n d . ■ ■
; v » *
____ _________________________ I
. . . I , - , n j C i . u o c u -
. d e n t s ' i n t o . s c h o o l s e i t h e r i n
j F c r n d a l e o r O a k P a r k w e r e
r e b u f f e d b y t h e s e c o m m u n i t i e s . !
w h i c h a r e a d j a c e n t t o R o y a l 1
I O a k T o w n s h i p . ;j 1 h .o C a r v e r S c h o o l B o a r d r.e .t
t h e s t a g e f o r T h u r s d a y ' s m o v e ■
| b y r e s i g n i n g o n m a s s e m i S e n t . ' 02. ̂,
j A s p o i l : : ! e l e c t i o n t o r e p l a c e .
. t h o h o a r d w a s c a l l e d f o r O c t . ,
i 2 d b u t n o t o n e v o t e r s h o w e d ■
j u p a t t h e p o l l s , s o t h e C o u n t y
| w a s f o r c e d i n n e t .
! - F r e d B e c k m a n , p r e s i d e n t o f
; t h e f i v e - m e m b e r O a k l a n d . C o t i n
; t y B o a r d o f E d u c a t i o n , s a i d t h e
’ b i g g e s t f a c t o r i n t h e d e c i s i o n
t o m a k e C a r v e r a p a r t o f t h e
O a k P a r k d i s t r i c t w a s t h e g e o
g r a p h i c a l l o c a t i o n o f O a k P a r k . •. » * «
' A D O P T I D O p e r s o n s a t t e n d e d
, a m e e t i n g i n O a k F a r i d H i g h
, S c h o o l T h u r s d a y n i g h t w h i c h
w e . a i n t e n d e d t o a n s w e r s o m e
j o f t h o q u e s t i o n s s u r r o u n d i n g
j t h e a c t i o n b y t h e C o u n t y .
M a n y o f t h e i r q u e s t i o n s w e n t
■ u n a n s w e r e d b e c a u s e s o m e o f
j t h e p r o b l e m s i n v o l v e d i n t h e
m e r g e r h a v e b e e n r e f e r r e d t o
. t h e S t a t e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ' s
* o f f i f e f o r a r u l i n g .
' O n o o f t h e m o s t c r u c i a l
! q u e s t i o n s i s w h e t h e r r c s l -
! d e n t s o f t h e C a r v e r d i s t r i c t
1 w i l l b e m a d e t o p a y s c h o o l
I m d l c a g o v o t e d b y p e o p l e I n
J t h e O a k - P a r k d i s t r i c t .
' D r . P a r k l l a n d s a i d t h o O a k '
P a r k S c h o o l B o a r d w o u l d u s e
a l l . U a I ' m d l t M c . s t o a c h i e v e a n
o r d e r l y t r a n s i t i o n t h a t w i l l
" c a m t h e r e s p e c t o f n i l c i t i z e n s
t h r o u g h o u t t h e s t a t e a n d n a
t i o n . "
C a r v e r n o w h a s 1 , 2 1 9 s t u - , '
' • c r . l n , l . O . - . l o f w h o m a t t e n d
• U g h s c h o o l I n D e t r o i t .
T h e -10 r . i n t h - g r . i d c r n a r e n t -
f- ’ c r h a g m a k e r h i t ! c l r s v c a i n
C . v c a r S i im .-ii.
The Detroit Free Press, November 11, 1960
-109-
APPENDIX F
SOURCES OF REVENUE OBTAINED
BY 54 METRO AREA DISTRICTS
OF TOTAL REVENUE •
State Redistri-
District.
Total
Operating
Revenue
Local
Revenue
State
Aid
bution
Federal
Funds
of
ESEA
Federal
Direct
Aid
Allen Park 900.68 62.53 36.07 1.38 -0-
Berkley 903.62 58.41 40.08 1.44 0.05
Birmingham 1119.78 79.58 19.82 0.03 0.05
Bloomfield
Hills 1203.23 79.77 19.84 0.27 0.11
Centerline 870.23 67.05 21.91 0.72 -0-
Cherry Hill 738.03 37.49 60.01 2.48 -0-
Clarencevilie 935.05 61.51 37.68 0.72 0.07
Clawson 766.90 43.79 55.47 0.73 -0-
Crestwood (information not available)
Dearborn 1340.55 90.96 7.95 1.09 -0-
Dearborn Hts. 758.32 36.34 62.59 1.05 -0-
Detroit 916.68 48.16 40.04 7.71 4.07
East Detroit 856.07 50.41 48.39 0.95 0.22
Ecorse 1010.64 83.01 13.20 3.67 0.11
Fairlane (information not available)
Farmington 918.56 63.80 34.82 1.32 0.04
Ferndale 927.56 61.70 37.68 0.61 -0-
Fitzgerald 1051.33 82.24 17.0 0.75 -0-
- 1 1 0 -
APPENDIX F
l • (continued)
District
Total
Operating
Revenue
Local
Revenue
State
Aid
State Redistri
bution of
Federal ESEA
Funds
Federal
Direct
Aid
Fraser 825.79 52.24 46.82 0.92 -0-
Garden City 775.42 33.94 64.65 1.29 0.11
Grosse Pointe 1195.05 87.21 12.66 0.13 -0-
Hamtramck 1106.76 80.18 12.49 1.53 5.78
Harper Woods 887.65 86.48 12.54 0.97 -0-
Hazel Park 987.98 42.48 44.93 3.04 0.41
Highland Park 1203.91 63.04 23.94 6.74 6.26
Inkster 880.62 24.89 59.77 13.69 1.64
Lakeshore 757.15 37.36 57.49 1.17 0.00 [less]
Lakeview 885.79 46.74 50.79 2.33 0.12
Lamphere 1018.27 71.21 27.45 1.32 -0-
Lincoln Park 729.70 53.35 44.61 2.02 -0-
Livonia 912.55 65.05 34.53 0.42 -0-
Madison Hts. 821.80 43.58 54.26 1.70 0.45
Melvindale 909.52 72.29 26.81 0.88 -0-
N. Dearborn Hts.892.73 63.07 36.12 0.81 -0-
Oak Park 1485.67 85.41 12.00 2.15 0.43
Redford Union 911.63 56.88 42.36 0.74 -0-
River Rouge 1393.23 92.13 2.9 4.66 0.22
Rivervievv7 1067.03, 97.78 2.16 0.00 -0-
Romulus 913.24 68.59 28.50 2.79 0.10
Roseville 820.56 44.73 53.36 1.84 0.05
Royal Oak 886.23 65.01 33.73 1.25 -0-
- 1 1 1 -
0
" ' APPENDIX F
District
Tota!^
Operating
Revenue
Local
Revenue
State
Aid
State^^edistri-
but^Sn of
Federal ESEA
Funds
(continued)
Federal
Direct
Aid
South Lake 769.19 65.99 32.50 1.49 -0-
South Redford 1007.63 82.72 17.27 -0- -0-
Southfield 1039.35 79.56 19.66 0.60 0.18
Southgate 826.35 54.35 44.56 1.07 -0-
Taylor 809.07 47.05 51.08 1.76 0.09
Troy 1002.15 77.19 21.10 1.70 -0-
Van Dyke 1034.91 75.02 23.80 1.15 0.01
Warren 858.25 64.98 34.04 0.41 0.55
Warren Woods 753.37 40.85 58.19 0.94 -0-
Wayne 919.65 54.77 43.65 1.08 0.48
WTest Bloomfield 901.92 64.55 34.29 1.06 0.07
Westwood 929.39 60.65 37.05 1.90 0.38
Wyandotte 855.73 67.42 29.73 0.31 2.53
Sources: Ranking of Michigan Public Hicrh School - School Districts hv
Selected Financial Data, 1970, Bulletin 1012, Michi gan State
ResultsDepartment of Education (1971); and Local District
Michi'gan Educat ionai Assessment Program, Michi can S-f-a-f-c
Department of Education (1971) , Defendants 1 Exhibit M13 .
- 1 1 2 -
APPENDIX G
School Notes
Attorney General Frank J .
Kelley, chairman of the Mu
nicipal Finance Commission,
announced today that the
Commission approved $5,-
720,000.Oil of Tax Anticipa
tion -Notes-Operating-Current
Fiscal Tear for The Grosse
Poinlc Public School System,
Wayne County.
Attorney Genera! Kelley
said, ''The proceeds will be ;
used to operate the School;
Disl: . t. These note s are to
be c:Ted August 1, 1972, are,
to h-e due April 1, 1873, and
will entry a maximum in
terest rate of C percent per
annum." ;
Other members of the Mu-
nicipa! Finance Commission
are A l l i s o n Green. State.
Treaauier; and John W. Por
ter, Superintendent of Public
Instruction. I
Grosse Pointe News, August 10, 1972
- 113-